G.R. No.

92163 June 5, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE,
PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY
AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.

G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990

SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,

vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W.
SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once more takes center stage as the focus of a
confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period
saw a number of similar cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where season and
circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite impassioned debate, even among laymen; none,
certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same question.

The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime
Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an information signed
and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R.
Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and
Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the
failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on
Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following
morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the
Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.3

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a
supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:

(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;

(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was
conducted, hence was denied due process;

(c) denied his right to bail; and

(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the
existence of probable cause. 4

The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the
Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been contemporaneously
but separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return
urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it very simply-the information in
Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the
information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion.
Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a
necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the
Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave
offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should
not apply.

The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of the same date 8
granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety
bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued without
prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon
the legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 against granting
bail to the Panlilios.

The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.

The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:

(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion
cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed with common
offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his written pleadings;

(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but
not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its
commission or in furtherance thereof.

On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine should
be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all
subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced by the
fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among
others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new
provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in
this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law
are committed, the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."' 11 In thus acting, the
President in effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it
the same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.

On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application to offenses
committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing
of rebellion with other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the Court felt
that the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome what
appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course under
either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that case:

There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder
were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties
would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the
crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. in other words,
in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty
would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity
with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.

Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than
that which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro:

La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado
francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)

We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as
amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:

Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de
ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.

En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represents la suma de
las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los delitos.

Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del
Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)

and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver
offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt
with separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48.
Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one
of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48
could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed
separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the
offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime
independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave
than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense. 12

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine
operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to
its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.

This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired into, much less adjudged. That is for the
trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the
petitioner's complaints about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.

The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the
objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging
simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:

In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the
murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as
means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information
is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty
imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the policy
of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while technically correct so far as
the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be
dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime
defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.

Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows
otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that
on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the
questioned information. 14 There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense
different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation.

It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without first personally determining the existence of
probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution.
15 This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination, it being
sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor.16 Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the
respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation.
17 Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives
no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's
case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple
rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts
from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its
denial?

The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending
trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke
that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against
him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not
without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.

Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily,
theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either
hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent Judge. 18

There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the present petition, whether these went into
the substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent
Judge in dealing with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should have been brought
up there instead of directly to this Court.

There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability or competence of the respondent
Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such
complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, in short that would justify
by passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the
reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should not thus be
precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It
makes no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following
the prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail
hearing where a capital offense is charged.19 It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or
fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.

It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a similar situation, all apparently
taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation
of such pleas has only contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.

Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also because to wash the Court's hand off it on
jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in
so doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of proceedings
that should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the relief appealed for was denied by the former and, in a proper
case, by the Court of Appeals on review.

Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas like the present, that clearly
short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts.
What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually
Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said spouses
have uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941,
that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained
without bail on the strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.

It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany quixotic quality that justifies the relative
leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power
and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their
ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem
so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable to, or
even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of our capital City seem safe from such
unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to
restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as
absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court
has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond
interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its
province.

WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against
petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said
petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely
provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be
posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court
shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 177218

Appellee,

Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus -

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO, and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

NOEL T. SALES,

Promulgated:

Appellant.

October 3, 2011

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed. However, he may not employ sadistic beatings and inflict fatal injuries
under the guise of disciplining them.

This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed
the August 3, 2005 Joint Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782
and RTC03-789, convicting appellant Noel T. Sales (appellant) of the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries, respectively. The
Information[3] for parricide contained the following allegations:

That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 oclock in the evening at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with evident premeditation and [in] a fit of
anger, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit [several] times, the different parts of the body of his legitimate eldest son,
Noemar Sales, a 9-year old minor, with a [piece of] wood, measuring more or less one meter in length and one [and] a half inches in
diameter, [thereby] inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds, which cause[d] the death of the said victim, to the damage and prejudice of the
latters heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

On the other hand, the Information[5] in Criminal Case No. RTC03-789 alleges that appellant inflicted slight physical injuries in the following
manner:

That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 oclock in the evening, at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [accused] assault[ed] and hit with a piece of wood, one
Noel Sales, Jr., an 8-year old minor, his second legitimate son, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which have required medical
attendance for a period of five (5) days to the damage and prejudice of the victims heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

When arraigned on April 11, 2003 and July 1, 2003, appellant pleaded not guilty for the charges of parricide[7] and slight physical injuries[8]
respectively. The cases were then consolidated upon manifestation of the prosecution which was not objected to by the defense.[9] During
the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to stipulate that appellant is the father of the victims, Noemar Sales (Noemar) and Noel Sales, Jr.
(Junior); that at the time of the incident, appellants family was living in the conjugal home located in Barangay San Vicente, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur; and, that appellant voluntarily surrendered to the police.[10]
Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old, respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial
procession of Our Lady of Peafrancia without the permission of their parents. They did not return home that night. When their mother, Maria
Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their fathers rage, Noemar
and Junior initially refused to return home but their mother prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached home at around 8 oclock in the
evening of September 20, 2002, a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then whipped them with a stick which was later broken so
that he brought his kids outside their house. With Noemars and Juniors hands and feet tied to a coconut tree, appellant continued beating
them with a thick piece of wood. During the beating Maria stayed inside the house and did not do anything as she feared for her life.

When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house with appellant assisting Noemar as the latter was staggering, while
Junior fearfully followed. Maria noticed a crack in Noemars head and injuries in his legs. She also saw injuries in the right portion of the head,
the left cheek, and legs of Junior. Shortly thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness. Maria tried to revive him and when Noemar
remained motionless despite her efforts, she told appellant that their son was already dead. However, appellant refused to believe her.
Maria then told appellant to call a quack doctor. He left and returned with one, who told them that they have to bring Noemar to a hospital.
Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a vehicle to take them to a hospital. As there was
no vehicle and because another quack doctor they met at the junction told them that Noemar is already dead, appellant brought his son back
to their house.

Noemars wake lasted only for a night and he was immediately buried the following day. His body was never examined by a doctor.

The Version of the Defense

Prior to the incident, Noemar and Junior had already left their residence on three separate occasions without the permission of their parents.
Each time, appellant merely scolded them and told them not to repeat the misdeed since something untoward might happen to them. During
those times, Noemar and Junior were never physically harmed by their father.

However, Noemar and Junior again left their home without their parents permission on September 16, 2002 and failed to return for several
days. Worse, appellant received information that his sons stole a pedicab. As they are broke, appellant had to borrow money so that his wife
could search for Noemar and Junior. When his sons finally arrived home at 8 oclock in the evening of September 20, 2002, appellant scolded
and hit them with a piece of wood as thick as his index finger. He hit Noemar and Junior simultaneously since they were side by side. After
whipping his sons in their buttocks three times, he noticed that Noemar was chilling and frothing. When Noemar lost consciousness,
appellant decided to bring him to a hospital in Naga City by waiting for a vehicle at the crossroad which was seven kilometers away from their
house.

Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and observed his difficulty in breathing. The pupils of Noemars eyes were also
moving up and down. Appellant heard him say that he wanted to sleep and saw him pointing to his chest in pain. However, they waited in
vain since a vehicle never came. It was then that Noemar died. Appellant thus decided to just bring Noemar back to their house.

Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her child. He claimed that Noemar died as a result of
difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never complained of the whipping done to him. Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was brought to a
hospital more than a year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a weak heart.

On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers from epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and
passes out. But he would regain consciousness after 15 minutes. His seizures normally occur whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.

The death of Noemar was reported to the police by the barangay captain.[11] Thereafter, appellant surrendered voluntarily.[12]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In a Joint Decision,[13] the trial court held that the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove that appellant was guilty of
committing the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries in the manner described in the Informations. In the crime of parricide, the trial
court did not consider the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation against appellant since there is no proof that he planned to kill
Noemar. But the trial court appreciated in his favor the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave
a wrong. The dispositive portion of said Joint Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of Noel Sales, beyond reasonable doubt, he is found guilty of
parricide in Crim. Case No. RTC03-782 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of
Noemar Sales, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000,00 as exemplary damages and to pay the
costs.

Furthermore, accused Noel Sales is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries in Crim. Case No. RTC03-
789 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty (20) days of Arresto Menor in its medium period.

Accused Noel Sales is likewise meted the accessory penalties as provided under the Revised Penal Code. Considering that herein accused has
undergone preventive imprisonment, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with the time he has undergone preventive
imprisonment in accordance with and subject to the conditions provided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal[15] which was given due course in an Order[16] dated September 21, 2005.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

However, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The dispositive portion of its Decision[17] reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision dated August 3, 2005 in Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and
RTC03-789 for Parricide and Slight Physical Injuries, respectively, is AFFIRMED.

Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant may appeal this case to the Supreme Court via a
Notice of Appeal filed before this Court.

SO ORDERED.[18]

Issues

Hence, appellant is now before this Court with the following two-fold issues:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE DEFENSE WITNESSES.[19]

Our Ruling
The appeal is without merit.

The Charge of Parricide

Appellant admits beating his sons on September 20, 2002 as a disciplinary measure, but denies battering Noemar to death. He believes that
no father could kill his own son. According to him, Noemar had a weak heart that resulted in attacks consisting of loss of consciousness and
froth in his mouth. He claims that Noemar was conscious as they traveled to the junction where they would take a vehicle in going to a
hospital. However, Noemar had difficulty in breathing and complained of chest pain. He contends that it was at this moment that Noemar
died, not during his whipping. To substantiate his claim, appellant presented his wife, Maria, who testified that Noemar indeed suffered
seizures, but this was due to epilepsy.

The contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The imposition of parental discipline on children of tender years must always be with the view
of correcting their erroneous behavior. A parent or guardian must exercise restraint and caution in administering the proper punishment.
They must not exceed the parameters of their parental duty to discipline their minor children. It is incumbent upon them to remain rational
and refrain from being motivated by anger in enforcing the intended punishment. A deviation will undoubtedly result in sadism.

Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already furious with them because they left the family dwelling without permission and that was
already preceded by three other similar incidents. This was further aggravated by a report that his sons stole a pedicab thereby putting him in
disgrace. Moreover, they have no money so much so that he still had to borrow so that his wife could look for the children and bring them
home. From these, it is therefore clear that appellant was motivated not by an honest desire to discipline the children for their misdeeds but
by an evil intent of venting his anger. This can reasonably be concluded from the injuries of Noemar in his head, face and legs. It was only
when Noemars body slipped from the coconut tree to which he was tied and lost consciousness that appellant stopped the beating. Had not
Noemar lost consciousness, appellant would most likely not have ceased from his sadistic act. His subsequent attempt to seek medical
attention for Noemar as an act of repentance was nevertheless too late to save the childs life. It bears stressing that a decent and responsible
parent would never subject a minor child to sadistic punishment in the guise of discipline.

Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended to discipline Noemar and not to kill him. However, the
relevant portion of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

xxxx

In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a
felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the
perpetrator.[20] Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. As
a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellants criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus
clear.

Appellants claim that it was Noemars heart ailment that caused his death deserves no merit. This declaration is self-serving and
uncorroborated since it is not substantiated by evidence. While Dr. Salvador Betito, a Municipal Health Officer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur
issued a death certificate indicating that Noemar died due to cardio-pulmonary arrest, the same is not sufficient to prove that his death was
due mainly to his poor health. It is worth emphasizing that Noemars cadaver was never examined. Also, even if appellant presented his wife,
Maria, to lend credence to his contention, the latters testimony did not help as same was even in conflict with his testimony. Appellant
testified that Noemar suffered from a weak heart which resulted in his death while Maria declared that Noemar was suffering from epilepsy.
Interestingly, Marias testimony was also unsubstantiated by evidence.

Moreover, as will be discussed below, all the elements of the crime of parricide are present in this case.

All the Elements of Parricide are present in the case at bench.

We find no error in the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, that appellant committed the crime of parricide.

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:

Art. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or
descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.[21]

In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person was killed. Maria testified that her son
Noemar did not regain consciousness after the severe beating he suffered from the hands of his father. Thereafter, a quack doctor declared
Noemar dead. Afterwards, as testified to by Maria, they held a wake for Noemar the next day and then buried him the day after. Noemars
Death Certificate[22] was also presented in evidence.

There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant killed the deceased. Same is sufficiently established
by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior. Maria testified that on September 20, 2002, Noemar and his younger brother, Junior, were
whipped by appellant, their father, inside their house. The whipping continued even outside the house but this time, the brothers were tied
side by side to a coconut tree while appellant delivered the lashes indiscriminately. For his part, Junior testified that Noemar, while tied to a
tree, was beaten by their father in the head. Because the savagery of the attack was too much for Noemars frail body to endure, he lost
consciousness and died from his injuries immediately after the incident.

As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child. While Noemars birth certificate was not presented, oral
evidence of filial relationship may be considered.[23] As earlier stated, appellant stipulated to the fact that he is the father of Noemar during
the pre-trial conference and likewise made the same declaration while under oath.[24] Maria also testified that Noemar and Junior are her
sons with appellant, her husband. These testimonies are sufficient to establish the relationship between appellant and Noemar.

Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide are obtaining in this case.

There is Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender but not Lack of Intention to Commit so Grave a Wrong

The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of appellant since the evidence shows that
he went to the police station a day after the barangay captain reported the death of Noemar. The presentation by appellant of himself to the
police officer on duty in a spontaneous manner is a manifestation of his intent to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be
incurred for his search and capture[25] which is the essence of voluntary surrender.

However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. Appellant adopted
means to ensure the success of the savage battering of his sons. He tied their wrists to a coconut tree to prevent their escape while they
were battered with a stick to inflict as much pain as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his face, head and legs that immediately caused his
death. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where
the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim.[26]

The Award of Damages and Penalty for Parricide

We find proper the trial courts award to the heirs of Noemar of the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
However, the award of exemplary damages of P25,000.00 should be increased to P30,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.[27]
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages an interest at the legal rate of 6%
from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.[28]

As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua
when it considered the presence of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
However, even if we earlier ruled that the trial court erred in considering the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong, we maintain the penalty imposed. This is because the exclusion of said mitigating circumstance does not result to a different penalty
since the presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the
imposition of reclusion perpetua as the proper prison term. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides in part as follows:

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the
application thereof:

xxxx

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty
shall be applied.

xxxx

The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. With one mitigating circumstance, which is
voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not the penalty of
death on appellant was thus proper.[29]

The Charge of Slight Physical Injuries

The victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his brother Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein appellant, while they were
tied to a coconut tree. He recalled to have been hit on his right eye and right leg and to have been examined by a physician thereafter.[30]
Maria corroborated her sons testimony.[31]

Juniors testimony was likewise supported by Dr. Ursolino Primavera, Jr. (Dr. Primavera) of Tinambac Community Hospital who examined him
for physical injuries. He issued a Medical Certificate for his findings and testified on the same. His findings were (1) muscular contusions with
hematoma on the right side of Juniors face just below the eye and on both legs, which could have been caused by hitting said area with a
hard object such as a wooden stick and, (2) abrasions of brownish color circling both wrist with crust formation which could have been
sustained by the patient due to struggling while his hands were tied. When asked how long does he think the injuries would heal, Dr.
Primavera answered one to two weeks.[32] But if applied with medication, the injuries would heal in a week.[33]

We give full faith and credence to the categorical and positive testimony of Junior that he was beaten by his father and that by reason
thereof he sustained injuries. His testimony deserves credence especially since the same is corroborated by the testimony of his mother,
Maria, and supported by medical examination. We thus find that the RTC correctly held appellant guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries.

Penalty for Slight Physical Injuries

We likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC. Dr. Primavera testified that the injuries sustained by Junior should heal in one week upon
medication. Hence, the trial court correctly meted upon appellant the penalty under paragraph 1, Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides:

ART. 266. Slight Physical Injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to
nine days or shall require medical attendance during the same period.

xxxx

There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, the penalty shall be in its medium period. The
RTC was thus correct in imposing upon appellant the penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor in its medium period.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the Joint Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and RTC03-789, convicting Noel T. Sales of the
crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the award of exemplary damages is increased to
P30,000.00. In addition, an interest of 6% is imposed on all monetary awards from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 225599

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs
CHRISTOPHER MEJARO ROA, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

VELASCO. JR., J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the Decision1 promulgated on August 27, 2015, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06456, which affirmed accused-appellant's
conviction for the offense of murder, punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, Pili,
Camarines Sur, in its Decision in Criminal Case No. P-4100, promulgated on September 3, 2013.

The present case stems from an Information filed against accused-appellant Christopher Mejaro Roa (Roa) on June 5, 2007, charging him for
the murder of Eliseo Delmiguez (Delmiguez), committed as follows:

That on or about 16 March 2007 at around 3:30 in the afternoon at Barangay San Miguel, Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and without justifiable cause, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and stab Eliseo Delmiguez with the use of a bladed weapon, locally known as
"ginunting," hitting and injuring the body of the latter, inflicting multiple mortal hack wound[s] thereon, which were the immediate and
direct cause of his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in such amount that may be proven in court.

That the killing was committed 1) with treachery, as the qualifying circumstance or which qualified the killing to murder, and 2) [w]ith taking
advantage of superior strength, as aggravating circumstance.2

The Facts

The facts surrounding the incident, as succinctly put by the RTC, are as follows:

A resident of Brgy. San Miguel, Bula, Camarines Sur, accused [Roa] is known to have suffered mental disorder prior to his commission of the
crime charged. While his uncle, Issac [Mejaro ], attributes said condition to an incident in the year 2000 when accused was reportedly struck
in the head by some teenagers, SPOl [Nelson] Ballebar claimed to have learned from others and the mother of the accused that the ailment is
due to his use of illegal drugs when he was working in Manila. When accused returned from Manila in 2001 , Issac recalled that, in marked
contrast to the silent and formal deportment with which he normally associated his nephew, the latter became talkative and was observed to
be "always talking to himself' and "complaining of a headache."

On September 27, 2001, accused had a psychotic episode and was brought to the [Don Susana J. Rodriguez Mental Hospital] DSJRM by his
mother and Mrs. Sombrero. Per the October 10, 2005 certification issued by Dr. Benedicto Aguirre, accused consulted and underwent
treatment for schizophrenia at the [Bi col Medical Center] BMC in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005. In her Psychiatric Evaluation
Report, Dr. [Edessa Padre-]Laguidao also stated that accused was prescribed antipsychotic medication which he was, however, not able to
continue taking due to financial constraints. Edgar [Sapinoso] and Rico [Ballebar], who. knew accused since childhood, admitted hearing
about the latter's mental health issues and/or his treatment therefor. Throughout the wake of an unnamed aunt sometime in March 2007, it
was likewise disclosed by Issac that accused neither slept nor ate and was known to have walked by himself all the way to Bagumbayan, Bula.

On March 16, 2007, Issac claimed that accused was unusually silent, refused to take a bath and even quarreled with his mother when
prompted to do so. At about 3 :30 p.m. of the same day, it appears that Eliseo, then 50 years old, was walking with Edgar on the street in
front of the store of Marieta Ballecer at Zone 3, San Miguel, Bula, Camarines Sur. From a distance of about 3 meters, the pair was spotted by
Rico who, while waiting for someone at the roadside, also saw accused sitting on the sidecar of a trimobile parked nearby. When Eliseo
passed by the trimobile, he was approached from behind by accused who suddenly stabbed him on the left lower back with a bolo locally
known as ginunting of an approximate length of 8 to 12 inches. Taken aback, Eliseo exclaimed "Tara man, " before falling to the ground.
Chased by both Edgar and Rico and spotted running by Mrs. Sombrero who went out of the Barangay Hall upon hearing the resultant din,
accused immediately fled and took refuge inside the house of his uncle, Camilo Mejaro.

With the incident already attracting people's attention, Barangay Captain Herminion Ballebar called for police assistance even as Isaac tried
to appease Eliseo's relatives. Entering Camilo's house, Issac saw accused who said nothing when queried about what he did. Shortly
thereafter, SPO 1 Hermilando Manzano arrived on board a motorcycle with SPO 1 Ballebar who called on accused to surrender. Upon his
voluntary surrender and tum over of the jungle knife he was holding to the police officers, accused was brought to the Bula Municipal Police
Station for investigation and detention. In the meantime, Eliseo was brought to the Bula Municipal Health Center where he was pronounced
dead on arrival and, after the necropsy examination, later certified by Dr. Consolacion to have died of Hypovolemia secondary to multiple
stab wounds.3 (citations omitted)

When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty," but in the certificate of arraignment, he signed his name as "Amado M. Tetangco."
Trial on the merits ensued. There was no contest over the fact that accused-appellant, indeed, stabbed the victim, but he interposed the
defense of insanity.

The Ruling of the RTC

In its Decision promulgated on September 3, 2013, the RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur found that accused-appellant is guilty of the offense of
Murder. The RTC ruled that the defense of insanity was not sufficiently proven as to exculpate accused-appellant from the offense charged.
The RIC noted that as an exempting circumstance, insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment
and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime. Thus, the RTC said, the accused must be shown to be deprived of reason or
that he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation
of the will. It is the accused who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity that has the burden of proving the same with clear and
convincing evidence. This entails, the RTC added, opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that
the accused was insane based on the witness' own perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a
psychiatrist.4

In the case of accused-appellant, the RTC ruled, he failed to discharge the burden of proving the claim of insanity. First, while Isaac Mejaro's
testimony was able to sufficiently prove that accused-appellant started having mental health issues as early as 2001 , the trial court ruled that
his past medical history does not suffice to support a finding that he was likewise insane at the time that he perpetrated the killing of
Delmiguez in 2007. To the trial court, the lack of showing of any psychotic incidents from the time of his discharge in 2002 until March 2007
suggests that his insanity is only occasional or intermittent and, thus, precludes the presumption of continuity.5

Second, the trial court acknowledged that accused-appellant exhibited abnormal behavior after the incident, particularly in writing the name
of Amado M. Tetangco in his certificate of arraignment. It also noted that midway through the presentation of the prosecution's evidence,
accused-appellant's mental condition worsened, prompting his counsel to file another motion for psychiatric evaluation and treatment, and
that he was subsequently diagnosed again to be suffering from schizophrenia of an undifferentiated type. The trial court, however, cited the
rule that the evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of abnormal
behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime. The trial court then ruled that the witnesses' account of the
incident provides no clue regarding the state of mind of the accused, and all that was established was that he approached Delmiguez from
behind and stabbed him on his lower back. To the trial court, this actuation of the accused, together with his immediate flight and
subsequent surrender to the police authorities, is not indicative of insanity.

Finally, while the accused was reputed to be "crazy" in his community, the trial court ruled that such is of little consequence to his cause. It
said:

The popular conception of the word "crazy" is to describe a person or act that is unnatural or out of the ordinary. A man may, therefore,
behave in a crazy manner but it does not necessarily or conclusively prove that he is legally so. The legal standard requires that the accused
must be so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent.6

Hence, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder, and sentenced him as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered finding accused Christopher Mejaro Roa GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

Accused is ordered to pay the Heirs of Eliseo Delmiguez the following sums: (1) ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of said victim; (b)
₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed his conviction to the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

In its presently assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the finding of conviction by the trial court. The CA first noted that all the elements of the
crime of murder had been sufficiently established by the evidence on record. On the other hand, the defense of insanity was not sufficiently
proven by clear and convincing evidence. The CA said:

Record shows that the accused-appellant has miserably failed to prove that he was insane when he fatally stabbed the victim on March 16,
2007. To prove his defense, accused-appellant's witnesses including Dr. Edessa Padre-Laguidao testified that they knew him to be insane
because he was brought and confined to the Bicol Medical Center, Department of Psychiatry for treatment in the year 2001 . However, such
fact does not necessarily follow that he still suffered from schizophrenia during the time he fatally attacked and stabbed the victim, Eliseo
Delmiguez. No convincing evidence was presented by the defense to show that he was not in his right mind, or that he had acted under the
influence of a sudden attack of insanity, or that he had generally been regarded as insane around the time of the commission of the acts
attributed to him.

An inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act under
prosecution was committed. Mere prior confinement in a mental institution does not prove that a person was deprived of reason at the time
the crime was committed. It must be noted that accused-appllant was discharged from the mental hospital in 2002, or long before he
committed the crime charged. He who relies on such plea of insanity (proved at another time) must prove its existence also at the time of the
commission of the offense. This, accused-appellant failed to do.7 (citations ommitted)

Moreover, the CA ruled that the testimonies of the defense witnesses that purport to support the claim of insanity are based on assumptions,
and are too speculative, presumptive, and conjectural to be convincing. To the CA, their observation that accused-appellant exhibited
unusual behavior is not sufficient proof of his insanity, because not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity.8
On the contrary, the CA found that the circumstances of the attack bear indicia that the killing was done voluntarily, to wit: (1) the use of a
long bolo locally known as ginunting, (2) the location of the stab wounds, (3) the attempt of accused-appellant to flee from the scene of the
crime, and (4) his subsequent surrender upon being called by the police authorities.

Thus, the CA dismissed the claim of insanity, and affirmed the conviction of the RTC for the offense charged. The CA merely modified the
award of damages, and dispositively held, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Judgment dated September 3, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Christopher Mejaro Roa is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder as
defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused-appellant is
ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim, Eliseo Delmiguez, the amount of: (1) P7 5, 000. 00 as civil indemnity for the death of the said victim,
(b) P50,000 .00 as moral damages, and (c) P30,000 .00 as exemplary damages as provided by the Civil Code in line with recent jurisprudence,
with costs. In addition, all awards for damages shall bear legal interest at the rate of six [percent] (6%) per annum from the date of finality of
judgment until fully paid.9

Aggrieved by the ruling of the CA, accused-appellant elevated the case before this Court by way of a Notice of Appeal.10

The Issue

The sole issue presented in the case before the Court is: whether there is sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant
for the offense of Murder, punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. However, there being no contest that accused-appellant
perpetrated the stabbing of the victim, which caused the latter's death, the resolution of the present issue hinges on the pleaded defense of
insanity.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds no reversible error in the findings of fact and law by the CA. Hence, the assailed Decision affirming the conviction of accused-
appellant for murder must be upheld.

Insanity as an exempting circumstance is provided for in Article 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code:

Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. - The following are exempt from criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement
in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the
permission of the same court.

In People v. Fernando Madarang,11 the Court had the opportunity to discuss the nature of the defense of insanity as an exempting
circumstance. The Court there said:

In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be punished as an offense. The insanity defense is rooted on the
basic moral assumption of criminal law. Man is naturally endowed with the faculties of understanding and free will. The consent of the will is
that which renders human actions laudable or culpable. Hence, where there is a defect of the understanding, there can be no free act of the
will. An insane accused is not morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished. No purpose of criminal law is served by punishing an
insane accused because by reason of his mental state, he would have no control over his behavior and cannot be deterred from similar
behavior in the future.

xxxx

In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required that there must be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment
because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental
faculties will not exclude imputability.

The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual means of proof As no man can
know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior.
Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the
accused, by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own perception of the accused,
or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. The testimony or proof of the accused's insanity must relate to the time
preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged. (citations omitted)

In this jurisdiction, it had been consistently and uniformly held that the plea of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance.12
Hence, the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone, and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the
issue of guilt, because the accused had already admitted committing the crime.13 This Court had also consistently ruled that for the plea of
insanity to prosper, the accused must present clear and convincing evidence to support the claim.

Insanity as an exempting circumstance is not easily available to the accused as a successful defense. It is an exception rather than the rule on
the human condition. Anyone who pleads insanity as an exempting circumstance bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing
evidence. The testimony or proof of an accused's insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the
commission of the offense with which he is charged.14
In the case at bar, the defense of insanity of accused-appellant Roa was supported by the testimony of the following witnesses: (1) his uncle,
Isaac Mejaro (Mejaro), (2) municipal health worker Mrs. Lourdes Padregon Sombrero (Sombrero), and (3) Dr. Edessa Padre-Laguidao (Dr.
Laguidao).

Dr. Laguidao testified that in 2001, accused-appellant was admitted at the Bicol Medical Center, and was discharged in 2002. She examined
accused-appellant on March 15, 2012 and August 15, 2012. She evaluated his mental condition and found out that his answers to her queries
were unresponsive, and yielding a meaningless conversation. She then diagnosed him as having undifferentiated type of Schizophrenia,
characterized by manifest illusions and auditory hallucinations which are commanding in nature. She also recommended anti-psychotic drug
maintenance.15

Mejaro testified that accused-appellant's mental illness could be attributed to an incident way back in May 8, 2000, when he was struck on
the head by some teenager. After that incident, accused-appellant, who used to be silent and very formal, became very talkative and always
talked to himself and complained of headaches. On September 27, 2001, accused-appellant had a psychotic episode, prompting his mother to
confine him at Don Suzano Rodriguez Mental Hospital (DSRMH). He was observed to be well after his confinement. The illness recurred,
however, when he failed to maintain his medications. The symptoms became worse in March 2007, when his aunt died. He neither slept nor
ate, and kept walking by himself in the morning until evening. He did not want to take a bath, and even quarreled with his mother when told
to do so.16

The foregoing testimonies must be examined in light of the quantum of proof required, which is that of clear and convincing evidence to
prove that the insanity existed immediately preceding or simultaneous to the commission of the offense.

Taken against this standard, the testimonies presented by accused-appellant unfortunately fail to pass muster. First, the testimony of Dr.
Laguidao to the effect that accused-appellant was suffering from undifferentiated schizophrenia stems from her psychiatric evaluation of the
accused in 2012, or about five years after the crime was committed. His mental condition five years after the crime was committed is
irrelevant for purposes of determining whether he was also insane when he committed the offense. While it may be said that the 2012
diagnosis of Dr. Laguidao must be taken with her testimony that the accused was also diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2001, it is worth
noting that the testimony of Dr. Laguidao as to the 2001 diagnosis of the accused is pure hearsay, as she had no personal participation in such
diagnosis. Even assuming that that portion of her testimony is admissible, and even assuming that it is credible, her testimony merely
provides basis for accused-appellant's mental condition in 2001 and in 2012, and not immediately prior to or simultaneous to the commission
of the offense in 2007.

Second, the testimony of Mejaro also cannot be used as a basis to find that accused-appellant was insane during the commission of the
offense in 2007. His testimony merely demonstrated the possible underlying reasons behind accused-appellant's mental condition, but
similar to Dr. Laguidao's testimony, it failed to shed light on accused-appellant's mental condition immediately prior to, during, and
immediately after accused-appellant stabbed the victim without any apparent provocation.

Accused-appellant further argues that the presumption of sanity must not be applied in his case, because of the rule that a person who has
been committed to a hospital or to an asylum for the insane is presumed to continue to be insane. In this case, however, it is noteworthy that
while accused-appellant was confined in a mental institution in 2001, he was properly discharged therefrom in 2002. This proper discharge
from his confinement clearly indicates an improvement in his mental condition; otherwise, his doctors would not have allowed his discharge
from confinement. Absent any contrary evidence, then, the presumption of sanity resumes and must prevail.

In fine, therefore, the defense failed to present any convincing evidence of accused-appellant's mental condition when he committed the
crime in March 2007. While there is evidence on record of his mental condition in 2001 and in 2012, the dates of these two diagnoses are too
far away from the date of the commission of the offense in 2007, as to altogether preclude the possibility that accused-appellant was
conscious of his actions in 2007. Absent any supporting evidence, this Court cannot sweepingly conclude that accused-appellant was mentally
insane for the whole 11-year period from 2001 to 2012, as to exempt him criminal liability for an act committed in 2007. It was the defense's
duty to fill in the gap in accused-appellant's state of mind between the 2001 diagnosis and the 2012 diagnosis, and unfortunately, it failed to
introduce evidence to paint a full picture of accused-appellant's mental condition when he committed the crime in 2007. With that, the Court
has no other option but to adhere to the presumption of sanity, and conclude that when accused-appellant attacked the victim, he was
conscious of what he was doing, and was not suffering from an insanity.

This conclusion is based not merely on the presumption of sanity, but bolstered by the circumstances surrounding the incident.1âwphi1 As
the prosecution correctly argued in its Appellee's Brief, there are circumstances surrounding the incident that negate a complete absence of
intelligence on the part of accused-appellant when he attacked the victim. First, he surprised the victim when he attacked from behind. This
is supported by the companion of the victim, who testified that while they were walking, they did not notice any danger when they saw
accused-appellant standing near the trimobile. Second, accused-appellant's attempt to flee from the scene of the crime after stabbing the
victim indicates that he knew that what he just committed was wrong. And third, when the police officers called out to accused-appellant to
surrender, he voluntarily came out of the house where he was hiding and voluntarily turned himself over to them.

The foregoing actions of accused-appellant immediately before, during, and immediately after he committed the offense indicate that he was
conscious of his actions, that he intentionally committed the act of stabbing, knowing the natural consequence of such act, and finally, that
such act of stabbing is a morally reprehensible wrong. His actions and reactions immediately preceding and succeeding the act of stabbing
are similar if not the same as that expected of a fully sane person.

Therefore, the Court finds no reasonable basis to reverse the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that accused-appellant's culpability
had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

As to the award of damages, however, the Court finds the need to modify the same, in line with the rule enunciated in People v. Jugueta,
where the Court laid down the rule that in cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the proper amounts of awarded
damages should be ₱75,000 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000 as moral damages and ₱75,000 as exemplary damages, regardless of the number of
qualifying aggravating circumstances present.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on August
27, 2015, in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 06456, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, the fallo of the Decision must read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Judgment dated September 3, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Christopher Mejaro Roa is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder as
defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accusedappellant is
ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim, Eliseo Delmiguez, the amount of: (1) ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the said victim, (b)
₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and (c) ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages as provided by the Civil Code in line with recent jurisprudence, with
costs. In addition, all awards for damages shall bear legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of
judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

People vs Miraña

G.R. No. 214757

PEOPLE OF TIIE PHlLIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee

vs

TIRSO SIBBU, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This resolves the appeal from the January 6, 2014 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04127 which affirmed with
modification the May 15, 2009 Decision2 of Branch 11, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City finding Tirso Sibbu (appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of attempted murder in Criminal Case No. 11722 and of murder in Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11723, and 11724.

In Criminal Case No. 11722, appellant, together with Benny Barid (Benny) and John Does was charged with attempted murder allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of December 2004, in Brgy. Elizabeth, Municipality of Marcos, Province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with an unlicensed firearm, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously shot BRYAN
JULIAN y VILLANUEVA, twice but missed, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt act'>, but did not
perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the said crime, by reason of some cause independent of his will, that is,
accused are poor shooters, to the damage and prejudice of the above-named victim.

That the crime was committed [in] the dwelling x x x of the victim at nighttime and disguise was employed, with accused Sibbu wearing a
bonnet on his face.3

In Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11723 and 11724, and except for the names of the victims and the location of their gunshot wounds, appellant
together with Benny and John Does, was charged with murder in three similarly worded Informations4 allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of December 2004, in Brgy. Elizabeth, Municipality of Marcos, Province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with an unlicensed firearm, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and treachery, did then and t11ere willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously shot [Trisha May
Julian y Villanueva, Ofelia Julian y Bagudan, and Warlito Julian y Agustin], inflicting upon [her/him] gunshot wounds, which caused [her/his]
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the above-named victim.

That the crime was committed in the dwelling x x x of the victim at nighttime and disguise was employed, with accused Sibbu wearing a
bonnet on his face.

During arraignment held on July 22, 2005, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. After pre-trial was conducted, trial on the
merits followed. On May 31, 2008, appellant's co-accused Benny was arrested. However, his trial was held separately considering that the
trial with respect to the Appellant was also almost finished with the prosecution already presenting rebuttal evidence.5
Version of the Prosecution

Bryan Julian (Bryan), the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 11722 and a common witness to all the cases, testified that between 6:30
and 7:00 p.m. of December 6, 2004, he was with his three-year old daughter, Trisha May Julian (Trisha), the victim in Criminal Case No.
11721; his mother Ofelia Julian (Ofelia), the victim in Criminal Case No. 11723; and his father, Warlito Julian (Warlito), the victim in Criminal
Case No. 11724 in the azotea of his parents' house in Barangay Elizabeth, Marcos, llocos Norte when he saw from a distance of about five
meters a person in camouflage unifo1m with a long firearm slung across his chest and a black bonnet over his head. When the armed man
inched closer to the house, he tried to fix his bonnet thereby providing Bryan the opportunity to see his face; Bryan had a clear look at the
armed man because there were Christmas lights hanging from the roof of their porch. Bryan recognized the armed man as the appellant.6
Brian also saw two men in crouching position at a distance of three meters away from the appellant. Fearing the worst, Bryan shouted a
warning to his family. Appellant then fired upon them killing Trisha, Ofelia and Warlito.

Bryan ran inside the house where he saw his brother, Warlito Julian, Jr. (Warlito Jr.) coming out of the bathroom. Bryan then proceeded to
the pigpen at the back of the house to hide.

Another prosecution witness, Eddie Bayudan (Eddie), testified that on December 6, 2004, he was by a well near his house when he heard
gunshots coming from the house of Warlito and Ofelia. When he turned towards the direction of the gunshot5, he saw a man about five
meters away wearing a black bonnet and a long-sleeved camouflage uniform and holding a long firearm. He also saw another man crouching
on the ground whom he recognized as the accused Benny. Eddie went inside his house for his and his family's safety. Afterwards, he heard
Bryan shouting for help. When he went out to investigate, he saw the dead bodies of Warlito, Ofelia, and Trisha.

Warlito Jr. also testified that he heard gunshots coming from outside their house. When he went out of the bathroom, Bryan told him that
appellant gunned down their parents and his niece. In his cross-examination, Warlito, Jr. claimed to have seen the appellant shooting at the
porch of their house.7

Police Superintendent Benjamin M. Lusad (P/Supt. Lusad), chief of the provincial intelligence and investigation branch of Ilocos Norte,
testified that at 7:00 a.m. of December 7, 2004, he conducted an investigation and an ocular inspection at the crime scene. He found
bloodstains on the floor of the porch, the cadavers of the victims laid side by side in the sala, and bullet holes in the cemented portion at the
front of the house below the window gril1.8 During his interview with Bryan, the latter pointed to appellant as the gunman.9

SPOl Eugenio Navarro (SPOl Navarro) also testified that he went to the crime scene together with Senior Police Inspector Arnold Dada, P02
Danny Ballesteros, and SPO1 Lester Daoang, where they found 13 spent shells and slugs of a caliber .30 carbine. Police Superintendent Philip
Camti Pucay who conducted the ballistic examination confirmed that the recovered shells and slugs were fired from a caliber .30 carbine.

Version of the Defense

The appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi. Appellant's father-in-law, Eladio Ruiz (Eladio), testified that on December 6, 2004,
appellant did not leave their house because they had a visitor, Elpidio Alay (Elpidio); moreover, appellant tended to his child. Eladio stated
that the distance between his house and Warlito's is approximately two kilometers and that it would take an hour to negotiate the distance
by foot.10

Eufrecina Ruiz (Eufrecina), mother-in-law of the appellant, also testified that appellant had been living with th.em for two years before he
was arrested.11 She narrated that on December 6, 2004, appellant did not leave their house the whole night as he was tending to his sick
child. She also claimed that they had a visitor who delivered firewood. Eufrecina alleged that appellant did not own any firearm and that he
did not know Benny.

Elpidio testified that on December 6, 2004, he went to the house of Eladio to deliver a wooden divider.12 He arrived at around 6:00 p.m. and
left at 7:00 a.m. the following day. Elpidio stated that the appellant did not leave the house that night and that appellant was inside the
house when he heard explosions.
Appellant denied the charges against him. He testified that on December 6, 2004, he never left the house of his in-laws because he was
taking care of his sick son. He claimed to have heard the explosions but thought that those were sounds of firecrackers since it was nearing
Christmas.13 Appellant denied having any misunderstanding with the Julian family, or knowing Bryan and Benny personally, or possessing
camouflage clothing.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On May 15, 2009, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder in Criminal Case Nos. 11721,
11723, and 11724, and of attempted murder in Criminal Case No. 11722. The RTC gave credence to Bryan's positive identification of appellant
as the person who shot at him and killed his daughter, mother and father. On the other hand, the RTC found appellant's defense of denial
and alibi weak.

The dispositive part of the RTC's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) In Criminal Case No. 11721, accused TIRSO SIBBU is hereby declared GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of murder. He is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Further, he is hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of Trisha Mae Julian y
Villanueva the [amounts] of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages;

2) In Criminal Case No. 11722, accused TIRSO SIBBU is hereby declared GUILTY BEYOND REASONfJ3LE DOUBT of the crime of attempted
murder. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor
as maximum.

3) In Criminal Case No. 11723, accused TIRSO SIBBU is hereby declared GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of murder. He is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Further, he is hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of Ofelia Juliany Bayudan
the [amounts] of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

4) In Criminal Case No. 11724, accused TIRSO SIBBU is hereby declared GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of murder. He is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETIJA. Further, he is hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of Warlito Juliany Agustin
the [amounts] of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11723 and 11724, accused TISO SIBBU is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Trisha Mae Julian y Villanueva;
Ofelia Julian y Bayudan; and Warlito Julian y Agustin the amount of ₱55,602.00 as actual damages.

SO ORDERED.14

Aggrieved by the RTC's Decision, appellant appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On January 6, 2014, the CA aft1rmed the RTC's Decision with modification as follows:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated May 15, 2009, issued by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 11, Laoag City in Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11722, 11723 and 11724, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 11721, appellant Tirso Sibbu is hereby declared Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. He is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Further, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Trisha May Julian y Villanueva the
[amounts] of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, with interest at the legal
rate of 6% percent from the finality of this judgment until fully paid;

2. In Criminal Case No. 11723, appellant Tirso Sibbu is hereby declared Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. He is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Further, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Ofelia Juliany Bayudan the
[amounts] of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, with interest at the legal
rate of 6% percent from the finality of this judgment until folly paid; and

3. In Criminal Case No. 11724, appellant Tirso Sibbu is hereby declared Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. He is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.Further, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Ofelia Juliany Bayudan the
[amounts] of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, with interest at the legal
rate of 6% percent from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.15

Dissatisfied with the CA's Decision, appellant elevated his case to this Court. On February 9, 2015, the Court issued a Resolution requiring the
parties to submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. However, the appellant opted not to file a supplemental brief since he had
exhaustively discussed his arguments before the CA. The Office of the Solicitor General also manifested that there was no longer any need to
file a supplemental brief since the appellant did not raise any new issue in his appeal before this Court.16

Issues

The main issue raised in the Appellant's Brief concerns Bryan's identification of the appellant as the assailant. The appellant contends that the
trial court erred in (1) giving undue credence to the testimony of the alleged eyewitness Bryan; and (2) in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as charged because the prosecution failed to overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor.17
Further, appellant argues that the aggravating circumstances of treachery, dwelling, and use of disguise were not sufficiently established.

Our Ruling

The appeal is unmeritorious.

We uphold the findings of the RTC, which were affirmed by the CA, that Bryan positively identified appellant as the person who shot at him
and killed Warlito, Ofelia, and Trisha. We have consistently ruled that factual findings of trial comts, especially when affirmed by the
appellate court, are entitled to respect and generally should not be disturbed on appeal unless certain substantial facts were overlooked
which, if considered, may affect the outcome of the case. After due consideration of the records of the case and the evidence adduced, the
Court finds that the RTC and the CA did not err in their appreciation of the facts and evidence.

We find that Bryan was able to identify the appellant as the assailant in the shooting incident; there is no reason to doubt his positive
testimony. As aptly observed by the RTC, Bryan's narration of how he was able to recognize the appellant was credible and convincing, to wit:

q You said somebody [shot] at you, your father, your mother, and your daughter while you were at the azotea of the house of your father on
December 6, 2004. Did you see the person who shot at you, your father, your mother, and your daughter?

a Yes, ma'am.

xxxx
q How far was [the gunman] when you saw him at the west side? a Around five (5) meters away, ma'am.

q What was his position at the time you first saw him?

a He was at this position, ma'am. (Witness is showing as if a gun was slung on his neck) Then I told my family, ''Somebody would shoot us, let
us all run and hide," and then he shot [at] me twice, ma'am.

xxxx

q How about [his] face x x x, can you x x x describe [it] to us?

a When be came near us he fixed his bonnet which covered one eye only that is why I recognized him; and even though his face was covered
with [a] bonnet, I could still recognize him because I usually mingled with him, ma'arn.

xxxx

q You said you were able to recognize his face because you were familiar with him. Who was that person whom you recognized?

A Tirso Sibbu, ma'am.

Q If this Tirso Sibbu is inside the courtroom today, would you be able to recognize him?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Kindly look around the courtroom and point to us if he is inside the courtroom?

A (Witness is pointing to a man wearing a black T-shirt with blue denim pants who when asked his name answered Tirso Sibbu)

Q You said you were able to recognize the face of this man Tirso Sibbu because you are familiar with him? Can you tell us why you were
familiar with him? What were the circumstances where you mingled with him?

A He was a jueteng collector and he came to our place three (3) times a day to get the bets, ma' am.

xxxx

q Considering, Mr. Witness, that it was already x x x 6:30 [to] 7:00 in the evening, how were you able to see the face of Tirso Sibbo?

A There was a light in front of the azotea, ma'am.

q What was the light in your azotea you are referring to?
a Christmas lights that were not blinking, ma'am.18

xxxx

q Now, Mr. Witness, how far [was the accused when you first noticed his presence]?

a More or less 5 meters, sir.

xxxx

q By the way, that was the first time [you noticed the presence of] the accused. Was that in the same place you saw him fire his gun?

a He came nearer, sir.

xxxx

q Now, Mr. Witness, [how did you recognize the accused]?

a He fixed his bonnet [his] face was partly covered, sir.

q x x x That bonnet x x x covered the face, is that correct?

a Only one eye was covered so he fixed it sir.

q And the whole face was covered except one eye, is that what you want to impress the Honorable Court?

a The hole that was meant for his left eye went at his right eye so he stretched the bonnet and his face was uncovered that is why I
recognized him, sir.

q You said that his face was uncovered, are you referring, to the whole face that was uncovered?

a Because of the stretching, the eyes and the nose were uncovered, sir.19

From Bryan's testimony above, it is clear that he was only five meters away from the appellant when the shooting incident happened. While
the appellant was seen wearing a bonnet over his head, Bryan was able to get a glimpse of appellant's face when the latter fixed his bonnet.
In addition, Christmas lights hanging from the roof of the porch provided illumination enabling Bryan to identify the appellant. Moreover,
Bryan is familiar with the appellant's built, height, and body movements. As correctly pointed out by the CA:

It is equally of common knowledge that the eyes readily [adjust] to the surrounding darkness even if one stands in a lighted area, and the
distance of five meters is not an impossible or improbable way as to preclude identification.1âwphi1
Besides, Bryan’s identification did not solely rely on facial recognition but also from appellant's body built and height, and the way he walked
and moved, all proper standards of identification as corroborated in the testimony of an experienced police officer and PMA graduate Police
Superintendent Benjamin M. Lusad, chief of the provincial intelligence and investigation unit of Ilocos Norte.20

Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the RTC and the CA were correct in holding that Bryan positively identified the appellant
as the person who shot at him and killed Warlito, Ofelia, and Trisha.

Appellant also questions the RTC's appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of treachery, dwelling. and use of disguise. Citing People v.
Catbagan,21 appellant argues that "[t]reachery cannot be considered when there is no evidence that the accused had resolved to commit the
crime prior to the moment of the killing; or that the death of the victim was the result of premeditation, calculation, or reflection."

We disagree. Treachery was correctly appreciated as qualifying circumstance in the instant case.

Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make."22

The case of Catbagan has an entirely different factual context with the case at bar. In Catbagan, the accused was a police officer who
investigated reported gunshots during an election gun ban in the residence of one of the victims. Prior to the shooting, Catbagan had no
intention of killing anyone. It just so happened that during a heated exchange, Cc1thagan drew his firearm and shot the victims. In this case
however, before the shooting incident, appellant was seen with a gun slung over his neck and a bonnet covered his face to conceal his
identity. It is clear that appellant's purpose is to hmm and kill his victims.

In this case, the evidence on record reveals that at the time of the shooting incident, Warlito, Ofelia, Trisha, and Bryan were at the porch of
their house totally unaware of the impending attack. In addition, they were all unarmed thus unable to mount a defense in the event of an
attack. On the other hand, appellant and his cohorts were armed. They also surreptitiously approached the residence of the victims.
Appellant, in particular, wore camouflage uniform to avoid detection. Although Bryan was able to warn his family about the impending
attack, it was too late for the victims to scamper for safety or to defend themselves. At the time Bryan became aware of appellant's presence,
the latter was already in the vicinity of about five meters. In fine, appellant employed deliberate means to ensure the accomplishment of his
purpose of killing his victims with minimal risk to his safety. There can be no other conclusion than that the appellant's attack was
treacherous.

With regard to the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the trial court correctly held:

In the instant cases, the victims were at their azotea in their house when accused Tirso Sibbu fired shots at them. Tirso Sibbu was outside the
house of the victims. Under these circumstances, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling can be appreciated against Tirso Sibbu. Thus, the
Supreme Court ruled:

xxxx

The aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be taken into account. Although the triggerman fired the shot from outside the house, his
victim was inside. For this circumstance to be considered it is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered the dwelling of the
victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own house, although the assailant may have devised means
to perpetrate the assault from without x x x.23

The use of disguise was likewise correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case. Bryan testified that the appellant covered
his face with a bonnet during the shooting incident There could be no other possible purpose for wearing a bonnet over appellant's face but
to conceal his identity, especially since Bryan and appellant live ir1 the same barangay and are familiar with each other.24

As for the defense put up by the appellant that he was inside the house of his in-laws during the shooting, the Court is unconvinced by his
denial and alibi.1avvphi1 Aside from being the weakest of all defenses, appellant was not able to establish that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time the shooting incident happened. We have consistently 1uled that ''for the defense of alibi
to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place when the crime was committed, but also that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity through clear and convincing evidence."25

In this case, the crime was committed in the residence of the victims which is located within the same barangay where appellant resides. In
fact, appellant's father-in-law testified that the distance between the crime scene and his house is "more or less 1 kilometer,"26 or two
kilometers as he later amended and that said distance could be traversed in one hour by foot.27 Verily, appellant's alibi must fail for failure to
show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.

The Court also upholds appellant's conviction for attempted murder. Appellant commenced the commission of murder through overt acts
such as firing his firearm at the residence of the victims but did not perfom1 all the acts of execution which should produce murder by reason
of some cause other than his own spontaneous desistance. Appellant simply missed his target; he failed to perform all the acts of execution
to kill Bryan, Appellant is therefore guilty of attempted murder, Unfortunately, Warlito, Ofelia and Trisha had to bear the brunt of appellant's
firearm.

All told, appellant was correctly convicted of three counts of murder considering the qualifying circumstance of treachery and one count of
attempted murder. Since two aggravating circumstances of dwelling and use of disguise attended the commission of the crime of murder,
appellant should be sentenced to death in accordance with Article 6328 of the Revised Penal Code. Under Article 24829 of the Revised Penal
Code, murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Thus under Article 63, the higher penalty should be imposed. However, because
of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death
penalty is now prohibited.1âwphi1 The law provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed with
no eligibility for parole. Accordingly5 appellant should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility forparole in lieu of the death
penalty in Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11723, 11724.

In People v. Jugueta,30 the Court held that:

x x x [F]or crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an ordinary aggravating circumstance but due to the
prohibition to impose the death penalty, the actual penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the latest jurisprudence pegs the amount of
₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱l00,0000.00 as moral damages. For the qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or the ordinary
aggravating circumstances present, the amount of ₱l00,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages aside from civil indemnity and moral
damages. Regardless of the attendance of qualifying aggravating circumstance, the exemplary damages shall be fixed at ₱100,000.00. x x x

xxxx

Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in certain cases. x x x Under Article 2424 of the Civil Code,
temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss allthough the exact
amount was not proved. In this case, the Court now increases the amount to be awarded as temperate damages to ₱50,000.00.

xxxx

In summary:

1. For those crimes like, Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional Mutilation, Infanticide, and other crimes involving death of a victim where the
penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of R. A 9364:

a. Civil indemnity-₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages –₱l00,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

a. Frustrated:

i. Civil indemnity-₱75,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

b. Attempted:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages –₱50,000.00

Hence, in Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11723, and 11724 where the appellant was convicted of murder, the crime being attended by the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and by the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and disguise, we further modify the awards of civil
indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to ₱100,000.00 each for each case. Moreover, since the award of actual damages in the
amount of ₱55,602.00 pertained to all three cases, the same should be modified to ₱50,000,00 for each case.

In Criminal Case No. 11722 for attempted murder, the RTC as affirmed by the CA imposed the penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional
as minimum to ten (10) years as prision mayor as maximum.

In People v. Jugueta,31 the Court en banc held as follows:

In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties imposed on appellant. Murder is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for each of two
(2) counts of murder. However, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, prescribing the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be
imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without eligibility for parole. With regard to the
four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for each count is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggrawating circumstance
the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period, Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty should be from two
(10) years and one (l) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e.,
prision correccional, in any of its periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. This Court finds it apt to impose on
appellant the Indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (l) day of prission correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder. (Emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing, the proper imposable penalty for attempted murder, and considering the attendant aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and disguise, is four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (l) day
of prision mayor, as maximum. In addition, appellant is liable to pay civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages at ₱50,000.00
each. Finally, these monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the January 6, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04127 is AFFIRMED with FURTHER MODIFICATIONS
as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 11721, appellant Tirso Sibbu is hereby declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. He is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole. Further, he is ordered to pay the heirs of Trisha May Julian
y Villanueva the amounts of ₱l00,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00, as moral damages, ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, all with interest at the ro1te of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

2. In Criminal Case No. 11723, appellant Tirso Sibbu is hereby declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. He is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole. Further, he is ordered to pay the heirs of Ofelia Julian y
Bayudan the amounts of ₱l00,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱50,000.00
as temperate damages, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

3. In Criminal Case No. 11724, appellant Tirso Sibbu is hereby declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. He is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole. Further, he is ordered to pay the heirs of Warlito Julian, Sr.
y Agustin the amounts of ₱l00,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱50,000.00
as temperate damages, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

4. In Criminal Case No. 11722, appellant Tirso Sibbu is hereby declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted 1nurdcr and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. Further, he is ordered to pay Bryan Julian y Villanueva civil indemnity, moral damages, and
exemplary dams.gos each in the amount of ₱50,000.00, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision
until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 210710, July 27, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LUISITO GABORNE Y CINCO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 29 July 2013 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01183, affirming the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33, Calbiga, Samar which found appellant Luisito Gaborne y Cinco guilty of the crime of
Murder with the use of Unlicensed Firearm, as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) as amended by Sec. 6 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7659, and Frustrated Murder as defined in Article 248 in relation to Article 50 of the RPC, respectively.

Together with two others, appellant was charged with Murder with the use of Unlicensed Firearm and Frustrated Murder in the following
Informations:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Criminal Case No. CC-2007-1650

That on or about the 2nd day of February 2007, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening more or less, at Brgy. Mugdo, Hinabangan, Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above -named accused, conspiring, confederating, mutually helping one
another, with deliberate intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation, which qualify the offense into murder, did there,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, shot (sic) Sixto Elizan y Herrera, with the use of an unlicensed firearm a caliber [.]45 pistol, a special
aggravating circumstance pursuant to RA 8294, which accused have provided themselves for the purpose, thereby hitting and inflicting upon
the said Sixto Elizan y Herrera fatal gun shot wounds on the different parts of his body, which gun shot wounds caused his instantaneous
death.3chanrobleslaw
Criminal Case No. CC-2007-1650

That on or about the 2nd day of February 2007, at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening more or less, at Brgy. Mugdo, Municipality of
Hinabangan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring,
confederating, mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to kill, and with treachery, which qualifies the offense to murder, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot [sic] the victim, Rey Perfecto C. de Luna, with the use of a caliber [.]45 pistol, an
unlicensed firearm, a special aggravating circumstance pursuant to Rep. Act No. 8294, with which the accused have provided themselves for
the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the victim the following wounds, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Gun shot wound (R) back penetrating (R) chest, lacerating diaphragm, (R) lobe of the liver, thru and thru and greater omentum with massive
hemoperitoneum

Gun shot wound (R) para spinal area at L2 penetrating abdomen perforating ileum thru and thru

thus, accused have performed all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence but which
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some cause independent of the will of the accused, that is, the timely medical
treatment/intervention rendered to the victim at Saint Paul's Hospital, Tacloban City.4

On arraignment, appellant entered a plea of NOT GUILTY5 for both charges. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

The Facts

The antecedent facts culled from the Appellee's Brief6 and the records of the case are summarized as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryOn 2 February 2007 at around 10:30 in the evening, Rey Perfecto%De Luna (De Luna) and Sixto Elizan7 (Elizan)
entered a videoke bar8 at Barangay Mugdo, Hinabangan, Samar.9 Noli Abayan (Abayan), appellant and Joselito Bardelas (Bardelas) followed
five minutes thereafter.10chanrobleslaw

While Elizan and De Luna were drinking, singing and merely having fun, four successive gunshots11 were fired through the window. Because
of this, Elizan and De Luna were hit from behind.12 Later on, De Luna13 and Marialinisa Pasana14 (Pasana) saw appellant, who was then
wearing a black t-shirt and a black cap, holding a gun aimed at their location. Pasana also saw accused-appellant and Bardelas escape after
the incident.15chanrobleslaw

Elizan and De Luna were brought to St. Paul's Hospital at Tacloban City.16 Unfortunately, Elizan was pronounced dead upon arrival. De Luna,
on the other hand, survived.17chanrobleslaw

Appellant steadfastly denied the accusations. According to him, he and his companions ordered for bottles of beer. However, when they tried
to order for more bottles, the waitress refused to give them their order unless they pay for their previous orders first.18 While Abayan was
explaining to the father of the owner of the videoke bar, appellant and Bardelas went out to urinate,19 however, the waitress locked the
front door.20 While standing outside, he heard the waitress utter the words, "If you will not pay, I [will] have you killed, all of you, right this
moment.21 He also consistently contend that it was a man wearing black shirt and camouflage pants who fired shots to the videoke bar22,
not him.

The following day, appellant and Bardelas were arrested and underwent paraffin test.23chanrobleslaw

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On 12 March 2010, the RTC rendered a joint judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of the two (2) charges of Murder with the use of
Unlicensed Firearm and Frustrated Murder. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [c]ourt finds the co-accused LUISITO GABORNE y CINCO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as
principal in the crimes of:
�

A.

Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. CC-2007-1640 and considering
the presence of one (1) aggravating circumstance without any mitigating circumstance to offset it, hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to pay the Heirs of Sixto Elisan y Herrera Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death; Php50,000.00
in moral damages and Php25,000.00 in exemplary damages and to pay the costs of this suit.

B.

Frustrated Murder penalized under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. CC-2007-1650 and
considering the presence of one (1) aggravating circumstance without any mitigating circumstance to offset it hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment of an indeterminate penalty ranging from ELEVEN (11) YEARS of Prision Mayor as minimum to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS of
Reclusion Temporal as maximum, to pay Perfecto de Luna Php264,866.58 as civil liability without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs of this suit.

The accused who underwent preventive imprisonment since February 3, 2007 shall be credited with the full time during which he was
deprived of his liberty if he agreed voluntarily and in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners
otherwise he will be entitled to only four-fifths (4/5) thereof.

Because the prosecution absolutely failed to prove guilt of accused NOLI ABAYAN y LARGABO and co-accused JOSELITO BARDELAS y
BACNOTAN from the instant criminal charges, they are ACQUITTED in these cases. No civil liability is assessed against them.

Because the said accused are detained, the Provincial Warden of Samar are hereby ordered to release the said accused from detention unless
they are held for some-other cause or ground.24

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA found no merit in appellant's arguments. It pointed out that appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest as it was
raised for the first time on appeal.25cralawred Thus, the appellate court was fully convinced that there is no ground to deviate from the
findings of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The Joint Judgment dated March 12, 2010 rendered by Branch 33, Regional Trial Court of
Calbiga, Samar, 8th Judicial Region in Criminal Case Nos. [CC-] 2007-1640 and [CC-]2007-1650 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to
the award of damages, to wit:

The award of civil indemnity in Criminal Case No. [CC-]2007-1640 is affirmed;

The award of moral damages in the amount of Php50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. [CC-]2007-1640 is affirmed;

The award of exemplary damages in the amount of Php25,000.00 in Criminal Case No. [CC-]2007-1640 is affirmed;

In Criminal Case No. [CC-]2007-1650, accused-appellant is ordered to pay moral damages to the private offended party, Rey Perfecto De
Luna, in the amount of Php40,000.00;

In Criminal Case No. [CC-]2007-1650, accused appellant is likewise ordered to pay exemplary damages to the private offended party, Rey
Perfecto De Luna, in the amount of Php20,000.00; and cralawlawlibrary

Accussed-appellant is further ordered to additionally pay the private offended parties in the two criminal cases, Rey Perfecto De Luna and the
heir/s of Sixto Elizan, interest on all damages at the legal rate of six percent (6%) from the date of finality of this judgment until the amounts
awarded shall have been fully paid.26

Appellant appealed the decision of the CA. The Notice of Appeal was given due course and the records were ordered elevated to this Court
for review. In a Resolution27 dated 19 February 2014, this Court required the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs. Both
parties manifested that they are adopfing all the arguments contained in their respective briefs in lieu of filing supplemental
briefs.28chanrobleslaw

Our Ruling

We find that the degree of proof required in criminal cases has been met in the case at bar. Appellant's defenses of denial and alibi are bereft
of merit.

Assailing the legality of arrest should

be made before entering a plea

Before anything else, we resolve the procedural issue raised by the appellant.29chanrobleslaw

Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.30 In People v. Velasco,31 this Court held that the accused is
estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest for his failure to move for the quashal of the Information before arraignment. In this case,
appellant only questioned the legality of his arrest for the first time on appeal.32chanrobleslaw

Furthermore, even granting that indeed there has been an irregularity in the arrest of the appellant, it is deemed cured by his voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court over his person.33 Thus, appellant is deemed to have waived his constitutional protection
against illegal arrest34 when he actively participated in the arraignment35 and trial of this case.36chanrobleslaw

Elements of Murder and Frustrated

Murder were established

This Court finds that the circumstance of treachery should be appreciated, qualifying the crime to Murder. According to the Revised Penal
Code:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

ARTICLE 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means
or persons to insure or afford impunity.

In consideration of a price, reward or promise.

By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of
an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.

On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone,
epidemic, or any other public calamity.

With evident premeditation.

With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

Thus, the elements of murder are: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any
of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.37chanrobleslaw
Furthermore, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.38chanrobleslaw

The requisites of treachery are:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(1)

The employment of means method, or manner of execution which will ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts
on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and

(2)

Deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method, or manner of execution.39

In this case, the hapless victims were merely drinking and singing in-front of the videoke machine when shot by the appellant. The firing was
so sudden and swift that they had no opportunity to defend themselves or to retaliate. Furthermore, appellant's acts of using a gun and even
going out of the videoke bar evidently show that he consciously adopted means to ensure the execution of the crime.

In addition, the lower courts appropriately found appellant liable for the crime of Frustrated Murder.

A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.40chanrobleslaw

Dr. Angel Cordero M.D. categorically said that De Luna could have died because of the wounds if the surgery was not conducted timely.41
Hence, appellant performed all the acts of execution which could have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of a cause independent of his will, which is, in this case, the timely and able medical attendance rendered to De
Luna.

The defense of denial cannot be given

more weight over a witness'positive

identification

Appellant denies the accusations on the ground that he has no motive to kill Elizan and injure De Luna. This alibi is bereft of merit. Intent is
not synonymous with motive. Motive alone is not a proof and is hardly ever an essential element of a crime.42 As a general rule, proof of
motive for the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence
of accused for the crime charged such as murder.43 In Kummer v. Peopled44 this Court held that motive is irrelevant when the accused has
been positively identified by an eyewitness.

Evidently, accused-appellant's intent to kill was established beyond reasonable doubt. This can be seen from his act of shooting Elizan and De
Luna from behind with a firearm while they were innocently singing and drinking. Intent to kill was also manifest considering the number of
gun shot wounds sustained by the victims.45chanrobleslaw

In the instant case, Pasana and De Luna positively identified accused-appellant as the person who fired shots during the
incident:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Pasana's testimony:

� �

Q: Can you recall who among the five (5) went out?

A: Yes, Ma'am.

� �

Q: Of the two (2) among the five (5) who went out, are these two (2) people or persons here in court right now?
A: Yes, Ma'am.

� �

Q: And who are these two (2) persons you are referring to, can you point it out to the Honorable Court if they are here in [c]ourt right
now?

A: That person, Ma'am.

� �

Interpreter: Witness, Your Honor, is pointing to a person who earlier identified himself as Luisito Gaborne.

� �

xxxx

� �

Q: Point specifically, who among those persons?

A: That person, Ma'am.

� �

Interpreter: Witness, Your Honor, is pointing to a person who identified himself earlier as Luisito Gaborne.46

� �

De Luna's Testimony:

� �

Q: How about the appearance of the guy whom you said holding a gun, can you recall?

A: I can recall him if he is inside the court, ma'am.

� �

Q: Can you point it out to the court, the other guy whom you saw at the videoke bar?

A: Yes, ma'am, if I can go with him in a short distance, I can point him.

� �

Q: Can you point him?

A:

(The witness stood up and approach (sic) the accused' bench and pointed to a person and when asked his name answered to (sic): Luisito
Gaborne)

� �

Q: You said that there was also another guy by the window? (the court butt-in [sic])

� �

THE COURT:

� �

Q: Excuse me, this man who answered Luisito Gaborne was the one holding the fire arm?

A: Yes, your Honor.47

This Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly
observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness
of witnesses.48chanrobleslaw

It is doctrinally entrenched in our jurisprudence49 that the defense of denial is inherently weak because it can easily be fabricated. Such
defense becomes unworthy of merit if it is established only by the accused themselves and not by credible persons. Thus, this Court agrees
with the lower courts in giving the positive identification of the eyewitnesses more weight than appellant's defense of denial.
Paraffin Tests are not conclusive

The positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses bears more weight than the negative paraffin test result conducted the day
after the incident.

Paraffin tests, in general-, have been rendered inconclusive by this Court. Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test was
extremely unreliable for use. It can only establish the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand; however, the test alone cannot
determine whether the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm; The presence of nitrates should be taken only as an
indication of a possibility or even of a probability but not of infallibility that a person has fired a gun, since nitrates are also admittedly found
in substances other than gunpowder.50chanrobleslaw

In this case, prosecution witness, Pasana51 and the victim himself, De Luna,52 testified in the trial court that it was indeed the appellant who
was holding the gun during the incident. It should also be considered that appellant was arrested the day after the incident.53 Thus, it is
possible for appellant to fire a gun and yet bear no traces of nitrate or gunpowder as when the hands are bathed in perspiration or washed
afterwards.54chanrobleslaw

Corpus delicti of the crime can be

established by testimony

With regard to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm, we agree with the trial court and the
appellate court that the same must be appreciated in the instant case. In People v. Lualhati, this Court ruled that in crimes involving
unlicensed firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, which are: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and
(2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the
same.55chanrobleslaw

Appellant's contention that the corpus delicti was not established for the reason that the firearm used was not presented as evidence is not
persuasive. In People v. Orehuela,56 this Court held that the existence of the firearm can be established by testimony, even without the
presentation of the said firearm. In the present case, the testimonies of Pasana and De Luna indubitably demonstrated the existence of the
firearms. Furthermore, the certification57 from the Philippine National Police that appellant is not a firearm license holder of any caliber
proves that he is not licensed to possess the same. Thus, the prosecution was able to prove the existence of the firearm and that the
appellant is not licensed to possess the same notwithstanding the fact that the firearm used was not presented as evidence.

Illegal Possession of Firearm as an

aggravating circumstance

in the crimes of Murder and

Frustrated Murder

The CA appropriately appreciated the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in the crimes of Murder and Frustrated
Murder. Under R.A. No. 1059, use of loose firearm in the commission of a crime, like murder, shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.58chanrobleslaw

In view of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 8294 and R.A. No. 10591, to Presidential Decree No. 1866, separate prosecutions for
homicide and illegal possession are no longer in order. Instead, illegal possession of firearm is merely to be taken as an aggravating
circumstance in the crime of murder.59 It is clear from the foregoing that where murder results from the use of an unlicensed firearm, the
crime is not qualified illegal possession but, murder. In such a case, the use of the unlicensed firearm is not considered as a separate crime
but shall be appreciated as a mere aggravating circumstance. Thus, where murder was committed, the penalty for illegal possession of
firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance.60 The intent of Congress is to treat the offense
of illegal possession of firearm and the commission of homicide or murder with the use of unlicensed firearm as a single
offense.61chanrobleslaw
In the case at hand, since it was proven that accused-appellant was not a licensed firearm holder,62 and that he was positively identified by
the witnesses as the one who fired shots against the victims, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of Murder and
Frustrated Murder should be considered as an aggravating circumstance thereof.

The presence of such aggravating circumstance would have merited

the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of Murder. However, in view of R.A. No. 9346, we are mandated to impose on appellant the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

Damages and civil liability

This Court resolves to modify the damages awarded by the appellate court in line with the recent jurisprudence.63 Appellant shall pay the
Heirs of Sixto Elizan y Herrera P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and PI00,000.00 as exemplary damages for the
crime of Murder with the use of Unlicensed Firearm.

Appellant shall also be liable to pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages for
the crime of Frustrated Murder. In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all monetary awards from
date of finality of this Judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the 29 July 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01183 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant
LUISITO GABORNE Y CINCO is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder with the use of Unlicensed Firearm and shall
suffer a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility for parole and shall pay the Heirs of Sixto Elizan y Herrera P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P1 00,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and of the crime of Frustrated Murder and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from eleven (11) years of Prision Mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18) years of
Reclusion Temporal as maximum and shall pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid.

In the service of his sentence, appellant, who is a detention prisoner, shall be credited with the entire period of his preventive imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.chanRobles

G.R. No. 151978 July 14, 2004

ARTURO ROMERA, petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated January 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR. No. 23753, affirming the August 16,
1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, in Criminal Case No. 98-1089. The RTC convicted petitioner Arturo
Romera of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to imprisonment ranging from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of
prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. He was also ordered to pay private offended
party P19,361.15 as actual damages and P10,000 as attorney’s fee.

The Information against petitioner reads:

On October 4, 1998, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, at Sitio Puntod, Barangay Balagnan, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
attack, assault, and stab one Roy Mangaya-ay with the use of a bolo, thus, inflicting a mortal wound on the abdomen of the latter; accused
thereby performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the felony of Homicide which was not produced because of the
timely and effective medical attendance administered on the said victim.

CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249, in relation with Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.3

When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty and trial thereafter ensued.

The facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals and borne by the records, are as follows:

In the afternoon of October 4, 1998, petitioner Arturo Romera was with the victim, Roy Mangaya-ay, and five other men namely, Eligario
"Beboy" Acenas, Dennis "Bobong" Mangaya-ay, Ric Mangaya-ay, Bebing Zulueta and Franklin Generol. They were all headed for Biasong to
play volleyball. When they reached Biasong, it was raining, so they decided to while away time at the house of Ciriaca Capil. Franklin Generol
hung a string made of cigarette foil on Bebing Zulueta’s pants and said, "There’s a monkey among us." Everybody laughed except Roy
Mangaya-ay, who got angry and chided Franklin Generol to stop lest he make enemies. Bebing Zulueta also got angry and pointed a finger at
Franklin Generol and said, "Even if you are stronger and older, if you will be hit by my fist, you will crawl." Petitioner then stood up and
warned everyone, "You all watch out in Balaguan." He pulled Franklin Generol to join him and said, "Let’s go, there are many boastful people
here." Thereafter, petitioner and Franklin left the group.

At six o’clock in the evening, Roy and his companions arrived in Balaguan. On their way home, they passed by the house of one Antonio
Mangaya-ay. In said house, which is about one kilometer away from petitioner’s own, they saw petitioner already carrying a bolo waiting for
them.

Suddenly, raising the bolo with his right hand, petitioner uttered, "Here are the brave ones." Roy and his companions ran away but Roy
slipped on the muddy ground. Petitioner approached Roy and said, "Come here, brave one." He held Roy up by the collar and stabbed him in
the stomach. Roy fell unconscious. When he woke up, he found himself at the provincial hospital where he underwent surgery and stayed for
more than three weeks.

After the stabbing incident, petitioner voluntarily surrendered to a certain Tibo Ramoso of the Citizen’s Armed Force Geographical Unit
(CAFGU). Ramoso accompanied petitioner to the Balingasay police station.

For his part, petitioner testified on what happened as follows:

Petitioner and his family were having dinner in their house at around seven o’clock in the evening. Thereafter, they went to bed. While lying
in bed, they heard Roy call petitioner and his wife, asking if they had beer and a fighter for sale. He did not answer Roy because he knew that
Roy was already drunk. Roy asked for petitioner but when the latter’s wife told him that petitioner was already asleep, he told her to wake
her husband up. Petitioner went down the house and asked who was at the door. Just as he opened the door for Roy, Roy thrust his bolo at
him. He successfully parried the bolo and asked Roy what it was all about. Roy answered he would kill petitioner. Petitioner tried to prevent
Roy from entering, so he pushed the door shut. As Roy was hacking at the wall, petitioner’s wife held the door to allow petitioner to exit in
another door to face Roy. He hurled a stone at Roy, who dodged it. Roy rushed to him and hacked him, but he parried the blow. Petitioner
grappled for the bolo and stabbed Roy in the stomach. Wounded, Roy begged petitioner for forgiveness. According to petitioner, he ceased
harming Roy for fear he might kill him.
The trial court discounted petitioner’s story of self-defense. It found that when petitioner got hold of the bolo, there was no more danger to
his life. Petitioner was convicted of frustrated homicide. The dispositive part of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused ARTURO ROMERA guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the offense charged. Consequently, taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the
provisions of the [I]ndeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to a penalty ranging from One (1) year Eight (8) months and Twenty
(20) days of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum and to pay the private offended
party as actual damages, P19,361.15 and another sum of P10,000.00 as attorneys fee without, however, subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning to the trial court the following assignments of error:

1. FAILURE TO APPRECIATE THE THEORY OF SELF DEFENSE.

2. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FAILURE TO APPRECIATE SPECIAL PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF DEFENSE, ARTICLE
69, REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH LOWER THE PENALTY BY TWO DEGREES.

3. FURTHER ALTERNATIVE, FAILURE TO APPLY ARTICLE 62 (5) REVISED PENAL CODE, WHICH LOWER THE PENALTY BY ONE DEGREE LOWER
WITH THE PRESENCE OF TWO OR MORE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.5

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. It pointed out that assuming arguendo that it was the victim who was the aggressor
at the start, the unlawful aggression ceased to exist when petitioner took possession of the bolo from the victim. Absent unlawful aggression,
the justifying circumstance of self-defense becomes unavailing.

The appellate court also ruled that Article 696 of the Revised Penal Code finds no application in this case. It explained that there can be no
self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. It held,
however, that petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender as it was established during trial that after the
incident he surrendered himself to the CAFGU and later on to the police authorities.

Undeterred, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the sole ground that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals erroneously failed
to apply Article 64 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, which lowers the imposable penalty by one degree when two or more mitigating
circumstances are present.

Petitioner contends that the victim provoked him to a fit of anger when the latter woke him up and thrust a bolo at him without warning as
petitioner opened the door. Moreover, by hacking and destroying the bamboo wall of his house, and endangering the lives of his children,
the victim also obfuscated his thinking and reasoning processes, says the petitioner.

For public respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the mitigating circumstances of provocation and passion or
obfuscation are unavailing to petitioner since it was he who initiated the attack. The OSG insists that it was not the victim who went to
petitioner’s house, but petitioner who went to where the victim was resting.

We note that while both the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not categorically state who started the attack, it can be reasonably gleaned
from their decisions that it was the victim who initiated the aggressive encounter. This finding of fact is amply supported by the evidence on
record.

Are the mitigating circumstances of provocation and passion or obfuscation present in this case?
Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls of his house are, in our view, sufficient provocation to
enrage any man, or stir his rage and obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and children are in danger. Petitioner stabbed
the victim as a result of those provocations, and while petitioner was still in a fit of rage. In our view, there was sufficient provocation and the
circumstance of passion or obfuscation attended the commission of the offense.

But, we must stress that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two separate mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the rule that
if these two circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance.7 From the facts
established in this case, it is clear that both circumstances arose from the same set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should not be
treated as two separate mitigating circumstances.

Nonetheless, we hold that since the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is also present, Article 64 (5) of the Revised Penal Code
should be applied, to wit:

ART. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. –…

...

5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances.

...

The penalty for frustrated homicide, pursuant to Article 508 of the Revised Penal Code, is the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by law for consummated homicide. The penalty for consummated homicide is reclusion temporal, hence the penalty next lower in
degree is prision mayor. There being two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, pursuant to Article 64 (5) of the Revised
Penal Code, the next lower penalty, prision correccional, is the next statutory penalty. But following the Indeterminate Sentence Law herein
applicable, the minimum term of the penalty that should be imposed on petitioner for frustrated homicide should be within the range of
arresto mayor in any of its periods or from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months, while the maximum term should be within the
range of prision correccional in its medium period or two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro
City, Branch 24, is MODIFIED as far as the penalty imposed is concerned. Petitioner ARTURO ROMERA is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum. He is also ORDERED to pay the private offended party P19,361.15 as actual damages, and P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Costs de
oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-33154 February 27, 1976

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ANGEL REYES Y ALCANTARA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.

Ruben Roxas (Counsel de Oficio) for appellant.

PER CURIAM:

AUTOMATIC REVIEW of the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila, 6th Judicial District, in Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-279 (70), dated
October 27, 1970, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, accused is hereby found guilty beyond i reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of murder qualified by the treachery and
there being proved the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position, without any mitigating in circumstance to offset the
same the Court sentences him to DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of P12,000.00 for the death of the latter, the sum of
P8,000.00 by way of moral damages, P8,000.00 by way of exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.

