SUPPLEMENTAL BAR REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW

BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA

1. Stabbing a person without knowledge that he is already dead is impossible crime.
Killing is the criminal act in homicide. But it is impossible to commit the criminal act of killing
if the victim, who is already dead. (Intod vs. CA, G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992) However,
if the accused, who stabbed the dead body of the victim, conspired with the one who previously
hacked and killed the victim, the former is liable for murder and not impossible crime because
of the collective responsibility rule. The liability of the accused for murder is based on the act of
his co-conspirator in hacking and killing the victim, which by fiction of the law shall be treated
as the act of both them. (People vs. Callao, G.R. No. 228945, March 14, 2018)

2. The defense of insanity is in the nature of a confession or avoidance because an

accused invoking it admits to have committed the crime but claims that he should not be
criminally liable therefor because of insanity, which is an exempting
circumstance. Consequently, the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone, and if found to
be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt. An
accused invoking the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with
clear and convincing evidence because every person is presumed sane. For the defense of
insanity to prosper, it must be proven that the accused was completely deprived of intelligence,
which must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous to the commission of the
offense with which he is charged. (People vs. Mirana, G.R. No. 219113, April 25, 2018)

2. The accused falsified a notarized Secretary's Certificate by making it appear that a

certain member of the board participated in the meeting where in fact he is already dead. On
the basis of this Certificate, and Deed of Sale, the Registry of Deeds cancelled the title of the
corporation’s property and a new one was issued. Under RPC, the period tor the prescription
of offenses commences from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party,
the authorities, or their agents. However, the offender party constructively discovered the crime
upon registration of the Secretary Certificate with the Deed of Sale in the Registry of Deeds
because of the rule on constructive notice to the entire world; hence, the period for prescription
commences on the date of registration of the falsified document. The case was dismissed since
the 10-year period of prescription for falsification lapsed because the information was filed
more than 10 years from the registration of the document. (Lim vs. People, G.R. No. 226590,
April 23, 2018)

As a general rule under Act 3326, prescription for offense punishable under special
laws begins to run from the date of the commission of the offense; if the date of the commission
of the violation is not known, it shall be counted form the date of discovery thereof (the
blameless ignorance doctrine). In determining whether it is the general rule or the exception
that should apply in a particular case, the availability or suppression of the information
relative to the crime should first be determined. If the necessary information, data, or records
based on which the crime could be discovered is readily available to the public, the general rule
applies. Prescription shall, therefore, run from the date of the commission of the crime.
Otherwise, should martial law prevent the filing thereof or should information about the
violation be suppressed, possibly through connivance, then the exception applies and the
period of prescription shall be reckoned from the date of discovery thereof. Under the law,
SALNs are accessible to the public for copying or inspection at reasonable hours. Under the
circumstances, the State is to be presumed to know of her omissions during the eight-year
period of prescription set in Act No. 3326. (People vs. Parba-Rural, G.R. No. 231884, June 27,
2018).

3. AAA lived rent-free in a house owned by accused. Accused intercepted AAA at the
garage area and held a knife to her back and dragged her to his room and raped her. Shortly
after, police authorities arrived; but accused refused to release her and detained her for a
period of time. Although the initial (forcible) abduction of AAA may have been absorbed by the
crime of rape, the continued detention of AAA after the rape cannot be deemed absorbed in it.
Likewise, since the detention continued after the rape had been completed, it cannot be
deemed a necessary means for the crime of rape. Hence, the accused is convicted of rape and
slight illegal detention (People vs. Concepcion, G.R. No. 214886, April 04, 2018, Third Division)
Note: The qualifying circumstance in serious illegal detention that the person detained is a
female is not alleged in the information.

