1.

VOLUNTARINESS IN CONFESSION, NO OBJECTION

WHEN PROVIDED WITH COUNSEL, CORPUS DELICTI
PROVED WITH EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF
MURDER

FACTS:

a group of men arrived at the residence of Julianito Luna y Tagle, Barangay Captain of Namunga, Rosario,
Batangas. One of the two men who introduced themselves as policemen allegedly looking for a certain
Hernandez suddenly shot Julianito in the head with a .45 caliber pistol and immediately after, they sped
away in an owner-type jeep.

Accused-appellant Elberto Base was among those identified on board the jeep and, together with Conrado
Guno, Frederick Lazaro and Eduardo Patrocinio, were indicted for Murder with Direct Assault Upon a
Person in Authority in a Second Amended Information 

Accused-appellant denied having anything to do with the fatal shooting of the victim and alleges, in sum,
that he was tortured to admit the crime. And that, there was no truth in typewritten statement given that it
was only made yup by the investigator and he was merely forced to sign the same.

However, the court rendered him guilty of the murder. Hence, an Appeal.

accused-appellant's appeal hinges on the admissibility of the Sworn Statement. challenging its probative
value, he insists in sum that the document is inadmissible in evidence because it was executed in violation
of his constitutional rights

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sworn Statements or Extrajudicial confession is admissible.

HELD:
Yes. It is admissible and the accused appellant’s claim is untenable.

For an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must be: 1.] voluntary; 2.] made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; 3.] express; and 4.] in writing.

With regards to having the right to counsel, while the initial choice in cases where a person under custodial
investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the
accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one.

Thus, the court is unconvinced of accused-appellant's claim that he was not adequately assisted by counsel
during his custodial interrogation.

A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any
objection against the former’s appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter
subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. Verily, to be an effective counsel "[a]
lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not
intended to stop an accused from saying anything that might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in
our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The
counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth."

Furthermore, with regards to the accused- appellant’s claim of coercion and torture in the hands of his
interrogators, the court was unpersuaded. Initially, Accused-appellant explained that the statements were a
product of his fear.  However, he failed to speak up and disclose his fear at the earliest opportunity subjects
to serious doubt the reality and substance of that supposed fear. Along the same vein, accused-appellant's
unsupported claims of physical abuse in the hands of his interrogators imply ring hollow in the absence of
other proof to corroborate them.

Secondly, the confessions made by his and his co-accused have the ring of truth about them. The
information in the confession could not have been supplied either any of those interviewed by the peace
officers or by the peace officers themselves because the said statement is comprehensive with details which
only be given those with intricate knowledge thereof.

thereby, as in this case, "an extrajudicial statement satisfies the requirements of the Constitution, it
constitutes evidence of a high order because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind
would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. The defense
has the burden of proving that it was extracted by means of force, duress, promise or reward. Unfortunately
for accused-appellant, he failed to overcome to overwhelming prosecution evidence to the contrary.

And Lastly, As stated under the rule, "an extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient
ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti."

Here, the prosecution presented other evidence to prove the two elements of corpus delicti, to wit: a.] a
certain result has been proven, i.e. a man has died; and 2.] some person is criminally responsible. And
therefore, merely requires some other evidence "tending to show the commission of the crime apart from
the confession." 

Thus, with overall scrutiny of the records of this case leads us to no other conclusion but the correctness of
the trial court in holding that the accused-appellant and his co-accused committed murder.

2. CONCUBINAGE, BOY BORN 5 YEARS AGO BEFORE

MARRIAGE, EVIDENCE OF SIMILAR ACTS
NICANOR P. NICOLAS v. HON. JUAN P. ENRIQUEZ

1. EVIDENCE; CONCUBINAGE; PRIOR SEXUAL RELATIONS DONE BEFORE COMPLAINANT’S

MARRIAGE. — Where the previous sexual relations sought to be proved were far removed in point of
time the illicit act now complained of, and having moreover taken place when there was as yet no legal
impediment to the same, they furnish no rational basis for the inference that they would be continued after
complainant’s marriage to one of the defendants had created such impediment and made continuance of
sexual relations between defendants a crime.

2. IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT; MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE. — The evidence of previous
sexual relations between defendants done before complainant’s marriage to one of them, being immaterial
and irrelevant, the trial court cannot be compelled to admit it regardless of whether or not the new Civil
Code permits investigation or injury into the paternity of a natural child except in actions for forcible
acknowledgment.

FACTS:
At the trial of a criminal case for concubinage filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Corazon
Vizcarra against the defendant Jimmy William Nelson and his co-defendant Priscilla Fontanosa, the court
ruled out testimony of three prosecution witnesses tending to show that a boy named Paul William Nelson,
born in Cavite on September 17, 1949, was the son of both defendants. The said testimony was objected to
as immaterial, but the objection was sustained on the ground that inquiry into the paternity of a natural
child is forbidden except in actions for forcible acknowledgment.

Contending that prior sexual relations between the defendants were admissible to show "propensity" to
commit the offense charged or disposition to maintain such relations even after the marriage of one of the
defendants to the complainant, the prosecution brought the present action for mandamus to compel the trial
court to admit the preferred evidence.

ISSUE:
1. whether or not the prior sexual relations done before complainant’s marriage may be made as evidence in
a complaint after the celebration of the marriage.
2. Whether or not the court may be maid to admit the evidence presented.

HELD:
1. No.
It is a rule of evidence that what one did at one time is no proof of his having done the same or a similar
thing at another time. But the rule is not absolute, for it is subject to the exceptions enumerated in section
17 of Rule 123, Rules of Court, which reads:

"SEC. 17. Evidence of similar acts. — Evidence that one did or omitted to do a certain thing at one time is
not admissible to prove that he did or omitted to do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may
be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage,
and the like."
We are not persuaded that the preferred evidence, when viewed in the light of facts brought out in the
present case, would come under any of the exceptions named. It appears from the order containing the
questioned ruling that the boy Paul was born five years before complainant’s marriage to one of the
defendants. This means that the previous sexual relations sought to be proved were far removed in point of
time from the illicit act now complained of, and having, moreover, taken place when there was as yet no
legal impediment to the same, they furnish no rational basis for the inference that they would be continued
after complainant’s marriage to one of the defendants had created such impediment and made continuance
of sexual relations between the defendants a crime."

2. No. The evidence objected to being immaterial and irrelevant, the trial court cannot be compelled to
admit it regardless of whether or not the New Civil Code permits investigation or inquiry into the paternity
of a natural child except in actions for forcible acknowledgment.

3. DEED OF PARTIAL PARTITION AS EVIDENCE OF

ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP, NO COOWNERSHIP.
CRUZ VS CA

FACTS:

Essentially, the petitioners, upon the death of their father, acquire shares in several parcels land.
Thereafter, they executed a memorandum agreement, which state:
 that they shall have equal sharing;
 that they initiated a deed of partial partition, which in effect, the properties affected were
actually partitioned and the respective shares of each party, adjudicated to him/her; and
 That despite the execution of this Deed of Partial Partition and the eventual disposal or sale
of their respective shares, they agreed among themselves bind themselves to one another that
they shall share alike and receive equal shares from the proceeds of the sale of there share.

This agreement was annotated in the titles of the lands covered by the deed of partial partition.
Meanwhile, the court, in a case for the collection of sums of money, issued a writ of execution and
ordered Nerissa cruz, one of the co-owners of the lands, to pay spouses Malolos. Enforcing said writ,
the sheriff of the court levied upon the lands in question and thereafter, these properties were sold in
an execution sale to the highest bidders.
Nerissa failed to exercise her right of redemption and so the final deed of sale was executed ,
conveying the lands in question to spouses Malolos. The Malolos couple asked Nerissa Cruz Tamayo
to give them the owner's duplicate copy of the seven (7) titles of the lands in question but she refused.
The couple moved the court to compel her to surrender said titles to the Register of Deeds of Rizal for
cancellation. But Nerissa was adamant. She did not comply with the Order of the court and so the
Malolos couple asked the court to declare said titles as null and void.

