LAST MINUTE NOTES IN

POLITICAL LAW
by:

JUDGE GENER M. GITO, LL.M., D.C.L.

1. What are the crimes which are under the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court?

The following are the crimes cognizable by the International Criminal

Court: (a) The crime of genocide; (b) Crimes against humanity; (c) War
crimes; (d) The crime of aggression.

2. What is genocide?

For the purpose of this Statute, "genocide" means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the
group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.

3. What is “crimes against humanity”?

"Crime against humanity" means any of the following acts enumerated

in Article 7 of the Rome Statute when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack.

4. What are the conditions before the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over
the crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC?

Before the ICC can exercise jurisdiction, it is required that the State
must be a state party to the convention. It is provided under the Rome
Statute that the State party is considered deemed to have accepted the
jurisdiction of the ICC (Article 12). ICC shall also have jurisdiction over
those cases referred to it by the Security Council under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter.
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5. Can the ICC acquire jurisdiction nationals of non-parties?

YES. The ICC may exercise jurisdiction even over nationals of states
that are not parties to the Treaty and have not otherwise consented to
the jurisdiction. Article 12 provides that, in addition to jurisdiction
based on Security Council action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter
and jurisdiction based on consent by the defendant state nationality,
the ICC will have jurisdiction to prosecute the nationals of any state
when crimes within the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction are
committed on the territory of the state party. Likewise, ICC will have
jurisdiction over non-state party, if it consented to ICC jurisdiction.

6. Who may propose changes to the Constitution?

The following may propose chances to the constitution: 1) The

Congress, upon a vote of three-fourth of its members (Sec. 1(1), Art.
XVII). 2) A constitutional convention (Sec. 1(2), Art. XVII). 3). People
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein (Sec. 2, Art. XVII).

7. What are the two ways by which the Constitution may be changed?

Amendment and Revision.

8. Differentiate Revision from Amendment

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the

constitution. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial
entirety of the constitution. Amendment broadly refers to a change
that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle
involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the
constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific
provision being amended (Lambino vs. COMELEC, October 25,
2006).

9. What are the two (2) tests to determine the kind of change that is
proposed?

Quantitative test – It inquires into the number of provision altered,

deleted or changed.

Quantitative test – It inquires into the qualitative effect of the

proposed changed.

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10. May people’s initiative be used to revise the Constitution?

NO. People’s initiative cannot be sued to revise the Constitution. The

rationale for the answer lies in the constitutional text. Section 1, Article
XVII provides that amendment or revision may be proposed by
Congress and Constitutional Convention. While Section 2 provides
that amendment may likewise be proposed by the people.

11. Is the definition of national territory under our Constitution

internationally binding?

NO. The definition of the Philippine territory under the 1987

Constitution is not binding internationally. It should be noted that a
constitution is a municipal law. Being such, it only binds the nation
promulgating it. Thus, for it to be binding internationally, the extent of
national territory under the 1987 Constitution must be supported by
proofs which are acceptable under international law.

12. What is archipelagic doctrine?

13. Archipelagic doctrine prescribes a principle that archipelago should be

considered one integrated unit instead of being divided into several
islands. This can be effected by connecting the outermost point of the
outermost island of the archipelago with a straight baseline and all the
waters inside the baseline shall be considered internal waters.

14. Is archipelagic doctrine reflected in the definition of territory under

Article I?

YES. Article I reflects the archipelagic doctrine. The last sentence of

Article I provided that “[T]he waters around, between, and connecting
the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.”

15. Is archipelagic doctrine binding under international law?

NO. archipelagic doctrine is not yet accepted under international law.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)
does not treat the waters inside the baseline as internal waters.
UNCLOS III treats them as “archipelagic waters.”

16. What is the difference between internal water and archipelagic

water?

When a water is considered internal, it subject to the plenary

jurisdiction of the state over which it has sovereignty and jurisdiction.
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 Such state can disallow the passage of foreign vessels. Such vessels
may only be allowed passage upon the consent of the controlling state.

Archipelagic water are those waters inside the archipelagic baselines

drawn joining the outermost points of the outermost island of the
archipelago. Under UNCLOS III, the archipelagic state has
sovereignty over archipelagic water. The sovereignty extends to air
space, as well as to its sea bed and subsoil and resources contained
therein. However, unlike internal water, archipelagic water is subject
to the right of innocent passage, which right is provided by Article 52
of the UNCLOS III.

17. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of RA 9522 as it reduces

Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the
Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the
1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and
ancillary treaties. Is the law constitutional?

The law is constitutional. Baselines laws are nothing but statutory

mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision
the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves.
In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of
the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which
States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of
sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2, UNCLOS III), the
jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation
laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33, UNLCOS III), and the right to
exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic
zone (Article 56, UNCLOS III) and continental shelf (Article 77,
UNCLOS III). (Margallona vs. Ermita)

18. Is the adaptation of RA 9522’s adaptation of UNCLOS “regime of

islands” to determine maritime zones of Kalayaan Group of Island
and Scarborough shoal is inconsistent with Philippine claim of
sovereignty over these areas thus violating Article I of the
Constitution?

The Baseline Law, by adopting UNCLOS “regime of islands” does not

dismember Kalayaan group of islands and Scarborough shoal from the
national territory. The Philippine sovereignty and jurisdiction were
not diminished by the Baseline Law.
Under UNCLOS, archipelagic state has the right to draw baselines but
"[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable
extent from the general configuration of the archipelago" (Article 47
(3) of UNCLOS III). Kalayaan Group of Islands are located at an

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 appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine
archipelago (Margallona vs. Ermita).

19. What are the maritime zones?

Territorial sea - It is a sea, the breadth of which does not exceed 12

nautical miles from the baseline (Art. 3, UNCLOS III).
Contiguous zone - It is a sea, the breadth of which does not exceed 24
nautical miles from the baseline (Art. 33[2], UNCLOS III).

Exclusive Economic Zone - It is a sea, the breadth of which does not

exceed 200 nautical miles from the baseline (Art. 57, UNCLOS III).

Continental Shelf - The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises

the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its
territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory
to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental
margin does not extend up to that distance (Art. 76[1], UNCLOS III).

20. What are the right of a coastal state over maritime zones?

Territorial sea - The coastal state has sovereignty over the territorial
sea subject to this Convention and to other rules of international law
(Art. 2, UNCLOS III).

Contiguous zone - The coastal state has the right to exercise control
necessary to 1) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration
or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
and, 2) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations
committed within its territory or territorial sea (Art. 33, UNCLOS III).

Exclusive economic zone - The coastal state has the sovereign rights
for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing
the natural resources. It has also jurisdiction over the establishment
and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; marine
scientific research; and, the protection and preservation of the marine
environment (Art. 56, UNCLOS III).

Continental shelf - The coastal state has the exclusive right to explore
and exploit its natural resources therein (Art. 77, UNCLOS III).

21. What is the constitutional basis of principle of separation of power?

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 The constitutional basis of the principle of separation of powers is the
allocation of powers by the Constitution to the three great departments
of the government and Constitutional Commission. Thus, these three
departments must discharge their respective functions within the
limits of authority conferred by the Constitution (Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation vs. Republic, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, September 17,
2009).

22. When is there is violation of principle of separation of power?

The principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways:

firstly, "[o]ne branch may interfere impermissibly with the other's
performance of its constitutionally assigned function"; and
"alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes
a function that more properly is entrusted to another." In other words,
there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a)
interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department's functions
(Belgica vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013).

23. Section 12 of Attrition Law provides: “Joint Congressional Oversight

Committee. – There is hereby created a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate
and seven Members from the House of Representatives. The
Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the Senate
President, with at least two senators representing the minority. The
Members from the House of Representatives shall be appointed by
the Speaker with at least two members representing the minority.
After the Oversight Committee will have approved the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter
become functus officio and therefore cease to exist.” Is it
constitutional?

NO. From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law
that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this
principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to
approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken
effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress
or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the
members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of
the law (ABAKADA vs. Purisima).

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24. What is legislative veto?

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an

administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules
and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or
disapprove such regulations before they take effect (Abakada Guru Party-list
vs. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008).

25. Is legislative veto unconstitutional?

NO. Legislative veto is unconstitutional. Legislative veto violates the

principle of separation of powers. From the moment the law becomes
effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional (Abakada Guru Party-list vs. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715,
August 14, 2008).

26. What is a pork barrel system?

Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that
govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds,
primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the
respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of
government, including its members. (Belgica vs. Executive Secretary,
November 19, 2013).