If the accused committed robbery, and thereafter, detained the victim to prevent the
police from arresting them, robbery absorbs serious illegal detention for being incidental
(People vs. Astor, G.R. No. L-71765-66, April 29, 1987, Second Division). However, if the
accused committed rape, and thereafter, detained the victim to prevent the police from
arresting him, he is liable for rape and illegal detention. (People vs. Concepcion, G.R. No.
214886, April 04, 2018, Third Division)

4. The Lago case on tenacious resistance in rape is not anymore controlling. Among
the amendments of the law on rape introduced under R.A. No. 8353 is Section 266–D, which
provides “Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the act of rape in any degree
from the offended party, or where the offended party is so situated as to render her/him
incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the prosecution of rape.”
(People v. Sabadlab, G.R. No. 175924, March 14, 2012) The legislators agreed that Article 266–D
is intended to soften the jurisprudence on tenacious resistance or the Lago principle. (People v.
Dulay, G.R. Nos. 144344–68, July 23, 2002) The failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance
cannot be construed as a voluntary submission to culprit's desires. (People vs. Villabos, G.R.
No. 228960, June 11, 2018) It is not necessary for the victim of rape to sustain physical
injuries. She need not kick, bite, hit or scratch the offender with her fingernails to prove that
she had been defensive. (People v. Torres, G.R. No. 134766, January 16, 2004)

Force as an element of rape need not be irresistible. Intimidation is addressed to the

mind of the victim. It must be viewed in light of the woman's perception and judgment at the
time of the commission of the crime. It is therefore enough that it produces fear that if the
victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something would happen to her.
Intimidation includes the moral kind as the fear caused by threatening the girl with a knife or
pistol. (People vs. Bayanat, G.R. No. 215749, March 14, 2018)

5. Considering that only two persons are usually involved in rape cases, even the lone
uncorroborated testimony of the victim is enough to prove the crime as charged, as long as the
testimony is clear, positive and probable. In rape committed by a father against his own
daughter, the father's parental authority and moral ascendancy over his daughter substitutes
for violence and intimidation. (People vs. Clemento, G.R. No. 215202, March 14, 2018)

Accused touched AAA's vagina by using his middle finger, which was then fully covered
by a panty and a short pants. He ceasing therefrom when AAA swayed off his hand. There
being no actual insertion of accused's finger into AAA's vagina, he cannot be held liable for
consummated rape by sexual assault. Neither is he liable for attempted rape through sexual
assault since his acts cannot be interpreted as demonstrating an intent to actually insert his
finger inside her sexual organ. However, the accused can only be held guilty of the lesser crime
of acts of lasciviousness. (Lutap vs. People, G.R. No. 204061, February 05, 2018)

6. Mental retardation includes: (1) idiot, whose mental age is two–year old because his
IQ is 0–19; (2) imbecile, whose mental age is seven–year old because his IQ is 20–49; (3) moron
or feebleminded, whose mental age is 12–year old because his IQ is 50–69; and (4) a person
with borderline intelligence because his IQ is 70–89. (People v. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932,
October 19, 2011; People v. Bayrante, G.R. No. 188978, June 13, 2012; People vs. Gilles, G.R.
No. 229860, March 21, 2018)

If the information alleged force, threat, or intimidation without averment of any mental
disability on the part of the victim, the accused can still be convicted provided that sexual
congress and mental incapacity, i.e. the incapacity to give consent, are proven by clear and
convincing evidence (People vs. Quintos, G.R. No. 199402, November 12, 2014; People vs.
Gilles, G.R. No. 229860, March 21, 2018). Having sexual intercourse with a mentally retarded
person is equivalent to having sexual intercourse with a person through intimidation. If the
Information alleged intimidation as a mode of raping the victim, but the evidence merely proves
her mental retardation, the accused can be convicted of rape through intimidation. (People v.
Balatazo, G.R. No. 118027, January 29, 2004)

Assuming that accused and victim had a romantic relation, carnal knowledge with
victim, even if consensual, would amount to rape due to her mental disability. Knowledge
victim's mental retardation is not an element for the charge of rape. However, knowledge of her

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mental condition is important for purposes of qualifying the charge of rape. (People vs.
Martinez, G.R. No. 226394, March 7, 2018)

There are two victims in rape with mentally disability, to wit: (1) persons deprived of
reason; and (2) demented person. The concept of the terms “deprived of reason” is
comprehensive since it includes demented or insane person and mentally retarded person. On
the other hand, the term "demented" is confined to insane person. If the victim is insane, the
accused can be charged with rape of person deprived of reason or demented person. If the
victim is mentally retarded, the accused should be charged with rape of a person deprived of
reason (People vs. Eleuterio, G.R. No. 219957, April 04, 2018) or statutory rape of a person
under 12 years of age (People v. Daniega, G.R. No. 212201, June 28, 2017). Describing a
mentally retarded person in the information as demented is improper. However, describing the
victim in the information as a "mentally defective woman” (People vs. Martinez, G.R. No.
226394, March 7, 2018), or “a demented person whose mental age is below 7 years old” (People
v. Caoile, G.R. No. 203041, June 5, 2013) is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
mandate that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge against him.