At this point, Adoracion Cruz, Thelma Cruz, Gerry Cruz and Arnel Cruz entered the picture by
filing in said lower court a motion for leave to intervene and oppose [the] Maloloses' motion. The
Cruzes alleged that they were co-owners of Nerissa Cruz Tamayo over the lands in question.

Court issued an Order modifying the Order of September 7, 1984 by directing the surrender of the
owner's duplicate copies of the titles of the lands in question to the Register of Deeds not for
cancellation but for the annotation of the rights, and interest acquired by the Maloloses over said
lands.

Petitioners Adoracion, Thelma Debbie, Gerry and Arnel (all surnamed Cruz) filed an action for
partition against the private respondents, Spouses Eliseo and Virginia Malolos. The trial court
rendered a Decision in favor of the plaintiffs. On appeal, however, Respondent Court reversed the
trial court decision, stating that:

First, the DPP was not materially and substantially incompatible with the MOA. The DPP conferred
absolute ownership of the parcels of land in issue on Nerissa Cruz Tamayo, while the MOA merely
created an obligation on her part to share with the petitioners the proceeds of the sale of said
properties.

Second, the fact that private respondents registered the DPP was inconsistent with the allegation that
they intended to abandon it. Indeed, had they meant to abandon it, they would have simply gathered
the copies of said document and then torn or burned them.

Third, petitioners were estopped from claiming co-ownership over the disputed properties because, as
absolute owners, they either mortgaged or sold the other properties adjudicated to them by virtue of
the DPP.

Hence, this petition. 9

ISSUE:

Whether or not Respondent Court erred in ruling that petitioners are in estoppel by deed.

HELD:

NO. Under the principle Res inter alios acta, as a general rule, prohibits the admission of evidence
that tends to show that what a person has done at one time is probative of the contention that he has
done a similar acts at another time. 24 Evidence of similar acts or occurrences compels the defendant
to meet allegations that are not mentioned in the complaint, confuses him in his defense, raises a
variety of irrelevant issues, and diverts the attention of the court from the issues immediately before
it. Hence, this evidentiary rule guards against the practical inconvenience of trying collateral issues
and protracting the trial and prevents surprise or other mischief prejudicial to litigants. 25
The rule, however, is not without exception. While inadmissible in general, collateral facts may be
received as evidence under exceptional circumstances, as when there is a rational similarity or
resemblance between the conditions giving rise to the fact offered and the circumstances surrounding
the issue or fact to be proved. 26 Evidence of similar acts may frequently become relevant, especially
in actions based on fraud and deceit, because it sheds light on the state of mind or knowledge of a
person; it provides insight into such person's motive or intent; it uncovers a scheme, design or plan;
or it reveals a mistake. 27

In this case, petitioners argue that transactions relating to the other parcels of land they entered into,
in the concept of absolute owners, are inadmissible as evidence to show that the parcels in issue are
not co-owned. The Court is not persuaded. Evidence of such transactions falls under the exception to
the rule on res inter alios acta. Such evidence is admissible because it is relevant to an issue in the case
and corroborative of evidence already received. 28 The relevancy of such transactions is readily
apparent. The nature of ownership of said property should be the same as that of the lots in question
since they are all subject to the MOA. If the parcels of land were held and disposed by petitioners in
fee simple, in the concept of absolute owners, then the lots in question should similarly be treated as
absolutely owned in fee simple by the Tamayo spouses. Unmistakably, the evidence in dispute
manifests petitioners' common purpose and design to treat all the parcels of land covered by the DPP
as absolutely owned and not subject to co-ownership. 29

Under the principle of estoppel, petitioners are barred from claiming co-ownership of the lands in
issue. In estoppel, a person, who by his deed or conduct has induced another to act in a particular
manner, is barred from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct that thereby
causes loss or injury to another. 30 It further bars him from denying the truth of a fact which has, in the
contemplation of law, become settled by the acts and proceeding of judicial or legislative officers or by
the act of the party himself, either by conventional writing or by representations, express or implied or in
pais. 31

In their transactions with others, petitioners have declared that the other lands covered by the same
MOA are absolutely owned, without indicating the existence of a co-ownership over such properties.
Thus, they are estopped from claiming otherwise because, by their very own acts and representations
as evidenced by the deeds of mortgage and of sale, they have denied such co-ownership. 32

4. OPTION TO PURCHASE, UNACCEPTED

OFFER
ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC vs. CA et al
G.R. No. 111238
January 25, 1995
FACTS: Private respondents and their brothers Jose and Dominador
were the registered CO-OWNERS of a parcel of land in Las Pinas,
covered by a TCT.
Jose and Dominador sold their share (eastern portion of the land) to
Adelfa. Thereafter, Adelfa expressed interest in buying the western
portion of the property from private respondents herein. Accordingly, an
“exclusive Option to Purchase” was executed between Adelfa and Private
respondents and an option money of 50,000 was given to the latter.
A new owner’s copy of the certificate of title was issued (as the copy with
respondent Salud was lost) was issued but was kept by Adelfa’s counsel,
Atty. Bernardo.

Before Adelfa could make payments, it received summons as a case was

filed (RTC Makati)  against Jose and Dominador and Adelfa, because of
a complaint in a civil case by the nephews and nieces of private
respondents herein. As a consequence, Adelfa, through a letter,
informed the private respondents that it would hold payment of the full
purchase price and suggested that they settle the case with their said
nephews and nieces. Salud did not heed the suggestion; respondent’s
informed Atty. Bernardo that they are canceling the transaction. Atty
Bernardo made offers but they were all rejected.

RTC Makati dismissed the civil case. A few days after, private
respondents executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in favor of Chua, over
the same parcel of land.

Atty Bernardo wrote private respondents informing them that in view of

the dismissal of the case, Adelfa is willing to pay the purchase price, and
requested that the corresponding deed of Absolute Sale be executed.
This was ignored by private respondents.

Private respondents sent a letter to Adelfa enclosing therein a check

representing the refund of half the option money paid under the
exclusive option to purchase, and requested Adelfa to return the owner’s
duplicate copy of Salud. Adelfa failed to surrender the certificate of title,
hence the private respondents filed a civil case before the RTC Pasay, for
annulment of contract with damages. The trial court directed the
cancellation of the exclusive option to purchase. On appeal, respondent
CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC hence this petition.

ISSUE:
1. WON the agreement between Adelfa and Private respondents was
strictly an option contract
2. WON Article 1590 applies in this case, thereby justifiying the refusal
by Adelfa to pay the balance of the purchase price
3. WON Private respondents could unilaterraly and prematurely
terminate the option period, if indeed it is a option contract, as the
option period has not lapsed yet.
HELD: The judgement of the CA is AFFIRMED
1. NO. The agreement between the parties is a contract to sell, and not
an option contract or a contract of sale.
Contract to SELL

–     by agreement the ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to

pass until the full payment of the price

–     title is retained by the vendor until the full payment of the price,
such payment being a positive

Contract of SALE

–     the title passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold

–     the vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership until and unless
the contract is resolved or rescinded

There are two features which convince us that the parties never intended
to transfer ownership to petitioner except upon the full payment of the
purchase price.