27. What is congressional pork barrel system?

It is defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein

legislators, either individually or collectively organized into
committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s
utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or
practices.

28. Does “pork barrel system” violate the principle of separation of

powers?

YES. The “pork barrel system” violates the principle of separation of

powers. The distinguishing factor of a pork barrel system, especially
“Congressional Pork Barrel” is the authority of the legislator to
participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.
These post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to
functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to
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 intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of
budget execution. (Belgica vs. Executive Secretary, November 19,
2013).

29. Supposing Congressman Manhikmanaog of the 1st district of

Oriental Mindoro, during the budget deliberation in Congress
allocated a total of 70M worth of projects in his district. All
congressmen followed suit. Each of them allocated 70M worth of
project to their respective districts. Because senators would not want
to be left out, each of them identified projects worth 200M. They
were approved and they were all carried out in the GAA which was
eventually passed and approved. Are the actions of the legislators as
reflected in the GAA constitutional?

The action of the legislators as reflected in the GAA is not

unconstitutional.

What is prohibited under the Constitution is the participation of the

legislators in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.
This is proscribed because it violates the constitutional principle of
separation of powers. However, when project identification is done
during congressional budget deliberation, the same will not violate
separation of powers. The project identification happened while
Congress is performing its very function, which is legislation.

30. How does DAP violate separation of powers?

The act of the President of allotting or redirecting funds for certain

programs, activities or projects well beyond to what Congress had
intended, arrogate unto himself a power that belongs to Congress.
While the president is authorized to spend in line with his mandate to
execute the laws (including the GAA’s), such authority should not
translate to unfettered discretion that allows him to substitute his own
will for that of Congress. (Araullo vs. Aquino III, 728 SCRA 1).

31. What is the basis of non-delegation of power?

It is based upon the ethical principle that such delegated power

constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate
through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another (U.S. vs. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327, 330). A
further delegation of such power, unless permitted by the sovereign
power, would constitute a negation of this duty in violation of the trust
reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly (Cruz &
Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2014, at page. 160).

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32. Section 17, Article XII provides that “in times of national emergency,
when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility
or business affected with public interest.” Can this provision be
legally invoked by the President to temporarily take over or direct
the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest during without authority from
Congress?

NO. Without legislation, the President has not power to take over
privately-owned public utility of business affected with public
interest. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all
the power of the State under Section 17, Article XII in the absence of an
emergency powers act passed by Congress (David vs. Arroyo, 489
SCRA 161).

33. What are the test for valid delegation?

Completeness test - The law must be complete in all its essential terms
when it leaves the legislature so that there will be nothing left for the
delegate to do when it reaches him except to enforce it. A law is
complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate (Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 122
Phil. 965).

Sufficient standard test – A sufficient standard is intended to map out

the boundaries of the delegate’s authority by defining the legislative
policy and indicating the circumstances under which it is to be
pursued. The purpose of sufficient standard is to prevent a total
transference of legislative power from law-making body to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature
and exercise a power essentially legislative (Eastern Shipping Lines vs.
POEA, 166 SCRA 533, 543-544).

34. Section 8 of PD 910 (Law governing the disposition of Malampaya

Funds) pertinently provides: “All fees, revenues and receipts of the
Board x x x shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to finance
energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President.” Is the provision valid?

The provision is invalid as it constitutes an undue delegation of

legislative power. The phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does
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 not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits
of the President's authority with respect to the purpose for which the
Malampaya Funds may be used. (Belgica vs. Executive Secretary,
November 19, 2013).

35. Congress passed a law which provides that all candidates for
elective public office should undergo mandatory drug testing. Law
provides that those who will not undergo drug testing, they will be
allowed to assume the function of the office for which they were
elected, even if they were proclaimed. Is the law valid?

The law is not valid, as it adds the constitutional qualification for

senator which is fixed by the constitution (Social Justice Society vs.
DDB, November 3, 2008).

36. What are the constitutional requirements for the apportionment of

legislative district?

1) Legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and

the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio (Section 5(1), Article VI). 2) Each legislative districts shall
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory (Sec. 5(2), Article VI). 3) Each city with a population of at least
250,000 or each province shall have at least one representative (Sec.
5(3), Article VI).

37. Is plebiscite needed for the effectivity of the creation of a district

representative?

