Doctrine of Absorption

PEOPLE V. HERNANDEZ 99 Phil. 515

FACTS:

Amado HERNANDEZ5 (member of the CPP and President of the Congress of Labor Organizations) re-filed for bail
(previous one denied) for his conviction of rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies. The prosecution
said to deny this again because the capital punishment may be imposed. The defense however contends that rebellion
cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. The information states that the “…murders, arsons and robberies
allegedly perpetrated by the accused “as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith
and in furtherance thereof.”

ISSUE: WON rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.

HELD:

NO. Under the allegations of the amended information, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere
ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by HERNANDEZ, as means “necessary” for the perpetration of
said offense of rebellion and that the crime charged in the amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies. Under Article 1346 and 1357, these five (5)
classes of acts constitute only one offense, and no more, and are, altogether, subject to only one penalty. One of the
means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of said Article 135, is by “engaging in war against the forces
of the government” and “committing serious violence” in the prosecution of said “war”. These expressions imply
everything that war connotes. Since Article 135 constitute only 1 crime, Article 48 doesn’t apply since it requires the
commission of at least 2 crimes.

Enrile vs Salazar
G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990

FACTS:

In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement
officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon.
Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941.

The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior
State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio
Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime
of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup
attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.

Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none
having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28,
1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the
Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein
(which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his
constitutional rights.
ISSUE:
(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising from an offense being a necessary
means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?

HELD:

There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal Code cannot be applied in the case
at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this
could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a
fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the
absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48
said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said
provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while
technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on
the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the
information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple
rebellion.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as
applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be
considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be
accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition
for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial? The criminal
case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty
pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct
course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per
se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should
the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals
if appropriate relief was also available there.

The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed
against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple
rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier
grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered remanded to
the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for
any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement
as to costs.

PONCE ENRILE VS AMIN

GR NO. 93335, September 13, 1990

FACTS:

An information was filed against Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion "complexed" with murder and
charging him of violation of PD No. 1829.
It was alleged that Ponce Enrile entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort in his
house. Kwowing that Col. Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan
arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure of the petitioner that prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and
conviction was allegedly a violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.

On March 2, 1990, Sen. Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion but was denied. Then, Sen. Filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and to Quash/Dismiss the Information but then again was denied.

In return, Sen. Enrile filed for certiorari on the SC imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the respondent court on the following grounds:
a. the facts do not constitute an offense;
b. the alleged harboring and concealing of Col. Honasan is absorbed in complexed rebellion;
c. that justice requires only one prosecution for all the components of rebellion;
d. no probable cause for the violation of PD No. 1829; and
e. no preliminary investigation was conducted for the alleged violation of PD No. 1829.

ISSUE: WON Sen. Enrile be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier
filed against him.

HELD:

NO. The SC reiterated the long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and
subjecting them to separate prosecutions. It is Hernandez case that remains binding doctrine to prohibit the complexing
of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as means necessary to its commission or
as an intended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.

Petitioner's act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus
constituting a component thereof. All crimes, whether punishable under special law or general law, which are mere
components or ingredients, or committed in the furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and
cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes. It is the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel
thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by application of
Art. 48 of the RPC.

Transitory Crimes

PP vs. Yabut
G.R. No. L-42847. April 29, 1977
G.R. No. L-42902. April 29, 1977

Accused Cecilia Que Yabut as treasurer and her husband Geminiano Yabut, Jr. as president of the Yabut Transit Line
were charged with estafa for issuing several checks payable to the Free Tires Supply and Free Caltex Station owned and
operated by Alicia P. Andan. The complaint alleged that the accused by means of false pretenses and pretending to have
sufficient funds in the Merchants Banking Corporation and Manufacturers Bank and Trust Company in Caloocan City
prepared, issued and made out several checks despite full knowledge that at the time there was no or insufficient funds
in said bank, that upon presentation of the said checks, the checks were dishonored and inspite of repeated demands by
Freeway to deposit the necessary funds to cover the checks within the reglementary period enjoined by law, the
accused failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of Andan. Respondents instead of entering a plea
respectively filed their motions for the quashal of the information citing as one of their reasons that the venue was
improperly laid in Malolos, Bulacan, because the postdated checks were issued and delivered to, and received by the
complainant in Caloocan.
RULING:

While the subject checks were written, signed, or dated in Caloocan City, they were not completely made or drawn
there, but in Malolos (place of business and residence of the payee) where they were uttered and delivered. The place
where the bills were written, signed, or dated does not necessarily fix or determine the place where they were
executed. What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final
act essential to its consummation as an obligation. An undelivered bill or note is inoperative. Until delivery, the contract
is revocable. And the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, which
means “(t)he payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof.” Delivery of the check
signifies transfer of possession, whether actual or constructive, from one person to another with intent to transfer
title thereto. Thus, the penalizing clause of the provision of Art. 315, par. 2 (d) states: “By postdating a check, or issuing a
check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not
sufficient to cover the amount of the check.” Clearly, therefore, the element of deceit thru the issuance and delivery of
the worthless checks to the complainant took place in Malolos conferring upon a court in that locality jurisdiction to try
the case.

A prosecution for issuing a worthless check with intent to defraud is in the place where the check was uttered and
delivered. The venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and delivered to the payee. Since in
the instant case it was in Malolos, Bulacan where the checks were uttered and delivered to complaint Andan, at which
place, her business and residence were also located, the criminal prosecution of estafa may be lodged therein. The
giving of the checks by the two private respondents in Caloocan City to Modesto Yambao cannot be treated as valid
delivery of the checks, because Yambao is a mere “messenger” or “part-time employee” and not an agent of complaint
Alicia P. Andan.

Art. 60-65 Rules for graduation of penalties

People v Allen Mantalaba

G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011

FACTS:

Task Forcer Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report that Mantalaba who was
17 yrs old was selling shabu. After a buy-bust operation, two informations was filed against Mantalaba which was later
on consolidated. Mantalaba pleaded not guilty.

RTC found Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was penalized of reclusion perpetua to death and fine of 500k
for selling shabu and (2) for illegally possessing shabu, Mantalaba was penalized, in application of the ISL, 6 yrs and 1
day as minimum and 8 yrs as maximum of prision mayor and fine of 300k. CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
Thus, the present appeal.

Mantalaba: the lower court gravely erred in convicting him and that there was no evidence of actual sale between him
and the poser-buyer during the buy-bust operation. He also claims that the chain of custody of the seized shabu was not
established.

ISSUE: WON Mantalaba is guilty of drug trafficking and possession. NO

RULING:

The buy-bust operation was valid, establishing the following: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore. From the above testimony of the
prosecution witness, it was well established that the elements have been satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-
buyer were properly identified. The subject dangerous drug, as well as the marked money used, were also satisfactorily
presented. The testimony was also clear as to the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted.

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground
therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accused arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.

As to his minority, Mantalaba was minor during the buy-bust operation but was of legal age during the promulgation of
the decision. It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect after the promulgation of the RTC's decision against Mantalaba.
The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) and Rule on Juveniles
in Conflict with the Law that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of the judgment. However, as ruled in
People vs Sarcia, suspension of sentence can still be applied but NOT when the offender upon the promulgation of
judgment is 21 yrs old. or older. Mantalaba is now 21 yrs old, therefore his suspension of sentence is already moot and
academic.

But as to the penalty, CA must have appreciated Mantalaba's minority as privileged mitigating circumstance in fixing the
penalty. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua,
which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily,
also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion
temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.