(1)       the exclusive option to purchase, although it provided for

automatic rescission of the contract and partial forfeiture of the amount
already paid in case of default, does not mention that petitioner is
obliged to return possession or ownership of the property as a
consequence of non-payment. There is no stipulation anent reversion or
reconveyance of the property to herein private respondents in the event
that petitioner does not comply with its obligation. With the absence of
such a stipulation, although there is a provision on the remedies
available to the parties in case of breach, it may legally be inferred that
the parties never intended to transfer ownership to the petitioner to
completion of payment of the purchase price.
(2)       Secondly, it has not been shown there was delivery of the
property, actual or constructive, made to herein petitioner. The
exclusive option to purchase is not contained in a public instrument the
execution of which would have been considered equivalent to delivery. 
Neither did petitioner take actual, physical possession of the property at
any given time. It is true that after the reconstitution of private
respondents’ certificate of title, it remained in the possession of
petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Bayani L. Bernardo, who thereafter delivered
the same to herein petitioner. Normally, under the law, such possession
by the vendee is to be understood as a delivery.  18 However, private
respondents explained that there was really no intention on their part to
deliver the title to herein petitioner with the purpose of transferring
ownership to it. They claim that Atty. Bernardo had possession of the
title only because he was their counsel in the petition for reconstitution.
In effect, there was an implied agreement that ownership shall not pass
to the purchaser until he had fully paid the price in this case. Article
1478 of the civil code does not require that such a stipulation be
expressly made. Consequently, an implied stipulation to that effect is
considered valid and, therefore, binding and enforceable between the
parties. It should be noted that under the law and jurisprudence, a
contract which contains this kind of stipulation is considered a contract to sell.
The important task in contract interpretation is always the
ascertainment of the intention (parties never intended to transfer
ownership to petitioner except upon the full payment of the purchase
price) of the contracting parties and that task is, of course, to be
discharged by looking to the words they used to project that intention in
their contract. The title of a contract does not necessarily determine its
true nature.  Hence, the fact that the document under discussion is
entitled “Exclusive Option to Purchase” is not controlling where the text
thereof shows that it is a contract to sell.
The obligation of petitioner consisted of an obligation to give something,
that is, the payment of the purchase price. The contract did not simply
give petitioner the discretion to pay for the property.  It will be noted
that there is nothing in the said contract to show that petitioner was
merely given a certain period within which to exercise its privilege to
buy. The agreed period was intended to give time to herein petitioner
within which to fulfill and comply with its obligation, that is, to pay the
balance of the purchase price. No evidence was presented by private
respondents to prove otherwise.
The test in determining whether a contract is a “contract of sale or
purchase” or a mere “option” is whether or not the agreement could be
specifically enforced. There is no doubt that the obligation of petitioner
to pay the purchase price is specific, definite and certain, and
consequently binding and enforceable. Had private respondents chosen
to enforce the contract, they could have specifically compelled petitioner
to pay the balance. This is distinctly made manifest in the contract itself
as an integral stipulation, compliance with which could legally and
definitely be demanded from petitioner as a consequence.
While there is jurisprudence to the effect that a contract which provides
that the initial payment shall be totally forfeited in case of default in
payment is to be considered as an option contract,  still we are not
inclined to conform with the findings of respondent court and the
court a quo that the contract executed between the parties is an option
contract, for the reason that the parties were already contemplating
the payment of the balance of the purchase price, and were not merely
quoting an agreed value for the property. The term “balance,” connotes a
remainder or something remaining from the original total sum already
agreed upon.
In other words, the alleged option money was actually earnest
money which was intended to form part of the purchase price. The
amount was not distinct from the cause or consideration for the sale of
the property, but was itself a part thereof. It is a statutory rule that
whenever earnest money is given in a contract of sale, it shall be
considered as part of the price and as proof of the perfection of the
contract. It constitutes an advance payment and must, therefore, be
deducted from the total price. Also, earnest money is given by the buyer
to the seller to bind the bargain.
There are clear distinctions between earnest money and option
money, viz.:
(a) earnest money is part of the purchase price, while option money ids
the money given as a distinct consideration for an option contract;

(b) earnest money is given only where there is already a sale, while
option money applies to a sale not yet perfected; and

(c) when earnest money is given, the buyer is bound to pay the balance,
while when the would-be buyer gives option money, he is not required to
buy.
The aforequoted characteristics of earnest money are apparent in the so-
called option contract under review, even though it was called “option
money” by the parties. In addition, private respondents failed to show
that the payment of the balance of the purchase price was only a
condition precedent to the acceptance of the offer or to the exercise of
the right to buy. On the contrary, it has been sufficiently established that
such payment was but an element of the performance of petitioner’s
obligation under the contract to sell.

2. Its failure to pay the purchase price within the agreed period,
petitioner invokes Article 1590 of the civil Code which provides:

Art. 1590. Should the vendee be disturbed in the possession or

ownership of the thing acquired, or should he have reasonable grounds
to fear such disturbance, by a vindicatory action or a foreclosure of
mortgage, he may suspend the payment of the price until the vendor has
caused the disturbance or danger to cease, unless the latter gives
security for the return of the price in a proper case, or it has been
stipulated that, notwithstanding any such contingency, the vendee shall
be bound to make the payment. A mere act of trespass shall not
authorize the suspension of the payment of the price.

Respondent court refused to apply the aforequoted provision of law on

the erroneous assumption that the true agreement between the parties
was a contract of option. As we have hereinbefore discussed, it was not
an option contract but a perfected contract to sell. Verily, therefore,
Article 1590 would properly apply.

Both lower courts, are in accord that since the Civil Case in Makati
involved only the eastern half of the land subject of the deed of sale
between Adelfa and the Jimenez brothers, it did not, therefore, have any
adverse effect on private respondents’ title and ownership over the
western half of the land which is covered by the contract subject of the
present case. But at a glance, it is easily discernible that, although the
complaint prayed for the annulment only of the contract of sale executed
between petitioner and the Jimenez brothers, the plaintiffs therein were
claiming to be co-owners of the entire parcel of land, and not only of a
portion thereof nor, as incorrectly interpreted by the lower courts, not
pertaining exclusively to the eastern half adjudicated to the Jimenez
brothers.
Such being the case, petitioner was justified in suspending payment of
the balance of the purchase price by reason of the aforesaid vindicatory
action filed against it. The assurance made by private respondents that
petitioner did not have to worry about the case because it was pure and
simple harassment  is not the kind of guaranty contemplated under the
exceptive clause in Article 1590 wherein the vendor is bound to make
payment even with the existence of a vindicatory action if the vendee
should give a security for the return of the price.

3. YES. The private respondents may no longer be compelled to sell and

deliver the subject property to petitioner for two reasons, that is,
petitioner’s failure to duly effect the consignation of the purchase price
after the disturbance had ceased; and, secondarily, the fact that the
contract to sell had been validly rescinded by private respondents.

The mere sending of a letter by the vendee expressing the intention to

pay, without the accompanying payment, is not considered a valid
tender of payment.  Besides, a mere tender of payment is not sufficient
to compel private respondents to deliver the property and execute the
deed of absolute sale. It is consignation which is essential in order to
extinguish petitioner’s obligation to pay the balance of the purchase
price.

The rule is different in case of an option contract or in legal redemption

or in a sale with right to repurchase, wherein consignation is not
necessary because these cases involve an exercise of a right or privilege
(to buy, redeem or repurchase) rather than the discharge of an
obligation, hence tender of payment would be sufficient to preserve the
right or privilege. This is because the provisions on consignation are not
applicable when there is no obligation to pay.  A contract to sell, as in the
case before us, involves the performance of an obligation, not merely the
exercise of a privilege of a right. Consequently, performance or payment
may be effected not by tender of payment alone but by both tender and
consignation.
Furthermore, petitioner no longer had the right to suspend payment
after the disturbance ceased with the dismissal of the civil case filed
against it. Necessarily, therefore, its obligation to pay the balance again
arose and resumed after it received notice of such dismissal.
Unfortunately, petitioner failed to seasonably make payment. By reason
of petitioner’s failure to comply with its obligation, private respondents
elected to resort to and did announce the rescission of the contract
through its letter to petitioner. That written notice of rescission is
deemed sufficient under the circumstances. Article 1592 of the Civil
Code which requires rescission either by judicial action or notarial act is
not applicable to a contract to sell. Furthermore, judicial action for
rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides
for automatic rescission in case of breach, as in the contract involved in
the present controversy.
In the case at bar, it has been shown that although petitioner was duly
furnished and did receive a written notice of rescission which specified
the grounds therefore, it failed to reply thereto or protest against it. By
such cavalier disregard, it has been effectively estopped from seeking the
affirmative relief it now desires but which it had theretofore disdained.