Plebiscite is only needed in the creation of local government unit.

legislative district is not a local government unit. Therefore, plebiscite
is not required for the effectivity of the creation of legislative district.
(Bagabuyo vs, COMELEC).

38. Does the 250,000 population requirement apply to the creation of

legislative district in provinces?

NO. It applies only in cities (Aquino III vs. COMELEC).

39. In the ARMM law, the Regional Assembly of ARMM is allowed to

create a province within ARMM. Is the law constitutional?

No. Under the constitution, each province shall have at least one (1)
representative. Thus, the creation of a province carries with it the
creation of legislative district. And only Congress can create a
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 legislative district. Therefore, only Congress can create a province
(Sema vs. COMELEC).

40. Who may participate in party list election?

The following may participate in party list election: 1) National parties

and organizations; 2) Regional parties or organizations; 3) Sectoral
parties and organizations (Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC, April 2,
2013).

41. Is it required the parties or organization be organized along sectoral

lines or be marginalized and underrepresented?

National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations

do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to
represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector (Atong
Paglaum vs. COMELEC, April 2, 2013).

42. May a political party participate in party-list election?

Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they

register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections (Atong Paglaum vs. Comelec, April 2,
2013).

43. Congressman Abaya, the Chair of the Committee on Transportation

in the 16th Congress, authored bill creating a Department of
Transportation (DOTr). The bill was approved and eventually
signed by the President into law. May Congressman Abaya be
appointed as Cabinet Secretary of the newly created DOTr.?

No. Congressman Abaya cannot be appointed as Secretary of DOTr.

The last sentence of Section 13, Article VI provides that no member of
Congress may be appointed to any office which may have been created
or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was
elected.

44. What is the jurisdiction of electoral tribunal?

The sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives (Section 17, Article VI).

45. When does the jurisdiction of the Comelec over the candidates for
House end and when does the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal
begins?
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 The jurisdiction of an Electoral Tribunal begins once a winning
candidate has been: 1) Proclaimed; 2) Taken his oath; 3) Assumed
office

46. May Comelec entertain petition for disqualification of candidate for

Representative, Senator and President?

No. There is absence of an authorized proceeding for determining

before election the qualifications of candidate for Representative,
Senator and President. To disqualify a candidate, there must be a
declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate
sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the Commission to
be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution." (Poe vs. Comelec, March 8, 2016).

47. Congress provided that a law it had passed may re-amended or

revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon the vote of two
thirds (2/3) of the members of the House of Representatives and the
Senate. Is the law valid?

No. The SC declared this unconstitutional for Congress cannot pass an

irrepealable laws. SC said “where the legislature by its own act,
attempts to limits its power to amend or repeals laws, the Court has
the duty to strike down such act for interfering with the plenary
powers of Congress.” (Abas Kida vs. Senate).

48. How does a bill become a law?

When the president signs it. When the president vetoes it, but the veto
was overridden by two thirds of all the members of the House. When
the president does not act upon it within thirty days after it shall have
been presented to him.

49. May the President approve some part or parts of the bill and
veto the rest?

As a general rule, if the President disapproves a bill approved by

Congress, he should veto the entire bill. He is not allowed to veto
separate items of a bill. It is only in the case of appropriation, revenue, and
tariff bills that he is authorized to exercise item veto.

50. What is an appropriation law?

An appropriation measure may be defined as a statute the primary and

specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds
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 from the treasury. A law creating an office and providing funds
therefore is not an appropriation law since the main purpose is not to
appropriate funds but to create the office.

51. What are the Constitutional limitations on the power of

appropriation?

Sec. 24, Art. VI - All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills

authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.

Sec. 25(1), Art. VI - Section 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the
appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the
Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner
of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.

Section 25(2), Art VI - No provision or enactment shall be embraced

in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment
shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

Sec. 25(3), Art. VI - The procedure in approving appropriations for

the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving
appropriations for other departments and agencies.

Section 25(4), Art VI - A special appropriations bill shall specify the

purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds
actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised
by a corresponding revenue proposal therein.

Sec. 25(6), Art. VI - Discretionary funds appropriated for particular

officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported
by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be
prescribed by law.

Section 29(2), Art VI - No public money or property shall be

appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister,
other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to
any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

52. What is Disbursement Allocation Program?

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 DAP is a program by which the president accumulates or gathers the
supposed “savings” from the offices under the office of the president
to create a pool of funds. This pool of funds will be the source of funds
for the priority projects of the government. This is intended to
accelerate governmental spending. The source of funds is the
supposed “savings” which were derived from “unreleased
appropriations” and “unobligated allotment.” (Araullo vs. Aquino
III).