The evidence for the prosecution has established that on October 1, 1970, at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Jose Garcia and his cousin,
the deceased Norberto Flores, were on their way to the place where they drive a taxi, which was near their respective residences on G.
Tuason, Sampaloc, Manila. Along the way, they stopped awhile and joined a group of people watching and observing an insane person. While
thus engaged, two men, one of whom was the accused Angel Reyes, approached them and inquired about a certain Oscar Solomon, who lives
in that place. Thereupon, the deceased Norberto Flores, approached the accused and asked for a cigarette light but the latter struck him with
a karate chop to the stomach using the side of his open palm, at the same time poking a gun on them saying: "Ang sama ng porma ninyo."
The accused and his companion appeared to have taken liquor as they had alcoholic breath. Thereafter, Jose Garcia and the deceased
Norberto Flores, went to the house of the latter and stayed by the door, while the accused and his companion proceeded to look for Oscar
Solomon.

Immediately after the accused and his companion had left, Jose Garcia together with the deceased Norberto Flores, Ernesto Bautista and
Isagani Reyes went to Police Precinct No. 4 on G. Tuason, Sampaloc, Manila, where they reported and complained about the "gun-poking"
incident. Thereafter, the accused and his companion were picked up by three police officers and brought to the police precinct for
investigation. Accused made known that he was a policeman from Police Precinct No. 8, Manila Police Department, but that he was in civilian
clothes because he was on emergency leave that day.

At the police precinct, they were told to go to the investigation room located at the second floor. While inside the investigation room, the
accused tried to settle the matter with Jose Garcia. Meanwhile, Conchita Flores, mother of the deceased Norberto Flores, arrived. She
refused to settle the case with the accused and soon they shouted at each other. The accused said to Conchita Reyes: "Ayaw ninyong
paareglo gusto ninyo cuarta, cuarta." Thereafter, the accused Angel Reyes approached Norberto Flores, who was seated on a chair in front of
the table of the investigator'. Det. Domingo Gomez of the MPD, and sat on the edge of the table, about two feet away from the deceased
Norberto Flores. He uttered bad words and said: "I will shoot you now", and immediately, pulled his gun from his waistline and shot Norberto
Flores, who was then seated, stooping and smoking, hitting the said Norberto Flores in the abdomen which gunshot wound caused his death
a few hours thereafter.

Immediately after the shot, the people inside the investigation room scampered for cover. However, Det Domingo Gomez remained inside
the investigation room. Then Det. Ferrera arrived and immediately disarmed the accused, who was placed under arrest by Det. Domingo
Gomez. The accused, however, refused to give any statement.

For his defense, appellant claims that the shooting was accidental. His testimony-which was rejected by the trial court-is to the effect that
when he approached the deceased Norberto Flores, who was then seated in front of the table of the investigator, he heard Norberto Flores
say that he (accused) was only brave because he had a gun. This prompted the accused to answer: "You are always saying about my gun, here
is my gun", after which he drew his gun from his right waist to hand it over to the deceased. While the accused was in the process of handing
over the gun to the deceased Norberto Flores, the gun suddenly fired hitting the latter in the abdomen.

Appellant now maintains that the trial court erred in holding that the shooting was not accidental, and assails the trial court in giving weight
and credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Jose Garcia and Conhita Flores, claiming that their testimonies were not only
contradictory and conflicting in material and substantial points but also because they are biased and prejudiced, being the cousin and
mother, respectively of the deceased.

Upon review of the records, We find that the appellants contentions are devoid of merit. As correctly observed by the trial court, his
testimony that he accidentally shot the victim defies belief because the shooting of the victim was preceded by his threatening words.
Besides, had it really been accidental, then the natural tendency of the accused would have been to immediately give help to his unfortunate
victim and even to plead and express his regret to the mother of the deceased. But such was not the case. After shooting the victim, the
accused still aimed his gun at the prostrate body on the floor, which prevented the mother of the victim, Conchita Flores, from going to the
side of her son.

Furthermore, as pointed out by the Solicitor General in his belief, appellant's claim of accidental shooting is negated by the following facts:
(1) a revolver is not prone to accidental firing if it were simply being handed over to the deceased as appellant claims because of the nature
of its mechanism, unless it was already first cocked and pressure was exerted on the trigger in the process of allegedly handing it over If it
were uncooked, then considerable pressure had to be applied on the trigger to fire the revolver. Either way, the shooting of the deceased
must have been intentional because pressure on the trigger is necessary to make the gun fire, cocked or uncooked; (2) even assuming for the
sake of argument as correct the appellant's pretense of merely handing the firearm over to the deceased, the barrel or muzzle is never
pointed to a person, a basic firearms safety rule which appellant should know as a police officer; the proper handling of the gun dictates the
handing over of the same, butt first. It is indeed, strange, why in the case at bar the appellant allegedly handed over the gun to the deceased
with the barrel or muzzle of the gun pointed to the latter, instead of handing it over butt first.

Moreover, after his arrest the appellant refuse to give any statement to the police. Such conduct of the appellant strongly argues against his
claim of accidental shooting. He could have easily explained the matter to the Police. But he did not. This is another circumstance that casts
doubt upon his claim of accidental shooting.

We find, therefore, no error in the trial court's conclusion that the shooting of the deceased was not accidental but intentional.

Appellant points out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Jose Garcia and Conchita Flores. For example,
appellant claims as inconsistent their testimonies as to whether it was the deceased Norberto Flores who approached the accused or it was
the accused who approached the deceased after which the accused struck the latter with his open palm, at the same time poking a gun on
him; whether appellant poked a gun on the two of them, or only on the deceased; whether after the gun-poking incident, the deceased
Norberto Flores and Jose Garcia went to the former's house before proceeding to the-police precinct, or simply went directly to the police
precinct; whether Conchita Flores and the accused talked for about 20 minutes inside the police precinct, or they did not talk to each other;
and whether or not they shouted at each other inside the police precinct. The above inconsistencies refer only to minor and collateral
matters that do not impair the credibility of Jose Garcia and Conchita Flores. The discrepancies signify that the two witnesses did not
deliberately pervert the truth in their narrations. The discordance in their testimonies on collateral matters heightens their credibility and
shows that their testimonies were not coached nor rehearsed.1 Far from being evidence of falsehood they could justifiably be regarded as a
demonstration of their good faith. 2

We likewise, find no merit in appellant's claim that because these two witnesses are related to the deceased, their testimonies are
necessarily biased and prejudiced. Relationship to the victim alone does not impair the positive and clear testimony of witnesses. 3

Appellant claims the absence of treachery in the commission of the offense. There is no merit to the contention. The victim was unarmed at
the time he was shot, seated of a chair at the investigator's table, stooping and smoking, completely unaware of the impending attack. The
accused was seated on the edge of the table two feet away from the deceased when the former pulled out his gun from his waistline and
shot the victim, immediately after the accused had uttered the words, "I will shoot you now". It is evident that appellant employed a method
of attack which tended directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. Treachery therefore, qualified the killing to murder. 4

The crime was committed with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position. 5 Appellant was in civilian clothes at the time he was
apprehended by policemen of Precinct 4. He Identified himself as a policeman of the Manila Police Department belonging to Precinct 8.
Because of his position he was not relieved of his service firearm which he had on his' person in spite of the fact that the charge against him
was grave threats. At the investigation room of Precinct 4, appellant had the run of the place, in a manner of speaking, again because of his
position. In the course of the investigation being conducted by Det. Domingo Gomez, appellant had the effrontery and arrogance to sit on top
of the table of the investigator, at the edge thereof, in utter disregard of the respect due the investigator, let alone the elementary rules of
courtesy. From this position, appellant, with his service firearm, shot the deceased who was then seated on a chair in front of the
investigator's table, stooping and smoking. Instead of upholding the law, appellant broke it; instead of using his service firearm for good, he
used it for evil. Clearly, his crime is graver and his responsibility greater. 6

As to the mitigating circumstances of (a) sufficient provocation; (b) passion and obfuscation; (c) drunkenness; (d) voluntary surrender; and (e)
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, which the appellant claims to have attended the commission of the crime, We find the contention
to be without merit.
Since the alleged provocation 7 which caused the obfuscation 8 of the appellant did not come from the deceased but from the latter's
mother, Conchita Flores, the same may not, be appreciated in favor of appellant. Besides, it may be pointed out that in the present case,
provocation and obfuscation cannot be considered as two distinct and separate circumstances but should treated as one, having arisen from
the same incident. 9 Voluntary surrender may not also be credited to the appellant because the fact that he did not try to escape or did not
resist arrest after he was taken into custody by the authorities does not amount to voluntary surrender.10 A surrender to be voluntary must
be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities. Here, the accused after shooting the
deceased was immediately disarmed and placed under arrest. There is, therefore, no voluntary surrender to speak of because the appellant
was in point of fact arrested. 11

As to the alleged lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed the same cannot likewise be considered in favor of appellant.
His clear intention to kill the deceased may be inferred from the fact that he used a deadly weapon and fired at the deceased almost point
blank, thereby hitting him in the abdomen and causing death.

And as to the alternative circumstance of intoxication, it suffices to state that the medical certification 12 shows that appellant was not
intoxicated.

Finally as to the civil liability of the accused, We find that the award of moral damages in the sum of P8,000.00 is in accordance with law. This
has been sufficiently discussed in the case of Heirs of Raymundo Castro vs. Bustos, L-25913, Feb. 28, 1969. 13 Likewise, in view of our finding
that the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position, the award of exemplary damages is also
justified

WHEREFORE, finding the appealed judgment in accordance with the law and the evidence, the same is hereby affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

- versus -
RAMON ARIVAN y FORNILLO,

Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 176065

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

NACHURA, and

REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 22, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For review is the Decision[1] dated 20 October 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01163 which affirmed the Decision[2]
dated 9 August 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 107, in Criminal Case No. Q-99-80302, finding herein appellant
Ramon Arivan y Fornillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against AAA.[3]

Appellant Ramon Arivan y Fornillo was charged with raping AAA in a criminal complaint[4] which reads:

The undersigned accuses RAMON ARIVAN Y FORNILLO, of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:

That [on] or about 31st day of December 1998, in Quezon City, Philippines, while [AAA] was looking for her brother, the said [appellant]
offered to help her but however brought her to a shanty and while there, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with her, against her will and without her consent.[5]

Upon arraignment, the appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. The pre-trial conference yielded
no positive results, thus, the same was declared closed and terminated. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: AAA, the victim; SPO1 Reynaldo Pangilinan (SPO1 Pangilinan), the police officer who
apprehended the appellant; Dr. Emmanuel Reyes (Dr. Reyes), Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory,
Camp Crame, Quezon City, who conducted a physical examination on AAA; and SPO4 Mila Billones (SPO4 Billones), the investigating officer
assigned at Police Station 6, Batasan Hills, Quezon City.

AAA testified that in 1996, she was taken by her mother from their house in xxx City to stay in the house of her uncle, CCC and aunt, DDD
located at xxx, Barangay xxx, xxx City.[6] Her 17-year old brother, BBB, likewise stayed in said house. AAA admitted that she already stopped
schooling[7] and while she was living with her uncle and aunt, she worked as a scavenger and was able to gain friends.[8]

On 31 December 1998, about 11:30 in the evening, AAA went outside the house of her uncle and aunt to look for her brother because it was
New Years Eve and she, her brother, uncle and aunt were supposed to eat together. While she was looking for her brother, the appellant
approached and asked her where she was going. When she told him that she was looking for her brother, the appellant offered to help her
look for her brother and he even told her that he knew where her brother was.[9] AAA remembered that she had seen the appellant earlier
that day talking to her brother. Thinking that the appellant was her brothers friend, she readily agreed to go with him.[10] They walked
together and the appellant took her to a place with a hut or shanty located in Payatas, Quezon City.[11] Upon arrival thereat, both AAA and
the appellant crossed the fence. AAA called for her brother three times but no one answered.[12] She got irritated with the appellant for
misleading her. She decided to leave the place[13] but appellant held her right hand preventing her from leaving. AAA tried to remove
appellants grip on her hand and she succeeded. But then again, when she was about to go out, the appellant was able to hold her hand and
force her to enter the shanty or hut.[14] AAA was not able to shout for help as she was threatened by the appellant that if she would do so,
he would kill her brother. The appellant tried to cover her mouth to prevent her from shouting but he did not succeed because she kept on
struggling. Despite the appellants failure to cover her mouth, she was not able to shout as the appellant threatened her again that if she will
shout, he will kill her brother. Afraid, she did not shout.[15]

Once inside the hut or shanty, the appellant dragged her to a room where there was a mosquito net. The place was dark. When she turned
her head, her forehead hit a hard object, which made her a little bit dizzy.[16] Thereafter, the appellant forced her to lie down and forcibly
removed her garterized[17] shorts and panty. She pushed the appellant to prevent him from pulling down her shorts and panty, but her
efforts remained futile. The appellant was able to get on top of her, held her two hands outwards and spread her legs. AAA kept on struggling
by pushing the appellant away. She struggled to free herself by moving her body from side to side and by crossing her legs, but to no avail.
She likewise tried to shout but the appellant covered her mouth. Despite her tenacious resistance, the appellant kept on forcing himself on
her and also threatened her that if she would not accede to his lustful desire, he would kill her and her brother. Out of fear, she finally gave
in. The appellant then kissed her on the lips and also succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina and made push and pull movements for
several times. She felt pain.[18] After satisfying his lust, the appellant stood up, got dressed and threatened her not to tell anyone what had
happened; otherwise, he would kill her, her brother and her aunt. Then, the appellant left. When the appellant left, she also stood up, put on
her clothes and went home running and crying.[19]

When AAA reached their house, her uncle saw her and asked her why she was running and crying. She immediately told him that she was
raped but she did not know the name of her ravisher. Her uncle told her that they should report the incident to the police.[20] At dawn of 1
January 1999, AAA and her uncle left the house to go to the police station. While waiting for a ride, AAA saw the appellant standing beside a
barbeque stand. She immediately pointed to appellant as her malefactor. Her uncle got mad and was about to approach the appellant when
a jeepney arrived, which they boarded.[21] They went to a police station in their area; however, since there was no police investigator
present thereat, they went to another police station. Not having been attended to as there was also no police investigator present because it
was New Year, they then proceeded to Police Station 6, Batasan Hills, Quezon City. It was already 6:00 in the evening when they arrived
thereat.[22]
At Police Station 6, she narrated to the police officer what happened to her. After she made her complaint, she stayed at the police station
while SPO1 Pangilinan and her uncle, CCC, immediately proceeded to Payatas, the place where the alleged rape incident happened. In
Payatas, SPO1 Pangilinan and AAAs uncle saw the appellant walking along the street or near the dumpsite. AAAs uncle immediately pointed
the appellant to SPO1 Pangilinan as the person who abused his niece. SPO1 Pangilinan approached the appellant and invited him to go with
them to the police station. The appellant voluntarily submitted. The appellant was apprehended on the evening of 1 January 1999. Upon
their arrival at Police Station 6, another uncle of AAA was also present. When AAA saw the appellant at the police station, she readily pointed
to him as her abuser. And she came to know the name of the appellant when his statements were being taken by the police as she was
present thereat. The following day, or on 2 January 1999, AAA, together with her uncle, CCC, went to Camp Crame for her medical
examination.[23]

SPO1 Pangilinan corroborated the testimony of AAA that the latter made a complaint at Police Station 6 as regards the alleged rape incident.
He likewise affirmed that upon receiving the complaint of AAA, he, together with AAAs uncle, immediately proceeded to the place where the
alleged rape incident happened. And when they arrived at the said place, they saw the appellant walking around. He was able to recognize
the appellant as AAAs uncle pointed the appellant to him. He then invited the appellant to go with them at Police Station 6. Upon their arrival
at Police Station 6, AAA positively identified the appellant as her malefactor. Thereafter, he turned over the case to SPO4 Billones, the
investigator assigned at Police Station 6.[24]

SPO4 Billones testified that on 1 January 1999, she met AAA at Police Station 6. AAA was then accompanied by her uncle, CCC. They reported
to her the rape incident that happened to AAA on 31 December 1998 at around 11:30 p.m. After AAA informed her that she was raped, she
made a referral for AAA to be examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame. SPO4 Billones similarly affirmed that on 1 January 1999,
when the appellant was brought to their station, AAA was there and she positively identified the appellant as the person who raped her.
Thereafter, SPO4 Billones referred the case to the inquest fiscal.[25]

Dr. Reyes declared in court that on 2 January 1999, he met AAA at Medico-Legal Office in Camp Crame. She was brought there by her uncle
with a request from Police Station 6, Batasan Hills, for a medico-legal examination[26] as AAA was allegedly raped on 31 December 1998. He
conducted an extra-genital examination of AAAs body and found an abrasion on AAAs forehead on the frontal region measuring 0.5 by 3
centimeters. According to him, said abrasion could have been caused by the rubbing of the skin against a hard rough surface object, which
was sufficient to cause a scrape. On the examination of AAAs genital organ, he found that there was an abundance of pubic hair; the labia
majora, which is the most external portion of the vagina, was full, convex and coaptated. He also found the labia minora with abrasion. He
explained that the same ordinarily appears in the vaginal canal even if sexual intercourse occurred in a brutal manner but the woman was
stimulated or wet. He likewise found that the hymen of AAA was already remnant, which means that there was a possibility that AAA had
previously engaged in sexual intercourse prior to the alleged rape incident. He did not find any laceration in the hymen of AAA and there was
also an absence of spermatozoa in AAAs vagina. Dr. Reyes examined AAA about 36 hours after she was allegedly raped. He, however,
admitted that his findings jibe with the allegations of AAA. He then concluded that AAA was in a non-virgin state physically. Dr. Reyes reduced
into writing the medical examination he conducted on AAA.[27]

For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of the appellant and his brother, Rizaldy Arivan (Rizaldy), to refute the allegations of AAA.

The appellant vehemently denied that he raped AAA. He even claimed that AAA was his girlfriend. He testified that he met AAA for the first
time in November, 1998 at the dumpsite in Payatas, Quezon City. He started courting her also in November, 1998 and they became
sweethearts beginning December, 1998.
Appellant claimed that on 31 December 1998, at around 9:00 to 10:00 oclock in the evening, when he was about to go to the church for it
was New Years Eve, he met AAA in the street. Holding each others hand, they walked going to church. According to the appellant, the church
was near his brothers house and it was also in Payatas. On their way to the church, they met some of his friends who were also scavengers,
namely: Angelo, Exel, Aldrin and Noli, who was also called Handsome. He averred that AAA knew his friends because his friends also saw her
at the dumpsite. After the mass, which according to the appellant lasted for two hours, or at about 12:00 midnight, he, AAA, and his friends
went straight to his brothers house where they ate and lighted some firecrackers. He said that his brother knew that AAA was his girlfriend.
Then, at about 1:00 a.m. of 1 January 1999, they left his brothers house and proceeded to Angelos house. At that time, AAA was still with
him. When they arrived at Angelos house, they ate and talked with Angelos wife. He claimed that Angelo knew that AAA was his girlfriend.
They stayed in Angelos house until 1:30 a.m. of 1 January 1999.

Thereafter, appellant went to his house, which was only eight houses away. In going to his house, he was with Noli and AAA. His other friends
stayed at a party near Angelos house. In his house, he got his jacket and cap and had them worn by AAA. They stayed in his house for less
than 30 minutes. Then, they proceeded to another friends house, Ver, who was also his neighbor. On the way to Vers house, they met AAAs
brother who told AAA to go home as their grandfather was looking for her. AAA retorted that her brother should not bother with her. When
they arrived at Vers house, Vers mother was there. Appellant told AAA to go home because he had to attend to something and that he will go
somewhere else. AAA kept on following him and Noli. They left Vers house at around 3:00 a.m. They likewise went to Marlons house as there
was a party near his house. AAA and Noli went to the said party while the appellant stayed at Marlons house where he and Marlon had a
drinking session. After two hours, Noli returned. AAA was left at the said party because she met some acquaintances there. At about 5:30
a.m., appellant and Noli left Marlons house and instructed AAA to follow them at his house. When they arrived at his house, they likewise
drank beer. Excel, also a friend, arrived. At around 6:30 a.m., AAA arrived and ate breakfast with them. After they had their breakfast, AAAs
aunt arrived looking for her. AAA motioned to the appellant not to tell her aunt that she was there. The appellant then told AAAs aunt that
AAA was not with them. AAAs aunt left. AAAs aunt came back at 8:00 a.m., still looking for her. AAAs aunt did not find her for she was able to
run to a neighbors house through a broken wall. Again, AAAs aunt left angrily. When appellant went inside his house, he was surprised when
he did not find AAA. Louie, his neighbor, went to his house and told him that AAA was in their house. He told Louie to tell AAA to just follow
him at Aldrins house. At the latters house, they drank some beer and sang in the karaoke. AAA followed him there and they stayed there for
three hours. Suddenly, AAAs uncle arrived. AAA tried to run but her uncle was able to get hold of her hand and succeeded in pulling her out
of the house.

Subsequently, appellant and his companions went home. When he arrived at his house, where the alleged rape incident happened, he went
to sleep. Noli, who also lived there, likewise slept. The appellant woke up at around 7:00 p.m. of 1 January 1999. Then, he and Noli had
coffee. When he and Noli were about to go to the dumpsite, he was apprehended by the police and by some barangay officials. He asked
them why he was being apprehended and was told that he was being accused of raping AAA. He was then brought to Police Station 6, where
he was incarcerated for about seven days. He claimed that he and AAA did not have any sexual relation and he did not know any reason why
AAA was accusing him of such a grave offense.[28]

Rizaldy, appellants brother, testified that on 31 December 1998, at around 11:00 p.m. until 1:00 a.m. of 1 January 1999, he was at his house
with his family. Suddenly, his brother and his girlfriend, AAA, arrived. After half an hour, appellants barkadas likewise arrived. While eating,
he even noticed that his brother and AAA were so sweet to each other to the point of feeding each other. Afterwards, his brother lay down
on AAAs lap. His brother, with AAA on his side, later on told him that AAA was the woman whom he will marry. The group stayed in his house
for about an hour. Thereafter, they proceeded to one of the appellants friends.[29]

Rizaldy disclosed that he knew AAA as he always saw her with the appellant at the dumpsite. On 29 October 1998, he asked his brother if he
was courting AAA, to which the appellant replied yes. Only on 31 December 1998 did he learn that appellant and AAA were already
sweethearts for he saw his brother lie down on the lap of AAA when they were at his house. He admitted that the first time he came to know
that there was a complaint filed against his brother was on 2 January 1999. That was also the date when he found out that his brother was
brought to the police station. Upon knowing that his brother was already at the police station, he did not do anything. He did not even
volunteer to give a statement at the police station to shed light as to what really happened or to help his brother. It was only in the year 2000
that he learned that the case filed against his brother was for rape. He only knew that he was going to testify in court when a subpoena was
sent to his house in May, 2001.[30]
On 9 August 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape; the
dispositive portion of the said Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the [appellant], RAMON ARIVAN Y FORNILLO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape. He is hereby sentenced:

1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Considering that he has been detained since [2 January 1999], he must be credited in the
service of his sentence with the length of time that he has been detained;

2. To indemnify [AAA], in the amount of P50,000.00;

3. To pay [AAA] moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00; and

4. To pay the costs of the suit.[31]

The records of this case were originally transmitted before this Court on appeal. Pursuant to People v. Mateo,[32] the records were
transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.

In his brief, the appellants lone assignment of error was: the trial court gravely erred in finding the appellant guilty of the crime charged
despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[33]

The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision on 20 October 2005, affirming the Decision of the RTC.

The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.[34] In view thereof, the appellate court forwarded to this Court the records of this case.
On 7 March 2007, this Court resolved[35] to accept the present case and notify the parties that they may file their respective supplemental
briefs, if they so desired. The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it was adopting its brief dated 27 June 2005 filed before the
appellate court, as its supplemental brief.

After a meticulous review of the records, this Court finds no reason to reverse the judgments of the trial court and the appellate court.

A rape charge is a serious matter with pernicious consequences both for the appellant and the complainant; hence, utmost care must be
taken in the review of a decision involving conviction of rape.[36] Thus, in the disposition and review of rape cases, the Court is guided by
these principles: First, the prosecution has to show the guilt of the accused by proof beyond reasonable doubt or that degree of proof that, to
an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction. Second, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. Third, unless there are special reasons, the findings of trial courts, especially
regarding the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. Fourth, an accusation for rape can be
made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; and fifth, in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution.[37]

In the case at bar, the appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. According to him, he could not
have perpetrated the act complained of because at the time that the alleged rape incident happened, he and the private complainant were in
the company of other persons. This Court finds this argument unmeritorious.

As this Court has repeatedly said, lust is no respecter of time and place and the crime of rape can be consummated even when the malefactor
and victim are not alone. In fact, it can be committed in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school
premises, inside an occupied house, and even in the room where other members of the family are also sleeping. Its commission is not limited
to isolated places.[38]

Moreover, a candid narration by a rape victim deserves credence particularly where no ill motive is attributed to the rape victim that would
make her testify falsely against the accused. For no woman in her right mind will admit to having been raped, allow an examination of her
most private parts and subject herself as well as her family to the humiliation and shame concomitant with a rape prosecution, unless the
charges are true. Where an alleged victim says she was sexually abused, she says almost all that is necessary to show that rape had been
inflicted on her person, provided her testimony meets the test of credibility.[39]

The issue of credibility has, time and again, been settled by this Court as a question best addressed to the province of the trial court because
of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while
testifying which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial
courts assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the formers findings, particularly when no significant facts and
circumstances were shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have affected the outcome of the
case.[40] The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.[41]
In this case, no cogent reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure from the findings of the trial court with respect to the assessment
of AAAs testimony.

As can be gleaned from the records of the present case, when AAA testified in court, her testimony described in details the hideous
experience she suffered on 31 December 1998 in the hands of the appellant. In her narration on the manner of how the appellant took
advantage of her, she never wavered in her testimony. The trial court characterized AAAs testimony as straightforward, categorical and
candid. Further, during her testimony before the court a quo, she cried[42] whenever she had to recall and narrate what happened to her.
The crying of a victim during her testimony is evidence of the truth of the rape charges, for the display of such emotion indicates the pain that
the victim feels when asked to recount her traumatic experience.[43] And, as the trial court mentioned in its Decision, AAA exhibited courage
and conviction in prosecuting the case. She gladly cooperated with the court a quo during the ocular inspection of the place where the rape
incident happened, knowing that she had to go back to see the place where she had been abused by the appellant. Moreso, during AAAs
testimony before the trial court, she positively identified the appellant as her ravisher. The straightforward narration of AAA of what
transpired, accompanied by her categorical identification of appellant as the malefactor, sealed the case for the prosecution.[44] Also, it was
not shown that she had been motivated by any ill desire that would make her testify falsely against the accused. Given the foregoing, it is
beyond doubt that AAAs testimony is credible and the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

The contentions of the appellant that the trial court made a mistake in not believing that he and the private complainant were sweethearts
and that they did not engage in any sexual intimacy are likewise unavailing.

This Court is in conformity with the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court that, indeed, the appellant and the private
complainant were not sweethearts. The sweetheart defense is a much-abused defense that rashly derides the intelligence of the Court and
sorely tests its patience. Being an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love affair must be supported by convincing proof. In the present
case, other than the appellants self-serving assertions, there was no support of his claim that he and AAA were lovers. His sweetheart
defense cannot be given credence in the absence of corroborative proof like love notes, mementos, pictures or tokens, that such romantic
relationship really existed.[45] Moreso, as the appellate court stated in its Decision, the following circumstances or actuations of the private
complainant immediately after the alleged raped incident belies appellants claim of such a relationship, to wit: (1) AAA immediately disclosed
to her uncle that she was raped; (2) AAA immediately sought the help of the police authorities in apprehending the appellant; (3) AAA
subjected herself to physical examination; (4) AAA outrightly filed the criminal complaint against the appellant; and (5) AAA never knew the
name of the appellant until after the appellants statement was taken at Police Station 6.[46] In addition, the corroborative testimony of
Rizaldy that the private complainant and the appellant were sweethearts cannot be given any credit because of his relationship with the
appellant. This Court notes that Rizaldy is the brother of the appellant and it is well settled that the testimonies of close relatives and friends
are necessarily suspect and cannot prevail over the unequivocal declaration of the complaining witness.[47]

The appellant similarly avers that force and intimidation were not attendant in the case at bar and the requisites for the crime of rape were
not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance, particularly when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and
the latter submits herself to the appellants advances out of fear for her life or personal safety. The test remains to be whether the threat or
intimidation produces a reasonable fear in the mind of the victim that if she resists or does not yield to the desires of her attacker, the threat
would be carried out. It is thus not necessary for the victim to have resisted unto death or to have sustained physical injuries in the hands of
the accused. So long as the intercourse takes place against the victims will and she submits because of genuine apprehension of harm to her
and her family, rape is committed.[48]
Based on the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court, which findings are affirmed by this Court, the testimony of the private
complainant clearly proves that the appellant had carnal knowledge of her and the same was done through force and intimidation. It bears
emphasis that when the private complainant learned that her brother, BBB, was not in the hut, she decided to leave. The appellant, however,
grabbed her right hand and prevented her from leaving. Threatening that he would kill her brother, he dragged her inside the hut where he
succeeded in ravishing her. Under the circumstances, she indeed could not do anything but cry in fear. She tried to scream but he prevented
her by covering her mouth and threatening to kill her, her brother, aunt, and uncle. That she struggled and resisted is shown by the medical
findings that she sustained an abrasion on her forehead measuring 0.5 by 3 centimeters[49] which could have been caused by the rubbing of
the skin against a hard rough object. Indeed, force and intimidation were applied by the appellant in order to perpetrate the commission of
the crime of rape against AAA.

The medico-legal findings that AAA has a remnant hymen, meaning it was possible that she had engaged in sexual intercourse prior to 31
December 1998, and that no spermatozoa was found on her private organ, do not negate the fact of rape. The same cannot be used to the
advantage of the appellant as to exonerate him from the crime charged.

It is well-settled that the rupture of the hymen or vaginal lacerations are not necessary for rape to be consummated. A medical examination
is not indispensable in the prosecution of a rape victim. Insofar as the evidentiary weight of the medical examination is concerned, we have
already ruled that a medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely corroborative in character and is not an
indispensable element for conviction in rape. What is important is that the testimony of private complainant about the incident is clear,
unequivocal and credible, and this we find here to be the case.[50] Further, well-settled is the rule that prior sexual intercourse which could
have resulted in hymenal laceration is not necessary in rape cases for virginity is not an element of rape.[51] Hence, it is of no moment that
there is a finding that AAAs hymen was remnant.

Similarly, it must be stressed that the absence of spermatozoa in the private complainants sex organ does not disprove rape. It could be that
the victim washed or urinated prior to her examination, which may well explain the absence of spermatozoa.[52]

In sum, the straightforward testimony of AAA, as well as her unwavering and positive identification of her defiler and tormentor, was
sufficient to convict the appellant. Besides, appellants flimsy and self-serving sweetheart defense and denial were not able to destroy the
truthfulness and the credibility of AAAs testimony. As the Court of Appeals stated in its Decision dated 20 October 2005, the defense of the
appellant suffers from lack of credible corroboration. Other than his brother, none of those who were allegedly with them at one time or
another came forward to support his story. Thus, this Court is convinced that the trial court and the appellate court correctly convicted the
appellant of the crime of rape,[53] which is punishable by reclusion perpetua.[54]

As to damages. This Court affirms the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity given by the lower courts to the victim. Civil indemnity, which is
actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.[55]
Moral damages in rape cases should be awarded without need of showing that the victim suffered trauma of mental, physical, and
psychological sufferings constituting the basis thereof. These are too obvious to still require their recital by the victim at the trial, since we
even assume and acknowledge such agony as a gauge of her credibility.[56] Thus, this Court finds the award of moral damages by both lower
courts in the amount of P50,000.00 proper.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01163 dated 20 October 2005 finding herein
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Padiernos vs People

G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.

HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Amado M. Santiago, Jr. for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside: (a) the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal
Case

No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, disqualified from
acting in said criminal case; and (b) the Resolution of said court promulgated on

March 14, 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 Amended Informations against petitioner (Rollo, pp. 2-35 and pp. 36-94).

On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the
benefits of the Alien Legalization Program (Rollo, p. 36).

On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez,
205 SCRA 162 [1992]), to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that said case was intended
solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the
Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination."
The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992.
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which motion was set for hearing on
November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, pp. 38-41).

On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case for
arraignment on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 42)

On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a pending motion for inhibition, and that
petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 43-44).

On November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the arraignment (Rollo, p. 45).

On November 10, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 47-48). The motion stated that while the information
alleged that petitioner had approved the application or legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and advantages it lacked a list
of the favored aliens. According to petitioner, unless she was furnished with the names and identities of the aliens, she could not properly
plead and prepare for trial.

On November 12, 1992 and upon motion of petitioner in G.R.

No. 107598 (Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al.), we directed the Sandiganbayan (First Division) to reset the arraignment to a
later date and to dispose of the two incidents pending before it (Re: disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and the motion for the
bill of particulars).

At the hearing on November 13, 1992 on the motion for a bill of particulars, the prosecution stated categorically that they would file only one
amended information against petitioner.

However, on December 8, 1992, the prosecution filed a motion to

admit the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402; Rollo, pp. 61-126).

On March 3, 1993, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued the questioned Resolution dated March 11, 1993, denying the motion for his
disqualification (Rollo, pp. 151-164).

On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution, admitting the 32 Amended Informations and ordering
petitioner to post the corresponding bail bonds within ten days from notice (Rollo, pp. 165-185). Petitioner's arraignment on the 32 Amended
Informations was set for

April 12, 1993 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 186).

Hence, the filing of the instant petition.

Acting on the petition for the issuance of a restraining order, we issued the Resolution dated March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice
Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and from
enforcing the resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended Informations and from proceeding
with the arraignment on

April 12, 1993" (Rollo, p. 194).

Re: Disqualification of the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice

The petition for disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena is based on the publication of is letter in the July 29, 1992 issue of the
Philippine Star, which to petitioner "prejudged" the validity of the information filed
against her. Petitioner claims that Presiding Justice Garchitorena "cannot be expected to change the conclusions he has subconsciously
drawn in his public statements . . . when he sits in judgment on the merits of the case . . ." (Rollo, pp. 16-17).

The letter in question was written in response to an item in Teodoro Benigno's column in the July 22, 1992 issue of the Philippine Star,
criticizing the Sandiganbayan for issuing on July 11, 1992 a hold-departure order against petitioner. Benigno wrote that said order reflected a
"perverse morality" of the Sandiganbayan and the lack of "legal morality" of its Presiding Justice, thus:

I cannot, for example accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis Garchitorena who would stop Miriam Defensor Santiago
from going abroad for a Harvard scholarship because of graft charges against her. Some of the most perfidious Filipinos I know have come
and gone, left and returned to these shores without Mr. Garchitorena kicking any kind of rumpus. Compared to the peccadilloes of this
country's outstanding felons, what Miriam is accused of is kindergarten stuff. The Sandiganbayan Supremo got a lot of headlines for stopping
Miriam but I contend this is the kind of perverse morality we can do without (Rollo, p. 156).

The portion of the letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which petitioner finds objectionable, reads as follows:

(c) Mrs. Santiago has never informed any court where her cases are pending of her intention to travel, whether the Regional Trial Court
where she is charged with soliciting donations from people transacting with her office at Immigration or before the Sandiganbayan where she
is charged with having favored unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program nor even the Supreme Court where her
petition is still pending (Rollo, p. 158).

In particular, petitioner considered as prejudgment the statement of Presiding Justice Garchitorena that petitioner had been charged before
the Sandiganbayan "with having favored unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program."

The statement complained of was just a restatement of the Information filed against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 16698 in connection with
which the hold-departure order was issued. Said Information specified the act constituting the offense charged, thus:

That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization of
aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow
the legalization of the same, thereby causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to said aliens
in the discharge of the official and administrative functions of said accused (Rollo, p. 36).

It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of the Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the
hold-departure order which Benigno viewed as uncalled for. The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity and
integrity of the Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with no exception, have to secure permission
to leave the country. Nowhere in the letter is the merit of the charge against petitioner ever touched. Certainly, there would have been no
occasion for the letter had Benigno not written his diatribe, unfair at that, against the Sandiganbayan.

Notwithstanding petitioner's misgiving, it should be taken into consideration that the Sandiganbayan sits in three divisions with three justices
in each division. Unanimity among the three members is mandatory for arriving at any decision of a division (P.D. No. 1606, Sec. 5). The
collegiate character of the Sandiganbayan thus renders baseless petitioner's fear of prejudice and bias on the part of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena (Paredes v. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 [1969] ).

Re: Claim of denial of due process

Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were violated by reason of the delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation. According to her, while the offense was allegedly committed "on or before October 17, 1988", the information was
filed only on May 9, 1991 and the amended informations on December 8, 1992 (Rollo, p. 14).

Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 [1988] is inapplicable to petitioner's case. In Tatad, there indeed was an unexplained inaction on the
part of the public prosecutors inspite of the simplicity of the legal and factual issues involved therein.
In the case at bench, there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got snarled because of the complexity of the issues involved.
The act complained of in the original information came to the attention of the Ombudsman only when it was first reported in the January 10,
1989 issue of the Manila Standard. Immediately thereafter, the investigatory process was set in motion. The investigation was first assigned
to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of petitioner herself the investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor
Gualberto dela Llana but on request of petitioner herself the investigation was re-assigned to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon. The case was handled by a panel of four prosecutors, who submitted a draft resolution for the filing of the charges on March 29, 1990.
The draft resolution had to undergo the hierarchy of review, normal for a draft resolution with a dissenting vote, until it reached the
Ombudsman in March 1991.

We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R.

No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing of the
information against her in those petitions. a piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.

Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the
official acts complained of therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of
Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even
though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. she concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion
to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).

In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information (People v. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963] ).
Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion that:

(1) She was a public officer;

(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984;

(3) Those aliens were disqualified;

(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and

(5) She acted in "evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official functions."

The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.

The claims that the acts complained of were indeed authorized under Executive Order No. 324, that petitioner merely followed in good faith
the policy adopted by the Board of Commissioners and that the aliens were spouses or unmarried minor children of persons qualified for
legalization of stay, are matters of defense which she can establish at the trial.

Anent petitioner's claim that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had caused "undue injury to any party, including the
Government," there are two ways of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the
Government; and (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.

In Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held:

The use of the distinctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 (a). In other words the act of giving any
private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference is not an indispensable element of the offense of "causing any undue injury
to any party" as claimed by petitioners although there may be instances where both elements concur.
Re: Delito continuado

Be that as it may, our attention was attracted by the allegation in the petition that the public prosecutors filed 32 Amended Informations
against petitioner, after manifesting to the Sandiganbayan that they would only file one amended information (Rollo, pp. 6-61). We also
noted that petitioner questioned in her opposition to the motion to admit the 32 Amended Informations, the splitting of the original
information (Rollo, pp. 127-129). In the furtherance of justice, we therefore proceed to inquire deeper into the validity of said plant, which
petitioner failed to pursue with vigor in her petition.

We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and hence, there should only be one information
to be file against her.

The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous
crime."

In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that the concept of delito continuado has been a
vexing problem in Criminal Law — difficult as it is to define and more difficult to apply.

According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal
provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united
in one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim

(II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed.).

According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the
perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).

Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54).

Applying the concept of delito continuado, we treated as constituting only one offense the following cases:

(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the accused at the same time and at the same period of time
(People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320 [1939] ).

(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop and at the same period of time (People v. Jaranillo,
55 SCRA 563 [1974] ).

(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People v. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437 [1926] ).

(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time he collects veteran's benefits on behalf of a client, who
agreed that the attorney's fees shall be paid out of said benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). The collection of the legal fees were
impelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts of collection were made under the same criminal
impulse (People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 [1955] ).

On the other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the following cases:

(1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from January 19 to December 1955 and the other from January
1956 to July 1956 (People v. Dichupa, 113 Phil. 306 [1961] ). The said acts were committed on two different occasions.
(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and falsifications to conceal said offenses committed in August and
October 1936. The malversations and falsifications "were not the result of only one purpose or of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify .
. ." (People v. Cid, 66 Phil. 354 [1938] ).

(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure of the collector to turn over the installments for a radio
and the other in June 1964 involving the pocketing of the installments for a sewing machine (People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 [1976] ).

(4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from customers of the employer made on different dates
(Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 308 [1975]).

The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes penalized under special laws,

e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following up claims for war veteran's benefits (People v.
Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ).

Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence,
legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.

The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time creates a single offense or separate offenses has troubled also
American Criminal Law and perplexed American courts as shown by the several theories that have evolved in theft cases.

The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is, the taking of several things, whether belonging to the same
or different owners, at the same time and place constitutes but one larceny. Many courts have abandoned the "separate larceny doctrine,"
under which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also abandoned was the doctrine that the government has the
discretion to prosecute the accused or one offense or for as many distinct offenses as there are victims (annotation, 37 ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-
1414).

The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the commission of the different criminal acts as but one continuous act
involving the same "transaction" or as done on the same "occasion" (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81
Mich. 573, 45 NW 1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).

An American court held that a contrary rule would violate the constitutional guarantee against putting a man in jeopardy twice for the same
offense (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179). Another court observed that the doctrine is a humane rule, since if a separate charge could be filed for
each act, the accused may be sentenced to the penitentiary for the rest of his life (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179).

In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act — that of her approving the application
for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege.

The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law — Executive Order No. 324
dated

April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about
October 17, 1988.

The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information, except that instead of the word "aliens" in the
original information each amended information states the name of the individual whose stay was legalized.

At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that they would file only one amended information
embodying the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. As stated in the Order dated November 12, 1992 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division):
On the matter of the Bill of Particulars, the prosecution has conceded categorically that the accusation against Miriam Defensor Santiago
consists of one violation of the law represented by the approval of the applications of 32 foreign nationals for availment (sic) of the Alien
Legalization Program. In this respect, and responding directly to the concerns of the accused through counsel, the prosecution is categorical
that there will not be 32 accusations but only one . . . (Rollo, p. 59).

The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The
strong probability even exists that the approval of the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of
the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document.

Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the Government suffered a single harm or
injury. The Sandiganbayan in its Order dated November 13, 1992 stated as follows:

. . . Equally, the prosecution has stated that insofar as the damage and prejudice to the government is concerned, the same is represented
not only by the very fact of the violation of the law itself but because of the adverse effect on the stability and security of the country in
granting citizenship to those not qualified (Rollo, p. 59).

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) is AFFIRMED and its
Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is MODIFIED in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office
of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one information
charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25,
1993 is LIFTED insofar as to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 137953-58. April 11, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellant, vs. WILFREDO DELA TORRE, appellee.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The prosecution cannot appeal a decision in a criminal case whether to reverse an acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed in a
conviction.

The Case

The prosecution appeals the March 31, 1998 Decision[1] and June 3, 1998 Order[2] issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales
(Branch 69)[3] in Criminal Cases Nos. 2179-I, 2180-I, 2181-I, 2182-I, 2183-I and 2184-I. The assailed Decision convicted Wilfredo Dela Torre of
two counts of acts of lasciviousness and four counts of rape, while the challenged Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
plaintiff (now appellant).

The dispositive portion of the Decision is reproduced hereunder:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Wilfredo dela Torre is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as follows:
1) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2179-I of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, is
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years of prision correccional, and to indemnify Mary Rose
dela Torre in the amount of P10,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.

2) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2180-I of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, is
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years of prision correccional, and to indemnify Mary Rose
dela Torre in the amount of P10,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.

3) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2181-I of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.

4) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2182-I of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.

5) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2183-I of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.

6) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2184-I of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of civil
damages.[4]

The two Amended Informations for acts of lasciviousness, dated July 1, 1997, were similarly worded as follows:

That on or about the 30th day of September, 1996 at Brgy. Guisguis, municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being the father of one Mary Rose de la Torre, actuated by lust and by means of
coercion, threats, intimidation and other consideration, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness
on the person of Mary Rose de la Torre, a minor of 11 years old, to the damage and prejudice of the said Mary Rose de la Torre.[5]

The other Information[6] charged appellee with the same crime against the same victim on a different date, October 10, 1996.

On the other hand, the four Informations charging him with rape, dated July 1, 1997, similarly read as follows:

That on or about the 18th day of October, 1996 at Brgy. Guisguis, municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of Zambales, Philippine[s], and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being the father of one Mary Rose de la Torre, with lewd design by means of coercion,
threats, intimidation and other consideration, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge with one Mary
Rose de la Torre, a minor of 11 years old, without her consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.[7]

The three other Amended Informations recited the same allegations on different dates: November 1,[8] November 12[9] and December
23,[10] 1996. When arraigned on August 13, 1997, appellee pleaded[11] not guilty[12] to all six (6) Informations. After trial in due course, the
RTC rendered the challenged Decision.

Appellee did not appeal, but the prosecution filed a Notice of Appeal[13] dated June 9, 1998.

The Facts

Appellants Version

In its Brief,[14] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecutions version of the facts as follows:
Appellee Wilfredo dela Torre had a common-law relationship with Melinda dela Torre. The latter gave birth to three children, Mary Rose,
Mark Anthony, and Mark Domil. When Mary Rose was about seven (7) years old, her mother left the conjugal abode with Mark Domil,
leaving her and sibling Mark Anthony in the care of appellee, who resided with his progeny in a one-room hut in Sitio Pao, Guis-guis, Sta.
Cruz, Zambales.

Mary Rose and her brother Mark Anthony studied at the Guinabon Elementary School. She was the brightest in her class, even though
because of their poverty, she had to walk from their hut to the school everyday.

In January of 1997, Felita Sobrevilla, noticed a sudden change in the behavior and performance of Mary Rose, who was twelve-year[s] old at
th[at] time. The latter appeared sleepy, hungry and snobbish. She also urinated on her panty. When confronted by Generosa Mayo, the head
teacher, Mary Rose admitted to her that she was abused repeatedly by appellee. Mayo informed Elpidia Balindo, the aunt of Mary Rose,
about the abuses. They then decided to refer the matter to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), who took Mary
Rose under its custody.

It turned out that on September 30, 1996, Mary Rose was about to sleep when appellee told her, anak puwede ba nating subukan? She did
not understand what that meant and continued to sleep. Appellee then placed himself on top of Mary Rose. After removing her shorts as
well as his shorts, he poked his penis into her organ. He also kissed and embraced Mary Rose, who just wept. The same incident was
repeated in the evening of October 10, 1996.

In the evening of October 18, 1996, appellee was able to insert his penis into the vagina of Mary Rose. After the act, her whole body ached.
She started to fear appellee. He also had sexual intercourse with his minor daughter on three more occasions, that is, on November 1 and 12
and December 23, 1996.

A medical examination conducted by Dr. Milagrina Mayor, Rural Health Physician of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, on Mary Rose revealed that her
vagina admitted one finger with ease. She was no longer a virgin. Her hymen was broken with healed lacerations at the 3:00, 6:00 and 9:00
nine oclock positions. The girl also suffered from urinary tract infection.[15] (Citations omitted)

Appellees Version

On the other hand, appellees statement of facts,[16] as contained in his Brief,[17] is reproduced as follows:

Appellee WILFREDO DELA TORRE had three (3) children with Melinda Torre, namely: Mary Rose, Mark Anthony and Mark Ronnil. Melinda left
her family when Mary Rose was about seven (7) years old bringing with her Mark Ronnil. The victim lived with her father and brother Mark
Anthony in Sta. Cruz, Zambales.

Felina Sobrevilla, teacher of Mary Rose, noticed sudden changes in her behavior and when confronted, the latter admitted that she was
sexually abused by her father. Her head teacher informed her Aunt Elpidia Balindo about the sexual abuses. They referred the case to the
DSWD who took her under its custody.

Mary Rose testified that her father committed sexual abuses on her on the following dates: September 30, 1996, October 10, 1996, October
18, 1996, November 01, 1996, November 12, 1996 and December 23, 1996.

Appellee, on the other hand denies vehemently the charges being imputed on him by her daughter and said that the only reason he can think
of why the daughter filed the charges is because he did not allow her to stay with her teacher, Mrs. Sobrevilla.[18] (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Trial Court

The RTC ruled that it was duly established that accused Wilfredo committed acts of lasciviousness against Mary Rose on 30 September 1996
and 10 October 1996, and had carnal knowledge [of] Mary Rose on 18 October 1996, 01 November 1996, 12 November 1996 and 23
December 1996.[19] Further, the trial court added that the moral ascendancy of appellee over the victim was equivalent to intimidation. It
did not give any probative value to his uncorroborated and unsubstantiated defenses of denial and alibi.

However, the court a quo refused to impose the supreme penalty of death on appellee. It maintained that there were circumstances that
mitigated the gravity of the offenses, as follows:

1. As testified to (supra) there was absence of any actual, physical violence or intimidation in the commission of the acts complained of.

xxxxxxxxx

2. The abandonement by Melinda (common-law wife of accused Wilfredo and mother of Mary Rose) when Mary Rose was seven (7) years old
leaving behind Wilfredo, Mary Rose and her brother, Mark Anthony.

3. The extreme poverty on the life of Wilfredo, Mary Rose and Mark Anthony.

4. After the mother of Mary Rose left the conjugal home, for more than five (5) years, Wilfredo, Mary Rose and Mark Anthony were living
together as a family and Mary Rose was never molested by her father.

5. There is reason to deprive Wilfredo of the love of her daughter Mary Rose but there is no reason to deprive Mark Anthony of the love of
his father considering that both Mary Rose and Mark Anthony have no one to call as a mother.[20]

Hence, this appeal.[21]

The Issue

In this appeal, the solicitor general assigns this single error for our consideration:

The Court a quo erred in penalizing appellee with reclusion perpetua in each of the four indictments for rape, instead of imposing the
supreme penalty of death as mandated by R.A. No. 7659.[22]

The Courts Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

Lone Issue:

Propriety of Appeal by the Prosecution

The prosecution asks this Court to modify the RTC Decision by imposing the supreme penalty of death on the accused. It argues that it has
proven that the victim is the daughter of the accused, and that she was below eighteen (18) years old when the rapes took place. As a
consequence, the trial court should have imposed the penalty of death pursuant to Section 11 of RA 7659.[23]

Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused
will be placed in double jeopardy. This provision is substantially the same as that provided by the 1985 Rules.
The question now is whether an increase in the penalty imposed by the lower court will violate the right of the accused against double
jeopardy.

In several cases, this Court has already definitively ruled on this issue. Recently, in People v. Leones,[24] it unmistakably declared that [w]hile
it is true that this Court is the Court of last resort, there are allegations of error committed by a lower court which we ought not to look into
to uphold the right of the accused. Such is the case in an appeal by the prosecution seeking to increase the penalty imposed upon the
accused for this runs afoul of the right of the accused against double jeopardy.[25] It added:

This Court has not just once ruled that where the accused after conviction by the trial court did not appeal his conviction, an appeal by the
government seeking to increase the penalty imposed by the trial court places the accused in double jeopardy and should therefore be
dismissed.[26]

This doctrine was applied as early as 1904 in Kepner v. United States[27] (hereinafter Kepner), as follows:

The Court of First Instance, having jurisdiction to try the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused, found Kepner not guilty; to try him
again upon the merits, even in an appellate court, is to put him a second time in jeopardy for the same offense.[28]

The Kepner doctrine was clarified in a 1987 case.[29] Speaking through Justice Isagani A. Cruz, the Court explained that an appeal of the
prosecution from a judgment of acquittal (or for the purpose of increasing the penalty imposed upon the convict) would place him in double
jeopardy.[30]

Double jeopardy provides three related protections: (1) against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) against a
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) against multiple punishments for the same offense.[31]

Although Kepner technically involved only a single proceeding, the Court regarded the practice as equivalent to two separate trials, and the
evil that the Court saw in the procedure was plainly that of multiple prosecution.[32]

The ban on double jeopardy is deeply rooted in jurisprudence. The doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State
from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated
trials.[33] It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the
hope of securing a conviction.[34] And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of
securing a greater penalty.[35]

Being violative of the right against double jeopardy, the instant appeal filed by the prosecution cannot prosper. The rule is clear -- the
prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty.[36]

Besides, even assuming that the penalties imposed by the RTC were erroneous, these cannot be corrected by this Court on an appeal by the
prosecution. Said the Court:

Whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the
intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious
the error may be.[37]

The only way to nullify an acquittal or to increase the penalty is through a proper petition for certiorari to show grave abuse of discretion.
This was explained in People v. CA and Maquiling[38] as follows:

While certiorari may be used to correct an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that
the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. On the other hand, if
the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right
against double jeopardy would be violated. Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to
the express injunction of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy.[39]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 100382-100385. March 19, 1997]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO TABACO, accused-appellant.

DECISION

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

In four related informations, Mario Tabaco was charged with four counts of Murder for shooting to death on March 22, 1987 Capt. Oscar
Tabulog (Criminal Case No. 10-259), Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Criminal Case No. 10-270), Felicito Rigunan (Criminal Case No. 10-284) and Pat.
Romeo Regunton (Criminal Case No. 10-317). Except for the names of the victims, the informations in these four (4) cases identically read:

"That on or about March 22, 1987, in the Municipality of Aparri, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused Mario Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one [name], inflicting upon him several wounds which caused his death.

Contrary to Law."[1]

In Criminal Case No. 10-316, accused was charged in the following information with the complex crime of Homicide and Frustrated Homicide
for shooting to death Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo:

"That on or about March 22, 1987, in the municipality of Aparri, province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, Mario Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and
shoot Jorge Siriban, Jr., and S/Sgt. Benito Raquepo, inflicting upon them wounds on their bodies, which wounds sustained by Jorge Siriban,
Jr., caused his death.

That the accused had performed all the acts of execution (with respect to the victim Sgt. Benito Raquepo; which would have produced the
crime of Homicide as a consequence but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his own will."[2]

All cases were consolidated before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan.

The mass of evidence for the prosecution, as found by the trial court, is as follows:

"In the evening of March 22, 1987, the 17th PC stationed at Aparri, Cagayan, under then Lt. James Andres Melad, sponsored a cock derby,
under the name of Jose Ting, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Aparri, Cagayan.

This being so, peace officers in uniform with long firearms were assigned as guards to maintain peace and order at the cockpit arena namely:
(1) Sgt. Benito Raquepo; (2) CIS Roque P. Datugan, both from the 117th PC and (3) Pat. Andles Semana, INP, Aparri, Cagayan. Accused Mario
Tabaco who was in civilian clothes claims to have been also assigned by his Commanding Officer of 117th PC, to verify the presence of NPAs
and assist in the protection of VIPs in the cockpit arena, bringing with him his M-14 issued firearm.

Other peace officers who came to participate were: (1) Policeman Mariano Retreta of INP, Buguey, Cagayan, who arrived with the deceased
Jorge Siriban and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., Licerio Antiporda II; (2) Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer of 117th PC Company; (3) Policeman Romeo Regunton
(deceased) who was also armed, arrived in company with the deceased Ex-Mayor Arreola; (4) Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, INP Buguey; (5)
Pat. Barba; and (6) CIC PC Paragas.

At about nine (9) o'clock in the evening of same date, the group of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola of Buguey, Cagayan, arrived at the cockpit
arena. His companions were (1) Antonio Villasin; (2) Rosario Peneyra; (3) victim Lorclo Pita, Jr. and/or five (5) of them including the Mayor.
They occupied and were (4th row) north western part cockpit-gate. Others seated with the Mayor were: (1) the late Capt. Oscar Tabulog; (2)
the late Pat. Romeo Regunton, who was at the back of the mayor; (3) the late Felicito Rigunan. The accused CIC Tabaco was seated on the
arm of the bench situated at the lower portion of the arena about more than three (3) meters away, (infront and a little bit in the west), from
the place where the late Mayor and his group were seated (at the 4th row of seats upper portion). During the ocular inspection conducted,
the Court noticed the distance to be more than three (3) meters, and/or probably 4-5 meters.

At about ten(10) o'clock 1987, while the accused Mario Tabaco was seated as described above, he suddenly without warning or provocation,
shot the late mayor Jorge Arreola, with his M-14 rifle, followed by several successive burst of gunfire, resulting in the shooting to death of the
late Mayor Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Romeo Regunton, although the latter managed to run passing through the
western gate near the gaffers cage but was chased by accused Tabaco. Regunton was later found dead inside the canteen of Mrs. Amparo Go
inside the Octagon cockpit arena.

Pat. Mariano Retreta of INP Buguey, who was then at the Co's canteen, saw the accused going out rushing from the cockpit arena, at a
distance of one meter. Pat. Retreta is a relative and neighbor of the accused Tabaco in Buguey, Cagayan. He tried to pacify Tabaco telling him
'what is that happened again Mario.' Meanwhile, Sgt. Benito Raquepo of 117th PC, and one of those assigned to maintain peace and order at
the Octagon cockpit arena, who was at the canteen taking snacks, heard five (5) successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena.
In a little while, he saw the accused Tabaco coming from inside the cockpit arena. Raquepo advised Tabaco 'Mario relax ka lang' 'Mario keep
calm.' They stood face to face holding their rifles and when Tabaco pointed his gun towards Sgt. Raquepo, Pat. Retreta grappled for the
possession of the gun to disarm Tabaco, and in the process, the gun went off hitting Sgt. Raquepo and also the late Jorge Siriban who
happened to be near Raquepo. Siriban died on the spot while Raquepo survived his wounds on his legs due to adequate medical treatment.

There were other persons injured that evening namely: (1) Antonio Chan injured on his right foot; (2) Salvador Berbano injured on his right
forearm and on his right abdomen and (3) Rosario Peneyra on his face and right shoulder. But, the three, did not file their complaints."[3]

Upon the other hand, the evidence for the defense as stated in the Brief for the Accused-appellant is as follows:

"Ordered by his commanding officer in the 117th PC Company to assist in the maintenance of peace and order at the Octagon Cockpit Arena
located at Talungan, Aparri, Cagayan on March 22, 1987, accused Mario Tabaco with his officially issued M-14 rifle and with the basic load of
ammunition went to the Octagon Cockpit arena on March 22, 1987 in compliance to the orders of a superior officer arriving thereat at about
12:00 o'clock noon, more or less. He directly went inside the cockpit arena to make some observations and found out that there were several
persons inside the said cockpit who were in possession of firearms, some short and some long, and were seen in different places and/or
corners of the cockpit. Accused did not bother to verify as to why the said persons were allowed to carry their firearms because of his
impressions that if they did not have the authority, the guards of the main gate of the cockpit would surely have confiscated the same from
them. It was his belief then that they may have come from other agencies of the government, assigned to help in the maintenance of peace
and order in the cockpit, Accused thus seated himself at the lowermost seat (first step) of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena
on March 22, 1987.

At about 9:00 o'clock that very night of March 22, 1987, while accused was seated at the lowermost seat of the slanted bleachers of the
Octagon Cockpit arena, he heard a gun report fired atop his head. Having been officially assigned to help in the maintenance of peace and
order in the cockpit and that his presence must be known, his immediate reaction upon hearing the gun report was to fire a warning shot in
the air and directed to the ceiling and/or roof of the Octagon cockpit arena. After firing a warning shot, his warning was answered by burst of
gun fire coming from different directions inside the cockpit arena, for which reason, he forced to leave and rush outside, holding his M-14
rifle with the muzzle pointed downwards. As he (accused) rushed towards the main gate of the cockpit arena, Mariano Retreta and Sgt.
Benito Raquepo saw him and who told him, (accused) to relax lang. Accused testified that when Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito Raquepo
told him to relax lang, he all the time thought that the gun reports fired inside the cockpit arena was nothing to said persons. Accused
however, insisted to go out, but in so doing, Mariano Retreta pressed the gun which he was holding downwards and grabbed said gun from
accused. As the gun was pressed by Mariano Retreta, said gun went off, hitting Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. That
because of such incident, accused had to run away, out of fear to Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the family of Jorge Siriban who may lay the blame
on him. The following morning, accused surrendered to the police authorities of Lallo, Cagayan, who happened to pass by, not on account of
the death of Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Oscar Regunton which he did not know at the time he
surrendered, but on account of the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the injury sustained by Sgt. Benito Raquepo."[4]

After trial, the court a quo, in a joint decision dated January 14, 1991, found accused-appellant guilty as charged on all counts. In giving
credence to the version of the prosecution over that of accused-appellant, it found that:

"From the evidence adduced, it is easily discernible that the prosecution and defense cannot agree on what actually transpired that night of
March 22, 1987, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena, Aparri, Cagayan leading to the shooting to death of subject victims. For, while the prosecution
maintains that it was the accused Mario Tabaco who shot the victims, the defense insists that he is not the assailant, but somebody else or
others, since the accused merely fired a warning shot upwards the roof of the cockpit arena.

In fine, the Court is called upon to resolve the issue of credibility versions. 'Where there are directly conflicting versions of the same incident,
the Court, in its search for the truth, perforce has to look for some facts and circumstances which can be used as valuable tools in evaluating
the probability or improbability of a testimony for after all, the element of probability is always involved in weighing testimonial evidence.
(Carolina Industries, Inc. vs. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., L-46908, May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 734; Lacsan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-
46485, November 21, 1979, 94 SCRA 461, both citing the case of People vs. Boholst Caballero, L-2349, November 25, 1974, 61 SCRA 180).

Towards this end, the prosecution presented three (3) eyewitnesses, namely: Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and Fireman Rogelio
Guimmayen in the shooting to death of the deceased victims, Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Romeo Regunton and Felicito
Rigunan. Also, the prosecution presented Sgt. Benito Raquepo, Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer, and three (3) eyewitnesses in
the shooting to death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Sgt. Raquepo. So too, the prosecution presented PC Sgt. Antonio Domingo, Pat.
Andres Semana, PC Sgt. Jose Algeria and Pat. Merlin Bautista, as corroborative witnesses in both situational cases/incidents. As well stated in
the above findings of facts, prosecution witnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra actually saw the accused Mario Tabaco stood up from
his seat at the lower front row and in port arm position directed his M-14 rifle towards the place of the late Mayor Arreola, and his group at
the 4th row upper portion of the bleachers and fired three successive automatic gun shots that felled Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar
Tabulog, Pat. Romeo Regunton and one Felicito Rigunan. This was corroborated by prosecution witness Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who
was then ten (10) meters away from the accused, which was not far, considering that the cockpit arena was well-lighted at that time.

Not only that, immediately after the gun burst of automatic fire, the accused was seen coming out rushing from inside the cockpit arena by
INP Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Raquepo, the former being a relative and neighbor, pacified accused Tabaco, telling 'what is that
happened again Mario,' while the latter told him 'Mario relax ka lang keep calm.' After which Mariano Retreta grappled for the possession of
the gun assisted by PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer when Tabaco refused to stop. Sgt. Ferrer got the gun M-14 and surrendered it to his Commanding
Officer, as corroborated by Sgt. Antonio Domingo, while in the process of disarming the accused Mario Tabaco, when the gun went of, hitting
the deceased victim Jorge Siriban and Sgt. Raquepo."[5]

The accused admitted that the M-14 rifle which he brought with him to the cockpit arena was heavily loaded, but when the gun was taken
from his possession by Pat. Retreta and PC Sgt. Ferrer, the gun's magazine was already empty.

The court a quo said further:

"ATTY. VILLENA:

Q: When you took that M-14 from the accused, do you remember if it had a magazine that time?

A: Yes, sir with magazine.

Q: Do you have the magazine now?

A: It is with 117th PC Company, sir.

Q: After taking that M-14 from the accused, did you examine the rifle?

A: Yes, sir, I examined it.

Q: Did you examine the magazine of that rifle?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did you examine if there are live bullets?

A: No live bullets, sir. "(TSN, direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer, pp. 44-45, March 26, 1990 session, stenographer L. Tamayo).

Further, Sgt. Ferrer continued:

"PROSECUTOR ATAL:

Q: You likewise mentioned in your direct examination that when you surrendered this gun, M-14, and this magazine, there were no live
ammunitions in the magazine?

A: There were two remaining bullets, sir.

Q: How many bullets in all?

A: Twenty, sir.

Q: You said you heard first seven gun reports?

A: Yes, sir I heard seven gun reports. (TSN, continuation of direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer, May 14, 1990 session, Stenographer L. Tamayo).

MORE, there is evidence that empty/spent shells of bullets were found inside the cockpit arena (Exh. 'R' & 'R-1', pp. 157-158, record).

ATTY. ARIOLA:

Q: Showing to you Exh. 'R', do you know whose picture is this?

A: Picture of spent shells.

Q: How about Exh. 'R-1', do you know what is this?

A: The same, sir spent shells. (TSN, PC/CIS Sgt. Investigator Jose Algeria, p. 29, Oct. 1, 1990 session, Stenographer L. Tamayo).
Finally, another circumstance which maybe considered as adverse against the accused, is the fact that he was really arrested and not that he
voluntarily surrendered as appearing in the INP Lallo Police Blotter, as testified to by Pat. Melin Bautista (Exh. 'S', p. 188, record).

Furthermore, it appears that the same accused Mario Tabaco, has still a pending case for murder before Branch 6, of this Court. (Exh. 'T', p.
187, record).

The Court is impressed with the testimonies of the three prosecution eyewitnesses namely: Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and INP
Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who narrated their versions of the incident with ring of truth, which are both clear and convincing, in regard to
the shooting to death by accused Mario Tabaco of the deceased victims Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Crim. Case No. 10-270), Capt. Oscar Tabulog
(Crim. Case No. 1259), Pat Romeo Regunton (Crim. Case No. 10-317) and the late Felicito Rigunan (Crim. Case No. 10-284).

Such positive testimonies were corroborated by the testimonies of PC Sgt. Raquepo, PC Sgt. Ferrer and Pat. Mariano Retreta, who saw the
accused rushing outside the cockpit arena holding his M-14 rifle, immediately after the burst of successive and automatic gunfire inside the
cockpit arena. Although they have not seen the accused shoot the four victims (Arreola, Tabulog, Rigunan and Regunton), yet their
corroborative testimonies constitute sufficient combination of all circumstances, so as to produce a conviction of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. (People vs. Pimentel, 147 SCRA 251; People vs. Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714), even as such circumstances proved reasonable leads to the
conclusion pointing to the accused Tabaco, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime. (People vs. Magallanes, 147 SCRA 92;
People vs. Macatana, 161 SCRA 235). And, in the face of all these circumstances, the burden of proof to establish his innocence LIES on the
accused, as the ONUS PROBANDI from that moment is now shifted to the accused. (Dulpo vs. Sandiganbayan, 150 SCRA 138). A resort to
circumstantial evidence is in the very nature of things, a necessity, and as crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where
concealment is highly probable, and to require direct testimony would in many cases result in freeing criminals and would deny the proper
protection of society. (People vs. ROA, 167 SCRA 116).

As to the death of Jorge Siriban (Crim. Case No. 10-316) and the wounding of Sgt. Raquepo, there is no adventure of doubt, that accused
Mario Tabaco was the author of the crime charged and thus be held responsible for the same. The evidence adduced in this case is
overwhelming, coming no less from accused's brothers PC personnel, who, aside from their direct testimonies, are entitled to the settled rule
that they have regularly performed their official duty. (Section 5[M], Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court).

Accordingly, the Court is not impressed with the defense put up by the accused, even as it does not inspire confidence, hence, the same
deserves no credence.

The accused contends that he merely fired his gun up towards the roof, and that he could have not shot the four (4) deceased victims with
the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola considering the elevation of the 4th step or row in the upper bleachers of the cockpit arena, in relation to
where the accused was, the front row, in much lower elevation. The accused further contends that he could not have shot afore-said victims,
as maybe gleaned from the testimony of Dr. Rivera, especially to wound No. 2, inflicted upon the body of the late Mayor Arreola.

The Court believes otherwise. In the first place, the three (3) eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio
Guimmayen, testified that they saw the accused stood up from his seat and directed his gun M-14 towards the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola
who were then at the upper 4th row of cemented seats at the bleachers. They could have been inaccurate of the distance of meters, as it
could have been around 5 meters from where the accused stood up, which is a little bit west of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who were
then facing south, face to face with the accused. This is true and the same will jibe with the findings of Dr. Rivera, where the gun shot wounds
inflicted upon the body of the late Capt. Tabulog, were on the left portion of his forehead front to back (Wound No. 1); Wound No. 2, in his
left temple; Wound No. 3, below his right clavicle of his right shoulder and Wound No. 4, on his left thigh downward.

In the case of the late Mayor Arreola his wounds are: Wound No. 1, is on the left side of his head above the hairline; Wound No. 2, right base
of his neck and exited at the upper shoulder base through and through. Wound No. 3, was on his left lower abdomen and his lower back as
exit for wound Nos. 1 and 2, the relative position of the assailant and the victim is face to face, so with Wound No. 3. For wound No. 2, the
point of entry is higher than the point of exit, but there is a possibility that the victim Arreola, probably bent forward and the bullet
ricocheted.

It must be noted that the seats in the upper bleachers where the group of the late Mayor stayed were all cemented including their back rests
and the bullets fired from the gun of the accused must have rebounded or deflected from surface to surface, on the cemented back rests and
seats hitting wound No. 2, on the body of the Mayor and the bodies of Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. The bullets RICOCHETED, at
the place where the group of the Mayor stayed. Anent the cemented railguard dividing the lower and upper bleachers, the same is not too
high so as to obviate the possibility of hitting the group of the late Mayor Arreola, especially as in this case, when the accused stood up from
his seat and fired at his victims. Witness Rosario Peneyra testified that his wound on his face and right abdomen must have been caused by
the debris of the said cemented railguard which was hit by the bullets.

In the case of the death of Jorge Siriban, there is not much dispute as the evidence adduced is overwhelming and even the defense admits
that Siriban died due to gunshot wounds inflicted upon him during the grappling of the subject gun (Exh. 'K').

The Court believes in the reliability and intrinsic credibility of the prosecution witnesses, there being no competent evidence presented for
them to falsely testify against the accused. There is no issue of motive, as the accused was clearly and positively identified.

All told, the Court believes and so holds that herein accused Mario Tabaco is the author/culprit in the shooting to death of the deceased
victims, Jorge Arreola, Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, as well as the deceased Jorge Siriban and the wounding of
Benito Raquepo."[6]

The dispositive part of the decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, and fortified by the balm of clear judicial conscience, the Court finds the accused Mario
Tabaco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of all the crimes charged against him:

1. In Criminal Cases Nos. (a) 10-259 (Oscar Tabulog); (b) No. 10-270 (Jorge Arreola); (c) 10-284 (Felicito Rigunan); and (d) 10-317 (Romeo
Regunton), involving four (4) murder victims, but declared to have been prosecuted in one Information; the same being a complex crime
under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, the accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced to a single penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, in its maximum
period, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased victims Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and
Romeo Regunton, the amount of P50,000.00 each for a total of P150,00.00 subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate
docket fees if collected, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. However, in Criminal Case No. 10-270, the accused Mario
Tabaco is further ordered to pay the heirs of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola, the grand total amount of P633,500.00, by way of total civil
liability, subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket fees, in case of successful collection, both without
subsidiary imprisonment in case insolvency.

2. In Criminal Case No. 10-316 for Homicide with Frustrated Homicide, the accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty ranging from, ten (10) years and one(1) day Prision Mayor as MINIMUM, to Seventeen (17) years, Four(4) months, one (1) day of
RECLUSION TEMPORAL as MAXIMUM, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Jorge Siriban, the amount of P50,000.00, by way of death
indemnity, plus P30,000.00 to Sgt. Benito Raquepo, by way of medical expenses incurred, subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of
the appropriate docket fees in case of successful collection; both without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

3. The M-14 rifle (Exh. 'K' and 'K-2') the corpus delicti, presently deposited with 117th PC Company, Aparri, Cagayan, is hereby ordered
forfeited in favor of the government; Perforce, the Commanding Officer of the 117th PC, Aparri, Cagayan, is peremptorily ordered to deposit
to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court of this court, the said M-14 rifle with magazines, for proper disposition in accordance with law and the
rules.

4. The accused to pay the costs.

5. In the service hereof, the accused shall be entitled to the full length of time, he underwent preventive imprisonment (March 23, 1987),
provided he voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he shall be
credited to only four-fifth (4/5) thereof. (Art. 29, NCC; as amended by RA 6127, June 17, 1970; U.S. vs. Ortencio, 38 Phil. 341; People vs.
Chavez, 126 SCRA 1).

SO ORDERED."[7] (Underscoring ours)

Notwithstanding the single penalty imposed by the trial court, accused still interposed the present appeal on the following grounds:
(1) The trial court erred in convicting Mario Tabaco of the crime of murder in connection with the deaths of Oscar Tibulog, Jorge Arreola,
Felicito Rigunan, and Romeo Regunton.

(2) The trial court erred in holding Mario Tabaco liable for homicide on the death of Jorge Siriban and the injury sustained by Benito Raquepo.

(3) The trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of accused-appellant Tabaco.

The pivotal issue presented in this case is one of credibility. Time and again, we have ruled that when the issue hinges on the credibility of
witnesses vis-a-vis the accused's denials, the trial court's findings with respect thereto are generally not disturbed on appeal,[8] unless there
appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted.[9] The reason for the rule is eloquently stated in the case of People vs. de Guzman,[10] thus:

"In the resolution of factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having
the opportunity to observe them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that
will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the
reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an
insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready
reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has
nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned
innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned
verdict."[11]

After a careful examination of the records, we find no ground or reason to set aside or disturb the trial court's assessment of credibility of the
eyewitnesses when they testified pointing to accused-appellant as the assailant in the shooting of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his
companions.

1. Eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra, who were with the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola on that fateful night of March 22, 1989,
categorically testified that it was accused-appellant, whom they positively identified in court, who fired his M-14 Rifle at their direction
hitting the ex-mayor and his companions.

Villasin's testimony on this point is as follows:

"COURT:

Q: You heard gun report, what can you say?

A: I saw that he was the one who made the gun report, sir.

ATTY ARRIOLA:

Q: Who was that 'he' you are referring to?

A: Mario Tabaco, sir. (p. 19, tsn, March 19, 1990)

Q: Why do you say that Mario Tabaco was the one from whom those gun reports come from?

A: Because he was the only person from whom I saw a gun, sir.
Q: What did you do also upon hearing those gun reports?

A: I had to seek shelter, sir.

Q: What happened to Ex-Mayor Arreola?

A: He was hit, sir.

PROSECUTOR MIGUEL:

Q: You said that the accused shot Ex-Mayor Arreola, what kind of weapon did he use if you know?

A: M-14, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: After the incident (precedent) have you come to learn what happened to Regunton?

A: I came to know that he was dead, sir.

Q: Was that all you gathered?

A: Also Capt. Tabulog, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: How many shots did you hear?

A: Three (3) shots, sir.

Q: All those three (3) shots were directed to Ex-Mayor?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You heard three shots according to you, was that successive or automatic?

A: Successive, sir.

Q: You were seated at the left side of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who was seated on his right side?
A: None, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Mr. witness, you said that you saw the deceased holding a gun when you first heard gun shot, will you please describe the stands
(position) of the accused?

A: Like this. (The witness demonstrated that the accused was standing on a forth (port) arm position).

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What did he do with the gun when you saw him?

A: He fired the gun, sir.

Q: To what the gun was directed when he fired the gun?

A: To Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.

ATTY. VILLENA:

Q: You said earlier that after the incident you left the cockpit and returned, when you returned, what did you see?

A: I saw two dead persons, sir.

Q: Whose cadavers were these that you saw?

A: The cadavers of Ex-Mayor Arreola and Capt. Tabulog, sir.

Q: How far was the cadaver of Tabulog to Arreola?

A: Less than a meter, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: When you saw the corpse of Capt. Tabulog, can you identify the person passing as you mentioned?

A: They have similarity, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: When you heard first gun shot, can you tell the position of Arreola, you and your companions?

A: We were sitting at the backrest of the 4th seat, sir.

Q: Where were you facing?

A: We were facing south the arena.

Q: Where did the first gun shot came from?

A: It came from Mario Tabaco, sir.

Q: From what direction?

A: Infront of us, sir.

Q: Where was he, was he in your front?

A: He was in the first row of seats.

Q: After the first gun shot, what happened?

A: Somebody was killed, sir.

Q: Who was that?

A: Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Q: How many gun shot reports did you hear?

A: Many, sir.

ATTY. VILLENA:

Q: You said that you heard more gun shots, can you tell the nature, was there in succession or automatic?
A: Automatic, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Can you tell us your previous occupation?

A: An army man, sir.

Q: How long have you been employed with the army?

A: Five (5) years, sir.

Q: As an army before, have you ever been handled an M-14?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you tell us if you are familiar with M-14 being fired?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, you said earlier that you heard many more shots after you run, would you say that these gun shots you heard were fired from M-14
rifle?

A: Those are that came from M-14, sir.

Q: Where were you at the time when you heard the automatic gun shot?

A: I was outside the cockpit, sir."[12]

On cross-examination by the defense counsel, witness Villasin testified, thus:

"ATTY. CONSIGNA:

Q: You said that after the first gun shot or gun report, Mr. Tabaco was on the first seat downward, is it not?

A: Mr. Tabaco placed his left foot on the first seat aiming his gun, sir.

Q: Directly toward the first seat, is that what you mean?

A: It was directed to Ex-Mayor Arreola.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: I want to make it clear, Mr. witness, it was the first gun that you went to hide yourself at the gate of the cockpit, is that correct?

A: After the 3rd gun shot, sir.

Q: And these three (3) gun reports, they were in a single successive shot, is it not Mr. witness?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: That person who allegedly passed by you or infront of you prior to the first gun report, did you notice if he had a gun with him?

A: He passed by our back, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And that person according to you was still there when the late Mayor Arreola was shot?

A: He was directly behind him when the gun reports were made, sir.

Q: You mean to say the first gun report?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And that first gun report was hit Ex-Mayor Arreola?

A: The three gun reports hit the Mayor, sir."[13]

For his part, Peneyra testified as follows:

"ATTY. ARRIOLA

Q: Do you remember what particular place of the cockpit when you go with Mayor Arreola?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What part of the cockpit?

A: We went up to the bleacher, sir.

Q: Do you remember how the bleachers were arranged inside the cockpit?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How were they arranged?

A: In rows, step by step, sir.

COURT:

Q: How many rows?

A: Four rows, sir.

ATTY. ARRIOLA:

Q: And what row did you stay together with the late Mayor Arreola?

A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin took the 4th step, sir.

Q: And how about you?

A: We stood at their back west of them, sir.

Q: By the way, can you tell to the court what were your respective position of the place where you stayed?