If the Information alleged the victim of rape is demented, but the evidence merely proves
her mental retardation, the accused cannot be convicted of rape of a demented person unless
the accused failed to raise the mistake in the Information as an objection (People v. Ventura,
Sr., G.R. No. 205230, March 12, 2014; People vs. Eleuterio, G.R. No. 219957, April 04, 2018)

7. Having sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child constitutes child

prostitution if committed for money, profit, or any other consideration (People vs. Jalosjos, G.R.
Nos. 132875-76, November 16, 2001); or sexual abuse is committed under coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group. In child prostitution, the victim is called child
exploited in prostitution while in sexual abuse the victim is called child subjected to other
abuse (Section 5 of RA No 7610). Coercion is either physical or psychological. Taking advantage
of ascendency as a swimming instructor over student is psychological coercion (People vs.
Larin, G.R. No. 128777, October, 7 1998). The assurance of love, guarantee that she would not
get pregnant by using the "withdrawal method" and the promise of marriage were classified as
"psychological coercion" and "influence" within the purview of Section 5 of RA 7610. Hence,
accused is guilty of sexual abuse (Caballo vs. People, GR No. 198732, June 10, 2013).

Accused cannot be prosecuted for complex crime of rape and sexual abuse under RA No
7610 because the latter is punishable under special law. He cannot be prosecuted for both
rape and sexual abuse because of the rule on double jeopardy (People v. Matias, G.R. No.
186469, June 13, 2012 and Alberto vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182130, June 19,
2013).

12 years old or above

If the child is 12 years old or above, and the acts of the accused constitute sexual abuse
or child prostitution under RA No. 7610 and rape through sexual assault or acts of
lasciviousness, he shall be prosecuted under RA No. 7610 since this law prescribed a grave
penalty (Dimakuta vs. People, G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015). In this case, the crime
should be designated as lascivious conduct under RA No. 7610. (People vs. Molejon, G.R. No.
208091, April 23, 2018)

If the acts committed upon a child 12 years old or above constitute sexual abuse and
rape through sexual intercourse, he shall be prosecuted under RPC since this law prescribed a
graver penalty. (People v. Matias, G.R. No. 186469, June 13, 2012 and Alberto vs. Hon. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 182130, June 19, 2013).

Under 12 years old

If the child is under 12 years old, and the acts of the accused constitute sexual abuse
and rape or acts of lasciviousness, the latter shall be prosecuted penalized as follows: (1) rape
through sexual intercourse; (2) acts of lasciviousness with the penalty of reclusion temporal in
its medium period (Section 5 of RA No. 7610). In the latter case, the crime should be
designated as acts of lasciviousness under RPC in relation to RA No. 7610 (People vs. Molejon,
G.R. No. 208091, April 23, 2018)

Prior to RA No. 8353 (Rape Law), inserting finger into genital orifice is acts of
lasciviousness. Hence, reclusion temporal in its medium period under RA No. 7610 should be
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imposed for acts of lasciviousness committed against a child, who child is under 12 years old.
Under RA No. 8353, inserting finger into genital orifice is rape through sexual assault where
the penalty is prision mayor. The penalty for rape through sexual assault under RPC as
amended by RA No. 8353 is lighter than that prescribed under RA No. 7610 for acts of
lasciviousness committed against a child, who child is under 12 years old. To impose the
lighter penalty under RPC as amended by RA 8353 is unfair to the victim. It is not the intention
of RA No. 8353 to disallow the imposition of the higher penalty under RA No. 7610 if the victim
is child subjected to sexual abuse, who is under 12 years of age. Hence, the accused shall be
convicted of rape through sexual assault under RPC with the penalty of reclusion temporal in
its medium period under RA No. 7610 (People vs. Chingh, G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011;
Ricalde vs. People, 211002, January 21, 2015) In this situation, the crime should be
designated as rape through sexual assault under RPC in relation to RA No. 7610. (People vs.
Tulugan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019)