53. What are considered savings under the law?

The following are considered savings under the law: 1) Funds which
are still available after the completion or final discontinuance or
abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the
appropriation is authorized. 2) There can be savings when there is
unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions.
3) There can be savings from cost-cutting measures adopted by
government agencies (Araullo vs. Aquino III).

54. Are unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotment savings

under the law?

NO. Based on the above conception of “saving” (Araullo vs. Aquino

III).

55. What are considered unconstitutional in Araullo vs. Aquino?

The following are considered unconstitutional. 1) The pooling of funds

from “unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated
allotments”, being not savings, violates Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI. 2) The
transfer of funds from DAP to augment deficient items not provided
in the GAA violates Sec. 29(1) of Art. VI. 3) Cross-border
augmentations from savings were violative of Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI
(Araullo vs. Aquino III).

56. What are the requisites for the valid transfer of appropriated funds
under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?

1) There is a law authorizing the transfer funds within their respective

offices; 2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations for their respective offices; and, 3) The purpose of the
transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices (Araullo vs. Aquino III).

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57. What is the difference between the power of Congress under Section
22 (Question hour) and its power to conduct legislative
investigation?

Section 21 It relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of

legislation, the aims to which is to elicit information that may be used
for legislation. In the exercise of its power under Sec. 21, Congress can
compel the appearance of cabinet secretaries.

Section 22 pertains It pertains to the power to conduct question hour

to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. In the
exercise of its power under, Sec. 22, Congress can only request the
appearance of the secretaries of the executive department (Senate vs.
Ermita).

58. The president issued OE 464 directing certain officials of the

government to secure prior consent from the president before they
appear before in Congress. Is the EO constitutional?

EO is Unconstitutional. It violates Sec. 21, Article VI When Congress

exercise its power of inquiry in aid of legislation, heads of department
cannot refuse appearance during the inquiry on the claim that they
have not secured prior president’s consent. They can only refuse
appearance on a valid claim of executive privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim
of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from
this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence,
beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment (Senate vs. Ermita).

59. Can Congress compel the justices of the Supreme Court to appear
during congressional inquiry?

No. By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt
from this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is
vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on
the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal
autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary
(Senate vs. Ermita).

60. What are the requisites of presidential communication privilege?

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 First, communications must relate to “quintessential and non-
delegable power of the President. Second, the communications are
received by the President close advisors. Third, there is no adequate
showing of compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere.

61. For how long can the Congress detain a person cited for legislative
contempt?

The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent
power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries in aid of
legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative
inquiry under which the said power is invoked. In Arnault, it was
stated that obedience to its process may be enforced by the Senate
Committee if the subject of investigation before it was within the range
of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony called
relates to that subject. Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate
legislative inquiry, then the inherent power of contempt by the Senate
may be properly exercised. Conversely, once the said legislative
inquiry concludes, the exercise of the inherent power of contempt
ceases and there is no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained
witness (Balag vs. Senate, G.R. No. 234608, July3, 2018).

62. When is legislative inquiry deemed terminated?

Sec. 22. Report of Committee. Within fifteen (15) days after the
conclusion of the inquiry, the Committee shall meet to begin the
consideration of its Report. The Report shall be approved by a majority
vote of all its members. Concurring and dissenting reports may
likewise be made by the members who do not sign the majority report
within seventy-two (72) hours from the approval of the report. The
number of members who sign reports concurring in the conclusions of
the Committee Report shall be taken into account in determining
whether the Report has been approved by a majority of the members
x x x x.

The legislative inquiry of the Senate also terminates upon the

expiration of one (1) Congress. As stated in Neri, all pending matters
and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon the
expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of
the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the
same status, but as if presented for the first time (Balag vs. Senate,
G.R. No. 234608, July3, 2018).

16
63. The law allows the holder of appointive position in the executive
department hold any other office other than he is presently holding.
Is the law constitutional?

It is unconstitutional in so far as the President, department head,

deputies and assistants are concerned. All other appointive officials in
the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the
primary functions of their positions. However, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article
I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII
is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants (Civil
Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary; Funa vs. Executive vs.
Secretary, February 11, 2010; Funa vs. Acting Justice Secretary,
February 19, 2013; Public Interest Center vs. Elma, June 30, 2006).