NOTES:
3. Option vs. contract

An option, as used in the law on sales, is a continuing offer or contract

by which the owner stipulates with another that the latter shall have the
right to buy the property at a fixed price within a certain time, or under,
or in compliance with, certain terms and conditions, or which gives to
the owner of the property the right to sell or demand a sale. It is also
sometimes called an “unaccepted offer.” An option is not of itself a
purchase, but merely secures the privilege to buy.  It is not a sale of
property but a sale of property but a sale of the right to purchase.  It is
simply a contract by which the owner of property agrees with another
person that he shall have the right to buy his property at a fixed price
within a certain time. He does not sell his land; he does not then agree
to sell it; but he does sell something, that it is, the right or privilege to buy
at the election or option of the other party.
Its distinguishing characteristic is that it imposes no binding obligation
on the person holding the option, aside from the consideration for the
offer. Until acceptance, it is not, properly speaking, a contract, and does
not vest, transfer, or agree to transfer, any title to, or any interest or
right in the subject matter, but is merely a contract by which the owner
of property gives the optionee the right or privilege of accepting the offer
and buying the property on certain terms.
On the other hand, a contract, like a contract to sell, involves a meeting
of minds two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the
other, to give something or to render some service. Contracts, in general,
are perfected by mere consent, which is manifested by the meeting of
the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to
constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance
absolute.

The distinction between an “option” and a contract of sale is that an

option is an unaccepted offer. It states the terms and conditions on
which the owner is willing to sell the land, if the holder elects to accept
them within the time limited. If the holder does so elect, he must give
notice to the other party, and the accepted offer thereupon becomes a
valid and binding contract. If an acceptance is not made within the time
fixed, the owner is no longer bound by his offer, and the option is at an
end.

A contract of sale, on the other hand, fixes definitely the relative rights
and obligations of both parties at the time of its execution. The offer and
the acceptance are concurrent, since the minds of the contracting parties
meet in the terms of the agreement

 The contract to sell was validly rescinded by the sellers. In this

case, the SC held that the written notice of rescission sent by
the sellers to Adelfa was sufficient. The SC held that the
resolution of reciprocal contracts may be made extra-judicially
unless successfully impugned in court. The Court said that
Adelfa’s receipt of the said notice without objection amounts to
an admission of the veracity and validity of the seller’s claim.

5. TPR’s signed by certain Estrada who was not presented in

court, which was denied by him according to Azurin.
THEREAFTER EXECUTED AN AFFIDAVIT AFFIRMING HIS
ALLEGATION, EXECUTED 2 MONTHS AFTER INVESTIGATION
NORA S. EUGENIO and ALFREDO Y. EUGENIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Initially, around 1982, Private respondent (Pepsi) filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioners
Nora S. Eugenio and Alfredo Y. Eugenio. Eventually, the couple lost the case, both in the trial court and the
court of appeals.
On appeal with the Supreme Court, With the review of the factual findings it appeared that, sometime in
1981, private respondent through the head of its Legal Department, Atty. Rosario, invited alfredo for an
interview regarding alleged "non-payment of debts to the company, inefficiency, and loss of trust and
confidence."
After the meeting, private respondent alleged that petitioner Alfredo Y. Eugenio requested that he be
allowed to retire and the existing accounts be deducted from his retirement pay, but that he later withdrew
his retirement plan. Said petitioner disputed that allegation and, in fact, he subsequently filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal. The finding of labor arbiter, later affirmed by the Supreme Court, showed that this
petitioner was indeed illegally dismissed, and that he never filed an application for retirement.

With their aforesaid accounts still unpaid, petitioner Alfredo Y. Eugenio submitted to Atty. Rosario the
aforementioned four TPRs. Thereafter, Atty. Rosario ordered Daniel Azurin, assistant personnel manager,
to conduct an investigation to verify this claim of petitioners. According to Azurin, during the investigation
on December 4, 1981, Estrada allegedly denied that he issued and signed the aforesaid TPRs. He also
presented a supposed affidavit which Estrada allegedly executed during that investigation to affirm his
verbal statements therein. Surprisingly, however, said supposed affidavit is inexplicably dated February 5,
1982. 20 At this point, it should be noted that Estrada never testified thereafter in court and what he is
supposed to have done or said was merely related by Azurin.

On this Point, During the appeal with the Court of Appeals, respondent court disagreed with herein
petitioners that the testimony of Jovencio Estrada is hearsay evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony made by Estrada is Hearsay.
HELD:
The rule is clear and explicit. Under the hearsay evidence rule, a witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in the Rules. 23 In the present case, Estrada failed to appear as a witness at the trial. It
was only Azurin who testified that during the investigation he conducted, Estrada supposedly denied having
signed the TPRs. It is elementary that under the measure on hearsay evidence, Azurin's testimony cannot
constitute legal proof as to the truth of Estrada's denial. For that matter, it is not admissible in evidence,
petitioners' counsel having seasonably objected at the trial to such testimony of Azurin as hearsay. And,
even if not objected to and thereby admissible, such hearsay evidence has no probative value whatsoever

It is true that the testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case
or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in
evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. 25 Private respondent
cannot, however, seek sanctuary in this exception to the hearsay evidence rule.

Firstly, the supposed investigation conducted by Azurin was merely an inter-office interview conducted by
a personnel officer.

Secondly, the "investigation" was more of a free-flowing question and lacks the element of cross
examination. Thus, without the full opportunity to cross-examine the witness, evidence relating to the
testimony given is inadmissible in another proceeding, in absent of any conduct on the part of the accused
amounting to a waiver of his right to cross-examine

Thirdly, there was no way to authenticate the notes presented because of the absences of the person who
created them.

Lastly, there was no evidence to prove the absence of Estrada.

Thus, aside from the fact that they were not prepared by the affiants themselves but by another, it was also
executed more than two months after the investigation, presumably for curative purposes as it were.
Therefore, not only is the affidavit of Estrada inadmissible, it is likewise barred as evidence by the hearsay
evidence rule. 

Now, on this point, respondent court disagreed with herein petitioners

that the testimony on the alleged denial of Jovencio Estrada regarding his
 signatures on the disputed TPRs, as well as his affidavit dated February 5,
1982[21] wherein he affirmed his denial, are hearsay evidence because
Estrada was not presented as a witness to testify and be cross-examined
thereon. Except for the terse statement of respondent court that since
petitioner Alfredo Eugenio was supposedly present on December 4, 1981,
"(t)he testimony of Jovencio Estrada at the aforementioned investigation
categorically denying that he issued and signed the disputed TPRs is,
therefore, not hearsay,"[22] there was no further explanation on this
unusual doctrinal departure.

The rule is clear and explicit. Under the hearsay evidence rule, a witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge;
that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise
provided in the Rules.[23] In the present case, Estrada failed to appear as
a witness at the trial. It was only Azurin who testified that during the
investigation he conducted, Estrada supposedly denied having signed the
TPRs. It is elementary that under the measure on hearsay evidence,
Azurin's testimony cannot constitute legal proof as to the truth of
Estrada's denial. For that matter, it is not admissible in evidence,
petitioners' counsel having seasonably objected at the trial to such
testimony of Azurin as hearsay. And, even if not objected to and thereby
admissible, such hearsay evidence has no probative value whatsoever.
[24]

Obviously, neither is the affidavit of Estrada admissible; it is likewise barred

as evidence by the hearsay evidence rule.[28] This is aside from the fact that,
by their nature, affidavits are generally not prepared by the affiants
themselves but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's
statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one
writing them.[29] The dubiety of that affidavit, as earlier explained, is further
underscored by the fact that it was executed more than two months after the
investigation, presumably for curative purposes as it were.