A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin sat at the backrest of the fourth step, sir.

Q: And how about you, where did you stay also?

A: I stood at the right back of Mayor Arreola, sir.

Q: And how about Romeo Regunton?

A: He also stayed at the back of Mayor Arreola, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: While you were in that position together with your companions, do you remember if there was untoward incident that happened?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was that untoward incident that happened?

A: That was the time when Mario Tabaco shot the late Mayor Arreola, sir.

Q: Do you know what did Mario Tabaco use in shooting the late Arreola?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What kind of firearm?

A: M-14, sir.

Q: And do you know if Mayor Arreola was hit when Mario Tabaco shot him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How do you know that Mayor Arreola was hit?

A: Because I saw it, sir.

Q: What did you do also?

A: When Mayor Arreola was already dead, I sought cover because I was also wounded.

Q: Do you know what happened also to Romeo Regunton?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened to him?

A: When I was wounded he also said, 'uncle I was also wounded.'

Q: What did you tell when he told you that?

A: I told him, 'you seek cover also my son'.

Q: How did Romeo Regunton took cover?

A: He moved slowly by dragging his body along the ground, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: By the way, how far were you from Mario Tabaco who fired upon the person of Mayor Arreola?

A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir."[14]

On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:

"ATTY. CONSIGNA:

Q: When for the first time when you were already in the cockpit arena did you see the accused Mario Tabaco?

A: Before the shooting, sir.

Q: And approximately how many minutes or seconds did you see Mario Tabaco for the first time prior to the shooting incident?

A: Probably 5 minutes before, sir.

Q: And in that place of the cockpit arena have you seen the accused herein Mario Tabaco?

A: He sat on the first row of the seats.

Q: And sitting on the first row of the bleachers, on what part of the cockpit arena did Mario Tabaco, the accused sit?

A: He sat a little bit west of us, sir.

COURT:

Q: How far?

A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir.

Q: A little bit to the west, do I get from you that he was seated on the western part o the cockpit?

A: A little to the west, sir.

Q: And you together with the late Mayor Arreola were also on the western part of the cockpit?

A: We were on the northwest.

Q: Mario Tabaco, therefore, the accused in these cases was not directly in front of you?

A: A little bit west of us, sir.

Q: It was on that position of the accused Mario Tabaco and your position with the late Arreola on the northwest when you according to you
saw Mario Tabaco fired his gun, is that what you mean?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: That the accused Mario Tabaco was on the first row when he allegedly shot on Mayor Arreola who was on 4th row, is that what you
mean?

A: Mario Tabaco stood up and faced us, sir.

Q: So while Mario Tabaco stood up and faced towards the direction where you were together with the late Mayor Arreola still Mario Tabaco
was on the floor of the cockpit arena?

A: Yes, sir, on the cemented floor.

Q: And immediately after you heard the first shot coming from the accused Mario Tabaco considering that you were right behind the late
Mayor Arreola, as you have stated in your direct examination you immediately sought cover?

A: I only lay flat to the floor of the cockpit when Mario Tabaco fired three (3) shots.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: At the time you laid flat facing down and you did not come to know that Mayor Arreola was dead already?

A: Why not, the first and second shots, I know him that he was already dead.

Q: And the three (3) shots that you heard were all directed towards Mayor Arreola?

A: Yes, sir, in our place.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:
Q: To whom the 3rd shot directed?

A: In our place, sir.

Q: No person was involved on the 3rd shot?

A: That was also the time when Romeo Regunton came toward me and told me that he was also hit.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Q: You don't know the person who shot him?

A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir.

Q: You do not know the person who shot him?

A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir."[15]

The above testimonies of Villasin and Peneyra pointing to accused-appellant as the assailant in the shooting of the ex-mayor and his
companions were corroborated further by the testimony of another eyewitness in the person of Rogelio Guimmayen. His account of the
incident is as follows:

"PROSECUTOR ABAD:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: How far were you from Tabaco when you saw him holding that gun?

A: More or less ten (10) meters, sir.

Q: Where was he at that specific time and place?

A: Inside the cockpit, sir.

Q: Where were you also?

A: I was at the stairs, sir.

Q: When you saw him what happened if any?

A: When he entered he stopped and then the gun fired and that was the time when I got down, sir.

Q: Did you see to whom he was directing the gun?

A: It was directed to the Mayor's place, sir.

Q: How far was the Mayor from the accused Mario Tabaco?

A: More or less three (3) meters only. There was only one bench between them, sir.

Q: Did you see the accused firing his gun towards the Mayor?

A: With his first shot which was directed to the Mayor that was the time I got down to hide myself, sir."[16]

On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:

"ATTY. CONSIGNA:

Q: So, it was at the time you were inside the cockpit arena that you heard gunfire?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you did not see who fired that gunfire while you were inside the cockpit arena?

A: When I was inside, I saw Mario Tabaco pointing a gun to the Mayor and the gun went off and that's the time I took cover, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And that was the last time you heard burst of gunfire inside the cockpit arena?

A: When I went outside, I heard shots inside and outside."[17]

Set over against the foregoing positive and categorical testimonial declaration of the abovenamed eyewitnesses for the prosecution is the
accused-appellant's bare denial of the charges against him. As between the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution
witnesses and the bare denial of accused, the choice is not difficult to make. For, it is a settled rule that positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses of the accused as perpetrator of the crime is entitled to greater weight than his bare denial and explanation.[18]

Likewise, there is no evidence from the record, as none was adduced by accused-appellant, of any ill-motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses as to why would they testify adversely against accused-appellant in the way that they did. Well-settled is the rule that where there
is no evidence and nothing to indicate, that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the presumption
was that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.[19]
2. Accused-appellant contends that eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra were not telling the truth when they testified that it was accused-
appellant who was the assailant in the shooting of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions considering that Dr. Rivera, who examined the
cadaver of Ex-Mayor Arreola, testified that the trajectory of the bullets that hit the Ex-Mayor shows that the assailant was on the same level
as the Ex-Mayor, and the trajectory of the third bullet shows that the assailant was at a higher level as the point of entry was higher than the
point of exit. Appellant states that he was seated at the first row which was the lowest while the Ex-Mayor and his companions were seated
at the fourth row which was the highest. This contention, however, is untenable.

Eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra testified that accused-appellant was at the first row of seats of the slanted bleachers of the cockpit arena,
when he stood up, stepped on one of the seats, aimed his rifle at Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions and fired at them.[20]

The abovequoted testimonies explain very well why two gunshot wounds found on the cadaver of Ex-mayor Arreola appear to have been
inflicted while he and his assailant were face to face and at the same level.

Upon the other hand, according to Dr. Rivera, one of the gunshot wounds of Ex-Mayor Arreola had a point of entry higher than the point of
exit because he must have already been lying down when his wound was inflicted.[21]

Well-established, too, from the evidence on record is accused-appellant's liability for the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the near-fatal
wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo.

Not seriously disputed by accused-appellant are the testimonies of Sgt. Benito Raquepo and policeman Mario Retreta. Sgt. Benito Raquepo
testified that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987 while he was taking his snacks at the canteen of Co located at the left
side of the gate of the cockpit arena, he heard five successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena. While he was on his way
inside the cockpit arena, he saw the accused-appellant coming from inside the cockpit arena. He told the accused "Mario relax ka lang", after
which the accused pointed his gun at him. At that point in time, Mario Retreta who was among the persons near Mario Tabaco, grabbed the
gun from the latter. It was at that point when the gun went off hitting him on the right thigh and the bullet exiting on his left thigh. He also
saw that Jorge Siriban, who was then about three meters away from his left side, was hit at his testicles.

Mario Retreta, a policeman and relative of accused-appellant, on the other hand corroborated in part the testimony of Sgt. Raquepo. He
testified that at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987, he was at the canteen of Mrs. Co. While thereat, he saw accused-
appellant rushing out from the cockpit arena. Before he saw accused-appellant, he heard a gun report from inside the cockpit arena. He was
then about one meter away from accused-appellant when he noticed Sgt. Raquepo whom he is acquainted with, and Jorge Siriban who was
then standing at the gate of the cockpit arena. Sgt. Raquepo was facing accused-appellant and at that distance and position, he heard Sgt.
Raquepo said: "Mario keep calm". He also told accused-appellant: "What is that happened again, Mario." When he saw accused-appellant
change his gun position from port arm to horizontal position, he got near accused-appellant and pressed down the muzzle of the gun when
accused appellant squeezed the trigger hitting Sgt. Raquepo on both thighs and also Jorge Siriban. A certain Sgt. Ferrer joined in the grapple
and was able to take away the gun from accused-appellant.

Sgt. Raquepo survived the gunshot wounds due to adequate medical assistance but Siriban was not as lucky.

Accused-appellant claims that he did not have the criminal intent to kill Siriban or wound Sgt. Raquepo, and that the gun would not have
been fired in the first place had Mario Retreta, for no apparent reason, not tried to grab the gun from him, are without merit.

Retreta testified that he grabbed the gun from accused-appellant because the latter changed his gun from port arm position to horizontal
position, and at that instance he thought accused-appellant might harm Sgt. Raquepo.[22]

Furthermore, even assuming that he lacked criminal intent in the killing of Sgt. Raquepo and the near-fatal wounding of Siriban, his claim of
innocence cannot be sustained. His undisputed act of firing the gun, which is by itself felonious in total disregard of the consequences it
might produce, is equivalent to criminal intent.
Accused-appellant cannot evade responsibility for his felonious acts, even if he did not intend the consequences thereof for, in accordance
with Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.

We note that while the accused was found guilty in all four (4) murder charges and the penalty of reclusion perpetua should have been
imposed on him in all four (4) murder charges, the trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four murder charges. The trial
court explained the single sentence for four murder charges in this wise:

"Whether or not the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317, involving the killings of Oscar Tabulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and
Romeo Regunton, respectively, should have been prosecuted under only one Information.

The law provides:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.

'When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other,
the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (as amended by Art. No. 400). (Art.
48, Revised Penal Code).'

Read as it should be, this article provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is to be imposed; first, where the single act
constitutes two or more g rave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and second, when the offense is a necessarily means for committing
the other (delito complejo) and/or complex proper (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748).

In the cases at bar, the Provincial Prosecutor filed four (4) separate Informations of murder, which should have been otherwise, as the
shooting to death of the four (4) victims should have been prosecuted under one information, involving four (4) murder victims.

The evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or successive automatic gun fires, meaning
continuous. Hence, it is a complex crime involving four murdered victims, under the first category, where a single act of shooting constituted
two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto), as decided in the cases of People vs. Dama, CA 44 O.G. 3339; People vs. Lawas,
97 Phil. 975; People vs. Pineda, L-26222, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748.

Paraphrasing a more recent decision of the Supreme Court, we say -- as the deaths of Oscar Tahulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and
Romeo Regunton, in Criminal Cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317 respectively, were the result of one single act of the accused Mario Tabaco,
(People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307) the penalty --- is the penalty imposed for the more serious offense. The more serious offense is murder, the
killing have been attended by TREACHERY because the victims were completely taken by surprise and had no means of defending themselves
against Mario Tabaco's sudden attack. The penalty is imposable in its maximum degree (People vs. Fernandez, 99 Phil. 515), but as the death
penalty is no longer permitted the same is hereby reduced to a single penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the four (4) murders. (People vs.
Herson Maghanoy, GR Nos. 67170-72, December 15, 1989).

Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 10-316, for homicide with Frustrated Homicide and it appearing also that the death of Jorge Siriban and the
wounding of Benito Raquepo, was the result of one single act of the accused Tabaco, the applicable penalty is the penalty imposed for the
more serious offense. The more serious offense is HOMICIDE, to be imposed in its maximum degree of reclusion temporal, which is 17 years,
4 months, 1 day to 20 years. There being no modifying circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty that should
be imposed, and which is hereby imposed, upon the accused Mario Tabaco is 10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as the minimum, to 17
years, 4 months, 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, plus P30,000.00 actual damages for medical expenses of Benito Raquepo.

It was duly proved beyond doubt that the gun (Exhs. 'K', SN No. 1492932, 'K-2' magazine of M-14 and Exh. 'L' Memo Receipt of M-14 issued to
Tabaco), used by the accused, is admittedly an automatic powerful weapon, more powerful than an M-16 armalite rifle. It is so powerful that
the bullets can penetrate even more than five (5) persons resulting to their deaths. And, this was proven when, according to witness Rosario
Peneyra, the bullets even destroyed the cemented rail guard separating the lower and upper bleachers of the cockpit arena, and causing
wounds on his face and on his right shoulder. Additionally, we have the used/spent empty shells (Exh. 'R' and 'R-1')."[23]
We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four murder cases. The trial court
holding that a complex crime was committed since "the evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire
and/or successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous (emphasis ours)"[24] does not hold water.

Of course, to justify the penalty imposed, the trial court relied on the doctrines enunciated in People vs. Pama[25] (not People vs. Dama, as
cited by the trial court), People vs. Lawas,[26] and People vs. Pineda.[27]

The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said case, there was only one bullet which killed two persons. Hence, there was
only a single act which produced two crimes, resulting in a specie of complex crime known as a compound crime, wherein a single act
produces two or more grave or less grave felonies. In the case at bench, there was more than one bullet expended by the accused-appellant
in killing the four victims. The evidence adduced by the prosecution show that Tabaco entered the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-
machine gun.[28] He fired the weapon, which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its magazine, continuously. When the rifle was recovered
from Tabaco, the magazine was already empty. Moreover, several spent shells were recovered from the scene of the crime. Hence, the ruling
enunciated in People vs. Pama cannot be applied. On the contrary, what is on all fours with the case at bench is the ruling laid down in People
vs. Desierto[29]. The accused in that case killed five persons with a Thompson sub-machine gun, an automatic firearm which, like the M-14, is
capable of firing continuously. As stated therein:

"In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the death of each of the five persons who were killed by
appellant and the physical injuries inflicted upon each of the two other persons injured were not caused by the performance by the accused
of one simple act as provided for by said article. Although it is true that several successive shots were fired by the accused in a short space of
time, yet the factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to each death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the victims,
corresponds a distinct and separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as those resulting
from every singe act that produced the same. Although apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses successively in a matter of seconds,
yet each person killed and each person injured by him became the victim, respectively, of a separate crime of homicide or frustrated
homicide. Except for the fact that five crimes of homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide were committed successively during the
tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing that would connect one of them with its companion offenses." (emphasis ours)

In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger of the Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its
special mechanism, the person firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the
act of pressing the trigger which should produce the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them.[30]

The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda.[31] True, the case of Pineda provided us with a definition of what a complex crime is. But that
is not the point. What is relevant is that Art. 48 was not applied in the said case because the Supreme Court found that there were actually
several homicides committed by the perpetrators. Had the trial court read further, it would have seen that the Supreme Court in fact
recognized the "deeply rooted x x x doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct
crimes."[32] Clarifying the applicability of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court further stated in Pineda that "to apply the
first half of Article 48, x x x there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law."[33] (emphasis
supplied) The firing of several bullets by Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire, constitutes several acts. Each
person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of murder. There is no showing that only a single missile passed through the
bodies of all four victims. The killing of each victim is thus separate and distinct from the other. In People vs. Pardo[34] we held that:

"Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two different shots, two separate murders, and not a complex
crime, are committed."

Furthermore, the trial court's reliance on the case of People vs. Lawas[35] is misplaced. The doctrine enunciated in said case only applies
when it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by numerous killers. In the case at bench, all of the deaths are attributed,
beyond a shadow of a doubt, to the accused-appellant.

Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be considered a complex crime. They are separate crimes. The
accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for each and every death he has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of
reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in finding accused-appellant guilty of four (4) counts of Murder
and one (1) count of Homicide with frustrated homicide, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is, hereby AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that four sentences of reclusion perpetua be hereby imposed.
Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-47941 April 30, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

JAIME TOMOTORGO y ALARCON, defendant-appellant.

ALAMPAY, J.:

Jaime Tomotorgo y Alarcon, the accused-appellant in this case, appeals from the decision rendered on December 22, 1977, by the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch IV, in Criminal Case No. 403 of said court finding him guilty of the crime of parricide for having killed
his wife Magdalena de los Santos. The dispositive portion of said judgment reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the accused Jaime Tomotorgo y Alarcon is hereby condemned to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Magdalena delos Santos in the sum of P12,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment, plus costs. And considering the circumstances under which the offense was committed, the court hereby recommends
executive clemency for him, after serving the minimum of the medium penalty of prision mayor.

Let copy of this decision be furnished, his Excellency, the President of the Philippines, and the Chairman of the Board of Pardons and Parole.

SO ORDERED.

Given at Naga City, this 22nd day of December, 1977.

SGD. ALFREDO S. REBUENA

Judge (Rollo, pg. 10)

The facts of this case as recited in the decision of the trial court and in the appellee's brief stand uncontroverted and undisputed. From the
evidence submitted it is disclosed that the victim, Magdalena de los Santos, was the wife of the herein accused. Several months prior to the
occurrence of the fatal incident on June 23, 1977, Magdalena de los Santos had been persistently asking her husband to sell the conjugal
home which was then located at Sitio Dinalungan, Barangay Cabugao, Municipality of Siruma, Camarines Sur. She wanted their family to
transfer to the house of her husband's in-laws which is in the town of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. (TSN, pp. 6-10, December 13, 1977). Accused
Tomotorgo would not accede to his wife's request. He did not like to abandon the house wherein he and his wife were then living.
Furthermore, he had no inclination to leave because he has many plants and improvements on the land which he was then farming in said
municipality of Siruma, Camarines Sur, a town very far from the place of his in-laws where his wife desired their family to transfer to.

On June 23, 1977, at about seven o'clock in the morning, the accused left his home to work on his farm Upon his return at about nine o'clock
that same morning. He found his wife and his three-month old baby already gone. He proceeded to look for both of them and sometime later
on, on a trail about two hundred (200) meters from their home, he finally saw his wife carrying his infant son and bringing a bundle of
clothes. He asked and pleaded with his wife that she should return home with their child but she adamantly refused to do so. When appellant
sought to take the child from his wife, the latter threw the baby on the grassy portion of the trail hereby causing the latter to cry. This
conduct of his wife aroused the ire of the herein accused. Incensed with wrath and his anger beyond control, appellant picked lip a piece of
wood nearby and started hitting his wife with it until she fell to the ground complaining of severe pains on her chest. Realizing what he had
done, the accused picked his wife in his arms and brought her to their home. He then returned to the place where the child was thrown and
he likewise took this infant home. Soon thereafter, Magdalena de los Santos died despite the efforts of her husband to alleviate her pains.

After the accused changed the dress of his wife, he reported the tragic incident to the Barangay Captain of their place who brought him to
Policeman Arellosa to whom the accused surrendered. He also brought with him the piece of wood he used in beating his wife.

Charged with the crime of parricide, the accused at his arraignment on November 24, 1977, with assistance from his counsel de-oficio,
pleaded not guilty to the said offense. However, when his case was called for trial on December 13, 1977, his counsel manifested to the court
that after his conference with the accused, the latter expressed a desire to change his previous plea of not guilty to that of guilty. Accordingly,
and upon motion by the counsel of the accused and without objection on the part of the prosecution, the trial court allowed the accused to
withdraw his original plea. Upon being re-arraigned, the accused entered a plea of guilty. He confirmed the manifestations made by his
counsel to the court regarding his desire to change his initial plea. He expressed his realization of the gravity of the offense charged against
him and the consequences of his plea. His counsel was then permitted by the court to establish the mitigating circumstances which were
then invoked in favor of the accused.

After the accused had testified and upon his plea given in open court, the court below found him guilty of the crime of parricide, but with
three mitigating circumstances in his favor, namely: voluntary surrender, plea of guilty, and that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation.

With the imposition by the court below of the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the herein accused and the subsequent denial of his motion
for reconsideration of the judgment rendered against him, the accused through his counsel filed a notice of appeal to this Court.

In his appeal, accused argues and contends that the lower court erred:

1. In disregarding its own findings of fact which showed manifest lack of intent to kill;

2. In disregarding the provisions of Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code which prescribes the proper applicable penalty where the
crime committed is different from that intended;

3. In not following the mandatory sequence of procedures for determining the correct applicable penalty;

4. In denying the appellant the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. (Appellant's Brief, pg. 1, pars. 1-4)

We find no merit in the appeal of the accused herein which assails only the correctness of the penalty imposed by the trial court on him.

Appellant submits that the penalty for the felony committed by him which is parricide being higher than that for the offense which he
intended to commit, and which he avers to be that of physical injuries only, the provisions of Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code which
relate to the application of penalties should have been observed and followed by the trial court. The said provision of law which accused
invokes provides that:

ART. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that intended in cases in which the felony
committed is different from that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shag be observed;

1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the offense which the accused intended to
commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.
xxx xxx xxx

Continuing, appellant argues in his appeal brief submitted to this Court, that:

xxx xxx xxx

The felony actually committed, parricide. has a higher penalty (reclusion perpetua to death) than the felony intended, qualified physical
injuries (reclusion temporal medium and maximum). Hence, since the penalty corresponding to the felony intended shall be imposed in its
maximum period, the prescribed penalty is therefore reclusion temporal maximum. This is a divisible penalty.

Under Article 64, sub-par. 5, of the Penal Code,

When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances.

The trial court itself found "that the accused is entitled to three (3) mitigating circumstances with no aggravating circumstances, namely:
voluntary surrender, plea of guilty, and obfuscation. We submit that the plea of guilty, which, as we had shown earlier, was improvidently
made, should no longer be considered. This leaves only two mitigating with no aggravating. Sufficient compliance with the law. Hence, an
automatic lowering of the penalty by one degree, or to reclusion temporal medium This being a case where a period constitutes the entire
range of the penalty prescribed, and therefore, also a degree. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 8-9)

Appellant maintains the belief that he should be punished only for the offense he intended to commit which he avers to be serious physical
injuries, qualified by the fact that the offended party is his spouse. Pursuant to the sub-paragraph of paragraph 4 of Art. 263 of the Revised
Penal Code and as his wife is among the persons mentioned in Art. 246 of the same code, appellant contends that the penalty imposable
should then be reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods. On this mistaken premise, appellant therefore claims that the
penalty prescribed by law for his offense is divisible and he should thus be entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

These contentions of the accused are manifestly untenable and incorrect. Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code expressly states that criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act be different from that which he intended and
that the accused is liable for all the consequences of his felonious acts.

The reference made by the accused to Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code which prescribes graduated penalties for the corresponding
physical injuries committed is entirely misplaced and irrelevant considering that in this case the victim died very soon after she was assaulted.
It will be, therefore, illogical to consider appellant's acts as falling within the scope of Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime
committed is parricide no less.

We are in complete accord with and we sustain the ruling made by the courts below that the accused is not entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. The court sustains the submissions of the appellee that —

... Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to cases where more serious consequences not intended by the offender result from
his felonious act because, under Article 4, par. I of the same Code, he is liable for all the direct and natural consequences of his unlawful act.
His lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong is, at best mitigating (Article 13, par. 3).

Article 49 applies only to cases where the crime committed is different from that intended and where the felony committed befalls a
different person (People vs. Albuquerque, 59 Phil. 150).

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code punished parricade with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, which are two indivisible penalties.
As the commission of the act was attended by mitigitating circumstances with no aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty, which is
reclusion perpetua, should be imposed (People vs. Laureano, et al., 71 Phil. 530; People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 697; People vs. Belarmino, 91
Phil. 118) Appellee's Brief, pp. 6-7). (Emphasis supplied)
We hold that the fact that the appellant intended to maltreat the victim only or inflict physical imjuries does not exempt him from liability for
the resulting and more serious crime committed. In the case of People vs. Climaco Demiar, 108 Phil. 651, where the accused therein had
choked his mother in a fit of anger because the latter did not prepare any food for him, it was ruled that hte crime committed by Demiar is
parricide (Article 246, Revised Penal Code), the deceased victim of his criminal act being his legitimate mother. Said crime was declared as
punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. As the mitigating circumstance of alck of intent to commit so grave a wrong. (Article 13 (3 Id.)
The penalty imposed on the herein accused is therefore correct in the light of the relevant provisions of law and jurisprudence.

The trial court in its consideration of this case had added a recommendation that "executive clemency be extended to the accused-appellant
after his service of the minimum of the medium penalty of prison mayor." The Solicitor General likewise concludes and prays in the People's
Brief that in view of the circumstances which attended the commission of the offense, a recommendation for the commutation of the penalty
would be appropriate. (Appellee's Brief, pg. 7). This Court is constrained to take note that the accused-appellant is said to have been in
detention since June 23, 1977 or for more than seven years already. This Court can do no less than express its hope that hte accused-
appellant can be now extended an absolute or conditional pardon by the President of the Republic of the Philippines or that there be a
commutation of his sentence so that he may qualify and be eligible for parole.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed without any pronouncement as to costs.

Considering the circumstances which attended the commission of the offense, the manifest repentant attitude of the accused and his
remorse for his act which even the trial court made particular mention of in its decision and the recommendation made by the Office of the
Solicitor General as well as number of years that the accused-appellant had been imprisoned, this Court can do no less than recommend that
executive clemency be extended to the accused-appellant, Jaime Tomotorgo y Alarcon, or that his sentence be commuted so that he can now
qualify and be considered eligible for parole. This recommendation of the Court should be promptly brought to the attention of the President
of the Republic of the Philippines by the proper authorities in whose custody the herein accused has been placed.

Aside from this, let copy of this decision be furnished the Office of the President of the Republic of the Philippines and the Chairman of the
Board of Pardons and Parole.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 105673. July 26, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO MAGANA, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution in this case was more than sufficient to convict the accused-appellant of rape with
homicide. But beyond affirming the correctness of the trial court's decision and reiterating familiar legal doctrines, we declare that in this
instance, the ruthlessness and viciousness exhibited by appellant in carrying out his dastardly design upon a hapless minor most certainly
warrants the imposition of the severest punishment possible. We also note with considerable frustration and anxiety that this case is only
one among a host of others, constituting a veritable floodtide of crime and immorality which seemingly signals an unstoppable regression to
the law of the jungle, where anyone is free to grab and take whatever he pleases.

This is an appeal taken from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 38,[1] in Criminal
Case No. 6919 entitled "People vs. Antonio Magana. The trial court found the accused (appellant herein) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the special complex crime of rape with homicide and sentenced him to "imprisonment for life (Reclusion Perpetua)".[2]

The Facts
At about 6:00 a.m. of January 14, 1991, 14-year old Odette Sta. Maria left for school, as usual taking the feeder road which is about 2 1/2 km.
from Sierra Bros. From there, she would have gotten a ride to school.

At about 7:00 a.m. that morning, Danilo De Austria saw accused-appellant "strangling the victim" with his left arm by the side of the feeder
road. De Austria was about to untie his carabao before reporting the incident to the authorities, but he was immediately accosted by the
appellant who poked a knife at him, threatening to kill him if the family of the victim would come to know of the matter.

The victim's mother, Lucia Sta. Maria, got worried when at 5:00 p.m., her daughter was not with the other kids returning from school. She
and her husband started to ask around for Odette, and learned that she did not even make it to school that day . Together with De Austria
and some neighbors, they searched of Odette. At about 9:00 p.m., they found the body of the girl sprawled on the ground some twenty
meters from the site of that morning's incident. The body was muddy, the face swollen, with hack wounds on the neck. Half of the victim's
body was covered with cut grass. Her skirt was raised upward; her panty had been removed and was found near the body.

Post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Marcelito B. Abas, Municipal Health Officer of Labo, Camarines Norte, showed that the victim
sustained hacking wounds on the neck, hematomas on the head, body and left arm, and multiple laceration of the hymen. The cause of death
was "shock hemorrhagic due to the hacking wound on the neck". The time of death was estimated at approximately 12 to 24 hours prior to
the time of autopsy.

After the burial of the victim, De Austria revealed to the Sta. Marias what he witnessed that fateful morning. Accordingly, on March 7, 1991,
an Information was filed charging appellant with rape with homicide. It reads:

"That on or about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1991, at Mahawanhawan, Municipality of Labo, Province of Camarines Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bolo and with the use of a piece of
wood, and by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one
ODETTE STA. MARIA, a girl of 14 years old (sic), against the latter's will; that on or after the commission of said offense, said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate intent to kill and with evident premeditation and taking advantage of his
superior strength, assault, attack, hack and hit said Odette Sta. Maria, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal wounds which
were the proximate cause of the death of said Odette Sta. Maria, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.

"All contrary to law, and with the aggravating circumstances that the said offense was committed in uninhabited place being a grassy area
and the victim not having given provocation for the offense."[3]

On February 7, 1992, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Antonio Magana guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime
of Rape with Homicide and hereby sentences him to the penalty of DEATH. However, in view of the suspension of the death penalty, accused
is hereby sentenced (sic) imprisonment for life (Reclusion Perpetua). And, he is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) for her death, THIRTY-NINE THOUSAND PESOS (P39,000.00) as liquidated damages, TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as moral damages and TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as exemplary damages."[4]

Hence, this appeal.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution's theory is that on that fatal morning appellant was lying in wait for the victim, and when she passed by on her way to
school, appellant forced her to go with him by strangling or choking her and threatening her with a bladed weapon, the same one used on De
Austria. Then, he forced himself on her. Afterwards, he hacked her neck, thereby killing her. He attempted to hide the body of the victim by
covering it with cut grass. He also threatened to kill De Austria to prevent the latter from telling on him.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses: Dr. Marcelito Abas, Municipal Health Officer of Labo, Camarines
Norte, Danilo De Austria, Lucia Sta. Maria, Fe Caramoan Juanson, and Antonio Vasquez.

Dr. Abas testified that the victim sustained a hacking wound on the right side of the neck; an incised wound above the first wound parallel to
each other; multiple hematomas of both eyes, both cheeks, left forehead, and left chin; "multiple hematomas right chest, both scapular
region (sic) of the back, left upper extremity posterior aspect with fracture of both radius and ulna, middle portion;" and multiple laceration
of the hymen at 4, 6 and 8 o'clock.[5] Also, when he conducted the autopsy, the victim was not wearing underwear.[6] Dr. Abas was of the
opinion that the victim died approximately 12 to 24 hours before the post-mortem examination which was conducted at 8:30 a.m. of January
15, 1991, and that death could have occurred at about 7:00 a.m. of January 14, 1991.[7] The hacking wound, he said, was caused by a sharp
instrument, but the hematomas were inflicted with a blunt instrument. He also testified that the multiple lacerations in the victim's hymen,
which were probably inflicted just before the hacking, indicated the possibility of rape.[8]

Danilo De Austria, a farmer and resident of Mahawanhawan, Labo, Camarines Norte, was familiar with both the appellant and the victim. He
testified that on that fateful morning, at about 7:00 a.m., while he was walking along the feeder road towards the ricefields in Barangay
Mahawanhawan, he espied the appellant and the victim some forty meters ahead of him.[9] He was shocked to see appellant strangling the
victim with his left arm.[10] Before he could make a move, appellant blocked his way, poked a double-bladed weapon at him and threatened
to kill him if he told the Sta. Marias of the incident. He said, "Yes, yes" because he was "over-frightened" of the appellant. He knew appellant
to be abusive whenever he was drunk.[11]

De Austria further testified that the vicinity where he saw appellant assaulting the victim was uninhabited, and that cries for help would go
unheard; that the person working the ricefields in that area was none other than accused-appellant himself; and that the body of the victim
was found in a grassy area five meters from the feeder road, and about twenty meters from where the victim was seen being strangled.[12]
De Austria also revealed that some ten days after the killing, both he and the appellant were abducted and interrogated by the NPA, and that
he heard appellant admit to the NPAs that he had raped the girl.[13]

Lucia Sta. Maria, mother of the victim, testified that about a week before her daughter's death, they met appellant, and Odette complained
that appellant was staring at her in a "bad way. The victim informed her that appellant would look at her that way everytime they met.[14]

Fe Caramoan Juanson, a neighbor, testified that while she was grazing her carabao, she saw appellant standing on the feeder road at about
6:30 a.m. that day. Appellant, who was wearing a faded jacket, appeared uneasy, looking left and right and towards the hinterland of the
barangay, seemingly waiting for somebody.[15] The place where she saw appellant waiting was very near the place where the body of the
victim was recovered.[16]

Antonio Vasquez, martial arts instructor of the victim's brother-in-law, spent the night of January 13, 1991 at the house of the Sta. Marias,
and left at about 6:10 a.m. the following morning to go back to Labo. He took the feeder road and saw the appellant, whom he met many
times and knew by face and whom he positively identified in court, standing quite near the place where the victim's body was subsequently
recovered. Appellant appeared to be uneasy and was pacing back and forth; he seemed to be looking for something. The witness noticed that
appellant wore a faded brown jacket at that time.[17]

Version of the Defense

The defense's theory consists of establishing an alibi for appellant and implicating Danilo De Austria as the perpetrator of the crime. The
following witnesses were presented, viz., Merly Mahipos, Wilfredo Chavez, Jaime Chavez, Jovita Paquita, and the appellant himself.

Mahipos, 35, married and a resident of Sierra Bros, testified that on January 14, 1991, at about 6:30 a.m., she and her husband were walking
from Sierra Bros to Mahawanhawan, a distance of two kilometers (about thirty minutes on foot) they met the victim and Danilo De
Austria.[18] The latter were not yet halfway on the road to Sierra Bros and about 50 meters from the house of Mahipos' parents. The victim
was walking ahead of De Austria by about seven (7) arms length.[19] She asked the victim why she was alone and the victim only smiled. De
Austria walked fast and carried a bolo ("sinampalok") about eighteen inches long.[20] He was wearing a white T-shirt and black short pants.
She did not see appellant, however.

Wilfredo Chavez, 31, married, a farmer and resident of Mahawanhawan, testified that at about 6:00 a.m. of January 14, 1991, while he was at
home, he saw De Austria and the victim pass by, with the victim ahead of De Austria by about seven (7) arms length.[21] He did not see
appellant that morning.
Jaime Chavez, 42, married, a farmer and likewise a resident of Mahawanhawan, testified that on that day, at about 6:30 a.m., he was in his
house situated beside the feeder road, waiting for his co-laborers to arrive as they were supposed to go gold panning at Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte. He saw the victim (in her school uniform) pass by, followed closely by De Austria at about 6:30 a.m.[22] After five (5)
minutes, Mahipos and her husband passed by, going the other way. He further testified that appellant came to his house at about 7:00 a.m.
and asked that he be included in the gold panning activity. Appellant stayed in his house for an hour and left at around 8:00 a.m. together
with Kagawad Jovita Paquita to buy cigarettes at Sierra Bros.[23] He later saw appellant in Sierra Bros at about 9:00 a.m. He also testified that
the place where appellant worked was about half a kilometer from the place where the body of Odette was recovered.[24]

Jovita Paquita, 47, married and resident of Mahawanhawan, testified that she saw appellant at Chavez' house at past 8:00 a.m. that,
morning. She and appellant walked together to Sierra Bros. There, they parted ways.[25]

Appellant testified that on that day, after taking breakfast at about 6:30 a.m., he went to his mother's house (which is near the feeder road
and about 50 meters from his own house[26]), where he stayed for about 15 minutes, then left by about 7:00 a.m. to see Kagawad Jaime
Chavez.[27] Chavez' house is approximately 330 meters from appellant's house.[28] After about five minutes, he went to the
Mahawanhawan Elementary School to buy cigarettes. Unable to buy any there, he returned to Chavez' place and thereafter went to Sierra
Bros at 8:00 a.m. He bought cigarettes at Sierra Bros, then returned to his house, arriving there at around 9:30 a.m.[29] Later, he made copra
at his parent's land, then spent the rest of the day at his house, which is only 500 meters from the grassy place where the body of the victim
was found.[30]

The Issues

The appellant charges that the trial court erred:

"1. In failing to give due credence to the accused's defenses;

2. In giving undue credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses;

3. x x x (In convicting) the accused despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt;

4. In convicting the accused of x x x Rape with Homicide although the prosecution have (sic) only proven a case for Homicide;

5. In not considering that based on the evidences (sic) presented (by) both the prosecution and the defense, it is Danilo De Austria and not
the accused, who is probably guilty of the offense charged."[31]

all of which may be summed up as questioning the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses and its appreciation of the weight
and sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, vis-a-vis that of the defense.

The Solicitor General adds that the trial court erred when it equated life imprisonment with reclusion perpetua in the dispositive portion of
the decision.

The Court's Ruling

First Issue: Credibility of Appellant's Defense

We cannot agree with appellant's contention to the effect that the defense built a more credible case than the prosecution, and that its story
is consistent with ordinary human experience. In essence, the defense's theory is that, although appellant was in Mahawanhawan, he could
not have been at the scene of the crime that fatal morning, and that someone else (De Austria) was present thereat.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General,[32] appellant's alibi itself showed that he was at or very near the place where witness De Austria said
he saw him at the time of the commission of the felony. By appellant's own admission, he was in the same barangay on the date and time
when the crime occurred. The places where appellant claimed to have gone that morning are, as found by the trial court, "within walking,
distance" of each other. Thus, the court a quo held "x x x that despite (the) variance in testimony as to time and others, it is not physically
impossible for accused to be at the scene of the crime. x x x." Therefore, his alibi is inherently weak and hardly credible.

In jurisprudence, alibi is generally considered a weak defense because of the facility with which it can be fabricated.[33] Thus, courts have
always looked upon it with suspicion and have received it with caution. It is a well-settled rule that in order for alibi to prevail, the defense
must establish by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that the accused was somewhere else.[34]

To cite only one example, this court, in People vs. Cruz,[35] computed distances to show that, contrary to the allegation of the accused, it was
not physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime:

"x x x In the case at bar, the distance between his father's farm and the resthouse on the other hand, and the distance between the said
boundary and the resthouse, on the other, which are 2 and 1/2 kilometers, respectively, are not such distances as were physically impossible
for accused to negotiate or traverse; in fact, per his own testimony, he was able to travel from his father's farm to the said boundary to play
basketball that same day. Besides, the house of accused's parents where he was living was only 200 to 250 meters away from the resthouse,
which distance accused could have easily negotiated x x x."

Aside from its inherent weakness, accused-appellant's alibi cannot overcome the positive identification by witness De Austria of appellant as
the one strangling the victim that fatal morning.

Second Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

Hewing to the general rule in criminal law that the guilt of an accused is not determined by the weakness of defense's case but by the
strength of that of the prosecution, appellant also tries to attack the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

Appellant points to the fact that the witnesses for the prosecution are related to the victim and one another. But then, such purported
"defect" cannot be ascribed solely to the witnesses of the prosecution. Among the witnesses of the defense, we find that Mahipos is
appellant's "kinakapatid,[36] while the Chavezes are related to appellant by affinity,[37] and Paquita admitted that appellant is the "godson
of (her) in-law."[38]

Relationship can put the testimony of a witness in doubt, but it cannot adversely affect credibility by itself.[39] It is a familiar rule of law that
the assessment of witnesses' credibility by the trial court is accorded great respect because it is in the best position to observe and evaluate
their demeanor at the time they gave their testimony.[40] As will be shown later, this Court sees no reason to rule otherwise.

Perhaps from sheer desperation, appellant advances an incredible theory: the spouses Sta. Maria, parents of the victim, were trying to cover
up their involvement with New People's Army by blaming appellant for the crime. Aside from failing to prove such alleged involvement,
accused could not point to any believable reason why the victim's parents would supposedly forego seeking justice for the rape and killing of
their daughter merely in order to allay some vague suspicion about their ideological leanings.

On the other hand, it is not also logical to conclude(as accused-appellant would have us do) that Juanson was lying because she, and not her
husband, happened to be grazing their carabao that morning when she saw appellant on the feeder road. Likewise, the defense was too
obviously clutching at straws when they tried to fault Vasquez, who happens to be a martial arts instructor, for not having accompanied the
victim that day on her way to school. He was only a guest of the victim's brother-in-law, not even of the Sta. Marias, and we cannot see how
he could have been held responsible in any manner for assuring the safety of the victim.

Further, the defense contends that the testimony of De Austria is inconsistent with logic and human experience. He testified that he saw
appellant strangling the victim, but there was no sign of strangulation according to Dr. Abas. Also, he was threatened by appellant with a
double-bladed weapon, but no such weapon was presented in court. And instead of reporting the strangling incident to the authorities at
once, he opted to untie his carabao first.

The Court finds that these circumstances do not destroy the credibility of De Austria. On direct examination, he testified as follows:

"PROS. VILLAFUERTE

Q. Now, Mr. Witness, do you still recall where were you sometime on January 14, 1991, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning?

xxx xxx xxx

A: I was walking towards the ricefield.

Q: Where?

A: On the feeder road.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: While walking on the feeder road of Mahawan-hawan on that particular date and time, do you remember if you have seen anybody on
that time while walking?

xxx xxx xxx

A: Antonio Magana, sir.

Q: Who else?

A: And Odette.

xxx xxx xxx

PROS. VILLAFUERTE

Q: In what manner did you see this Odette Sta. Maria and this Antonio Magana?

A: I was behind them.

Q: Behind whom?

A: Behind Odette and Antonio Magana.

Q: And what did you see?

A: I saw Magana strangling Odette Sta. Maria.

Q. In what manner did you see Antonio Magana strangling Odette Sta. Maria?

A: He was ahead of me and I was behind her.

Q: Do you mean to say that Odette was also walking in the feeder road?

A: When I saw the two (2) they were no longer walking.

Q: And you said that Antonio Magana was some sort of strangling Odette Sta. Maria. How was Antonio Magana strangling Odette Sta. Maria?

A: Using his left arm, sir.

Q: And that left arm was wrapped around the neck of Odette Sta. Maria?

A: Yes, sir."[41]

The absence of signs of strangulation does not change in the slightest the fact that the victim was attacked and killed. Even though the
weapon used in the killing was not presented in court, still it does not disprove the use of force and violence, as the fatal hack wounds on the
cadaver which, according to Dr. Abas,[42] were caused by such a weapon, sufficiently establish this point.

In People vs. Cortes, supra, this Court held that delay in reporting a crime does not detract from the veracity of the testimony as long as it is
explained. Such delay could be ascribed to fear of reprisal or reticence to get involved. In this case, the reason was clearly fear, as appellant
threatened De Austria with harm unless the latter kept quiet. De Austria knew the accused to be abusive (even violent) when drunk.
Furthermore, their relative ages also provide basis for De Austria's fear. While the accused is 42 years of age,[43] De Austria is a young man of
19 years.[44] On direct examination, De Austria stated:

"Q: And what did you do when you saw this thing that you have just said?

A: I was shocked and I did not do anything.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: You said that you were shocked because of what you saw, what did you do?

A: My plan was to untie the carabao and to report the matter afterwards, but he blocked my way.

Q: What did you do when you were blocked by him?

A: He poked a double bladed weapon on me.

Q: Did he say anything to you?

A: That once the Sta. Marias knew about this thing, he was going to kill me. 'Don't expect to live!

Q: How did you receive that message?

A: When he poked a bladed weapon.

Q: When those words were uttered to you, what did you feel?

A: Because I was overfrightened, I said, 'Yes, Yes'.

Q: Are you afraid of Antonio Magana?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Why?

A: Because when he gets drank (sic), he becomes abusive.

Q: You have personal knowledge on that?

A: Yes, sir."[45]

While the reactions of eyewitnesses to a crime may vary, and even if De Austria's reaction may not be typical or expected of a very credible
witness, still, the same cannot be considered damaging to his credibility. The trial court accepted his testimony and this Court sees no reason
not to.

Third Issue: Case Against De Austria

In a facetious attempt to throw the blame on De Austria and to discredit him, the defense presented witnesses who claimed that they saw De
Austria trailing the victim by a few arms' length on the feeder road that morning; one witness added that De Austria had with him a
"sinampalok" (bolo) about eighteen inches long.

The Court cannot bring itself to believe such story. While cross-examining De Austria, the defense tried but failed to elicit an admission that
he was courting the victim.[46] Nothing else was presented to show improper motive on his part. Viewed against De Austria's clear and
categorical testimony that he saw appellant strangling the victim, the testimonies of the defense witnesses merely ascribe to De Austria a
vague and equivocal act which cannot by any stretch of the imagination be made the basis for imputing to him the authorship of the crime.

Fourth Issue: Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence

The evidence of the prosecution is undeniably circumstantial in nature. This is true of most rape and rape-cum-homicide cases. The Court, in
previous decisions, always took this into consideration.[47] In many cases, the victim, usually the sole witness, is killed. In People vs.
Masongsong,[48] we held that rape is usually done with the least possibility of being seen by the public, as in fact, the presence of
eyewitnesses might even raise serious doubts.

The present case is no different, built as it is upon circumstantial evidence presented through the prosecution witnesses. Dr. Abas testified
that the victim died from hack wounds on the neck and that her hymen sustained lacerations, showing the victim was violated and violently
killed. He opined that the victim was raped before she was hacked to death. Dr. Abas approximation of the time of death was corroborated
by the testimonies of De Austria, Juanson and Vasquez.[49] Lucia Sta. Maria testified that she found her daughter's body with skirt raised and
without underwear. De Austria positively identified appellant as the person strangling the victim that morning. Juanson and Vasquez
confirmed that they also saw appellant looking uneasy, walking back and forth as if waiting for somebody by the feeder road that morning .

Juanson on direct examination said:

"Q On January 14, 1991, do you recall having seen Antonio Magana?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What time on January 14, 1991 have you seen Antonio Magana?

A I could not tell exactly what time but it was in the morning of January 14, 1991.

Q Can you, more or less, approximate the time?

A To my estimate, more or less 6:30 in the morning.

Q Where did you see Antonio Magana on that date and time?

A He was standing at the feeder road."[50]

"Q You said you saw Antonio Magana standing on the feeder road while you were grazing your carabao. What did you notice from Antonio
Magana, if any?

A He was uneasy, looking both sides and looking towards the interland (sic) of the barangay."[51]

"Q Do you know the place where the body of Odette Sta. Maria was recovered?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Do you know when she was allegedly raped and killed?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What date was that?

A January 14.

Q 1991?

A Yes, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q On the same day that you saw Antonio Magana seemingly waiting for somebody at about 6:30 o'clock in the morning?

ATTY. MAGANA:

Misleading, Your Honor. The witness had not testified that she has seen Antonio Magana waiting for somebody.

FISCAL VILLAFUERTE:

I did not mention any name.

COURT:

Witness may answer.

WITNESS:

A Yes, Sir.

FISCAL VILLAFUERTE:

Q That place where you saw Antonio Magana in the early morning of January 14, 1991, do you know how far is it from the very place also
where the body of Odette Sta. Maria was found on the night of same day, at more or less 6:30?

WITNESS:

A I could not give a good estimate but it is only very near where the cadaver was found.

xxx xxx xxx

Q And in the place where you said Antonio Magana was looking, was he looking in that direction where a resident at the house where Odette
Sta. Maria is residing will be coming from?
A Yes, Sir."[52]

Vasquez on direct examination corroborates. He said:

"Q Mr. Witness, what time did you return to Labo on January 14, 1991?

A About 6:10 in the morning.

Q Did you check your watch?

A Yes, Sir."[53]

"Q In that early morning of January 14, do you recall if you have seen Antonio Magana?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Where?

A The place where I saw him on January 14, 1991, Antonio Magana was quite near the place where we recovered the body of Odette Sta.
Maria.

xxx xxx xxx

Q And what did you notice at him when you glanced at him?

A I don't understand why he is acting uneasy."[54]

Motive was established by Lucia Sta. Maria who testified that her daughter told her one week prior to the incident that appellant would
always look at her in a "bad way" whenever they met. On direct examination she said:

"Q During the death, as a result of the death of Odette Sta. Maria, did you have any suspect as to who could have done this to your daughter?

A I am suspecting the accused Antonio Magana because one week before she died, we met him.

Q When you said you met Antonio Magana, what happened then?

A My daughter held my hand, and she was trembling all over.

Q What was your reaction when you noticed this to Odette?

A I asked her why she was behaving like that, she told me that Antonio Magana was staring at her in a bad way.
Q Did you ask your daughter how she had seen the accused staring at her?

A That everytime she went to school and back home, and whenever she met Antonio Magana, she informed me that Antonio Magana stared
bad at her.

Q In other words, Odette had that fear over the looks of Antonio Magana?

A Yes, sir.

Q And when she told you that, what did you tell her, if any?

A I did not mind it, sir, I said it might be natural on his part.

Q This incident happened a week before she died?

A Yes, Sir."[55]

Taken together, these pieces of circumstantial evidence are sufficient to convict the appellant of the crime charged, (a) there being more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inference is derived having been duly proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances being such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[56] Considered as a whole, they constitute an unbroken chain
leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion -- that appellant was the author of the crime.

It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a degree of proof, as excluding the
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.[57] This was sufficiently established in the case at bar.

Fifth Issue: Rape Despite Absence of Spermatozoa

The defense harps on the absence of spermatozoa during autopsy as proving that no rape was committed.

The Court disagrees. It has been long settled that absence of spermatozoa does not necessarily mean that rape was not committed; the
slightest penetration of the female organ is enough.[58] The lacerations of the victim's hymen sufficiently established that sexual intercourse
took place. This is further corroborated by Lucia who saw the cadaver without underwear and with skirt raised.

Again, we find the chain of circumstances unerringly leading to one solitary conclusion: appellant was the perpetrator of this despicable
crime.

Life Imprisonment Is Not Reclusion Perpetua

The Solicitor General points out the error of the trial court in equating reclusion perpetua with life imprisonment when it sentenced the
accused "to the penalty of DEATH. However, in view of the suspension of the death penalty, accused is hereby sentenced to imprisonment
for life (Reclusion perpetua) x x x."[59]
This Court distinguished between the two penalties in its previous decisions. Recently, in People vs. Lascuna,[60] the Court noted that such
distinction have been made as early as 1948 in People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil 167. In People vs. Baguio,[61] the Court made the following
differentiation:

"The Code (Revised Penal Code) does not prescribe the penalty of life imprisonment for any of the felonies therein defined, that penalty
being invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized not by the x x x Code but by special law. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for
at least thirty (30) years, after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual
special disqualification, etc. It is not the same as life imprisonment which, for one thing, does not carry with it any accessory penalty, and for
another, does not appear to have any definite extent or duration."

At the risk of being repetitive, this Court enjoins trial judges to keep the foregoing in mind and apply the correct penalty. We further caution
them against lapsing into the same error.

In the instant case, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua because the imposition of the death penalty under the Revised Penal Code (in
Article 335 thereof, as amended by R.A. 2632 and R.A. 4111, when by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed), was
prohibited by the Constitution at the time the offense was committed. So too, we delete the award of liquidated damages inasmuch as there
was no pre-agreement on any such damages.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS with modifications the assailed Decision. We uphold the conviction of appellant for the crime of
rape with homicide and the order to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) for her death,
twenty thousand pesos (P20.000.00) as moral damages and ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) as exemplary damages. We herewith modify
the sentence imposed to reclusion perpetua.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-28519. February 17, 1968.]

RICARDO PARULAN, Petitioner, v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, Respondent.

Ricardo Parulan in his own behalf as petitioner.

Solicitor General for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. HABEAS CORPUS; GROUND FOR RELIEF. — For deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights, lack of jurisdiction of the Court to
impose the sentence, or excessive penalty affords grounds for relief by habeas corpus.

2. JURISDICTION; CRIMES, PERSISTENT AND CONTINUING, DEFINED; EVASION OF SERVICE OR SENTENCE. — Rule 110, section 14, of the
Revised Rules of Court provides that in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
province where the offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place. In transitory or continuing offenses some
acts material and essential to the crime occur in one province and some in another, in which case, the rule is settled that the court of either
province where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took place has jurisdiction to try the case. There are, however, crimes which
although all the elements thereof for its consummation may have occurred in a single place, yet by reason of the very nature of the offense
committed, the violation of the law is deemed to be continuing. Of the first class, the crime of estafa or malversation, and abduction, may be
mentioned; and as belonging to the second class are the crimes of kidnapping and illegal detention where the deprivation of liberty is
persistent and continuing from one place to another, and libel where the libelous matter is published or circulated from one province to
another. To this latter class may also be included the crime of evasion of service of sentence, when the prisoner in his attempt to evade the
service or sentence imposed upon him by the courts and thus defeat the purpose of the law, moves from one place to another; for, in this
case, the act of the escaped prisoner is a continuous or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force,
however long it may be. It may not be validly said that after the convict shall have escaped from the place of his confinement the crime is
fully consummated, for as long as he continues committing the crime, he may be arrested without warrant, at any place where he may be
found.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ARREST, WITHOUT A WARRANT, PRINCIPLE APPLIED. — Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court may be invoked in support of
this conclusion; for, under section 6(c) thereof one of the instances when a person may be validly arrested without warrant is where he has
escaped from confinement. Undoubtedly, this right of arrest without a warrant is founded on the principle that at the time of the arrest, the
escapee is in the continuous act of committing a crime evading the service of his sentence.

RESOLUTION

ANGELES, J.:

On petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed by Ricardo Parulan, directed to the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, praying that the latter be
ordered "to release immediately and without delay the body of the petitioner from unlawful and illegal confinement", anchoring the relief
prayed for on certain allegations in the petition, to the effect that petitioner’s confinement in the state penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal,
under the administrative and supervisory control of the respondent Director of Prisons, is illegal, for the reason that the sentence of
conviction imposed upon said petitioner for the crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal
Code, was rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his person and of the offense with which he was charged.

It appears that the petitioner, as alleged in the petition, was confined in the state penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal, service a sentence of life
imprisonment which, however, was commuted to twenty (20) years by the President of the Philippines. In October, 1964, he was transferred
to the military barracks of Fort Bonifacio (formerly Fort Wm. McKinley) situated at Makati, Rizal, under the custody of the Stockade Officer of
the said military barracks. In that month of October, 1964, while still service his prison term as aforesaid, he effected his escape from his
confinement. Petitioner was recaptured in the City of Manila. Prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized under
Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, before the Court of First Instance of Manila, after due trial, petitioner was found guilty of the offense
charged and sentenced accordingly with the impossable penalty prescribed by law, on August 3, 1966.

Assuming the correctness of the facts as alleged in the petition, and on the basis thereof, we shall proceed to discuss the merits of the case
regarding the validity and legality of the decision sentencing the petitioner to a prison term for the crime of evasion of sentence.

Settled is the rule that for deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights, lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence, or
excessive penalty affords grounds for relief by habeas corpus.

The issue, therefore, as posed in the petition is: Was the Court of First Instance of Manila with jurisdiction to try and decide case and to
impose the sentence upon the petitioner, for the offense with which he was charged - evasion of service of sentence?

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Place where action is to be instituted.-(a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality
or province where the offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place."cralaw virtua1aw library
There are crimes which are called transitory or continuing offenses because some acts material and essential to the crime occur in one
province and some in another, in which case, the rule is settled that the court of either province where any of the essential ingredients of the
crime took place has jurisdiction to try the case. 1 As Gomez Orbaneja opines —

"Que habiendo en el delito continuado tantos resultados como hechos independientes en sentido natural, el principio del resultado no basta
para fijar el forum delicti commisi, y ha de aceptarse que el delito se comete en cualquiera de los lugares donde se produzca uno de esos
plurales resultados." 2

There are, however, crimes which although all the elements thereof for its consummation may have occurred in a single place, yet by reason
of the very nature of the offense committed, the violation of the law is deemed to be continuing. Of the first class, the crime of estafa or
malversation, 3 and abduction, 4 may be mentioned; and as belonging to the second class are the crimes of kidnapping and illegal detention
where the deprivation of liberty is persistent and continuing from one place to another, 5 and libel where the libelous matter is published or
circulated from one province to another. 6 To this latter class may also be included the crime of evasion of service of sentence, when the
prisoner in his attempt to evade the service of the sentence imposed upon him by the courts and thus defeat the purpose of the law, moves
from one place to another; for, in this case, the act of the escaped prisoner is a continuous or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse
and operated by an unintermittent force, however, long it may be. It may not be validly said that after the convict shall have escaped from
the place of his confinement the crime is fully consummated, for, as long as he continues to evade the service of his sentence, he is deemed
to continue committing the crime, and may be arrested without warrant, at any place where he may be found. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Court may be invoked in support of this conclusion, for, under section 6 [c] thereof, one of the instances when a person may be validly
arrested without a warrant is where he has escaped from confinement. 7 Undoubtedly, this right of arrest without a warrant is founded on
the principle that at the time of the arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of committing a crime-evading the service of his sentence.

WHEREFORE, the writ is denied. Without costs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 179187

Appellee,

Present:

-versus-

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,

CHICO-NAZARIO,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** and

BRION, JJ.

RENATO TALUSAN y PANGANIBAN,

Appellant.

Promulgated:

July 14, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.

By Decision of May 25, 2007, the Court of Appeals[1] affirmed the conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 199 of Las Pias City of
Renato Talusan y Panganiban (appellant) of kidnapping with rape of AAA,[2] a minor of six years.

The Information filed against appellant, together with one Eljoy Salonga, reads:

That during the period from January 15, 2004 up to January 23. 2004, in the City of Las Pinas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with one ELJOY SALONGA, whose true identity and
present whereabout is still unknown, without legal authority or justifiable motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnap, carry away, detain and deprive AAA, a SIX (6) year old, minor, of her liberty, against her will and consent, and the said detention
lasted for eight (8) days, and while accused RENATO TALUSAN y PANGANIBAN @ Nato, @ Roxell B. Verga, Jr., was in custody of AAA and
armed with a gun, by means of force, threat, or intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously inserted his finger into
the vagina of AAA for several instances against her will and consent thereby subjecting her to sexual abuse, which is prejudicial to her
physical and psychological development.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Salongas true identity and . . . whereabout[s] were, as stated in the Information, unknown.

From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is gathered:

In the early morning of January 14, 2004, as AAA was on her way to school, appellant, who was sitting by a tree in Las Pias, pulled her aside
and cajoled her into joining him by telling her that they would go to Jollibee. AAA obliged as she knew appellant to be a fellow attendee of
Sunday Bible classes. Appellant brought AAA, however, to a house in Imus, Cavite occupied by one El Joy Salonga and two unidentified
individuals to whom he introduced her as his daughter.

AAA was thereafter under appellants control and custody for eight days during which he abused her by inserting his finger inside her vagina
on a daily basis before breakfast, despite her resistance.

AAA having failed to return home by noon of January 14, 2004, her stepfather BBB went to her school to inquire. As nobody knew her
whereabouts, BBB decided to report the matter to the Las Pias City Police Station. A neighbor then informed him that he saw appellant sitting
by a tree at the same time that AAA was on her way to school.

BBB thereupon went around the community to elicit information about appellant. A former co-worker of appellant gave BBB an address in
Imus, Cavite, prompting BBB to report on January 22, 2004 to the Imus Police Station the disappearance of AAA.

At dawn of the following day, January 23, 2004, appellant, who was with AAA, was apprehended.
For inquest purposes, Dr. Pierre Paul Carpio, medico-legal officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, conducted an
initial medico-legal examination which revealed the following

Findings:

- Hymen: Deep fresh 3 & 9oclock position

- Vestibule congested

Conclusion:

- Subject compatible with recent loss of virginity

- There are no ext. signs of application of any form of trauma[4] (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, the filing of the Information for kidnapping with rape.

Upon arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of guilty. The lower court thereupon conducted a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness of appellants plea, and despite repeated questions and just as repeated answers showing that
appellant understood his plea and its consequences, the trial court still ordered the prosecution to, as it did, present evidence.

Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, noting that AAAs detailed account of her ordeal is a manifestation of her honesty and
forthrightness,[5] convicted appellant, disposing in its Decision of June 7, 2004 as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing discussions and finding the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt by his voluntary and
spontaneous plea of guilty, while the undersigned Presiding Judge does not believe in the imposition of death penalty as a form of
punishment, nevertheless, in obedience to the law which is his duty to uphold, this Court finds the accused, RENATO TALUSAN y
PANGANIBAN, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt for the special complex crime of KIDNAPPING with RAPE and hereby sentences him to suffer
the supreme penalty of DEATH.

The Court did not consider the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty because the penalty imposable is single and indivisible and
this is regardless of its presence. x x x

Accused is hereby ordered to pay the victim AAA, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity and an additional amount of
P50,000.00 by way of moral damages which by case law is automatically awarded to rape victims without need of proof. x x x

SO ORDERED.[6] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

The case was forwarded to this Court on automatic review due to the death penalty imposed. Per People v. Mateo,[7] however, the Court
referred the case to the Court of Appeals by Resolution of November 22, 2005 for intermediate disposition.

By Decision of May 25, 2007, the Court of Appeals, upholding with modification appellants conviction, disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated 07 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 199, Las Pinas City is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Renato Talusan y Panganiban @ Natol @ Roxell B. Vergara, Jr. is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, conformably
with R.A. No. 9346, without eligibility for parole and is ordered to indemnify the AAA the following: (a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and (b)
P50,000.00 as moral damages.

Costs de oficio. (Underscoring supplied)

SO ORDERED.[8]
By Resolution of December 3, 2007, the Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective Supplemental Briefs if they so
desired within thirty (30) days from notice.[9] In compliance, the parties submitted their respective Manifestations that the Appeal Briefs
they had earlier filed would suffice.

In his lone assignment of error, appellant faults the trial court for convicting him on the basis of an improvident plea of guilt as it failed, so he
claims, to judiciously follow the guidelines set forth in People v. Pastor.[10]

The appeal is bereft of merit.

In Pastor, the Court, holding that there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a searching inquiry, nevertheless
came up with the following guidelines:

1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent
counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual
threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge's intimidating robes.

2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning
and consequences of a plea of guilty.

3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which
may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.

4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such
sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does
not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper
but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.

5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his
indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.

6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter.

7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy
or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.[11]

There is thus no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a searching inquiry. As long as the voluntary intent of the accused and his
full comprehension of the consequences of his plea are ascertained, as was done in the present case, the accuseds plea of guilt is sustained.
Consider the following transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings taken during appellants arraignment:

ATTY. CABARDO

Accused is ready for arraignment, Your Honor.

COURT

Arraign the accused in Tagalog.

(Accused is arraigned and he pleads Guilty to the Criminal Information)

COURT
What is his plea? Hes pleading guilty?

COURT INTERPRETER

Yes, Your Honor.

COURT

This Court will conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of his plea.

Q Mr. Renato Talusan, what is your educational attainment?

ACCUSED

A I reached 2nd year High School, Your Honor.

Q Do you know how to read and write?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q What is your occupation?

A Im a driver, Your Honor.

Q When you were arraigned today, you pleaded Guilty as charged in the Criminal Information. Did you plead Guilty voluntarily, freely without
anyone forcing or intimidating you?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Did Atty. Cabardo, your counsel explained [sic] to you the effects and consequences if you will plead Guilty to the Criminal Information as
charged?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Is it the understanding of the Court that Atty. Cabardo explained to you fully your rights under the Constitution before you plead Guilty to
the Criminal Information?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Do you know Mr. Talusan that, if you will plead Guilty to the Criminal Information, this Court will immediately sentence you and confine
you at the National Penitentiary?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Did Atty. Cabardo exert pressure on you or influence you so that you will plead Guilty to the Criminal Information?
A No, Your Honor.

Q Are you saying, Mr. Talusan that you are doing this voluntarily, freely and of your own volition?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Did Fiscal assigned in this Court, State Prosecutor Napoleon A. Monsod intimidate you or exert pressure on you so that you will plead Guilty
to the Criminal Information?

A No, Your Honor.

COURT

Please speak louder.

ACCUSED

A No, Your Honor.

COURT
Q Did anyone outside or inside of this courtroom threaten you, exert pressure on you so that you will plead Guilty as charged to the Criminal
Information?

A None, Your Honor.

Q So, it is therefore true that on January 15, 2004 up to January 23, 2004, you kidnapped, detained one AAA, a six (6) year old minor against
her will and consent?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q And that while in your custody, by means of force intimidation, you inserted your finger inside the vagina of the said minor for several
instances against her will?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q For the last time, Mr. Renato Talusan, despite the admonition given to you by this Court, do you still insist and reiterate your pleading
Guilty to the Criminal Information as charged for Kidnapping with Multiple Rape?

A Yes, Your Honor.

COURT

The Court is convinced. I admire you Mr. Talusan for taking the responsibilities and I hope that you will be completely reformed.
ACCUSED

Yes, Your Honor.

COURT

Fiscal, inspite of [sic] the fact that the accused has pleaded Guilty as charged in the Criminal Information, I am directing the Prosecution to
present evidence to determine the culpability of the accused.[12] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

But even assuming arguendo that appellant entered an improvident plea of guilt when arraigned, there is no compulsion to remand the case
to the trial court for further reception of evidence. While the Court has set aside convictions based on improvident pleas of guilt in capital
offenses, which pleas had been the sole basis of the judgment, where the trial court receives evidence to determine precisely whether the
accused erred in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea is made loses legal significance for the simple reason that the conviction is,
independently of the plea, based on evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged.

In the present case, even without the plea of guilt of appellant, the evidence presented by the prosecution supports his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt[13] of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659.[14] Thus in People v. Larraaga[15] the Court held:

Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of
the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious
physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must
necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of
separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision:
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. (Italics in the original; underscoring
supplied)

A review of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the actual confinement, restraint and rape of AAA were proven.

Thus, AAA, a minor whose testimony is given full faith and credit, youth and immaturity being generally badges of truth and sincerity,[16]
declared:
Q: Did you go voluntarily with the accused?

A: He forced me, Your Honor.

Q: Why did you say that the accused forced you to go with him, what did the accused do to you?

A: He told me that we are going to Jollibee but it turned out that it was not true.

Q: When you went with the accused and boarded a tricycle, you really wanted to go to Jollibee, is that the understanding of the Court?

A: I did not want to, Your Honor.

Q: What did you do when you say that you do not want to go with the accused?

A: Nothing, Your Honor.

Q: Did you cry?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: How did you cry?

A: I was just crying, Your Honor.[17]

xxxx

Q: Can you remember how many nights and days you have not seen your mother and father?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How many nights?

A: Eight (8) nights, sir.

Q: After you were brought to the wake, where there is a dead person and at the club, where else were you taken by Kuya Renato?

A: At coastal mall, sir.

Q: A while ago, AAA, you said that kuya Renato abused you and Kuya Renato inserted his penis in your vagina, do you recall that?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Which was inserted, his penis or his finger?

A: His finger, sir.

xxxx

Q: When it was inserted inside, did you cry?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did you say to Kuya Renato?

A: I told him that it was painful. [18]

AAAs stepfather BBB testified on her disappearance for eight days and the measures he took in order to recover her. And the initial medico-
legal report conducted for inquest purposes shows that AAA suffered deep fresh lacerations in her hymen which are compatible with recent
loss of virginity.
The qualifying circumstance of minority was alleged and established with the presentation of AAAs certificate of live birth, hence, the death
penalty imposed by the trial court is in order. In view, however, of the enactment in the interim of Republic Act 9346, An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the appellate court correctly modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility
for parole.

A word on the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity, which
is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape, and the award of moral damages even without need of proof as it is presumed that the victim
suffered moral injuries,[19] are both increased from P50,000 to P75,000.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of May 25, 2007 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the separate awards of civil
indemnity and moral damages are increased from P50,000 to P75,000. In all other respects, the Decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198554 July 30, 2012

MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, AFP (RET.), Petitioner,

vs.

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, representing the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN; THE
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. EDUARDO SL. OBAN, JR., and LT. GEN. GAUDENCIO S. PANGILINAN, AFP (RET.),
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 under Rule 65, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure which seeks to annul and set aside the Confirmation of Sentence dated September 9, 2011, promulgated by the Office of the
President.

The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:

On October 13, 2004, the Provost Martial General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Col. Henry A. Galarpe, by command of Vice-
Admiral De Los Reyes, issued a Restriction to Quarters1 containing the following:

1. Pursuant to Article of War 70 and the directive of the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP to the undersigned dtd 12 October 2004, you are hereby
placed under Restriction to Quarters under guard pending investigation of your case.
2. You are further advised that you are not allowed to leave your quarters without the expressed permission from the Acting Chief of Staff,
AFP.

3. In case you need immediate medical attention or required by the circumstance to be confined in a hospital, you shall likewise be under
guard.

Thereafter, a Charge Sheet dated October 27, 2004 was filed with the Special General Court Martial NR 2 presided by Maj. Gen. Emmanuel R.
Teodosio, AFP, (Ret.), enumerating the following violations allegedly committed by petitioner:

CHARGE 1: VIOLATION OF THE 96TH ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN OFFICER AND GENTLEMAN).

SPECIFICATION 1: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military
law, did, on or about 16 March 2004, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully fail to disclose/declare all his existing assets in his Sworn
Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net Worth for the year 2003 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic
Act 6713, such as the following: cash holdings with the Armed Forces Police Savings and Loans Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) in the amount of six
million five hundred [thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend received from AFPSLAI from June 2003 to December 2003 in the
amount of one million three hundred sixty-five thousand pesos (P1,365,000.00); dollar peso deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, Allied
Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's Bank and Planter's Development
Bank; motor vehicles registered under his and his wife’s names such as 1998 Toyota Hilux Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. WRY-843, Toyota Car
with Plate Nr. PEV-665, Toyota Previa with Plate Nr. UDS-195, 1997 Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr. FEC 134, 1997 Mitsubishi L-300 Van with
Plate Nr. FDZ 582 and 2001 Toyota RAV 4 Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. FEV-498, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.

SPECIFICATION 2: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military
law, did, on or about 11 March 2003, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully fail to disclose/declare all his existing assets in his Sworn
Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2002 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic
Act 6713, such as the following: his cash holdings with the Armed Forces Police Savings and Loans Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) in the amount of
six million five hundred [thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend received form AFPSLAI in June 2002 and December 2002 in the total
amount of one million four hundred thirty-five thousand pesos (1,435,000.00), dollar and peso deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines,
Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's Bank and Planter's
Development Bank; motor vehicles registered under his and his wife’s names such as 1998 Toyota Hilux Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. WRY-
843, Toyota Car with Plate Nr. PEV-665, Toyota Previa with Plate Nr. UDS-195, 1997 Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr. FEC-134, 1997 Mitsubishi
L-300 Van with Plate Nr. FDZ-582, and 2001 Toyota RAV 4

Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. FEV-498, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.

SPECIFICATION 3: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military
law, did, while in the active military service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully violate his solemn
oath as a military officer to uphold the Constitution and serve the people with utmost loyalty by acquiring and holding the status of an
immigrant/permanent residence of the United

States of America in violation of the State policy governing public officers, thereby causing dishonor and disrespect to the military
professional and seriously compromises his position as an officer and exhibits him as morally unworthy to remain in the honorable profession
of arms.

CHARGE II: VIOLATION OF THE 97TH ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE).

SPECIFICATION 1: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military
law, did, on or about 16 March 2004, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully make untruthful statements under oath of his true assets in his
Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic
Act 6713, conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.

SPECIFICATION NO. 2: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to
military law, did, on or about 11 March 2003, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully make untruthful statements under oath of his true assts
in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2002 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to
Republic Act 6713, conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.

Petitioner, upon arraignment on November 16, 2004, pleaded not guilty on all the charges.

The Office of the Chief of Staff, through a Memorandum2 dated November 18, 2004, directed the transfer of confinement of petitioner from
his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo to the ISAFP Detention Center. On the same day, petitioner, having reached the age of fifty-six
(56), compulsorily retired from military service after availing of the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1650,3 amending Sections 3
and 5 of P.D. 1638, which establishes a system of retirement for military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Pursuant to a Resolution4 dated June 1, 2005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was transferred from the ISAFP
Detention Center to the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center.

After trial, at the Special General Court Martial No. 2, on December 2, 2005, the findings or the After-Trial Report5 of the same court was
read to the petitioner. The report contains the following verdict and sentence:

MGEN CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 AFP the court in closed session upon secret written ballot 2/3 of all the members present at the time
the voting was taken concurring the following findings. Finds you:

On Specification 1 of Charge 1 – Guilty except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Phils, dollar peso deposits with Allied Bank,
Banco de Oro, Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Island, United Coconut Planters Bank and Planters Development Bank.

On Specification 2 of Charge 1 – Guilty except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Phils, dollar peso deposits with Allied Bank,
Banco de Oro, Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Island, United Coconut Planters Bank and Planters Development Bank.

On Specification 3 of Charge 1 – Guilty

On Specification 1 of Charge 2 – Guilty

On Specification 2 of Charge 2 – Guilty

And again in closed session upon secret written ballot 2/3 all the members are present at the time the votes was taken concurrently
sentences you to be dishonorably [discharged] from the service, to forfeit all pay and allowances due and to become due and to be confined
at hard labor at such place the reviewing authority may direct for a period of two (2) years. So ordered. (Emphases supplied)

Afterwards, in a document6 dated March 27, 2006, the Staff Judge Advocate stated the following recommended action:

IV. RECOMMENDED ACTION:

The court, after evaluating the evidence, found accused: GUILTY on Charge 1, GUILTY on Specification 1 on Charge 1 – except the words dollar
deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, dollar and peso deposits with Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of
the Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's Bank and Planter's Development Bank; GUILTY on Charge 1, Specification 2 except the words
dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, dollar and peso deposits with Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank,
Bank of the Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planters Bank and Planter's Development Bank; GUILTY on Specification 3 of Charge 1; GUILTY
on Charge 2 and all its specifications. The sentence imposed by the Special GCM is to be dishonorably discharged from the service, to forfeit
all pay and allowances due and to become due; and to be confined at hard labor at such place the reviewing authority may direct for a period
of two (2) years. As it is, the sentence is proper and legal. Recommend that the sentence be approved. The PNP custodial facility in Camp
Crame, Quezon City, is the appropriate place of confinement. The period of confinement from 18 October 2004 shall be credited in his favor
and deducted from the two (2) years to which the accused was sentenced. Thus, confinement will expire on 18 October 2006. Considering
that the period left not served is less than one (1) year, confinement at the National Penitentiary is no longer appropriate.

4. To carry this recommendation into effect, a draft "ACTION OF THE REVIEWING AUTHORITY" is hereto attached.

In an undated document,7 the AFP Board of Military Review recommended the following action:

8. RECOMMENDED ACTION:

A. Only so much of the sentence as provides for the mandatory penalty of dismissal from the military service and forfeiture of pay and
allowances due and to become due for the offenses of violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and for
violation of AW 97 (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) be imposed upon the Accused.

B. The records of the instant case should be forwarded to the President thru the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of National Defense, for final
review pursuant to AW 47, the Accused herein being a General Officer whose case needs confirmation by the President.

C. To effectuate the foregoing, attached for CSAFP's signature/approval is a proposed 1st

Indorsement to the President, thru the Secretary of National Defense, recommending approval of the attached prepared "ACTION OF THE
PRESIDENT."

After six (6) years and two (2) months of preventive confinement, on December 16, 2010, petitioner was released from the Camp Crame
Detention Center.8

The Office of the President, or the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP and acting as the Confirming Authority under the Articles of
War, confirmed the sentence imposed by the Court Martial against petitioner. The Confirmation of Sentence,9 reads in part:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, do hereby
confirm the sentence imposed by the Court Martial in the case of People of the Philippines versus Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP:

a) To be dishonorable discharged from the service;

b) To forfeit all pay and allowances due and to become due; and

c) To be confined for a period of two (2) years in a penitentiary.

FURTHER, pursuant to the 48th and 49th Articles of War, the sentence on Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP shall not be
remitted/mitigated by any previous confinement. Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP shall serve the foregoing sentence effective on this
date.

DONE, in the City of Manila, this 9th day of September, in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand and Eleven.

Consequently, on September 15, 2011, respondent Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T. Gazmin, issued a Memorandum10 to the Chief
of Staff, AFP for strict implementation, the Confirmation of Sentence in the Court Martial Case of People of the Philippines Versus Major
General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP.
On September 16, 2011, petitioner was arrested and detained, and continues to be detained at the National Penitentiary, Maximum Security,
Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City.11

Aggrieved, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari and petition for habeas corpus, alternatively. However, this
Court, in its Resolution12 dated October 10, 2011, denied the petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration13
dated November 15, 2011, but was denied14 by this Court on December 12, 2011.

Petitioner enumerates the following grounds to support his petition:

GROUNDS

A.

THE JURISDICTION OF THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL CEASED IPSO FACTO UPON THE RETIREMENT OF PETITIONER, FOR WHICH REASON THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE, AND PETITIONER'S ARREST AND
CONFINEMENT PURSUANT THERETO IS ILLEGAL, THUS WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

B.

EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT PETITIONER REMAINED AMENABLE TO COURT MARTIAL JURISDICTION AFTER HIS
RETIREMENT, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN IMPOSING THE SENTENCE OF TWO (2) YEARS
CONFINEMENT WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, FOR WHICH REASON PETITIONER'S ARREST AND CONFINEMENT IS ILLEGAL, THUS WARRANTING
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

C.

EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE PENALTY OF TWO (2) YEARS CONFINEMENT MAY BE IMPOSED IN ADDITION TO
THE PENALTIES OF DISMISSAL AND FORFEITURE, THE SENTENCE HAD BEEN FULLY SERVED IN VIEW OF PETITIONER'S PREVENTIVE
CONFINEMENT WHICH EXCEEDED THE 2-YEAR SENTENCE, AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO REPUDIATE SAID
SERVICE OF SENTENCE, FOR WHICH REASON PETITIONER'S ARREST AND CONFINEMENT DESPITE FULL SERVICE OF SENTENCE IS ILLEGAL,
THUS WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.15

In view of the earlier resolution of this Court denying petitioner's petition for habeas corpus, the above grounds are rendered moot and
academic. Thus, the only issue in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which was properly filed
with this

Court, is whether the Office of the President acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the
Confirmation of Sentence dated September 9, 2011.

In its Comment16 dated October 27, 2011, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) lists the following counter-arguments:

I.

PETITIONER'S DIRECT RECOURSE TO THE HONORABLE COURT VIOLATES THE DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS; HENCE, THE PETITION
SHOULD BE OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED.
II.

THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL RETAINED JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONER DESPITE HIS RETIREMENT DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM SINCE THE SAID TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION HAD ALREADY FULLY ATTACHED PRIOR TO PETITIONER'S
RETIREMENT.

III.

THE CONFIRMATION ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT DIRECTING PETITIONER TO BE CONFINED FOR TWO (2) YEARS IN A
PENITENTIARY IS SANCTIONED BY C. A. NO. 408 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 178, PURSUANT TO THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY AS THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AFP.