If the crime committed against a child, who child is under 12 years old, is qualified rape
through sexual assault, the Chingh case is not applicable since RA No. 8353 prescribed a grave
penalty of reclusion temporal for it. Hence, the accused should be held liable for qualified rape
through sexual assault with the penalty under RPC (People vs. Bonaagua, G.R. No. 188897,
June 6, 2011; People vs. Pusing, G.R. No. 208009, July 11, 2016).

8. A traffic investigator confiscated the driver's license of complainant after figuring in a

vehicular accident. He then demanded and eventually received from him the amount of
P2,000.00 from complainant in exchange for the release of his driver's license. Accused
employed intimidation to obtain money from complainant as the act performed by the latter
caused fear in the mind of the former that he might not be able to drive a taxi and earn a living
for his family. Accused was convicted of robbery. (Flores vs. People, G.R. No. 222861, April 23,
2018)

Before Article 360 of RPC was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel
may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated,
irrespective of where it was written or printed. Experience had shown that under that old rule
the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal
action in a remote or distant place. To forestall such harassment, RA No. 4363, which amended
RPC, lays down specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent
harassment arising from out-of-town libel suits. (People vs. Macasaet, G.R. No. 196094, March
5, 2018) As a general rule, venue for libel is either province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resided at the time of
the commission of the offense. However, if the offended party is a public officer, there is a third
optional venue, and that is, province, city or Manila where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense. In all cases, the criminal action shall be filed in the Regional Trial
Court.

9. In a bigamy case, accused alleged that complainant, his wife, acquired Canadian
citizenship, obtained a divorce, and thereafter, remarried. By raising divorce, it is incumbent
upon the accused to show that it was validly obtained in accordance with complainant's
national law (e.g. Canadian law) prior to the celebration of the second marriage. In this case,
accused presented a certificate of divorce allegedly issued by the registrar of the Supreme
Court of British Columbia. The defense was rejected. First, the divorce decree required to prove
the fact of divorce is the judgment itself as rendered by the foreign court and not a mere
certification. Second, assuming the certificate of divorce may be considered as the divorce
decree, it was not accompanied by a certification issued by the proper Philippine diplomatic or
consular officer stationed in Canada, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132. Lastly, no copy
of the alleged Canadian law was presented by the defense. Thus, it could not be reasonably
determined whether the subject divorce decree was in accord with complainant's national law.
Accused was convicted of bigamy. (Sarto vs. People, G.R. No. 206284, February 28, 2018)

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him/her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (par. 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code) This rule includes cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. (Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005)
However, Orbecido case will not apply if there is no competent evidence concerning
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naturalization of the alien spouse and the divorce decree, which capacitated the alien spouse to
remarry. (Sarto vs. People, supra)

10. Information alleged that publisher and writer of Malaya with address at Port Area,
Manila City defamed private complainant by writing and publishing a defamatory article in the
Malaya. The Port Area, Manila is the editorial and business offices of Malaya. This is a
compliance with the rule requiring allegation in the information of the place where the alleged
defamatory article was printed and first published. The Information need not parrot the
provisions of Article 360 of the RPC and expressly use the phrase "printed and first published."
If there is no dispute that the place of publication indicated in the Information is the place
where the alleged defamatory article was "printed and first published," then the law is
substantially complied with. After all, the filing of the Information before an RTC of Manila
would forestall any inclination to harass the accused. (People vs. Macasaet, G.R. No. 196094,
March 5, 2018)

11. The elements of trafficking in person are as follows: (1) The act of recruitment,
transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent
or knowledge, within or across national borders; (2) The means used which include "threat or
use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception or abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another; this
means as an element can be dispensed with when the victim is a minor and (3) The purpose of
trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs. (People vs. De Dios, G.R. No. 234018, June 06, 2018)