This is a situation that irresistibly arouses judicial curiosity, if not suspicion.

Respondent corporation was fully aware that its case rested, as it were, on
the issue of whether the TPRs were authentic and which issue, in turn, turned
on the genuineness of Estrada's signatures thereon. Yet, aside from cursorily
dismissing the non-presentation of Estrada in court by the glib assertion that
he could not be found, and necessarily aware that his alleged denial of his
signatures on said TPRs and his affidavit rendered the same vulnerable to
the challenge that they are hearsay and inadmissible, respondent
corporation did nothing more. In fact, Estrada's disappearance has not been
explained up to the present.

6. MARIJUANA – EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION, ADMISSION, INVESTIGATION
ALREADY DDEEMED CUSTODIAL
FACTS:

SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya,
testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received a tip from
an unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly
owned by Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva
Vizcaya. The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to appellant's (ABE
VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ) hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of
Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his
operatives to verify the report. At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following
day, said police team, accompanied by their informer, left for the site where the
marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from
the nearest barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed
by their informant. The police found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then,
proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw
seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25
meters from appellant's hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the
prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his.
The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194 kilograms.
The police took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants.
Appellant was then arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090 kilograms, was
sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya for analysis. Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory
forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic examination of said plant, she
found cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication for
marijuana. She next conducted a chemical examination, the results of which
confirmed her initial impressions. She found as follows: "SPECIMEN
SUBMITTED: Exh "A" - 1.090 grams of uprooted suspected marijuana plant
placed inside a white sack with markings. x x x "FINDINGS: Qualitative
examination conducted on the above stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to
the test for Marijuana, a prohibited drug." ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, the
accused, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by trial court of cultivating
marijuana plants punishable under section 9 of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection.
The accused-appellant contended there was unlawful search and that the court
erred in declaring the marijuana plants, as evidence despite that was the product
of an illegal search; erred in convicting the accused of violation of section 9
(Dangerous Drugs Act), Republic Act No. 6425 despite of the inadmissibility of
the evidence; and gravely erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon
the accused despite failure of the court to prove that the land where the Indian
Hemp were cultivated was a public land on the assumption that the accused
planted.

Issues stated:

1. Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in this case lawful?

2. Was the used evidence (seizure of marijuana plants) in the case against
Valdez admissible?

3. Has the prosecution proved that Valdez was guilty beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD:

The Supreme Court REVERSED the decision of the Regional Trial Court and the
appellant was AQUITTED 1. and 2. No. In the instant case, there was no search
warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the existence of
probable cause. Contention: For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General
argues that the records clearly show that there was no search made by the police
team, in the first place. The OSG points out that the marijuana plants in question
were grown in an unfenced lot and as each grew about five (5) feet tall, they
were visible from afar, and were, in fact, immediately spotted by the police
officers when they reached the site. The seized marijuana plants were, thus, in
plain view of the police officers. Ruling: We find no reason to subscribe to
Solicitor General's contention that we apply the "plain view" doctrine. For the
doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present: (a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere seizure
of evidence without further search. In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut
testified that they first located the marijuana plants before appellant was arrested
without a warrant. Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded
the search of appellant's premises. Note further that the police team was
dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited
flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer
is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes
across an incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was
not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at
the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal
plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent"
and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were
not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus,
cannot be made to apply. We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that
the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal search and
seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana
plants as evidence for the prosecution, we find that said plants cannot, as
products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against
appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a
reversible error on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon
the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.

4. No. In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony
of the police officers to the effect that appellant admitted ownership of the
marijuana when he was asked who planted them. It made the following
observation: "It may be true that the admission to the police by the
accused that he planted the marijuana plants was made in the absence of
any independent and competent counsel. But the accused was not, at the
time of police verification; under custodial investigation. His admission is,
therefore, admissible in evidence and not violative of the constitutional fiat
that admission given during custodial investigation is not admissible if
given without any counsel."

The Constitution plainly declares that any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right: (1) to remain silent; (2)
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice;
and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel. An investigation begins
when it is no longer a general inquiry but starts to focus on a particular
person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating
or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged
offense. The moment the police try to elicit admissions or confessions or
even plain information from a person suspected of having committed an
offense, he should at that juncture be assisted by counsel, unless he
waives the right in writing and in the presence of counsel. In the instant
case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the police
appellant's name as well as the location of appellant's farm, where the
marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. While the police operation
was supposedly meant to merely "verify" said information, the police chief
had likewise issued instructions to arrest appellant as a suspected
 marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked to appellant in his
farm, the latter was already under investigation as a suspect. The
questioning by the police was no longer a general inquiry. Moreover, we
find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its
admissibility. For a confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the
following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with
the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be
express; and (4) it must be in writing. The records show that the admission
by appellant was verbal. It was also uncounselled. A verbal admission
allegedly made by an accused during the investigation, without the
assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest and even before his formal
investigation is not only inadmissible for being violative of the right to
counsel during criminal investigations, it is also hearsay. Summary of
ruling in no. 3: First, as earlier pointed out, the seized marijuana plants
were obtained in violation of appellant's constitutional rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The search and seizure were void
ab initio for having been conducted without the requisite judicial warrant.
The prosecution's very own evidence clearly establishes that the police
had sufficient time to obtain a warrant. There was no showing of such
urgency or necessity for the warrantless search or the immediate seizure
of the marijuana plants subject of this case. To reiterate, said marijuana
plants cannot be utilized to prove appellant's guilt without running afoul of
the constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and the
inadmissibility of evidence procured pursuant to an unlawful search and
seizure. Second, the confession of ownership of the marijuana plants,
which appellant allegedly made to the police during investigation, is not
only hearsay but also violative of the Bill of Rights. The purported
confession was made without the assistance of competent and
independent counsel, as mandated by the Charter. Thus, said confession
cannot be used to convict appellant without running afoul of the
Constitution's requirement that a suspect in a criminal investigation must
have the services of competent and independent counsel during such
investigation. In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial
evidence as to appellant's voluntary confession of ownership of the
prohibited plants relied upon to prove appellant's guilt failed to meet the
test of Constitutional competence.

7. TRIAL COURT CONVICTED ACCUSED OF MURDER

BASED ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE. POLICEMAN
PRESENTED HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE,
RELIED ON AFFIDAVIT OF EYEWITNESS WHO
WAS NOT PRESENTED IN COURT. SPO3 WAS
ALSO NOT THOSE WHO APPREHENDED HIM
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENE MAMALIAS Y FIEL

G.R. No. 128073. March 27, 2000

FACTS:
Accused Rene Mamalias y Feil was convicted of murder and frustrated murder, for the
death of Francisco de Vera y Del Valle, and the gunshot wound inflicted on Alexander
Bunag. He seeks his acquittal on the ground that the trial court convicted him purely on
the basis of hearsay evidence but he escaped pending decision of his appeal.
The prosecution presented only two (2) witnesses, namely police investigator SPO3
Manuel Liberato of the Western Police District Command, who took the Affidavit of
Epifanio Raymundo, the alleged eyewitness of the shooting incident and Dr. Remigio
Rivera, a resident physician at Mary Johnston Hospital in Tondo, Manila, who testified
that he treated the gunshot wounds of Alexander Bunag.
The prosecution tried to present Alexander Bunag, the heirs of Francisco De Vera and
Epifanio Raymundo as additional witnesses but the authorities could not locate them.
For lack of other material witnesses, the prosecution rested its case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not  the guilt of the accused-appellant was established beyond

reasonable doubt.