IV.

PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE WAS NOT VIOLATED IN THIS CASE.

V.

THE IMPOSITION OF THE PENALTY OF TWO (2) YEARS CONFINEMENT ON PETITIONER BY THE GCM, AND AS CONFIRMED BY THE PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES, IS VALID.

VI.

ACCORDINGLY, PUBLIC RESPONDENTS DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING AND IMPLEMENTING THE
CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE.17

Petitioner, in his Reply18 dated January 20, 2012, disagreed with the arguments raised by the OSG due to the following:

(A)

THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE IS AN ACT BY THE PRESIDENT, AS THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, AND NOT MERELY AS
THE HEAD OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. THEREFORE, THE HONORABLE COURT IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE COURT WHERE HIS ACT MAY BE
IMPUGNED, AND NOT IN THE LOWER COURTS, I.E., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ("RTC") OR THE COURT OF APPEALS ("CA"), AS THE OSG
ERRONEOUSLY POSTULATES.

(B)

ALTHOUGH THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL ("GCM") RETAINED JURISDICTION "OVER THE PERSON" OF PETITIONER EVEN AFTER HE RETIRED
FROM THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES ('AFP"), HOWEVER, HIS RETIREMENT, CONTRARY TO THE STAND OF THE OSG, SEVERED HIS
"JURAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH THE MILITARY, THEREBY PLACING HIM BEYOND THE SUBSTANTIVE REACH OF THE AFP'S COURT MARTIAL
JURISDICTION.

(C)

UNDER ART. 29, REVISED PENAL CODE ("RPC"), PETITIONER'S COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE OF TWO (2) YEARS IN CARCERATION HAD ALREADY
BEEN SERVED IN FULL SINCE HE HAD ALREADY SUFFERED PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT OF AT LEAST SIX (6) YEARS BEFORE THE SENTENCE
COULD BE CONFIRMED, WHICH MEANS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NO MORE JURISDICTION WHEN HE CONFIRMED IT, THEREBY RENDERING
THE "CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE" A PATENT NULLITY, AND, CONSEQUENTLY, INVALIDATING THE OSG'S POSITION THAT THE PRESIDENT
STILL HAD JURISDICTION WHEN HE CONFIRMED THE SENTENCE.19

Petitioner raises the issue of the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial to try his case. According to him, the said jurisdiction ceased ipso
facto upon his compulsory retirement. Thus, he insists that the Office of the President had acted without jurisdiction in issuing the
confirmation of his sentence.

This Court finds the above argument bereft of merit.

Article 2 of the Articles of War20 circumscribes the jurisdiction of military law over persons subject thereto, to wit:

Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. - The following persons are subject to these articles and shall be understood as included in the term
"any person subject to military law" or "persons subject to military law," whenever used in these articles:

(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the Philippine Constabulary; all members of the
reserve force, from the dates of their call to active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all
other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by the
terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same;

(b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary second lieutenants;

(c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the field in time of war or
when martial law is declared though not otherwise subject to these articles;

(d) All persons under sentence adjudged by courts-martial.

(As amended by Republic Acts 242 and 516).

It is indisputable that petitioner was an officer in the active service of the AFP in March 2003 and 2004, when the alleged violations were
committed. The charges were filed on October 27, 2004 and he was arraigned on November 16, 2004. Clearly, from the time the violations
were committed until the time petitioner was arraigned, the General Court Martial had jurisdiction over the case. Well-settled is the rule that
jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.21 Therefore, petitioner's
retirement on November 18, 2004 did not divest the General Court Martial of its jurisdiction. In B/Gen. (Ret.) Francisco V. Gudani, et al. v.
Lt./Gen. Generoso Senga, et al.,22 this Court ruled that:

This point was settled against Gen. Gudani's position in Abadilla v. Ramos, where the Court declared that an officer whose name was dropped
from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were
initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is
terminated. Thus, the Court held:

The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Colonel Abadilla at the time of the alleged offenses. This jurisdiction having been
vested in the military authorities, it is retained up to the end of the proceedings against Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the rule that
jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.

Citing Colonel Winthrop's treatise on Military Law, the Court further stated:

We have gone through the treatise of Colonel Winthrop and We find the following passage which goes against the contention of the
petitioners, viz. —
3. Offenders in general — Attaching of jurisdiction. It has further been held, and is now settled law, in regard to military offenders in general,
that if the military jurisdiction has once duly attached to them previous to the date of the termination of their legal period of service, they
may be brought to trial by court-martial after that date, their discharge being meanwhile withheld. This principle has mostly been applied to
cases where the offense was committed just prior to the end of the term. In such cases the interests of discipline clearly forbid that the
offender should go unpunished. It is held therefore that if before the day on which his service legally terminates and his right to a discharge is
complete, proceedings with a view to trial are commenced against him — as by arrest or the service of charges, — the military jurisdiction
will fully attach and once attached may be continued by a trial by court-martial ordered and held after the end of the term of the enlistment
of the accused x x x

Thus, military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the initiation of the proceedings
against him occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4 October 2005. We see no reason to unsettle the Abadilla doctrine. The OSG also
points out that under Section 28 of Presidential Decree No. 1638, as amended, "an officer or enlisted man carried in the retired list of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be subject to the Articles of War x x x" To this citation, petitioners do not offer any response, and in fact
have excluded the matter of Gen. Gudani's retirement as an issue in their subsequent memorandum.23

It is also apt to mention that under Executive Order No. 178, or the Manual for Courts-Martial, AFP, the jurisdiction of courts-martial over
officers, cadets, soldiers, and other military personnel in the event of discharge or other separation from the service, and the exceptions
thereto, is defined thus:

10. COURT-MARTIAL – Jurisdiction in general – Termination – General Rules – The general rule is that court-martial jurisdiction over officers,
cadets, soldiers and others in the military service of the Philippines ceases on discharge or other separation from such service, and that
jurisdiction as to any offense committed during a period of service thus terminated is not revived by a reentry into the military service.

Exceptions – To this general rule there are, however, some exceptions, among them the following:

xxxx

In certain case, where the person's discharge or other separation does not interrupt his status as a person belonging to the general category
of persons subject to military law, court-martial jurisdiction does not terminate. Thus, where an officer holding a reserve commission is
discharged from said commission by reason of acceptance of a commission in the Regular Force, there being no interval between services
under the respective commissions, there is no terminating of the officer's military status, but merely the accomplishment of a change in his
status from that of a reserve to that of a regular officer, and that court-martial jurisdiction to try him for an offense (striking enlisted men for
example) committed prior to the discharge is not terminated by the discharge. So also, where a dishonorable discharged general prisoner is
tried for an offense committed while a soldier and prior to his dishonorable discharge, such discharge does not terminate his amenability to
trial for the offense. (Emphases supplied.)

Petitioner also asserts that the General Court Martial's continuing jurisdiction over him despite his retirement holds true only if the charge
against him involves fraud, embezzlement or misappropriation of public funds citing this Court's ruling in De la Paz v. Alcaraz,et al.24 and
Martin v. Ve r.25 However, this is not true. The OSG is correct in stating that in De la Paz,26 military jurisdiction over the officer who reverted
to inactive status was sustained by this Court because the violation involved misappropriation of public funds committed while he was still in
the active military service, while in Martin,27 military jurisdiction was affirmed because the violation pertained to illegal disposal of military
property. Both cited cases centered on the nature of the offenses committed by the military personnel involved, justifying the exercise of
jurisdiction by the courts-martial. On the other hand, in the present case, the continuing military jurisdiction is based on prior attachment of
jurisdiction on the military court before petitioner's compulsory retirement. This continuing jurisdiction is provided under Section 1 of P.D.
1850,28 as amended, thus:

Section 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed Forces. - Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding – (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts
shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended,
otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all persons subject to military law under article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit
any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided, that, in
either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities when court-martial
jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction
over the person of the accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from
the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by law: Provided further, that the
President may, in the interest of justice, order or direct, at any time before arraignment, that a particular case be tried by the appropriate
civil court. (Emphasis supplied.)

Having established the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial over the case and the person of the petitioner, the President, as Commander-
in-Chief, therefore acquired the jurisdiction to confirm petitioner's sentence as mandated under Article 47 of the Articles of War, which
states:

Article 47. Confirmation – When Required. - In addition to the approval required by article forty-five, confirmation by the President is
required in the following cases before the sentence of a court-martial is carried into execution, namely:

(a) Any sentence respecting a general officer;

(b) Any sentence extending to the dismissal of an officer except that in time of war a sentence extending to the dismissal of an officer below
the grade of brigadier general may be carried into execution upon confirmation by the commanding general of the Army in the field;

(c) Any sentence extending to the suspension or dismissal of a cadet, probationary second lieutenant; and

(d) Any sentence of death, except in the case of persons convicted in time of war, of murder, mutiny, desertion, or as spies, and in such
excepted cases of sentence of death may be carried into execution, subject to the provisions of Article 50, upon confirmation by the
commanding general of the Army in the said field.

When the authority competent to confirm the sentence has already acted as the approving authority no additional confirmation by him is
necessary. (As amended by Republic Act No. 242). (Emphasis supplied.)

In connection therewith, petitioner argues that the confirmation issued by the Office of the President directing him to be confined for two (2)
years in the penitentiary had already been fully served in view of his preventive confinement which had exceeded two (2) years. Therefore,
according to him, the Office of the President no longer has the authority to order his confinement in a penitentiary. On the other hand, the
OSG opines that petitioner cannot legally demand the deduction of his preventive confinement in the service of his imposed two-year
confinement in a penitentiary, because unlike our Revised Penal Code29 which specifically mandates that the period of preventive
imprisonment of the accused shall be deducted from the term of his imprisonment, the Articles of War and/or the Manual for Courts-Martial
do not provide for the same deduction in the execution of the sentence imposed by the General Court Martial as confirmed by the President
in appropriate cases.

On the above matter, this Court finds the argument raised by the OSG unmeritorious and finds logic in the assertion of petitioner that Article
29 of the Revised Penal Code can be made applicable in the present case.

The OSG maintains that military commissions or tribunals are not courts within the Philippine judicial system, citing Olaguer, et al. v. Military
Commission No. 4,30 hence, they are not expected to apply criminal law concepts in their implementation and execution of decisions
involving the discipline of military personnel. This is misleading. In Olaguer, the courts referred to were military commissions created under
martial law during the term of former President Ferdinand Marcos and was declared unconstitutional by this Court, while in the present case,
the General Court Martial which tried it, was created under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, and remains a valid entity.

In Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines,31 this Court ruled that a court-martial case is a criminal case and the General
Court Martial is a "court" akin to any other courts. In the same case, this Court clarified as to what constitutes the words "any court" used in
Section 1732 of the 1935 Constitution prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel in any criminal case in which an officer or
employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office. This Court held:

We are of the opinion and therefore hold that it is applicable, because the words "any court" includes the General Court-Martial, and a court-
martial case is a criminal case within the meaning of the above quoted provisions of our Constitution.
It is obvious that the words "any court," used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel "in any criminal case in which an
officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office," refers, not only to a civil, but also to a
military court or a Court-Martial. Because, in construing a Constitution, "it must be taken as established that where words are used which
have both a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail over the restricted unless the nature of the subject matter of the
context clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended." (11 American Jurisprudence, pp. 680-682).

In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army,* 43 Off. Gaz., 855, we did not hold that the word "court" in general used
in our Constitution does not include a Court-Martial; what we held is that the words "inferior courts" used in connection with the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to "review on appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments of
inferior courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment," as provided for in section 2, Article VIII, of the
Constitution, do not refer to Courts-Martial or Military Courts.

Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, quoted by the petitioners and by this Court in the case of Ramon Ruffy et al vs. Chief of Staff of the
Philippine Army, supra, has to say in this connection the following:

Notwithstanding that the court-martial is only an instrumentality of the executive power having no relation or connection, in law, with the
judicial establishments of the country, it is yet, so far as it is a court at all, and within its field of action, as fully a court of law and justice as is
any civil tribunal. As a court of law, it is bound, like any court, by the fundamental principles of law, and, in the absence of special provision of
the subject in the military code, it observes in general the rules of evidence as adopted in the common-law courts. As a court of justice, it is
required by the terms of its statutory oath, (art. 84.) to adjudicate between the U.S. and the accused "without partiality, favor, or affection,"
and according, not only to the laws and customs of the service, but to its "conscience," i.e. its sense of substantial right and justice unaffected
by technicalities. In the words of the Attorney General, court-martial are thus, "in the strictest sense courts of justice. (Winthrop's Military
Law and Precedents, Vol. 1 and 2, 2nd Ed., p. 54.)

In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas., 796, 801, citing 6 Op. Attys. Gen. 425, with approval, the court said:

In the language of Attorney General Cushing, a court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by the same authority that any other exists by, and
the law military is a branch of law as valid as any other, and it differs from the general law of the land in authority only in this: that it applies
to officers and soldiers of the army but not to other members of the body politic, and that it is limited to breaches of military duty.

And in re Davison, 21 F. 618, 620, it was held:

That court-martial are lawful tribunals existing by the same authority as civil courts of the United States, have the same plenary jurisdiction in
offenses by the law military as the latter courts have in controversies within their cognizance, and in their special and more limited sphere
are entitled to as untrammelled an exercise of their powers.

And lastly, American Jurisprudence says:

SEC. 99. Representation by Counsel. — It is the general rule that one accused of the crime has the right to be represented before the court by
counsel, and this is expressly so declared by the statues controlling the procedure in court-martial. It has been held that a constitutional
provision extending that right to one accused in any trial in any court whatever applies to a court-martial and gives the accused the
undeniable right to defend by counsel, and that a court-martial has no power to refuse an attorney the right to appear before it if he is
properly licensed to practice in the courts of the state. (Citing the case of State ex rel Huffaker vs. Crosby, 24 Nev. 115, 50 Pac. 127; 36
American Jurisprudence 253)

The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered by a court-martial must be approved by the reviewing authority before it
can be executed (Article of War 46), does not change or affect the character of a court-martial as a court. A judgment of the Court of First
Instance imposing death penalty must also be approved by the Supreme Court before it can be executed.

That court-martial cases are criminal cases within the meaning of Section 17, Article VI, of the Constitution is also evident, because the crimes
and misdemeanors forbidden or punished by the Articles of War are offenses against the Republic of the Philippines. According to section 1,
Rule 106, of the Rules of Court, a criminal action or case is one which involves a wrong or injury done to the Republic, for the punishment of
which the offender is prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines; and pursuant to Article of War 17, "the trial advocate of a
general or special court-martial shall prosecute (the accused) in the name of the People of the Philippines."

Winthtrop, in his well known work "Military Law and Precedents' says the following:

In regard to the class of courts to which it belongs, it is lastly to be noted that the court-martial is strictly a criminal court. It has no civil
jurisdiction whatever; cannot enforce a contract, collect a debt, or award damages in favor of an individual. . . . Its judgment is a criminal
sentence not a civil verdict; its proper function is to award punishment upon the ascertainment of guilt. (Winthrop's Military Law and
Precedents, Vols. 1 & 2, 2nd Ed., p. 55.)

In N. Y. it was held that the term "criminal case," used in the clause, must be allowed some meaning, and none can be conceived, other than
a prosecution for a criminal offense. Ex parte Carter. 66 S. W. 540, 544, 166 No. 604, 57 L.R.A. 654, quoting People vs. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74;
Counselman vs. Hitchcock, 12 S. Ct. 195; 142 U.S. 547, L. Ed. 111o. (Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 485.)

Besides, that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal and not an administrative case, and therefore
it would be, under certain conditions, a bar to another prosecution of the defendant for the same offense, because the latter would place the
accused in jeopardy, is shown by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Grafton vs. United States, 206 U. S.
333; 51 Law. Ed., 1088, 1092, in which the following was held:

If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment will be accorded the finality and conclusiveness as to the
issues involved which attend the judgments of a civil court in a case of which it may legally take cognizance; x x x and restricting our decision
to the above question of double jeopardy, we judge that, consistently with the above act of 1902, and for the reasons stated, the plaintiff in
error, a soldier in the Army, having been acquitted of the crime of homicide, alleged to have been committed by him in the Philippines, by a
military court of competent jurisdiction, proceeding under the authority of the United States, could not be subsequently tried for the same
offense in a civil court exercising authority in that territory.33 (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, as extensively discussed above, the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the word and acts as a criminal court.
On that premise, certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code, insofar as those that are not provided in the Articles of War and the Manual
for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary. Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code:

Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. - Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are
not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary.

A special law is defined as a penal law which punishes acts not defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code.34 In the present case,
petitioner was charged with and convicted of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman (96th Article of War) and Violation of the 97th
Article of War, or Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline, both of which are not defined and penalized under the Revised
Penal Code. The corresponding penalty imposed by the General Court Martial, which is two (2) years of confinement at hard labor is penal in
nature. Therefore, absent any provision as to the application of a criminal concept in the implementation and execution of the General Court
Martial's decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29 should be applied. In fact, the deduction of petitioner's
period of confinement to his sentence has been recommended in the Staff Judge Advocate Review, thus:

x x x Recommend that the sentence be approved. The PNP custodial facility in Camp Crame, Quezon City, is the appropriate place of
confinement. The period of confinement from 18 October 2004 shall be credited in his favor and deducted from the two (2) years to which
the accused was sentenced. Thus, confinement will expire on 18 October 2006. Considering that the period left not served is less than one (1)
year, confinement at the National Penitentiary is no longer appropriate.35 (Emphasis supplied.)

The above was reiterated in the Action of the Reviewing Authority, thus:

In the foregoing General Court-Martial case of People of the Philippines versus MGEN. CARLOS F. GARCIA 0-5820 AFP (now Retired), the
verdict of GUILTY is hereby approved.
The sentence to be dishonorably discharged from the service; to forfeit all pay and allowances due and to become due; and to be confined at
hard labor at such place as the reviewing authority may direct for a period of two (2) years is also approved.

Considering that the Accused has been in confinement since 18 October 2004, the entire period of his confinement since 18 October 2004
will be credited in his favor. Consequently, his two (2) year sentence of confinement will expire on 18 October 2006.

The proper place of confinement during the remaining unserved portion of his sentence is an official military detention facility.1âwphi1
However, the Accused is presently undergoing trial before the Sandiganbayan which has directed that custody over him be turned over to the
civilian authority and that he be confined in a civilian jail or detention facility pending the disposition of the case(s) before said Court. For this
reason, the Accused shall remain confined at the PNP's detention facility in Camp Crame, Quezon City. The Armed Forces of the Philippines
defers to the civilian authority on this matter.

Should the Accused be released from confinement upon lawful orders by the Sandiganbayan before the expiration of his sentence adjudged
by the military court, the Provost Marshal General shall immediately take custody over the Accused, who shall be transferred to and serve
the remaining unserved portion thereof at the ISAFP detention facility in Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City.36 (Emphasis
supplied.)

Nevertheless, the application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause
of the 1987 Constitution. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.37 It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner.38 The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through
the state's duly-constituted authorities.39 In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially,
and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.40 It,
however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) the classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the
same class.41 "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."42 In the present case, petitioner belongs to the class of those
who have been convicted by any court, thus, he is entitled to the rights accorded to them. Clearly, there is no substantial distinction between
those who are convicted of offenses which are criminal in nature under military courts and the civil courts. Furthermore, following the same
reasoning, petitioner is also entitled to the basic and time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused.43 It must be remembered that the provisions of the Articles of War which the petitioner violated are penal
in nature.

The OSG is correct when it argued that the power to confirm a sentence of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, includes the power to
approve or disapprove the entire or any part of the sentence given by the court martial. As provided in Article 48 of the Articles of War:

Article 48. Power Incident to Power to Confirm. - The power to confirm the sentence of a court-martial shall be held to include:

(a) The power to confirm or disapprove a finding, and to confirm so much only of a finding of guilty of a particular offense as involves a
finding of guilty of a lesser included offense when, in the opinion of the authority having power to confirm, the evidence of record requires a
finding of only the lesser degree of guilt;

(b) The power to confirm or disapprove the whole or any part of the sentence; and

(c) The power to remand a case for rehearing, under the provisions of Article 50. (Emphasis supplied.)

In addition, the President also has the power to mitigate or remit a sentence. Under Article 49 of the Articles of War:
Article 49. Mitigation or Remission of Sentence. - The power to order the execution of the sentence adjudged by a court-martial shall be held
to include, inter alia, the power to mitigate or remit the whole or any part of the sentence.

Any unexpected portion of a sentence adjudged by a court-martial may be mitigated or remitted by the military authority competent to
appoint, for the command, exclusive of penitentiaries and Disciplinary Barracks of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or Philippine
Constabulary, in which the person under sentence is held, a court of the kind that imposed the sentence, and the same power may be
exercised by superior military authority; but no sentence approved or confirmed by the President shall be remitted or mitigated by any other
authority, and no approved sentence of loss of files by an officer shall be remitted or mitigated by any authority inferior to the President,
except as provided in Article 52.

When empowered by the President to do so, the commanding general of the Army in the field or the area commander may approve or
confirm and commute (but not approve or confirm without commuting), mitigate, or remit and then order executed as commuted, mitigated,
or remitted any sentence which under those Articles requires the confirmation of the President before the same may be executed. (As
amended by Republic Act No. 242).

Thus, the power of the President to confirm, mitigate and remit a sentence of erring military personnel is a clear recognition of the
superiority of civilian authority over the military. However, although the law (Articles of War) which conferred those powers to the President
is silent as to the deduction of the period of preventive confinement to the penalty imposed, as discussed earlier, such is also the right of an
accused provided for by Article 29 of the RPC.

As to petitioner's contention that his right to a speedy disposition of his case was violated, this Court finds the same to be without merit.

No less than our Constitution guarantees the right not just to a speedy trial but to the speedy disposition of cases.44 However, it needs to be
underscored that speedy disposition is a relative and flexible concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient.
Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.45 In determining whether or not the right to the speedy
disposition of cases has been violated, this Court has laid down the following guidelines: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for such
delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.46

In this case, there was no allegation, whatsoever of any delay during the trial. What is being questioned by petitioner is the delay in the
confirmation of sentence by the President. Basically, the case has already been decided by the General Court Martial and has also been
reviewed by the proper reviewing authorities without any delay. The only thing missing then was the confirmation of sentence by the
President. The records do not show that, in those six (6) years from the time the decision of the General Court Martial was promulgated until
the sentence was finally confirmed by the President, petitioner took any positive action to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case.
This is akin to what happened in Guerrero v. Court of Appeals,47 where, in spite of the lapse of more than ten years of delay, the Court still
held that the petitioner could not rightfully complain of delay violative of his right to speedy trial or disposition of his case, since he was part
of the reason for the failure of his case to move on towards its ultimate resolution. The Court held, inter alia:

In the case before us, the petitioner merely sat and waited after the case was submitted for resolution in 1979. It was only in 1989 when the
case below was reraffled from the RTC of Caloocan City to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon and only after respondent trial judge of the latter
court ordered on March 14, 1990 the parties to follow-up and complete the transcript of stenographic notes that matters started to get
moving towards a resolution of the case. More importantly, it was only after the new trial judge reset the retaking of the testimonies to
November 9, 1990 because of petitioner's absence during the original setting on October 24, 1990 that the accused suddenly became zealous
of safeguarding his right to speedy trial and disposition.

xxxx

In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation against his own right to speedy disposition only when the
respondent trial judge reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to assume that he would have just continued to sleep on his right − a situation
amounting to laches − had the respondent judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of the records and of ordering
the remedy precisely so he could dispose of the case. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those ten years between
1979 when accused filed his memorandum and 1989 when the case was reraffled, the accused showed signs of asserting his right which was
granted him in 1987 when the new constitution took effect, or at least made some overt act (like a motion for early disposition or a motion to
compel the stenographer to transcribe stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his silence would have to be interpreted as a
waiver of such right.
While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right to a speedy trial, and although this Court has always
zealously espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a
party's individual rights should not work against and preclude the people's equally important right to public justice. In the instant case, three
people died as a result of the crash of the airplane that the accused was flying. It appears to us that the delay in the disposition of the case
prejudiced not just the accused but the people as well. Since the accused has completely failed to assert his right seasonably and inasmuch as
the respondent judge was not in a position to dispose of the case on the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper and
equitable to give the parties fair opportunity to obtain (and the court to dispense) substantial justice in the premises.48

Time runs against the slothful and those who neglect their rights.49 In fact, the delay in the confirmation of his sentence was to his own
advantage, because without the confirmation from the President, his sentence cannot be served.

Anent petitioner's other arguments, the same are already rendered moot and academic due to the above discussions.1âwphi1

Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.50 Thus, applying, the earlier disquisitions, this Court finds that the Office
of the President did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Confirmation of Sentence in question.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 of Major General Carlos F. Garcia, AFP (Ret.) is hereby DISMISSED.
However, applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, the time within which the petitioner was under preventive
confinement should be credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of the President, subject to the conditions set forth by the same law.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 202124

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

IRENEO JUGUETA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252. The CA
affirmed the judgments of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, finding accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta y Flores
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.

In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province
of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a caliber.22 firearm, with
intent to kill, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot with said firearm Mary Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old, who suffered the following:

"Gunshot wound -
Point of Entry – lower abdomen, right, 2 cm. from the midline and 6 cm. from the level of the umbilicus, directed upward toward the left
upper abdomen."

and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 ½ years of age, who suffered the following:

"Gunshot wound -

Point of Entry - 9th ICS along the mid-axillary line, right, 1 cm. diameter

Point of Exit - 7th ICS mid-axillary line, left;"

which directly caused their instant death.

That the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for the attack and the accused took
advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.

Contrary to law.2

In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, was charged with Multiple Attempted Murder,
allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of
Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with
the said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly
by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the
spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is, the occupants Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy
Ann Divina, both elementary pupils and who are minors, were not hit.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against them. At said proceedings, one Danilo Fajarillo submitted his sworn
statement stating that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only
appellant who was carrying a firearm while the other two had no participation in the shooting incident. Fajarillo further stated that Roger San
Miguel was not present at the crime scene. Based on the sworn statement of Fajarillo, the Provincial Prosecutor found no prima facie case
against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.4 Thus, upon motion of the prosecution, the case for Attempted Murder against Gilbert Estores
and Roger San Miguel was dismissed, and trial proceeded only as to appellant.5

At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr. Lourdes Taguinod who executed the Medico-
Legal Certificate and confirmed that the children of Norberto, namely, Mary Grace and Claudine, died from gunshot wounds. Dr. Taguinod
noted that the trajectory of the bullet wounds showed that the victims were at a higher location than the shooter, but she could not tell what
kind of ammunitions were used.6

Norberto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in the evening of June 6, 2002, as his entire family lay down on
the floor of their one-room nipa hut to sleep, the "sack" walling of their hut was suddenly stripped off, and only the supporting bamboo
(fences) remained. With the covering of the wall gone, the three (3) men responsible for the deed came into view. Norberto clearly saw their
faces which were illuminated by the light of a gas lamp hanging in their small hut. Norberto identified the 3 men as appellant, Gilbert Estores
and Roger San Miguel.
The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused to do so. The men then uttered, "Magdasal ka na at katapusan
mo na ngayon." Norberto pleaded with them, saying, "Maawa kayo sa amin, matanda na ako at marami akong anak. Anong kasalanan ko sa
inyo?" Despite such plea for mercy, a gunshot was fired, and Norberto immediately threw his body over his children and wife in an attempt
to protect them from being hit. Thereafter, he heard successive gunshots being fired in the direction where his family huddled together in
their hut.7

When the volley of shots ceased and the three (3) men left, Norberto saw that his two (2) young daughters were wounded. His wife went out
of their house to ask for help from neighbors, while he and his older daughter carried the two (2) wounded children out to the street. His
daughter Mary Grace died on the way to the hospital, while Claudine expired at the hospital despite the doctors' attempts to revive her.8

In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant, Norberto replied that he had a previous altercation with
appellant who was angered by the fact that he (Norberto) filed a case against appellant's two other brothers for molesting his daughter.9

On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as his defense. Appellant's testimony, along with those of Gilbert
Estores, Roger San Miguel, Isidro San Miguel and Ruben Alegre, was that he (appellant) was just watching TV at the house of Isidro San
Miguel, where he had been living for several years, at the time the shooting incident occurred. However, he and the other witnesses
admitted that said house was a mere five-minute walk away from the crime scene.10

Finding appellant’s defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the testimony of Norberto, the trial court ruled that the evidence
clearly established that appellant, together with two other assailants, conspired to shoot and kill the family of Norberto. Appellant was then
convicted of Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7698-G reads:

WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Double Murder
defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of
Mary Grace Divina and to indemnify her heirs in the amount of Php50,000.00 and another to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of
Claudine Divina and accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Claudine Divina in the sum of Php50,000.00. In addition, he is hereby
ordered to pay the heirs of the victims actual damages in the amount of Php16,150.00 and to pay for the costs.

SO ORDERED.11

On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7702-G, reads:

WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Multiple Attempted
Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor
as maximum for each of the offended parties; Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. Further, accused is
ordered to pay for the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.12

Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. On January 30, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision affirming appellant's
conviction for the crimes charged.13

Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to this Court. On July 30, 2012, the Court issued a Resolution14 notifying the
parties that they may submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Both parties manifested that they will no longer submit supplemental
briefs since they had exhaustively discussed their positions before the CA.15
The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, such as his failure to state from the
beginning that all three assailants had guns, and to categorically identify appellant as the one holding the gun used to kill Norberto’s children.

The appeal is unmeritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative
weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect. Thus, generally, the Court
will not recalibrate and re-examine evidence that had been analyzed and ruled upon by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.16

The evidence on record fully supports the trial court's factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, that appellant acted in concert with two other
individuals, all three of them carrying firearms and simultaneously firing at Norberto and his family, killing his two young daughters. Norberto
clearly saw all of the three assailants with their firearms as there is illumination coming from a lamp inside their house that had been laid
bare after its walling was stripped off, to wit:

Q: When the wall of your house was stripped off by these three persons at the same time, do you have light in your house?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What kind of light was there?

A: A gas lamp.

Q: Where was the gas lamp placed at that time?

A: In the middle of our house.

xxxx

Q: when did they fire a shot?

A: On the same night, when they had stripped off the wallings.

Q: How many gunshots did you hear?

A: Only one.

Q: Do you know the sound of a gunshot? A firearm?

A: Yes, sir, it is loud? (sic)

xxxx

Q: After the first shot, was there any second shot?

A: After that, successive fire shot (sic) followed and my youngest and eldest daughters were hit.

xxxx

Q: How many of the three were holding guns at that time?

A: All of them.

Q: You mean to tell the honorable court that these three persons were

having one firearm each?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And they fired shots at the same time?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: To what direction these three persons fired (sic) their firearms during that night?

A: To the place where we were.

Q: When those three persons were firing their respective firearms, what was your position then?

A: I ordered my children to lie down.

Q: How about you, what was your position when you were ordering your children to lie down?

A: (witness demonstrated his position as if covering his children with his body and ordering them to line (sic) down face down)

Q: Mr. Witness, for how long did these three persons fire shots at your house?

A: Less than five minutes, sir.

Q: After they fired their shots, they left your house?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And when these persons left your house, you inspected your children to see what happened to them?
A: Yes, sir, they were hit.

x x x17

Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of Norberto's daughters because, as ruled by the trial court,
they clearly conspired to kill Norberto's family. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement regarding the commission
of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of a prior meeting between the perpetrators to discuss the commission of the crime is not
necessary as long as their concerted acts reveal a common design and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one is the act of all.18 Here,
the three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of Norberto together, each with his own firearm. It is, therefore, no
longer necessary to identify and prove that it is the bullet particularly fired from appellant's firearm that killed the children.

Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide,
attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation.19 The presence of any one of the circumstances enumerated in
Article 248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a killing as murder.20 The trial court correctly ruled that appellant is liable for murder because
treachery attended the killing of Norberto’s two children, thus:

x x x Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina, were all lying down side by side about to sleep on June 6, 2002 at around
9:00 o’clock in the evening, when suddenly their wall made of sack was stripped off by [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta, Roger San Miguel and
Gilberto Alegre (sic) [Gilbert Estores]. They ordered him to go out of their house and when he refused despite his plea for mercy, they fired at
them having hit and killed his two (2) daughters. The family of Norberto Divina were unarmed and his children were at very tender ages.
Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were shot and killed were 13 years old and 3 ½ years old respectively. In this case, the victims were
defenseless and manifestly overpowered by armed assailants when they were gunned down. There was clear showing that the attack was
made suddenly and unexpectedly as to render the victims helpless and unable to defend themselves. Norberto and his wife and his children
could have already been asleep at that time of the night. x x x 21

Verily, the presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children to murder. As held in People v. Fallorina,22 the essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his part. Minor children, who
by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.

As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code states that a felony is attempted
when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In Esqueda v. People,23 the Court held:

If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the offender
had no intention to kill the victim, or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to
kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the
crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) the words uttered by
the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.

In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of appellant as shown by the use of firearms, the words
uttered24during, as well as the manner of, the commission of the crime. The Court thus quotes with approval the trial court’s finding that
appellant is liable for attempted murder, viz.:

In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony of murder first by suddenly stripping off the wall of their
house, followed by successive firing at the intended victims when Norberto Divina refused to go out of the house as ordered by them. If only
there were good in aiming their target, not only Mary Grace and Claudine had been killed but surely all the rest of the family would surely
have died. Hence, perpetrators were liable for Murder of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina but for Multiple Attempted Murder for
Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. But as [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta was the only one charged in this
case, he alone is liable for the crime committed.25

Meanwhile, the supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that he failed to state from the very beginning that all three assailants
were carrying firearms, and that it was the shots from appellant’s firearm that killed the children, are too trivial and inconsequential to put a
dent on said witness's credibility. An examination of Norberto's testimony would show that there are no real inconsistencies to speak of. As
ruled in People v. Cabtalan,26 "[m]inor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect the credibility of
witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime."27 Both the trial court and the CA found
Norberto's candid and straightforward testimony to be worthy of belief and this Court sees no reason why it should not conform to the
principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v. People28 that:

Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, especially when
affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that
would justify altering or revising such findings and evaluation. This is because the trial court's determination proceeds from its first-hand
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court
in unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor x x x.29

The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no outstanding or exceptional circumstance to justify a
deviation from such long-standing principle. There is no cogent reason to overturn the trial court's ruling that the prosecution evidence,
particularly the testimony of Norberto Divina identifying appellant as one of the assailants, is worthy of belief. Thus, the prosecution evidence
established beyond any reasonable doubt that appellant is one of the perpetrators of the crime.

However, the Court must make a clarification as to the nomenclature used by the trial court to identify the crimes for which appellant was
penalized. There is some confusion caused by the trial court's use of the terms "Double Murder" and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in
convicting appellant, and yet imposing penalties which nevertheless show that the trial court meant to penalize appellant for two (2)
separate counts of Murder and four (4) counts of Attempted Murder.

The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial, show that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the
crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the victims was not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant and his
cohorts. In the same vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted Murder in
Criminal Case No. 7702-G. It bears stressing that the Informations in this case failed to comply with the requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Court that an information must charge only one offense.

As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective. The reason for the rule is stated
in People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao Station, et al.,30 thus:

The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge
against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which
might confuse him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule
117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the
defect is deemed waived.

However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the quashal of the Informations, he is
deemed to have waived his right to question the same. Section 9 of Rule 117 provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground
of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the
same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g),
and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule."

It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it
before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each
offense.31

Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of
murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and proven during trial.

Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida,32 the Court explained the concept of a complex crime as defined in Article 4833 of the Revised Penal Code,
thus:
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender they
constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as a compound crime,
or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as a complex crime proper, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two
or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when
various victims expire from separate shot, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.34

Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two others, in firing successive and indiscriminate shots
at the family of Norberto from their respective firearms, intended to kill not only Norberto, but his entire family. When several gunmen, as in
this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a group of people, it shows their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are
committing not only one crime. What appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime because as held in People
v. Nelmida,35 "each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons
constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime."36

Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account dwelling as an ordinary, aggravating
circumstance, despite the fact that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G contain sufficient allegations to that effect, to
wit:

Criminal Case No. 7698-G for Double Murder:

That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for the attack and the accused took
advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.37

Criminal Case No. 7702-G for Multiple Attempted Murder:

x x x the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with short firearms of
undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto
Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution
which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused x x x38

In People v. Agcanas,39 the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity
of privacy which the law accords to human abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who
offends him elsewhere." Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party provided that the
latter has not given provocation therefor.40 The testimony of Norberto established the fact that the group of appellant violated the victims'
home by destroying the same and attacking his entire family therein, without provocation on the part of the latter. Hence, the trial court
should have appreciated dwelling as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.

In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties imposed on appellant. Murder is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for each of two
(2) counts of murder.41 However, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be
imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without eligibility for parole. With regard to the
four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for each count is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance,
the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty should be from ten
(10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
i.e., prision correccional, in any of its periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. This Court finds it apt to
impose on appellant the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder.

Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as regards criminal cases where the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Generally, in these types of criminal cases, there are three kinds of damages awarded by the Court;
namely: civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary damages. Likewise, actual damages may be awarded or temperate damages in some instances.
First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the
prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil
law.42 This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC which states, "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."

It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate.43 Article
2206 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may
have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter;
such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability
not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the
decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period
not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by
reason of the death of the deceased.

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the
damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity.
Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay
the victim a sum of money as restitution. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of
civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot be
changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants
it.44

The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also compensatory in nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals45
expounded on the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz.:

Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as physical suffering, mental anguish,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the concept of
grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness
and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the
discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have
sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 221946 and Article 222047 of the Civil Code. x x x.

Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as "compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or
mental anguish resulting from a wrong."48 They may also be considered and allowed "for resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation,
indignity, and vexation suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her assailant's conduct, as well as the factors of provocation, the
reasonableness of the force used, the attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental distress."49

The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon: "[T]he award of moral damages is aimed
at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted."50

Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222051 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is
discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages
can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.52
Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to exemplary damages, thus:

ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong
doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of
outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of
exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as
a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted,53 the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt
caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant – associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross
negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud54 – that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages
are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either
case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.55

The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic
sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the
private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the
accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the
criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended
party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating
circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine,
relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an
award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. 56

The reason is fairly obvious as to why the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure57 requires aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or
qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or information. It is in order not to trample on the constitutional right of an accused to be informed
of the nature of the alleged offense that he or she has committed. A criminal complaint or information should basically contain the elements
of the crime, as well as its qualifying and ordinary aggravating circumstances, for the court to effectively determine the proper penalty it
should impose. This, however, is not similar in the recovery of civil liability. In the civil aspect, the presence of an aggravating circumstance,
even if not alleged in the information but proven during trial would entitle the victim to an award of exemplary damages.

Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only due to the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but
also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as
Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of
the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio,58 the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or
aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal,59 the Court awarded exemplary damages
on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. In People v.
Cañada,60 People v. Neverio61 and People v. Layco, Sr.,62 the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as
deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.

Existing jurisprudence pegs the award of exemplary damages at ₱30,000.00,63 despite the lack of any aggravating circumstance. The Court
finds it proper to increase the amount to ₱50,000.00 in order to deter similar conduct.

If, however, the penalty for the crime committed is death, which cannot be imposed because of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346, prevailing
jurisprudence64 sets the amount of ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Before awarding any of the above mentioned damages, the Court, however, must first consider the penalty imposed by law. Under RA 7659
or An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, and for Other
Purposes, certain crimes under the RPC and special penal laws were amended to impose the death penalty under certain circumstances.65
Under the same law, the following crimes are punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in general,66 mutiny on the high seas,67 and simple
rape.68 For the following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: qualified piracy;69 qualified bribery under
certain circumstances;70 parricide;71 murder;72 infanticide, except when committed by the mother of the child for the purpose of
concealing her dishonor or either of the maternal grandparents for the same purpose;73 kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
certain circumstances;74 robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under certain circumstances;75 destructive arson, except
when death results as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under the article;76 attempted or frustrated rape, when
a homicide is committed by reason or on occasion thereof; plunder;77 and carnapping, when the driver or occupant of the carnapped motor
vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.78 Finally, RA 7659 imposes the death
penalty on the following crimes:

(a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the gift or present.

(b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the victim or any other person; (ii) when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention; (iii) when the victim is raped, subjected
to torture or dehumanizing acts.

(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Article 320, death results.

(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes insane or homicide is committed; (ii) when committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances: (1) when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the
victim; (2) when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities; (3) when the rape is committed in full view of the
husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity; (4) when the victim is a religious or a child
below seven years old; (5) when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease; (6) when
committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency; and (7)
when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.

From these heinous crimes, where the imposable penalties consist of two (2) indivisible penalties or single indivisible penalty, all of them
must be taken in relation to Article 63 of the RPC, which provides:

Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be
applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the
application thereof:

1. when in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.

2. when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

3. when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty
shall be applied.

4. when both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset
one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding
rules, according to the result of such compensation. (Revised Penal Code, Art. 63)

Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties, the court has the duty to ascertain the presence of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, in crimes where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the court can
impose either reclusion perpetua or death, depending on the mitigating or aggravating circumstances present.
But with the enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is
now prohibited. It provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated makes
use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.79

As a result, the death penalty can no longer be imposed. Instead, they have to impose reclusion perpetua. Despite this, the principal
consideration for the award of damages, following the ruling in People v. Salome80 and People v. Quiachon,81 is "the penalty provided by
law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender."82

When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the death penalty were it not for RA 9346, the Court has
ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v. Victor,83 that the award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape when punishable by death should
be ₱75,000.00 We reasoned that "[t]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial
fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."84 Such
reasoning also applies to all heinous crimes found in RA 7659. The amount was later increased to ₱100,000.00.85

In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v. Arizapa,86 ₱50,000.00 was awarded as moral damages without
need of pleading or proving them, for in rape cases, it is recognized that the victim's injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from
the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of moral damages.87 Subsequently, the amount was increased to ₱75,000.00 in People
v. Soriano88 and P100,000.00 in People v. Gambao.89

Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346, the imposable penalty as provided by the law for
the crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must be used as the basis for awarding damages and not the actual penalty imposed.1avvphi1

Again, for crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an ordinary aggravating circumstance but due to the
prohibition to impose the death penalty, the actual penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the latest jurisprudence90 pegs the amount of
₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱100,0000.00 as moral damages. For the qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or the ordinary
aggravating circumstances present, the amount of ₱100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages aside from civil indemnity and moral
damages. Regardless of the attendance of qualifying aggravating circumstance, the exemplary damages shall be fixed at ₱100,000.00. "[T]his
is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuation over time, but also an expression of
the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes x x x."91

When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there being no ordinary aggravating
circumstance, the Court rules that the proper amounts should be ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and
₱75,000.00 exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating circumstances present.

When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act done by the offender caused several crimes, the fact that those
were the result of a single design, the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages will depend on the penalty and the number of victims.
For each of the victims, the heirs should be properly compensated. If it is multiple murder without any ordinary aggravating circumstance but
merely a qualifying aggravating circumstance, but the penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC wherein the maximum penalty
shall be imposed,92 then, for every victim who dies, the heirs shall be indemnified with ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In case of a special complex crime, which is different from a complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC, the following doctrines are
noteworthy:

In People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog,93 this Court ruled that special complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has its own
definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the case of People v.
Barros,94 explained that composite crimes are "neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of
the Revised Penal Code], since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies [compound crimes]
nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another [complex crime proper]. However, just like the regular complex
crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes
although composed of two or more offenses."95

In People v. De Leon,96 we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or
by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during
or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons
intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through
reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that
two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by
reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still
be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with
homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery
with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.97

In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and
slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the rape.98 Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of
superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the prosecution, the same would not
qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the
aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v.
Macabales:99

Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating circumstance of treachery is present. They aver that
treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes against property. However, we find that the trial court in this case correctly
characterized treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying, circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in
defending himself when his arms were held by two of the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales, as their other
companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance.

Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. There is no special
complex crime of robbery with murder under the Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the circumstances proven concerning the
actual commission of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it
helps determine the penalty to be imposed.100

Applying the above discussion on special complex crimes, if the penalty is death but it cannot be imposed due to RA 9346 and what is actually
imposed is the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity and moral damages will be ₱100,000.00 each, and another ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages in view of the heinousness of the crime and to set an example. If there is another composite crime included in a special
complex crime and the penalty imposed is death, an additional ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 moral damages and ₱100,000.00
exemplary damages shall be awarded for each composite crime committed.

For example, in case of Robbery with Homicide101 wherein three (3) people died as a consequence of the crime, the heirs of the victims shall
be entitled to the award of damages as discussed earlier. This is true, however, only if those who were killed were the victims of the robbery
or mere bystanders and not when those who died were the perpetrators or robbers themselves because the crime of robbery with homicide
may still be committed even if one of the robbers dies.102 This is also applicable in robbery with rape where there is more than one victim of
rape.

In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to determine the stage in which the crime was committed and proven
during the trial. Article 6 of the RPC provides:

Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are
punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when an
offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of
R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each be ₱100,000.00 and another ₱100,000.00 for exemplary
damages or when the circumstances of the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the civil indemnity and moral damages
should be ₱75,000.00 each, as well as exemplary damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00. If, however, the crime proven is in its frustrated
stage, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each be ₱50,000.00, and an award of ₱25,000.00 civil indemnity
and ₱25,000.00 moral damages when the crime proven is in its attempted stage. The difference in the amounts awarded for the stages is
mainly due to the disparity in the outcome of the crime committed, in the same way that the imposable penalty varies for each stage of the
crime. The said amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded in cases of felonies in their frustrated or attempted stages shall be
the bases when the crimes committed constitute complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC. For example, in a crime of murder with
attempted murder, the amount of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is ₱100,000.00 each, while in the attempted
murder, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is ₱25,000.00 each.

In a special complex crime, like robbery with homicide, if, aside from homicide, several victims (except the robbers) sustained injuries, they
shall likewise be indemnified. It must be remembered that in a special complex crime, unlike in a complex crime, the component crimes have
no attempted or frustrated stages because the intention of the offender/s is to commit the principal crime which is to rob but in the process
of committing the said crime, another crime is committed. For example, if on the occasion of a robbery with homicide, other victims
sustained injuries, regardless of the severity, the crime committed is still robbery with homicide as the injuries become part of the crime,
"Homicide", in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, is understood in its generic sense and now forms part of the essential
element of robbery,103 which is the use of violence or the use of force upon anything. Hence, the nature and severity of the injuries
sustained by the victims must still be determined for the purpose of awarding civil indemnity and damages. If a victim suffered mortal
wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the victim should be awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and
exemplary damages equivalent to the damages awarded in a frustrated stage, and if a victim suffered injuries that are not fatal, an award of
civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages should likewise be awarded equivalent to the damages awarded in an attempted
stage.

In other crimes that resulted in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, like homicide, death under tumultuous
affray, reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim shall be ₱50,000.00 and ₱50,000.00
moral damages without exemplary damages being awarded. However, an award of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages in a crime of homicide
shall be added if there is an aggravating circumstance present that has been proven but not alleged in the information.

Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in certain cases. The award of ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.104 Under
Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary
loss although the exact amount was not proved.105 In this case, the Court now increases the amount to be awarded as temperate damages
to ₱50,000.00.

In the case at bar, the crimes were aggravated by dwelling, and the murders committed were further made atrocious by the fact that the
victims are innocent, defenseless minors – one is a mere 3½-year-old toddler, and the other a 13-year-old girl. The increase in the amount of
awards for damages is befitting to show not only the Court's, but all of society's outrage over such crimes and wastage of lives.

In summary:

I. For those crimes106 like, Murder,107 Parricide,108 Serious Intentional Mutilation,109 Infanticide,110 and other crimes involving death of a
victim where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

a. Frustrated:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

b. Attempted:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

ii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

a. Frustrated:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages111 – ₱100,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely attempted:112

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely attempted:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where death, injuries, or sexual abuse results, the civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages will depend on the penalty, extent of violence and sexual abuse; and the number of victims where the
penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime committed. In other complex crimes where death does not result, like
in Forcible Abduction with Rape, the civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages depend on the prescribed penalty and the penalty
imposed, as the case may be.

IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide,113 Robbery with Rape,114 Robbery with Intentional Mutilation,115 Robbery
with

Arson,116 Rape with Homicide,117 Kidnapping with Murder,118 Carnapping with Homicide119 or Carnapping with Rape,120 Highway
Robbery with Homicide,121 Qualified Piracy,122 Arson with Homicide,123 Hazing with Death, Rape, Sodomy or Mutilation124 and other
crimes with death, injuries, and sexual abuse as the composite crimes, where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to
reclusion perpetua although death did not occur.

1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds125 and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be
awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua.

2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be
awarded:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

In Robbery with Physical Injuries,126 the amount of damages shall likewise be dependent on the nature/severity of the wounds sustained,
whether fatal or non-fatal.

The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the robber/s or perpetrator/s are themselves killed or injured in the
incident.1âwphi1

Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise apply, and that for every additional rape committed, whether against the
same victim or other victims, the victims shall be entitled to the same damages unless the other crimes of rape are treated as separate
crimes, in which case, the damages awarded to simple rape/qualified rape shall apply.

V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, i.e., Homicide, Death under Tumultuous
Affray, Infanticide to conceal the dishonour of the offender,127 Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and
Unintentional Abortion, etc.:

1.1 Where the crime was consummated:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes where there are no stages, i.e., Reckless Imprudence and Death
under tumultuous affray:

a. Frustrated:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱30,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱30,000.00

b. Attempted:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱20,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱20,000.00

If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not alleged in the Information,128 in addition to the above mentioned
amounts as civil indemnity and moral damages, the amount of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages for consummated; ₱30,000.00 for frustrated;
and ₱20,000.00 for attempted, shall be awarded.

VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua and death occurs in the course of the rebellion, the heirs of
those who died are entitled to the following:129

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00130

B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the rebellion and could have died if not for a timely medical
intervention, the following shall be awarded:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in court, the amount of
₱50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded.

To reiterate, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity is P3,000.00, but does not
provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be
validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it.131

Prescinding from the foregoing, for the two (2) counts of murder, attended by the ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling, appellant
should be ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the following damages: (1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity for each of the two children who
died; (2) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages for each of the two victims; (3) another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the two
victims; and (4) temperate damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 for each of the two deceased. For the four (4) counts of Attempted Murder,
appellant should pay ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the four
victims. In addition, the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages payable by the appellant are subject to
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid.132

Lastly, this Court echoes the concern of the trial court regarding the dismissal of the charges against Gilberto Estores and Roger San Miguel
who had been identified by Norberto Divina as the companions of appellant on the night the shooting occurred. Norberto had been very
straightforward and unwavering in his identification of Estores and San Miguel as the two other people who fired the gunshots at his family.
More significantly, as noted by the prosecutor, the testimonies of Estores and San Miguel, who insisted they were not at the crime scene,
tended to conflict with the sworn statement of Danilo Fajarillo, which was the basis for the Provincial Prosecutor's ruling that he finds no
probable cause against the two. Danilo Fajarillo's sworn statement said that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and
Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm and the two other people with him had no
participation in the shooting incident. Said circumstances bolster the credibility of Norberto Divina's testimony that Estores and San Miguel
may have been involved in the killing of his two young daughters.

After all, such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to double jeopardy because the same only attaches if the following
requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached before the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second
jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. In turn, a first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent
court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.133 In this case, the case against Estores and San Miguel was dismissed
before they were arraigned. Thus, there can be no double jeopardy to speak of. Let true justice be served by reinvestigating the real
participation, if any, of Estores and San Miguel in the killing of Mary Grace and Claudine Divina.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252 is
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the
crime of murder defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and hereby
sentences him to suffer two (2) terms of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole under R.A. 9346. He is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of
Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina the following amounts for each of the two victims: (a) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱100,000.00
as moral damages; (c) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages.

(2) In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the
crime of attempted murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, for each of the four (4) counts of
attempted murder. He is ORDERED to PAY moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages of PS0,000.00 to each of the four victims, namely, Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina.

(3) Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of
this decision until fully paid, to be imposed on the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages.

(4) Let the Office of the Prosecutor General, through the Department of Justice, be FURNISHED a copy of this Decision. The Prosecutor
General is DIRECTED to immediately conduct a REINVESTIGATION on the possible criminal liability of Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel
regarding this case. Likewise, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice for his information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

FERDINAND A. CRUZ,

Petitioner,

- versus -
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 176504

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

NACHURA and

REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 3, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which assails the Decision[1] dated 27 April 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27661 which affirmed the Decision[2] and the Order[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 140, finding petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz (Ferdinand) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft.

On 10 July 1997, an Information was filed before the RTC of Makati City charging Ferdinand with Qualified Theft. The accusatory portion of
the Information reads:

That on or about the 25th day of October 1996, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then employed as Marketing Manager of Porta-Phone Rentals, Inc. with office address
located at 3/F ENZO Bldg., Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City, herein represented by Juanito M. Tan, Jr. and had access to the funds of the
said corporation, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of said corporation, with grave abuse of confidence, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the amount of P15,000.00 belonging to said Porta-Phone Rentals,
Inc., to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid amount of P15,000.00.[4]

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 97-945. During the arraignment on 22 August 1997, Ferdinand, with the assistance of counsel de
parte, entered a plea of not guilty.[5] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Juanito M. Tan, Jr., the General Manager of Porta-Phone Rentals, Inc.
(Porta Phone) when the incident in question took place. He testified that Ferdinand appropriated for himself the amount of P15,000.00, an
amount which should have been remitted to the company; (2) Catherine Villamar (Catherine), the Credit and Collection Officer of Porta-
Phone, who discovered that Ferdinand issued a receipt for P15,000.00 from Hemisphere-Leo Burnett (Hemisphere), and who also testified
that Ferdinand misappropriated the amount for his own benefit and, when she confronted him, said he had unpaid reimbursements from the
company; (3) Luningning Morando, the accounting supervisor of Porta-Phone, corroborated the alleged fact that Ferdinand received the
amount and did not turn over the same to the company; and (4) Wilson J. So, Chief Executive Officer of Porta-Phone, who testified that
meetings were held to demand from Ferdinand the subject sum of money.

As documentary evidence, the prosecution offered the following: Exhibit A Official Receipt No. 2242, the receipt in which Ferdinand
acknowledged that he received the amount of P15,000.00 from Hemisphere; Exhibit B the Minutes of the Meeting held on 30 October 1996
attended by Wilson So, Juanito Tan, Luningning Morando and Ferdinand, wherein Wilson So asked Ferdinand the reason for the formers
refusal to remit the P15,000.00 to the company, and Ferdinand answered that there was no need to turn over the said amount because he
had outstanding reimbursements from the company in the amount of P8,518.08; Exhibit C the Resignation Letter of Ferdinand; Exhibit D - the
Inter-Office Demand Letter dated 7 November 1996, addressed to Ferdinand from Juanito M. Tan, Jr. requiring the former to return the
amount of P15,000.00; Exhibit E - the Handwritten Explanation of Ferdinand dated 8 December 1996, that he remitted the amount to
Luningning Morando; Exhibit F- Inter-Office Memorandum dated 8 November 1996, issued by Juanito Tan and addressed to Luningning
Morando to explain her side regarding the allegation of Ferdinand that she received the P15,000.00; Exhibit G- Inter-Office Memorandum
prepared by Luningning Morando dated 9 November 1996, denying the allegation that she received the amount of P15,000.00 from
Ferdinand; Exhibit H- Inter-Office Memorandum dated 11 November 1996, issued by Juanito Tan for Ferdinand to further explain his side in
light of Luningning Morandos denial that she received the amount. It also advised Ferdinand to wait for the verification and computation of
his claim for reimbursements; Exhibit I- Formal Demand Letter dated 25 November 1996, addressed to Ferdinand and issued by the legal
counsel of Porta-Phone Rentals, Inc., asking the former to return to the company the subject amount; Exhibit J- the Affidavit of Complaint
executed by Juanito Tan against Ferdinand; Exhibit K- the Collection List dated 30 October 1996, showing that Ferdinand received from
Hemisphere the amount of P15,000.00, and the same was not turned over to Catherine; Exhibit L- Reply-Affidavit dated 5 February 1997,
executed by Juanito M. Tan, Jr.; Exhibit M- the Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit of Juanito M. Tan, Jr. dated 21 February 1997.

The collective evidence adduced by the prosecution shows that at around 5:30 p.m. of 25 October 1996, in the City of Makati, Ferdinand,
who is a Marketing Manager of Porta-Phone, a domestic corporation engaged in the lease of cellular phones and other communication
equipment, went to the office of Porta-Phone located on the third floor of Enzo Building, Senator Gil Puyat Avenue, and took hold of a pad of
official receipts from the desk of Catherine, Porta-Phones collection officer. With the pad of official receipts in his hands, Ferdinand
proceeded to his client, Hemisphere, and delivered articles of communication equipment. Although he was not an authorized person to
receive cash and issue receipts for Porta-Phone, Ferdinand received from Hemisphere the amount of P15,000.00 as refundable deposit for
the aforesaid equipment. On 26 October 1996, Ferdinand went to Porta-Phone and returned the pad of receipts, but failed to deliver the
cash he received from Hemisphere. On 28 October 1996, the next working day, Catherine checked the booklet of official receipts and found
that one of the official receipts was missing. The green duplicate of the missing official receipt, however, showed that Ferdinand received the
amount of P15,000.00 from Hemisphere. Upon learning of Ferdinands receipt of the said amount, Catherine confronted Ferdinand, who
answered that he deposited the amount to his personal bank account. Catherine then instructed Ferdinand to remit the amount the next
day.[6] Catherine reported the incident to the accounting supervisor, Luningning Morando, who, in turn, reported the same to the General
Manager, Junito Tan. The following day, Ferdinand went to the office but did not deliver the amount to Catherine, reasoning that Porta-
Phone still owed him unpaid reimbursements.[7] This incident came to the knowledge of Chief Executive Officer Wilson So. Thus, on 30
October 1996, Wilson So invited Ferdinand, Juanito and Luningning to a meeting. In the meeting, Wilson So demanded that Ferdinand return
the collection. Ferdinand refused to turn over the amount to the company. He would return the amount only upon his receipt of his
reimbursements from the company. Since Ferdinand adamantly withheld the collected amount, Juanito issued a demand letter dated 7
November 1996, ordering the former to deliver the amount to the company. Ferdinand answered, this time claiming that he had already
remitted the amount to Luningning. With this, Juanito issued a memorandum dated 8 November 1996, addressed to Luningning asking her to
explain her side regarding the allegation of Ferdinand that she received the P15,000.00. Luningning completely denied having received the
amount from Ferdinand. Juanito then issued another letter to Ferdinand to further explain his side in view of Luningnings denial that she
received the amount. In the letter, Juanito also advised Ferdinand to wait for the verification and computation of his claim for
reimbursements. With the conflicting claims of Luningning and Ferdinand, another meeting was set on 14 November 1996. In that meeting
Luningning again denied having received the amount. Ferdinand did not appear in the meeting. Later, a formal demand letter was issued to
Ferdinand by Porta-Phones legal counsel, which letter went unheeded. Several attempts to reach Ferdinand proved to be futile. This
prompted the company to file a criminal complaint against Ferdinand.

The defense alleged that the amount involved was already turned over to the company through Luningning. To substantiate this, the defense
presented Ferdinand as its only witness.
Ferdinand testified that on 25 October 1996, he delivered to Hemisphere several communication gadgets and received from the same the
amount of P15,000.00 as refundable deposit (the amount required by Porta-Phone from its lessor-client to answer for the damage that may
befall the items leased) for the delivered items. Since he did not bring with him the official receipt of Porta-Phone, he merely acknowledged
having received the amount in an Acknowledgement Receipt issued by Hemisphere. Considering that it was already late in the afternoon
when he delivered the communication items, Ferdinand brought the said amount home. The following day, he went to the companys
accounting supervisor, Luningning, to turn over to her the amount. Luningning received the money and instructed Ferdinand to fill up the
details of the transaction in Official Receipt No. 2242. When Ferdinand asked Luningning to affix her signature to the official receipt to
acknowledge that she received the amount, the latter declined and instead asked the former to affix his signature, since it was he who closed
the deal.

Later, on 28 October 1996, Catherine approached him and asked him to affix his signature to the triplicate copy of Official Receipt No. 2242.

Ferdinand admitted that he attended the meeting of 30 October 1996 with Juanito, Luningning and Wilson So. He, however, claimed that the
discussion centered on his entitlement to reimbursements from the company. Thereupon, Wilson So got angry with him and asked him to
resign, owing to his persistent claim for reimbursement. After this, the company withheld his salary, prompting him to file a labor case
against the same on 4 November 1996.

On 30 June 2001, the RTC rendered a decision finding Ferdinand guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The decretal portion
of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused FERDINAND A. CRUZ, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to indemnify the offended party in the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND
(P15,000.00) PESOS and to pay the costs.[8]

On 2 August 2001, Ferdinand filed a Motion for New Trial on two grounds: (1) absence of a preliminary investigation for the crime of qualified
theft; and (2) newly discovered evidence. Anent the first ground, it must be noted that in the beginning, Ferdinand was being indicted for
Estafa/Falsification of Private Document. The prosecutor later found that the proper charge should be for Qualified Theft. Ferdinand argued
that since his counter-affidavits were for the charge Estafa/Falsification of Private Document, he claimed that preliminary investigation for
Qualified Theft was absent. With regard to the second ground, Ferdinand argued that newly discovered evidence, i.e., the testimony of a
certain Marilen Viduya, could change the judgment on the case. The RTC granted the motion based on the second ground, and set aside its
30 June 2001 decision.

Marilen Viduya, a former employee of Hemisphere, testified that she asked Ferdinand to affix his signature to an acknowledgement receipt
for the amount of P15,000.00, which was the refundable deposit of Hemisphere for the equipment delivered, because Ferdinand did not
bring with him the official receipt of Porta-Phone. She also averred that Luningning went to Hemisphere and conducted an inventory of the
delivered communication items. Luningning admitted to her that the P15,000.00 was already remitted to Porta-Phone.
In an Order[9] dated 15 July 2003, the RTC declared that it did not find the testimony of Marilen Viduya persuasive. It revived and reinstated
its 30 June 2001 decision convicting Ferdinand of the crime charged.

Dissatisfied, Ferdinand appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals, on 27 April 2006, promulgated its Decision affirming the decision of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DENIED. The 30 June 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 140, in Makati City, is hereby
AFFIRMED.[10]

Ferdinand filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 4 October 2006.

Hence, the instant petition.

Ferdinand contends that he was denied due process as his trial was pursued without prior clearance from the Department of Labor pursuant
to Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 16 which allegedly states that clearance must be sought from the Ministry of Labor and /or the
Office of the President before taking cognizance of complaints for preliminary investigation and the filing in court of the corresponding
information of cases arising out of, or related to, a labor dispute. He avers that this circular is designed to avoid undue harassment that the
employer may use to cow employees from pursuing money claims against the former.

He also argues that due process was not accorded since he was indicted for qualified theft, even as he was initially investigated for
estafa/falsification of private documents. It must be noted that the original indictment was for estafa/falsification of private documents but
later the prosecutor found it proper to charge him with qualified theft. According to him although he was given the chance to file counter-
affidavits on the charge of estafa/falsification of private documents, he was not given the opportunity to answer during the preliminary
investigation of the crime of qualified theft.
Finally, Ferdinand maintains that his guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt, absent evidence of the presence of the elements of
the crime charged and given the weakness of the evidence proffered by the prosecution.

Ferdinands arguments are not meritorious.

The settled rule is that when an accused pleads to the charge, he is deemed to have waived the right to preliminary investigation and the
right to question any irregularity that surrounds it.[11] In the instant case, Ferdinand did not present evidence that arraignment was forced
upon him. On the contrary, he voluntarily pleaded to the charge and actively participated in the trial of the case.

Besides, the prior clearance requirement before taking cognizance of complaints under the cited DOJ circular is not applicable to the case of
Ferdinand. The RTC found that the money claim which the Labor Arbiter awarded to Ferdinand covered only his salary during the month of
November 1996. It must be noted that the crime attributed to Ferdinand was committed on 25 October 1996 before Ferdinand was entitled
to the money claim. In other words, the crime was first committed before the accrual of the money claim. This being the case, it is not
remote that it was Ferdinand who used the labor case, which he filed before the Labor Arbiter, to have leverage against the company in the
criminal case.

It is not correct for Ferdinand to claim that preliminary investigation on the charge of qualified theft was not accorded him. The truth is,
Ferdinand was able to answer the initial charge of estafa/falsification of private documents through his counter-affidavits. Based on the same
complaint affidavit and the same sets of evidence presented by the complainant, the prosecutor deemed it proper to charge Ferdinand with
qualified theft. Since the same allegations and evidence were proffered by the complainant in the qualified theft, there is no need for
Ferdinand to be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits anew, as he had already answered said allegations when he submitted
counter-affidavits for the original indictment of estafa/falsification of private documents.

The RTC correctly convicted Ferdinand of the crime of qualified theft.

The elements of the crime of theft are the following: (1) there was a taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the
taking was without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking was done with intent to gain; and (5) the taking was accomplished without
violence or intimidation against the person or force upon things.[12] Under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, theft is qualified when it is,
among others, committed with grave abuse of confidence, to wit:

ART. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified
in the next preceding article, if committed x x x with grave abuse of confidence x x x.
The prosecution established, beyond the shadow of doubt that Ferdinand took and kept the fifteen thousand peso-collection from the
companys client. Although Ferdinand insists he remitted the amount personally to Luningning, this claim is self-serving. If indeed he
personally delivered the P15,000.00, he would have at least required Luningning to acknowledge the receipt thereof before he parted with
the same. The Court of Appeals incisively pointed out that it was implausible for Ferdinand to have acceded to executing an acknowledgment
receipt in favor of Hemisphere so as to give the latter protection from his company, and yet he did not ask for some kind of receipt when he
allegedly turned over the money to Luningning. Quite specious is Ferdinands argument that he would not have had in his possession a copy
of Official Receipt No. 2242, had he not delivered the amount to Luningning. Ferdinand acquired the receipt, not because he remitted the
amount, but because he took a sheet from a booklet of receipts containing Official Receipt number 2242 and issued the same to Hemisphere
despite his lack of authority to do so, to maliciously induce the client into believing that he would remit the amount to Porta-Phone.

The collected amount belonged to Porta-Phone and not to Ferdinand. When he received the same, he was obliged to turn it over to the
company since he had no right to retain it or to use it for his own benefit, because the amount was a refundable deposit for the
communication items leased out by Porta-Phone to Hemisphere. As he had kept it for himself while knowing that the amount was not his, the
presence of the element of unlawful taking is settled.

Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information, in which it is charged that there was unlawful taking
(apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things subject of asportation.[13] In this case, it was apparent that the reason why
Ferdinand took the money was that he intended to gain by it. In the meeting held on 30 October 1996, Ferdinand admitted having received
the amount and kept it until his reimbursements from the company would be released to him. Thus, in the initial hearing of 23 September
1997, Ferdinands counsel made this declaration:

Court: By the way paero, what is the defense of the accused?

xxxx

Atty. Dizon: Denial your honor. Denial. While it is true that he did not return that P15,000.00 pesos, it is because the company owes the
accused more than P20,000.00.[14]

In the course of his testimony, Ferdinand claimed that he had remitted the amount to Luningning. This insistent claim for reimbursements by
Ferdinand would in fact show that he had the intention to take the subject money; hence, intent to gain is made more manifest.
Ferdinands lack of authority to receive the amount is apparent, because he is not one of the collection officers authorized to collect and
receive payment, thus:

Atty. Salvador: You made mention of collectibles, who is authorized by the company to collect the collectibles?

Witness: My accounting group is the only group authorized to make collections for and on behalf of the company.

Atty. Salvador: Can you give the names of this accounting group that you have mentioned?

Witness: Yes sir, the group is composed of : Cathy Villamar; Dull Abular; and Evic Besa.

Atty. Salvador: Is the accused part of the group?

Witness: No sir.[15]

The lack of consent by the owner of the asported money is manifested by the fact that Porta-Phone consistently sought the return of the
same from Ferdinand in the meetings held for this purpose and in the various letters issued by the company.

As a marketing manager of Porta-Phone, Ferdinand made use of his position to obtain the refundable deposit due to Porta-Phone and
appropriate it for himself. He could not have taken the amount had he not been an officer of the said company. Clearly, the taking was done
with grave abuse of confidence.
Ferdinand likewise assails the testimony of prosecution witness Juanito, who retracted his affidavit of desistance in favor of the former and
explained on the witness stand that he had agreed to execute the same due to personal favors bestowed on him by Ferdinand. Ferdinand
asserts that Juanitos retraction should not be given credence. This contention is unconvincing. As aptly discussed by the Court of Appeals:

[W]hile his desistance may cast doubt on his subsequent testimony, We are not unmindful that he was in fact grilled by the defense regarding
his motives in revoking his earlier desistance and he remained steadfast in his testimony that [Ferdinand] was never authorized by Porta-
Phone to collect payments and that during the meeting of 30 October 1996, [Ferdinand] refused to return the money. Rather than destroy his
credibility, the defenses grilling regarding the reasons for his filing his earlier desistance even strengthened the value of his testimony for he
only executed the same because of some personal favors from [Ferdinand]. And while [Ferdinand] suggests that subsequent revocation of his
desistance in open court may be due this time to favors extended by Porta-Phone cannot be sustained when taken together with the fact
that [Juanito] was long been separted from Porta-Phone when he testified. In fact Porta-Phones CEO did not even have kind words for
[Juanito] when the former testified. x x x.[16]

In sum, this Court, yields to the factual findings of the trial court which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, there being no compelling
reason to veer away from the same. This is in line with the precept stating that when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the
appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.[17]

The RTC imposed on petitioner the indeterminate penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor as minimum to Fourteen (14)
Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for
Qualified Theft is two degrees higher than that specified in Article 309. Paragraph 1 of Article 309 provides that if the value of the thing stolen
is more than P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00, the penalty shall be prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. In this
case, the amount stolen was P15,000.00. Two degrees higher than prision mayor minimum and medium is reclusion temporal in its medium
and maximum periods. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum shall be prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period or within the range of 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance in the commission of the offense, the maximum period of the indeterminate sentence shall be within the range of 16
years, 5 months and 11 days to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days. The minimum penalty imposed by the RTC is correct. However, the maximum
period imposed by RTC should be increased to 16 years, 5 months and 11 days.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 April 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 27661 finding Ferdinand A. Cruz GUILTY of the crime
of Qualified Theft is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Ferdinand A. Cruz is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10
years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 16 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO QUIRIMIT, defendants. JUAN SAMSON and defendant-appellant.

PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, offended party-appellee,

vs.

HEIRS OF LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, defendants-appellants. *

Norberto J. Quisumbing for appellant Sendaydiego.

Donato & Rillera for appellant Samson.

Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.

AQUINO, J.:

In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is that in 1969 Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial
treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson y Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with
Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from the road and
bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23.

The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend "ARTICLE OR SERVICE" the nature of the obligation
incurred is indicated. That part is supposed to be signed by two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by the governor's
representative.

The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs. Paragraph 1 is a certificate to be signed by the creditor. It is
stated therein that the creditor vouches that the expenses "were actually and necessarily incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1 was not
signed presumably because it is not relevant to the purchase of materials for public works projects.

Paragraph 2 is a certification that the expenses are correct and have been lawfully incurred. It is signed by the provincial engineer.

Paragraph 3 contains these words: "Approved for pre-audit and payment, appropriations and funds being available therefore." This is signed
by the provincial treasurer.

Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated February 28, 1969, reads:

I certify that this voucher has been pre-audited and same may be paid in the amount of sixteen thought seven hundred twenty-seven and
52/100 (P16,727.52) in cash or in check, provided there is sufficient fund cover the payment.

This is signed by the auditor.

Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in the provincial engineer's certification "was paid
in the amount and on the date shown below and is chargeable as shown in the summary hereof. ... ." It may be noted that the provincial
treasurer signs two part of the voucher.
Following paragraph 5, and as referred to therein, is the receipt of the signed by the creditor. As accomplished in Exhibit K, the receipt reads
(it was signed according to the prosecution by Juan Samson, a point which is disputed by him):

Received this 31st day of March, 1969, from L P. Sendaydiego, Province of Pangasinan the sum of seven hundred twenty-seven pesos &
52/100 (16,727.52) in full payment of the above stated account, which I hereby certify to be correct. Paid by Check No. .................................

CARRIED CONSTR. SUPPLY CO. By: (Sgd.) JUAN SAMSON

According to the prosecution, Samson also signed on the left margin of the six vouchers below the stamped words: "Presented to Prov.
Treasurer. By Juan Samson."

Voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K). — This Provincial voucher, dated February 28, 1969, evidences the payment of PI 6,727.52 to the Carried
Construction Supply Co. of Dagupan City for lumber and hardware materials supposedly used in the repair of the bridge in Barrio Libertad at
the Umingan-Tayug road in Pangasinan along the Nueva Ecija boundary (Exh. K). The voucher makes reference to invoice No. 3327 and other
supporting papers.

The falsity of that provincial voucher is proven by the following intances:

(a) That there was no project for the repair of the bridge at Barrio Libertad (P. 1; Exh. Z).

(b) That the amount of P16,727.52 was never received by the Carried Construction Supply Co The alleged official receipt No. 3025 of the
company dated March, 1969 (Exh. K-6) is forged.

(c) That the lumber and materials mentioned in Exhibit K were never delivered by the company to the provincial government

(d) That in the provincial voucher, Exhibit K, and in the supporting requisition and issue voucher (RIV) No. 2206 dated January 29, 1969 (Exh.
A), covering the same lumber and hardware ma the signatures of the following office were forged: Salvador F. Oropilla senior civil engineer;
Rodolfo P. Mencias, supervising civil engineer Victoriano M. Sevilleja, acting provincial engineer, and Ricardo B. Probincias, chief of
equipment of the governor's office. These four office denied that their signatures in the two vouchers, Exhibits A and B, are their genuine
signatures.

(e) That the imprint of the rubber stamp on Exhibits A and B, containing the words "Approved: For and By Authority of the Governor (signed)
Ricardo B. Primicias, Chief of Equipment", is not the imprint of the genuine rubber stamp used in Primicias office.

(f) That charge invoice No. 3327 of the Carried Construction Supply Co. dated February 18, 1969, containing a description and the prices of
the lumber and hardware material (Exh. B), is fake because, according to Ambrosio Jabanes, the company's assistant manager, the company's
invoice No. 3327 was issued to the Mountain Agricultural College (Exh. II-1). Oropilla denied that his alleged signature on Exhibit B is his
signature.

(g) That three other documents, supporting the provincial voucher (Exh. K), were also forged. Those documents are the taxpayer's cate dated
February 10, 1969 (Exh. C) stating that no tax is due on the goods sold in the fake invoice No. 3327 and the two certificates as to the samples
of lumber allegedly purchased from the Carried Construction Supply Co., (Exh. D and E). Narciso P. Martinez, a district forester, denied that
his signatures in Exhibits D and E are his signatures.

(h) That Angelo C. Manuel the checker of the provincial auditor's office, denied that his signature on the left margin is his signature (Exh. A-
10).

The forged character of provincial voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K) is incontrovertible.

Other five forged voucher. — Five other provincial vouchers evidencing supposed payments of certain amounts to the Carried Construction
Supply Co. for lumber and hardware materials supposingly used in the repair of other bridges were also falsified. These five vouchers are the
following:

(1) Voucher No. 11995 dated April 29, 1969 evidencing the payment of P14,571.81 for number and hardware materials allegedly used in
the repair of Bayaoas bridge at the Urbiztondo-Pasibi Road (Exh. O).

(2) Voucher No. 11869 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P5,187.28 'or lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in
the repair of the Panganiban bridge at the UminganTayug Road (Exh. P)

(3) Voucher No. 11870 dated April 28, 1969 evidencing the payment of P6,290.60 for lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in
the repair of the Cabatuan bridge at the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. Q).

(4) Voucher No. 11871 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P9,769.64 for lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in
the repair of the Casabar bridge at the Binalonan-San Manuel Road (Exh. R).

(5) Voucher No. 11872 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the Payment of P4,501.38 for lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in
the repair of the Baracbac bridge at the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. S).

As in the case of voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Oropilla, Mencias, and Primicias declared that their signatures in the said five vouchers are not
their genuine signatures. Samson, who hand-carried the said vouchers for processing, did not turn over to the provincial auditor's office the
papers supporting the said vouchers after the vouchers had been pre-audited. Hence, those supporting papers could not be presented in
evidence.

Jabanes, the aforementioned assistant manager of the Carried Construction Supply Co., testified that the lumber and hardware materials
mentioned in the five vouchers were never delivered by his company to the provincial government. The charge invoices mentioned in the
said vouchers were cancelled invoices issued to the Mountain Agricultural College. The projected repairs of the bridges were fictitious.

The company's cashier testified that the company never received the payments for the lumber and hardware materials. The receipts
evidencing payments (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4 are fake official receipts. The cashier produced in court the genuine official receipts (Exh. LL to LL-
7) bearing the serial numbers of the fake receipts. The genuine receipts do not refer to transactions with the provincial government.

Samson played a stellar role in the processing of the six vouchers. He used to be an employee of the pro treasurer's office. He resigned and
worked with several firms doing business with the provincial government. In 1969 he was the collector of the Carried Construction Supply Co.
He represented that firm in its dealings with the offices of the governor, provincial auditor, provincial engineer and provincial treasurer. He
was personally known to those provincial officials and the employees of their offices (21-22 Sendaydiego's brief).

The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with their respective supporting papers, were hand-carried by Samson. He delivered the papers to
Carmencita Castillo, the ledger clerk in the provincial engineer's office, for recording and for her signature (Ekh. DD).

Thereafter, Samson brought the papers to the provincial treasurer's office. Marcelo Crusade, a laborer in that office who performed the
chore of recording the vouchers and payrolls, recorded Vouchers Nos. 11869, 11871 and 11872 (Exh. P, R and S). Crusadas initials appear on
the upper lefthand corner of the said vouchers with the date 4/17/69.