64. Two months immediately preceding the day of election, the

president appointed a justice of the Supreme Court. Does the
appointment violate Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution?

No. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary (De Castro vs. JBC)

65. The signing of the appointing papers and the transmittal of the same
was made before the ban but the acceptance and oath of office
happened during the ban. Is the appointment valid?

The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid

appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of
the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence
of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and
(4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the
appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications. The concurrence of all these elements
should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is made,
whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. These
steps in the appointment process should always concur and operate as
a single process. There is no valid appointment if the process lacks
even one step. Thus, all the requisites for a valid appointment must be
accomplished before the prohibitory period (Velicaria-Garafil vs.
Office of the President, June 16, 2015).

17
66. Does the president have disciplinary jurisdiction over Deputy
Ombudsman?

NO. The Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body. The

constitutional commissions have been consistently intended by the
framers to be independent from executive control or supervision or
any form of political influence. At least insofar as these bodies are
concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the "independence"
granted to these bodies prevents presidential interference. (Gonzales
vs. OP, 2014).

67. What is betrayal of public trust?

The Constitutional Commission eventually found it reasonably

acceptable for the phrase betrayal of public trust to refer to "[a]cts
which are just short of being criminal but constitute gross
faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power,
inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of
discretionary powers." In other words, acts that should constitute
betrayal of public trust as to warrant removal from office may be less
than criminal but must be attended by bad faith and of such gravity
and seriousness as the other grounds for impeachment (Gonzales vs.
OP, 2012).

68. What is the doctrine of qualified political agency?

The acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and

promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved
or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively, the acts of the
Chief Executive. Put simply, when a department secretary makes a
decision in the course of performing his or her official duties, the
decision, whether honorable or disgraceful, is presumptively the
decision of the President, unless he quickly and clearly disowns it
(Villena v. Sec. of Interior).

69. What are the military powers of the President?

The following are the military powers of the president: 1) calling out
power; the power to suspend writ of habeas corpus; 3) the power to
declare martial law? (Section 18, Art. VI).

70. What are the limitations on the military power of the president?

The following are the limitations on the military power of the

president:

18
a. He may call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion only.

b. The grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the proclamation of martial law are now limited only to
invasion or rebellion.

c. The duration of such suspension or proclamation shall not exceed

sixty days, following which it shall be automatically lifted.

d. Within forty-eight hours after such suspension or proclamation, the

President shall personally or in writing report his action to the
Congress.

e. The Congress may then, by majority votes of all its members voting
jointly, revoke his action. The revocation may not set aside by the
President.

f. By the same vote and in the same manner, the Congress may, upon
initiative of the President, extend his suspension or proclamation
for a period to be determined by the Congress if the invasion or
rebellion shall continue and the public safety requires extension.

g. The action of the President and the Congress shall be subject to

review by the Supreme Court which shall have the authority to
determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of such action. This
matter is no longer considered a political question and may be
raised in an appropriate proceeding by any citizen. Moreover, the
Supreme Court must decide the challenge within thirty days from the
time it is filed.

h. Martial law does not automatically suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or the operation of the Constitution. The civil
courts and the legislative bodies shall remain open. Military courts
and agencies are not conferred jurisdiction over civilians where the
civil courts are functioning.

i. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall

apply only to persons facing charges of rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

j. Any person arrested for such offenses must be judicially charged

therewith within three days. Otherwise shall be released.

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71. What kind of proceeding should be initiated to question the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension or proclamation
under Sec. 18, Art. VII?

The phrase “in an appropriate proceeding” appearing in the 3rd

paragraph of Art. VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the
purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
exercise of the Chief executive’s emergency power. It could be
denominated as complaint, a petition, or matter to be resolved by the
Court (Lagman vs. Medialdea, 2017).

72. What factual situation should be considered by the Court in

determining whether there is sufficient for the President’s the
declaration and/or suspension?

The determination of the Court as to whether there is sufficient basis

for the declaration and sufficiency must be based only on the facts or
information known and available to the President at the time he made
the declaration or suspension which facts and information are found
in the proclamation as well as the written report submitted to Congress
(Lagman vs. Medialdea, 2017).

