Answer for #5:

Child is defined under RA 9775 as a person below eighteen (18) years of age or those over, but is unable to fully take care of himself/herself from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability. Further, a child shall also refer to a person, regardless of
age, who is presented, depicted or believed to be a child as defined; and a computer-generated, digitally or manually crafted images or graphics of a
person who is represented or who is made to appear to be a child.

Answer for #6:

Child pornography is any public or private presentation, by whatever means, of a child engaged or involved in real or simulated explicit sexual activities
or any representation of the sexual parts of a child for primarily sexual purposes.

Answer for #7:

Explicit sexual activity is the actual or simulated:

a. Sexual intercourse or lascivious act including, but not limited to, contact involving genital to genital, oral to genital, anal to genital, or oral to
anal whether between person of the same of opposite sex;
b. Bestiality;
c. Masturbation;
d. Sadistic or masochistic abuse;
e. Lascivious exhibition of the genitals, buttocks, breast, pubic area and /or anus; or
f. Use of any object or instrument for lascivious acts

G.R. No. 168539               March 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.

Facts:

The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision 3 in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which
nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air
Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President
of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation
of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died
prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.

On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash  the Information filed against him on the ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not
constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the
deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated
by any official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.

On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:

Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a
private person and his alleged co-conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with
whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.

Ruling:

Yes.

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty,
held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of
public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto. 12 This is the controlling doctrine as
enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving herein private respondent. 13
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019.
It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged.
The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of
the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public
officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict
Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. 14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be
alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together
with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer
has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.

G.R. No. 111426 July 11, 1994

NORMA DIZON-PAMINTUAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Facts:

A robbery was committed on 12 February 1988 in the house of the private complainants who afterwards reported the incident to the Parañaque Police,
the Western Police District, the NBI, and the CIS, and submitted a list of the lost items and sketches of the jewelry taken from them. Three of these items
stolen, viz., (a) a pair of earrings and ring studded with diamonds worth P75,000.00; (b) one set of earrings worth P15,000.00 and (c) a chain with
crucifix worth P3,000.00, were displayed for sale at a stall tended to by the petitioner in Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The public display of
the articles for sale clearly manifested an intent to gain on the part of the petitioner.

The Regional Trial Court of Manila found the petitioner guilty of the violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. No. 1612) and the CA affirmed the lower court
decision.

Issue:

Whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals manifestly erred in affirming the decision of public respondent Judge Cañeba, in blatant disregard of
applicable law and well-established jurisprudence.

Ruling:

No.

The elements of the crime of fencing are:

1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from
the proceeds of the said crime;

3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft; and

4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.

In the instant case, there is no doubt that the first, second, and fourth elements were duly established. The more crucial issue to be resolved is whether
the prosecution proved the existence of the third element: that the accused knew or should have known that the items recovered from her were the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or
has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within the mind's grasp with certitude and clarity. 16 When knowledge of the existence of a
particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence unless he actually
believes that it does not exist. 17 On the other hand, the words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would
ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. 18 Knowledge refers to a
mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is contained therein, it
must determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that person. And given two equally plausible states of cognition or mental awareness,
the court should choose the one which sustains the constitutional presumption of innocence. 19

Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that "[m]ere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the
subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing," it follows that the petitioner is presumed to have knowledge of the fact that the
items found in her possession were the proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise
from the established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. This presumption does not offend the presumption of
innocence enshrined in the fundamental law.

The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She relied solely on the testimony of her brother which was insufficient to
overcome the presumption, and, on the contrary, even disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry and that she used
to buy from a certain Fredo.