Samson signed on the left margin of the vouchers to indicate that he presented them to the provincial t r's office. Crusade said that after
Samson had presented the said papers to him, Samson brought them to Ricardo Baraan, the book-keeper of the provincial treasurer's office
for processing and for the latter's signature (Exh. WW).
From Baraan's office, Samson hand-carried the vouchers to the provincial auditor's office. He asked Virginia Cruz, a clerk to record the same
(Exh. CC).

Afterwards, Samson asked Donato Rosete the assistant provincial treasurer, to initialled the voucher After Rosete had initialled the vouchers,
Samson went to the provincial treasurer's office where the amounts covered by the voucher were paid by Sendaydiego to him in cash
(instead of by check) as representative of the Carried Construction Supply Co. (Exh. EE). He received the payments on March 31 and April 29
and 28 (four payments on that date) as shown on the face of the vouchers.

The signature of Sendaydiego and Quirimit, the auditor, on the said six vouchers are admittedly authentic. Sendaydiego signed the vouchers
ahead of Rosete, his assistant. Sendaydiego's defense is that he signed the vouchers in the honest belief that the signatures therein of the
provincial office concerned were genuine because the voucher had been pre-audited and approved by the auditor.

Samson denied the authenticity of his two signatures on each of the six vouchers showing that he received from Sendaydiego the amounts
covered thereby as representative of the lumber and hardware firm (Exh. OO to TT) and that he presented the vouchers to the provincial s
treasurer 's office (Exh. 6-12 — Samson). Sendaydiego testified that Samson's signatures are genuine.

In connection with the six vouchers, Sendaydiego, Samson and Quirimit were charged with malversation through falsification in three
docketed as follows:

1. Criminal Case No. 23349 involving provincial voucher No. 10724 dated February 28, 1969 in the sum of P16,7Z7.52 (Exh. X), L-33252.

2. Criminal Case No. 23350 involving provincial vouchers Nos. 11869, 11870, 11871 dated April 15 (two dates) 28 and 15, 1969 for the
respective amounts of P5,187.28, P6,290.60, P9,769-64 and P4,501.38 (four vouchers, Exh. P, Q, R and S), now L-33253.

3. Criminal Case No. 23351 involving provincial voucher No. 11955 dated April 29, 1969 in the sum of P14,571.81 (Exh. O), now L-
33254.

After trial the lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and Samnson guilty of malversation through falsification of
public or official documents imposing each of the following penalties:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 23349, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten months and twenty-one-days, as minimum, to eighteen
years, two months and twenty-one days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and a fine of P16,727.52 and to indemnify solidarity the
provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount;

(2) In Criminal Case No. 23350, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P29,748.90 and to indemnify solidarily the provincial
government of Pangasinan in the same amount; and

(3) In Criminal Case No. 23351, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten months and twenty-one days, as minimum, to eighteen
year two months and twenty-one days of reclusion temporal as maximum , and a fine of P14,571.81 and to indemnify solidarity the provincial
government of Pangasinan in the same amount.

Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court.

Sendaydiego died on October 5, 1976. His appeal as to his criminal liability was dismissed. Death extinguished his criminal liability remained.
The resolution of July 8, 1977 dismissing Sendaydiego's appeal read s follows:

The death of appellant Sendaydiego during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment of conviction rendered against him by the
lower court became final and executory extinguished his criminal liability meaning his obligation to serve the personal or imprisonment
penalties and his liability to pay the fines or pecuniary penalties (Art. 89[1], Revised Penal Code; 1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., 565).
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment
was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through falsification
and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).

The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation
in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal
action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).

When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed
to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided' in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action
survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).

The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U S. vs. Elvina,
24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).

In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is
concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money claims of the Province
of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making
applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code (Note: The lower court had issued an order of attachment against him
on January 13, 1970 for the sum of P36,487 and in the brief for said appellant, there is no specific assignment of error affecting the civil
liability fixed by the trial court.) and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and
addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said
heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3,
Rules of Court). According to Sendaydiego's brief, he had a wife and ten children named Arturo, Licerio, Jr., Prospero, Regulo, Eduardo, Cesar,
Nola, Aida, Wilfredo and Manolo (deceased).

The title of this case should be amended to show its civil aspect by adding thereto the following. Province of Pangasinan vs. Heirs of Licerio P.
Sendaydiego.

Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his
estate would be liable for which his estate would be liable.

Sendaydiedo's appeal; civil liability of his estate. — In view of Sendaydiego's death, it is not necessary to resolve his first two assignments of
error, wherein he assails the imposition of reclusion perpetua as a cruel and unusual penalty and wherein it is argued that there is no
complex crime of malversation through falsification committed by negligence.

In the third assignment of error, it is contended that the trial court erred in allowing private prosecutors Millora and Urbiztondo to prosecute
the case thereby allegledly subjecting the accused to proceedings marked by undue publicity, pre-judgment, bias and political self-interest.

Atty. Vicente D. Millora, a senior member of the provincial board actually handled the prosecution of the case from the preliminary
investigation, which started on June 5, 1969, up to the termination of the trial on July 29, 1970.

At the commencement of the preliminary investigation, the counsel for the accused auditor inquired whether Atty. Millora was authorized by
the provincial board to act as private prosecutor in representation of the province of Pangasinan, the offended party. Atty. Millora replied
that there was a board resolution designating him as a private prosecutor.

The acting provincial commander, who filed the complaints manifested to the trial court that he had authorized Atty. Millora to act as private
prosecutor (4-8 tsn June 5, 1969).
Another defense counsel filed a written motion to inhibit Millora and the others as private prosecutors. The lower court denied the motion in
its order of June 18, 1969 (p. 40, Record of Criminal Case No. 23350).

After the termination of the p investigation conducted by the lower court, the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan and the city final of Dagupan
City filed three informations against the accused all dated November 4, 1969.

At the commencement of the trial on February 23, 1970 the city fiscal, an assistant provincial fiscal and Atty. Millora, the private prosecutor,
appeared for the prosecution. The city fiscal moved "that the private prosecutor (Millora) be authorized to conduct the examination subject
to our (the fiscal's) control and supervision". The trial court granted the motion (7 tsn).

At the hearing on April 23, 1970 the same city fiscal moved that Atty. Urbiztondo be authorized to examine the prosecution witnesses under
his supervision and control The trial court granted the motion (155 tsn).

The record shows that at every hearing the provincial fiscal, the city fiscal or an assistant fiscal were present together with the private
prosecutor.

Under the foregoing circumstances, we believe that there was substantial compliance with the rule that the criminal action should be
"prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal" and that "the provincial fiscal shall represent the province" in any court (Sec.4, Rule
110, Rules of Court; sec. 1683, Revised Administrative Code).

The observation of Sendaydiego's counsel, that the imposition of reclusion perpetua "could have been the result of the undue publicity,
prejudgment, bias and political interest which attended the proceedings ", is not well-founded. The trial court's decision dispels any doubt as
to its impartiality. The evidence in the three cases is mainly documentary. The unassailable probative value of the documents involved rather
than bias and prejudice, was the decisive factor on which the trial court anchored the judgment of conviction.

Moreover, as already adverted to, Sendaydiego's death had rendered moot the issue as to the propriety of the imposition of reclusion
perpetua. And, as will be shown later, reclusion perpetua cannot be imposed in these cases because the crimes committed were not
complex.

The other seven assigmments of error made by Sendaydiego's counsel refer to the trial court's conclusion that Sendaydiego and Samson are
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation through falsification or, specifically, that the provincial treasurer, in signing the six vouchers,
evinced "malice or fraud and that there must have been connivance between" the two.

Several lances indicate that Sendaydiego conspired with Samson. Donato N. Rosete, the assistant provincial treasurer, testified that, contrary
to the usual procedure, he affixed his initial to paragraph 3 of the vouchers after Sendaydiego had signed it. Rosete adhered to that unusual
procedure because the interested party, Samson who hand-carried the vouchers, approached Rosete after he (Samson) had conferred with
the provincial treasurer and Samson told Rosete to initial the voucher because it was areglado na (already settled) since the treasurer had
already signed the voucher (54 tsn July 3, 1969).

Rosete's testimony and affidavit confute appellant Sendaydiego's contention that the trial court erred in finding that he signed the
questioned vouchers before Rosete had placed his initial in them. After the treasurer had signed the voucher, Rosete's duty to initial it was
only ministerial (75 tsn July 3, 1969).

The bookkeeper in the treasurer's office testified that he indicated in the vouchers that the amounts covered thereby should be paid in cash.
That indication was made by means of the symbol "A-1-1" placed at the bottom of the vouchers under the column "Account Number". The
bookkeeper was in. instructed by Samson to place that symbol Samson told him that he (Samson) had an understanding with Treausrer
Sendaydiego that the payment should be made in cas. There were instances when the treasurer insisted on payment by check to creditors
other than Juan Samson.
The cash payments were made to Samson in the inner office of the provincial treasurer where the cashier was summoned to make the cash
payments (11-12 ton July 9, 1969; p. 11, Exh. EE). As noted by the trial court, it was unusual that the payments should be made in the
treasurer's office when that was a ministerial chore of the cashier.

The cash payments were made to Samson even if Samson had no power of attorney from the Carried Construction Supply Co. authorizing
him to receive the payments. The space in the vouchers for the signature of the witness, who should be present when the payments were
received, was blank. The treasurer did not bother to have a witness to attest to the payments or to require the exhibition of Samson's
residence certificate.

Another apt observation of the trial court is that the forged character of the six vouchers would have been unmasked by the supposed
creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., if the payments had been made by means of checks. The company on receiving the checks would
have returned them to the treasurer because it knew that there was no reason to make any payments at all. The trial court said that the cash
payments prove Sendaydiego's collusion with Samson.

Sendaydiego's counsel assails the lower court's finding that there was a conspiracy between the provincial and Samson as shown by the fact
that the amounts covered by the vouchers were paid to Samson by the cashier in the treasurer's inner office. That point was testified to by
Rosete, the assistant provincial treasurer.

The cashier, Napoleon Ulanday, would have been the beet witness on how and where the payments were made. However, Ulanday died
before the preliminary investigation was started. On May 27, 1969, after the anomalies were unearthed, he wrote a letter to the provincial ,
stating that he paid to Samson the amounts covered by five vouchers in the of Salazar K. Misal and Josefina E. Pulido (Exh. 13).

Rosete was in a position to state that the cash payments were made to Samson in the treasurers inner office because his table was near the
main door of the treasurers office or was about fifteen meters away (18 tsn). Rosete always knew when the cashier went to the treasurers
office because the cashier was oned by means of a buzzer (long buzz), and when the cashier came out of the treasurer's office, he would be
holding the voucher (12-13 tsn).

Sendaydiego's counsel that no gross negligence can be imputed to the treasurer (malversation is a crime which can be committed by means
of dolo or culpa and the penalty in either case is the same). This argument does not deserve serious consideration because the facts proven
by the prosecution show that he had a tieup with Samson and that he acted maliciously in signing the six questioned vouchers.

The last contention put forward for Sendaydiego is that, because the trial court acquitted the auditor, then the treasurer's exoneration
follows as a matter of course. We see no merit in that contention because the evidence for the prosecution against Sendaydiego is not the
same as its evidence against the auditor. For that reason the auditor was charged only as an accomplice, whereas, the treasurer was charged
as a principal. The auditor based his defense on the undeniable fact that the treasurer had approved the six vouchers "for pre-audit and
payment" before they were passed upon by the auditor. In short, the auditor was misled by the treasurer's certification which the auditor
apparently assumed to have been made in good faith when in truth it was made in bad faith.

We are convinced after a minutiose examination of the documentary and oral evidence and an unprejudiced consideration of the arguments
of Sendaydiego's counsel that his criminal liability was established beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the civil liability fo his estate for
the amounts malversed was duly substantial.

Samson's appeal. — Samson's brief has no statement of facts. He contends that the trial court erred in disregarding the expert testimony that
his signatures on the vouchers are not his signature; in finding that he forged the vouchers and received the proceeds thereof, and in relying
on circumstantial evidence as proof of conspiracy.

As a preliminary issue, Samson argues that Judge Eloy B. Bello should have inhibited himself "in fairness to the accused, in the interest of
justice, and as a gesture of delivadeza" because he had conducted the preliminary investigation.

Our searching study of the recrod fails to sustain Samson's insinuation that he was prejudiced by the fact that Judge, who conducted the
preliminary investigation, was the one who tried the case and convicted him. Judge Bello tried the case fairly. His conduct of the trial does
not show that he had already prejudged their guilt.
Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of court, in allowing a Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation, does not disqualify it
from trying the case after it had found probable cause and after the fiscal, as directed by the Court, had filed the corresponding information.
The rule assumes that the Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, could impartially try the case on the merits.

We cannot assume that judges as a rule are opinionated and narrow-minded insomuch that they would invariably be iron-bound by their
findings at the preliminary investigation.

The case of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, who conducts a preliminary investigation and then tries the case on the merits, is similar to
a situation where an inferior court conducts a preliminary investigation of a grave or less grave offense falling within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance and tghe inferior court. In such a case, the inferior court after terminating the preliminary
investigation is not obligated (por delivadeza) to remand the case to the Court of First Instance for trial. The inferior court has the option to
try the case on the merits (People vs. Palmon, 86 Phil. 350; Natividad vs. Robles, 87 Phil. 834; People vsw. Colicio, 88 Phil. 196). The
assumption is that the inferior court can try the case without any ingrained bias or undue prejudice.

Samson sought to prove, through Lieutenant Colonel Jose G. Fernandez, retired chief of the Constabulary crime laboratory, a handwriting
expert, that his signatures on the vouchers are not his signatures.

Fernandez found that the questioned signatures and the alleged genuine signatures (exemplars) of Samson have fundamental differences.
The expert concluded that the questioned signatures and the exemplar signatures of Samson were not written by one and the same person
(Exh. 20).

After examining the questioned and genuine signatures and analysing the evidence and contentions of the parties, we find that the expert is
correct in declaring that (as admitted by the trial court) there are radical differences between the questioned and authentic signatures.

But the expert is in error in concluding that Samson did not forge the questioned signatures or in implying that Samson had no hand in the
writing thereof.

The truth is that Samson used two forms of signature. His supposed genuine signatures found in his residence certificates, income tax returns
and the genuine office receipt of the Carried Construction Supply Co. are "in an arcade form or rounded form of writing". The surname
Samson is encircled.

On the other hand, the questioned signatures used in Samson's transactions with the provincial government are in angular form; his surname
is not encircled, and the questioned signatures terminate in angular and horizontal strokes.

Samson was consistent in his fakeries. Knowing that the six vouchers evidenced fictitious transactions, he used therein his fake signature, or
the signature which is different from his signature in genuine documents. He used his forged signatures in the six fake official receipts of the
Carried Construction Supply Co., stating that the amounts covered by the six vouchers were received by him (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4). the expert
admitted that a person may have two forms of signature (186 tsn July 16, 1970).

Signatures may be deliberately disguised with the dishonest intention of denying the same as and when necessary (Mehta, Identification of
Handwriting and Cross Examination of Experts, pp. 4th Ed., 1970, p. 224; Harrison, Suspect Documents 418-419).

Sendaydiego himself testified that the questioned signatures of Samson in the six vouchers were Samson's signatures (94-99 tsn July 31,
1969).

Fernandez, the handwriting expert, declared that the questioned signatures of Samson in the vouchers were written by only one person (264-
265 tsn July 16, 1970).
The evidence conclusively proves that Samson, as the representative or collector of the supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co.,
hand-carried the vouchers in question to the offices of the provincial engineer, treasurer and auditor and then back to the treasurer's office
for payment. He actually received the cash payments. Under those circumstances, Samson is presumed to be the forger of the vouchers.

The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and be made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting
thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged
documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing
the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery. (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil., 453; People
vs. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338 People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).

In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to
be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People vs.Caragao, L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA
993).

Samson's use of one form of signature for his crooked transactions with the provincial government and another form of signatures of his valid
transactions or papers shows the deviousness of the falsifications perpetrated in these cases. (Note that Sendaydiego signed the certification
in the first voucher, Exhibit K, stating that proceeds thereof were paid to

Samson but Sendaydiego did not sign the same certification in the other five forged vouchers, Exhibits O, P, Q, R and S).

As to the question of conspiracy, the statement of Samson's on page 19 of his brief, that "the trial court made absolutely no finding of any
supposed conspiracy' between Samson and Sendaydiego, is not correct.

We have already noted that the trial court explicitly stated that the circumstance that Sendaydiego signed the six vouchers ahead of his
assistant shows that there was "malice or fraud" on the part of Sendaydiego and that there was conivance between Samson and Sendaydiego
when the proceeds of the vouchers were paid to Samson in Sendaydiego's inner office, instead of in the cashier's office (p. 23, 26, Decision,
Appendix to Samson's brief). The trial court said that the fact that Sendaydiego allowed payment in cash shows "his collission with Samson
(Ibid, p. 26).

Samson's contention that the trial court merely conjectured that he had received the proceeds of the vouchers is not well taken. The trial
court's finding on that point is based on very strong circumstantial evidence (assuming that it was not proven that Samson signed the
vouchers).

Samson vehemently argues that there is no evidence that the total sum of P57,048. 23 paid under the six vouchers "was really
misappropriated". He asserts that the six vouchers are genuine (although he contends that his signatures thereon are forgeries) and that
there is no proof that the amounts covered thereby were not paid for the construction materials shown in the six vouchers were never
delivered by the company (Exh. HH).

These contentions appear to be untenable in thelight of the declaration of Jabanes, the assistant manager of Carried Construction Supply Co.,
the alleged supplier, that the materials shown in the six vouchers were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH).

And Leticia Sevilleja (wife of the provincial engineer), who was employed as cashier of the carried Construction Supply Co., denied that
Samson turned over to the company the proceeds of the six vouchers which he was supposed to have collected for the company from
Sendaydiego. The six vouchers appear to be fake principally because they evidence fictitious sales of construction materials.

Under the said circumstances, it cannot be contended that there was no malversation after Sendaydiego admtte that Samson acknowledged
in the six vouchers that he received from Treasurer Sendaydiego the total sum of P57,048.23.

The assertion of Samson's counsel on pgae 29 of his brief, that the finding as to his guilt is based on a shaky foundation or is predicated on
circumstances which wre not proven, is not correct.
Recapitulations. — In resume, it appears that the provincial treasurer wants to base his exculpation on his belief that in the six vouchers the
signatures of Samson and the officials in the provincial engineer's office appeared to be genuine and on the fact that the auditor had
approved the vouchers. The tresurer claimed that he acted in good faith in approving the payments of the proceeds of the vouchers to
Samson as the representative of the supplier, Carried Construction Co.

On the other hand, Samson, by impugning his signatures in the vouchers, denied that he received the said amounts from the cashier of the
treasurer's office.

These conflicting versions of the treasurer and Samson have to be resolved in the light of the inexpugnable fact that Samson had hand-
carried the voucehrs and followed up their processing in the offices of the provicial government the construction materials described in the
six vouchers and denied having received from Samson the prices of the alleged sales.

The result is the Samson's denial of his signatures in the six vouchers and in the six receipts (Exh. K-6 and KK to KK-4) and the provicial
treasurer's pretension of having acted in good faith or having committed an honest mistake have to be disbelieved.

The unavoidable conclusion is that Sendaydiego and Samson were in cahoots to defraud the provincial government and to camouflage the
defraudation by means of the six vouchers which have some genuine features and which appear to be extrinsically authentic but which were
intrinsically fake.

Penalties. — The trial court and the assumed that three complex crimes of malversation through falsification of public documents were
committed in this case. That assumption is wrong.

The crimes committed in these three cases are not complex. Separate crimes of falsification and malversation were committed. These are not
cases where the execution of a single act constitutes two grave or less grave felonies or where the falsification was used as a means to
commit malversation.

In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the malversation. It is settled that if the falsification was resorted to for the purpose
of hiding the malversation, the falsification and malversation are separate offenses (People vs. Cid, 66 Phil 354; People vs. Villanueva, 58 Phil.
671; People vs. Geralde 52 Phil. 1000; People vs. Regis, 67 Phil. 43).

In the Regis case, supra where the modus operandi is similar to the instant cases, the municipal treasurer made it appear in two official
payrolls dated April .30 and May 2, 1931 that some persons worked as laborers in a certain street project at Pinamungahan, Cebu. In that
way, the two amounts covered by the payrolls, P473.70 and P271.60, were appropriated and taken from the municipal funds. As a matter of
fact, no such work was done in the said street project and the persons mentioned in both payrolls had not performed any labor.

It was held in the Regis case, that the falsification and malversation did not constitute a complex crime because the falsifications were not
necessary means for the co on of the malversations. Each falsification and each malversation constituted independent offenses which must
be punished separately.

The municipal treasurer was convicted of two falsifications and two malversations. Four distinct penalties were imposed.

In the instant cases, the provincial , as the custodian than of the money forming part of the road and bridge could have malversed or
misappropriated it without falsifiying any voucher. The falsification was used as a device to prevent detection of the malversation.

The falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one continuing offense impelled by a single criminal impulse.

Each falsification of a voucher constitutes one crime. The falsification of six vouchers constitutes six separate or distinct offenses (People vs.
Madrigal-Gonzales, 117 Phil. 956).
And each misappropriation as evidenced by a provincial voucher constitutes a separate crimes of malversation were committed. Appellant
Samson is a co-principal in each of the said twelve offenses.

As already stated, he is presumed to be the author of the falsification because he was in possession of the forged vouchers and he used them
in order to receive public monies from the provincial treasurer.

He is a co-principal in the six crimes of malversation because he conspired with the provincial treasurer in committing those offenses. The
trial court correctly ruled that a private person conspiring with an accountable public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of
malversation (People vs. Rodis, 105 Phil. 1294; U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. Dato and Lustre, 37 Phil. 359; U.S. vs. Dowdell, 11 Phil. 4;
People vs. Caluag, 94 Phil. 457).

Note that a different rule prevails with respect to a stranger taking part in the commission of parricide or qualified theft. In such cases, the
stranger is not guilty of parricide or qualfied theft but only of murder or homicide, as the case may be, and simple theft, by reason of
paragraph 3, article 62 of the Revised Penal Code (People vs. Patricio, 46 Phil. 245).

Falsification of a public document committed by a private person is punished in article 172(1) of the Revised Penal Code by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.

For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28 and P4,501.38, respectively covered by vouchers Nos. 11869 and 11872 (Exh. P and S), the
penalty provided in paragraph 2 of article of the Revised Penal Code is prision mayor minimum and medium.

For the malversation of the sums of P6,290.60 andP9,769.64, respectively covered by vouchers Nos. 1187 and11871 (Exh. Q and R) the
penalty provided in paragraph 3 of article 217 is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal minimum.

For the malversation of the sums of P16,727.52 and 10995 (Exh. K and O), the penalty provided in paragraph 4 of article 217 is reclusion
temporal medium and maximum.

In each of the malversation cases, a fine equal to the amount malversed should be added to the imprisonment penalty.

In the twelve cases the penalty should be imposed in the medium peiod since there are no modifying circumstances (Arts. 64[1] and 685,
Revised Penal Code). Samson is entitled to an indeterminate sentence.

WHEREFORE, Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public document and six crimes of malversation.

In lieu of the penalties imposed by the trial court, he is sentenced to the following penalties:

For each of the six falsification of the vouchers (Exh. K, O, P, Q, R and S), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of
prison correccional minimum, as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional medium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of three
thousand pesos.

For the malversation of the sum of P16,727.52 covered by voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine
in the amount of P16,727.52, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case NO. 23349, L-33252).

For the malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered by voucher No. 11995 (Exh. O), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine
in the sum of P14,571.81, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23351, L-33254).
For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60 covered by voucher No. 11870 (Exh. Q), Samson is sentenced to an indertiminate penalty of
nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of
P6,290.60, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).

For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by voucher No. 11871 (Exh. R), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of
P9,769.64, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).

For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28, covered by voucher No. 11869 (Exh. P), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,187.28,
and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).

For the malversation of the sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher no. 11872 (Exh. S), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five
(5) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of
P4,501.38, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).

In the service of the twelve penalties meted to Samson, the threefold limit provided for in article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be
observed (People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677), meaning that the maximum penalty that he should serve is three times the indeterminate
sentence of twelve (12) years to seventeen (17) years, the severest penalty imposed on him, or thirty-six (36) years to fifty-one (51) years (see
People vs. Peñas, 68 Phil. 533).

The maximum duration of his sentences should not exceed forty (40) years (Penultimate par. of art. 70; People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People
vs. Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68 Phil. 530 and 69 Phil. 58).

The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the sum of P57,048.23.

Samson and the said estate are sojidarily liable for the said indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal Code). Samson should pay one-half of the
costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 125066. July 8, 1998]

ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doa Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision,
Paraaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant
sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00.

Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint[1] against petitioner with the Fiscals
Office.

On 13 January 1988, an information[2] was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (docketed as Criminal Case No. 33919)
charging petitioner with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury. The information read:
The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight
Physical Injury as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused, Isabelita Velasco Reodica, being then the driver and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw
bearing plate no. NJU-306, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same in a reckless, careless,
negligent and imprudent manner, without regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution
to avoid damage to property and injuries to person, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said vehicle to
bump/collide with a Toyota Corolla bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven and owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby causing damage amounting to
P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of its owner, in the aforementioned amount of P8,542.00.

That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto Bonsol suffered bodily injuries which required medical attendance for a
period of less that nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same period of time.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.

On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decision[3] convicting petitioner of the quasi offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries, and sentencing her:

[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the complainant, Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen
Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippine Currency, without subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the
costs.[4]

The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise:

As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant suffered slight physical injuries (Exhs. D, H and I). In view of the resulting
physical injuries, the penalty to be imposed is not fine, but imprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental of Criminal Law Review, Eight Edition 1988,
p. 711). Slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence is now punished with penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period (People v.
Aguiles, L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited in Gregorios book, p. 718).[5]

As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and medical expenses (P5,000.00).

Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR No. 14660. After her motions for
extension of time to file her brief were granted, she filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex
Abundanti Cautela, Period for Filing Appellants Brief. However, respondent Court of Appeals denied this motion and directed petitioner to file
her brief.[6]

After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision[7] on 31 January
1996 affirming the appealed decision.

Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration[8] raising new issues, thus:

NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE PENALTY AND MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE SINCE IT IS
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO BE ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH ARE LIGHT
OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION AND EVEN ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT IMPOSE A
PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.[9]

.........
REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION OR LACK OF JURISDICTION.[10]

In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, as well as her
supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court premised
on the following grounds:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 1996 AND MORE SO ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE CONTRARY
TO LAW AND GROSSLY ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY IMPOSED A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE CRIME OF
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON THE BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A SECONDARY SOURCE.

A IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR,[11] THE SAME CASE WHERE THE COURT A QUO BASED ITS FINDING OF A PENALTY WHEN IT AFFIRMED
THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS STATED IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS THAT THE PENALTY FOR SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE IS ARRESTO MENOR AND NOT ARRESTO MAYOR. IT IS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE
RESPONDENT COURT TO PUNISH PETITIONER MORE THAN SHE SHOULD OR COULD BE PUNISHED BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL ERROR COPIED
FROM A SECONDARY SOURCE.

B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES IMPOSING A SINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN ITS ELLIPTICAL
RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996.

C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE
DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.

Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted not only the title, but likewise the ruling of the case cited as
authority regarding the penalty for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was not People v.
Aguiles, but People v. Aguilar; while the ruling was that the penalty for such quasi offense was arresto menor not arresto mayor.

As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts below should have pronounced that there were two separate light
felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with damage to property, instead
of considering them a complex crime. Two light felonies, she insists, do not rate a single penalty of arresto mayor or imprisonment of six
months, citing Lontok v. Gorgonio,[12] thus:

Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000.00 and slight
physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the
lesiones menos graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365).

.........

The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is different from the instant case because in that case the negligent act
resulted in the offenses of lesiones menos graves and damage to property which were both less grave felonies and which, therefore,
constituted a complex crime.

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should have been
charged in a separate information.

She then suggests that at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable in their maximum period and computed or added
together, only sum up to 60 days imprisonment and not six months as imposed by the lower courts.
On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, being punishable only
by arresto menor, is a light offense; as such, it prescribes in two months. Here, since the information was filed only on 13 January 1988, or
almost three months from the date the vehicular collision occurred, the offense had already prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus:

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should have been
charged in a separate information. And since, as a light offense, it prescribes in two months, Lontoks criminal liability therefor was already
extinguished (Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], Rule 117, Rules of Court). The trial court committed a
grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontoks motion to quash that part of the information charging him with that light offense.

Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, since Regional Trial Courts do not deal with arresto menor
cases. She submits that damage to property and slight physical injuries are light felonies and thus covered by the rules on summary
procedure; therefore, only the filing with the proper Metropolitan Trial Court could have tolled the statute of limitations, this time invoking
Zaldivia v. Reyes.[13]

In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with petitioner that the penalty should
have been arresto menor in its maximum period, instead of arresto mayor, pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Buerano v. Court of Appeals,[14] which frowns upon splitting of
crimes and prosecution, it was proper for the trial court to complex reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries and damage to property
because what the law seeks to penalize is the single act of reckless imprudence, not the results thereof; hence, there was no need for two
separate informations.

To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction to impose arresto menor for slight
physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court properly took cognizance of this case because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty for
the damage to property, which was a fine equal to thrice the value of P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG cites Cuyos v. Garcia.[15]

The OSG then debunks petitioners defense of prescription of the crime, arguing that the prescriptive period here was tolled by the filing of
the complaint with the fiscals office three days after the incident, pursuant to People v. Cuaresma[16] and Chico v. Isidro.[17]

In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude and appreciation to the OSG in joining cause with her as to the first
assigned error. However, she considers the OSGs reliance on Buerano v. Court of Appeals[18] as misplaced, for nothing there validates the
complexing of the crime of reckless imprudence with physical injuries and damage to property; besides, in that case, two separate
informations were filed -- one for slight and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and the other for damage to property
through reckless imprudence. She then insists that in this case, following Arcaya v. Teleron[19] and Lontok v. Gorgonio,[20] two informations
should have been filed. She likewise submits that Cuyos v. Garcia[21] would only apply here on the assumption that it was proper to complex
damage to property through reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Chico v. Isidro[22] is likewise
inapposite, for it deals with attempted homicide, which is not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma[23] should not be given retroactive effect; otherwise, it would either unfairly prejudice her or
render nugatory the en banc ruling in Zaldivia[24] favorable to her.

The pleadings thus raise the following issues:

I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.

II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries are light felonies.

III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code applies to the quasi offenses in question.
IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on appeal.

V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offenses in question.

VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed.

I. The Proper Penalty.

We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arresto mayor imposed by the trial court and affirmed by
respondent Court of Appeals is incorrect. However, we cannot subscribe to their submission that the penalty of arresto menor in its
maximum period is the proper penalty.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it
would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would
have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor
in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less
than 25 pesos.

A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some
wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case
the courts shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to
apply.

According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, a light
felony, is arresto menor in its maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however,
committed deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1
day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may be either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed under the first
paragraph of Article 365. This being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor.[25]

As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the third paragraph of Article 365, which provides for
the penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless imprudence in this case did not result in damage to property only. What applies is the
first paragraph of Article 365, which provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an
act committed through reckless imprudence which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the
damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the crime would have been malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised
Penal Code, and the penalty would then be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months which is
higher than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty under Article 329 were equal to or lower than that provided
for in the first paragraph, then the sixth paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i.e., the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in
its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty
for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a maximum of 4 months, at the discretion of the court, since the
fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that in the imposition of the penalties therein provided the courts shall exercise their sound discretion
without regard to the rules prescribed in article 64.

II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.

Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the wrongful act is
performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of
skill.[26]

As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by public censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the
Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of law carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both.
Since public censure is classified under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the graduated scale provided in
Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty lower than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries is a light felony.

On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier discussed, penalized with arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods. Since arresto mayor is a correctional penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in
question is a less grave felony not a light felony as claimed by petitioner.

III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.

Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should Article 48 of the Revised Code on complex crimes be applied?
Article 48 provides as follows:

ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. -- When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is
necessary a means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period.

Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. However,
in Lontok v. Gorgonio,[27] this Court declared that where one of the resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there
is no complex crime, thus:

Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex crime. The resulting offenses may be treated as separate or the
light felony may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light felonies of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both resulting
from a single act of imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one information. They are separate offenses
subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).

Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000 and slight
physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the
lesiones menos graves and damage to property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].

Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.

IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.

Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries should
have been charged in a separate information because it is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no
longer question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in one information, to wit: (1)
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. This defect was deemed
waived by her failure to raise it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the information.[28] Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court
may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them.[29]

V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the

Quasi Offenses in Question.

The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless the statute
expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment.[30]

At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. Section 32(2)[31] thereof provided that except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two
months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof.

The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of the imprisonment and the amount of fine prescribed by
law for the offense charged. The question thus arises as to which court has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure, such as reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries.

In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan,[32] this Court found that a lacuna existed in the law as to which court had jurisdiction over offenses penalized
with destierro, the duration of which was from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, which was co-extensive with prision correccional. We then
interpreted the law in this wise:

Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts, and
since by Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has placed destierro below arresto
mayor as a lower penalty than the latter, in the absence of any express provision of law to the contrary it is logical and reasonable to infer
from said provisions that its intention was to place offenses penalized with destierro also under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and
municipal courts and not under that of courts of first instance.

Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within the jurisdictional ambit of the
MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under the graduated
scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus,
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said courts.

As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same was also under the jurisdiction of
MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods -- the duration of
which was from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months.

Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of Makati.

VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.

Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in
two months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony
whose penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five years.

To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is necessary to determine whether the filing of the complaint
with the fiscals office three days after the incident in question tolled the running of the prescriptive period.

Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. -- The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and
shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped by any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis supplied)

Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information,
does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed for preliminary examination or investigation only or for an action on the merits.[33] Thus,
in Francisco v. Court of Appeals[34] and People v. Cuaresma,[35] this Court held that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscals office
suspends the running of the statute of limitations.

We cannot apply Section 9[36] of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable
by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information
directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila
and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by information. However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the
prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts.

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution,
this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.[37] Hence, in case of
conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.

Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was involved therein was a violation of a municipal ordinance;
thus, the applicable law was not Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run. Under
Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is suspended only when judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty party. Accordingly,
this Court held that the prescriptive period was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as
such did not constitute a judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive period there was only the filing of the information in the
proper court.

In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof and the rulings in Francisco and
Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscals
office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold
petitioners defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the information in this case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE
as the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919.

Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
ARNEL COLINARES, G.R. No. 182748

Petitioner,

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,

CARPIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

- versus - PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ,

MENDOZA,

SERENO,

REYES, and

PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. Promulgated:
December 13, 2011

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about a) the need, when invoking self-defense, to prove all that it takes; b) what distinguishes frustrated homicide from
attempted homicide; and c) when an accused who appeals may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.

The Facts and the Case

The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares (Arnel) with frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.[1]

Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on June 25, 2000, he and Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to
buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked
behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about 15 inches in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus fled.

Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by the roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone
struck him with something hard on the right temple, knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had hit him.
Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he happened to be smoking outside his house. He sought the help of a
barangay tanod and they brought Rufino to the hospital.

Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate[2] showing that Rufino suffered two lacerated wounds on the forehead, along the hairline
area. The doctor testified that these injuries were serious and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment.

The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed self-defense. He testified that he was on his way home that
evening when he met Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who were all quite drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was
but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried to stab
Arnel but missed. The latter picked up a stone and, defending himself, struck Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias saw this, he charged
towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the attack and hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled and
hid in his sisters house. On September 4, 2000, he voluntarily surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal Police Station.

Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding party on the night of the incident. His three companions were
all drunk. On his way home, Diomedes saw the three engaged in heated argument with Arnel.

On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment from two years and four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.
Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.

Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted
homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision but deleted the award for
lost income in the absence of evidence to support it.[3] Not satisfied, Arnel comes to this Court on petition for review.

In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required Arnel and the Solicitor General to submit their respective positions on
whether or not, assuming Arnel committed only the lesser crime of attempted homicide with its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, he could still apply for probation
upon remand of the case to the trial court.

Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on
him that makes his offense probationable. The language and spirit of the probation law warrants such a stand. The Solicitor General, on the
other hand, argues that under the Probation Law no application for probation can be entertained once the accused has perfected his appeal
from the judgment of conviction.
The Issues Presented

The case essentially presents three issues:

1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the head with a stone;

2. Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel is guilty of frustrated homicide; and

3. Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced probationable penalty, whether or not he may still
apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.

The Courts Rulings

One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and that he merely acted in self-defense when he hit Rufino back with a
stone.

When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of showing that he was legally justified in killing the victim or inflicting injury to
him. The accused must establish the elements of self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. When successful, the otherwise felonious
deed would be excused, mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused.[4]

In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense requires (1) that the person whom the offender killed or injured
committed unlawful aggression; (2) that the offender employed means that is reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression; and (3) that the person defending himself did not act with sufficient provocation.[5]
If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has nothing to prevent or repel and the other two requisites
of self-defense would have no basis for being appreciated. Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or an
imminent danger of such attack. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not enough. The victim must attack the accused with actual
physical force or with a weapon.[6]

Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression. He alone testified that Jesus and Ananias rained
fist blows on him and that Rufino and Ananias tried to stab him. No one corroborated Arnels testimony that it was Rufino who started it.
Arnels only other witness, Diomedes, merely testified that he saw those involved having a heated argument in the middle of the street. Arnel
did not submit any medical certificate to prove his point that he suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino and his companions.[7]

In contrast, the three witnessesJesus, Paciano, and Ananiastestified that Arnel was the aggressor. Although their versions were mottled with
inconsistencies, these do not detract from their core story. The witnesses were one in what Arnel did and when and how he did it. Compared
to Arnels testimony, the prosecutions version is more believable and consistent with reality, hence deserving credence.[8]

Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor, would he be liable for frustrated homicide when the wounds he inflicted
on Rufino, his victim, were not fatal and could not have resulted in death as in fact it did not?

The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accuseds intent to take his victims life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly
and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent.[9] And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other
things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.[10]

Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so forceful that it knocked Rufino out. Considering the great size of his
weapon, the impact it produced, and the location of the wounds that Arnel inflicted on his victim, the Court is convinced that he intended to
kill him.

The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not frustrated, homicide. In Palaganas v. People,[11] we ruled that
when the accused intended to kill his victim, as shown by his use of a deadly weapon and the wounds he inflicted, but the victim did not die
because of timely medical assistance, the crime is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If the victims wounds are not fatal, the crime is
only attempted murder or attempted homicide.

Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth, and severity of the victims wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified
that head injuries are always very serious,[12] he could not categorically say that Rufinos wounds in this case were fatal. Thus:
Q: Doctor, all the injuries in the head are fatal?

A: No, all traumatic injuries are potentially treated.

Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the wounds actually are not fatal on that very day?

A: I could not say, with the treatment we did, prevent from becoming fatal. But on that case the patient preferred to go home at that time.

Q: The findings also indicated in the medical certificate only refers to the length of the wound not the depth of the wound?

A: When you say lacerated wound, the entire length of the layer of scalp.

Q: So you could not find out any abrasion?

A: It is different laceration and abrasion so once the skin is broken up the label of the frontal lo[b]e, we always call it lacerated wound, but in
that kind of wound, we did not measure the depth.[13]

Indeed, Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication that his skull incurred fracture or that he bled internally as a
result of the pounding of his head. The wounds were not so deep, they merely required suturing, and were estimated to heal in seven or
eight days. Dr. Belleza further testified:

Q: So, in the medical certificate the wounds will not require surgery?

A: Yes, Madam.

Q: The injuries are slight?

A: 7 to 8 days long, what we are looking is not much, we give antibiotics and antit[e]tanus the problem the contusion that occurred in the
brain.
xxxx

Q: What medical intervention that you undertake?

A: We give antibiotics, Your Honor, antit[e]tanus and suturing the wounds.

Q: For how many days did he stay in the hospital?

A: Head injury at least be observed within 24 hours, but some of them would rather go home and then come back.

Q: So the patient did not stay 24 hours in the hospital?

A: No, Your Honor.

Q: Did he come back to you after 24 hours?

A: I am not sure when he came back for follow-up.[14]

Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the prosecutions claim that Rufino would have died without
timely medical intervention. Thus, the Court finds Arnel liable only for attempted homicide and entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.

Three. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him
for frustrated homicide.
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him
should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as
maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.

Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by the state only to qualified convicted offenders.
Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.[15] Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he should be deemed
permanently disqualified from applying for probation.

But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not
have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If
the Court allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant
him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances of his case.

Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals from the judgment of conviction is disqualified from availing
himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for
frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.

If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinions hard position, it will apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial courts annulled
judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the
Supreme Courts judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial courts judgmenteven
if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial courts erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of
his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is
justice there?

The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in
Francisco v. Court of Appeals[16] that the probation law requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail
himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between Francisco and this case.

In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the accused guilty of grave oral defamation and sentenced him to a prison
term of one year and one day to one year and eight months of prision correccional, a clearly probationable penalty. Probation was his to ask!
Still, he chose to appeal, seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right to apply for probation. When the acquittal did not come, he
wanted probation. The Court would not of course let him. It served him right that he wanted to save his cake and eat it too. He certainly
could not have both appeal and probation.

The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of
probation. This requirement outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accusedto wager on the result of his appealthat when his
conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for
probation as an escape hatch thus rendering nugatory the appellate courts affirmance of his conviction.[17]

Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between
appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say, By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation. The stiff penalty that the trial
court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Courts greatly
diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when
they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.

Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best
warranted his conviction only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore,
Arnel sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for probation.

In a real sense, the Courts finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction
that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of
the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right
to apply for probation.

The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is
one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions.[18] As
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the
accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation
Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.[19]

One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply for probation after he appealed from the trial courts
judgment of conviction would not be consistent with the provision of Section 2 that the probation law should be interpreted to provide an
opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender. An accused like Arnel who appeals from a judgment convicting him, it is claimed,
shows no penitence.

This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime,
frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the
Court now finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months.

Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced penalty, it would be sending him straight behind bars.
It would be robbing him of the chance to instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the probation
law.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months
maximum, he would have had the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the
right had the RTC done right by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.

The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply for probation when the new penalty that the
Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES the Decision dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
29639, FINDS petitioner Arnel Colinares GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty from four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum,
and to pay Rufino P. Buena the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages, without prejudice to petitioner applying for probation within 15
days from notice that the record of the case has been remanded for execution to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in
Criminal Case T-2213.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 108747 April 6, 1995

PABLO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects appeals and encourages an
otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and save the state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law
expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the
moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch" thus
rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction. Consequently, probation should be availed of at the first opportunity by
convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated, who manifest spontaneity, contrition and remorse.

As conceptualized, is petitioner entitled to probation within the purview of P.D. 968, as amended by P.D. 1257 and P.D. 1990?

Petitioner's woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC Trans. Company he failed to control his outburst and blurted —

You employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches (sic), bullshit. Puro kayo walang utak . . . . Mga anak ng puta . . . . Magkano ba kayo
. . . God damn you all.
Thus for humiliating his employees he was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in five (5) separate Informations instituted by five (5) of
his employees, each Information charging him with gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.

On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61, found petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation
in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against him, i.e., Crim. Cases Nos. 105206, 105207, 105209 and 105210, sentenced him to a prison term of
one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each crime committed on each date of each case,
as alleqed in the information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala
Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.1 He was however acquitted in
Crim. Case No. 105208 for persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify.

Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting on his innocence, petitioner elevated his case to the Regional Trial Court.

On 5 August 1991 the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 59, affirmed his conviction but appreciated in his favor a mitigating circumstance
analogous to passion or obfuscation. Thus —

. . . (he) was angry and shouting when he uttered the defamatory words complained of . . . . he must have been angry and worried "about
some missing documents . . . as well as the letter of the Department of Tourism advising ASPAC about its delinquent tax of P1.2 million . . . . "
the said defamatory words must have been uttered in the heat of anger which is a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion or
obfuscation.2

Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment . . . . "3 After he failed to
interpose an appeal therefrom the decision.of the RTC became final. The case was then set for execution of judgment by the MeTC which, as
a consequence, issued a warrant of arrest. But·before he could be arrested petitioner filed an application for probation which the MeTC
denied "in the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No, 84850, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 566 . . . ."4

Forthwith he went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which on 2 July 1992 dismissed his petition on the following grounds —

Initially, the Court notes that the petitioner has failed to comply with the provisions of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 of September 4,
1991. Violation of the circular is sufficient cause for dismissal of the petition.

Secondly, the petitioner does not allege anywhere in the petition that he had asked the respondent court to reconsider its above order; in
fact, he had failed to give the court an.opportunity to correct itself if it had, in fact, committed any error on the matter. He is, however,
required to move for reconsideration of the questioned order before filing a petition for certiorari (Sy It v. Tiangco, 4 SCRA 436). This failure is
fatal to his cause. It is a ground for dismissal of his petition (Santos v. Vda. de Cerdenola, 5 SCRA 823; Acquiao v. Estenso, 14 SCRA 18; Del
Pilar Transit, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 31-SCRA 372).

Thirdly, it is obvious that respondent court did not commit any capricious, arbitrary, despotic or whimsical exercise of power in denying the
petitioner's application for probation . . . .

Fourthly, the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time . . . .

Fifthly, the Court notes that Section 4 of PD 968 allows the trial court to grant probation after conviction, upon an application by the
defendant within the period of appeal, upon terms and conditions and period appropriate to each case, but expressly rules out probation
where an appeal has been taken . . . . 5

The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

In the present recourse, petitioner squirms out of each ground and seeks this Court's compassion in dispensing with the minor technicalities
which may militate against his petition as he now argues before us that he has not yet lost his right to avail of probation notwithstanding his
appeal from the MeTC to the RTC since "[t]he reason for his appeal was precisely to enable him to avail himself of the benefits of the
Probation Law because the original Decision of the (Metropolitan) Trial Court was such that he would not then be entitled to probation." 6 He
contends that "he appealed from the judgment of the trial court precisely for the purpose of reducing the penalties imposed upon him by the
said court to enable him to qualify for probation." 7

The central issue therefore is whether petitioneris still qualified to avail of probation even after appealing his conviction to the RTC which
affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of the penalties imposed.

Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.

First. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. 8 Its benefits cannot extend to those not expressly included. Probation is not a right of an
accused, but rather an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state which may be granted by the court to a seemingly
deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he stands convicted. 9 It
is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation
rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for
the benefit of the accused.10 The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latter's
prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the
terms of the law who is not clearly within them.

Neither Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly mandates that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if
the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction," nor Llamado v. Court of Appeals 11 which interprets the quoted
provision, offers any ambiguity or qualification. As such, the application of the law should not be subjected to any to suit the case of
petitioner. While the proposition that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the appealis solely to reduce the
penalty to within the probationable limit may be equitable, we are not yet prepared to accept this interpretation under existing law and
jurisprudence. Accordingly, we quote Mr. Justice Feliciano speaking for the Court en banc in Llamado v. Court of Appeals—

. . . we note at the outset that Probation Law is not a penal statute. We, however, understand petitioner's argument to be really that any
statutory language that appears to favor the accused in acriminal case should be given.a "liberal interpretation." Courts . . . have no authority
to invoke "liberal interpretation" or "the spirit of the law" where the words of the statute themselves, and·as illuminated by the history of
that statute, leave no room for doubt or interpretation. We do not believe that "the spirit of·the law" may legitimately be invoked to set at
naught words which have a clear and definite meaning imparted to them by our procedural law. The "true legislative intent" must obviously
be given effect by judges and all others who are charged with the application and implementation of a statute. It is absolutely essential to
bear in mind, however, that the spirit of the law and the intent that is to be given effect are derived from the words actually used by the law-
maker, and not from some external, mystical or metajuridical source independent of and transcending the words of the legislature.

The Court is not here to be understood as giving a "strict interpretation" rather than a "liberal" one to Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976
as amended by P.D. No. 1990. "Strict" and "liberal" are adjectives which too frequently impede a disciplined and principled search for the
meaning which the law-making authority projected when it promulgated the language which we must apply. That meaning is clearly visible in
the text of Section 4, as plain and unmistakable as the nose on a man's face. The Courtis simply·reading Section 4 as it is in fact written. There
is no need for the involved process of construction that petitioner invites us to engage in, a process made necessary only because petitioner
rejects the conclusion or meaning which shines through the words of the statute. The first duty of the judge is to take and apply a statute as
he finds it, not as he would like·it to be. Otherwise, as this Court in Yangco v. Court of First Instance warned, confusion and uncertainty will
surely follow, making, we might add, stability and continuity in the law much more difficult to achieve:

. . . [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words as to give them the color of a particular judicial theory are not only
unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which has caused so much confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public to
understand and know what the law is with respect to a given matter, is in considerable measure the unwarranted interference by judicial
tribunals with the English language as found in statutes and contracts, cutting the words here and inserting them there, making them fit
personal ideas of what the legislature ought to have done or what parties should have agreed upon, giving them meanings which they do not
ordinarily have cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the meaning
of a given statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court for its interpretation and construction.

The point in this warning may be expected to become sharper as our people's grasp of English is steadily attenuated. 12

Therefore, that an appeal should not·bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply
contrary to the clear and express mandate of Sec, 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which opens with a negativeclause, "no application
for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." In Bersabal v.
Salvador, 13 we said —

By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction. negative words and phrases are to be regarded as
mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. . . . the use of the term "shall" further emphasizes its mandatory character and
means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced.

And where the law does not distinguish the courts should not distinguish; where the law does not make exception the court should not
except.

Second. At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable. Hence, there was no need to appeal if only to reduce
the penalties to within the probationable period. Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused found guilty of several offenses in one
decision are not, and should not be, added up. And, the sum of the multiple prison terms imposed against an applicant should not be
determinative of his eligibility for, nay his disqualification from, probation. The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none
of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law,i.e., not more than six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation, unless he is
otherwise specifically disqualified. The number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are within the
probationable period. For, Sec. 9, par. (a), P.D. 968, as amended, uses the word maximum not total when it says that "[t]he benefits of this
Decree shall not be extended to those . . . . sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years." Evidently, the law
does not intend to sum up the penalties imposed but to take each penalty separately and distinctly with the others. Consequently, even if
petitioner was supposed to have served his prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional sixteen (16) times as he was sentenced to serve the prison term for "each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged
in the information(s)," and in each of the four (4) informations, he was charged with.having defamed the four (4) private complainants on
four (4) different, separate days, he was still·eligible for probation, as each prison term imposed on petitioner was probationable.

Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based on the assumption that those sentenced to
higher penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because of the
gravity and serious consequences of the offense they might further commit. 14 The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who
have been convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of The Revised Penal Code, 15 and not necessarily those who
have been convicted of multiple offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse. Hence, the basis of the disqualification
is principally the gravity of the offense committed and the concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not
exceeding six (6) years are not generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of probation.

To demonstrate the point, let ustake for instance one who is convicted in a single decision of, say, thirteen (13) counts of grave oral
defamation (for having defamed thirteen [13] individuals in one outburst) and sentenced to a total prison term of thirteen (13) years, and
another who has been found guilty of mutilation and sentenced to six (6) years and one (l) day of prision mayor minimum as minimum to
twelve (l2) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as maximuin. Obviously, the latter offender is more perverse and is
disqualified from availing of probation.

Petitioner thus proceeds on an erroneous assumption that under the MeTC Decision he could not have availed of the benefits of probation.
Since he could have, although he did not, his appeal now precludes him from applying for probation.

And, even if we go along with the premise of petitioner, however erroneous it may be, that the penalties imposed against him should be
summed up, still he would not have qualified under the Decision rendered by the RTC since if the "STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
imprisonment" imposed by the RTC is multiplied sixteen (16) times, the total imposable penalty would be ten (10) years and eight (8) months,
which is still way beyond the limit of not more than six (6) years provided for in the Probation Law, as amended. To illustrate: 8 months
multiplied by 16 cases = 128 months; 128 months divided by 12 months (in a year) = 10 years and 8 months, hence, following his argument,
petitioner cannot still be eligible for probation as the total of his penalties exceeds six (6) years.

The assertion that the Decision of the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times since there are only four (4) Informations thereby allowing
petitioner to qualify for probation, instead of sixteen (16) times, is quite difficult to understand. The penalties imposed by the MeTC cannot
be any clearer — "one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, in each crime committed on each
date of each case, as alleged in the information(s). "Hence, petitioner should suffer the imposed penalties sixteen (16) times. On the other
hand, the RTC affirmed, the judgment of conviction and merely reduced the duration of each penalty imposed by the MeTC "in each case to a
STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment" on account of a mitigating circumstance for each case, count or incident of grave oral
defamation·There is no valid reason therefore why the penalties imposed by the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times, and not sixteen
(16) times, considering that the RTC merely affirmed the MeTC as regards the culpability of petitioner in each of the sixteen (16) cases and
reducing only the duration of the penalties imposed therein. Thus —
Premises considered, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is AFFIRMED with modification, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in each of the above entitled cases and
appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance which is analogous to passion or obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the said
accused in each case to a straight penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law; and to pay the
costs. 16

Nowhere in the RTC Decision is it stated or even hinted at that the accused was acquitted or absolved in any of the four (4) counts under each
of the four (4) Informatfons, or that any part of thejudgment of conviction was reversed, or that any of the cases, counts or incidents was
dismissed. Otherwise, we will have to account for the twelve (12) other penalties imposed by the MeTC. Can we? What is clear is that the
judgment of conviction rendered by the was affirmed with the sole modification on the duration of the penalties.

In fine, considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up but taken separately as the totality of all the penalties is not the
test, petitioner should have immediately filed an application for probation as he was already qualified after being convicted by the MeTC, if
indeed thereafter he felt humbled, was ready to unconditionally accept the verdict of the court and admit his liability. Consequently, in
appealing the Decision of the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right to probation. For, plainly, the law considers appeal and probation
mutually exclusive remedies. 17

Third. Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct the penalties imposed by the MeTC, but to assert his innocence. Nothing
more. The cold fact is that petitioner appealed his conviction to the RTC not for the sole purpose of reducing his penalties to make him
eligible for probation — since he was already qualified under the MeTC Decision — but rather to insist on his innocence. The appeal record is
wanting of any other purpose. Thus, in his Memorandum before the RTC, he raised only three (3) statements of error purportedly committed
by the MeTC all aimed at his acquittal: (a) in finding that the guilt of the accused has been established because of his positive identification by
the witness for the prosecution; (b) in giving full faith and credence to the bare statements of the private complainants despite the absence
of corroborating testimonies; and, (c)in not acquitting him in all the cases," 18 Consequently, petitioner insisted that the trial court
committed an error in relying on his positive identification considering that private complainants could not have missed identifying him who
was their President and General Manager with whom they worked for a good number of years. Petitioner further argued that although the
alleged defamatory words were uttered in the presence of other persons, mostly private complainants, co-employees and clients, not one of
them was presented as a witness. Hence, according to petitioner, the trial court could not have convicted him on the basis of the
uncorroborative testimony of private complainants. 19

Certainly, the protestations of petitioner connote profession of guiltlessness, if not complete innocence, and do not simply put in issue the
propriety of the penalties imposed. For sure, the accused never manifested that he was appealing only for the purpose of correcting a wrong
penalty — to reduce it to within the probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so after asserting his innocence therein,
petitioner should be precluded from seeking probation. By perfecting his appeal, petitioner ipso facto relinquished his alternative remedy of
availing of the Probation Law the purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who although
already eligible does not at once apply for probation, but doing so only after failing in his appeal.

The fact that petitioner did not elevate the affirmance of his conviction by the RTC to the Court of Appeals does not necessarily mean that his
appeal to the RTC was solely to reduce his penalties. Conversely, he was afraid that the Court of Appeals would increase his penalties, which
could be worse for him. Besides, the RTC Decision had already become final and executory because of the negligence, according to him, of his
former counsel who failed to seek possible remedies within the period allowed by law.

Perhaps it should be mentioned that at the outset petitioner, in accordance with Sec 3, par. (e), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, 20 should
have moved to quash as each of the four (4) Informations filed against him charged four (4) separate crimes of grave oral defamation,
committed on four (4) separate days. His failure to do so however may now be deemed a waiver under Sec. 8 of the same Rule 21 and he can
be validly convicted, as in the instant case, of as many crimes charged in the Information.

Fourth. The application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law. This is vital way beyond the period allowed by law and
crucial. From the records it is clear that the application for probation was filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner had been
issued . . . (and) almost two months after (his) receipt of the Decision" 22 of the RTC. This is a significant fact which militates against the
instant petition. We quote with affirmance the well-written, albeit assailed, ponencia of now Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals
Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr., on the specific issue —
. . . the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time. The law in point, Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended, provides thus:

Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal. . . . place the defendant on probation . . . .

Going to the extreme, and assuming that an application for probation from one who had appealed the trial court's judgment is allowed by
law, the petitioner's plea for probation was filed out of time. In the petition is a clear statement that the petitioner was up for execution of
judgment before he filed his application for probation. P.D. No. 968 says that the application for probation must be filed "within the period
for perfecting an appeal;" but in this case, such period for appeal had passed, meaning to say that the Regional Trial Court's decision had
attained finality, and no appeal therefrom was possible under the law. Even granting that an appeal from the appellate court's judgment is
contemplated by P.D. 968, in addition to the judgment rendered by the trial court, that appellate judgment had become final and was, in fact,
up for actual execution before the application for probation was attempted by the petitioner. The petitioner did not file his application for
probation before the finality of the said judgment; therefore, the petitioner's attempt at probation was filed too late.

Our minds cannot simply rest easy on. the proposition that an application for probation may yet be granted even if it was filed only after
judgment has become final, the conviction already set for execution and a warrant of arrest issued for service of sentence.

The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had
become final, for him to file the application for probation with the trial court, is to stretch the law beyond comprehension. The law, simply,
does not allow probation after an appeal has been perfected.

Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed
from his conviction by the MeTC although the imposed penalties were already probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted only his
innocence and did not even raise the issue of the propriety of the penalties imposed on him, and finally, he filed an application for probation
outside the period for perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the instant petition for review should be as it is
hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 110097. December 22, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARNULFO ASTORGA, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Actual detention or locking up is the primary element of kidnapping. If the evidence does not adequately prove this element, the accused
cannot be held liable for kidnapping. In the present case, the prosecution merely proved that appellant forcibly dragged the victim toward a
place only he knew. There being no actual detention or confinement, the appellant may be convicted only of grave coercion.

The Case

The foregoing principle is used by this Court in resolving the appeal of Arnulfo Astorga challenging the March 31, 1993 Decision[1] of the
Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao convicting him of kidnapping.

In an Information[2] dated March 24, 1992 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 8243, Appellant Arnulfo Astorga was charged with violation of
Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about December 29, 1991 in the Municipality of Tagum, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and by means of force, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap Yvonne Traya, a minor, 8 years of age, thereby depriving her of her liberty against her will, to the damage and prejudice of
said offended party.

Arraigned on February 24, 1993, Appellant Astorga, duly assisted by his counsel,[3] pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits
ensued. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision[4] reads as follows:[5]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the guilt of accused ARNULFO ASTORGA having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to
Article 267 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, [he] is hereby sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua to be served at the National Penitentiary,
[Muntinlupa].

This appeal was filed directly with this Court in view of the penalty imposed.[6]

The Facts

Evidence for the Prosecution

The evidence for the prosecution was narrated in the Decision of the trial court, as follows:[7]

Prosecution witnesses extant from their testimonies categorically assert that around 6:30 P.M. children of neighbors were near the store of
the grandparents of Yvonne Traya.

Incidentally, there was a brown out that evening hence candle was used. The daughter and nephew of her aunt Bebeth were quarelling [sic]
about the possession of a flashlight until the glass got lost. Accused or Boy Astorga, went near and asked her daughter Jane what happened.
Glenda or Bebeth grabbed her baby and went home.

Accused told Yvonne to go with him to buy candy. She did not answer and accused immediately grabbed and hold [sic] her hand. Accused
placed his hand on her shoulder and covered his [sic] mouth.

Yvonne was only eight (8) years old on 29 December 1991 when she was brought by the accused allegedly to buy candy. Some stores were
closed; others were opened. Accused never went inside the store to buy candy. Instead she [sic] held and dragged Yvonne until they went
inside the compound of Maco Elementary School. They were walking inside the perimeter fence, [while the accused was] holding closely the
child. Later, there being no person around the gate, accused brought her out to the highway and walked towards the direction of Tagum.

Yvonne stays with her grandparents and so with her parents at Sitio Binuangan, Maco. She asked him where they were going and accused
answered that they were going home. She told him that they were already on the opposite direction because her grandparents house is at
Binuangan, while their route was going towards Tagum. Indeed, it was an opposite direction. Notwithstanding the assertion of Yvonne that
they were on the wrong direction, accused placed his hands on her shoulder and dragged her. She cried and protested that she must go
home. Accused did not heed her plea and while she was forced to walk she continued crying.

While accused and Yvonne were walking in the situation as described, somewhere near the Luponlupon bridge they met some group of men.
Having met on their opposite direction, the two, were noticed by the group of youngsters. The group were bound to Maco Catholic Church to
see a drama. Having met the two and as noticed by the group accused keep [sic] on looking back at them. The group were suspicious about
the man who was bringing a child. The group decided to follow them. Accused hurriedly walked fast with Yvonne, and to prevent from being
overtaken, he carried the victim and ran. They were chased. After a distance of half a kilometer they were overtaken.
Edwin Fabila declared that Jonathan, one of his companions with others in chasing, asked the accused where they were bound. He answered
towards Binuangan. The group noticed something suspicious because their destination was already towards Tagum which is an opposite
direction to Binuangan.

When asked who is the child, accused answered Traya. Jonathan one of those who chased knew the family. He got from the accused Yvonne
who showed some resistance. Nevertheless, the group brought her home at Binuangan. Likewise, accused was also brought by them to
Yvonnes home. The house of accused and Yvonne were five (5) meters away. Accused wanted to talk to the parents of the victim, but he was
driven by her aunt and adviced [sic] to leave otherwise he will be stabbed by Yvonnes father. He left and never talked with the family.

Evidence for the Defense

The facts as viewed by the defense are presented in the Appellants Brief,[8] dated December 10, 1993:

The defense consisted of the testimonies of Arbeth Nalcot and the accused-appellant himself.

Arbeth Nalcot, a resident of Tagum, Davao, testified tht [sic] in the afternoon of December 29, 1991, she was at the Municipal Hall of Maco,
Davao. She saw Astorga with two (2) companions. They were drinking Red Horse and were already drunk. When they finished drinking, she
went with Astorga to the latters house. (TSN, pp. 7-8 and 18, March 23, 1993). The house of Astorga is about 5 meters away from the house
of the complainant[.] Yvonne came and asked money from the accused to buy candy. The two went together and she was left behind. She
told them to hurry up. When they failed to return, she looked for them, but because it was already dark, she did not find them. She went
back to the house of the accused. (Ibid., pp. 10-11).

Arnulfo Astorga, a resident of Maco, Davao and a gold panner testified that at around 1:00 P.M. of December 29, 1991, he arrived at Maco
from Tagum. Upon arrival his two friends, Vicvic and Anding were already at his home. They decided to drink, hence they proceeded to
Adecor Cottage and drank two gallons of Tuba. At around 2:00 P.M., they were at the market place and drink beer grande. At 5:00 P.M. on
the same day, the three proceeded near the municipal hall and with some persons, they again continued their drinking spree taking up Red
Horse wine. (Decision, p. 3).

At about 6:00 P.M., he was already drunk and he went home. Yvonne approached him and asked him money to buy candy. He told her that
they will buy. They were not able to buy because the two stores where they went were already closed. (TSN, pp. 12 and 13, March 24, 1993).
He took her for a stroll for his drunkeness [sic] to subside. They walked inside the school premises which was about 20 meters away from the
second store. They went out of the school compound going towards Lupon-lupon because due to his drunkneness [sic], he thought it was the
way towards their house. (Ibid, pp. 14-15) They reached Lupon-lupon bridge, crossed it twice thinking that it was the bridge near the
municipal hall. After reaching Purok, they met several persons, he was asked were (sic) they were heading, and he answered to Tagumpay,
but he was told that they [sic] way was already going to Tagum. He requested those persons to guide them to Tagumpay. They asked him
who was the child he was carrying. He answered that it was Trayas child. (Ibid, pp. 16-17). He was carrying the child because he was already
crying as she already wanted to go home. The group of persons, men and women, guided them. Yvonne was being held by the women. They
arrived at Yvonnes house. He talked to the auntie of the child and told her that he would converse with her but he was advised to go away
because the father of Yvonne might hack him. So he went home. (Ibid, pp. 18-19)

The Trial Courts Ruling

The trial court justified its finding of guilt with the following discussion:[9]

Accused insisted [that] he was already drunk hence when he took Yvonne to buy candy, he strolled with her so that his drunkenness be
subsided.

All these defense version was rebutted by Yvonne when she categorically declared that she did not smell liquor on the accused.

His defense of intoxication has no leg to stand [on].

Consider these facts.

Never did he present Vicvic and Anding to corroborate that he was intoxicated that afternoon and at dusk because of their drinking spree
from 1:00 P.M. until 5:00 P.M.

He did not rebut the testimonies of Fabila that when they noticed his actions suspicious bringing with him a child, he walked fast dragging
Yvonne. When he noticed that the group of youngsters were chasing him, he carried Yvonne and ran until they covered a distance of half a
kilometer in chasing them, until they had overtaken him.

If he was that intoxicated, being under stupor and weakened by liquor, he could not ran that fast carrying Yvonne for half a kilometer.

Moreover, Yvonne categorically in straight forward testimony asserted that she did not smell liquor on the accused.

Accused, naivety [sic], that because of his intoxication, he got lost and was not able to proceed with Yvonne to Binuangan was a shallow
afterthought.

It must be recalled that Yvonne told him they were already going at opposite direction from home. Instead they were heeding towards
Tagum. Accused did not change course.

xxx xxx xxx

Again, not only force was employed in having Yvonne as captive by dragging, slapping her mouth and was holding her tight, but accused also
used psychological means of scaring her about a red eyed ghost.

Through this means and efforts, Yvonne was deprived of her liberty and was by force prevented to go home to her parents.

On rebuttal, Yvonne denied that she asked money from accused to buy candy. She also denied as testified by defense witness Arbeth Nalcot
that she went to the house of the accused on 29 December 1991 or on any other dates to ask money from Astorga for candy.

Defense evidence are [sic] punctured with unbelievability in his off tangent and incredible theory of drunkardness. His alleged being lost in
the direction of Binuangan in spite of Yvonnes insistence and that of the person they met that he was on the wrong way considering that
there are no criss crossing roads except the highway, is preposterous.

The Issues

Appellant imputes the following errors to the trial court:[10]

The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses which were replete with inconsistencies and
contradictions.

II

The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that Yvonne Traya was not detained, locked-up or deprived of her liberty.
III

The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that appellant had no motive to kidnap Yvonne Traya.

In the main, appellant challenges the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the legal characterization of the acts imputed to him.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted only of grave coercion, not kidnapping.

First Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

Appellant contends that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are not worthy of credence because they were inconsistent and
improbable. He cites the following:

Glenda Chavez testified that she was present when the accused told Yvonne that they will buy candy. She sensed that the accused was drunk.
(TSN, pp. 10-11, March 10, 1993). These testimonies were contradicted by Yvonne Traya when she declared that Glenda Chavez had already
went [sic] inside their house when [the] accused told her that they will buy candy (TSN, pp. 10, March 16, 1993). She testified that she did not
smell liquor on the accused. (Decision, pp. 3-4)

Edwin Fabila testified that their group was able to overtake the accused at a distance of 2 fathoms and they [sic] him about 15 to 20 meters
(TSN, p. 35, March 10, 1993). Arnel Fabila, on the other hand, testified that they overtook the accused after chasing him at a distance of half
kilometer (TSN, p. 10, March 11, 1993).

Yvonne Traya testified that the accused could not ran fast carrying her because she was heavy. (TSN, p. 19, March 16, 1993). However, Arnel
Fabila declared that they were able to overtake the accused only after chasing him at a distance of half kilometer (TSN, p. 10, March 11,
1993) meaning accused was running fast.[11]

We hold, however, that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses concerning minor details and collateral matters, like the examples
cited by appellant, do not affect the substance, veracity or weight of their declarations. These inconsistencies reinforce, rather than weaken,
their credibility, for different witnesses of startling events usually perceive things differently.[12] Indeed, the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses cannot be expected to be uniform to the last detail.

The testimony of Glenda Chavez that the accused was drunk at that time allegedly contradicted Yvonnes statement that the accused did not
smell of liquor. This does not detract from the credibility of either witness. Yvonne, then an eight-year-old child,[13] and her Aunt Glenda,
then twenty-seven years old,[14] do not have the same experiences or level of maturity; hence, their perceptions of events differ. More
important, whether the accused was drunk or not is an insignificant detail that does not substantially affect the testimonies of these
witnesses.

Further, the discrepancy in the witnesses estimate of the distance covered by the men who chased appellant does not render their
testimonies incredible.[15] Quite the contrary, such discrepancy shows their candor and sincerity, demonstrating that their testimonies were
unrehearsed.[16] Yvonne testified that when appellant noticed the group of men following them, he carried her and ran. Yvonnes testimony
is in accord with that of Arnel Fabila -- a member of the group who chased appellant -- that they were able to overtake appellant after
chasing him half a kilometer.[17]

Appellants challenge to the credibility of the prosecution account is also premised on the alleged failure of the trial court to consider the
following points:[18]
a) that the alleged victim admitted that she and the accused casually moved around the school premises, as if they were strolling; That when
they were already in the highway, they were also walking openly and casually until they were met by a group of youngster[s].

Edwin Fabila, one of the prosecutions witnesses, corroborated the fact that the two were walking casually along the highway when he first
saw them;

b) That it is highly incredible that accused and the alleged victim will not be seen or noticed by the people travelling or those persons residing
along the highway if it was true that the accused was dragging her and she was continuously crying from her residence up to a distance of
more than one kilometer;

c) That the accused and the alleged victim were travelling at a very slow pace; a distance of barely a kilometer for a period of more than two
hours;

d) That the accused was very drunk, having been drinking different kinds of intoxicating liquors from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., causing him to be
confused on which way they should take in going home.

e) That the accused was not hurt by the group of youngsters who allegedly rescued the child, nor was immediately brought to the municipal
hall which was just near the house of the victim for the filing of the necessary charge; this [sic] actuations only confirm the fact that the
accused merely sought their help in guiding them home, and

f) That it took more than one week for the complainant and her parents to file the case at the Fiscals Office.

We cannot sustain these contentions. The charge is not belied by the one-week delay in the filing of the complaint. It has been held that
delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily weaken the credibility of a witness where such delay is satisfactorily
explained.[19] In the present case, one week was reasonable, considering that the victim was a resident of Binuangan and that the case was
filed in Tagum, Davao.

Furthermore, the group whom appellant met did not hurt or bring him to the municipal hall, because they deemed it more urgent at the time
to rescue Yvonne and to bring her home, which they actually did.[20] There is no settled rule on how a group of young men should react
upon seeing a young girl snatched by an older man. Verily, violence is not the only normal reaction of young men who see a girl being forcibly
taken.

Appellants claim that he and Yvonne were merely strolling and walking casually does not negate the fact that Yvonne was deprived of her
will. As noted by the trial court, appellant used physical force and psychological means in restraining her.[21] Despite her young age, Yvonne
was able to clearly recount the events that transpired on that fateful night.

Moreover, there is no merit in the argument that the people travelling or living along the highway should have noticed appellant and Yvonne.
The fact is that a group of men actually noticed and ultimately chased them.

All in all, appellant utterly fails to justify a departure from the long settled rule that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses
should be accorded great respect on appeal.[22]

Second Issue: No Motive to Kidnap

Petitioner contends that [t]here was no evidence presented to prove why the accused should kidnap Yvonne Traya. He submits that the
prosecution had failed to prove [any] motive to support the alleged kidnapping incident, thus, making the theory of the defense more
credible and believable.[23]
The contention is insignificant. Motive is not an element of the crime. Furthermore, motive becomes material only when the evidence is
circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is some doubt on whether a crime has been committed or whether the accused has committed it.
Indeed, motive is totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.[24] In this
case, the identity of appellant is not in question. He himself admitted having taken Yvonne to Maco Central Elementary School.

Third Issue: Kidnapping or Coercion?

Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove one essential element of kidnapping -- the fact of detention or the deprivation of
liberty. The solicitor general counters that deprivation of liberty is not limited to imprisoning or placing the victim in an enclosure. Citing
People vs. Crisostomo,[25] he argues:

(T)he act proven in the record constitutes (kidnapping). It is no argument against this conclusion that the accused deprived the offended
party of her liberty without placing her in an inclosure; because illegal detention, as defined and punished in our Code, may consist not only
in imprisoning a person but also in detaining her or depriving her in any manner of her liberty.[26]

We agree with appellants contention this time.

Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,[27] the elements of kidnapping are as follows:

1. That the offender is a private individual.

2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty.

3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.

4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:

(a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than five (5) days; or

(b) That it is committed simulating public authority; or

(c) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or

(d) That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.

The Spanish version of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code uses the terms lockup (encerrar) rather than kidnap (secuestrar or raptar).
Lockup is included in the broader term of detention, which refers not only to the placing of a person in an enclosure which he cannot leave,
but also to any other deprivation of liberty which does not necessarily involve locking up.[28] Likewise, the Revised Penal Code was originally
approved and enacted in Spanish. Consequently, the Spanish text is controlling in cases of conflict with the English version, as provided in
Section 15 of the Revised Administrative Code.[29]

A review of the events as narrated by the prosecution witnesses ineluctably shows the absence of locking up. Victim Yvonne Traya
testified:[30]

Q. And after that what happened next?

A. When Auntie Bebeth went inside her house she was already bringing her child and bringing with her candle. And Arnulfo Astorga told me
that we will buy candy, sir.

Q. And after that?

A. And while I was not answering the question he immediately grabbed me.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. And after that, after he held your hand, what did he do next?

A. He placed his hands on my shoulder and also covering [sic] my mouth.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. And after that what did he do next?

A. He brought me to the school.

Q. What school did Boy Astorga bring you? What is the name of the school?

A. Maco Central Elementary School.

Q. How far is Maco Central Elementary School from your house?

A. A little bit near.

Q. When Boy Astorga brought you to school, was it dark?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Exactly where in Maco Elementary School did Boy Astorga bring you?

A. Inside the gate, sir.

Q. And once inside the gate what did he do to you?

A. We were going around the school?

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Do you know why you were going around the school?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why, what did he do?

A. We were going around and when he saw that there is no person in the gate we passed at that gate.

Q. And where did he go after passing that gate?

A. Towards Lupon-lupon, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. What about you, did you talk to him?

A. I asked him where we were going and he told me that we are going home and I told him that this is not the way to our house, and we did
not pass this way. (Witness gesturing a certain direction).

Q. And so when you said that that is not the way, when you said that is not the way because our house is towards Binuangan...

By the way, you said you were going to Lupon-lupon, do you know to what direction is going to Lupon-lupon, to what place is Lupon-lupon
going to?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where?

A. Going to my place.

Q. Do you know the place where it was going? What is that place?

A. On the road going to Tagum.

Q. Now, what about your house, where is it going?

A. To Binuangan.

Q. And so when you ... what did he do next when you said that is not the place going to your house?
A. We continued walking and he also placed his hands on my shoulder and dragged me, sir.

Q. What about you, what did you do when he was dragging you?

A. I was crying, sir.

Q. Did you say any word to him when you were crying?

A. Yes, I told him that we are going home.

Q. And what did Boy Astorga say?

A. He told me that we will be going home, and told me not to make any noise because if I will make any noise we will be lost on our way.

Q. And so, what did you do?

A. I continued crying, sir.

Q. And after that, what happened?

A. We continued walking and we met a person and he asked Boy Astorga where we are going, sir.

Q. What did that man ask Boy Astorga?

A. The man asked Boy Astorga where are you going, and Boy Astorga answered, to Binuangan, but the man continued to say that this way is
going to Tagum and not to Binuangan any more.

Q. What else did the man ask, if any?

A. I further said that we will already leave, and we will be the ones to go to Binuangan, and after that, Boy Astorga put me down because he
urinated. So, at that instance, I ran, but, after he urinated, he already took hold of me not to run any more because there is a ghost.

Q. When you said you ran away after Boy Astorga left you when he urinated, where did you run?

A. Towards Binuangan, sir.

Q. Towards the direction of your house?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you were overtaken again by Boy Astorga?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What did he do to you when you were overtaken by Boy Astorga?

A. He took hold of me again and he told me, he threatened me that there is [sic] a red eyes but I answered him that is [sic] not a red eyes of
the ghost but that is a light coming from the vehicle.

Q. Now, what happened next?

A. He placed a necklace on me, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

A. He was dragging me and I was crying when he was dragging me.

Q. While you were being dragged did you make any plea to him?

A. Yes, I told him that I will go home.

Q. And what did he say?

A. He said that we will go home but I know [sic] that that place we are [sic] heading to is [sic] not a way to our home but it is [sic] the
opposite.

Q. So, what happened next?

A. He continued dragging me and after that we met plenty of persons and I shouted for help and at that instance, he slapped my mouth and
after a few steps he already carried me.

xxx xxx xxx

A. He continued walking and I also continued crying and I told him that I want to go home and he told me that we are heading towards home,
but I told him that the way we are going to is not the way to our house.

Q. By the way, when you shouted [for] help, was it loud?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So, what happened next?

A. He continued running and he stopped several vehicles but they did not stop, so, we just continued walking.
Q. After that, what happened next?

A. He moved closer to the banana plants. He looked back and he saw that persons were already chasing him and after that he carried me and
ran.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the appellant and the victim were constantly on the move. They went to Maco Elementary School and
strolled on the school grounds. When nobody was at the Luponlupon bridge, appellant took the victim to the highway leading to Tagum,
Davao. At that time, Yvonne pleaded with appellant that she really wanted to go home to Binuangan, but appellant ignored her pleas and
continued walking her toward the wrong direction. Later on, the group of Witness Arnel Fabila spotted them. Appellant Astorga carried the
victim and ran, but Fabilas group chased and caught up with them.