73. What quantum of proof does the President need to satisfy for the
declaration and/or suspension?

What the President need to satisfy is only the standard of probable

cause for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus (Lagman vs. Medialdea, 2017).

74. In a given emergency situation, is it required of the President to

follow the sequence of graduated powers?

No. the determination of what power to employ in a given situation is

solely dependent on the president to decide. Thus, judicial review
should not extend to calibrating the president’s decision pertaining to
which extra-ordinary power to avail given a set of facts or conditions
(Lagman vs. Medialdea, 2017).

75. Is it mandatory for Congress to to convene jointly upon the

President's proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Article VII, Section 18
of the 1987 Constitution?

NO. By the language of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution,

the Congress is only required to vote jointly to revoke the President's

20
 proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus (Padilla vs Pimentel, 2017).

76. What are the forms of executive clemency?

The following are the forms of executive clemency: 1. Reprieves; 2.

Commutations; 3. Pardons; 4. Remission of fines; 5. Forfeitures; 6.
Amnesty

77. What are the limitations on the pardoning power of the president?

a. It cannot be exercised in cases of impeachment;

b. Reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remission of fines and
forfeitures can be given only “after conviction by final judgment;
c. A grant of amnesty must be with the concurrence of a “majority of
all the Members of Congress”
d. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation
of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the
President without the favorable recommendation of COMELEC.
e. A pardon cannot be extended to a person convicted of legislative
contempt or civil contempt.
f. Pardon cannot also be extended for the purpose of absolving the
pardonee of civil liability, including judicial costs.
g. Pardon will not restore offices forfeited

78. Can congress pass a law, increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court?

NO. because it violates Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution which

provides that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may not
be increased by law without its advice or concurrence (Carpio-
Morales vs. CA).

79. Can Congress pass a law prohibiting the court from issuing TRO or
Injunction?

NO. This will violate the rule making power of the Supreme Court
under Section 5(5). The issuance of TRO or injunction is a matter of
procedure which is under the exclusive prerogative of the Supreme
Court.

80. In order to decongest the cases pending before the Supreme Court,
the Congress passed a law which provides that the judgement of the
Court of Appeals in criminal cases imposing a penalty of reclusion
perpetua is final and executory and that said decision may not

21
 anymore be questioned by whatever procedural means. Is the law
constitutional?

NO. The law is unconstitutional. While it may be true that the

Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts, it may not deprive the Supreme
Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5, Article
VIII. Under Section 5, Article VIII, the Supreme Court has the power
to review, revise, modify or affirm decisions of the lower court in
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.

81. What are the subject of the rule making power of the Supreme
Court?

1.The protection and enforcement of constitutional rights;

2. Pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts;
3. The admission to the practice of law,
4. The Integrated Bar;
5. Legal assistance to the underprivileged.

82. The law provides: SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. -Any person
charged under any provision of this Act regardless of the imposable
penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-
bargaining. Is the law constitutional?

Plea bargaining is a matter of procedure. the rules on Plea bargaining

neither creates a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates
as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law
and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or
infraction of them (Estipona vs. Lobrigo, 2017).

83. What are the requisites of judicial review?

1) Actual case or controversy; 2) It must be raised by a proper party; 3)

It must be raised at the earliest proper opportunity; 4) It must be
necessary to the determination of the case

84. What are the exceptions to mootness?

a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

b. The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved;
c. When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
22
 d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review (David vs.
Arroyo).

85. What is the concept of rotational scheme of appointment?

The concept is intended to present any incumbent president to appoint

majority of the member of the Constitutional Commission. To achieve
this end, the following must concur: The term of the first
commissioners should start on a common date. Any vacancy before
expiration should be filled only for the unexpired balance (Gaminde
vs. COA, December 13, 2000).

86. What is the rule on rotation scheme of appointment in the

Constitutional Commission?

a. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional

commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of
the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of
seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot validly
shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of
the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational
system prescribed by the Constitution.

b. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death,

resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such
appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will
likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2),
Art. IX(D).

c. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who

were appointed for a full term of seven years and who served the
entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the
Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission
under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against
reappointment.

d. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for

less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position
of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing
chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on
reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service
as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor
will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in

23
 the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or
removal by impeachment.

e. The Court clarifies that “reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art.

IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office (Commissioner
to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an
appointment involving a movement to a different position or office
(Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment
and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred
under the Constitution (Funa vs. Villar).