HELD:

To overcome the presumption of innocence, proof beyond reasonable doubt of

every fact essential to constitute the offense with which the accused is charged
must be clearly established by the prosecution. The Constitution mandates that in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. This presumption of innocence is anchored on the basic
principles of justice. It cannot be overcome by suspicion or conjecture, a
probability that the accused committed the crime or that he had the opportunity to
do so. 
In the case at bar, the trial court merely relied on hearsay evidence, particularly on the
testimony of SPO3 Liberato and the sworn statement of Epifanio Raymundo who did not
testify in the trial court. The records clearly show that prosecution witness SPO3 Liberato
has no personal knowledge of the facts surrounding the shooting incident. The Progress
Report and the Booking and Arrest Report he prepared were based on information
related to him by Epifanio Raymundo almost five (5) months after the crimes were
committed. Clearly, his knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the shooting
incident was limited to the matters relayed to him by his co-policemen and the alleged
eyewitness, hence, hearsay. Wherefore the accused is acquitted for the crimes charged
due to reasonable doubt.
SPO3 Liberato was not even a member of the team of policemen that
apprehend the accused-appellant on January 4, 1993. He testified that the
accused-appellant was turned over to him only on January 6, 1993, and he
did not know how the accused-appellant was apprehended. He was also not
aware whether a warrant of arrest had been issued against the accused-
appellant.[17] Clearly, his knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the
shooting incident was limited to the matters relayed to him by his co-
policemen and the alleged eyewitness, hence, hearsay.

In the same vein, the sworn statement of Epifanio Raymundo is merely

hearsay evidence as he did not personally appear in court to affirm its
content. Its probative value, if any, is little. We have held that in criminal
cases, the admission of hearsay evidence would be a violation of the
constitutional provision that the accused shall enjoy the right to confront the
witnesses testifying against him and to cross-examine them. [18] A conviction
based alone on proof that violates the constitutional right of an accused is a
nullity and the court that rendered it acted without jurisdiction in its
rendition. Such a judgment cannot be given any effect whatsoever especially
on the liberty of an individual.

8. STATEMENT OF SGT. BANO ADMISSIBLE, ONLY TO

ESTABLSIH THE FACT OF STATEMENT MADE TO HIM BY
PUESCA, ONE OF THE ACCUSED IN THE CASE. BUT SAME
STATEMENT SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN ASS COMPETENT
EVIDENCE TO CONVICT ACCUSED

G.R. No. L-20986, August 14, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.HON. VICENTE N. CUSI JR., Presiding Judge,
Branch I, Court of First Instance of Davao, ARCADIO PUESCA alias Big Boy, WALTER APA, JOSE
GUSTILO alias Peping, FILOMENO MACALINAO, JR. alias White, RICARDO DAIRO alias Carding,
and MAGNO MONTANO alias Edol, respondents.

DIZON, J.:

FACTS:
 Puesca, Apa, Gustilo, Macalinao, Dairo, and Montano were charged with robbery in band with
homicide, to which they pleaded not guilty.
 While Sgt. Bano was testifying as prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial confession made to
him by Puesca, he said that the latter, aside from admitting his participation in the commission of the
offense charged, revealed that other persons conspired with him to commit the offense, mentioning
the name of each and everyone of them.
 The prosecuting officer asked the witness to mention in court the names of Puesca's alleged co-
conspirators.
 Counsel for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected to this, upon the ground that whatever
the witness would say would be hearsay as far as his clients were concerned.
 The respondent judge resolved the objection directing the witness to answer the question but without
mentioning or giving the names of the accused who had interposed the objection.
o The witness was allowed to answer the question and name his co-conspirators except those who
had raised the objection.
o The prosecuting officer's motion for reconsideration of this ruling was denied.

ISSUE/HOLDING: Should Sgt. Bano have been allowed to answer the question in full?  YES

RATIO:
 Hearsay evidence, if timely objected to, may not be admitted.
 But while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to
establish the truth of facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the
purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was
made or the tenor of such statement (People vs. Lew Yon).
 In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer is nothing more than to establish the fact
that the accused Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Bano the names of those who conspired with him to
commit the offense charged, without claiming that Puesca's statement or the answer to be given by
Sgt. Bano would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons so named really
conspired with Puesca.
 The question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been allowed to
answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be taken as competent
evidence to show that the persons named really and actually conspired with Puesca and later took
part in the commission of the offense.

DISPOSITIVE: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the writ is granted. The writ of preliminary injunction issued
heretofore is hereby set aside.

9 RAPE : XTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION ADMISSIBLE, NOT
MADE DURING CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JHONNETTEL MAYORGA
y LUMAGUE alias Puroy, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 135405; November 29, 2000

FACTS: About five o'clock in the afternoon of 24 June 1995, in Barangay Zone I,
Sitio Paraiso, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, five-year old Leney Linayao was
playing by the seashore. Suddenly, she was approached by the accused Jhonnettel
Mayorga y Lumague alias Puroy who asked her to buy for him a bottle of gin
commonly known as "bagets." He then brought the child to a marshy area ("lalao")
nearby where he boxed her on the face and chest and wrung her neck until she fainted.
By the time Leney recovered consciousness, Puroy had already raped her and then
disappeared. Leney, bleeding and muddied, stood up and walked away to the direction
of Matuod-tuod where her family lived. At about this time, Leney’s grandmother,
Alfonsa Magculang, together with some men started looking for her. While searching
they met Puroy's cousin, Edwin Lumague, who told them that Leney was raped by
Puroy and was "dead" when abandoned. According to Edwin, while he was preparing
to join the search, Puroy dissuaded him from going and confided to him that "iyong
bata si Leney ay napagtripan niya at nilitik niya." With Edwin leading the way, they
immediately repaired to where Leney was supposedly taken by Puroy. But she was not
there. The search party proceeded to the military detachment to report the matter.
There they were told by Richard Magboo that Leney had been taken by the barangay
tanods to Dr. Ngo’s clinic. On 27 June 1995 Dr. Cristina Gonzales physically
examined Leney at the provincial hospital. Dr. Gonzales found that Leney sustained
"hematoma, right eye; contusion hematoma, right temporal area; multiple abrasions:
right shoulder, left anterior chest, left thigh and leg, upper back. External genitalia:
complete hymenal lacerations at 3, 5, 7 & 10 o'clock positions with erythematous
borders, with a 1 cm. perineal laceration with purulent discharge. Internal
examination: vagina admits 1 finger with ease. Laboratory examination: cervico-
vaginal smear for the presence of spermatozoa revealed NEGATIVE result."
Jhonnettel Mayorga alias Puroy was accordingly charged with statutory rape of a child
five (5) years of age. At the trial, the prosecution presented Alfonsa Magculang, Dr.
Cristina Gonzales, Leney and Renato Gamilla, one of the barangay tanods who
brought Leney to Dr. Ngo’s clinic. After the prosecution had rested, Puroy with leave
of court filed a demurrer to evidence, which was denied by the trial court. Thereafter,
the defense presented the accused as its lone witness who claimed that the imputation
against him was a lie. He claimed that at the time of the supposed rape he was "patay
lasing The trial court did not sustain Puroy's defense of alibi. Edwin’s testimony was
also not given credence on the ground that it was hearsay and was violative of the
constitutional rights of the accused. Solely on account of Leney’s testimony, the court
a quo found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the crime of
RAPE. Forthwith, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused in convicting
him on the following grounds: 1. Leney’s testimony should not be given credence
since she had been coached by her grandmother; and 2. Edwin’s testimony was given
under compulsion of threat and does not deserve credit.