AAA was first lured to prostitution when accused offered her to a male customer and
paid her P400.00 for the transaction. Several other transactions transpired thereafter. Accused
would transact with the customers and then pay AAA each time for her service. It did not
matter that there was no threat, force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception or abuse of power
that was employed by accused when she involved AAA in her illicit sexual trade. AAA was still a
minor when she was exposed to prostitution by the prodding, promises and acts of accused.
Trafficking in persons may be committed also by means of taking advantage of the persons'
vulnerability as minors. Accused was convicted of qualified trafficking in person. (People vs. De
Dios, G.R. No. 234018, June 06, 2018)

Accused deceived 5 complainants, who were mostly minors, for they are made to believe
that they will be working as house helpers in Cagayan De Oro City with an enticing salary of
P1,500.00 per month. She told them that they would be allowed to go home once a week.
However, the complainants were transported to Marawi City. The complainants would not have
agreed or would not have been allowed by their parents if accused would directly offer them
work at Marawi City. The accused deliberately fabricated a story to delude her victims and their
parents. When complainant asked for their salary, they were told that it had already been given
to accused. This is slavery. Accused was convicted of trafficking in person qualified by the
circumstance of minority and large scale. (People vs. Nangcas, G.R. No. 218806, June 13,
2018)

12. While sourced from the same act, i.e., the issuance of a check subsequently
dishonored, estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are separate and distinct from each other
because they pertain to different causes of action. The differences between the two are as
follows: (1) Damage and deceit are essential elements for estafa, but are not so for violation
under B.P. Blg. 22, which punishes the mere issuance of a bouncing check; (2) under BP Blg.
22, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on
the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and hence punishable
which is not so under the Penal Code; (3) a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted
under BP Blg 22 even if he had issued the same for a preexisting obligation, while such
circumstance negates criminal liability for estafa; (4) specific and different penalties are
imposed in each of the two offenses; (5) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while
violation of BP Blg 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to the
entire banking system; (6) estafa are mala in se, while those of BP Blg, 22 are mala prohibita.
(Batac vs. People, G.R. No. 191622, June 06, 2018)

14. Treacherously killing the mayor while in the performance of his duty constitute a
complex crime of direct assault with murder. (People vs. Siega, G.R. No. 213273, June 27,
2018)
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 15. Accused gave unwarranted benefits and advantage to several contractors by
allowing them to deploy their equipment ahead of the scheduled public bidding. Under law, a
public contract shall be awarded to the lowest prequalified bidder. The successful bidder may
be allowed to commence work only upon receipt of a Notice to Proceed. They are liable for
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019. (Abubakar vs. People, G.R. No. 202408, June 27,
2018)

16. In Arias v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 81563 and 82512, December 19, 1989, the
property bought by the City is overpriced. When the accused was appointed as treasurer, the
sale of the property had already been consummated. Accused was charged with violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for causing damage to the government through manifest partiality
and evident bad faith. The only evidence presented by the prosecution is his signature on the
voucher. He was acquitted. Heads of offices can rely to a reasonable extent on their
subordinates on preparation of bids, purchase of supplies, or negotiations. Any executive head
agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. Thus,
executive head cannot be convicted on the sole basis of signature or approval appearing on a
voucher. To sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction, evidence must be presented other
than her signature on the voucher.

The principle in the Arias case is not applicable in the following cases:

a. If other than the accused’s signature on the voucher, circumstances show evident
bad faith, or manifest partiality such as: (a) Where the accused has foreknowledge of existing
anomaly – e.g., mayor signed the inspection report and the disbursement voucher despite the
fact that he had foreknowledge that the materials delivered by Guadines have already been
confiscated by the DENR (Escara v. People, G.R. No. 164921, July 8, 2005); or (b) where
accused approved the voucher without indication of the retention money required by law, and
he even inspected the construction site of hospital boat being constructed, in which he should
have noticed the financial weakness of the contractor and the defective works (Rivera v. People,
G.R. No. 156577, December 3, 2014);

b. If other than the accused’s signature on the voucher, circumstances show gross
inexcusable negligence such as where there is deviation from ordinary procedure, which
necessitate further investigation – e.g., mayor issued and encashed municipal checks despite
the facts that the disbursement vouchers were in the name of Kelly Lumber but the checks
were payable to another person and not to Kelly Lumber (Cruz v. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 134493, August 16, 2005);