This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or restraint of the victim, which is the primary element of kidnapping.[31]
Appellants apparent intention was to take Yvonne against her will towards the direction of Tagum. Appellants plan did not materialize,
however, because Fabilas group chanced upon them. The evidence does not show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that
he actually detained her. Appellants forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or
restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no lockup. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code. Grave coercion or coaccion grave has three
elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his
or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as
would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and
liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of a law or in the exercise of any
lawful right.[32] When appellant forcibly dragged and slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home to Binuangan. Appellant presented
no justification for preventing Yvonne from going home, and we cannot find any.

The present case should be distinguished from People vs. Rosemarie de la Cruz. [33] Here, Appellant Astorga tricked Yvonne to go with him
by telling her that they were going to buy candy. When Yvonne recognized the deception, she demanded that she be brought home, but
appellant refused and instead dragged her toward the opposite direction against her will. While it is unclear whether Appellant Astorga
intended to detain or lock up Yvonne, there is no question that he forced her to go with him against her will. In Rosemarie de la Cruz, Victim
Whiazel voluntarily went with accused. Furthermore, the accused in that case failed to consummate the crime of kidnapping because of the
timely intervention of the victims neighbor. Thus, the Court held in that case:[34]

In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of the latters liberty, in any manner, needs to be established
by indubitable proof (People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85 [1993]). The acts held by the trial court, and maintained by the People, as consummating
the crime of kidnapping in this case are those when accused-appellant held the victims hand and refused to let go when the victim asked to
go over to her neighbor, who by then already saw what was happening. This happened for only a very brief span of time and the evidentiary
record shows that there were a good number of people present at that time, that a guard was stationed at the gate, and that there was at
least a teacher nearby. The child could have just as easily shouted for help. While it does not take much to scare the wits out of a small child
like Whiazel, under the attendant circumstances, we cannot say with certainty that she was indeed deprived of her liberty. It must further be
noted that up to that brief moment when Cecilia saw them, and the child asked to be let go, the victim had gone with accused-appellant
voluntarily. Without any further act reinforcing the inference that the victim may have been denied her liberty, even taking cognizance of her
minority, the Court hesitates to find that kidnapping in the case at bar was consummated. While it is a well-entrenched rule that factual
findings of trial courts, especially when they concern the appreciation of testimony of witnesses, are accorded great respect, by exception,
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, as we perceive in the case at bar, the Court may choose to substitute its own
findings (People vs. Padua, 215 SCRA 266 [1992]).

The Information, dated March 24, 1992, filed against Astorga contains sufficient allegations constituting grave coercion, the elements of
which were sufficiently proved by the prosecution. Hence, a conviction for said crime is appropriate under Section 4, Rule 120 of the 1988
Rules on Criminal Procedure:

Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. -- When there is variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offenses as charged is included in or necessarily includes
the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged
included in that which is proved.
At the time the felony was committed on December 29, 1991, the penalty imposed by law for grave coercion was arresto mayor and a fine
not exceeding five hundred pesos.[35] The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply here because the maximum penalty does not exceed
one year.[36] However, appellant has been imprisoned for more than six (6) months. He has more than served the penalty imposable for
such an offense.[37]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Appellant is CONVICTED only of grave coercion and is sentenced to six (6) months of
arresto mayor. Unless he is being detained for any other valid cause, his IMMEDIATE RELEASE is herewith ordered, considering that he has
more than served the maximum penalty imposable upon him. The director of prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five days from
receipt of this Decision, of the actual date the appellant is released. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

-versus-

HERMIE M. JACINTO,

Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 182239

Present:

CORONA,C.J.,

Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

DEL CASTILLO, and

PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 16, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victims positive identification of the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime.[1] For it to prosper, the court must be convinced that there was physical impossibility on the part of
the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.[2]

Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose judgment of conviction has become final and executory only after his disqualification
from availing of the benefits of suspended sentence on the ground that he/she has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, shall still
be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as An Act
Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System, Creating the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council under the Department
of Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes.

Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA,[3] appellant Hermie M. Jacinto seeks before this Court the reversal of the judgment of his
conviction.[4]

The Facts

In an Information dated 20 March 2003[5] filed with the Regional Trial Court and docketed as Criminal Case No. 1679-13-141[1],[6] appellant
was accused of the crime of RAPE allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00 oclock in the evening more or less, at barangay xxx, municipality of xxx,
province of xxx and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [Hermie M. Jacinto], with lewd design did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with one AAA, a five-year old minor child.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating circumstance of minority, the victim being only five years old.[7]

On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.[8] During pre-trial,[9] the defense admitted the existence of the following documents:
(1) birth certificate of AAA, showing that she was born on 3 December 1997; (2) police blotter entry on the rape incident; and (3) medical
certificate, upon presentation of the original or upon identification thereof by the physician.

Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting witnesses to prove their respective versions of the story.

Evidence for the Prosecution

The testimonies of AAA,[10] her father FFF,[11] and rebuttal witness Julito Apiki [Julito][12] may be summarized in the following manner:

FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they were born. FFFs house is along the road. That of appellant lies at the back approximately
80 meters from FFF. To access the road, appellant has to pass by FFFs house, the frequency of which the latter describes to be every minute
[and] every hour. Also, appellant often visits FFF because they were close friends. He bore no grudge against appellant prior to the
incident.[13]

AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls him kuya. She sees him all the time playing at the basketball court near her house,
fetching water, and passing by her house on his way to the road. She and appellant used to be friends until the incident.[14]

At about past 6 oclock in the evening of 28 January 2003, FFF sent his eight-year-old daughter CCC to the store of Rudy Hatague to buy
cigarettes. AAA followed CCC. When CCC returned without AAA, FFF was not alarmed. He thought she was watching television at the house
of her aunt Rita Lingcay [Rita].[15]
Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay Rum.[16] At the store, he saw appellant place AAA on
his lap.[17] He was wearing sleeveless shirt and a pair of short pants.[18] All of them left the store at the same time.[19] Julito proceeded to
the house of Rita to watch television, while appellant, who held the hand of AAA, went towards the direction of the lower area or place.[20]

AAA recalled that appellant was wearing a chaleko (sando) and a pair of short pants[21] when he held her hand while on the road near the
store.[22] They walked towards the rice field near the house of spouses Alejandro and Gloria Perocho [the Perochos].[23] There he made her
lie down on harrowed ground, removed her panty and boxed her on the chest.[24] Already half-naked from waist down,[25] he mounted her,
and, while her legs were pushed apart, pushed his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull movement.[26] She felt pain and cried.[27]
Afterwards, appellant left and proceeded to the Perochos.[28] She, in turn, went straight home crying.[29]

FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from downstairs.[30] She was without slippers.[31] He found her face greasy.[32] There was mud
on her head and blood was oozing from the back of her head.[33] He checked for any injury and found on her neck a contusion that was
already turning black.[34] She had no underwear on and he saw white substance and mud on her vagina.[35] AAA told him that appellant
brought her from the store[36] to the grassy area at the back of the house of the Perochos;[37] that he threw away her pair of slippers,
removed her panty, choked her and boxed her breast;[38] and that he proceeded thereafter to the Perochos.[39]

True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the Perochos.[40] He asked the appellant what he did to AAA.[41] Appellant replied that he
was asked to buy rum at the store and that AAA followed him.[42] FFF went home to check on his daughter,[43] afterwhich, he went back to
appellant, asked again,[44] and boxed him.[45]

Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even date, Julito was still watching television at the house of Rita.[46] AAA and her mother
MMM arrived.[47] AAA was crying.[48] Julito pitied her, embraced her, and asked what happened to her, to which she replied that appellant
raped her.[49] Julito left and found appellant at the Perochos.[50] Julito asked appellant, Bads, did you really rape the child, the daughter of
[MMM]? but the latter ignored his question.[51] Appellants aunt, Gloria, told appellant that the policemen were coming to which the
appellant responded, Wait a minute because I will wash the dirt of my elbow (sic) and my knees.[52] Julito did found the elbows and knees of
appellant with dirt.[53]

On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the police station to have the incident blottered.[54] FFF also had AAA undergo a physical
check up at the municipal health center.[55] Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar, M.D., Rural Health Physician, issued a medical certificate[56] dated 29
January 2003. It reads:

Injuries seen are as follows:

1. Multiple abrasions with erythema along the neck area.

2. Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas.

3. Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area

4. Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall, midclavicular line

5. Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral area

6. Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and whitish mucoid-like material

7. Introitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding

8. Hymenal lacerations at the 5 oclock and 9 oclock position

Impression

MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES

HYMENAL LACERATIONS

Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar,[57] AAA submitted herself to another examination at the provincial hospital on the following day.
Dr. Christine Ruth B. Micabalo, Medical Officer III of the provincial hospital, attended to her and issued a medico-legal certificate dated 29
January 2003,[58] the pertinent portion of which reads:

P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar findings except No. 6 and 7 there is no bleeding in this time of examination.
(sic)[59]

Evidence for the Defense

Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a different version of the story. To corroborate his testimony, Luzvilla Balucan [Luzvilla] and
his aunt Gloria took the witness stand to affirm that he was at the Perochos at the time of the commission of the crime.[60] Luzvilla even
went further to state that she actually saw Julito, not appellant, pick up AAA on the road.[61] In addition, Antonia Perocho [Antonia], sister-
in-law of appellants aunt, Gloria,[62] testified on the behavior of Julito after the rape incident was revealed.[63]

Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with his parents whose house stands at the back of FFFs house.[64] He denied that there
was a need to pass by the house of FFF in order to access the road or to fetch water.[65] He, however, admitted that he occasionally worked
for FFF,[66] and whenever he was asked to buy something from the store, AAA always approached him.[67]

At about 8 oclock in the morning of 28 January 2003, appellant went to the Perochos to attend a birthday party. At 6:08 in the evening, while
the visitors, including appellant and his uncle Alejandro Perocho [Alejandro], were gathered together in a drinking session, appellants uncle
sent him to the store to buy Tanduay Rum. Since the store is only about 20 meters from the house, he was able to return after three (3)
minutes. He was certain of the time because he had a watch .[68]

Appellants aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house, confirmed that he was in her house attending the birthday party; and that appellant went out
between 6 and 7 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay from the store. She recalled that appellant was back around five (5) minutes later.
She also observed that appellants white shorts and white sleeveless shirt were clean.[69]

At 6:30 in the evening,[70] Luzvilla, who was also at the party, saw appellant at the kitchen having a drink with his uncle Alejandro and the
rest of the visitors.[71] She went out to relieve herself at the side of the tree beside the road next to the house of the Perochos.[72] From
where she was, she saw Julito, who was wearing black short pants and black T-shirt, carry AAA.[73] AAAs face was covered and she was
wiggling.[74] This did not alarm her because she thought it was just a game.[75] Meanwhile, appellant was still in the kitchen when she
returned.[76] Around three (3) minutes later, Luzvilla saw Julito, now in a white T-shirt,[77] running towards the house of Rita.[78] AAA was
slowly following behind.[79] Luzvilla followed them.[80] Just outside the house, Julito embraced AAA and asked what the appellant did to
her.[81] The child did not answer.[82]

Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She witnessed the punching incident and testified that appellant was twice boxed by FFF.
According to her, FFF tapped the left shoulder of the appellant, boxed him, and left. FFF came in the second time and again boxed appellant.
This time, he had a bolo pointed at appellant. Appellants uncle Alejandro, a barangay councilor, and another Civilian Voluntary Organization
(CVO) member admonished FFF.[83]

On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 oclock in the evening, she was watching the television along with other people at the house of
Rita. Around 7:10, Julito, who was wearing only a pair of black short pants without a shirt on, entered the house drunk. He paced back and
forth. After 10 minutes, AAA came in crying. Julito tightly embraced AAA and asked her what happened. AAA did not answer. Upon Antonias
advice, Julito released her and went out of the house.[84]

Appellant further testified that at past 7 oclock in the evening, FFF arrived, pointed a finger at him, brandished a bolo, and accused him of
molesting AAA. FFF left but returned at around 8 oclock in the evening. This time, he boxed appellant and asked again why he molested his
daughter.[85]
On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision,[86] the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape committed upon a 5-year old girl, the court
sentences him to death and orders him to pay [AAA] P75,000.000 as rape indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs[87]

The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly discovered evidence stating that appellant was apparently born on 1 March 1985
and that he was only seventeen (17) years old when the crime was committed on 28 January 2003.[88] The trial court appreciated the
evidence and reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.[89] Thus:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the death penalty upon the accused is amended in order to consider the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority. The penalty impos[a]ble upon the accused, therefore[,] is reduced to reclusion perpetua. xxx

Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for its disposition in view of the ruling in People v. Mateo and the
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals of cases where the penalty imposed is death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.[90]

On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the trial court with the following MODIFICATIONS:

xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the Indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant Hermie M. Jacinto is ordered to indemnify
the victim in the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the
costs.[91]

On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellants Notice of Appeal.[92] This Court required the parties to
simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs.[93] Both parties manifested that they have exhaustively discussed their positions in
their respective briefs and would no longer file any supplement.[94]
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE[95] by invoking the principle that if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more reasonable explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt, then the evidence
does not pass the test of moral certainty and will not suffice to support a conviction.[96]

Our Ruling

We sustain the judgment of conviction.

In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person accused of rape, we consider the three well-entrenched principles:

(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2)
in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[97]

Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim may be sufficient to convict the accused.[98] More so, when the
testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings of the examining physician.[99]

Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victims positive identification of the perpetrator of the crime,[100] except when it is
established that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the
crime.[101]

A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12) years of age even in the absence of any of the following
circumstances: (a) through force, threat or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c)
by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority.[102]
That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The vivid narration of the acts culminating in the insertion of appellants organ into the
vagina of five-year-old AAA and the medical findings of the physicians sufficiently proved such fact.

AAA testified:

PROS. OMANDAM:

xxxx

Q You said Hermie laid you on the ground, removed your panty and boxed you, what else did he do to you?

A He mounted me.

Q When Hermie mounted you, was he facing you?

A Yes.

Q When he mounted you what did he do, did he move?

A He moved his ass, he made a push and pull movement.

Q When he made a push and pull movement, how were your legs positioned?

A They were apart.

Q Who pushed them apart?

A Hermie.

Q Did Hermie push anything at you?

A Yes.

Q What was that?

A His penis.

Q Where did he push his penis?

A To my vagina.

Q Was it painful?

A Yes.

Q What was painful?

A My vagina.

Q Did you cry?

A Yes.[103]

The straightforward and consistent answers to the questions, which were phrased and re-phrased in order to test that AAA well understood
the information elicited from her, said it all she had been raped. When a woman, more so a minor, says so, she says in effect all that is
essential to show that rape was committed.[104] Significantly, youth and immaturity are normally badges of truth and honesty.[105]

Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr. Micabalo[106] revealed that the hymenal lacerations at 5 oclock and 9 oclock positions
could have been caused by the penetration of an object; that the redness of the introitus could have been the result of the repeated
battering of the object; and that such object could have been an erect male organ.[107]

The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the physicians finding of penetration conclusively established the essential requisite of carnal
knowledge.[108]

II

The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of the appellant at the time of the commission of the crime are now in dispute.
The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito who defiled AAA, and that appellant was elsewhere when the crime was
committed.[109]

We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim of rape could readily identify her assailant, especially when he is not a stranger to
her, considering that she could have a good look at him during the commission of the crime.[110] AAA had known appellant all her life.
Moreover, appellant and AAA even walked together from the road near the store to the situs criminus[111] that it would be impossible for
the child not to recognize the man who held her hand and led her all the way to the rice field.

We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on the unwavering testimony of AAA.

The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so young, that it was accused, whom she called kuya and who used to play basketball
and fetch water near their house, and who was wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts at the time he raped her, was convincing and persuasive.
The defense attempted to impute the crime to someone else one Julito Apiki, but the child, on rebuttal, was steadfast and did not
equivocate, asserting that it was accused who is younger, and not Julito, who is older, who molested her.[112]

In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the determination by the trial court of the credibility of the witnesses deserves
full weight and respect considering that it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses manner of testifying, their furtive glances, calmness,
sighs and the scant or full realization of their oath,[113] unless it is shown that material facts and circumstances have been ignored,
overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted.[114]

Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:

xxx His and his witness attempt to throw the court off the track by imputing the crime to someone else is xxx a vain exercise in view of the
private complainants positive identification of accused and other corroborative circumstances. Accused also admitted that on the same
evening, Julito Apiki, the supposed real culprit, asked him What is this incident, Pare?, thus corroborating the latters testimony that he
confronted accused after hearing of the incident from the child.[115]

On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in finding his denial and alibi weak despite the presentation
of witnesses to corroborate his testimony. Glaring inconsistencies were all over their respective testimonies that even destroyed the
credibility of the appellants very testimony.
Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro Perocho who sent him to store to buy Tanduay; that he gave the bottle to his uncle; and
that they had already been drinking long before he bought Tanduay at the store.

This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt Gloria, wife of his uncle Alejandro. On cross-examination, she revealed that her husband
was not around before, during, and after the rape incident because he was then at work.[116] He arrived from work only after FFF came to
their house for the second time and boxed appellant.[117] It was actually the fish vendor, not her husband, who asked appellant to buy
Tanduay.[118] Further, the drinking session started only after the appellants errand to the store.[119]

Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to deserve consideration.

Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro joined the drinking session. This is contrary to Glorias statement that her husband was at
work.

Luzvillas testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of sur-rebuttal witness Antonia Perocho. Antonia recalled that Julito arrived without a
shirt on. This belied Luzvillas claim that Julito wore a white shirt on his way to the house of Rita. In addition, while both the prosecution, as
testified to by AAA and Julito, and the defense, as testified to by Gloria, were consistent in saying that appellant wore a sleeveless shirt,
Luzvillas recollection differ in that Julito wore a T-shirt (colored black and later changed to white), and, thus, a short-sleeved shirt.

Also, contrary to Luzvillas story that she saw AAA walking towards Ritas house three (3) minutes after she returned to the Perochos at 6:38 in
the evening, Antonia recalled that AAA arrived at the house of Rita at 7:30. In this respect, we find the trial courts appreciation in order. Thus:

xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she went straight home, crying, to tell her father that Hermie had raped her. She did not first
drop into the house of Lita Lingkay to cry among strangers who were watching TV, as Luzvilla Balucan would have the court believe. When
the child was seen at the house of Lita Lingkay by Julito Apiki and Luzvilla Balucan, it was only later, after she had been brought there by her
mother Brenda so that Lita Lingkay could take a look at her ˗ just as Julito Apiki said.[120]

Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the same having been offered preferably by disinterested
witnesses. The defense failed thuswise. Its witnesses cannot qualify as such, they being related or were one way or another linked to each
other.[121]
Even assuming for the sake of argument that we consider the corroborations on his whereabouts, still, the defense of alibi cannot prosper.

We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be convinced that it would be physically impossible for the accused to have been at the
locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.[122]

Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the situs criminis and the location of the accused when the crime
was committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present at the scene of the crime and its
immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.[123]

In People v. Paraiso,[124] the distance of two thousand meters from the place of the commission of the crime was considered not physically
impossible to reach in less than an hour even by foot.[125] Inasmuch as it would take the accused not more than five minutes to rape the
victim, this Court disregarded the testimony of the defense witness attesting that the accused was fast asleep when she left to gather
bamboo trees and returned several hours after. She could have merely presumed that the accused slept all throughout.[126]

In People v. Antivola,[127] the testimonies of relatives and friends corroborating that of the appellant that he was in their company at the
time of the commission of the crime were likewise disregarded by this Court in the following manner:

Ruben Nicolas, the appellants part-time employer, and Marites Capalad, the appellants sister-in-law and co-worker, in unison, vouched for
the appellants physical presence in the fishpond at the time Rachel was raped. It is, however, an established fact that the appellants house
where the rape occurred, was a stones throw away from the fishpond. Their claim that the appellant never left their sight the entire
afternoon of December 4, 1997 is unacceptable. It was impossible for Marites to have kept an eye on the appellant for almost four hours,
since she testified that she, too, was very much occupied with her task of counting and recording the fishes being harvested. Likewise, Mr.
Nicolas, who, admittedly was 50 meters away from the fishpond, could not have focused his entire attention solely on the appellant. It is,
therefore, not farfetched that the appellant easily sneaked out unnoticed, and along the way inveigled the victim, brought her inside his
house and ravished her, then returned to the fishpond as if he never left.[128] (Emphasis supplied.)

As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense witnesses that appellant never left their sight, save from the 5-minute errand to the
store, is contrary to ordinary human experience. Moreover, considering that the farmland where the crime was committed is just behind the
house of the Perochos, it would take appellant only a few minutes to bring AAA from the road near the store next to the Perochos down the
farmland and consummate the crime. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, appellant could have committed the rape after buying
the bottle of Tanduay and immediately returned to his uncles house.[129] Unfortunately, the testimonies of his corroborating witnesses even
bolstered the fact that he was within the immediate vicinity of the scene of the crime.[130]
Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically impossible for appellant to have been at the time and place of the commission of
the crime.

All considered, we find that the prosecution has sufficiently established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

III

In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly considered Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006) despite the commission of the crime three (3) years before it was enacted on 28 April 2006.

We recognize its retroactive application following the rationale elucidated in People v. Sarcia:[131]

[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344][132] allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been convicted and are serving
sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense.
With more reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review.[133] (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty

Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age from criminal liability, unless
the child is found to have acted with discernment, in which case, the appropriate proceedings in accordance with the Act shall be
observed.[134]

We determine discernment in this wise:

Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.[135] Such capacity may be known
and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.[136]

xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong.[137] Such
circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minors cunning and shrewdness.[138]

In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: (1) choosing an isolated and dark place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent
detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim xxx, to weaken her defense are indicative of then seventeen (17) year-old appellants mental capacity to
fully understand the consequences of his unlawful action.[139]

Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be modified.

The birth certificate of AAA[140] shows that she was born on 3 December 1997. Considering that she was only five (5) years old when
appellant defiled her on 28 January 2003, the law prescribing the death penalty when rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years
old[141] applies.

The following, however, calls for the reduction of the penalty: (1) the prohibition against the imposition of the penalty of death in accordance
with Republic Act No. 9346;[142] and (2) the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the appellant, which has the effect of reducing
the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.[143]

Relying on People v. Bon,[144] the Court of Appeals excluded death from the graduation of penalties provided in Article 71 of the Revised
Penal Code.[145] Consequently, in its appreciation of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of appellant, it lowered the penalty
one degree from reclusion perpetua and sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as
maximum.[146]

We differ.

In a more recent case,[147] the Court En Banc, through the Honorable Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, clarified:
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law
shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the
accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.[148] (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Civil Liability

We have consistently ruled that:

The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which would have warranted
the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.[149]

Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at the time he committed the crime has no bearing on the gravity and extent of injury
suffered by the victim and her family.[150] The respective awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00 each
are, therefore, proper.[151]

Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which effectively lowered the penalty by one degree,
we affirm the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages.
And, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence,[152] the amount of exemplary damages should be increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.

Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration; Appropriate Disposition after the Lapse of the Period of Suspension of Sentence
Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law notwithstanding that he/she has reached the
age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is pronounced. Thus:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the
offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)

xxxx

Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,[153] which was promulgated on 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals held that, consistent with Article 192
of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended,[154] the aforestated provision does not apply to one who has been convicted of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.[155]

Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the decision in Sarcia,[156] overturning the ruling in Gubaton. Thus:

The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in
conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense
and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of
sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.[157]

The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations[158] on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of
2005) further strengthened the new position of this Court to cover heinous crimes in the application of the provision on the automatic
suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law. The pertinent portion of the deliberation reads:

If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and may
have acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the
Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos] proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and
Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or
primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the childs restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics
supplied in Sarcia.)[159]
On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law, which reflected the same
position.[160]

These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply to appellant. The suspension of
sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.[161] Section 40[162] of the law
and Section 48[163] of the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five (25) years old.

Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should
extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a
child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that
he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the
law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense
when he/she was still of tender age.

Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No.
9344.[164]

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination
with the DSWD.

Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,[165] the case shall be remanded to the court of origin to effect appellants confinement in an
agricultrual camp or other training facility.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00213 finding appellant Hermie M. Jacinto
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death penalty imposed on the
appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the victim P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in
accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

SO ORDERED.
JOEMAR ORTEGA,

Petitioner,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 151085

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,*

CHICO-NAZARIO, and

NACHURA, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 20, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision[2] dated October 26, 2000 which affirmed in toto the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City,
Branch 50, dated May 13, 1999, convicting petitioner Joemar Ortega[4] (petitioner) of the crime of Rape.

The Facts

Petitioner, then about 14 years old,[5] was charged with the crime of Rape in two separate informations both dated April 20, 1998, for
allegedly raping AAA,[6] then about eight (8) years of age. The accusatory portions thereof respectively state:

Criminal Case No. 98-19083

That sometime in August, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had
carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

Criminal Case No. 98-19084

That on or about the 1st day of December, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
Upon arraignment on September 10, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.[9] Thus, trial on the merits ensued. In the
course of the trial, two varying versions arose.

Version of the Prosecution

On February 27, 1990, AAA was born to spouses FFF and MMM.[10] Among her siblings CCC, BBB, DDD, EEE and GGG, AAA is the only girl in
the family. Before these disturbing events, AAA's family members were close friends of petitioner's family, aside from the fact that they were
good neighbors. However, BBB caught petitioner raping his younger sister AAA inside their own home. BBB then informed their mother
MMM who in turn asked AAA.[11] There, AAA confessed that petitioner raped her three (3) times on three (3) different occasions.

The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. MMM left her daughter AAA, then 6 years old and son BBB, then 10 years old, in the
care of Luzviminda Ortega[12] (Luzviminda), mother of petitioner, for two (2) nights because MMM had to stay in a hospital to attend to her
other son who was sick.[13] During the first night at petitioner's residence, petitioner entered the room where AAA slept together with
Luzviminda and her daughter. Petitioner woke AAA up and led her to the sala. There petitioner raped AAA. The second occasion occurred the
following day, again at the petitioner's residence. Observing that nobody was around, petitioner brought AAA to their comfort room and
raped her there. AAA testified that petitioner inserted his penis into her vagina and she felt pain. In all of these instances, petitioner warned
AAA not to tell her parents, otherwise, he would spank her.[14] AAA did not tell her parents about her ordeal.

The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1, 1996. Petitioner went to the house of AAA and joined her and her
siblings in watching a battery-powered television. At that time, Luzviminda was conversing with MMM. While AAA's siblings were busy
watching,

petitioner called AAA to come to the room of CCC and BBB. AAA obeyed. While inside the said room which was lighted by a kerosene lamp,
petitioner pulled AAA behind the door, removed his pants and brief, removed AAA's shorts and panty, and in a standing position inserted his
penis into the vagina of AAA.[15] AAA described petitioner's penis as about five (5) inches long and the size of two (2) ballpens. She, likewise,
narrated that she saw pubic hair on the base of his penis.[16]

This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his testimony. When BBB was about to drink water in their kitchen, as he was passing by his
room, BBB was shocked to see petitioner and AAA both naked from their waist down in the act of sexual intercourse. BBB saw petitioner
holding AAA and making a pumping motion. Immediately, BBB told petitioner to stop; the latter, in turn, hurriedly left. Thereafter, BBB
reported the incident to his mother, MMM.[17]

MMM testified that when she asked AAA about what BBB saw, AAA told her that petitioner inserted his fingers and his penis into her vagina.
MMM learned that this was not the only incident that petitioner molested AAA as there were two previous occasions. MMM also learned
that AAA did not report her ordeal to them out of fear that petitioner would spank her. MMM testified that when BBB reported the matter to
her, petitioner and Luzviminda already left her house. After waiting for AAA's brothers to go to sleep, MMM, with a heavy heart, examined
AAA's vagina and she noticed that the same was reddish and a whitish fluid was coming out from it. Spouses FFF and MMM were not able to
sleep that night. The following morning, at about four o'clock, MMM called Luzviminda and petitioner to come to their house. MMM
confronted Luzviminda about what petitioner did to her daughter, and consequently, she demanded that AAA should be brought to a doctor
for examination.[18]

MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to Dr. Lucifree Katalbas[19] (Dr. Katalbas), the Rural Health Officer of the locality who
examined AAA and found no indication that she was molested.[20] Refusing to accept such findings, on December 12, 1996, MMM went to
Dr. Joy Ann Jocson (Dr. Jocson), Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health Office. Dr. Jocson made an unofficial written report[21] showing
that there were abrasions on both right and left of the labia minora and a small laceration at the posterior fourchette. She also found that the
minor injuries she saw on AAA's genitals were relatively fresh; and that such abrasions were superficial and could disappear after a period of
3 to 4 days. Dr. Jocson, however, indicated in her certification that her findings required the confirmation of the Municipal Health Officer of
the locality.

Subsequently, an amicable settlement[22] was reached between the two families through the DAWN Foundation, an organization that helps
abused women and children. Part of the settlement required petitioner to depart from their house to avoid contact with AAA.[23] As such,
petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality. However, a few months later, petitioner went home for brief visits and in order to bring
his dirty clothes for laundry. At the sight of petitioner, AAA's father FFF was infuriated and confrontations occurred. At this instance, AAA's
parents went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which assisted them in filing the three (3) counts of rape. However, the
prosecutor's office only filed the two (2) instant cases.

Version of the Defense

Petitioner was born on August 8, 1983 to spouses Loreto (Loreto) and Luzviminda Ortega.[24] He is the second child of three siblings ― an
elder

brother and a younger sister. Petitioner denied the accusations made against him. He testified that: his parents and AAA's parents were good
friends; when MMM left AAA and her brothers to the care of his mother, petitioner slept in a separate room together with BBB and CCC
while AAA slept together with Luzviminda and his younger sister; he never touched or raped AAA or showed his private parts to her;
petitioner did not threaten AAA in any instance; he did not rape AAA in the former's comfort room, but he merely accompanied and helped
AAA clean up as she defecated and feared the toilet bowl; in the process of washing, he may have accidentally touched AAA's anus; on
December 1, 1996, petitioner together with his parents, went to AAA's house;[25] they were dancing and playing together with all the other
children at the time; while they were dancing, petitioner hugged and lifted AAA up in a playful act, at the instance of which BBB ran and
reported the matter to MMM, who at the time was with Luzviminda, saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual intercourse;[26]
petitioner explained to MMM that they were only playing, and that he could not have done to AAA what he was accused of doing, as they
were together with her brothers, and he treated AAA like a younger sister;[27] BBB was lying; AAA's parents and his parents did not get angry
at him nor did they quarrel with each other; petitioner and his parents peacefully left AAA's house at about nine o'clock in the evening;
however, at about four o'clock in the morning, petitioner and his parents were summoned by MMM to go to the latter's house; upon arriving
there they saw BBB being maltreated by his father as AAA pointed to BBB as the one who molested her; and MMM and Luzviminda agreed to
bring AAA to a doctor for examination.[28]

Luzviminda corroborated the testimony of her son. She testified that: her son was a minor at the time of the incident; CCC and BBB were the
children of MMM in her first marriage, while AAA and the rest of her

siblings were of the second marriage; CCC and BBB are half-brothers of AAA; when MMM entrusted AAA and her brothers to her sometime in
August of 1996, she slept with AAA and her youngest daughter in a separate room from petitioner; on December 1, 1996, she was at AAA's
house watching television and conversing with MMM, while FFF and Loreto were having a drinking spree in the kitchen; from where they
were seated, she could clearly see all the children, including petitioner and AAA, playing and dancing in the dining area; she did not hear any
unusual cry or noise at the time; while they were conversing, BBB came to MMM saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual
intercourse; upon hearing such statement, Luzviminda and MMM immediately stood up and looked for them, but both mothers did not find
anything unusual as all the children were playing and dancing in the dining area; Luzviminda and MMM just laughed at BBB's statement; the
parents of AAA, at that time, did not examine her in order to verify BBB's statement nor did they get angry at petitioner or at them; and they
peacefully left AAA's house. However, the following day, MMM woke Luzviminda up, saying that FFF was spanking BBB with a belt as AAA
was pointing to BBB nor to petitioner as the one who molested her. At this instance, Luzviminda intervened, telling FFF not to spank BBB but
instead, to bring AAA to a doctor for examination. Luzviminda accompanied MMM to Dr. Katalbas who found no indication that AAA was
molested. She also accompanied her to Dr. Jocson. After getting the results of the examination conducted by Dr. Jocson, they went to the
police and at this instance only did Luzviminda learn that MMM accused petitioner of raping AAA. Petitioner vehemently denied to
Luzviminda that he raped AAA. Thereafter, MMM and Luzviminda went to their employer who recommended that they should seek advice
from the Women's Center. At the said Center, both agreed on an amicable settlement wherein petitioner would stay away from AAA. Thus,
petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality for almost two (2) years. But almost every Saturday, petitioner would come home to visit
his parents and to bring his dirty clothes for laundry. Every time petitioner came home, FFF bad-mouthed petitioner, calling him a rapist.
Confrontations occurred until an altercation erupted wherein FFF allegedly slapped Luzviminda. Subsequently, AAA's parents filed the instant
cases.[29]

The RTC's Ruling

On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of petitioner as the
perpetrator of the crime by AAA and BBB, who testified with honesty and credibility. Moreover, the RTC opined that it could not perceive any
motive for AAA's family to impute a serious crime of Rape to petitioner, considering the close relations of both families. Thus, the RTC
disposed of this case in this wise:

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Joemar Ortega Y Felisario GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct
Participation of the crime of RAPE as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 and there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Two (2) Reclusion Temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the accused shall be imprisoned for each case for a period of Six (6) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to
Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. The accused is condemned to pay the offended party AAA, the sum of P100,000.00 as
indemnification for the two (2) rapes (sic).

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.[30]

Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon posting of the corresponding bail bond for his provisional liberty in the amount of
P40,000.00, the RTC ordered the petitioner's release pending appeal.[31]

The CA's Ruling

On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, holding that the petitioner's defense of denial could not prevail over the
positive identification of the petitioner by the victim AAA and her brother BBB, which were categorical, consistent and without any showing
of ill motive. The CA also held that the respective medical examinations conducted by the two doctors were irrelevant, as it is established
that the slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ consummates rape; thus, hymenal laceration is not an element of rape.
Moreover, the CA opined that petitioner acted with discernment as shown by his covert acts. Finally, the CA accorded great weight and
respect to the factual findings of the RTC, particularly in the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses.

Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration[32] of the assailed Decision which the CA denied in its Resolution[33] dated November 7,
2001.

Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED CERTAIN FACTS OF SUBSTANCE AND VALUE WHICH IF CONSIDERED MIGHT AFFECT
THE RESULT OF THE CASE.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR. LUCIFREE
KATALBAS.

III.

THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT, AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURT, THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT IN FACT COMMITTED AND IS
CAPABLE OF COMMITTING THE ALLEGED
RAPE WITHIN THE RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM WHERE SEVERAL OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE
MOTHERS WERE PRESENT IS IMPROBABLE AND CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE.

IV.

THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FACTS SET FORTH BY THE ALLEGED VICTIM REGARDING THE
CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE COMMISSION OF RAPE SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1996.[34]

Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual findings of the CA are conclusive on this Court, we are not prevented from overturning
such findings if the CA had manifestly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which if considered might affect the result of the case.
Petitioner stresses that from the testimonies of AAA and BBB, it can be deduced that penetration was achieved; thus, AAA felt pain.
Petitioner contends that assuming the allegations of AAA are true that petitioner inserted his fingers and his penis into her vagina, certainly
such acts would leave certain abrasions, wounds and/or lacerations on the genitalia of AAA, taking into consideration her age at the time and
the alleged size of petitioner's penis. However, such allegation is completely belied by the medical report of Dr. Katalbas who, one day after
the alleged rape, conducted a medical examination on AAA and found that there were no signs or indications that AAA was raped or
molested. Petitioner submits that the CA committed a grave error when it disregarded such medical report since it disproves the allegation of
the existence of rape and, consequently, the prosecution failed to prove its case; thus, the presumption of innocence in favor of the
petitioner subsists. Moreover, petitioner opines that like AAA, petitioner is also a child of the barrio who is innocent, unsophisticated and
lacks sexual experience. As such, it is incredible and contrary to human reason that a 13- year-old boy would commit such act in the very
dwelling of AAA, whose reaction to pain, at the age of six, could not be controlled or subdued. Petitioner claims that poverty was MMM's
motive in filing the instant case,

as she wanted to extort money from the parents of the petitioner. Petitioner points out that the medical report of Dr. Jocson indicated that
the abrasions that were inflicted on the genitalia of AAA were relatively fresh and the same could disappear within a period of 3 to 4 days.
Considering that Dr. Jocson conducted the medical examination on December 12, 1996, or after the lapse of eleven (11) days after the
alleged incident of rape, and that AAA's parents only filed the instant case after almost a year, in order to deter Luzviminda from filing a case
of slander by deed against FFF, it is not inconceivable that MMM inflicted said abrasions on AAA to prove their case and to depart from the
initial confession of AAA that it was actually BBB who raped her. Finally, petitioner submits that AAA and BBB were merely coached by MMM
to fabricate these stories.[35]

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that: the arguments
raised by the petitioner are mere reiterations of his disquisitions before the CA; the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not rely on the
testimonies of both doctors since despite the absence of abrasions, rape is consummated even with the slightest penetration of the lips of
the female organ; what is relevant in this case is the reliable testimony of AAA that petitioner raped her in August and December of 1996;
even in the absence of force, rape was committed considering AAA's age at that time; as such, AAA did not have any ill motive in accusing
petitioner; and it is established that the crime of rape could be committed even in the presence of other people nearby. Moreover, the OSG
relies on the doctrine that the evaluation made by a trial court is accorded the highest respect as it had the opportunity to observe directly
the demeanor of a witness and to determine whether said witness was telling the truth or not. Lastly, the OSG claims that petitioner acted
with discernment when he committed the said crime, as manifested in his covert acts.[36]
However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,[37] or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and it took
effect on May 20, 2006.[38] The law establishes a comprehensive system to manage children in conflict with the law[39] (CICL) and children
at risk[40] with child-appropriate procedures and comprehensive programs and services such as prevention, intervention, diversion,
rehabilitation, re-integration and after-care programs geared towards their development. In order to ensure its implementation, the law,
particularly Section 8[41] thereof, has created the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) and vested it with certain duties and
functions[42] such as the formulation of policies and strategies to prevent juvenile delinquency and to enhance the administration of juvenile
justice as well as the treatment and rehabilitation of the CICL. The law also

provides for the immediate dismissal of cases of CICL, specifically Sections 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68 of R.A. No. 9344's Transitory Provisions.[43]

The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide:

Title VIII

Transitory Provisions

SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and Below. Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15)
years old and below at the time of the commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the
appropriate local social welfare and development officer. Such officer, upon thorough assessment of the child, shall determine whether to
release the child to the custody of his/her parents, or refer the child to prevention programs, as provided under this Act. Those with
suspended sentences and undergoing rehabilitation at the youth rehabilitation center shall likewise be released, unless it is contrary to the
best interest of the child.

SECTION 65. Children Detained Pending Trial. If the child is detained pending trial, the Family Court shall also determine whether or not
continued detention is necessary and, if not, determine appropriate alternatives for detention. If detention is necessary and he/she is
detained with adults, the court shall immediately order the transfer of the child to a youth detention home.

SECTION 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in Conflict with the Law. The PNP, the BJMP and the BUCOR are hereby directed
to submit to the JJWC, within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inventory of all children in conflict with the law under their
custody.

SECTION 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years Pending Diversion and Court Proceedings. If a child reaches the age of
eighteen (18) years pending diversion and court proceedings, the appropriate diversion authority in consultation with the local social welfare
and development officer or the Family Court in consultation with the Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme Court, as
the case may be, shall determine the appropriate disposition. In case the appropriate court executes the judgment of conviction, and unless
the child in conflict with the law has already availed of probation under Presidential Decree No. 603 or other similar laws, the child may apply
for probation if qualified under the provisions of the Probation Law.
SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at
the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for
which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled
to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if
they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.

Ostensibly, the only issue that requires resolution in this case is whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape as found by both the RTC and the CA. However, with the advent of R.A. No. 9344 while petitioner's case is pending before this Court, a
new issue arises, namely, whether the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to petitioner's case, considering that at the time he
committed the alleged rape, he was merely 13 years old.

In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape against AAA. In a prosecution for rape, the complainant's candor is the
single most important factor. If the complainant's testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted solely on that
basis.[44] The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not doubt AAA's credibility, and found no ill motive for her to charge petitioner of the heinous
crime of rape and to positively identify him as the malefactor. Both courts also accorded respect to BBB's testimony that he saw petitioner
having sexual intercourse with his younger sister. While petitioner asserts that AAA's poverty is enough motive for the imputation of the
crime, we discard such assertion for no mother or father like MMM and FFF would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the
tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage their daughter's psyche and
mar her life if the charge is not true.[45] We find petitioner's claim that MMM inflicted the abrasions found by Dr. Jocson in the genitalia of
AAA, in order to extort money from petitioners parents, highly incredible. Lastly, it must be noted that in most cases of rape committed
against young girls like AAA who was

only 6 years old then, total penetration of the victim's organ is improbable due to the small vaginal opening. Thus, it has been held that actual
penetration of the victim's organ or rupture of the hymen is not required.[46] Therefore, it is not necessary for conviction that the petitioner
succeeded in having full penetration, because the slightest touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia of the pudendum
constitutes rape.[47]

However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the complete absence of any of
the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises.[48] Therefore, while there is a crime
committed, no criminal liability attaches. Thus, in Guevarra v. Almodovar,[49] we held:

[I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete
absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. In expounding on
intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert has stated:

"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit
from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the infant (has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability."
It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a criminal act.

In its Comment[50] dated April 24, 2008, the OSG posited that petitioner is no longer covered by the provisions of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344
since as early as 1999, petitioner was convicted by the RTC and the conviction was affirmed by the CA in 2001. R.A. No. 9344 was passed into
law in 2006, and with the petitioner now approximately 25 years old, he no longer qualifies as a child as defined by R.A. No. 9344. Moreover,
the OSG claimed that the retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 is

applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old as explained under Sections 67 and 68 thereof. The OSG also asserted that
petitioner may avail himself of the provisions of Section 38[51] of R.A. No. 9344 providing for automatic suspension of sentence if finally
found guilty. Lastly, the OSG argued that while it is a recognized principle that laws favorable to the accused may be given retroactive
application, such principle does not apply if the law itself provides for conditions for its application.

We are not persuaded.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:

SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings
in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance
with existing laws.
Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and below, at the time of the commission of the
crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer
(LSWDO). What is

controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age at the time of the promulgation
of judgment but the CICL's age at the time of the commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal
irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.[52]

Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord retroactive application to the aforequoted provisions of R.A.
No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law - favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are
favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect.[53] This principle is embodied in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle has been given expanded application in certain instances involving special laws.[54] R.A.
No. 9344 should be no exception.

In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's retroactivity is even patent from the deliberations on the bill in the Senate, quoted as follows:

Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions

Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory Provisions, pages 34 to 35, may I humbly propose that we should insert, after Sections 67
to 69, the following provision:

ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THIS LAW PENDING THE CREATION OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE WELFARE
AND RESTORATION (OJWR) AND THE LOCAL COUNCIL FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A YEAR, SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY
TRANSFERRED TO DSWD INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD SHALL UNDERTAKE DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR THEM, PRIORITIZING THE YOUNGER
CHILDREN BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE AND THE LIGHTER OFFENSES.
The only question will be: Will the DSWD have enough facilities for these adult offenders?

Senator Pangilinan, Mr. President, according to the CWC, the DSWD does not have the capability at the moment. It will take time to develop
the capacity.

Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall be transferred whenever the facilities are ready.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a clarification. When we speak here of children who do not have criminal liability under this law,
we are referring here to those who currently have criminal liability, but because of the retroactive effect of this measure, will now be exempt.
It is quite confusing.

Senator Santiago. That is correct.

Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be released either to their parents or through a diversion program, Mr. President. That is my
understanding.

Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will have to be a process of sifting before that. That is why I was proposing that they should
be given to the DSWD, which will conduct the sifting process, except that apparently, the DSWD does not have the physical facilities.

Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we have no argument. We will now have to just craft it to ensure that the input raised earlier
by the good Senator is included and the capacity of the DSWD to be able to absorb these individuals. Likewise, the issue should also be
incorporated in the amendment.

The President. Just a question from the Chair. The moment this law becomes effective, all those children in conflict with the law, who were
convicted in the present Penal Code, for example, who will now not be subject to incarceration under this law, will be immediately released.
Is that the understanding?
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall under . . . .

Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements, Mr. President.

Senator Santiago. Yes.

The President. But since the facilities are not yet available, what will happen to them?

Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age, which has not yet been settled . . . . . provides, for example, for conferencing family
mediation, negotiation, apologies, censure, et cetera. These methodologies will apply. They do not necessarily have to remain in detention.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President. But it will still require some sort of infrastructure, meaning, manpower. The personnel
from the DSWD will have to address the counseling. So, there must be a transition in terms of building the capacity and absorbing those who
will benefit from this measure.

The President. Therefore, that should be specifically provided for as an amendment.

Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President.

The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the Santiago amendment is accepted.[55]

xxxx

PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS

xxxx

Senator Pimentel.

xxxx

Now, considering that laws are normally prospective, Mr. President, in their application, I would like to suggest to the Sponsor if he could
incorporate some kind of a transitory provision that would make this law apply also to those who might already have been convicted but are
awaiting, let us say, execution of their penalties as adults when, in fact, they are juveniles.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do have a provision under the Transitory Provisions wherein we address the issue raised by the
good Senator, specifically, Section 67. For example, Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time
of the commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officer. So that would be giving retroactive effect.

Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be prosecuted.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes.

Senator Pimentel. What about those that have already been prosecuted? I was trying to cite the instance of juvenile offenders erroneously
convicted as adults awaiting execution.

Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to include that as an additional amendment, subject to style.

Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that because that is a reality that we have to address, otherwise injustice will really be . . .

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would also include that as a separate provision.

The President. In other words, even after final conviction if, in fact, the offender is able to prove that at the time of the commission of the
offense he is a minor under this law, he should be given the benefit of the law.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We accept that proposed amendment.[56]

The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the dominant factor in interpreting a statute. Significantly, this Court has
declared in a number of cases, that intent is the soul of the law, viz.:

The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the
vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the
legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter
of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to

a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that
sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature.[57]

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.[58] In this case, the plain meaning of R.A. No. 9344's unambiguous
language, coupled with clear lawmakers' intent, is most favorable to herein petitioner. No other interpretation is justified, for the simple
language of the new law itself demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the CICL.

It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the
certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioners age was never assailed in
any of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was below 15 years of
age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.

However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2) counts of rape committed against AAA, Section 6 thereof
expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption from civil liability. Accordingly, this Court sustains the ruling of the RTC, duly
affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. This award is in the nature of
actual or compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a conviction for rape.

The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from the civil indemnity awarded to the rape victim. AAA is
entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, without the
necessity of additional pleading or proof other than the fact of rape. Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury
necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape.[59]

A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact that a law intended to protect our children from the harshness of life
and to alleviate, if not cure, the ills of the growing number of CICL and children at risk in our country, has been enacted by Congress.
However, it has not escaped us that major concerns have been raised on the effects of the law. It is worth mentioning that in the Rationale
for the Proposed Rule on Children Charged under R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, it was found that:

The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 raising the age of criminal irresponsibility from 9 years
old to 15 years old has compounded the problem of employment of children in the drug trade several times over. Law enforcement
authorities, Barangay Kagawads and the police, most particularly, complain that drug syndicates have become more aggressive in using
children 15 years old or below as couriers or foot soldiers in the drug trade. They claim that Republic Act No. 9344 has rendered them
ineffective in the faithful discharge of their duties in that they are proscribed from taking into custody children 15 years old or below who
openly flaunt possession, use and delivery or distribution of illicit drugs, simply because their age exempts them from criminal liability under
the new law. [60]

The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively exonerates petitioner of rape, a heinous crime committed against
AAA who was only a child at the tender age of six (6) when she was raped by the petitioner, and one who deserves the laws greater
protection. However, this consequence is inevitable because of the language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not subject to review
by this Court.[61] Any perception that the result reached herein appears unjust or unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the
Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the law. Our task is
constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case.[62]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 filed against petitioner Joemar F. Ortega are hereby
DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred to the local social welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention
program. Nevertheless, the petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private complainant AAA, civil indemnity in the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). No costs.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two Houses of Congress and the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC).

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 117407. April 15, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IRVIN TADULAN y EPAN, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

Accused-appellant Irvin Tadulan was charged with the crime of rape before the Regional Trial Court of xxx, Branch xxx, Metro Manila, in a
complaint docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-186, alleging as follows:
"That on or about the 2nd day of April, 1992 in the Municipality of xxx, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, armed with a knife, with lewd design and by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with one AAA, a minor, nine (9) years old, without her consent and against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW."[1]

When arraigned under the foregoing indictment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime attributed to him. Thereafter, trial commenced
with both prosecution and defendant presenting evidence consisting of testimonies of witnesses and documentary exhibits.

The evidence presented by the prosecution tended to establish the following facts:

" x x x Complainant BBB owns a house at xxx, in Barangay xxx, Metro Manila where she resides with her common-law husband and their
minor daughter, AAA. Behind the said house, complainant also owns a three-door apartment building, one unit of which was rented and
occupied by accused Irvin Tadulan, his wife Adefa Tadulan and their three children name [sic] Dianne, Angie and Bochoy who were aged 10, 9
and 5, respectively. In 1992 complainant's daughter, AAA was about nine (9) year [sic] old (Exh. 'A') and was in grade school. She often
played with the accused's children in the vicinity of their house and the apartment building.

In the morning of April 2, 1992, at about 11:00 o'clock, AAA was playing with the other children when she was called by Irvin Tadulan into the
latter's apartment unit. He brought the girl upstairs and told her to lie down on the floor. Irvin Tadulan then removed the shorts and panties
of AAA and his own pants and briefs. He kissed the girl and fondled her breasts and private parts. Then he put himself on top of her and
inserted his organ into her genitals. AAA felt the pain in her vagina. She pushed Irvin Tadulan away from her and got up, but the latter poked
a kitchen knife at her and told her to remain lying down; and because of fear, AAA lay [sic] down on the floor again. Irvin Tadulan placed
himself on top of her once more, kissed and fondled her breasts as before, and finally succeeded in inserting his penis into her sex organ. As
he had intercourse with AAA, blood oozed out of her vagina and she felt the pain. Shortly thereafter, however, she heard her mother calling
her. So, Irvin Tadulan told her to dress up quickly and ordered her to go home.

Upon reaching home, AAA did not inform her mother that Irvin Tadulan had carnal knowledge of her; but two days later, their laundry
woman saw the blood stains on her panties and told her mother about it. At first, AAA refused to talk when her mother asked her about the
said blood stains, but when the mother persisted in asking her, the girl cried and revealed that Irvin Tadulan had sexual intercourse with her.
The mother (BBB) was shocked. She reported the matter to her godson who immediately confronted Irvin Tadulan relative to what he had
done to AAA. At first, Irvin Tadulan denied having done the act imputed to him by the said girl, but he later on admitted that he had sexual
intercourse with her.

Shortly thereafter, Irvin Tadulan's wife (Adefa Tadulan) arrived from a trip from Cagayan de Oro City, and BBB immediately informed her that
her husband, Irvin Tadulan has raped her (BBBs) daughter AAA. BBB further informed Adefa Tadulan that she would not take action against
the latter's husband if they would vacate the apartment unit right away. Adefa Tadulan later on met with BBB and told her that she had
driven away Irvin Tadulan, but requested that she and her children be allowed to stay until Saturday, April 11, 1992. BBB thereafter noted,
however, that Irvin Tadulan was still coming home to the apartment unit every night despite the promise of his wife that she herself would
call the police should he ever come back to the place. So, BBB conferred with her cousin, a lawyer, and later on made up her mind to file a
criminal charge against Irvin Tadulan before leaving for abroad, for she was then scheduled to go to the United States to fetch her mother
who was ill due to a stroke.

On the night of April 11, 1992, BBB heard a loud noise coming from the apartment building, and when she inquired about it she came to
know that it was Irvin Tadulan creating the noise because he was kicking the door of the apartment unit occupied by him and his family. So,
BBB called up the police because of her apprehension that Irvin Tadulan would create trouble due to the quarrel that was then taking place
between him and his wife. Responding policemen soon arrived at the place in a mobile car, and because Irvin Tadulan was denounced by his
wife for having rape [sic] the daughter of BBB, the said police officers brought Irvin Tadulan to the xxx Police Station for questioning and also
asked BBB and her daughter to follow them. So, that same evening, BBB and her daughter went to the xxx Police Station where they gave
their respective sworn statements (Exhs. 'B' & 'E') and lodged their complaint against Irvin Tadulan. It was during the taking of her statement
before the police when AAA also revealed that Irvin Tadulan had laid with her not only on April 2, 1992. She stated that Irvin Tadulan had
previously laid on top of her and first attempted to have intercourse with her sometime in September 1, 1991, but it was not consummated
because she was hurt whenever he tried to insert his penis into her vagina.
In order to determine physical signs of sexual abuse, the xxx Police Station made a Request For The Medico Legal Examination of AAA to the
PC Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, Quezon City (Exh. 'F') on the following day, April 12, 1992, upon the written Consent For
Examination (Exh. 'G') which was signed by the mother, BBB. A medico-legal officer of the PCCLS examined AAA and then issued Medico-
Legal Report No. M-0708-92 dated April 13, 1992 (Exh. 'C') finding her 'hymen with deep, healed laceration at 4 o'clock", and with the
conclusion that the 'Subject is in non-virgin state physically'. Thereafter, the xxx Police Station forwarded the sworn statements of AAA and
her mother, together with all the pertinent papers to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of xxx where the said minor child and her mother
signed the Complaint for Rape (Exh. 'D') against Irvin Tadulan, which initiated the prosecution of the said accused in this case."[2]

On the other hand, accused Irvin Tadulan set up the defense of alibi and pardon. In support of his defense, Tadulan testified that he could
not have raped AAA in his apartment unit in xxx, Metro Manila, at 11:00 o'clock in the morning of 2 April 1992 as he was then at his place of
work at the Republic Asahi Glass Corporation in xxx, Metro Manila, where he was employed as a mobile equipment operator. His testimony
was corroborated by his supervisor at the plant who testified that on 2 April 1992, Irvin Tadulan worked with him at the company plant
during the first shift, from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.; and that as shown in Tadulan's daily time record (Exhibit " 1 "), said accused punched in at
5:25 a.m. and punched out at 2:31 p.m.

Relative to the defense of pardon or condonation, Adefa Tadulan, wife of accused-appellant, testified that when she arrived at their
apartment on 7 April 1992 from Cagayan de Oro, she learned from BBB and her daughter AAA that the latter had been raped by her husband;
that she again went to see BBB and asked for forgiveness and that the latter told her: "Hayaan mo na lang, umalis na lang kayo dito, kung ang
Dios nagpapatawad, tao pa kaya." Said witness also testified that she asked BBB if the accused Irvin Tadulan could just leave first while she
and their children would vacate the apartment unit on the coming Saturday, and BBB agreed; and that pursuant to said agreement, Irvin
Tadulan immediately left the apartment and she started packing their belongings and sent their children to Cagayan de Oro in the company
of her mother.

Adefa Tadulan further testified that on the night of 11 April 1992, her husband came home and upon learning that she had sent their children
to the province, he got angry and they had a violent quarrel. The noise created by the quarrel was heard by BBB who immediately called the
police; and on that same night, BBB and AAA lodged a complaint for rape against accused Irvin Tadulan despite the previous understanding
between BBB and Adefa Tadulan that BBB would not take action anymore against Irvin Tadulan.

Prior to the reception of evidence for the accused, his counsel filed a Motion to Plead Guilty to Lesser Offense[3] praying that accused be
allowed to plead guilty to the crime under Article 336, Revised Penal Code, denominated as Acts of Lasciviousness. No communication
having been received from the complainant with regard to said offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense, the trial proceeded for the reception
of evidence for the defense

After trial, the now appealed judgment was rendered by the lower court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged. The dispositive part of the decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, AND IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Court hereby finds accused IRVIN TADULAN guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby sentenced to the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessory penalties the law provides therefor.

Accused Irvin Tadulan is also hereby ordered to indemnify the offended minor girl, AAA in the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00),
with interest thereon at the legal rate of six per cent (6%) per annum from the filing of the complaint in this case until the same is fully paid.

SO ORDERED."[4]

In this appeal, accused Irvin Tadulan assigns the following errors to the trial court:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING EXCULPATORY WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE.

II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES MARKED AS THEY ARE
WITH INCONSISTENCIES AND IMPROBABILITIES WHICH CAST SERIOUS DOUBTS AS TO THEIR TRUTHFULNESS.

III

ASSUMING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S VERSION OF THE INCIDENT IS CORRECT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT
THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY PARDONED BY COMPLAINANTS.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.[5]

The issues raised by accused-appellant boil down to credibility of witnesses.

In rejecting the version of the accused-appellant, the trial court made the following findings and conclusions to which we agree.

"This Court finds, however, that the abovementioned testimonies of accused Irvin Tadulan and his witness cannot prevail over the more
convincing testimony of the rape victim, AAA, who positively identified the said accused as the one who raped her and described in a clear
and straightforward manner how she was sexually abused by him. In the absence of any clear showing of ill motive that might have impelled
her to impute the heinous crime of rape against the said accused, there is no reason to doubt the veracity of the declarations of the said
victim in court; for as held in a case (People vs. Camasis, 189 SCRA 649), 'it is hard to believe that a young unmarried woman would reveal
that she was deflowered and allow the examination of her private parts and thereafter permit herself to be the subject of public trial if her
motive was not to bring to justice the person who wronged her.' Also applicable here is the well-settled principle that 'alibi is unavailing as a
defense where there is positive identification of the perpetrator of the crime, most specially, when the said identification is made by the
victim of the rape herself in the absence of any motive to implicate the assailant' (People vs. Felipe, 191 SCRA 176, and cases therein cited).
Besides, it has been held time and time again, that for alibi to prosper as a defense the accused must show that he was so far away that he
could not have been physically present at the place of the crime, or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission (People vs. Tasurra,
192 SCRA 266). In this case, however, it is clear that accused Irvin Tadulan was not so situated on April 2, 1992, for according to him he was
at the plant of the Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation in xxx, Metro Manila -- which is but a few kilometers from Barangay xxx of the same
municipality where the crime was committed.

Relative to the defense of pardon or condonation also set up by accused Irvin Tadulan, his wife Adefa Tadulan testified that on April 7, 1992
when she arrived at their apartment unit from a trip from Cagayan de Oro City, she came to know from both BBB and her daughter, AAA, that
the latter has been raped by her husband; that she again met with BBB and asked for forgiveness; and that the said mother told her: 'Hayaan
mo na lang, umalis na lang kayo dito, kung ang Diyos ay nagpapatawad, tao pa kaya.' The said wife also testified that she asked BBB if her
husband could just leave first while she and their children could vacate the apartment unit on the coming Saturday, and BBB agreed; and that
pursuant to the said agreement Irvin Tadulan immediately left their house, after which she also sent their children to Cagayan de Oro City in
the company of her mother and then started packing-up their belongings. She further testified that on the night of April 11, 1992, however,
her husband came home and quarreled with her upon knowing that she had sent their children to the province; that because of the noise
their quarrel created, BBB called for the police; and that on that same night, BBB and her daughter lodged a complaint for rape against Irvin
Tadulan, despite the previous understanding between her and BBB that the latter would not anymore take any action against her husband.

It should be pointed out, however, as earlier narrated above, that according to BBB, she agreed not to file any complaint against Irvin Tadulan
upon the representation of his wife, Adefa Tadulan, that she had driven away her husband, and her promise that if he would ever return to
their apartment unit, she herself would call for the police; that she (BBB) noted, however, that Irvin Tadulan was still coming home to their
apartment unit every night; that she was prompted to call for police assistance because she saw Irvin Tadulan kicking the door of the
apartment during a violent quarrel with his wife on the night of April 11, 1992; and that because soon after policemen arrived at the place,
Adefa Tadulan herself informed them that her husband has raped AAA, she (BBB) and her said child proceeded with the filing of their
complaint for rape against Irvin Tadulan.

From the evidence just discussed, it would appear that the initial desistance of BBB from taking any action against Irvin Tadulan, was upon
the representation of the latter's wife Adefa Tadulan that she had driven away her husband, and her promise that should he ever come back
to their apartment unit she herself would call for the police; but that the said representation turn [sic] out to be untrue, and the promise was
not complied with because Irvin Tadulan was still coming home every night and, in fact, he and her [sic] wife had a violent quarrel in the
apartment unit on the night of April 11, 1992. Otherwise stated, the desistance was subject to certain conditions which were not complied
with, and for which reason BBB proceeded with the filing of a criminal complaint against Irvin Tadulan. Upon such circumstances, it is clear to
the mind of this Court that the complainant has not expressly pardoned the said accused.

Besides, there are authorities holding that pardon must be granted not only by the parents of an offended minor but also by the minor
herself in order to be effective as an express pardon under Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in the case of People vs. Lacson, Jr.,
(C.A.) 55 O.G. 9460, we find the following words: 'Neither must we be understood as supporting the view that the parents alone can extend a
valid pardon. Far from it, for we, too are of the belief that the pardon by the parents, standing alone, is inefficacious.' It was also held in
another case, that 'The express pardon of a person guilty of attempted abduction of a minor, granted by the latter's parents, is not sufficient
to remove criminal responsibility, but must be accompanied by the express pardon of the girl herself.' (U.S. vs. Luna, 1 Phil. 360)

In the present case, the supposed pardon of the accused was allegedly granted only by the mother (BBB) without the concurrence of the
offended minor, AAA. Hence, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the initial desistance of the said mother from taking any
action against the accused, constitutes pardon, it is clear that upon the authorities cited above, such pardon is ineffective without the express
concurrence of the offended minor herself.

In fine, this Court concludes that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused Irvin Tadulan of the crime of rape charged against him,
and that the defenses of alibi and pardon or condonation set up by him are lacking in merit."[6]

We have consistently held that appellate courts, as a rule, will not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses. We
have sustained trial courts in this respect, considering their vantage point in the evaluation of testimonial evidence, absent, of course, any
showing of serious error or irregularity that otherwise would alter the result of the case.[7] We find no such serious error or irregularity in the
case at bar.

Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court gravely erred when it disregarded the defense of alibi despite the overwhelming evidence that
the accused did not leave his place of work on 2 April 1992. According to the appellant, his immediate supervisor, Leandro Daguro, testified
that he (appellant) reported for work on 2 April 1992 and was assigned in a critical area, and being the only driver at that time a problem
would have ensued had he left his post at any given time on 2 April 1992. Appellant likewise faults the trial court when it observed that there
was no physical impossibility for him to be at xxx where the crime was committed because the court mainly focused its attention on the fact
that Barangay xxx is but a few kilometers away from Barangay xxx, both in xxx, hence, appellant could have returned to his place of work
after committing the crime at the time and place it occurred. Accused argues that the distance between the two barangays was never an
issue, that the question really is whether or not appellant left or could have left his work at the Republic Asahi Glass Corporation in Barangay
xxx and gone home to Barangay xxx in the morning of 2 April 1992.

We are not persuaded. The testimony of Leonardo Daguro that accused could not have left his work as this would have resulted in a big
problem at the area where appellant was working is too simple for comfort. The same witness testified that he could not remember if a
problem arose on that date when the crime was committed and that he was supervising an average of seventeen (17) men in different
sections of the raw material department so that he had to go around each section.

We quote with approval the following observation of the court a quo:

" x x x Besides, it has been held time and time again that for alibi to prosper as a defense the accused must show that he was so far away
that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime, or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission (People vs.
Tasurra, 192 SCRA 266). In this case, however, it is not so situated on April 2, 1992, for according to him he was at the plant of the Republic
Asahi Glass Corporation in Barangay xxx, Metro Manila -- which is but a few kilometers from Barangay xxx of the same municipality where the
crime was committed."[8]

Accused-appellant tries to discredit the victim's testimony by questioning her behavior after she was allegedly raped by the accused in
September 1991 in that she did not show any fear of the accused on 2 April 1992 when she was called by him. It should be borne in mind, in
this connection, that the victim was only a naive nine (9) year old child when the crime was committed on her. She considered the accused
as a friend, almost like a relative, as in fact she called him "Tito Loloy." She therefore unsuspectingly went near the accused when called by
the latter.

As we have stressed in a recent case -

" x x x it is not proper to judge the actions of children who have undergone traumatic experience by the norms of behavior expected under
the circumstances from mature people. The range of emotion shown by rape victims is yet to be captured even by the calculus. It is thus
unrealistic to expect uniform reactions from rape victims."[9]

The victim AAA was too young to totally comprehend the consequences of the dastardly act inflicted on her by the accused-appellant.

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General: "(A)s regards the acts imputed to BBB, the delay of seven (7) days from the date of her
knowledge of the rape incident on 4 April 1992 in reporting to the authorities the rape of her daughter is excusable. At that time, she was not
yet certain of the steps she would take considering the delicate nature of the problem they were facing" (citing People v. Danguilan, 218
SCRA 98;People v. Joaquin, Jr., 225 SCRA 179)." Besides, we have ruled that a delay in prosecuting the rape is not indicative of fabricated
charges.[10]

Finally, the accused's denial and alibi cannot prevail over his positive identification by the victim AAA as her rapist. AAA testified in a clear
and straightforward manner that appellant through force and intimidation and with use of a deadly weapon (kitchen knife), succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of her.[11]

As for the defense that BBB, as the mother of the victim BBB, expressly pardoned him, we sustain the trial court's finding which reads as
follows:

"From the evidence just discussed, it would appear that the initial desistance of BBB from taking any action against Irvin Tadulan, was upon
the representation of the latter's wife Adefa Tadulan that she had driven away her husband, and her promise that should he ever come back
to their apartment unit she herself would call for the police; but that the said representation turned out to be untrue, and the promise was
not complied with because Irvin Tadulan was still coming home every night and, in fact, he and her wife had a violent quarrel in the
apartment unit on the night of April 11, 1992. Otherwise stated, the desistance was subject to certain conditions which were not complied
with, and for which reason BBB proceeded with the filing of a criminal complaint against Irvin Tadulan. Upon such circumstances, it is clear to
the mind of this Court that the complainant has not expressly pardoned the said accused.

Besides, there are authorities holding that pardon must be granted not only by the parents of an offended minor but also by the minor
herself in order to be effective as an express pardon under Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in the case of People vs. Lacson, Jr.,
(C.A.) 55 O.G. 9460, we find the following words: 'Neither must we be understood as supporting the view that the parents alone can extend a
valid pardon. Far from it, for we, too are of the belief that the pardon by the parents, standing alone, is inefficacious.' It was also held in
another case, that 'The express pardon of a person guilty of attempted abduction of a minor, granted by the latter's parents, is not sufficient
to remove criminal responsibility, but must be accompanied by the express pardon of the girl herself.' (U.S. vs. Luna, 1 Phil. 360)

In the present case, the supposed pardon of the accused was allegedly granted only by the mother (BBB) without the concurrence of the
offended minor, AAA. Hence, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the initial desistance of the said mother from taking any
action against the accused, constitutes pardon, it is clear that upon the authorities cited above, such pardon is ineffective without the express
concurrence of the offended minor herself."[12]

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated 4 August 1994 in Criminal Case No. 92186 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch xxx of xxx, Metro
Manila, is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification as to the indemnity for the victim which is raised to P50,000.00 from P30,000.00 to conform
with prevailing jurisprudence including the recent case of People v. Romualdo Miranda y Geronimo, et al., G.R. No. 97425, 24 September
1996, where the victim was also a minor, as in the case at bar.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 135457. September 29, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE PATRIARCA, JR., alias "KA DJANGO," CARLOS NARRA, alias "KA JESSIE" and TEN (10)
JOHN DOES, accused-appellant.
DECISION

BUENA, J.:

Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., with the aliases of "Ka Django," "Carlos Narra" and "Ka Jessie," appeals the decision of the Regional Trial
Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 2773 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias 'Ka
Django,' 'Carlos Narra,' 'Ka Jessie,' and 21 John Does" convicting him of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.

On August 16, 1990, an information for murder was filed against Jose Patriarca, Jr., alias "Ka Django," "Carlos Narra", "Ka Jessie," et al.,
charging them of murder committed as follows:

"That on or about the 30th day of June, 1987 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening in the Municipality of Donsol, Province of Sorsogon,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, armed with guns, forcibly took away ALFREDO AREVALO from his residence and brought him to Sitio Abre, Mabini, Donsol,
Sorsogon, and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack,
assault and shoot ALFREDO AREVALO thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which directly caused his death to the damage and
prejudice of his legal heirs.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."

Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with Murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under
Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively.

Upon arraignment on November 25, 1993, accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Joint
trial of the three cases was conducted considering the substantial identity of the facts and circumstances of the case.

Prosecution witness Nonito Malto testified that on June 30, 1987, the accused, with ten (10) armed companions, requested permission to
rest in his house, which was granted. They had with them a person who was hogtied. Accused Patriarca asked that the lights in Malto's house
be extinguished and Malto complied.

Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of July 1, 1987, Malto was awakened by a gunshot. When he looked out, he saw Patriarca holding a
gun and ordering the person who was hogtied to lie down. After several minutes, Malto heard two gunshots. He then heard the accused
direct his companions to carry away the dead man.

Nonito Malto, later on, learned that the dead man was Alfredo Arevalo when Patriarca went back to his place, together with the military, on
March 29, 1990.

The skeletal remains of Alfredo Arevalo were recovered in the property of a Rubuang Tolosa and were identified by Elisa Arevalo, the mother
of the victim.

The second witness for the prosecution was Elisa Arevalo. She knew Patriarca, alias "Ka Django", as he told her on March 10, 1987 not to let
her son join the military. She, however, replied that they were only seeking employment. Her son Alfredo was her companion in attending to
their farm and he was a member of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) in their locality.

After she was informed by her tenant Alegria Moratelio Alcantara that her son was abducted by the New People's Army (NPA) led by
Patriarca, she reported the matter to the military and looked for him. She was informed by the residents of the place where the NPA passed,
that they saw her son hogtied, that her son even asked for drinking water, and complained that he was being maltreated by the NPA. After
three days of searching, a certain Walter Ricafort, an NPA member and a relative of hers, notified her that her son Alfredo was killed by Jose
Patriarca, Jr.
In the municipal building, Nonito Malto likewise informed her of her son's death in the hands of Ka Django. Consequently, a Death Certificate
was issued by the Local Civil Registrar.

When the skeletal remains of a man were recovered, she was able to identify them as belonging to her son by reason of the briefs found in
the burial site. Her son, Alfredo Arevalo, used to print his name on the waistband of his briefs so that it would not get lost.

The defense presented accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. and Francisco Derla who admitted that accused is a member of the NPA operating in
Donsol, Sorsogon, but denied ever abducting the victims in the three criminal cases filed against him.

On January 20, 1998, a decision was rendered convicting the accused and imposing the following penalty:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias Ka Django, alias Carlos Narra guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua
with all the accessory provided by law and to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim Alfredo Arevalo,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and as regards Crim. Case No. 2665 and Crim. Case No. 2672, for failure of the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, said Jose Patriarca alias Carlos Narra, Ka Django, is hereby acquitted.

"In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be given full credit of his period of detention.

"With cost de-oficio.

"SO ORDERED."[1]

Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant assigns the following lone error allegedly committed by the trial court:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER, AN OFFENSE COMMITTED IN PURSUANCE OR
IN FURTHERANCE OF REBELLION.

Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 amending Proclamation No. 347, dated March 25, 1994, entitled
"Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other
Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission." His
application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board. Attached to appellant's brief is the Notice of Resolution of the National
Amnesty Commission (NAC) dated November 17, 1999 which states:

"Quoted below is a resolution of the National Amnesty Commission dated 22 October 1998.[2]

'RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 refers to Application No. 02125 of MR. JOSE NARRA PATRIARCA filed with the Local Amnesty Board of Legazpi
City on 18 February 1997.

'Applicant admitted joining the NPA in 1977. He served under the Sandatahang Yunit Pampropaganda and participated in the following
armed activities:

'a) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay Hirawon, Donsol, Sorsogon on 14 February 1986;

'b) Encounter with elements of the Philippine Constabulary at Barangay Godon, Donsol, Sorsogon on 15 February 1986;
'c) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay Banwang, Gurang, Donsol, Sorsogon in 1987;

'd) Liquidation of ELMER CADAG an alleged military informer at Barangay Boroan, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 21 March 1987, in which a case of
Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;

'e) Liquidation of a certain RUDY DEBORJA, a thief and nuisance of the community, at Donsol, Sorsogon, on 09 March 1984, in which a case of
Murder in Criminal Case No. 2665 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;

'f) Liquidation of a certain ALEJANDRINO MILITANTE for his misconducts at San Antonio, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 12 February 1986, in which a
case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2664 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;

'g) Liquidation of a certain ALFREDO AREVALO, a former member of the CHDF at Sitio Abe (sic), Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 30 June 1987, in
which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;

'h) Liquidation of one DOMINGO DONQUILLO, a barangay captain, at Barangay Tinanogan, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 20 September 1986 in which
a (sic) Criminal Case No. 2663 was filed against him.

'After a careful verification and evaluation on (sic) the claims of the applicant, the Local Amnesty Board concluded that his activities were
done in the pursuit of his political beliefs. It thus recommended on 20 May 1998 the grant of his application for amnesty.

'The Commission, in its deliberation on the application on 22 October 1999, resolved to approve the recommendation of the Local Amnesty
Board.

'WHEREFORE, the application for amnesty of MR. JOSE NARRA PATRIARCA under Proclamation No. 724 is hereby GRANTED for rebellion
constituted by the acts detailed above, provided they were committed on or before the date he was captured on 22 June 1988. Let a
Certificate of Amnesty be issued in his favor as soon as this Resolution becomes final. It shall become final after the lapse of fifteen (15)
calendar days from receipt of this Notice, unless a Motion for Reconsideration is filed with the Commission by any party within said
period.'"[3]

On March 9, 2000, Hon. Alfredo F. Tadiar, Chairman of the National Amnesty Commission, wrote the following letter to the Provincial
Prosecutor of Sorsogon, Sorsogon:

"Notice of Amnesty Grant to Jose N. Patriarca"

"Pursuant to NAC Action No. 95-358-C, we are transmitting herewith the attached copy of RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 granting amnesty to
JOSE N. PATRIARCA. The grantee was accused of the following cases:

"1. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.

"2. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2665 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.

"3. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2664 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.

"4. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.

"5. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2663 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"He is currently detained at the Provincial Jail, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.

"The purpose of this transmittal is to provide you, as the chief prosecutor of the province, the opportunity to take whatever action you may
deem appropriate from receipt of this note. This grant of amnesty shall become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt
of this Notice, unless a Motion for Reconsideration is filed with the Commission by any party within said period.

"Thank you for your continued support for the Peace Process."[4]

The Office of the Solicitor General, in its letter dated June 23, 2000 to the National Amnesty Commission, requested information as to
whether or not a motion for reconsideration was filed by any party, and the action, if there was any, taken by the NAC.[5]

In his reply dated June 28, 2000, NAC Chairman Tadiar wrote, among other things, that there has been no motion for reconsideration filed by
any party.[6]

Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. was granted amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 dated May 17, 1996. It amended Proclamation No.
347 dated March 25, 1994.

Section 1 of Proclamation No. 724 reads thus:

"Section 1. Grant of Amnesty. - Amnesty is hereby granted to all persons who shall apply therefor and who have or may have committed
crimes, on or before June 1, 1995, in pursuit of their political beliefs, whether punishable under the Revised Penal Code or special laws,
including but not limited to the following: rebellion or insurrection; coup d'etat; conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, insurrection, or
coup d'etat; disloyalty of public officers or employees; inciting to rebellion or insurrection; sedition; conspiracy to commit sedition; inciting to
sedition; illegal assembly; illegal association; direct assault; indirect assault; resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or agents of
such person; tumults and other disturbances of public order; unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances; alarms and
scandals; illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives, committed in furtherance of, incident to, or in connection with the
crimes of rebellion and insurrection; and violations of Articles 59 (desertion), 62 (absence without leave), 67 (mutiny or sedition), 68 (failure
to suppress mutiny or sedition), 94 (various crimes), 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman), and 97 (general article) of the
Articles of War; Provided, That the amnesty shall not cover crimes against chastity and other crimes for personal ends."

Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one
sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations.[7] Amnesty looks backward, and
abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.[8]

Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely
extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.

In the case of People vs. Casido,[9] the difference between pardon and amnesty is given:

"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because
the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of
which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after
conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it
abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does 'not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,' and it 'in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence' (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts
into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty
stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense."
This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective.
It serves to put an end to the appeal.[10]

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 in Criminal Case No.
2773 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.

Pursuant to Resolution No. D-99-8683,[11] Criminal Case Nos. 2663 and 2664, which are both filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon,[12] are ordered DISMISSED. The release of Jose N. Patriarca who is presently detained at the Provincial Jail of Sorsogon
is likewise ORDERED unless he is being detained for some other legal cause.

The Director of Prisons is ordered to report within ten (10) days his compliance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., G.R. No. 167571

Petitioner,

Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,

Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA,

VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

RAMON C. TONGSON and

RODRIGO G. CAWILI, Promulgated:

Respondents.
November 25, 2008

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review[1] of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119,
which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.s (petitioners) petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for reconsideration.[2]

The facts, as culled from the records, follow.

In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and
his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans.
Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the
checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the
amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.[3]

On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson[4] for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)[5] before
the Quezon City Prosecutors Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.[6] Tongson
claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latters personal
capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of his services, he was
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawilis business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several
criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his
signatures on the said checks had been falsified.

To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongsons signatures, which were purportedly the same as the
those appearing on the checks.[7] He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawilis
business associate.[8]

In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,[9] City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the
charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed
before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,[10] after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced
checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer
the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.