RULING: The argument that Leney has lost her credibility since she admitted that she
had been coached by her grandmother has no merit. The victim, an innocent and
guileless five-year old when the crime was committed against her, cannot be expected
to recall every single detail and aspect of the brutal experience that she went through
in the hands of the accused. Besides, at the time of her testimony she had stopped
schooling and did not have the gift of articulation. It is but fair that she be guided
through by her grandmother in recounting her harrowing experience which happened
two (2) years before she testified. We realize how extremely painful it was for Leney
to reveal that she had been raped. Her attempt to demonstrate before the court the
accused's success in having carnal knowledge of her spoke of her utter innocence and
naiveté. Her painful cries were eloquent testimonies of an anguish too grievous for a
young girl to bear. Indeed, it is simply hard to conceive that a girl of her character
would be able to weave such a sordid tale.
The lower court's ruling that the admission of the declaration of the accused would
constitute a violation of his constitutional right is misplaced. His declaration was not
made under custodial investigation; hence, it does not come within the gamut of Sec.
12, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution. Nor is there merit to the court’s finding that
Edwin’s testimony was hearsay. This is a misinterpretation of the hearsay rule. It must
be pointed out that the statement to him of the accused constitutes an extrajudicial
admission. This admission can be received against the accused since it is not within
the purview of the hearsay rule. Wigmore explains that the hearsay rule is intended to
give the parties a right to object to the introduction of a statement not made under oath
and not subject to cross-examination. Its purpose is to afford a party the privilege, if he
desires it, of requiring the declarant to be sworn and subjected to questions. Wigmore
then adds that where the evidence offered are his statements, the purpose does not
apply, and so the hearsay rule does not likewise apply, as "he does not need to cross-
examine himself." In the face of Edwin's testimony that the accused had made the
admission, it becomes imperative for the latter to disprove it. His explanation that
Edwin was coerced to testify against him is at best a futile attempt to prop a tottering
defense. The allegation can be no better than pure speculation as nothing was offered
to support it. On the other hand, it is indeed incredible that Edwin could be frightened
by the threat of a five-year old child. The defense of alibi set up by the accused is
equally untenable. The rule is that the defense of alibi when not supported by clear and
convincing evidence deserves no weight in law as it can be easily fabricated or
contrived. It cannot be given evidentiary value than the affirmative testimony of
credible witnesses who harbor no ill motives against the accused, for as between a
categorical testimony on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former is
generally held to prevail.

At this juncture, we take exception to the pronouncement made by the

court below that "the testimony of Edwin Lumague that accused
Jhonnettel Mayorga conveyed to him that 'May napagtripan akong bata.
(Nalitik daw po niya ang bata)' could not be given credence and therefore
inadmissible, both as violative of the constitutional rights of the accused
and as hearsay evidence."[13]

The lower court's ruling that the admission of the declaration of the
accused would constitute a violation of his constitutional right is
misplaced. His declaration was not made under custodial investigation;
hence, it does not come within the gamut of Sec. 12, Art. III, of the 1987
Constitution.[14]

Nor is there merit to the court's finding that Edwin's testimony was
hearsay. This is a misinterpretation of the hearsay rule. It must be pointed
out that the statement to him of the accused constitutes an extrajudicial
admission.[15] This admission can be received against the accused since it is
 not within the purview of the hearsay rule. Wigmore explains that the
hearsay rule is intended to give the parties a right to object to the
introduction of a statement not made under oath and not subject to cross-
examination. Its purpose is to afford a party the privilege, if he desires it,
of requiring the declarant to be sworn and subjected to questions.
Wigmore then adds that where the evidence offered are his statements,
the purpose does not apply, and so the hearsay rule does not likewise
apply, as "he does not need to cross-examine himself." [16]

HABEAS CORPUS, TRANSFER OF A PERSON CONVICTED

10.
WITHMURDER WITH HOMICIDE, QUESTIONS LEGALITY OF DETENTION

BECAUSE OF LOST RECORDS… ADMISSION ON HIS PART.

FERIA v. CA

G.R. No. 122954. February 15, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner Norberto Feria has been under detention since May 21, 1981, by reason of his
conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide In Criminal Case No. 60677.

On June 9, 1993, petitioner sought to be transferred from the Manila City Jail to the
Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City, but the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail
informed the Presiding Judge that the transfer cannot be effected without the submission
of the requirements, namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and
Information.

It was then discovered that the entire records of the case, including the copy of the
judgment, were missing.

In response to the inquiries made by counsel of petitioner, both the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of Court of RTC attested to the fact that the records of
Criminal Case No. 60677 could not be found in their respective offices. Upon further
inquiries, the entire records appear to have been lost or destroyed in the fire which
occurred at the second and third floor of the Manila City Hall on November 3, 1986.
Petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme
Court against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his
discharge from confinement on the ground that his continued detention without any valid
judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy in this case.

In this case, the records were lost after petitioner, by his own admission, was already
convicted by the trial court of the offense charged. Further, the same incident which
gave rise to the filing of the Information for Robbery with Homicide also gave rise to
another case for Illegal Possession of Firearm, the records of which could be of
assistance in the reconstitution of the present case.

Herein, based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is
sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of Feria which serves
as the legal basis for his detention. Petitioner made judicial admissions, both verbal
and written, that he was charged with and convicted of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment "habang buhay". Further, the records
also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated January 1985 of then
Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that Feria was convicted of the crime
of Robbery with Homicide on 11 January 1985. Such Monthly Report constitutes an
entry in official records under Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, which is prima facie evidence of facts therein stated. As a general rule, the
burden of proving illegal restraint rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In
other words, where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth
process which on its face shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is
incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the
apparent effect of such process. If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful
public authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the
restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal.
Since the public officials have sufficiently shown good ground for the detention,
Feria's release from confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court. Furthermore, there is also no showing that petitioner duly appealed his
conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, hence for all intents and purposes,
such judgment has already become final and executory. When a court has jurisdiction
of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order, or
decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus. Put another way, in order
that a judgment may be subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be void
for lack of jurisdiction

Petitioner's declarations as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him under
Section 23 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This rule is based upon the presumption
that no man would declare anything against himself, unless such declaration were
true,18 particularly with respect to such grave matter as his conviction for the crime of
Robbery with Homicide. Further, under Section 4 of Rule 129, "[a]n admission, verbal or
written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made." Petitioner does not claim
any mistake nor does he deny making such admissions.

Public respondents likewise presented a certified hue copy of People's Journal dated
January 18, 1985, page 2,20 issued by the National Library, containing a short news article
that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and was sentenced to
"life imprisonment." However, newspaper articles amount to "hearsay evidence, twice
removed"21 and are therefore not only inadmissible but without any probative value at all
whether objected to or not,22 unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of
the matter asserted. In this case, the news article is admissible only as evidence that such
publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein stated.

11. DYING DECLARATION. WHO STABBED THE

DECEASED RELATED TO WIFE. ADMISSIBLE
EXCEPTION TO HEARSAY RULE.

People v. Sison GR 109617 Aug. 1997

FACTS:

Cesar Abaoag was at the barangay road in front of his house with his elder
brother when all of a sudden, Ronnie Manuel arrived coming from the west
complaining that he was being chased by Felipe Sion and Johnny Juguilon.
Seconds later, Felipe Sion and Johnny Juguilon appeared and started
throwing stones. Fernando Abaoag told them to stop throwing stones but
before they desisted and left. While Abaoag was inside his house, he heard
the sound of stone throwing at the nearby house of his brother Fernando. He
saw his brother Fernando already outside his house. He also saw Johnny
Juguilon, one of the members of the group of stone throwers, hurl a big stone
against Fernando. Felix Sion, Edong Sion and Miguel Disu who were also
throwing stones towards his direction. On the other hand, appellant Felipe
Sion, who was near the victim, with a very sharp double bladed dagger,
stabbed Fernando multiple times. Cesar tried to extend help to his brother but
he was hit by a stone. He heard the assailants shouting that he will also be
killed, so he desisted in helping brother. He ran to his brother’s house to call
his brother’s wife. When they got there the assailants were no longer there
and found her husband lying weak and dying. The victim died after being
rushed in the hospital. On June 1992, Sison was arrested. On June 1992,
RTC annulled and voided the bail. The case was proceeded only against
Sison and Disu because they were the only ones arrested.