In Lihaylihay vs. People, G.R. No. 191219, July 31, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, the accused
in his capacity as Chairman of the Inspection and Acceptance Committee, signed the 16
certificates of acceptance, inventory, and delivery of articles despite its incompleteness or lack
of material dates, while co-accused certified to the correctness of the Inspection Report Forms
even if no such deliveries were made. Since there are reasons for the heads of offices to further
examine the documents in question, accused cannot seek refuge by invoking the Arias
doctrine.

The Arias doctrine cannot exonerate accused from criminal liability because there were
circumstances that should have prompted them to make further inquiries on the transactions
subject of this case e.g. the irregular mobilization of contractors prior to the scheduled public
bidding, and contract which contains a patently illegal stipulation and advance payment
without appropriate documents such as purchase orders and delivery receipts to support this
disbursement. (Abubakar vs. People, G.R. No. 202408, June 27, 2018)

c. If the public officer acting in his capacity as head of office has not relied on his
subordinates but on officers of equal rank such as heads of the Office of the City Treasurer
and, the Office of the City Accountant in approving the cash advances in the amount of P18
million to paymaster despite of the failure to liquidate previous cash advances (Jaca v. People,
G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013); and

d. If the documents involving the release of funds are not so voluminous so as to

preclude him from studying each one carefully. (Santillano v. People, G.R. Nos. 175045–46,
March 3, 2010)

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 17. The payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of, or compromise on the amounts
or funds malversed or misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does not extinguish
the accused's criminal liability or relieve the accused from the penalty prescribed by the law. At
best, such acts of reimbursement may only affect the offender's civil liability, and may be
credited in his favor as a mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender. Accused
enjoys the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, due to his partial restitution of the
amount malversed (Valenzuela vs. People, G.R. No. 205693, February 14, 2018)

18. Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 on suspension of service of sentence of a minor does not
distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has
been convicted of a lesser offense. Hence, the Court should also not distinguish and should
apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been
found guilty of a heinous crime. Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the
automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law can be gleaned from the
Senate deliberation. In fact, the Court En Banc promulgated on November 24, 2009, the
Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law, which echoed such legislative intent.
Although suspension of sentence still applies even if the child in conflict with the law is already
18 years of age or more at the time the judgment' of conviction was rendered, however, such
suspension is only until the minor reaches the maximum age of 21. Appellant is now 34 years
old, thus, the service of his sentence will not anymore be suspended. However, he shall be
given the benefit of being confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility. (People
vs. Rupisan, G.R. No. 226494, February 14, 2018)

19. When a special law adopts the technical nomenclature of the penalties (e.g. prison
mayor) in RPC, the intention of the law is to adopt the provisions under this Code on
imposition of penalty (People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994). Special aggravating
circumstance of organized/syndicated crime group (People v. Esparas, G.R. No. 120034, July
10, 1998); The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority (People v. Montalaba, G.R. No.
186227, July 20, 2011; People v. Musa, G.R. No. 199735, October 24, 2012); and special
aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism (People v. Salazar, G.R. No. 98060, January 27,
1997) were appreciated in malum prohibitum crime where the law punishing it adopts the
technical nomenclature of the penalty of RPC. The penalty for illegal possession of loose firearm
shall be applied in its minimum period because of the mitigating circumstance of confession
(Jacaban v. People, G.R. No. 184355, March 23, 2015), and the penalty for sexual abuse (Malto
v. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007), that for fencing (Cahulugan vs. People, G.R.
No. 225695, March 21, 2018, Perlas Bernabe) and that for violence against woman (Melgar vs.
People, G.R. No. 223477, February 14, 2018, Perlas-Bernabe) shall be applied in its medium
period in the absence of modifying circumstance.

