PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 

plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENATO MONTIERO Y
RAMIREZ, accused-appellant.  (People v. Montiero y Ramirez, G.R. No.
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110106, [July 31, 1995], 316 PHIL 950-958)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION;
NO VIOLATION OF RIGHTS IN CASE AT BAR. — We find that the extrajudicial
confession of appellant did not violate Section 12 (1), Article III of the
Constitution. The objective of said law is to prevent the use of coercion in
extracting a confession from a suspect. Any form of coercion, whether physical,
mental, or emotional, in extracting confessions, stamps the confession with the
taint of inadmissibility. Appellant's extrajudicial confession is free from any
duress. We reiterate the rule that a confession constitutes evidence of high order
since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind
would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth
and his conscience. It is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it
was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or
leniency. (People v. Montiero y Ramirez, G.R. No. 110106, [July 31, 1995], 316
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PHIL 950-958)

The following morning, appellant verbally confided to Chief of Police Sgt. Galleon

that he was the perpetrator of the crime. He pointed to a one and one-half feet-
long and two-inch thick piece of wood  10 he used in hitting the head of the
deceased. He also indicated the post in his kitchen house where he hid the
jewelries and money taken from the victim. 11 The 2" x 8" piece of wood, one (1)
ring, two (2) pairs of earring, one (1) bracelet, and cash money were recovered
by the police.  (People v. Montiero y Ramirez, G.R. No. 110106, [July 31, 1995],
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316 PHIL 950-958)

People vs Hernandez
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCLUSIONARY RULE; NOT APPLICABLE TO THE
SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT MADE BY THE ACCUSED WHICH WERE NOT
ELICITED THROUGH QUESTIONING BY THE AUTHORITIES; CASE AT BAR.
— Under the circumstances in this case, it cannot be successfully claimed that
appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal
mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police and may
arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section
12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to
the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the
mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to
talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and
voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that
appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the
mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his
uncounseled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it
has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not
apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted
having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is
the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under
Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state
as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from
freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, we hold that
appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE TO CONFESSIONS MADE BY THE
ACCUSED IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS BY NEWS REPORTERS; CASE
AT BAR. — Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly
admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news
reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that
statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised
interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. Clearly,
appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue
influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters
when they interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the direction and
control of the police. They were there to check appellant'sconfession to the
mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the
commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing
him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did appellant protest his
innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied
all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment.
All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other
relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the
news reporters.
 (People v. Andan y Hernandez, G.R. No. 116437, [March 3, 1997], 336 PHIL
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91-117)
7. ID.; ID.; ADMISSIBILITY; ACCUSED'S SPONTANEOUS AND
VOLUNTARY VERBAL CONFESSION MADE IN A PRIVATE MEETING,
ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. — InPeople v. Andan (269 SCRA 95), the
accused's spontaneous and voluntary verbal confession made in
a private meeting with the municipal mayor was admitted in evidence because
the same was not covered by the requisites of Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III
of the Constitution.
 8. ID.; ID.; EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION; NOT A SUFFICIENT
GROUND FOR CONVICTION UNLESS CORROBORATED BY EVIDENCE OF
CORPUS DELICTI; CASE AT BAR. — Under Rule 133, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court, an extra-judicial confession shall not be sufficient ground for conviction,
unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti, which is defined as the body of
the crime and, in its primary sense, means a crime has actually been committed.
Applied to a particular offense, it is the actual commission by someone of the
particular crime charged. In this case, aside from the admission made by
accused-appellant, the bruised and battered body of the victim herself recovered
at the exact spot described by accused-appellant conclusively established the
corroborating evidence of corpus delicti.
 (People v. Licayan y Sucano, G.R. No. 144422, [February 28, 2002], 428 PHIL
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332-351)

But assuming that the motive of the accused was really good, does this mean
that criminal intent on her part is thus completely ruled out? WE do not believe
so. A good motive, as we have earlier intimated, is not incompatible with an
unlawful intent. One may be convicted of a crime whether his motive appears to
be good or bad or even though no motive is proven. A good motive does not
prevent an act from being a crime. (People ex rel, Hegeman v. Corrigan, 87 N.E.
792, 796; 195 N.Y. 1, quoting People v. Molineux, supra; Clark, Cr. Law, sec. 14;
People v. Weiss, 300 N.Y.S. 249, 255; 252 App. Div. 463). A classic example
is euthanasia or mercy killing. It is condemned by law although the motive may
be to spare a hopeless patient prolonged suffering And if a father drowns his
child who is five years of age to save it from starving, he is guilty of parricide
though he was actuated by a good motive — love for the child (People v. Kirby, 2
Parker Cr. R., N.Y., 28. See also U.S. v. Marmon, 45 Fed. 414. Both are cited in
The Revised Penal Code, Francisco, supra). The father or brother of a rape
victim, who kills the rapist long after the commission of the rape, to avenge the
victim's defloration, is not exempt from penal liability. A son killing his sleeping
father, who used to beat up his hardworking mother, to relieve his good mother
from so much misery, does not justify the parricide. So also, if a person cuts off
the foot of a mischievous child to prevent if from doing further mischief with its
foot, and thus save it from possible criminal liability, that person stands liable for
physical injuries. True enough, the act involved in the instant case, which is the
beating of a child, is less serious than those involved in the above-cited cases,
but the fact that an act is less serious than another does not mean that it is not
criminal. Other examples can be catalogued ad infinitum. Thus, our penal code
provides specific penalties for specific crimes, depending, generally, on their
seriousness.  (Bagajo v. Marave, G.R. No. L-33345, [November 20, 1978], 176
 LLpr|||

PHIL 20-50)