The assailants were no longer there. She only saw her husband lying prostate on the
ground very weak in the state of dying. When she inquired what happened, Fernando
answered "naalaak" which in English means "I was hit" (pp. 4-5, TSN, July 27, 1992).
Fernando told his wife that his assailants were Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Edong Sion,
Johnny Juguilon and Felix Sion (p. 6, TSN, id.)

Finally, it is well to quote the statement uttered by Fernando Abaoag in the presence of
Felicitas Abaoag, to wit: "naalaak, which means, I was hit, take note of this because I
cannot survive these injuries of mine". Fernando Abaoag told Felicitas Abaoag, Felipe
Sion, Miguel Disu, Idong Sion, Johnny Juguilon and Felix Sion stabbed him. (2-12 tsn July
27, 1992). This is a dying declaration because it was made under a consciousness of
impending death (Section 37, Rule 130, Rules of Court).

APPELLANTS: In support of their first assigned error, appellants attack the identification
made of them by prosecution witnesses. They claim that if witness Cesar Abaoag actually
saw appellant Sion stab the victim, then Cesar should have immediately informed
Felicitas Abaoag, the victim's wife, of this fact. Cesar's failure was then unusual and
unnatural. Then, too, Felicitas Abaoag's testimony on her husband's alleged dying
declaration was "not specific" as far as the assailant's identities were concerned because
the victim merely said "naalaak" ("I was hit"), without identifying appellant Sion as the one
who stabbed him; and, her claim that her husband identified all the five (5) accused as the
ones who "stabbed" him was "an impossibility." Moreover, the prosecution witnesses
were limited to relatives of the victims; "other vital witnesses" — such as Marta Soriano,
Loly Galdones, or Eling Alcantara — should have been presented to corroborate the
"biased" testimonies of Cesar and Felicitas Abaoag.

he identifications of appellants and their co-accused were further bolstered by the

declaration made by the victim to his wife, Felicitas Abaoag. The trial court correctly
characterized this as a "dying declaration,"  having been made under the consciousness
38

of impending death. The victim was already weak his wife saw him and he knew that he
would not survive the injuries he sustained; he even died a few minutes later while on the
way to the hospital.  When Felicitas saw her husband, he told her what had happened to
39

him, who caused his injuries and that he did not expect to live, thus:

We find these statements given by the victim to his wife to have met the requisites of a
dying declaration under Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: (a) death is
imminent and the declarant was conscious of that fact; (b) the preliminary facts which
bring the declaration within its scope must be made to appear; (c) the declaration relates
to the facts or circumstances pertaining to the fatal injury or death; and (d) the declarant
would have been competent to testify had he survived.  Dying declarations are admissible
41

in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule because

of necessity and trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarant's death renders
impossible his taking the witness stand, and it often happens that there is no other equally
satisfactory proof of the crime; and trustworthiness, for it is "made in extremity, when the
party is at the point of death and every hope of this world is gone; when every motive to
 falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to
speak the truth.  We find no ulterior motive on the part of Felicitas to fabricate the
42

declarations of her husband.

n his defense, appellant Disu offered denial and alibi. He declared that he had no
participation in the killing of Fernando Abaoag, and during the whole night of 16 October
1991, while the quarrel, stoning and stabbing incidents in question were taking place, he
was resting and sleeping in the house of his employer, Felicidad Gatchalian, after driving
the latter's jeepney the entire day. However, before proceeding home from work that
afternoon, he went to the store of Oping Juguilon to buy cigarettes and dropped by the
house of appellant Sion where he stayed for about five minutes. He only learned about
the killing the following morning when he was told that he was one of the suspects. He
was arrested about a month after the incident. 2

It is settled that alibi is a weak defense for it is easy to concoct and fabricate; it cannot
prevail over and is worthless in the face of the positive identification by credible witnesses
that an accused perpetrated the crime.  We are unable to discern any plausible reason,
54

and appellant Disu does not offer any, why he should be falsely implicated by Cesar
Abaoag and mentioned in the victim's dying declaration as one of the victim' assailants, if
appellant Disu was not actually present during the incident and had no participation in the
commission of the crime. As to his motive or lack thereof, appellant Disu claims that he
had no misunderstanding with Fernando Abaoag or his family.  However, Felipe Sion, Jr.,
55

disclosed that appellant Disu was close to the Sion clan, which explains why appellant
Disu sympathized with and joined the Sions and Juguilon in assaulting the victim:
Federico Disu was Sion Jr.'s jeepney conductor for five (5) months, the latter teaching the
former how to drive for three (3) months; and when Disu became a driver himself, they
had the same route and saw each other every day at the poblacion.  Disu even admitted
56

that on 16 October 1991, after 5:00 p.m., he "dropped by" the house of Felipe Sion, which
he often did before. 57

12. DECLARATION OF DECEASED

TO POLICE OFFICER PUT INTO
WRITING AND BLOOD STAMPED.
People vs. Amaca
GR No. 110129 August 11, 1997

 Facts:

1.    Accused Amaca and another known as “Ogang” were charged for shooting Wilson Vergara.
During the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Edgar Pialago, a resident physician on duty
when the victim was brought to the hospital after the shooting. The doctor testified that he
was able to attend to the victim who had undergone a surgical operation conducted by
another doctor. At that time, the major organs of the victim were no longer functioning
normally, while his pancreas was likewise injured due to the 2 gunshot wounds at his back.
The victim was admitted at 10:45PM but expired the following evening at 10PM. According to
Dr. Pialago, even with immediate medical attention, the victim could not survive the wounds
 he sustained.

2.     Another witness testified, PO Mangubat,  a police officer , who interviewed the victim (Wilson
Vergara) right after the shooting. Mangubat  testified that he saw the victim already on board
a Ford Fiera pick-up ready for transport to the hospital. He inquired from the victim about the
incident, and the former answered he was shot by CVO Amaca and Ogang. Upon query why
he was shot, the victim said he did not know the reason why he was shot. Upon being asked
as to his condition, the victim said that he was about to die.  He was able to reduce into
writing the declaration of the victim and made latter affixed his thumb mark with the use of
his own blood in the presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City Mayor. 

3.       Segundina Vergara, mother of the victim, and her son-in-law Jose Lapera both desisted
from further prosecution of the case. the former because of the "financial help" extended by
the accused to her family, and the latter because Segundina had already "consented to the
amicable settlement of the case." Despite this, the Department of Justice found the existence
of a prima facie case based on the victim's ante mortem statement.

4.       The lower court convicted Amaca on the basis of the victim's ante mortem statement to
Police Officer Mangubat positively identifying accused. The dying declaration was deemed
sufficient to overcome the accused’s  defense of alibi. However, due to the voluntary
desistance of the victim's mother from further prosecuting the case, the court a quo declined
to make a finding on the civil liability of the appellant.

Issue (2): Whether or not  the dying declaration of victim should be admitted

YES.  The victim’s dying declaration is admissible.

A dying declaration is worthy of belief because it is highly unthinkable for one who is aware
of his impending death to accuse, falsely or even carelessly, anyone of being responsible for
his foreseeable demise. Indeed, "when a person is at the point of death, every motive for
falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak
the

truth." This is the rationale for this exception to the hearsay rule under Section 37, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court. The elements of such exception are: (1) the deceased made the
declaration conscious of his impending death; (2) the declarant would have been a
competent witness had he survived; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case where
the declarant's death is the subject of inquiry; and (5) the declaration is complete in itself. All
these concur in the present case.

Finally, Police Officer Mangubat is presumed under the law to have regularly performed his
duty. There is nothing in the circumstances surrounding his investigation of the crime which
shows any semblance of irregularity or bias, much less an attempt to frame Amaca. Even the
accused testified that he had no previous misunderstanding with Police Officer Mangubat
and knew no reason why the latter would falsely testify against him.

Declarant is a competent witness

The serious nature of the victim's injuries did not affect his credibility as a witness since said
injuries, as previously mentioned, did not cause the immediate loss of his ability to perceive
and to identify his shooter.