If the special law has not adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties in the Revised
Penal Code, the intention of the law is not to adopt the provisions of this Code on imposition of
penalties. Moreover, modifying circumstances cannot be appreciated since the penalty not
borrowed from the Code has no periods. The crime has no attempted or frustrated stage since
this penalty cannot be graduated one or two degrees lower.

The Simon principle is not applicable if the crime committed involved dangerous drugs
because R.A. No. 9165 has a special rule on the application of the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code. Under Section 98 of R.A. No. 9165, notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to
the contrary, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall not apply to the provisions of this
Act, except in the case of minor offenders.

17. Accused has a dating and sexual relationship with AAA resulting in BBB's birth. He
failed to provide BBB support ever since the latter was just a year old. Accused is charged with
psychological violence against woman under Section 5 (i) of RA No. 9262 for failure to give
support which "caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to AAA and
BBB. However, no evidence was presented to show that deprivation of support caused either
AAA or BBB any mental or emotional anguish. However, the accused can be convicted of
economic violence against woman under Section 5 (e), which is necessarily included in the
charge of psychological violence against woman under Section 5 (i) of RA No. 9262. Deprivation
or denial of support, by itself and even without the additional element of psychological violence,
is already specifically penalized therein as economic violence. (Melgar vs. People, G.R. No.
223477, February 14, 2018, Perlas-Bernabe)

20. The victim was shot while accused was robbing the passengers of a jeepney. Even if
victim's bag was not taken, accused are liable for special complex crime of robbery with
Address: Kapatiran Kaunlaran Foundation, Inc. (KKFI) 7
Unit 911-C P. Paredes Street, Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street)
* www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com /
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homicide. In this special complex crime, it is immaterial that the victim of homicide is other
than the victim of robbery, as long as homicide occurs by reason of the robbery or on the
occasion thereof. (People vs. Madrelejos, G.R. No. 225328, March 21, 2018)

21. Fencing is a malum prohibitum, and PD 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of
Fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or
anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher
penalty based on the value of the property. (Cahulugan vs. People, G.R. No. 225695, March 21,
2018, Perlas Bernabe)

The accused should have been forewarned that the soft drinks came from an illegal
source, as his transaction with the thief did not have any accompanying delivery and official
receipts, and that the latter did not demand that such items be replaced with empty bottles,
contrary to common practice among dealers of soft drinks. He should have known that the
goods are stolen. He was convicted of fencing. (Cahulugan vs. People, G.R. No. 225695, March
21, 2018, Perlas Bernabe)

22. RA No. 10951 amended RPC by prescribing lesser penalties for theft through the
adjustment of the values of the properties stolen on which the penalties for theft is based
taking into consideration the value of the money in 2017. However, RA No. 10951 failed to
adjust the penalties for fencing. This development would then result in instances where a
fence, which is theoretically a mere accessory to the crime of robbery or theft, will be punished
more severely than the principal of such latter crimes. This incongruence in penalties
therefore, impels an adjustment of penalties. Pursuant to Article 5 of RPC, the SC furnished a
copy of the decision on fencing the President through DOJ, the Senate President, and the
House Speaker to alert them on the excessive penalties for fencing.

23. There is no showing whatsoever that accused had knowledge of the insufficiency of
funds of the check he endorsed to private complainant. Admittedly, the checks received by
private complainant were checks issued and paid to accused by a certain Ham. Upon notice
that the subject checks were dishonored, accused immediately searched for Ham but the same
proved to be futile considering that the latter already left the country. (Juaquico vs. People,
G.R. No. 223998, March 05, 2018)

The business relationship between private complainant and accused is already 16-year,
and the former had the practice of accepting the checks of clients of the latter, even if he did
not personally know them. Thus, there is no need for the accused to assure the complainant
that the subject checks would be sufficiently funded upon maturity before accepting the same.
Clearly, private complainant was not deceived to accept the subject checks but did so out of a
standard procedure which he and accused developed over the years. (Juaquico vs. People, G.R.
No. 223998, March 05, 2018)

Address: Kapatiran Kaunlaran Foundation, Inc. (KKFI) 8

Unit 911-C P. Paredes Street, Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street)
* www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com /
villasislawcenter@gmail.com / mvplawoffice@gmail.com
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626