On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without
referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutors resolution. In her resolution,[11] ACP Sampaga held that the case had already
prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended,[12] which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4)
years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The
filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the
law contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had
already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already
prescribed.[13] Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be
sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not
the investigating prosecutor.[14] Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner.[15]

Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense
had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.[16] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003,[17]
the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not
prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutors office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan.[18] Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three (3) separate informations against
Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.[19] On 8 July 2003, the City Prosecutors Office filed an information[20] charging petitioner with three (3)
counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.[21]

However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,[22] the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that
the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against
Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a
prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it
defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses
penalized thereunder.[23] The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,[24] wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings
referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, and not the one before the prosecutors office.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari[25] before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition
was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioners failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum

shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached to the petition is a mere photocopy.[26]
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate courts resolution, attaching to said motion an amended Verification/Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping.[27] Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion, stating that subsequent compliance with the formal
requirements would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals added, the petition is patently
without merit and the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.[28]

In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and
in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.

The DOJ, in its comment,[29] states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the Rules of
Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of
the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its own
prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari. They
claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they claim that the long delay,
attributable to petitioner and the State, violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.[30]

The petition is meritorious.

First on the technical issues.

Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals substantially complies with the rules, the
verification being intended simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not a product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a number of cases that a deficiency in the verification can be
excused or dispensed with, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. [31]

Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and
correctthe court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules in order
that the ends of justice may be served,[32] as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by attaching the pertinent verification to his
motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with the verification requirement.

Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that there was failure to attach a certified
true copy or duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the petition before the

Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004,[33] a certified true copy of which was
attached as Annex A.[34] Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed a grievous mistake.

Now, on the substantive aspects.

Petitioner assails the DOJs reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,[35] a case involving the violation of a municipal ordinance, in declaring that the
prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the information in court. According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan,[36] wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office for preliminary investigation suspends the
running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner notes.[37] He argues that sustaining the DOJs and the
Court of Appeals pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his
control.[38]
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own
prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:

SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:
(a) x x x; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x

SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not
less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4)
years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot
uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was
conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment,[39] and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary
investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.[40]
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating.[41] Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December 1926 at a time
when the function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the
prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada[42] and People v. Joson,[43] is that the prescription of the offense is tolled
once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the

institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused.[44] These cases were followed by our declaration in People v. Parao and
Parao[45] that the first step taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends
the prescription of the offense.[46] Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,[47] we held that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court,
even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the
criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In addition, even if the
court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of
the proceedings against the offender,[48] and hence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted.

In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan[49] and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,[50] which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the

prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more recent case
of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al.,[51] the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the
investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act,[52] another special law, is
equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.

The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case[53] is instructive, thus:

While it may be observed that the term judicial proceedings in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before investigation and punishment in the old
law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive
function of the executive branch, the term proceedings should now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it
involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative
proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.[54]
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his
control.[55] A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-
year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against

Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit
with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9)
years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioners control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as
early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJs flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer
unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accuseds delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of
the investigating agencies.

We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner s filing of his complaintaffidavit before the Office of the City
Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of
probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is
ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION G.R. NO. 140231

ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

(PCGG), represented by ORLANDO

L. SALVADOR,

Petitioner,

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO, and

NACHURA, JJ.

HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO,

Office of the Ombudsman-Manila,

CONCERNED MEMBERS OF THE PNB

BOARD OF DIRECTORS,

REYNALDO TUASON, CARLOS

CAJELO, JOSE BARQUILLO, JR.,

LORETO SOLSONA, PRIMICIAS

BANAGA, JOHN DOES, and

NORTHERN COTABATO SUGAR

INDUSTRIES, INC. (NOCOSII), Promulgated:

Respondents. July 9, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

The Presidential Commission on Good Government[1] (petitioner) filed the herein Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Resolution[2] dated May 21, 1999 of Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto in OMB No. 0-95-0890 which dismissed petitioner's
criminal complaint for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019[3] against concerned members of Philippine National
Bank (PNB) Board of Directors and Northern Cotabato Sugar Industries, Inc. (NOCOSII) officers, namely: Reynaldo Tuason, Carlos Cajelo, Jose
Barquillo, Jr., Loreto Solsona, Primicias Banaga and John Does (respondents); and the Order[4] dated July 23, 1999 which denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration.

The facts:

On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which was tasked to inventory all behest loans, determine the parties involved and recommend
whatever appropriate actions to be pursued thereby.

On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding the functions of the Committee to include the
inventory and review of all non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest.
The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a behest loan, to wit: a) it is undercollaterized; b) the borrower
corporation is undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal notes; d) the
stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose
intended; f) the use of corporate layering; g) the non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and, h) the extraordinary
speed in which the loan release was made.

Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working Group (TWG) were the loan transactions between NOCOSII and PNB.

After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan transactions, the Committee classified the loans obtained by
NOCOSII from PNB as behest because of NOCOSIIs insufficient capital and inadequate collaterals. Specifically, the Committee's investigation
revealed that in 1975, NOCOSII obtained loans by way of Stand-By Letters of Credit from the PNB; that NOCOSII was able to get 155% loan
value from the offered collateral or an excess of 85% from the required percentage limit; that the plant site offered as one of the collaterals
was a public land contrary to the General Banking Act; that by virtue of the marginal note of then President Marcos in the letter of Cajelo,
NOCOSII was allowed to use the public land as plant site and to dispense with the mortgage requirement of PNB; that NOCOSII's paid-up
capital at the time of the approval of the guaranty was only P2,500,000.00 or only about 6% of its obligation.

Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the criminal
complaint against respondents. Petitioner alleges that respondents violated the following provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx

e. Causing undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.

xxx
g. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or
not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the the Ombudsman, prompting Graft Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda S.
Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the case based on the available evidence.

In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95-0890, GIO Diaz-Salcedo recommended the dismissal of the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against the respondents and for prescription of the offense. Ombudsman Desierto
approved the recommendation on May 21, 1999.[5]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[6] but it was denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the Order dated July 9, 1999, which was approved
by Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999.[7]

Forthwith, petitioner elevated the case to this Court and in support of its petition alleges that:

A) The Respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint filed by
the Petitioner on the ground of Prescription considering that:

1. THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO RECOVER BEHEST LOANS AS ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE UNDER ARTICLE XI, SECTION 15, OF
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;

2. PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT RUN IN FAVOR OF A TRUSTEE TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE BENEFICIARY;

3. THE OFFENSES CHARGED ARE IN THE NATURE OF CONTINUING CRIMES AS THE STATE CONTINUES TO SUFFER INJURY ON EACH DAY OF
DEFAULT IN PAYMENT. HENCE, PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT APPLY;

4. PRESCRIPTION AS A MATTER OF DEFENSE MUST BE PLEADED, OTHERWISE, IT IS DEEMED WAIVED;

5. PRESCRIPTION HAS NOT BEEN INVOKED IN THIS CASE. SINCE IT MAY BE WAIVED OR MAY NOT BE SET IN DEFENSE, THE OMBUDSMAN
CANNOT MOTU PROPRIO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION;

6. ARTICLE 91 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH ADOPTS THE DISCOVERY RULE SHALL APPLY IN THIS CASE;

7. THE LOAN CONTRACT AS OTHER LOAN TRANSACTIONS IN THE NATURE OF BEHEST LOANS ARE KEPT SECRET.[8]

B) The respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in not finding that a probable cause
exists for violation by the private respondents of section 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019 despite the presence of clear, overwhelming and unrebutted
evidence.[9]

In its Comment, the Ombudsman, without delving on the issue of prescription, in view of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto (1999),[10] contends that its finding of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against respondents
deserves great weight and respect, and must be accorded full weight and credit.

No comment was filed by the rest of the respondents.

The issue before the Court is whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that: (a) the offense leveled against
respondents has prescribed; and (b) no probable cause exists against respondents.

The petition is partly meritorious.

Respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the subject complaint on the ground of prescription.
Respondents members of the PNB Board of Directors and Officers of NOCOSII are charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019, a special law.
Amending said law, Section 4, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195,[11] increased the prescriptive period from ten to fifteen years.

The applicable law in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326,[12] as amended, which provides:

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same not be known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

The issue of prescription has long been laid to rest in the aforementioned Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto,[13] where the Court held:

x x x it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned
transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans. Thus,
we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should
be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.

The assertion by the Ombudsman that the phrase if the same not be known in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 does not mean lack of knowledge
but that the crime is not reasonably knowable is unacceptable, as it provides an interpretation that defeats or negates the intent of the law,
which is written in a clear and unambiguous language and thus provides no room for interpretation but only application.[14]

The Court reiterated the above ruling in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (2001),[15] thus:

In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 Edsa Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions
were made (PCGG vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 140232, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 767; Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, supra, Note 14; Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, supra, Note 16). Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality of
those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an
exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.
As to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the second paragraph of Section 2, Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that
prescription is interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.[16]

Records show that the act complained of was discovered in 1992. The complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman on April 5,
1995,[17] or within three (3) years from the time of discovery. Thus, the filing of the complaint was well within the prescriptive period of 15
years.

On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that no probable cause exists against respondents, it
must be stressed that the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate
courts.[18] Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.[19] Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional
mandate[20] and the courts will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in
much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time
they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[21]

While there are certain instances when this Court may intervene in the prosecution of cases, such as, (1) when necessary to afford adequate
protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority; (5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where
the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges are
manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion
to quash on that ground has been denied,[22] none apply here.

After examination of the records and the evidence presented by petitioner, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the
Ombudsman.

No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Ombudsman. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.[23] The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[24]

The disquisition of GIO Diaz-Salcedo, in dismissing the criminal complaint, as approved by Ombudsman Desierto, is worth-quoting, thus:
Taking into consideration the provisions of Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61, the subject transactions can not be
classified as behest.

Evaluation of the records of this case reveals that the loans acquired by NOCOSII are actually foreign loans from Midland Bank Ltd. of London.
There were no direct loans released by PNB but merely credit accommodations to guaranty the loans from Midland Bank.

Anent complainant's claim that the collaterals offered by NOCOSII are insufficient, it should be noted that under PNB Board Resolution No.
689 dated July 30, 1975, one of the conditions imposed to NOCOSII was the execution of contract assigning all NOCOSII's share of sugar and
molasses to PNB. NOCOSII was also required to increase its paid up capital at P5,000,000.00 a year starting April 30, 1976 up to April 30, 1980
or a total of P25,000,000.00. In addition thereto, the stockholders of NOCOSII were required to pledge or assign all their present and future
shares to PNB while the accommodation remains standing. The proposed plant site which was offered as collateral was estimated to cost
P307,903,000.00. The foregoing collaterals offered by NOCOSII are more than sufficient to cover the loans of P333,465,260.00.

Furthermore, since the loan was approved by PNB, it presupposes that all the required clearances were submitted by NOCOSII including the
clearance from the Office of the President; and having complied with all the documentary requirements, NOCOSII became entitled to the
release of the loan.

Complainant further alleged that NOCOSII was undercapitalized because its paid up capital was only P50,000,000.00. Complainant, however,
failed to consider the other assets of NOCOSII which also form part of its capital. x x x[25]

The finding of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause by the Ombudsman is borne out by the evidence presented by petitioner:
firstly, there were no direct loans released by PNB but merely credit accommodations to guaranty NOCOSII's foreign loans from Midland Bank
Ltd. of London; secondly, NOCOSII effectively came under government control since 1975 when PNB acquired a majority of the voting rights
in NOCOSII and was given the power to appoint a comptroller therein; thirdly, PNB's credit accommodations to NOCOSII between 1975 and
1981 in the aggregate sum of P333,465,260.00 were sufficiently secured by: (1) the Assignment of Subscription Rights and/or Pledge of
Shares dated September 5, 1975 whereby NOCOSII officers pledged their shares of stock, representing 90% of NOCOSII's subscribed capital
stock, and assigned their subscription rights to future stocks in favor of PNB;[26] (2) the Deed of Assignment dated September 5, 1975
whereby NOCOSII assigned its share of sugar and molasses from the operation of its sugar central located at Barrio Mateo, Matalam, North
Cotabato in favor of PNB;[27] (3) the Joint and Solidary Agreement dated September 5, 1975 whereby the NOCOSII officers bound themselves
jointly and severally liable with the corporation for the payment of NOCOSII's obligations to PNB;[28] (4) the Real Estate Mortgage dated
October 2, 1981 whereby NOCOSII mortgaged various buildings, machineries and equipments, otherwise known as the NOCOSII Sugar Mill
Plant, with an estimated value of P307,593,000.00 in favor of PNB;[29] and (5) the Chattel Mortgage with Power of Attorney dated October 2,
1981 whereby NOCOSII mortgaged various transportation, agricultural and heavy equipment in favor of the PNB;[30] fourthly, PNB imposed
other conditions, such as, (1) the submission by NOCOSII of the Central Bank's approval of its foreign loans; (2) the submission by NOCOSII of
the required clearances from the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) and/or Presidential Committee on Sugar Industry
(PHILSUGIN); (3) submission by NOCOSII of its milling contracts covering a total area of not less than 14,000 hectares; (4) submission by
NOCOSII of the government permit that the planters can cultivate the required hectarage; (5) further increase in NOCOSII's total paid-in
capital to P25,000,000.00 at P5,000,000.00 a year starting April 30, 1976 up to April 30, 1980; (6) deposit in NOCOSII's account with the PNB
of all cash proceeds of NOCOSII's foreign loans the disposition of which shall be subject to the bank's control; and, (7) designation by the PNB
of its own representatives in NOCOSII's Board of Directors and its own comptroller who shall have the authority to control all disbursements
and receipts of funds of NOCOSII.[31]
The herein assailed Orders being supported by substantial evidence, there is no basis for the Court to exercise its supervisory powers over the
ruling of the Ombudsman. As long as substantial evidence supports the Ombudsmans ruling, that decision will not be overturned.[32]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Except as to prescription, the assailed Resolution dated May 21, 1999 and Order dated July 23, 1999
of the Ombudsman in OMB No. 0-95-0890 are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, G.R. No. 158131

Petitioner,

Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,

Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA, and

VELASCO, JR., JJ.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

JOSE V. MARTEL, OLGA S.

MARTEL, and SYSTEMS AND Promulgated:

ENCODING CORPORATION,

Respondents. August 8, 2007

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review[1] filed by the Social Security System (petitioner) of the Decision[2] dated 17 October 2002 and Resolution dated
5 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals. The Decision of 17 October 2002 affirmed the ruling of the Department of Justice (DOJ) dismissing
petitioners complaint against respondents Jose V. Martel, Olga S. Martel and five other individuals[3] for violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in
relation to Section 28(e) of Republic Act No. 1161 (RA 1161),[4] as amended by Republic Act No. 8282 (RA 8282),[5] for non-remittance of
contributions to petitioner. The 5 May 2003 Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

Respondents Jose V. Martel and Olga S. Martel (respondent Martels) are directors of respondent Systems and Encoding Corporation
(SENCOR), an information technology firm, with respondent Jose V. Martel serving as Chairman of the Board of Directors. Petitioner is a
government-owned and controlled corporation mandated by its charter, RA 1161, to provide financial benefits to private sector employees.
SENCOR is covered by RA 1161, as amended by RA 8282, Section 22 of which requires employers like SENCOR to remit monthly contributions
to petitioner representing the share of the employer and its employees.

In 1998, petitioner filed with the Pasay City Prosecutors Office a complaint against respondent Martels and their five co-accused (docketed as
I.S. No. 98-L-1534) for SENCORs non-payment of contributions amounting to P6,936,435.80 covering the period January 1991 to May 1997.
To pay this amount, respondent Martels offered to assign to petitioner a parcel of land in Tagaytay City covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 26340 issued under respondent Martels name. Petitioner accepted the offer subject to the condition that x x x [respondent Martels]
will x x x settle their obligation either by way of dacion en pago or through cash settlement within a reasonable time x x x.[6] Thus, petitioner
withdrew its complaint from the Pasay City Prosecutors Office but reserved its right to revive the same in the event that no settlement is
arrived at. Accordingly, the Pasay City Prosecutors Office dismissed I.S. No. 98-L-1534.

In December 2001, respondent Jose V. Martel wrote petitioner offering, in lieu of the Tagaytay City property, computer-related services. The
record does not disclose petitioners response to this new offer but on 7 December 2001, petitioner filed with the Pasay City Prosecutors
Office another complaint against respondent Martels and their five co-accused (docketed as I.S. No. 00-L-7142) for SENCORs non-remittance
of contributions, this time from February 1991 to October 2000 amounting to P21,148,258.30.

In their counter-affidavit, respondent Martels and their co-accused alleged that petitioner is estopped from holding them criminally liable
since petitioner had accepted their offer to assign the Tagaytay City property as payment of SENCORs liability. Thus, according to the accused,
the relationship between SENCOR and petitioner was converted into an ordinary debtor-creditor relationship through novation.

The Ruling of the Pasay City Prosecutors Office

In the Resolution of 28 February 2001, Pasay City Assistant Prosecutor Artemio Puti (Prosecutor Puti) found probable cause to indict
respondent Martels for violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in relation to Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as amended by RA 8282.[7] Prosecutor Puti
rejected respondent Martels claim of negation of criminal liability by novation, holding that (1) SENCORs criminal liability was already
consummated before respondent Martels offered to pay SENCORs liability and (2) the dacion en pago involving the Tagaytay City property
did not materialize. Prosecutor Puti noted that respondent Martels did not dispute petitioners claim on SENCORs non-remittance of
contributions.[8] Accordingly, the Pasay City Prosecutors Office filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City the corresponding
Information against respondent Martels, docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-0517.

Respondent Martels appealed to the DOJ.

The Ruling of the Department of Justice

In the Resolution dated 18 May 2001 signed by DOJ Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, the DOJ granted respondent Martels appeal, set
aside Prosecutor Putis Resolution of 28 February 2001, and ordered the withdrawal of the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 01-0517. The
DOJ found that respondent Martels and petitioner entered into a compromise agreement before the filing of the Information in Criminal Case
No. 01-0517 and that such negated any criminal liability on respondent Martels part. The DOJ Resolution pertinently reads:
From the facts obtaining, it cannot be denied that the dismissal of the first complaint docketed as I.S. No. 98-L-1534 constituted the
compromise agreement between the parties whereby complainant SSS agreed to respondents mode of settling their liability through a
dacion en pago. Consequently, the original relation between the parties was converted to that of an ordinary creditor-debtor relationship
thereby extinguishing the original obligation by a new one. Complainant, therefore, cannot insist on the original trust it had with respondents
existing prior to the dismissal of the former complaint (I.S. No. 98-L-1534) by filling [sic] the present complaint (I.S. No. 00-L-7142 now subject
of this appeal). Incidentally, this Office considers the latter complaint as a mere refilling [sic] of the former already compromised and
dismissed [complaint], because of the similarity of the parties and causes of action.

After the dismissal of the complaint in I.S. No. 98-L-1534 and prior to the filing of the complaint at bar docketed as 00-L-7142, respondents
have exerted great effort towards complying with the terms and conditions of the compromise by way of dacion en pago. For example,
respondents cite their arrangement for ocular inspection of the Tagaytay land by the Presidential Commission on Tagaytay-Taal and with the
Municipal Engineer of Laurel, Batangas. The approval of the said commission to build a 12-storey building had been complied with. This is not
disputed by complainant. Access roads were acquired by respondents from adjacent owners, ready to be titled in complainants name. Papers
and permits like ecological impact certification, site resurvey, soil test and site appraisal were secured from various offices like the
Municipality of Laurel, the Municipal Engineer, the Presidential Commission on Tagaytay-Taal, the Philippine Volcanology Commission, the
Bureau of Lands and the Department of Agriculture, among others.

On the part of complainant, it equally shows [sic] adherence to the agreement to compromise. Records show that on October 1999, one of its
officers, Atty. Mariano Pablo S. Tolentino, assistant vice-president, had expressed in writing his finding to the effect that (they) are satisfied to
see the lot that (respondents) have negotiated with Congressman Dumpit that (respondents) offered as access road to (respondents[])
property (Annex 8 of Petition for Review). And, as borne by the records, a Dacion En Pago Committee had been created by complainant SSS
precisely to set the mechanism of the settlement in motion. Further, respondents proposed an alternative mode of settlement through
computer-related services, which proposal was submitted to complainant as late as December 1, 2000.

Verily, the foregoing facts indelibly show that the parties had acted with an obvious intention to compromise. Hence, respondents reliance
on the doctrine of incipient criminal liability had [sic] factual and legal bases. While the rule provides that novation does not extinguish
criminal liability, this rule, however holds true only if a criminal information is already filed in court. Before that bench mark point, the
criminal liability is only at its incipient stage and the new relation between the parties forged at such stage had the effect of negating the
criminal liability of the offender (People vs. Galsim, People vs. Trinidad, 53 OG 731). x x x x

In fine, the compromise agreement between the parties whereby respondents obligation will be settled through a dacion en pago and the
dismissal of the complaint in I.S. No. 98-L-1534 has [sic] all the earmarks of novation negating respondents criminal liability. Ergo,
complainant is precluded from filing the present criminal complaint against respondents.[9]

Petitioner sought reconsideration but the DOJ denied its motion in the Resolution of 20 September 2001.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision of 17 October 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the DOJs rulings and dismissed petitioners petition. The appellate court
deferred to the DOJs power to review rulings of prosecutors and held that in reversing Prosecutor Putis findings, the DOJ did not act with
grave abuse of discretion.[10]

Petitioner sought reconsideration but the appellate court denied its motion in the Resolution of 5 May 2003.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the DOJs rulings because (1) respondent Martels were
charged not with Estafa but with violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in relation to Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as amended, a special law
impressed with public interest; (2) petitioner did not agree to settle respondent Martels criminal liability; and (3) novation serves only to
negate civil, but not criminal, liability.

In their Comment, respondent Martels countered that the DOJ correctly applied the concept of novation as they had settled SENCORs
liability. Respondent Martels added that as of the filing of their Comment, they had already paid P17,887,442.54 of SENCORs liability.

In its Reply, petitioner contended that although respondent Martels attempted to pay SENCORs overdue contributions through dacion en
pago, no payment took place, as evidenced by respondent Martels alternative offer to provide computer related services to petitioner
instead of assigning the Tagaytay City realty. On respondent Martels partial payment of SENCORs liability, petitioner contended that such
does not preclude the resolution of this petition.

The Issue
The issue is whether the concept of novation serves to abate the prosecution of respondent Martels for violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in
relation to Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as amended.

The Ruling of the Court

We rule in the negative and accordingly grant the petition.

The Concept of Novation Finds No Application Here

Novation, a civil law concept relating to the modification of obligations,[11] takes place when the parties to an existing contract execute a
new contract which either changes the object or principal condition of the original contract, substitutes the person of the debtor, or
subrogates a third person in the rights of the creditor.[12] The effect is either to modify or extinguish the original contract. In its extinctive
form, the new obligation replaces the original, extinguishing the obligors obligations under the old contract.[13]

This Court first recognized the possibility of applying the concept of novation to criminal cases in People v. Nery,[14] involving a case for
Estafa. In that case, the Court observed that although novation is not one of the means recognized by the Revised Penal Code to extinguish
criminal liability,[15] it may prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original basic transaction, provided
the novation takes place before the filing of the Information with the trial court. We held:

The novation theory may perhaps apply prior to the filing of the criminal information in court by the state prosecutors because up to that
time the original trust relation may be converted by the parties into an ordinary creditor-debtor situation, thereby placing the complainant in
estoppel to insist on the original trust. But after the justice authorities have taken cognizance of the crime and instituted action in court, the
offended party may no longer divest the prosecution of its power to exact the criminal liability, as distinguished from the civil. The crime
being an offense against the state, only the latter can renounce it x x x.
It may be observed in this regard that novation is not one of the means recognized by the Penal Code whereby criminal liability can be
extinguished; hence, the role of novation may only be to either prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt on the true nature of the
original basic transaction, whether or not it was such that its breach would not give rise to penal responsibility, as when money loaned is
made to appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to x x x.[16] (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, novation has been invoked to reverse convictions in cases where an underlying contract initially defined the relation of the parties such
as the contract in sale on commission in Estafa cases[17] or the contract in sale of goods in cases of violation of the Trust Receipts Law.[18]
Further, the party invoking novation must prove that the new contract did indeed take effect.[19]

The facts of this case negate the application of novation. In the first place, there is, between SENCOR and petitioner, no original contract that
can be replaced by a new contract changing the object or principal condition of the original contract, substituting the person of the debtor, or
subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. The original relationship between SENCOR and petitioner is defined by law RA 1161,
as amended which requires employers like SENCOR to make periodic contributions to petitioner under pain of criminal prosecution. Unless
Congress enacts a law further amending RA 1161 to give employers a chance to settle their overdue contributions to prevent prosecution, no
amount of agreements between petitioner and SENCOR (represented by respondent Martels) can change the nature of their relationship and
the consequence of SENCORs non-payment of contributions.

The indispensability of a prior contractual relation between the complainant and the accused as requisite for the application of novation in
criminal cases was underscored in People v. Tanjutco.[20] In that case, the accused, who was charged with Qualified Theft, invoked People v.
Nery to support his claim that the complainants acceptance of partial payment of the stolen funds before the filing of the Information with
the trial court converted his liability into a civil obligation thus rendering baseless his prosecution. The Court rejected this claim and held that
unlike in Nery, there was, in that case, no prior contractual relationship or bilateral agreement, which can be modified or altered by the
parties, thus:

Reliance on the aforecited Nery case, in support of the contention that the acceptance by complainant of payment converted the liability of
the accused-appellant into a civil obligation or else that it estopped said complainant from proceeding with the prosecution of the case, is
misplaced and unwarranted.

[I]n the Nery case, which is an action for estafa, there was contractual relationship between the parties that can be validly novated by the
settlement of the obligation of the offender. Whatever was said in that case, therefore, cannot be invoked in the present case where no
contractual relationship or bilateral agreement, which can be modified or altered by the parties, is involved. There is here merely a taking of
the complainants property by one who never acquired juridical possession thereof, qualified by grave abuse of confidence.[21] (Italicization
in the original; boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, there is here merely an employers failure to pay its contributions to a government corporation as mandated by that corporations
charter.

Secondly, as Prosecutor Puti correctly noted, the agreement between petitioner and respondent Martels for the latter to pay SENCORs
overdue contributions through the assignment to petitioner of a piece of realty never materialized. Petitioners acceptance of respondent
Martels offer was subject to a suspensive condition that x x x [private] respondents will x x x settle their obligation either by way of dacion en
pago or through cash settlement within a reasonable time x x x. This condition was not met because three years after respondent Martels
offer, petitioner did not receive any payment. In fact, respondent Jose Martel, at that point, changed the terms of the supposed settlement
by offering computer-related services instead of assigning the Tagaytay City realty. In their Comment to the petition, respondent Martels
explained that they made such alternative offer because the processing of the papers for the Tagaytay property met with some delay.[22] In
short, respondent Martels failed to make good on their promise in 1998 to settle SENCORs liability through dacion en pago. The
circumstances the DOJ cited as proof of the compromise agreements alleged implementation were nothing but steps preparatory to the
actual payment of SENCORs overdue contributions.

In sum, we hold that any payment respondent Martels would have made to petitioner (and it appears that pending this petition, respondent
Martels partially paid SENCORs liability) only affects their civil, if any, but not their criminal liability for violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in
relation to Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as amended. As noted in the Resolution dated 28 February 2001 of the Pasay City Prosecutors Office,
respondent Martels do not dispute SENCORs non-remittance of contributions from February 1991 to October 2000. Thus, the existence of
probable cause against respondent Martels, SENCORs directors,[23] is beyond doubt.

Prosecutors Findings Not Conclusive

In dismissing petitioners petition, the Court of Appeals held:

[T]his Court has no power to determine whether probable cause to warrant prosecution exist or not. x x x [T]he determination of whether or
not probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in court of [respondent Martels] should be consigned and entrusted to the Department
of Justice as reviewer of the findings of the public prosecutor x x x.

In this Petition, We are being asked to assume the function of Public Prosecutor by determining whether probable cause exists or not. Such is
a function that this Court should not be called upon to perform x x x.[24]
This is a misstatement of the law. This Court and the Court of Appeals possess the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary
investigations.[25] Although policy considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to the prosecutors findings,[26] courts should
never shirk from exercising their power, when the circumstances warrant, to determine whether the prosecutors findings are supported by
the facts, or as in this case, by the law. In so doing, courts do not act as prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary, exercising their mandate
under the Constitution, relevant statutes, and remedial rules to settle cases and controversies. Indeed, the exercise of this Courts review
power ensures that, on the one hand, probable criminals are prosecuted[27] and, on the other hand, the innocent are spared from baseless
prosecution.[28]

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision dated 17 October 2002 and Resolution dated 5 May 2003 of the Court of
Appeals. We REINSTATE the Resolution dated 28 February 2001 of the Pasay City Prosecutors Office.

SO ORDERED.

BENJAMIN (KOKOY) T. G.R. Nos. 165510-33

ROMUALDEZ,

Petitioner, Present:

Quisumbing,

- versus - Ynares-Santiago,

Carpio, and

Azcuna, JJ.

HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO,

in his official capacity as the Ombudsman,

and PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION

ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, Promulgated:

Respondents.

July 28, 2006

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

For resolution is petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[1] assailing the Decision dated September 23, 2005, the dispositive portion of which
states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions dated July 12, 2004 and September 6, 2004 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[2]

Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him
for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the
aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of
prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before
the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal
Case Nos. 04-23185704-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.

In its Comment,[3] the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that
petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution; that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable
cause in the conduct of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the
petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment[4] that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of
1989, the Omdudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the
alleged offenses of the petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For
Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether
prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the
negative, should be applied.

The issues for resolution are: (1) whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429
was a nullity; and (2) whether the offenses for which petitioner are being charged have already prescribed.

Anent the first issue, we reiterate our ruling in the assailed Decision that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 is a valid proceeding despite the previous dismissal thereof by the Sandiganbayan in its Minute Resolution[5]
dated February 10, 2004 which reads:

Crim. Cases Nos. 13406-13429PEO. vs. BENJAMIN T. ROMUALDEZ

Considering that the Decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. 143618-41, entitled Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez vs. The
Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division, et al.) promulgated on July 30, 2002 annulled and set aside the orders issued by this Court on June
8, 2000 which, among others, denied the accuseds motion to quash the informations in these cases; that in particular the above-mentioned
Decision ruled that the herein informations may be quashed because the officer who filed the same had no authority to do so; and that the
said Decision has become final and executory on November 29, 2002, these cases are considered DISMISSED. Let these cases be sent to the
archives.

The aforesaid dismissal was effected pursuant to our ruling in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan[6] where petitioner assailed the Sandiganbayans
Order dated June 8, 2000 in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 which denied his Motion to Quash, terminated the preliminary investigation
conducted by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero and set his arraignment for violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 on June 26, 2000.[7] In annulling
and setting aside the aforesaid Order of the Sandiganbayan, we held that:

In the case at bar, the flaw in the information is not a mere remediable defect of form, as in Pecho v. Sandiganbayan where the wording of
the certification in the information was found inadequate, or in People v. Marquez, where the required certification was absent. Here, the
informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect cannot be cured even by conducting another preliminary investigation. An
invalid information is no information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings.[8]

In effect, we upheld in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan[9] petitioners Motion to Quash and directed the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-
13429 because the informations were filed by an unauthorized party, hence void.
In such a case, Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court is pertinent and applicable. Thus:

SEC. 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution; exception. An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a
bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 3(g) and (i)[10] of this Rule.

An order sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy does not preclude the filing of
another information for a crime constituting the same facts. Indeed, we held in Cudia v. Court of Appeals[11] that:

In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or
information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its
dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the
first information would not be a bar in petitioners subsequent prosecution. x x x.[12]

Be that as it may, the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in the instant cases was not a violation of petitioners right to
be informed of the charges against him. It is of no moment that the cases investigated by the Ombudsman bore the same docket numbers as
those cases which have already been dismissed by the Sandiganbayan, to wit: Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429. As we have previously stated:

The assignment of a docket number is an internal matter designed for efficient record keeping. It is usually written in the Docket Record in
sequential order corresponding to the date and time of filing a case.

This Court agrees that the use of the docket numbers of the dismissed cases was merely for reference. In fact, after the new informations
were filed, new docket numbers were assigned, i.e., Criminal Cases Nos. 28031-28049 x x x.[13]

Besides, regardless of the docket numbers, the Ombudsman conducted the above-referred preliminary investigation pursuant to our Decision
in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan[14] when we categorically declared therein that:
The Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion when it abruptly terminated the reinvestigation being conducted by Prosecutor
Lucero. It should be recalled that our directive in G.R. No. 105248 for the holding of a preliminary investigation was based on our ruling that
the right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive, rather than a procedural right. Petitioners right was violated when the preliminary
investigation of the charges against him were conducted by an officer without jurisdiction over the said cases. It bears stressing that our
directive should be strictly complied with in order to achieve its objective of affording petitioner his right to due process.[15]

Anent the issue on the prescription of the offenses charged, we should first resolve the question of whether this Court may validly take
cognizance of and resolve the aforementioned issue considering that as we have said in the assailed Decision, this case has never progressed
beyond the filing of the informations against the petitioner[16] and that it is only prudent that evidence be gathered through trial on the
merits to determine whether the offense charged has already prescribed.[17] We reconsider our stance and shall rule in the affirmative.

Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the accused may, at any time before he enters his plea, move to quash the complaint and
information[18] on the ground that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished,[19] which ground includes the defense of
prescription considering that Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates prescription as one of those grounds which totally extinguishes
criminal liability. Indeed, even if there is yet to be a trial on the merits of a criminal case, the accused can very well invoke the defense of
prescription.

Thus, the question is whether or not the offenses charged in the subject criminal cases have prescribed? We held in the case of Domingo v.
Sandiganbayan[20] that:

In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense
charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.[21]

Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file his Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period
1967-1985 during his tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical
Assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable therein shall prescribe in 15 years. Significantly, this Court already declared in
the case of People v. Pacificador[22] that:

It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the
prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said statute was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years,
as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for the reason that the amendment, not
being favorable to the accused (herein private respondent), cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence, the crime prescribed on January 6,
1986 or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976.[23]
Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up to March 15, 1982, the same shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other
hand, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner during the period from March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15
years.

As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is made to Act No. 3326 which governs the computation of prescription of offenses
defined by and penalized under special laws. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides:

SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

In the case of People v. Duque,[24] we construed the aforequoted provision, specifically the rule on the running of the prescriptive period as
follows:

In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment" may be either disregarded as surplusage or
should be deemed preceded by the word "until." Thus, Section 2 may be read as:

"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law; and if the same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof;"

or as:

"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof and until institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment." (Emphasis supplied)[25]

Thus, this Court rules that the prescriptive period of the offenses herein began to run from the discovery thereof or on May 8, 1987, which is
the date of the complaint filed by the former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez against the petitioner with the PCGG.
In the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto[26] this Court already took note that:

In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions
were made. Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive
period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee
on Behest Loans.[27]

However, both respondents in the instant case aver that, applying Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code suppletorily, the absence of the
petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until April 27, 2000 prevented the prescriptive period for the alleged offenses from running.

We disagree.

Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the absence of the offender from the Philippines bars the running of the
prescriptive period. The silence of the law can only be interpreted to mean that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not intend such an interruption
of the prescription unlike the explicit mandate of Article 91. Thus, as previously held:

Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission, neither could the Court presume otherwise and
supply the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of the
interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the
time of the enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later wisdom may recommend the
inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would
have supplied if its attention has been called to the omission.[28]

The only matter left to be resolved is whether the filing of the complaint with the PCGG in 1987 as well as the filing of the informations with
the Sandiganbayan to initiate Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 in 1989 interrupted the running of the prescriptive period such that when the
Ombudsman directed petitioner to file his counter-affidavit on March 3, 2004, the offenses have already prescribed.

Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.
However, there is no such proceeding instituted against the petitioner to warrant the tolling of the prescriptive periods of the offenses
charged against him.
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,[29] petitioner averred that PCGG acted without jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion in conducting a
preliminary investigation of cases not falling within its competence.[30] This Court, in its resolve to deal with the merits of the case to remove
the possibility of any misunderstanding as to the course which it wishes petitioners cases in the Sandiganbayan to take[31]declared invalid

the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG over the 24 offenses ascribed to Romualdez (of failure to file annual statements of
assets and liabilities), for lack of jurisdiction of said offenses.[32]

In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,[33] petitioner assailed the validity of the informations filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos.
13406-13429 considering that the same were subscribed and filed by the PCGG. In granting petitioners plea, this Court held, thus:

Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect cannot be cured by conducting another preliminary investigation. An
invalid information is no information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings.[34]

Indeed, the nullity of the proceedings initiated by then Solicitor General Chavez in 1987 with the PCGG and by the PCGG with the
Sandiganbayan in 1989 is judicially settled. In contemplation of the law, no proceedings exist that could have merited the suspension of the
prescriptive periods.

Besides, the only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription is that which is filed or initiated by the offended party before
the appropriate body or office. Thus, in the case of People v. Maravilla,[35] this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the municipal
mayor for purposes of preliminary investigation had the effect of suspending the period of prescription. Similarly, in the case of Llenes v.
Dicdican,[36] this Court held that the filing of a complaint against a public officer with the Ombudsman tolled the running of the period of
prescription.

In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the PCGG. Thus, the same could not have interrupted the running
of the prescriptive periods.

However, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio contends that the offenses charged against the petitioner could not have prescribed
because the latter was absent from the Philippines from 1986 to April 27, 2000 and thus the prescriptive period did not run from the time of
discovery on May 8, 1987, citing Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that [t]he term of prescription should not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.

Mr. Justice Carpio argues that

Article 10 of the same Code makes Article 91 x x x supplementary to [special laws], unless the latter should x x x provide the contrary. Nothing
in RA 3019 prohibits the supplementary application of Article 91 to that law. Hence, applying Article 91, the prescriptive period in Section 11
of RA 3019, before and after its amendment, should run only after petitioner returned to this jurisdiction on 27 April 2000.

There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the RPC applies suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of
decisions since 1934, starting with People v. Moreno. Thus, the Court has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve cases
where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on the applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-settled, with the
latest reiteration made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v. People.

He also expresses his apprehension on the possible effects of the ruling of the Majority Opinion and argues that

The accused should not have the sole discretion of preventing his own prosecution by the simple expedient of escaping from the States
jurisdiction. x x x An accused cannot acquire legal immunity by being a fugitive from the States jurisdiction. x x x.

To allow an accused to prevent his prosecution by simply leaving this jurisdiction unjustifiably tilts the balance of criminal justice in favor of
the accused to the detriment of the States ability to investigate and prosecute crimes. In this age of cheap and accessible global travel, this
Court should not encourage individuals facing investigation or prosecution for violation of special laws to leave Philippine jurisdiction to sit-
out abroad the prescriptive period. The majority opinion unfortunately chooses to lay the basis for such anomalous practice.

With all due respect, we beg to disagree.

Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

Pursuant thereto, one may be tempted to hastily conclude that a special law such as RA No. 3019 is supplemented by the Revised Penal Code
in any and all cases. As it is, Mr. Justice Carpio stated in his Dissenting Opinion that
There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the RPC applies suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of
decisions since 1934, starting with People v. Moreno. Thus, the Court has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve cases
where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on the applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-settled, with the
latest reiteration made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v. People.

However, it must be pointed out that the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, by virtue of Article 10 thereof,
finds relevance only when the provisions of the special law are silent on a particular matter as evident from the cases cited and relied upon in
the Dissenting Opinion:

In the case of People v. Moreno,[37] this Court, before ruling that the subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code may be
applied in cases of violations of Act No. 3992 or the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, noted that the special law did not contain any provision that
the defendant can be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

In the case of People v. Li Wai Cheung,[38] this Court applied the rules on the service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal
Code in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of RA No. 6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 considering the
lack of similar rules under the special law.

In the case of People v. Chowdury,[39] the Court applied Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the Revised Penal Code to define the words principal,
accomplices and accessories under RA No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 because it was not defined
therein although it referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.

In the case at bar, the silence of RA No. 3019 on the question of whether or not the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents or
tolls the running of the prescriptive period is more apparent than real.

Even before the enactment of RA No. 3019 in 1960, Act No. 3326 was already in effect as early as December 4, 1926. Section 3 thereof
categorically defines special acts as acts defining and penalizing violations of the law not included in the Penal Code.

Thus, in the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,[40] this Court was categorical in ruling that
The law on prescription of offenses is found in Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code for offenses punishable thereunder. For those
penalized under special laws, Act No. 3326 applies.

Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. The running of the prescriptive period shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide
that the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can be
gathered from the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines
as a hindrance to the running of the prescriptive period. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. To elaborate, -

Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all
others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to
certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature
would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.[41]

Had the legislature intended to include the accuseds absence from the Philippines as a ground for the interruption of the prescriptive period
in special laws, the same could have been expressly provided in Act No. 3326. A case in point is RA No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997
where the legislature made its intention clear and was thus categorical that

SEC. 281. Prescription for Violations of any Provision of this Code All violations of any provision of this Code shall prescribe after five (5) years.

Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty persons and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
According to Mr. Justice Carpio, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code fills the so-called gap in Act No. 3326. Thus, while Act No. 3326 governs
the operation of the prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No. 3019, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code can and shall still be applied in
cases where the accused is absent from the Philippines. In effect, Article 91 would supplement Act No. 3326.

This could not have been the intention of the framers of the law.

While it is true that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code makes the Code suppletory to special laws, however, Act No. 3326 cannot fall within
the ambit of special law as contemplated and used in Article 10 of the RPC.

In the case of United States v. Serapio,[42] the Court had the occasion to interpret the term special laws mentioned in Article 7 of then Penal
Code of the Philippines, which is now Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, as referring to penal laws that punish acts not defined and
penalized by the Penal Code of the Philippines. Thus

This contention makes it necessary to define "special laws," as that phrase is used in article 7 of the Penal Code. Does this phrase "leyes
especiales," as used in the Penal Code (article 7) have the meaning applied to the phrase "special laws," as the same is generally used? x x x It
is confidently contended that the phrase "leyes especiales," as used in the Penal Code (article 7) is not used with this general signification: In
fact, said phrase may refer not to a special law as above defined, but to a general law. A careful reading of said article 7 clearly indicates that
the phrase "leyes especiales" was not used to signify "special laws" in the general signification of that phrase. The article, it will be noted,
simply says, in effect, that when a crime is made punishable under some other law than the Penal Code, it (the crime) is not subject to the
provisions of said code.[43]

Even if we consider both Act No. 3326 and Article 91 as supplements to RA No. 3019, the same result would obtain. A conflict will arise from
the contemporaneous application of the two laws. The Revised Penal Code explicitly states that the absence of the accused from the
Philippines shall be a ground for the tolling of the prescriptive period while Act No. 3326 does not. In such a situation, Act No. 3326 must
prevail over Article 91 because it specifically and directly applies to special laws while the Revised Penal Code shall apply to special laws only
suppletorily and only when the latter do not provide the contrary. Indeed, elementary rules of statutory construction dictate that special
legal provisions must prevail over general ones.

The majority notes Mr. Justice Carpios reservations about the effects of ruling that the absence of the accused from the Philippines shall not
suspend the running of the prescriptive period. Our duty, however, is only to interpret the law. To go beyond that and to question the
wisdom or effects of the law is certainly beyond our constitutionally mandated duty. As we have already explained

Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission, neither could the Court presume otherwise and
supply the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of interpretation,
enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of the
enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts
are not authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its
attention has been called to the omission.[44]

Mr. Justice Carpio also remarks that the liberal interpretation of the statute of limitations in favor of the accused only relates to the following
issues: (1) retroactive or prospective application of laws providing or extending the prescriptive period; (2) the determination of the nature of
the felony committed vis--vis the applicable prescriptive period; and (3) the reckoning of when the prescriptive period runs. Therefore, the
aforementioned principle cannot be utilized to support the Majority Opinions conclusion that the prescriptive period in a special law
continues to run while the accused is abroad.

We take exception to the foregoing proposition.

We believe that a liberal interpretation of the law on prescription in criminal cases equally provides the authority for the rule that the
prescriptive period runs while the accused is outside of Philippine jurisdiction. The nature of the law on prescription of penal statutes
supports this conclusion. In the old but still relevant case of People v. Moran,[45] this Court extensively discussed the rationale behind and
the nature of prescription of penal offenses

We should at first observe that a mistake is sometimes made in applying to statutes of limitation in criminal suits the construction that has
been given to statutes of limitation in civil suits. The two classes of statutes, however, are essentially different. In civil suits the statute is
interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter between two contending parties. In the construction of the statute, therefore, there is no
intendment to be made in favor of either party. Neither grants the right to the other; there is therefore no grantor against whom the
ordinary presumptions, of construction are to be made. But it is, otherwise when a statute of limitation is granted by the State. Here the
State is the grantor, surrendering by act of grace its rights to prosecute, and declaring the offense to be no longer the subject of prosecution.'
The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall
be cast over the offence; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen and that from
henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence it is that statutes of
limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of
amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute, is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time,
while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.
Independently of these views, it must be remembered that delay in instituting prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State,
but of peril to public justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the policy of the law
that prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes, enforcing such promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They are not merely
acts of grace, but checks imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity from its subalterns, and to secure for criminal trials the
best evidence that can be obtained. (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny petitioner the benefits accruing from the liberal construction of prescriptive laws on criminal
statutes. Prescription emanates from the liberality of the State. Any bar to or cause of interruption in the operation of prescriptive periods
cannot simply be implied nor derived by mere implication. Any diminution of this endowment must be directly and expressly sanctioned by
the source itself, the State. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the grantee thereof, the accused.
The foregoing conclusion is logical considering the nature of the laws on prescription. The exceptions to the running of or the causes for the
interruption of the prescriptive periods may and should not be easily implied. The prescriptive period may only be prevented from operating
or may only be tolled for reasons explicitly provided by the law.

In the case of People v. Pacificador,[46] we ruled that:

It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that in the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable
to the accused is to be adopted. The said legal principle takes into account the nature of the law on prescription of crimes which is an act of
amnesty and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender. In the case of People v. Moran, this Court amply discussed the nature
of the statute of limitations in criminal cases, as follows:

The statute is not statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall
be cast over the offense; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen; and that from
henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence, it is that statues of
limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of
amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time,
while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.[47]

In view of the foregoing, the applicable 10-and-15-year prescriptive periods in the instant case, were not interrupted by any event from the
time they began to run on May 8, 1987. As a consequence, the alleged offenses committed by the petitioner for the years 1963-1982
prescribed 10 years from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 1997. On the other hand, the alleged offenses committed by the petitioner for the years
1983-1985 prescribed 15 years from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 2002.

Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3,
2004 by requiring the petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit, the alleged offenses subject therein have already prescribed. Indeed, the
State has lost its right to prosecute petitioner for the offenses subject of Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan
and Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the
Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila are all hereby ordered
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100285 August 13, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

NAPOLEON DUQUE, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Trinidad, Reverente, Makalintal, Cabrera and Monsod Law Office for accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:

Appellant Napoleon Duque was charged with and convicted of violating Section 38 in relation to Section 39 of P.D. No. 442, as amended,
known as The Labor Code of the Philippines. The charge of illegal recruitment was set out in the information in the following terms:

That on or about and/or sometime in January 1986, at Calamba, Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused well knowing that he is not licensed nor authorized by the proper government agency (POEA) to engage in recruitment of workers
for placement abroad, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit Glicerio Teodoro, Agustin Ulat, Ernesto Maunahan,
Norma Francisco, Elmo Alcaraz and Marcelino Desepida as workers abroad exacted and actually received money from the above-named
victims, to their damage and prejudice.

Contrary to law. 1

The evidence in chief of the prosecution consisted principally of the testimony of the following witnesses: Agustin Ulat, Elmo Alcaraz,
Marcelino Desepida and Norma Francisco. Their testimonies were summarized in the trial court's decision as follows:

. . . sometime in January 1986, he (Agustin Ulat) was invited by the accused to his house in Calamba, Laguna. Thereat accused informed him
that he was recruiting workers for Saudi Arabia and that he was interested in getting (sic) him. Accused likewise presented to him that he
(accused) was a licensed recruiter (TSN, 22 Oct. 1990, pp. 6-7). The accused told him to secure his birth certificate, an NBI clearance and
medical certificate. He was able to secure an NBI clearance which he showed to the accused. The latter thereafter told him that he would
secure the rest of his papers like passport, visa and medical certificate for him and for this, accused asked him to prepare the amount of
P20,000.00. He did not have that money, so he mortgaged his lot for P20,000.00 to the cousin of the accused, Socorro Arlata. He immediately
gave this amount to the accused who assured him that he would be able to leave within two months. The accused did not issue a receipt for
that amount despite his request. He did not persist in asking the accused because he trusted him, accused coming from an affluent family and
a member of a well-known Catholic organization, the "Cursillo" (TSN, 22 Oct. 1990, pp. 4-9). However, accused failed to employ him at Saudi
Arabia within two months despite repeated promise (sic) to do so. Thus, he demanded the return of his money but accused failed. Finally, he
decided, together with the other complainants, to file a complaint against accused before the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA). . . .

Elmo Alcaraz, Marcelino Desepida and Norma Francisco individually testified to the following: sometime also in January 1986, they went to
the house of accused for work abroad as the latter had earlier told them that he was recruiting workers for the Saudi Arabia. The accused
asked money to process their papers. Alcaraz was able to give the accused on 22 February 1986 the amount of P5,000.00, but the accused
failed to issue him a receipt and he did not persist in asking for it because he trusted the accused on (TSN, 5 Nov. 1990, pp. 5-7). Desepida
was able to give the accused on 18 Feb. 1986, the amount of P7,000.00 as placement fee for which the accused did not issue a receipt
although he promised to issue one the next day. However, the following day, when he reminded the accused of the receipt, he refused saying
that he (Desepida) should trust [the accused]. Francisco was able to give the accused P9,000.00 on 21 February 1986 in the presence of the
other applicants (TSN, 26 Nov. 1990, p. 5). But, the accused again failed to issue a receipt despite demand. She was told by the accused to
trust him (Ibid., p. 6). However, the accused failed to return their money notwithstanding. Thus, all of them decided to file a complaint with
the POEA against the accused. There, they executed a joint affidavit (Exh. "A"). 2

During the trial, Duque denied the charges. He controverted the allegation that he had recruited complainants for overseas employment. He
also denied that he had received any monies in consideration of promised employment. However, he acknowledged that his house had
served as a meeting place for a certain Delfin and one Engr. Acopado who allegedly were the persons who had promised complainants, work
abroad.

On the basis of the positive identification by private complainants of appellant Duque as the person they had talked to for placement abroad,
the person who had collected fees from them and who had received information from them needed for arranging their departure for abroad,
the trial court concluded that accused Duque was primarily responsible for promising placement and inducing private complainants to part
with their money. The prosecution also submitted a certification from the licensing branch of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration ("POEA") stating that no records existed whatsoever of a grant to the accused of a license or authority to recruit for overseas
employment. The dispositive part of the decision reads:

Wherefore, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, [of] violation of [Art.] 38 in relation to [Art.] 39 of P.D. 442
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, and hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a
fine of P100,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the offended parties: Agustin Ulat the amount of
P20,000.00; Marcelino Desepida the amount of P7,000.00; Norma Francisco the amount of P9,000.00; and Elmo Alcaraz the amount of
P3,000.00 and the cost of suit. 3

Before this Court, appellant Duque raises only one (1) issue: that of prescription of the criminal offense for which he was convicted.

The recruitment of persons for overseas employment without the necessary recruiting permit or authority form the POEA constitutes a crime
penalized, not by the Revised Penal Code, but rather by a special law, i.e., Article 38 in relation to Article 290 of the Labor Code. Article 290 of
the Labor Code provides, in relevant part, that:

Art. 290. Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three (3) years.

xxx xxx xxx

The Labor Code, however, does not contain any provisions on the mode of computation of the three-year prescriptive period it established.

The Solicitor General states, and we agree with him, that Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for
Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run" (emphasis supplied),
supplied the applicable norm. 4 Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, reads as follows:

Section 2: ...

xxx xxx xxx

Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

Examination of the abovequoted Section 2 shows that there are two (2) rules for determining the beginning of the prescriptive period: (a) on
the day of the commission of the violation, if such commission be known; and (b) if the commission of the violation was not known at the
time, then from discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment. Appellant Duque contends that
the prescriptive period in the case at bar commenced from the time money in consideration of promises for overseas employment was
parted with by complainants. Duque thus contends that the prescriptive period began to run sometime in January 1986. The information
was, however, filed by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna on 22 May 1990, i.e., more than four (4) years later. Duque concludes
that the offense of illegal recruitment had accordingly prescribed by May 1990.

We are not persuaded. Article 38 of the Labor Code as amended reads as follows:
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. — (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to
be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry
of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.

(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and
shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph
hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and
detention of such non-license or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to
national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the search of the office or
premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of
companies, establishments and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been
licensed or authorized to do so. (Emphasis supplied)

It will be seen that illegal recruitment has two (2) basic elements, to wit: (a) recruitment activities as listed in Articles 38 and 34 of the Labor
Code; and (b) the lack of the necessary license or authority from the POEA to engage in such activities. Recruitment for overseas employment
is not in itself necessarily immoral or unlawful. It is the lack of necessary license or permit that renders such recruitment activities unlawful
and criminal. Such lack of necessary permit or authority, while certainly known to appellant Duque back in January 1986, was not known to
private complainants at that time. Indeed, private complainants discovered that appellant did not possess such authority or permit only when
they went to the offices of the POEA for the purpose of filing a claim for return of the money they had delivered to appellant Duque. Since
good faith is always presumed, the complainants were entitled to assume the appellant Duque was acting in good faith when he presented
himself as a recruiter for overseas placement. Even if it be assumed arguendo that ordinary prudence required that a person seeking
overseas employment ought to check the authority or status of persons pretending to be authorized or to speak for a recruitment or
placement agency, the offended parties' failure to do so did not start the running of the prescriptive period. In the nature of things, acts
made criminal by special laws are frequently not immoral or obviously criminal in themselves; for this reason, the applicable statute requires
that if the violation of the special law is not known at the time, then prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery
of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.

Appellant Duque assails Section 2 of Act No. 3326 as illogical or absurd. A literal reading of Section 2 appears to suggest that two (2) elements
must coincide for the beginning of the running of the prescriptive period: first, the element of discovery of the commission of the violation of
the special law; and second, the "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment." It is then argued by appellant that
because the co-existence of these two (2) requirements is necessary under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the relevant prescriptive period would
never begin to run.

Here appellant has a point. However, it should be noted, firstly, that the literal reading that appellant suggests, does not benefit appellant,
for the prescriptive period in the case at bar had not in any case been exhausted since prosecution of appellant commenced only a few
months after the POEA and the complainants had discovered that appellant had no governmental authority to recruit for overseas work and
was merely pretending to recruit workers for overseas employment and to receive money therefor, i.e., that appellant did not even attempt
to locate employment abroad for complainants. Secondly, we do not think there is any real need for such a literal reading of Section 2. As is
well-known, initiation of proceedings for preliminary investigation of the offense normally marks the interruption of the period of
prescription. Under appellant Duque's literal reading, the prescription period would both begin and be interrupted by the same occurrence;
the net effect would be that the prescription period would not have effectively begun, having been rendered academic by the simultaneous
interruption of that same period. A statute providing for prescription of defined criminal offenses is more than a statute of repose and
constitutes an act of grace by which the State, after the lapse of a certain period of time, surrenders its sovereign power to prosecute the
criminal act. A statute on prescription of crimes is an act of liberality on the part of the State in favor of the offender. 5 The applicable well-
known principles of statutory interpretation are that statutes must be construed in such a way as to give effect to the intention of the
legislative authority, 6 and so as to give a sensible meaning to the language of the statute and thus avoid nonsensical or absurd results, 7
departing to the extent unavoidable from the literal language of the statute. Appellant's literal reading would make nonsense of Section 2 of
Act No. 3326.

In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment" may be either disregarded as surplusage or
should be deemed preceded by the word "until." Thus, Section 2 may be read as:
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law; and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof;

or as:

Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and until institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. (Emphasis supplied)

We believe and so hold that the applicable prescriptive period in the case at bar began to run from the time the recruitment activities of
appellant Duque were ascertained by the complainants and by the POEA to have been carried out without any license or authority from the
government. The discovery by the complainants and by the POEA was, as a practical matter, simultaneous in character and occurred
sometime in December 1989 when the complainants went to the POEA with the complaint for recovery of the placement fees and expenses
they had paid to appellant Duque, and the POEA, acting upon that complaint, discovered and informed the private complainants that Duque
had operated as a recruiter without the essential government license or authority. Accordingly, the offense of illegal recruitment had not
prescribed when the complaint was filed with the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in April 1990 and when the information was filed in court in
May 1990.

It is relevant to note that the same result would be reached by giving supplemental effect to provisions of the Revised Penal Code in the
application of Article 290 of the Labor Code. 8 Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:

Art. 91. Computation of the prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and
shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the above-quoted Article 91, the prescriptive period in respect of the offense of illegal recruitment began to run on the date of
discovery thereof by the private complainants and the authorities concerned (POEA) sometime in December 1989 and was interrupted on 16
April 1990 when the affidavit-sworn complaint was filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, 9 and certainly by May 1990 when the
criminal information was filed in court by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna. Once more, the appellant's defense of prescription
must fail.

Under Section 39 of the Labor Code as amended, the penalty of life imprisonment is properly imposable where the illegal recruitment is
committed "in large scale," i.e., where it is "committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group." 10 In the case at bar,
private complainants are more than three (3) in number. Moreover, appellant Duque had represented to the public at large, including private
complainants, that he was a licensed

recruiter.11 Duque's house served as his business office and he asked the private complainants to see him in his house. 12 There,
complainants were "briefed" as to the requirements for overseas employment before their supposed departure and were each required to
secure a clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation. 13 Considerable sums were collected from each of the complainants
supposedly to "facilitate" the processing of passports, medical certificates and other working papers. 14 Complainants were, in addition,
shown documents which purported to be job placement orders. This organized modus operandi was repeated in respect of each of the
complainants and presumably in respect of other persons who were similarly victimized by appellant. There is no question that the
recruitment activities of Duque were organized and "large scale" in nature. 15

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with the sole modification that the penalty properly
imposable and hereby imposed is life imprisonment and not reclusion perpetua. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177763 July 3, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

GARY VERGARA y ORIEL and JOSEPH INOCENCIO1 y PAULINO, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before this Court is an appeal of the March 30, 2007 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 023873 affirming with
modification the December 29, 2001 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City in Crim. Case No. 01-0275, entitled
People of the Philippines v. Gary Vergara y Oriel alias "Gary" and Joseph Inocencio y Paulino alias "Joseph, " finding accused-appellants Gary
Vergara (Vergara) and Joseph Inocencio (Inocencio) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder as principal and accomplice, respectively.

On February 13, 2001, an Information for the crime of murder qualified by treachery was filed against accused-appellants.

On March 12, 2001, upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.5 Trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution established that at around midnight of February 10, 2001, accused-appellants were causing a ruckus on Libertad-Colayco
Streets, Pasay City by throwing water bottles at passers-by. At around 2:00 a.m., the victim, Miguelito Alfante, who was seemingly drunk,
walked down the street. Vergara approached Alfante and told him: "Pare, mukhang high na high ka." Alfante retorted: "Anong pakialam mo?"
At this juncture, Vergara threw his arm around Alfante’s shoulder, received a knife from Inocencio, and suddenly stabbed Alfante. Vergara
then said "Taga rito ako." Thereafter, Vergara and Inocencio ran from the scene but were pursued by several witnesses. Alfante, meanwhile,
was brought to the Pasay City General Hospital where he died.6

The autopsy report conducted on the cadaver of the victim revealed that Alfante sustained eight stab wounds: five located on the chest area
and three on the left forearm. The victim sustained two fatal wounds: one which severed the left ventricle of the heart and another wound
puncturing the lower lobe of the left lung. The Autopsy Report N-01-1517 signed by Dr. Dominic Agbuda, medico-legal officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation who conducted the autopsy, stated that:

CAUSE OF DEATH: MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS, CHEST, LEFT ARM.

The common-law wife of the victim, Gina Alfante,8 testified that she incurred the following expenses in connection with the death and burial
of Alfante:

a) ₱17,000.00 for the coffin

b) ₱3,000.00 for the nicho

c) ₱250.00 for the mass

d) ₱15,000.00 for food and drinks for the wake; and

e) ₱16,000.00 for the burial lot.

Gina further testified that Alfante had been working as a mason prior to his death earning ₱500.00 a day.9
In his defense, Vergara denied the version of the prosecution. He testified that on February 10, 2001, at around midnight, he and Inocencio
went to a convenience store to buy salted eggs for "baon" the following day. When they passed by Libertad corner Colayco Streets in Pasay
City to go to the 7-11 convenience store, they saw Alfante together with nine other persons. Contrary to the testimony of prosecution
witnesses, it was Alfante who approached Vergara, knife in hand and proceeded to stab him. He was able to evade the attack and grappled
with Alfante for possession of the knife and, in the course of their struggle, Alfante sustained his injuries. Inocencio stood by his side for the
duration of the incident.10 Thereafter, he fled the scene. He went to the nearest police station and was subsequently brought to the Ospital
ng Maynila for treatment for the injury on his right palm sustained during the tussle.11

Dr. Oliver Leyson, Medical Officer III of the Ospital ng Maynila, testified to his medical examination and treatment of Vergara’s injury caused
by a bladed weapon which he sustained on February 11, 2001.12

After evaluating the respective evidence of the contending parties, on December 29, 2001, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The decretal portion of the Decision stated:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises and considerations, this Court hereby renders judgment finding the accused GARY
VERGARA Y ORIEL alias GARY and JOSEPH INOCENCIO Y PAULINO alias JOSEPH both GUILTY as principal and accomplice, respectively, for the
crime of Murder, as this felony is defined and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, and appreciating
in favor of the accused Gary Vergara y Oriel alias Gary the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating
circumstance to offset the same, the Court hereby sentences said accused Gary Vergara y Oriel alias Gary to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and the other accused Joseph Inocencio y Paulino alias Joseph to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from
Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of Reclusion
Temporal, as maximum, and for them to pay, jointly and severally the Heirs of the deceased Miguelito Alfante the sums of Php51,250.00, as
actual damages, Php1,020,000.00, as indemnity for loss of earnings of the same deceased, Php250,00.00 as moral damages, plus costs
(sic).13

Accused-appellants filed their notice of appeal on February 5, 2002 to the Supreme Court.14 The appeal was accepted by this Court in its
Resolution15 dated September 4, 2002 but was subsequently transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to People v. Mateo.16

As in the Court of Appeals, accused-appellants challenge the court a quo’s finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They averred that the
elements of the crime of murder were not proven.17 On March 30, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification as to the award of
damages the Decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals thus disposed of the appeal in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the Decision dated December 29, 2001, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 116, Pasay City is AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellants are jointly and severally held liable to pay the heirs of the victim, to the exclusion of his
common-law-wife, the following amount, to wit:

a. ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnification;

b. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and

c. ₱51,250.00 as actual damages.18

Hence, this appeal.19 Accused-appellants’ confinement was confirmed by the Bureau of Corrections on April 11, 2007.20

The appellee21 manifested that it would not file a supplemental brief.

On May 13, 2008, accused-appellant Joseph P. Inocencio filed a motion to withdraw his appeal stating that he is no longer interested to
pursue an appeal.22 This Court, in a Resolution dated June 25, 2008, granted the motion of appellant Inocencio and declared the case
terminated as far as he is concerned.23

Due to the failure of accused-appellant Vergara’s counsel to file a supplemental brief, the Court, in a Resolution dated November 19, 2008,
resolved to dispense with its filing.24

We affirm the March 30, 2007 decision of the Court of Appeals with modification respecting the award of damages.

The pertinent provision in this case is Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1) With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means
or persons to insure or afford impunity. (Emphasis added.)

Jurisprudence is consistent in reiterating that the trial court is in a better position to adjudge the credibility of witnesses especially if it is
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.25 People v. Clores26 reminds us that:

When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the guiding rules some of which are that (1) the Appellate court will not
disturb the factual findings of the lower Court, unless there is a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, which showing is absent herein; (2) the findings of the
Trial Court pertaining to the credibility of a witness is entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to examine his demeanor as he
testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, can discern if such witness is telling the truth or not; and (3) a witness who testifies in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness. (Citations
omitted.)

The rationale for these guidelines is that, having heard the witnesses themselves and having observed firsthand their deportment and
manner of testifying under grueling examination, the trial courts are in a better position to decide the question of credibility.27 On the other
hand, this Court is far detached from the details and drama during trial and relies only on the records of the case in its review. On the matter
of credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, this Court admits to its limitations and acknowledges the advantage of the trial court
whose findings we give due deference.

We see no need to depart from the aforestated rules. A careful review of the records reveals that accused-appellant Vergara failed to negate
the findings of the trial court with concrete evidence that it had overlooked, misconstrued or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight
and substance that would have affected the result of the case. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it stated that:

The death of the victim, Miguelito Alfante, is directly caused by the stab wounds inflicted by [appellant Vergara] when he placed his left arm
on the shoulder of the victim and stabbed him repeatedly in his chest and left forearm with a knife handed to him by [appellant Inocencio].
This is an overwhelming evidence, and in stark contrast, all [appellant Vergara] could offer are denial and self-defense. Denial is an
intrinsically weak defense, which the accused must buttress with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Having failed to
satisfy, the denial must necessarily fail.28 (Citation omitted.)

Anent accused-appellant Vergara’s claim of self-defense, the following essential elements had to be proved: (1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.29 A person who invokes self-defense has the burden of proof. He must prove all the
elements of self-defense. However, the most important of all the elements is unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Unlawful
aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete.30
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be
offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. It "presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger
- not merely threatening and intimidating action." It is present "only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one’s life."31

In the present case, the element of unlawful aggression is absent. By the testimonies of all the witnesses, the victim’s actuations did not
constitute unlawful aggression to warrant the use of force employed by accused-appellant Vergara. The records reveal that the victim had
been walking home albeit drunk when he passed by accused-appellants. However, there is no indication of any untoward action from him to
warrant the treatment that he had by accused-appellant Vergara’s hands. As succinctly stated by the RTC:

The victim was just walking, he was neither uttering invectives words nor provoking the appellants into a fight. Appellant Vergara was the
unlawful aggressor. He was the one who put the life of the victim in actual peril. This can be inferred from the wounds sustained by the
victim."32

It is thus clear that there being no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the act of accused-appellant Vergara of taking a knife and
stabbing the victim was not made in lawful self-defense.

We also agree with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the acts of accused-appellant Vergara constituted treachery qualifying the crime
committed to murder. As we have previously ruled upon, treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.33

Here, accused-appellant Vergara after exchanging words with the victim, threw his arm around the victim’s shoulder and proceeded to stab
him. The victim was totally unaware of the evil that would befall him. The number and severity of the wounds received by the victim
indicated that he was rendered immobile and without any real opportunity to defend himself other than feebly raising his arm to ward off
the attack. We, thus, sustain the trial court and the Court of Appeals in finding that the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present in the
commission of the crime.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the
crime of murder. Though there was an appreciation of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance, following the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63,
paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.34

However, to conform to existing jurisprudence the Court must modify the amount of indemnity for death and exemplary damages awarded
by the courts a quo.

Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death
of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation;
and (6) interest, in proper cases.35

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the heirs of the victim was able to prove before the trial court, actual damages in the amount of
₱51,250.00 based on the receipts36 they submitted to the trial court.1âwphi1

We also agree with the Court of Appeals when it removed the RTC’s award respecting the indemnity for the loss of earning capacity. As we
have already previously ruled that:

Damages for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages, which as a rule must be duly proven by documentary evidence, not
merely by the self-serving testimony of the widow.

By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the
deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in
the deceased’s line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than
the minimum wage under current labor laws.37 (Citations and emphasis omitted.)
In this case, we are constrained to uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals since no documentary evidence was presented to buttress the
claim for the loss of earning capacity of the victim as claimed by his common-law wife. Neither was it shown that the victim was covered by
the exceptions mentioned in the above-quoted case. The Court of Appeals stated:

Settled is the rule that actual damages, inclusive of expected earnings lost caused by the crime, must be proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty and on the best evidence to prove obtainable by the injured party. The prosecution failed to meet this criteria, no witness was
presented to support the contention of the common-law-wife of the victim that the latter is a self-employed mason earning ₱500.00 a day.
Hence, this Court cannot rely on the uncorroborated testimony of the common-law-wife of the victim which lacks specific details or
particulars on the claimed loss earnings.38 (Citation omitted.)

Moreover, we deem it proper that an award for exemplary damages be made. We have ruled as follows:

Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the
offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party
when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an
aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender.
In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party
to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.39 (Emphasis omitted.)

We, thus, award exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 to conform to existing jurisprudence.40

We increase the award for mandatory civil indemnity to ₱75,000.00 to conform to recent jurisprudence.41

Lastly, we sustain the RTC’s award for moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 even in the absence of proof of mental and emotional
suffering of the victim’s heirs.42 As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about
emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family.43 While no amount of damages may totally compensate the sudden and tragic
loss of a loved one it is nonetheless awarded to the heirs of the deceased to at least assuage them.

In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.44

WHEREFORE, the March 30, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02387 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant
Gary Vergara y Oriel alias "Gary" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Miguelito Alfante the amounts of ₱51 ,250.00 as actual damages, ₱75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at
the legal rate of 6o/o per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus

FRANCISCA TALARO,* GREGORIO TALARO,** NORBERTO (JUN) ADVIENTO, RENATO RAMOS, RODOLFO DUZON,*** RAYMUNDO ZAMORA**
and LOLITO AQUINO,

Accused.

NORBERTO (JUN) ADVIENTO, RENATO RAMOS and LOLITO AQUINO,

Accused-Appellants.

G.R. No. 175781

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,

CARPIO,

VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,****

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ,

MENDOZA,

SERENO,

REYES, and

PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 20, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

This is an automatic review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on December, 15, 2005, in accordance with Section 2
of Rule 125, in relation to Section 3 of Rule 56, of the Rules of Court. The CA affirmed with modification the judgment rendered by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38 of Lingayen, Pangasinan, thereby finding accused-appellants Norberto (Jun) Adviento, Renato Ramos
and Lolito Aquino, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing them to death, but acquitting accused Rodolfo
Duzon.

Accused-appellants were charged before the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, with the crime of murder under an Information reading as
follows:

That on or about the 26th day of April 1994, in the Poblacion of the Municipality of Laoac, Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating with each other, with intent to kill, and with treachery, and evident
premeditation, in consideration of a price, and by means of motor vehicle, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and
shoot one MELVIN ALIPIO, with a handgun hitting the latter in the different parts of his body and the wounds being mortal caused directly
the death of said MELVIN ALIPIO, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code.[2]

The testimonies of prosecution witnesses showed the sequence of events shortly before and after the killing of victim Melvin Alipio to be as
follows.

Raymundo Zamora is the nephew of Gregorio Talaro, the husband of Francisca Talaro. In the morning of April 24, 1994, when Zamora went
home for breakfast after driving his tricycle, he found Francisca Talaro, Lolito Aquino, Renato Atong Ramos, and Norberto Jun Adviento
conversing among themselves under a santol tree in front of his (Zamora's) house. He went near the group to find out what they were talking
about and he learned that his aunt, Francisca Talaro, was transacting with the other three accused-appellants for the killing of Atty. Melvin
Alipio. He was merely a meter away from the group so he heard the group's conversation. He learned that Francisca Talaro would give the
three accused-appellants an advance payment of P30,000.00 and then another P30,000.00 after Atty. Melvin Alipio is killed, with said last
payment to be delivered in Barangay (Brgy.) Bactad. The three accused-appellants then nodded their heads in agreement. After learning of
the group's plan, Zamora got scared and stayed away from the group, but three days after that meeting in front of his house, he was asked by
Francisca Talaro to drive her and her husband Gregorio to Brgy. Bactad. The Talaro spouses alighted at a place in Brgy. Bactad, while Zamora
stayed in his tricycle and merely waited for them. He assumed that the couple delivered the payment of P30,000.00 to someone in Brgy.
Bactad.[3]
Accused-appellant Lolito Aquino, when questioned during preliminary investigation, admitted that he and co-accused Renato Ramos
conducted a surveillance on Atty. Alipio in the afternoon of April 25, 1994.[4]

Around 6 o'clock in the morning of April 26, 1994, tricycle driver Rodolfo Duzon was at the parking area in the poblacion of Urdaneta waiting
for passengers, when accused-appellant Renato Ramos approached him. Accused-appellant Ramos offered to pay Rodolfo Duzon P200.00 for
the latter to drive Ramos' motorcycle to Laoac, Pangasinan to take some onions and turnips there. Duzon agreed, so after bringing his own
tricycle home to his house in Bactad, Urdaneta, he then drove Ramos' motorcycle to the poblacion of Urdaneta. At the poblacion, Ramos
bought a basket where he placed the onions and turnips. Ramos then told Duzon to drive the motorcycle to Laoac, but they first passed by
Garcia Street in Urdaneta. At a house along Garcia Street, Ramos alighted and talked to someone whom Rodolfo Duzon later came to know as
accused-appellant Lolito Aquino. Ramos then told Duzon that after coming from Laoac, Duzon should leave the motorcycle at that house on
Garcia Street with Lolito Aquino. Ramos and Duzon then proceeded to Laoac, stopping at a gas station where they fueled up. Ramos alighted
from the motorcycle at the gas station and, taking along the basket of onions and turnips, walked towards Guardian Angel Hospital (the clinic
owned by the Alipios). Five minutes after Ramos alighted, Duzon heard three gunshots coming from the west, and moments later, he saw
Ramos, who was coming toward him, being chased by another man. When Ramos got to the motorcycle, he ordered Duzon to immediately
drive away, and poked a gun at Duzon's back. Ramos then instructed Duzon as to the route they should take until they reached Urdaneta
where Ramos alighted, leaving Duzon with instructions to bring the motorcycle to Garcia Street, leave it with Lolito Aquino, then meet him
(Ramos) again at the poblacion where he (Duzon) will be paid P200.00 for his services. Duzon did as he was told, but when he met with
Ramos at the poblacion and asked for the P200.00, Ramos got mad and shouted invectives at him. A few days later, he again ran into Ramos
who warned him to keep his silence, threatening to kill him (Duzon) too if he tells anyone about the killing. Accused-appellant Norberto (Jun)
Adviento also threatened him not to reveal to anyone whatever he knows about the crime. That was why Duzon decided to keep quiet. Later,
however, he revealed the matter to his brother, Victoriano Duzon, who accompanied him to the Criminal Investigation Services (CIS) Office in
Urdaneta so he could give his statement. He executed affidavits, assisted by a lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), attesting to
what he knew about the crime, in his desire to be a state witness.[5]

Witness Rene Balanga, who was the helper of the spouses Atty. Melvin and Dr. Lina Alipio, was cleaning the windows at the clinic of Dr. Alipio
around 8 o'clock in the morning of April 26, 1994. He heard three gunshots coming from the garage of the clinic, which was around ten
meters away from where he was. Immediately after the gunshots, he saw a man quickly walking out from the garage, going towards the main
gate, but he was not able to clearly see the face of the man. He merely observed that the man was around 5'4 to 5'5 in height, medium-built,
wearing a blue jacket and faded maong (denim) pants. He ran towards the garage and there, he saw Atty. Melvin Alipio lying dead. He then
chased after the man so he could identify him better but he did not succeed in doing so because the driver of the motorcycle that the
gunman was boarding was already drawing something out from the rear portion of the motorcycle. After the assailant sped off, Balanga went
to the police station in Laoac to report the crime and give his statement before the CIS. Sometime later, at the CIS Office, he identified
Rodolfo Duzon as the driver of the motorcycle used by the gunman to get away.[6]

Another eyewitness, Eusebio Hidalgo, whose son was confined at the clinic, was sitting at a bench in the garage of the clinic on the morning
of April 26, 1994. Two other women who were looking for Atty. Alipio also sat at the bench with him after he told them that Atty. Alipio was
still having his breakfast. After a few minutes, a man arrived looking for Dr. Alipio, and also sat at the bench. Thereafter, Atty. Alipio came out
to the garage and talked to the two women. When Atty. Alipio finished talking to them, the man sitting with them on the bench suddenly
stood up and shot Atty. Alipio three times. Atty. Alipio was merely one meter away from the assailant when the latter shot him. After the
shooting, the assailant walked away. Hidalgo then saw the helper at the clinic, Reny Balanga, run after the assailant, but the latter had
whistled to his companion who was waiting on his motorcycle and the two were able to speed away aboard said vehicle. Hidalgo identified
the assailant from a picture[7] shown to him.[8] The picture was that of Renato Ramos.[9]

A few weeks after Atty. Melvin Alipio had been killed, Zamora was in the parking lot in Sta. Maria Norte in Binalonan, when accused-appellant
Aquino approached him and told him to remind Francisca Talaro that she still has to pay him (Aquino) P10,000.00. Zamora then immediately
told his uncle Gregorio Talaro about Aquino's message and the very next day, Gregorio went to Zamora's house with the P10,000.00.
Gregorio could no longer wait for Aquino so he just left the money with Zamora, instructing him to hand it over to Aquino when the latter
arrives. Later that day, Zamora saw Aquino so he told him (Aquino) to just get the money from his house. About three weeks later, Aquino
again went to Zamora's house, this time saying he needs another P5,000.00 just in case he needs to escape. Zamora then contacted Francisca
Talaro and conveyed Aquino's message to her. The following day, Gregorio again went to Zamora's house and left the P3,000.00 for Aquino.
That afternoon, Zamora again told Aquino to just pick up the money from his house. Zamora observed that Aquino seemed happy enough
with the P3,000.00 he received.[10]

Zamora said that he thinks the Talaros had Atty. Alipio killed because the latter was not able to comply with his contractual obligations to the
Talaros to complete the construction of a building. Dr. Lina Alipio, the wife of the victim Atty. Melvin Alipio, confirmed that indeed, the victim
entered into an agreement with Rodolfo Talaro, the Talaro spouses' son, for the construction of a building, but the construction was not
finished within the agreed one-year period because of the sudden rise of prices for materials. Atty. Alipio asked Rodolfo for additional
payment so he could finish construction, but the latter refused to pay more. Dr. Alipio stated that eventually, Atty. Alipio and Rodolfo agreed
that Atty. Alipio would return all the money he received from Rodolfo and the whole property would, in turn, be turned over to Atty. Alipio.
Atty. Alipio was unable to return the money despite several demands made by Rodolfo, and Dr. Alipio believes this is the reason why the
Talaros had her husband killed. Dr. Alipio further testified on matters regarding expenses for the wake and burial, and the earnings of her
husband.[11]

Dr. Arnulfo Bacarro conducted the autopsy on the victim and stated that three slugs were taken from the body of the victim, and the cause of
death was internal hemorrhage.[12] Police officers testified on how they conducted the investigation, stating that accused-appellant Aquino
and Zamora's statements were taken in the presence of their respective lawyers. They maintain that no bodily harm was inflicted on the
accused-appellants while they were being investigated.[13]

On the other hand, accused-appellant Lolito Aquino stated that he was taken by CIS men without a warrant of arrest; that he was mauled by
police authorities while under detention, but could not undergo a medical check-up due to fear from threats that he would be killed by police
authorities if he did so; that he was assisted by a PAO lawyer when he made his confession, but he did not read the contents of the
document, Sgt. Tomelden just ordered him to sign the same; that the PAO lawyer is not his own choice; that he does not know Rodolfo
Duzon and Raymundo Zamora; and that he was not present at the meeting held in Raymundo Zamora's yard. He admitted, however, that the
motorcycle used by the gunman belongs to him; and that he first agreed to be a state witness because he was promised to be paid
P20,000.00 and that he would be placed in the witness protection program.[14]

Accused-appellant Norberto (Jun) Adviento's defense is denial and alibi. He claimed that he was not present during the April 24, 1994
meeting held to plan the killing of Atty. Alipio, because on said date and time, he was in the house of Congressman Amadito Perez, for whom
he works as driver-messenger, and that morning, he also drove the Congressman's family to church to hear mass. On April 26, 1994, he also
reported for work at the house of the Congressman from 8 o'clock in the morning until 5 o'clock in the afternoon. He likewise denied
personally knowing any of his co-accused except for Duzon whose face is familiar to him.[15]

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:

Wherefore, in the light of all the considerations discussed above, this court hereby finds and holds the accused Francisca Talaro, Norberto
(Jun) Adviento, Renato Ramos, Rodolfo Duzon and Lolito Aquino, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and
penalized under the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and conformable thereto,
pursuant to law, hereby imposes on each of the accused the death penalty and to pay proportionately the costs of the proceedings.

The court further orders the accused to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased the sum of P83,000.00 as actual damages;
P100,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as death indemnity; P10,000.00 as [attorney's fees] paid to their private prosecutor and
P2,400,000.00 as loss in the earning capacity of the deceased without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Taking into consideration that accused Francisca Talaro is already 75 years old, the death penalty meted upon her shall be commuted to
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code.

And considering that the evidence adduced by the prosecution against the accused Gregorio Talaro is not sufficient to sustain his conviction
of the offense filed against him, the court hereby declares accused Gregorio Talaro not guilty. The court likewise declares Raymundo Zamora
acquitted of the offense filed against him.

Let an order of arrest be issued against accused Renato Ramos who escaped from jail during the pendency of this case, to be served by the
NBI, CIC and PNP of Urdaneta, Pangasinan.

SO ORDERED.[16]

The case was then brought to this Court for automatic review in view of the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellants. However, in
accordance with the ruling in People v. Mateo,[17] and the amendments made to Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, and
Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Court transferred this case to the CA for intermediate review.

On December 15, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38 of Lingayen, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. U-
8239, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Rodolfo Duzon is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and his release
is hereby ordered unless he is being held for some other legal cause.

Further, in lieu of the awards made by the trial court in favor of the heirs of deceased Atty. Melvin Alipio, accused-appellants are ordered to
pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim the following amounts: (1) P25,000.00 as temperate damages; (2) P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (3) P50,000.00 as moral damages; and (4) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages;

SO ORDERED.[18]

The case is now before this Court on automatic review. The prosecution opted not to file a supplemental brief with this Court. Accused-
appellants Lolito Aquino and Renato Ramos jointly filed their supplemental brief where it is argued that the two should be acquitted because
(1) the prosecution evidence is insufficient to prove that Lolito Aquino was part of the conspiracy to kill Atty. Melvin Alipio; and (2) the
identity of Renato Ramos was never established. Accused-appellant Noberto (Jun) Adviento argued in his Appellant's Brief filed with the CA,
that the prosecution's evidence is insufficient to establish conspiracy, and there are no aggravating circumstances to justify the imposition of
the death penalty.

The Court agrees with the CA's conclusion that the evidence on record proves beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants Lolito
Aquino, Renato Ramos, and Norberto (Jun) Adviento, together with Francisca Talaro, conspired to kill Atty. Melvin Alipio.

Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the unlawful killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide,
attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation. The presence of any one of the circumstances enumerated in Article
248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a killing as murder.[19]

In People v. Sanchez,[20] the Court held that [t]he essence of treachery is the sudden attack by an aggressor without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime
without risk to the aggressor. There can be no cavil that the evidence on record shows treachery in the killing of Atty. Alipio, thus qualifying
the crime as murder. The assailant, identified as accused-appellant Renato Ramos, just suddenly fired upon Atty. Alipio at a very close
distance, without any provocation from said unarmed victim, who was then just conversing with some other people.

There is also evident premeditation because the evidence shows that a couple of days before the actual shooting of Atty. Alipio, Raymundo
Zamora already saw and heard accused-appellants Norberto (Jun) Adviento, Renato Ramos, and Lolito Aquino, talking to Francisca Talaro and
coming to an agreement to kill Atty. Alipio.
Pitted against the prosecution evidence, accused-appellants' only defense is that the evidence is insufficient to prove they are part of the

conspiracy to commit the murder. Said defense is sorely wanting when pitted against the prosecution evidence.

In People v. Bautista,[21] the Court reiterated the hornbook principle of conspiracy, to wit:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where
all the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose or
common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established. It must be shown that all participants performed
specific acts which such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to commit the felony.

xxxx

Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as
one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design. x x x[22] (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the existence of a conspiracy has been established by the testimony of Raymundo Zamora, positively identifying all three
accused-appellants as the ones he saw and heard transacting with Francisca Talaro on April 24, 1994 to kill Atty. Melvin Alipio for the price of
P60,000.00, and pointing to Lolito Aquino as the one who demanded and received part of the payment after Atty. Alipio had been killed. The
credibility of Raymundo Zamora's testimony is further bolstered by Lolito Aquino's admission[23] that he and Renato Ramos even conducted
surveillance on the victim a day before Renato Ramos carried out the shooting, and that the motorcycle used as a getaway vehicle belonged
to him. Rodolfo Duzon also pointed to Renato Ramos as the gunman; he also pointed to Renato Ramos and Norberto (Jun) Adviento as the
ones who threatened to kill him if he talks to anyone about the shooting. All the proven circumstances point to the conclusion that accused-
appellants acted in concert to assure the success of the execution of the crime; hence, the existence of a conspiracy is firmly established.

Lolito Aquino's admission, and accused-appellants' positive identification of Raymundo Zamora and Rodolfo Duzon cannot be belied by
accused-appellants' mere denial. It is established jurisprudence that denial and alibi cannot prevail over the witness' positive identification of
the accused-appellants.[24] Moreover, accused-appellants could not give any plausible reason why Raymundo Zamora would testify falsely
against them. In People v. Molina,[25] the Court expounded, thus:

In light of the positive identification of appellant by the prosecution witnesses and since no ill motive on their part or on that of their families
was shown that could have made either of them institute the case against the appellant and falsely implicate him in a serious crime he did
not commit, appellant's defense of alibi must necessarily fail. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the defense of alibi, being inherently weak,
cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. x x x[26] (Emphasis supplied)
Accused-appellant Lolito Aquino claimed he merely admitted his participation in the crime out of fear of the police authorities who allegedly
manhandled him, however, the trial court did not find his story convincing. The trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is conclusive on this Court as it is the trial court which had the opportunity to closely observe the demeanor of witnesses.[27] The
Court again explained the rationale for this principle in Molina,[28] to wit:

As oft repeated by this Court, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect
because it is more competent to so conclude, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the stand,
and the manner in which they gave their testimonies. The trial judge therefore can better determine if such witnesses were telling the truth,
being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Further, factual findings of the trial court as regards its assessment of the
witnesses' credibility are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the Court of Appeals affirms the said findings,
and will not be disturbed absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts and circumstances which could substantially affect
the outcome of the case.[29]

The Court cannot find anything on record to justify deviation from said rule.

Accused-appellant Renato Ramos insisted that he was not properly identified in open court, and considering that there are so many persons
named Renato Ramos, then there can be some confusion regarding his identity. There is no truth to this claim. Ramos was properly identified
in open court by Raymundo Zamora, as one of the men he saw and heard transacting with Francisca Talaro for the killing of Atty. Alipio.[30]
Hence, there can be no doubt as to which Renato Ramos is being convicted for the murder of Atty. Alipio.

Another strong indication of Lolito Aquino's and Renato Ramos' guilt is the fact that they escaped from detention while the case was pending
with the trial court. Renato Ramos escaped from prison on December 20, 1994,[31] while Lolito Aquino escaped on May 5, 1996.[32] It has
been repeatedly held that flight betrays a desire to evade responsibility and is, therefore, a strong indication of guilt.[33] Thus, this Court
finds no reason to overturn their conviction.

Nevertheless, this Court must modify the penalty imposed on accused-appellants Norberto (Jun) Adviento, Lolito Aquino, and Renato Ramos.
In People v. Tinsay,[34] the Court explained that:

On June 30, 2006, Republic Act No. 9346 (R.A. 9346), entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, took
effect. Pertinent provisions thereof provide as follows:

Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-
Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven
Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659) otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other laws, executive orders and decrees
insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

xxxx

SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by
reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

It has also been held in People vs. Quiachon that R.A. No. 9346 has retroactive effect, to wit:

The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the principle in criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda
adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides as follows:

Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 provides that persons convicted of offenses pushed with
reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole.
Hence, in accordance with the foregoing, appellant should only be sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.[35]

The awards for damages also need to be modified. In People v. Alberto Anticamara y Cabillo, et al.,[36] the Court held that in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No.
9346, the award of moral damages should be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, while the award for exemplary damages, in view of
the presence of aggravating circumstances, should be P30,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 15, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00071 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellants is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua without possibility of parole in
accordance with R.A. No. 9346; and INCREASING the award of moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, and the award of exemplary
damages from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00. The rest of the award of the Court of Appeals is hereby maintained.

SO ORDERED.

JEFFREY RESO DAYAP, G.R. No. 177960

Petitioner,

Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,

Chairperson,

- versus - CORONA,*

CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA, and

CHICO-NAZARIO,** JJ.
PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG,

GENESA SENDIONG, ELVIE Promulgated:

SY and DEXIE DURAN,

Respondents. January 29, 2009

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review[1] on certiorari of the Decision[2] dated 17 August 2006 and Resolution[3] dated 25 April 2007 by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01179 entitled, Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa R. Sendiong, Elvie H. Sy and Dexie Duran v. Hon. Judge Cresencio
Tan and Jeffrey Reso Dayap.

The case had its origins in the filing of an Information[4] on 29 December 2004 by the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Sibulan, Negros Oriental,
charging herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and
Damage to Property. The pertinent portion of the information reads:

That at about 11:55 oclock in the evening of 28 December 2004 at Brgy. Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive in a reckless and
imprudent manner a 10-wheeler cargo truck with plate number ULP-955, color blue, fully loaded with sacks of coconut shell, registered in the
name of Ruben Villabeto of Sta. Agueda Pamplona, Negros Oriental, thereby hitting an automobile, a Colt Galant with plate number NLD-379
driven by Lou Gene R. Sendiong who was with two female passengers, namely: Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, thus causing the instantaneous
death of said Lou Gene R. Sendiong, less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy and extensive damage to the
above-mentioned Colt Galant which is registered in the name of Cristina P. Weyer of 115 Dr. V. Locsin St., Dumaguete City, to the damage of
the heirs of the same Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the other two offended parties above-mentioned.

An act defined and penalized by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental, petitioner was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to
the charge.[5]

On 17 January 2005, respondents Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa Sendiong and Dexie Duran filed a motion for leave of court to file an
amended information.[6] They sought to add the allegation of abandonment of the victims by petitioner, thus: The driver of the 10-wheeler
cargo truck abandoned the victims, at a time when said [Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong was still alive inside the car; he was only extracted from the
car by the by-standers.[7]

On 21 January 2005, however, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the motion to amend the information be
considered withdrawn.[8] On 21 January 2003, the MTC granted the withdrawal and the motion to amend was considered withdrawn.[9]

Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified for the prosecution. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner
sought leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted. Petitioner filed his Demurrer to Evidence[10] dated 15 April 2005 grounded
on the prosecutions failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for reckless imprudence, to which respondents filed
a Comment[11] dated 25 April 2005.

In the Order[12] dated 16 May 2005, the MTC granted the demurrer and acquitted petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence. The MTC
found that the evidence presented by respondents failed to establish the allegations in the Information. Pertinent portions of the order state:

An examination of the allegations in the information and comparing the same with the evidence presented by the prosecution would reveal
that the evidence presented has not established said allegations. The facts and circumstances constituting the allegations charged have not
been proven. It is elementary in the rules of evidence that a party must prove his own affirmative allegations.

xxxx
Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can this Court find that it was the accused who committed the crime as charged. Its witnesses
have never identified the accused as the one who has committed the crime. The prosecution never bothered to establish if indeed it was the
accused who committed the crime or asked questions which would have proved the elements of the crime. The prosecution did not even
establish if indeed it was the accused who was driving the truck at the time of the incident. The Court simply cannot find any evidence which
would prove that a crime has been committed and that the accused is the person responsible for it. There was no evidence on the allegation
of the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong as there was no death certificate that was offered in evidence. The alleged less serious physical injuries
on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy were not also proven as no medical certificate was presented to state the same nor was a doctor
presented to establish such injuries. The alleged damage to the [C]olt [G]alant was also not established in any manner as no witness ever
testified on this aspect and no documentary evidence was also presented to state the damage. The prosecution therefore failed to establish if
indeed it was the accused who was responsible for the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the injuries to Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, including
the damage to the Colt Galant. The mother of the victim testified only on the expenses she incurred and the shock she and her family have
suffered as a result of the incident. But sad to say, she could not also pinpoint if it was the accused who committed the crime and be held
responsible for it. This Court could only say that the prosecution has practically bungled this case from its inception.

xxxx

The defense furthermore argued that on the contrary, the prosecutions [evidence] conclusively show that the swerving of vehicle 1 [the Colt
Galant] to the lane of vehicle 2 [the cargo truck] is the proximate cause of the accident. The court again is inclined to agree with this
argument of the defense. It has looked carefully into the sketch of the accident as indicated in the police blotter and can only conclude that
the logical explanation of the accident is that vehicle 1 swerved into the lane of vehicle 2, thus hitting the latters inner fender and tires.
Exhibit 7 which is a picture of vehicle 2 shows the extent of its damage which was the effect of vehicle 1s ramming into the rear left portion of
vehicle 2 causing the differential guide of vehicle 2 to be cut, its tires busted and pulled out together with their axle. The cutting of the
differential guide cause[d] the entire housing connecting the tires to the truck body to collapse, thus causing vehicle 2 to tilt to its left side
and swerve towards the lane of vehicle 1. It was this accident that caused the swerving, not of [sic] any negligent act of the accused.

xxxx

Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two thingsthe fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the
crime for which the accused stands charged, and the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Sad to say, the prosecution has
miserably failed to prove these two things. When the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of establishing the guilt of the accused, an
accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf.

xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer is granted and the accused JEFFREY RESO DAYAP is hereby acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence. The bail bond posted for his temporary liberty is also hereby cancelled and ordered released to the accused or his duly authorized
representative.

SO ORDERED.[13]

Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,[14] alleging that the MTCs dismissal of the case was done without
considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution. Respondents added that the MTC failed to observe the manner the trial of the case
should proceed as provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court as well as failed to rule on the civil liability of the accused in spite of the
evidence presented. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Br. 32.

In the order[15] dated 23 August 2005, the RTC affirmed the acquittal of petitioner but ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for
further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. The RTC ruled that the MTCs recital of every fact in arriving at its conclusions disproved
the allegation that it failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also demonstrated that the MTC conducted
the trial of the case in the manner dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, except that the defense no longer presented its
evidence after the MTC gave due course to the accuseds demurrer to evidence, the filing of which is allowed under Sec. 23, Rule 119. The RTC
however agreed that the MTC failed to rule on the accuseds civil liability, especially since the judgment of acquittal did not include a
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the RTC declared that the aspect of civil liability was not
passed upon and resolved to remand the issue to the MTC. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan on accuseds acquittal is AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the
court of origin or its successor for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[16]
Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC order, but these were denied for lack of merit in the order[17] dated 12
September 2005.

Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179. The appellate court
subsequently rendered the assailed decision and resolution. The Court of Appeals ruled that there being no proof of the total value of the
properties damaged, the criminal case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC and the proceedings before the MTC are

null and void. In so ruling, the appellate court cited Tulor v. Garcia (correct title of the case is Cuyos v. Garcia)[18] which ruled that in complex
crimes involving reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or physical injuries and damage to property, the jurisdiction of the court to take
cognizance of the case is determined by the fine imposable for the damage to property resulting from the reckless imprudence, not by the
corresponding penalty for the physical injuries charged. It also found support in Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the
1991 Rule 8 on Summary Procedure, which govern the summary procedure in first-level courts in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence where the imposable fine does not exceed P10,000.00. As there was no proof of the total value of the property
damaged and respondents were claiming the amount of P1,500,000.00 as civil damages, the case falls within the RTCs jurisdiction. The
dispositive portion of the Decision dated 17 August 2006 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by Us REMANDING the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial
Region, Branch 32, Negros Oriental for proper disposition of the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.[19]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision,[20] arguing that jurisdiction over the case is determined by the
allegations in the information, and that neither the 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure nor Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
can be the basis of the RTCs jurisdiction over the case. However, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit
in the Resolution dated 25 April 2007.[21] It reiterated that it is the RTC that has proper jurisdiction considering that the information alleged
a willful, unlawful, felonious killing as well as abandonment of the victims.

In the present petition for review, petitioner argues that the MTC had jurisdiction to hear the criminal case for reckless imprudence, owing to
the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,[22] which confers jurisdiction to first-level courts on offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence. He asserts that the RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction on the basis of a legally unfiled and officially
withdrawn amended information alleging abandonment. Respondents are also faulted for challenging the MTCs order acquitting petitioner
through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42.
The petition has merit. It should be granted.

The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that jurisdiction over the offense charged pertained to the RTC.

Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the basis of the Information dated 29 December 2004 charging petitioner only with
the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage to property. The Court of Appeals
however declared in its decision that petitioner should have been charged with the same offense but aggravated by the circumstance of
abandonment of the victims. It appears from the records however that respondents attempt to amend the information by charging the
aggravated offense was unsuccessful as the MTC had approved the Provincial Prosecutors motion to withdraw their motion to amend the
information. The information filed before the trial court had remained unamended.[23] Thus, petitioner is deemed to have been charged
only with the offense alleged in the original Information without any aggravating circumstance.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who, by reckless imprudence, commits any act which, had it been intentional,
would constitute a grave felony, with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. When
such reckless imprudence the use of a motor vehicle, resulting in the death of a person attended the same article imposes upon the
defendant the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

The offense with which petitioner was charged is reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage to
property, a complex crime. Where a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime
is committed.[24] Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies,
or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the definition of
felonies in Article 3 as acts or omissions punishable by law committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).[25] Thus, the penalty
imposable upon petitioner, were he to be found guilty, is prision correccional in its medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years)
and maximum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years).

Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of
the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.[26] When this case was filed on 29 December
2004, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the
first-level courts over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties including those for civil liability. It explicitly states that in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. It follows that
criminal cases for reckless

imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods should fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not
the RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained to the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the
criminal case.[27] Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken cognizance of the case and the proceedings before
it were valid and legal.
As the records show, the MTC granted petitioners demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of the offense on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is filed after the prosecution had rested its case, and when the
same is granted, it calls for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.[28] Such dismissal of a
criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy.[29]
But while the dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still reviewable but only by certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing court, and the
only legal basis to reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court, in
acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus
rendering the assailed judgment void.[30]

Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari alleging that the MTC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the
case and failing to consider the evidence of the prosecution in resolving the same, and in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as
mandated by the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint. The
MTCs conclusions were based on facts diligently recited in the order thereby disproving that the MTC failed to consider the evidence
presented by the prosecution. The records also show that the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court.

The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the remand of the case of the matter of civil liability for the reception of
evidence.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals on directing the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect, as well as
with the RTC in directing a similar remand to the MTC.

The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. [31] However, the civil action based on delict
may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist[32] or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.[33]
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the
case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.[34] This is because when the
accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence
on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to
evidence and acquitting the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the
case and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of
the case.[35]

A scrutiny of the MTCs decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal was based on the findings that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist and that petitioner did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him; hence, petitioners civil liability
has been extinguished by his acquittal. It should be noted that the MTC categorically stated that it cannot find any evidence which would
prove that a crime had been committed and that accused was the person responsible for it. It added that the prosecution failed to establish
that it was petitioner who committed the crime as charged since its witnesses never identified petitioner as the one who was driving the
cargo truck at the time of the incident. Furthermore, the MTC found that the proximate cause of the accident is the damage to the rear
portion of the truck caused by the swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear left portion of the cargo truck and not the reckless driving of the
truck by petitioner, clearly establishing that petitioner is not guilty of reckless imprudence. Consequently, there is no more need to remand
the case to the trial court for proceedings on the civil aspect of the case, since petitioners acquittal has extinguished his civil liability.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 17 August 2006 and Resolution dated 25 April 2007 in CA-G.R. SP.
No. 01179 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated 16 May 2005 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros Oriental in Criminal
Case No. 3016-04 granting the Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap of the offense charged therein is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174659

Plaintiff-appellee,

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

AZCUNA,*

TINGA,*

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,**

REYES,***

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and

BRION, JJ.

RAGA SARAPIDA MAMANTAK

and LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK,

Accused-appellants. Promulgated:

July 28, 2008

x---------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

There are people who are simply incapable of feeling pity or compassion for others.

Ma. Teresa Basario must have felt a dagger deep in her heart when she lost her two-year old son, Christopher, two weeks before Christmas
on December 13, 1999. And again upon being reunited with him some 16 months later when he could neither recognize her nor remember
who he was.

Justice demands that those responsible for this cruel and agonizing separation of mother and child be punished to the full extent of the law.

At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with Christopher and her elder sister Zenaida to a McDonalds outlet in the KP Tower
in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and Christopher looked for a vacant table while Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after
Teresa took her seat, Christopher followed Zenaida to the counter. Barely had Christopher gone from his mothers sight when she realized
that he had disappeared. She and her sister frantically looked for him inside and outside the premises of the fastfood outlet, to no avail. As
their continued search for the child was futile, they reported him missing to the nearest police detachment.

The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform the public of the loss of Christopher and to appeal for help and
information. Despite the publicity, however, Teresa received no word about Christophers whereabouts. Worse, pranksters were gleefully
having a field day aggravating her misery.

On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman who sounded like a muslim. The caller claimed to have custody of Christopher
and asked for P30,000 in exchange for the boy.

On March 27, 2001, the same muslim-sounding woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent photo of her son from the Jalal
Restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when Teresa went there, someone gave her a recent picture of
Christopher. She then contacted the mysterious woman through the cellphone number the latter had previously given her. When the woman
instructed her to immediately board a ship for Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not raised the ransom money yet. They then agreed
to conduct the pay off in the morning of April 7, 2001 at Pitangs Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.

Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). A team was formed and Police Officer (PO)3[1] Juliet
Palafox was designated to act as Teresas niece.

Together with the PAOCTF team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001. On April 7, 2001, they arrived in Iligan City and proceeded to the
designated meeting place.
At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitangs Carinderia, two women came. They were Raga Sarapida
Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached Teresa and PO3 Palafox and asked who they were waiting for. Teresa replied
that they were waiting for a certain Rocma Bato, the name written at the back of the picture she received in Jalal Restaurant in Manila. She
showed the photo to Mamantak who stated that she knew Bato. Mamantak then told Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato if the latter
was already in Kapatagan. Mamantak turned to Taurak, supposedly the cousin of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and
informed them that she had Christopher. Taurak asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but they refused. Taurak reluctantly agreed
to leave Mamantak with them while she fetched Christopher.

Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and told Teresa that Christopher was in a nearby ice plant. She asked
Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted on their agreement that the boy be handed over at the carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came
back after several minutes with Christopher.

Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child was unmoved. He no longer recognized nor understood her for he
could only speak in the muslim dialect. When asked who he was, the boy gave a muslim name with Taurak as surname.

Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom money. She answered that her niece had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox.
Thereafter, Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney which was parked outside, under Tauraks watchful eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3
Palafox handed the ransom money to Mamantak. At this juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and the PAOCTF team then closed
in and arrested Mamantak and Taurak.

Christopher relearned Tagalog after a month and gradually began to forget the incident. On the other hand, Teresa almost lost her sanity. At
the time Christopher was kidnapped, she was pregnant with her third child. The child, born very sickly, eventually died.

The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were charged with kidnapping for ransom under the following Information:

That on December 13, 1999 in Binondo, Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, carry away and deprive Christopher Basario, a two-year old minor of his liberty against his will for the purpose of extorting ransom as in
fact a demand for ransom was made as a condition for his release amounting to THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) to the damage and
prejudice of Christopher Basario in said amount and such other amount as maybe awarded to him under the provisions of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Mamantak and Taurak pleaded not guilty when arraigned. After pre-trial, trial ensued and the parties presented their respective evidence.

In defense, Mamantak and Taurak denied the charges against them. Taurak testified that at the time and date of the alleged kidnapping, she
was peddling wares in Divisoria market, Manila. When she saw Christopher wandering about aimlessly, she talked to him but he did not seem
to understand her. She took the boy under her care and waited for someone to come for him. No one did. As it was already 7:00 p.m., she
brought the boy home with her to the Muslim Center in Quiapo.

The next day, she and her husband took the boy to the nearest police outpost but no one was there so they just brought the boy to their stall.
They opted to keep the boy until his parents could claim him.

On February 17, 2001, Taurak brought the child to Maganding, Sultan Kumander, Lanao del Sur. Sometime later, Teresa contacted her and
asked for Christophers picture for confirmation. It was at this point that Taurak arranged a meeting at Pitangs Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao
del Norte on April 7, 2001. She did not bring the boy at first as a precautionary measure. Only after confirming that Teresa was the boys
mother did she relinquish custody to her. However, she was shocked when members of the PAOCTF suddenly arrested her. She protested
because she was innocent. There were no charges against her nor was there a warrant for her arrest.

Mamantak corroborated her sister Tauraks testimony. She claimed that she was at Nunungan, Lanao del Norte on December 13, 1999. At
that time, she did not know the exact whereabouts of Taurak who was in Manila and whom she had not seen for some time. They met again
on April 7, 2001 at Pitangs Carinderia but only by chance. She happened to be there when Taurak came. When Teresa arrived later, Taurak
talked to her and then left, returning after a few hours with Christopher whom Mamantak saw for the first time. Taurak told her that she had
found the boy and was returning him to his mother. Mamantak stayed in the carinderia all the while, waiting for her ride home at 4:00 p.m.
She was stunned when PAOCTF members suddenly arrested her and her sister as she had not committed any crime and there was no warrant
for her arrest.

After evaluating the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision[2] on November 30, 2004 finding Taurak and
Mamantak guilty as charged:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding both accused LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK and accused RAGA SARAPIDA [MAMANTAK]
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA No. 7659 and both are hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Both accused are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay the Christopher Basario
represented by the mother, [Ma.] Teresa Basario the amount of PHP50,000.00 as compensatory damages and PHP50,000.00 as moral
damages. With costs against the accused.

Both accused are given credit for the preventive imprisonment undergone by them during the pendency of this case.
SO ORDERED.[3]

Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision[4] dated March 31, 2006, the appellate court ruled that the trial court
erred in not considering the demand for P30,000 as a demand for ransom. Such circumstance required the imposition of the death penalty.
Thus, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of Taurak and Mamantak with modification amending the penalty from reclusion perpetua
to death.[5] Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to
this Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.[6]

We affirm the Court of Appeals, with a modification of penalty.

Kidnapping is defined and punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (RA) 7659:

ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive
him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have
been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any
other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed.

The crime has the following elements:

(1) the offender is a private individual; not either of the parents of the victim[7] or a public officer who has a duty under the law to detain a
person;[8]

(2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;

(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal and

(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three
days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained
or threats to kill him are made or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public official.

If the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose
of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention becomes inconsequential. The crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if
none of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is present.[9]

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it.[10] It
includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time.[11]
And liberty is not limited to mere physical restraint but embraces ones right to enjoy his God-given faculties subject only to such restraints
necessary for the common welfare.[12]

The two-year-old Christopher suddenly disappeared in Binondo, Manila and was recovered only after almost 16 months from Taurak and
Mamantak (both of them private individuals) in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. During the entire time the boy was kept away from his mother,
he was certainly deprived or restrained of his liberty. He had no means, opportunity or capacity to leave appellants custody and return to his
family on his own. He had no choice but to stay with total strangers, go with them to a far away place and learn a culture and dialect alien to
him. At such a very tender age, he was deprived of the liberty to enjoy the company and care of his family, specially his mother.

Taurak unlawfully kept the child under her control and custody and even brought him to Lanao del Norte. She demanded P30,000 in
exchange for his return to his mother. On the other hand, Mamantaks actions (e.g., her presence in the carinderia and her acceptance of the
ransom) showed without doubt that she was aiding her sister and was acting in concert with her. These were the identical factual findings of
both the trial and appellate courts. There is no reason to disturb them as they are sufficiently supported by evidence.

Tauraks story that she merely gave Christopher refuge was incredible. It was like the apocryphal tale of a man accused of theft of large cattle;
his excuse was that he saw a piece of rope and brought it home not knowing that there was a cow tied to the other end. She never even tried
to bring the boy to the proper authorities or surrender him to the Department of Social Welfare and Developments social workers in her
barangay or in the city hall at any time during the 16 months he was with her. And how could Teresa have initiated her phone conversations
with Taurak when they were total strangers to each other?

Similarly, Mamantaks account that she was at Pitangs Carinderia only by coincidence and that it was only there that she first saw Christopher
invites nothing but disbelief. The unequivocal testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on her role in arranging for the payment of ransom
and the release of the kidnap victim (e.g., confirming the identity of Teresa and demanding and receiving the ransom money) showed
otherwise. The evidence clearly established that Mamantak was a principal in the kidnapping of Christopher.

Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself.[13] The trial and appellate
courts correctly ruled that the statements of Taurak and Mamantak did not deserve credence. Moreover, factual findings of the trial court,
including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight thereof, are accorded great, if not conclusive, value
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[14]

The Court of Appeals considered the demand for P30,000 as a qualifying circumstance which necessitated the imposition of the death
penalty. On the other hand, the trial court deemed the amount as too measly, compared to what must have been actually spent for the care
and subsistence of Christopher for almost two years. It therefore treated the amount not as ransom but as a reimbursement of expenses
incurred for taking care of the child. (Kidnappers in Mindanao today call it reimbursement for board-and-lodging.)

Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that will release him from
captivity.[15] No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as
a bargaining chip in exchange for the victims freedom.[16] The amount of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial.

In this case, the payment of P30,000 was demanded as a condition for the release of Christopher to his mother. Thus, the Court of Appeals
correctly considered it as a demand for ransom.

One final point of law. While the penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code[17] is death, RA 9346[18] has banned the death penalty and reduced all death sentences to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole. Pursuant to this law, we reduce the penalty imposed on appellants from death to reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole.
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of P50,000 civil indemnity[19] was proper. Pursuant to People v. Garalde,[20] the award of
P50,000[21] moral damages is increased to P200,000 considering the minority of Christopher. Moreover, since the crime was attended by a
demand for ransom, and by way of example or correction, Christopher is entitled to P100,000 exemplary damages.[22]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The March 31, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00729 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Appellants Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom for which they are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. They
are further ordered to pay, jointly and severally, P50,000 civil indemnity, P200,000 moral damages and P100,000 exemplary damages to their
young victim Christopher Basario.

Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

SAFEGUARD SECURITY G.R. NO. 165732

AGENCY, INC., and ADMER

PAJARILLO,

Petitioners,

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.*

YNARES-SANTIAGO, (Working Chairperson)

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CALLEJO, SR., and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO,

VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN

LAURO TANGCO, VON LARRIE

TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO

and VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO, Promulgated:

Respondents. December 14, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. (Safeguard) and Admer Pajarillo (Pajarillo) assailing the
Decision[1] dated July 16, 2004 and the Resolution[2] dated October 20, 2004 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462.

On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew
her time deposit per advise of the banks cashier as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with
corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and
pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting
her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangelines husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents
reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of
Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 2000.[3] On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in
a Decision[4] dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.

Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint[5] for damages against Pajarillo for
negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage
committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

In their Answer,[6] petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangelines death was not due to Pajarillos negligence as the latter acted
only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorneys fees.

Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision,[7] the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline Tangco, and against defendants Admer Pajarillo
and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. ordering said defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following:

1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P157,430.00), as actual damages

2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as death indemnity;

3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral damages;

4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00), as exemplary damages;

5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as attorneys fees; and

6. costs of suit.
For lack of merit, defendants counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. [8]

The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillos claim that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to
Pajarillos bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such
report to the head office and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he
should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her
instantly; that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof
negating liability in the instant case.

The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded
that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show
that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguards evidence simply
showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision
includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their
servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.

Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA issued its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.s civil
liability in this case is only subsidiary under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. No pronouncement as to costs.[9]

In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had
been found guilty of Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly
liable under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely
dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is
deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might proceed
does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the employment
and supervision of employees is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution dated October 20, 2004.

Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the following assignment of errors, to wit:

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding petitioner Pajarillo liable to respondents for the payment of damages and other
money claims.

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it applied Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code in holding petitioner Safeguard solidarily
[sic] liable with petitioner Pajarillo for the payment of damages and other money claims.

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to find that petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees, hence, should be excused from any liability.[10]

The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline; and (2) Safeguard should be held solidarily
liable for the damages awarded to respondents.

Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176[11] of the Civil Code, in which
case, its liability is jointly and severally with Pajarillo. However, since it has established that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of Pajarillo, it should be exonerated from civil liability.

We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing a separate civil action against petitioners are limited to the
recovery of damages arising from a crime or delict, in which case the liability of Safeguard as employer under Articles 102 and 103 of the
Revised Penal Code[12] is subsidiary and the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employee is not available to it.

The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.

The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, to wit:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil

liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed the same on January 14, 1998.

The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the crime of homicide, for which he had already been found guilty of
and serving sentence thereof, thus must be governed by the Revised Penal Code.

We do not agree.

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex
delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission
complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under
Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the
offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission or under both causes.[13]
It is important to determine the nature of respondents cause of action. The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in
the complaint as constituting the cause of action.[14] The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the
claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.[15]

The pertinent portions of the complaint read:

7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard assigned and posted in the Ecology Bank Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, who was
employed and under employment of Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. hence there is employer-employee relationship between co-defendants.

The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage to herein plaintiffs.

8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing Evangeline Tangco, who brought her firearm out of her bag, suddenly without exercising
necessary caution/care, and in idiotic manner, with the use of his shotgun, fired and burst bullets upon Evangeline M. Tangco, killing her
instantly. x x x

xxxx

16. That defendants, being employer and the employee are jointly and severally liable for the death of Evangeline M. Tangco.[16]

Thus, a reading of respondents complaint shows that the latter are invoking their right to recover damages against Safeguard for their
vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillos act of shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code which provides:

ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,[17] we held:

x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:

"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law." (Emphasis supplied)

The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in the criminal case but one based on culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from crime.[18] The source of the obligation sought to be
enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission punishable by law.

In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,[19] where the issue involved was whether the civil action filed by plaintiff-appellants is founded on crime
or on quasi-delict, we held:

x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based on a crime in view of the reservation made by the offended party in the criminal case
(Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before the court, to file a separate civil action. Said the trial court:

It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of May 10, 1969
constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept the validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had
already appeared as complainants. While that case was pending, the offended parties reserved the right to institute a separate civil action. If,
in a criminal case, the right to file a separate civil action for damages is reserved, such civil action is to be based on crime and not on tort.
That was the ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964.

We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is inapplicable to the instant case x x x.

xxxx
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he
may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of
a good father of the family.

In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved their right
in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.[20] (Emphasis
supplied)

Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide is already final and executory, such judgment has no relevance
or importance to this case.[21] It would have been entirely different if respondents cause of action was for damages arising from a delict, in
which case the CA is correct in finding Safeguard to be only subsidiary liable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.[22]

As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents cause of action is based on quasi-delict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, when the injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on
the part of the master or the employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in the supervision over him after selection or
both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon petitioners to prove that they
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent in shooting Evangeline.

The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact, which, as a general rule, we cannot pass
upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law.[23] Generally, factual findings of the trial
court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (8) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by
the evidence on record. [24]

A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent reason for us to deviate from the factual finding of the trial court and
affirmed by the CA that petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline.

Respondents evidence established that Evangelines purpose in going to the bank was to renew her time deposit.[25] On the other hand,
Pajarillo claims that Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and aimed the same at him, thus, acting instinctively, he shot her in self-defense.
Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance of about one meter or one arms length[26] he stepped backward,
loaded the chamber of his gun and shot her.[27] It is however unimaginable that petitioner Pajarillo could still make such movements if
indeed the gun was already pointed at him. Any movement could have prompted Evangeline to pull the trigger to shoot him.

Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on his mere apprehension that Evangeline will stage a bank robbery.
However, such claim is befuddled by his own testimony. Pajarillo testified that prior to the incident, he saw Evangeline roaming under the fly
over which was about 10 meters away from the bank[28] and saw her talking to a man thereat;[29] that she left the man under the fly-over,
crossed the street and approached the bank. However, except for the bare testimony of Pajarillo, the records do not show that indeed
Evangeline was seen roaming near the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. In fact, there is no evidence
that Pajarillo called the attention of his head guard or the banks branch manager regarding his concerns or that he reported the same to the
police authorities whose outpost is just about 15 meters from the bank.

Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she could have already apprised herself that Pajarillo, who was posted
outside the bank, was armed with a shotgun; that there were two guards inside the bank[30] manning the entrance door. Thus, it is quite
incredible that if she really had a companion, she would leave him under the fly-over which is 10 meters far from the bank and stage a bank
robbery all by herself without a back-up. In fact, she would have known, after surveying the area, that aiming her gun at Pajarillo would not
ensure entrance to the bank as there were guards manning the entrance door.

Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony,
except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is
outside judicial cognizance.[31]

That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank and was actually in the act of pulling her gun from her bag when
petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot her, finds support from the contentions raised in petitioners petition for review where they argued that
when Evangeline approached the bank, she was seen pulling a gun from inside her bag and petitioner Pajarillo who was suddenly beset by
fear and perceived the act as a dangerous threat, shot and killed the deceased out of pure instinct;[32] that the act of drawing a gun is a
threatening act, regardless of whether or not the gun was intended to be used against petitioner Pajarillo;[33] that the fear that was created
in the mind of petitioner Pajarillo as he saw Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun from her purse was suddenly very real and the former merely
reacted out of pure self-preservation.[34]

Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is absent, Pajarillos claim of self-defense cannot be accepted specially when
such claim was uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence other than his testimony which was even doubtful. Pajarillos
apprehension that Evangeline will shoot him to stage a bank robbery has no basis at all. It is therefore clear that the alleged threat of bank
robbery was just a figment of Pajarillos imagination which caused such unfounded unlawful aggression on his part.

Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory negligence. Although she was a licensed firearm holder, she had no business
bringing the gun in such establishment where people would react instinctively upon seeing the gun; that had Evangeline been prudent, she
could have warned Pajarillo before drawing the gun and did not conduct herself with suspicion by roaming outside the vicinity of the bank;
that she should not have held the gun with the nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who mistook the act as hold up or robbery.
We are not persuaded.

As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that Evangeline was seen roaming outside the vicinity of the bank and acting
suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. Evangelines death was merely due to Pajarillos negligence in shooting her on his imagined threat
that Evangeline will rob the bank.

Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it had adequately shown that it had exercised the diligence required in the
selection and supervision of its employees. It claims that it had required the guards to undergo the necessary training and to submit the
requisite qualifications and credentials which even the RTC found to have been complied with; that the RTC erroneously found that it did not
exercise the diligence required in the supervision of its employee. Safeguard further claims that it conducts monitoring of the activities of its
personnel, wherein supervisors are assigned to routinely check the activities of the security guards which include among others, whether or
not they are in their proper post and with proper equipment, as well as regular evaluations of the employees performances; that the fact that
Pajarillo loaded his firearm contrary to Safeguards operating procedure is not sufficient basis to say that Safeguard had failed its duty of
proper supervision; that it was likewise error to say that Safeguard was negligent in seeing to it that the procedures and policies were not
properly implemented by reason of one unfortunate event.

We are not convinced.

Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.

xxxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage.

As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former. Safeguard is presumed
to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law. This presumption may be overcome only by
satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision
of its employee.

In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service
records.[35] On the other hand, due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for
the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach
or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add
that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting
through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions.[36] To establish these factors in a trial involving
the issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.

We agree with the RTCs finding that Safeguard had exercised the diligence in the selection of Pajarillo since the record shows that Pajarillo
underwent a psychological and neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by the St. Martin de Porres Center where no psychoses ideations
were noted, submitted a certification on the Pre-licensing training course for security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances.

The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the diligence required in the supervision of its employee, particularly Pajarillo. In this
case, while Safeguard presented Capt. James Camero, its Director for Operations, who testified on the issuance of company rules and
regulations, such as the Guidelines of Guards Who Will Be Assigned To Banks,[37] Weapons Training,[38] Safeguard Training Center
Marksmanship Training Lesson Plan,[39] Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions,[40] it had also been established during Cameros cross-
examination that Pajarillo was not aware of such rules and regulations.[41] Notwithstanding Cameros clarification on his re-direct
examination that these company rules and regulations are lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of the instructors during classroom
instructions and not necessary to give students copy of the same,[42] the records do not show that Pajarillo had attended such classroom
instructions.

The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and continuous evaluation of the security guards performance. Pajarillo had
only attended an in-service training on March 1, 1997 conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa, his first assignment as security guard of Safeguard,
which was in collaboration with Safeguard. It was established that the concept of such training was purely on security of equipments to be
guarded and protection of the life of the employees.[43]
It had not been established that after Pajarillos training in Toyota, Safeguard had ever conducted further training of Pajarillo when he was
later assigned to guard a bank which has a different nature of business with that of Toyota. In fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a
bank is different from being on duty in a factory since a bank is a very sensitive area.[44]

Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangelines act of just depositing her firearm for safekeeping, i.e., of immediately shooting her,
confirms that there was no training or seminar given on how to handle bank clients and on human psychology.

Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors who go around the bank two times a day to see the daily
performance of the security guards assigned therein, there was no record ever presented of such daily inspections. In fact, if there was really
such inspection made, the alleged suspicious act of Evangeline could have been taken noticed and reported.

Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of actual damages in the amount P157,430.00 which were the expenses
incurred by respondents in connection with the burial of Evangeline were supported by receipts. The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
for the death of Evangeline is likewise in order.

As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate descendants
and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Moral damages are
awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has
undergone, by reason of the defendants culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante; thus it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.[45] The intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is
proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender.[46]

In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering caused by Evangelines death was so sudden causing respondent Lauro to lose a
wife and a mother to six children who were all minors at the time of her death. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[47] we awarded one million pesos
as moral damages to the heirs of a seventeen-year-old girl who was murdered. In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[48]
we likewise awarded the amount of one million pesos as moral damages to the parents of a third year high school student and who was also
their youngest child who died in a vehicular accident since the girls death left a void in their lives. Hence, we hold that the respondents are
also entitled to the amount of one million pesos as Evangelines death left a void in the lives of her husband and minor children as they were
deprived of her love and care by her untimely demise.

We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary
damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.[49] It is awarded as a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. In quasi-delict, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant
acted with gross negligence.[50]
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be recovered when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages are awarded.
Hence, we affirm the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 178115 July 28, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias CARDING SUMILHIG, PASOT SALOLI, ERIC ENOC, WARLITO MONTEBON,* and CIO LIMAMA,
Accused,

JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias CARDING SUMILHIG, and PASOT SALOLI, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated July 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00187-MIN, which affirmed with
modifications the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) conviction2 of appellants Jojo Sumilhig (Jojo), Ricardo Sumilhig alias Carding Sumilhig (Carding),
and Pasot Saloli (Pasot) in Criminal Case No. 3(99).

Factual Antecedents

Appellants, together with the accused Eric Enoc, Warlito Montibon and Cio Limama, were charged with double murder and double frustrated
murder in an Amended Information,3 the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about October 31, 1998, inthe Municipality of Kiblawan, Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, armed with assortedfirearms, with intent to
kill with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, simultaneously strafe the house of
Eugenio Santander resulting to death of [Cresjoy] Santander and RollySantander and seriously wounding Marissa Santander and Micel
Santander, which would have caused their death had there been no timely and able medical assistance rendered to them, to the damage and
prejudice of the offended parties.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Only Jojo, Carding and Pasot, who entered separate pleas of "not guilty" during their arraignment,5 faced trial. The other accused could not
be located and remain at-large to this day.
Factual Antecedents

The prosecution established that onOctober 31, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., Jerry Masaglang (Jerry), together with Eugenio Santander
(Eugenio) and his son Mario, were in the living room of Eugenio’s house in SitioOverland, Kimlawis, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. Suddenly, they
heard gun bursts and saw six persons firing at the kitchen where members of the Santander family werehaving dinner. Jerry and Mario
recognized the assailants to be the appellants and their co-accused.

The strafing of the kitchen lasted for about two minutes. Before the gunmen dispersed, Jojo shouted, "At last, I have retaliated!" In the
aftermath, the children of Eugenio’s other son Remegio6 Santander (Remegio), 3-year old Cresjoy,7 8-year old Rolly, and teeners Marissa and
Micel, sustained gunshot wounds. Unfortunately, Cresjoy expired while on the way to the hospital while Rolly was pronounced dead-on-
arrival. Marissa sustained gunshot wounds atthe right breast area and left wrist, while Micel was wounded inthe left sternal area and elbow.

Jojo denied involvement in the incident and interposed the defense of alibi. At the time of the incident, he claimed to be in the house of his
parents-in-law in SitioOlogo-o, BarangayTacub, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. He further asserted that it was impossible for him to be at the scene
of the crime on October 31, 1998 since he could not walk briskly due to a gunshot wound he earlier sustained in his left knee and anus. He
maintained that it was only in January 1999 that he was able to walk without the aid of crutches. However, Jojo admitted harboring ill-will
against the Santander clan since he believed that they were the ones responsible for the massacre of his family in February 1998.

Carding, for his part, claimed to be illiterate and unaware of the incident. He contended that at the time of the shooting, he was in
Dalmandang, Tacub, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, which is four-hours walk away from the crime scene. Pasot, on the other hand, maintained that
he was withhis wife at the house of Pablo Mot in Lampara, Balasiao, Kiblawan, Davao atthe time the crime was committed. Bothclaimed total
ignoranceof the incident.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC convicted the appellants ofthe complex crime of double murder and double frustrated murder and sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of death. It further ordered them to indemnify, jointlyand severally, the heirs of Cresjoy and Rolly the sum of ₱100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, and the surviving victims, Marissa and Micel, the sums of ₱50,000.00 and ₱30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages,
respectively.8

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA did not find any reason to disturb the findings of the RTC. However, it found merit in appellants’ argument that the crime
committed could not have been a complex crime since the death and injuries complained of did not result from a single act but from several
and distinctacts of shooting. And as treachery was alleged in the Amended Information and sufficiently proven during trial, appellants should
be convicted instead of two counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder. Thus, in rendering its Decision9 dated July 28, 2006, the
CA disposed ofthe case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of appellants Jojo Sumilhig, Alias Carding Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli is affirmed butmodified as
follows –

Appellants Juan "Jojo" Sumilhig, Alias Carding Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli, are found guilty beyondreasonable doubt of:

a. Murder for killing Crisjoy Santander, and x x x are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;

b. Murder for the killing of Rolly Santander, and x x x are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;

c. Frustrated Murder for the shooting of Marissa Santander and x x x are sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ofsix (6) years, four (4) months
and [ten] (10) days of prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporalas
maximum; d. Frustrated Murder for the shooting of Micel Santander and x x x are sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ofsix (6) years, four
(4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporalas maximum. All accused are ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Crisjoy Santander and Rolly Santander the sum
of ₱100,000.00 and the surviving victims Marissa Santander and Micel Santander ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.10

Hence, this appeal.

Since there is no more dispute that appellants should not have been convicted of the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder
as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) already concedes to the same,11 the only error left from those raised by appellants in their brief is
as follows:

GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY
WAS PRESENT AND INFINDING THAT THE CRIMES COMMITTED WERE MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER.12

It must be noted at the outset that Carding diedon June 24, 2011 during the pendency of this appeal.13 "[I]n view of [this] supervening event,
it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on [Carding’s] appeal. Whether x x x he was guilty of the [crimes] charged has becomeirrelevant since,
following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, x x x, even assuming [that Carding] had incurred any criminal liability, it was totally
extinguished by his death. Moreover, because [the] appeal was still pending and no final judgment of conviction had been rendered against
him [before] he died, his civil liability arising from the crime, being civil liability ex delicto,was likewise extinguished by his death."14

Appellants’ Arguments

Appellants claim that the RTC erred in relying heavily on the ill-feelings and vendetta Jojo harbored against the Santander family. They
contend that this motive for committing the crime is not a substitute for proof beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, Jojo’salibi that it was
impossible for him to be at the crime scene due to the gunshot wounds in his knee and anus is amply corroborated by a medical prognosis.

Anent Pasot, appellants argue that although the trial court found his claim of total ignorance on almost about everything to beincredulous,
still, his conviction must not rest on the weakness of his defense but on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence.

Appellants likewise question the finding of conspiracyand treachery.

Our Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

Appellants’ conviction was based on

their positive identification by the

prosecution witnesses.

True, the RTC noted in its Decision the existence of motive on the part of Jojo for committing the crime as well as Pasot’s incredulous claim of
ignorance on almost about everything. It is well to note, however, that the said court neither based the appellants’ conviction on the
existence of such motive nor on Pasot’s weak defense of ignorance alone, but upon the prosecution witnesses’ identification of appellants as
the assailants, viz:
Assessing the evidence presented by both [P]rosecution and defense, we see a less than glaring hint of vendetta. As part of his defense, the
accused Jojo Sumilhig narrated that his family was massacred by Jerry Santander, brother of Remigio Santander [in] February 1998. Short of
admitting the crime, Sumilhig stated that because of this, he harbored ill feelings not only against Jerry and Carlos Santander but also against
their family. Thus a clear motive for killing the Santander family has been established giving credence to prosecution witnesses’ allegation
that after the strafing Jojo Sumilhig shouted"Nakabalos na ko!" The likelihood of his intention to wipe out the said family became even more
apparent.

Despite his positive assertion that it was the Santanders that killed his family, he did not file any case against them. It was only after he was
arrested that he filed a complaint against Jerry and Carlos Santander.

His alibi likewise failed to meet the stringent requisites of the Rules. Even as Dr. Quirapas appeared determined to rule out the possibility that
he could walk without crutches five months after his discharge, the same was based on general medical prognosis. Such prognostication
admits certain exception[s], as could be gleaned from the testimony of the doctor himself that the healing period may vary depending on the
age and physical condition of the patient. Notably Jojo Sumilhig was then 23 years old.

What was certain was the positive identification made by Jerry Masaglang and Remegio Santander of all of the accused.

The "overkill" by which the accused Pasot Saloli and Carding Sumilhig claimed total ignorance of almost anything only served to arouse
incredulity. Both accused claimed they could not read, write, tell time, day, month or year. Neither could [they] allegedly speak [or]
understand Visayan, which is of common knowledge to be widely spoken in almost every part of Mindanao. Saloli claimed he did not know
what day [it] was when he was testifying, or the day before and after that. Both claimed they did not know the complainants or of the
massacre that took place.

xxxx

More importantly, these claims [of] utter ignorance are belied by the evasiveness by which all three accused answered in obvious effort to
avoid criminal responsibility. Behind the façade of ignorance and lack of education lurks a calculating mind. We find [it] difficult to ascribe
innocence to the accused when traces of ingenuity and craftiness characterize their testimonies.

All these observations however become insignificant in the face of the positive and spontaneous identification of the assailants/accused by
credible witnesses Jerry Masaglang and Remigio Santander.15

There is no reason to doubt Jerry and Mario’s identification of the appellants considering that (1) Jerry was just six meters away from
them;16 (2) the moon was bright and Jerry was familiar with all the accused as most of them are his relatives;17 and, (3) Mario knows
Jojoever since he was small.18 Besides, "[t]ime-tested is the rulethat between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the
negative averments of the accused, the former undisputedly [deserve] more credence and [are] entitled to greater evidentiary weight."19

Anent the respective alibis interposed by appellants, suffice it to say that "[a]libi cannot prevail over the positive identification of a credible
witness."20

There was conspiracy among the accused.

"[C]onspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it."21 It
is not necessary to adduce evidence of a previous agreement to commit a crime.22 "Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial
evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves
when such leadto a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest."23

Here, there is no proof of a previous agreement among the accused but there is a series of events that clearly established conspiracy among
them. First, they were all armed with firearms. Second, they surreptitiously approached the crime scene. Third, when they were within close
range of the intended victims, they simultaneously discharged their firearms. Fourth, they ceased firing at the same time and fled together.
Undoubtedly, their acts before, during and immediately after strafing the house of Eugenio evince their unanimity in design, intent and
execution.24 Treachery attended the commission of the crime.
"There is treachery whenthe offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods orforms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure the execution, without risk to himself arising from [any] defense which the offended party
might make."25

Treachery is evident in this case as the suddenness and unexpectedness of the assault deprived the victims of an opportunity to resist it or
offer any defense of their persons. This is considering that the victims were unaware that they would be attacked by appellants with a hailof
bullets from their firearms fired at close range. Indeed, "[t]he suddenness of the attack, without the slightest forewarning thereof, placed the
[victims] x x x in such a position that they could not have defended themselvesfrom the aggression x x x."26

The crime committed is two counts of

murder and two counts of frustrated

murder.

As earlier discussed, treachery attendedthe commission of the crime. This qualifies the killing of Cresjoy and Rolly to murder.

With regard to Marissa and Micel, the Court notes that while the RTC was silent as to the nature of injuries sustained by them, the CA
correctly ruled on the seriousness thereof. The Medico Legal report of Marissa shows that she suffered multiple gunshot wounds in her right
breast and left wrist27 while the Certificate of Treatment/Confinement of Micel states that she sustained gunshot wounds in the area of the
sternum and elbow.28 As aptly found by the CA, the girls would have died if not for the timely medical attention provided to them. The
crimes committed by the appellants against them were thus frustrated murders.

The Penalty

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetuato death.1âwphi1 With both penalties
being indivisible and there being no aggravating circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the lower of the two
penalties which is reclusion perpetua was properly imposed by the CA on appellants for each count of murder.29 However, appellants are
not eligible for parole.30

As regards the frustrated murders of Marissa and Micel, the penalty lesser by one degree shall be imposed on appellants.31 Accordingly, the
penalty that must be imposed is reclusion temporalfor each count of frustrated murder. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and in the
absence of modifying circumstances other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the
medium period of reclusion temporal, which has a range of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayorin any of its periods, the
range of which is from six (6) years,one (1) day to twelve (12)years. The prison term imposed by the CA on appellants must therefore be
modified to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporalas maximum, which is within these ranges,32 for each count of frustrated murder.

Awards of Damages

For the murders of Cresjoy and Rolly, the CA correctly held that their heirs are entitled to an award of civil indemnity, however, the amount
of the award must be ₱75,000.00 for each death pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.33 The awards of moral damages in the amount of
₱50,000.00 each and exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 each are proper.34 In addition, the heirs of the victims are entitled to
temperate damages in the sum of ₱25,000.00 for each death in lieu of actual damages.35

For the frustrated murders of Marissa and Micel, the awards of moral and exemplary damages by the CA must be decreased to ₱40,000.00
and ₱20,000.00, respectively for each victim.36 They are likewise entitled to temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 each in lieu of
actual damages.37

All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annumfrom the date of finality of thisjudgment until fully paid.38
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 00187-MIN which affirmed withmodification the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of DigosCity, Davao del Sur, Branch 19, finding appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two counts of murder and two counts offrustrated murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONSas follows:

For the murders of Cresjoy Santander and Rolly Santander:

(1) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall suffer the prison tenn of reclusion perpetua for each count of murder without eligibility for
parole;

(2) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall pay the heirs of the victims the amount of ₱5,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of each
victim;

(3) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall pay the heirs of the victims ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages for each death.

For the frustrated murders of Marissa Santander and Micel Santander:

(1) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each count of frustrated
murder; and,

(2) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli are ordered to pay moral damages and exemplary damages to each of the victims in the reduced
amounts of ₱40,000.00 and ₱25,000.00, respectively.

All amounts of damages awarded shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum commencing from the date of finality of judgment until
fully paid.

Due to the death of Ricardo Swnilhig alias Carding Sumilhig prior to final judgment, his criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto as found by
the Regional Trial Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are extinguished. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 3(99) is ordered dismissed
insofar as Ricardo Sumilhig alias Carding Sumilhig is concerned.

Costs against appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 205412, September 09, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ADRIAN GUTING Y TOMAS, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For Our consideration is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 23, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04596, which
affirmed the Decision2 dated June 24, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68, in Criminal Case No. 06-93, finding
accused-appellant Adrian Guting y Tomas guilty of the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.

In an Information3 dated August 1, 2006, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-93, accused-appellant was charged before the RTC with Parricide,
allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about 4:50 in the rainy afternoon of July 30, 2006 at Plaridel St., Poblacion B. Camiling, Tarlac, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with evident
premeditation, that is, having conceived and deliberated to kill his own father Jose Guting y Ibarra, 67 years old, married, while inside their
residential house, and armed with a bladed weapon, suddenly and unexpectedly stabbed several times the victim, employing means, manner
and form in the execution thereof which tender directly and specially to insure its commission without danger to the person of said accused,
the result of which attack was that said victim received multiple stab wounds on his body which directly caused his instantaneous death.

When arraigned on September 19, 2006, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.4 Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the
merits ensued.

Below is a summary of the prosecution witnesses' testimonies.

Police Officer (PO1) Fidel Torre (Torre) testified that on the rainy afternoon of July 30, 2005, at around 5:00 o'clock, he and PO1 Alexis Macusi
(Macusi) were standing in front of the Camiling Police Station when accused-appellant, all wet from the rain and with a bladed weapon in his
hand, suddenly approached them and told them that he had stabbed his father. Hearing accused-appellant's statement, PO1 Torre
immediately got the bladed weapon from accused-appellant and turned it over to PO1 Macusi for proper disposition.5

PO1 Macusi corroborated PO1 Torre's testimony. PO1 Macusi narrated that accused-appellant suddenly appeared before them at the Police
Station, all wet and holding a knife. Accused-appellant proclaimed that his father was already dead. Unsuspecting, PO1 Macusi asked who
killed accused-appellant's father. Accused-appellant answered, "Sinaksak ko po yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!" PO1 Torre then got the
knife from accused-appellant and gave it to PO1 Macusi. PO1 Macusi placed the knife in the custodian cabinet in the Police Station.
Thereafter, PO1 Macusi, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Eliseo Hermosado (Hermosado), and SPO2 Noli Felipe (Felipe) went to the residence of
Jose Guting (Jose), accused-appellant's father, to verify the reported crime, while other police officers informed Flora Guting (Flora), Jose's
wife (also accused-appellant's mother), who was still in the market with Emerlito Guting (Emerlito), Jose and Flora's other son (accused-
appellant's brother), who was then driving a tricycle for hire. While waiting for Flora and Emerlito, PO1 Macusi, SPO2 Hermosado, and SPO2
Felipe inquired from the neighbors if anybody had witnessed the crime, but no one did. When Flora and Emerlito arrived, they entered the
house and saw Jose's lifeless body with blood still oozing from his wounds. Immediately, Flora and Emerlito brought Jose to the hospital
where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Subsequently, Flora and Emerlito executed their respective Sinumpaang Salaysay and filed a case
for Parricide against accused-appellant.6

On cross-examination, PO1 Macusi divulged that when the knife was given to him by PO1 Torre for safekeeping, he did not ask accused-
appellant if it was the knife he used to kill his father. Neither did accused-appellant mention to PO1 Macusi that it was the knife he used in
stabbing Jose. All that accused-appellant said was, "Sinaksak ko po yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!" PO1 Macusi also admitted that he did
not request for the examination of the knife because it was clean; any trace or stain of blood on it would have been washed away by the rains
at that time. PO1 Macusi was further questioned as to why he did not put into writing accused-appellant's admission that he killed his father,
and PO1 Macusi explained that it escaped his mind as he was still new at the job then and he was carried away by the fast flow of events.7

Flora conceded that she was not present when Jose, her husband, was killed by accused-appellant, their son. Flora only learned of the
stabbing incident and accused-appellant's surrender from the police officers of the Camiling Police Station. Flora declared that she spent for
the wake and burial of Jose and that Jose, who was a tricycle driver, had been earning around P200.00 a day at the time of his death.8

Doctor Valentin Theodore Lomibao (Dr. Lomibao) conducted the autopsy of Jose's body. Dr. Lomibao reported that Jose suffered around 39
stab wounds on the head, neck, thorax, abdomen, and extremities. Jose's internal organs were heavily damaged by the stab wounds,
resulting in his instantaneous death. Dr. Lomibao also showed several pictures of Jose's body which were taken before he conducted the
autopsy.9

Accused-appellant opted not to present any evidence in his defense.

The RTC promulgated its Decision on June 24, 2010 finding accused-appellant guilty of Parricide based on his verbal admission that he killed
his father, Jose. Even assuming that accused-appellant's admission was inadmissible in evidence, the RTC adjudged that the prosecution was
still able to establish sufficient circumstantial evidence which, taken collectively, pointed to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the
brutal killing of his father. The dispositive portion of the RTC judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, accused Adrian Guting y Tomas is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Parricide punishable under
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and hereby sentences him to a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

Accused is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, another amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and still another amount of P30,000.00 as temperate damages.10

Accused-appellant appealed his conviction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04596. The appellate court
promulgated its Decision on May 23, 2012, decreeing thus:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68 convicting herein accused-
appellant Adrian Guting y Tomas for the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED.11

Hence, accused-appellant comes before us via the instant appeal with the same assignment of errors he raised before the Court of Appeals,
to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF HIS EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF INSUFFICIENT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HIS FAVOR.12

We find no merit in accused-appellant's appeal.

Accused-appellant argues that his oral confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, without the assistance of counsel, is inadmissible in evidence
for having been made in blatant violation of his constitutional right under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 12, paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution mandate that:

SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

xxxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.13

The "investigation" in Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertains to "custodial investigation." Custodial investigation
commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the
police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission.14 As we expounded in
People v. Marra15:

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. (Citation omitted.)
Applying the foregoing definitions, accused-appellant was not under custodial investigation when he admitted, without assistance of counsel,
to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi that he stabbed his father to death. Accused-appellant's verbal confession was so spontaneously and
voluntarily given and was not elicited through questioning by the police authorities. It may be true that PO1 Macusi asked accused-appellant
who killed his father, but PO1 Macusi only did so in response to accused-appellant's initial declaration that his father was already dead. At
that point, PO1 Macusi still had no idea who actually committed the crime and did not consider accused-appellant as the suspect in his
father's killing. Accused-appellant was also merely standing before PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi in front of the Camiling Police Station and was
not yet in police custody.

Accused-appellant cites in support of his argument People v. Cabintoy,16 where we held that an uncounselled extrajudicial confession
without a valid waiver of the right to counsel - that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel - is inadmissible in evidence. The situation of
accused-appellants in Cabintoy is not similar to that of accused-appellant herein. The accused-appellants in Cabintoy, when they executed
their extrajudicial confessions without assistance of counsel, were already suspects under custodial investigation by the San Mateo Police for
robbery with homicide committed against a taxi driver. Accused-appellant in the instant case, on his own volition, approached unsuspecting
police officers standing in front of the police station with a knife in his hand and readily confessed to stabbing his father to death. Accused-
appellant was arrested and subjected to custodial investigation by the police officers only after his confession.

Hence, herein accused-appellant's confession, even if done without the assistance of a lawyer, is not in violation of his constitutional right
under Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The present case is more akin to People v. Andan17 wherein we allowed
into evidence the uncounselled confession of therein accused-appellant given under the following circumstances:

Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a
municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police and may arguably be- deemed a law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in
response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk
to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not
know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement
officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures
on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would
lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, we hold that appellant's
confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.

Moreover, accused-appellant's verbal confession that he stabbed his father to death made to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, established
through the testimonies of said police officers, falls under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court, which provides that "[t]he act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him." This rule is based upon the notion that no man
would make any declaration against himself, unless it is true.18 Accused-appellant's declaration is admissible for being part of the res gestae.
A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when these three requisites
concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.19 All the requisites are
present in this case. Accused-appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence, that is, his father's death. Accused-
appellant made the confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi only a few minutes after and while he was still under the influence of said
startling occurrence, before he had the opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. In fact, accused-appellant seemed to still be in shock when
he walked to the Police Station completely unmindful of the rain and the knife in his hand, and headed directly to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi,
who were standing in front of the Police Station, to confess to stabbing his father to death. The police officers who immediately went to the
house of Jose, accused-appellant's father, found Jose's lifeless body with blood still oozing from his stab wounds. As res gestae, accused-
appellant's spontaneous statement is admissible in evidence against him.

Accused-appellant's confession was further corroborated by the circumstantial evidence.

To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the
mind as to the criminal liability of the accused.20 Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court enumerates the conditions when circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction, thus:

SEC. 4.� Circumstantial Evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) There is more than one circumstance;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, found that the aforequoted requisites have been satisfied in this case given the following
circumstantial evidence:

1. On or about 4:50 o'clock in the afternoon of July 30, 2006, the victim was stabbed to death.

2. Thirty minutes later, [accused-appellant] personally went to Camiling Police Station and surrendered himself and the bladed weapon he
used in killing his father to the police authorities of the said police station.

3. When his mother learned about the incident, [accused-appellant] did nothing to appease his responding mother. "It has always been said
that criminal case are primarily about human nature." Here is a case of a son doing nothing to explain the death of his father to his grieving
mother. Such inaction is contrary to human nature.

4. When he was detained after police investigation, [accused-appellant] did not object to his continued detention.

These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to accused-appellant, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.21 The incriminating collage of facts against accused-appellant was created by circumstantial
evidence anchored on the credible and unbiased testimony of the prosecution's witnesses. We will not disturb but shall accord the highest
respect to the findings of the RTC on the issue of credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, it having had the opportunity to observe
their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.22

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines Parricide as follows:

Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or
descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The
key element in Parricide - other than the fact of killing - is the relationship of the offender to the victim.23 All the elements are present in this
case. Jose, the victim, was killed by accused-appellant, his own son. Accused-appellant's birth certificate, which was presented before the
RTC, establishes that accused-appellant was the legitimate son of Jose and Flora.

The crime of Parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. With one mitigating circumstance, namely,
voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused-appellant was
proper.

We modify though the monetary awards imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When death occurs due to a crime, the
following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.24

Prevailing jurisprudence pegs the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded to the heirs of the victim of Parricide at P75,000.00
each.25 The temperate damages awarded by the RTC in the amount of P30,000.00 should be decreased to P25,000.00 to also conform with
the latest jurisprudence.26 It is fitting to additionally award exemplary damages in the sum of P30,000.00 considering the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of relationship.

Damages for the loss of earning capacity of Jose should be awarded as well given the testimony of his wife, Flora, on this particular fact. We
refer to our pronouncements in People v. Verde27 that:

The heirs are also entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased Francisco Gealon. The fact that the prosecution did not
present documentary evidence to support its claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of
said damages. The testimony of the victim's wife, Delia Gealon, as to the earning capacity of her husband Francisco Gealon sufficiently
establishes the basis for making such an award. It was established that Francisco Gealon was 48 years old at the time of his death in 1991. His
average income was P200.00 a day. Hence, in accordance with the American Expectancy Table of Mortality adopted in several cases decided
by this Court, the loss of his earning capacity is to be calculated as follows:

To be able to claim damages for loss of earning capacity despite the non-availability of documentary evidence, there must be oral testimony
that: (a) the victim was self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws and judicial notice was taken of the fact
that in the victim's line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or (b) the victim was employed as a daily wage worker earning less
than the minimum wage under current labor laws.28

In the case at bar, Jose was 67 years old at the time of his death and was earning a daily wage of P200.00 as a tricycle driver, which was
below the P252.00 to P263.50 minimum wage rate for non-agriculture under Wage Order No. 11 dated June 16, 2005 for Region III. We take
judicial notice that there is no documentary evidence available to establish the daily earning capacity of a tricycle driver. We thus compute
the award of damages for the loss of Jose's earning capacity as follows:

Net earning capacity (x) = life expectancy x Gross annual income - less living expenses (50% of gross annual
income)

� �

= 2(80-67) x [73,000.00-36,500.00]

� �������� 3

� �

� = 8.67 x 36,500.00

� �

� = P316,455.00

Finally, in conformity with current policy, we impose interest on all monetary awards for damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04596, finding accused-appellant, Adrian Guting y Tomas, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
P25,000.00 as temperate damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P316,455.00 as compensation for loss of earning capacity. All
monetary awards for damages shall be subject to interest of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision until they are
fully paid.

SO ORDERED.chanroble

[G.R. No. 108395. March 7, 1997]

HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO GUARING, JR., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., and ANGELES CUEVAS,
respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 20,
which ordered respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, to pay various amounts in damages to petitioners,
the heirs of the late Teodoro Guaring, Jr.

This case arose from an unfortunate vehicular accident which happened on November 7, 1987, along the North Expressway in San Rafael,
Mexico, Pampanga. Involved in the accident were a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who died as a result of the mishap,
Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, driven by Angeles Cuevas, and a Toyota Cressida car, driven by Eligio Enriquez. The Mitsubishi Lancer was
heading north, at the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour. Following it was the Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, with Plate No. CVD-584. On
the other hand, the Toyota Cressida was cruising on the opposite lane, bound for Manila.
Petitioners, heirs of Teodoro Guaring, Jr., brought this action for damages, based on quasi delict, in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Their
evidence tended to show that the Rabbit bus tried to overtake Guarings car by passing on the right shoulder of the road and that in so doing
it hit the right rear portion of Guarings Mitsubishi Lancer. The impact caused the Lancer to swerve to the south-bound lane, as a result of
which it collided with the Toyota Cressida car coming from the opposite direction.

With Teodoro Guaring, Jr. in the Lancer, seated beside him in front, was Bonifacio Clemente. Riding in the Toyota Cressida driven by Sgt.
Eligio Enriquez was his mother, Dolores Enriquez, who was seated beside him. Seated at the back were his daughter Katherine (who was
directly behind him), his wife Lilian, and his nephew Felix Candelaria.

Killed in the collision were Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who was driving the Lancer, and Dolores Enriquez, who was riding in the Cressida, while
injured were Bonifacio Clemente and the occupants of the Toyota Cressida.

Private respondents, on the other hand, presented evidence tending to show that the accident was due to the negligence of the deceased
Guaring. They claimed that it was Guaring who tried to overtake the vehicle ahead of him on the highway and that in doing so he encroached
on the south-bound lane and collided with the oncoming Cressida of U.S. Air Force Sgt. Enriquez. Private respondents claim that as a result of
the collision the Lancer was thrown back to its lane where it crashed into the Rabbit bus.

On May 16, 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, at fault,
and holding them solidarily liable for damages to petitioners. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the latter to pay the former, jointly
and severally, the sum of:

1. P500,000.00 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased Teodoro Guaring, Jr.;

2. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;

3. P50,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and

4. Costs of suit.

From this judgment, private respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. appealed, contending:

1. The lower court erred in not finding that the proximate cause of the collision was Guarings negligence in attempting to overtake the car in
front of him.

2. The lower court erred in not holding that PRBL exercised due diligence in the supervision of its employees.

3. The lower court erred in awarding the amount of P500,000.00 in favor of plaintiffs-appellees representing Guarings loss of earning
capacity.

4. The lower court erred in awarding moral damages in favor of plaintiffs-appellees.

5. The lower court erred in awarding attorneys fees in favor of plaintiffs-appellees.

On December 16, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in the civil
action for damages and dismissing the complaint against private respondents Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Cuevas, on the strength of
a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court at San Fernando, Pampanga, in the criminal case, acquitting the bus driver Angeles Cuevas of
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and double homicide. The appellate court held that since the basis of petitioners action
was the alleged negligence of the bus driver, the latters acquittal in the criminal case rendered the civil case based on quasi delict untenable.

Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that

[1] EVIDENCE IN ONE CASE IS INADMISSIBLE IN ANOTHER CASE AGAINST A PERSON NOT A PARTY IN THE FIRST CASE AND TO HOLD
OTHERWISE IS VIOLATIVE OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.

[2] THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS WITHOUT FACTUAL FINDINGS AND DID NOT RESOLVE SQUARELY THE ASSIGNED ERRORS
AND IS THEREFORE A VOID JUDGMENT.

[3] ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE, WHETHER ON REASONABLE DOUBT OR NOT, IS NO BAR TO THE PROSECUTION FOR
DAMAGES BASED ON QUASI-DELICT.

The question is whether the judgment in the criminal case extinguished the liability of private respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, for damages for the death of Teodoro Guaring, Jr. In absolving private respondents from liability, the Court of
Appeals reasoned:[1]

Since the appellees civil action is predicated upon the negligence of the accused which does not exist as found by the trial court in the said
criminal case, it necessarily follows that the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case carries with it the extinction of the civil responsibility
arising therefrom. Otherwise stated, the fact from which the civil action might arise, that is, the negligence of the accused, did not exist.

The finding in the criminal case that accused Cuevas was not negligent and the proximate cause of the accident was the act of deceased
Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him likewise exonerates PRB from any civil liability.

Although it did not say so expressly, the appellate court appears to have based its ruling on Rule 111, 2(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which provides:

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.

This provision contemplates, however, a civil action arising from crime, whereas the present action was instituted pursuant to Art. 2176 of
the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability based on quasi delict. Thus, in Tayag v. Alcantara,[2] it was held:

. . . a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c), Section 3, Rule 111 [now Rule 111, 2(b)], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. . . .

It is noteworthy that the accident in that case also involved a Philippine Rabbit bus and that, as in this case, the acquittal of the bus driver was
based on reasonable doubt. We held that the civil case for damages was not barred since the cause of action of the heirs was based on quasi
delict.

Again, in Gula v. Dianala it was held:[3]

Since the cause of action of plaintiffs-appellants is based on culpa aquiliana and not culpa criminal, thus precluding the application of the
exception in Sec. 3(c) of Rule 111 [now Rule 111, 2(b)], and the fact that it can be inferred from the criminal case that defendant-accused,
Pedro Dianala, was acquitted on reasonable doubt because of dearth of evidence and lack of veracity of the two principal witnesses, the
doctrine in Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113, will not find application. In that case, the acquittal was not based on reasonable doubt and the
cause of action was based on culpa criminal, for which reason we held the suit for damages barred.

Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi delict, the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages
because the acquittal was based not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held:[4]

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which
the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
(PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability
of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies
of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code);
and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector
of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).

In the present case, the dispositive portion of the decision of the RTC in the criminal case reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court, entertaining reasonable doubt as to his guilt, the accused is hereby acquitted, of the offense of reckless imprudence
resulting to double homicide and damage to property as charged in the Information, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[5]

It was thus error for the appellate court to skip the review of the evidence in this case and instead base its decision on the findings of the trial
court in the criminal case. In so doing, the appellate court disregarded the fact that this case had been instituted independently of the
criminal case and that petitioners herein took no part in the criminal prosecution. In fact this action was filed below before the prosecution
presented evidence in the criminal action. The attention of the Court of Appeals was called to the decision in the criminal case, which was
decided on September 7, 1990, only when the decision of the trial court in this case was already pending review before it (the Court of
Appeals).

The appellate court did not even have before it the evidence in the criminal case. What it did was simply to cite findings contained in the
decision of the criminal court. Worse, what the criminal court considered was reasonable doubt concerning the liability of the bus driver the
appellate court regarded as a categorical finding that the driver was not negligent and, on that basis, declared in this case that the proximate
cause of the accident was the act of deceased Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him. The notion that an action for quasi delict is
separate and distinct from the criminal action was thus set aside.

This case must be decided on the basis of the evidence in the civil case. This is important because the criminal court appears to have based its
decision, acquitting the bus driver on the ground of reasonable doubt, solely on what it perceived to be the relative capacity for observation
of the prosecution and defense witnesses.[6] The prosecution did not call Bonifacio Clemente to testify despite the fact that shortly after the
accident he gave a statement to the police, pinning the blame for the accident on the Philippine Rabbit bus driver. Indeed, the civil case
involved a different set of witnesses. Petitioners presented Eligio Enriquez, who was driving the Cressida, and Bonifacio Clemente, who was a
passenger in Guarings car. Thus, both had full view of the accident.
It is unfair to bind petitioners to the result of the criminal action when the fact is that they did not take part therein. That the witnesses
presented on behalf of the petitioners are different from those presented by the prosecution should have brought home to the appellate
court the fundamental unfairness of considering the decision in the criminal case conclusive of the civil case.

Because the Court of Appeals did not consider the evidence in the civil case, this case should be remanded to it so that it may render another
decision in accordance with the law and the evidence. The issues raised by petitioners are essentially factual and require the evaluation of
evidence, which is the function of the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. They cannot be decided in this
Court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals with instruction to render
judgment with reasonable dispatch in accordance with law and the evidence presented in Civil Case No. 88-43860.

SO ORDERED.