87. What is the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over election contest?

Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the

elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials. And appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.

88. Who has jurisdiction over the qualifications of party-list?

COMELEC or HRET?

The COMELEC has jurisdiction. However, with respect to the

qualification of the nominees of party list, it is the HRET which has
jurisdiction. (Layug vs. COMELEC, February 28, 2012).

89. Does the COMELEC have jurisdiction over exclusion or inclusion of

voters?

No. Under Section (3), Article IX-C, the COMELEC can decide all
question relating to election except the right to vote?

90. What are the territorial and political of the Philippines?

The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the

Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.
There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided (Section 1, Article 10).

91. Can Congress pass a law creating an Autonomous Region in

Southern Tagalog?

No. Under Section 1, Article X, autonomous regions can only be

established in Muslim Mindanao and Cordelleras.

24
92. What are the requisites for a valid ordinance?

The following are the requisites for a valid ordinance: 1) It must not be
contrary to the Constitution or law; 2) It must not be unfair or
oppressive 3) It must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) It must not
prohibit but regulate trade; 5) It must not be unreasonable

93. What is the nature of the taxing power of the local government units?

It is a constitutional grant. Section 5, Article X provides “Each local

government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of
revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent
with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges
shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.” Thus, Congress
cannot deprive LGU of its power to tax. It can only regulate the same.

94. May the power of local governments to raise revenues be limited by

administrative order?

Under Section 5, Article X, only guidelines and limitations that may be

established by Congress can define and limit such power of local
governments? (John Hay vs. Lim, 2003).

95. May Congress impose conditions for the release of IRA?

No. It is proscribed by Section 6, Article X which provides that Local

government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the
national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
(Batangas vs. Executive Secretary, [2004]).

96. Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides that “Local

government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in
the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
Under Section 284 of the LCG “Section 284. Allotment of Internal
Revenue Taxes. - Local government units shall have a share in the
national internal revenue taxes based on the collection of the third
fiscal year preceding the current fiscal…”

Should the IRA be limited to national internal revenue taxes?

NO. Although the power of Congress to make laws is plenary in

nature, congressional lawmaking remains subject to the limitations
stated in the 1987 Constitution. The phrase national internal revenue
taxes engrafted in Section 284 is undoubtedly more restrictive than the
term national taxes written in Section 6. As such, Congress has actually
25
 departed from the letter of the 1987 Constitution stating that national
taxes should be the base from which the just share of the LGU comes.
Such departure is impermissible. Verba legis non est recedendum (from
the words of a statute there should be no departure). Equally
impermissible is that Congress has also thereby curtailed the
guarantee of fiscal autonomy in favor of the LGUs under the 1987
Constitution.

Customs duties are also taxes because they are exactions whose
proceeds become public funds. According to Garcia v. Executive
Secretary, customs duties is the nomenclature given to taxes imposed on
the importation and exportation of commodities and merchandise to
or from a foreign country (Mandanas vs. Executive Secretary, GR No.
199802, July 3, 2018).

97. What is the term of local government elective officials?

The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,

which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected (Section 8, Article 10).

98. When will the 3 term limit of local elective officials apply?

Two requisites must concur: 1) Official must have been elected to the
same position 3 times; 2) He must have served three full terms.

99. What are the rules on term limits of local government elective
officials?

a. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the

official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on
succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired
portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one
full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional and
statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the
application of any term limit (Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, [1998]).

b. If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his
assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position
is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance
or interruption (Montebon v. COMELEC, [2008]).

26
c. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and
who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth
term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the
continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in the
interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a
private citizen (Adormeo v. Comelec, [2002]); Socrates v. Comelec,
[2002]).

d. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a

municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the
incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa v. COMELEC,
[2003]).

e. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the

elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the office remain
unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred
from exercising the functions of his office during this period
(Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC [2009]).

f. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position

and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an
election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him
from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his
term of office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida v.
Comelec, [1999]).

g. The break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years
or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any
length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to
break the continuity of service (Socrates v. Comelec; Lonzanida v.
Commission on Elections).

h. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision

becomes final after said official had served the full term for said
office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an
interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to
finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the
application of term limits because the nullification of his
proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong v. Alegre,
[2006]; Rivera III v. Comelec, [2007]).

i. A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective

local official merely served the balance of the latter’s term of office;
it is not a full three-year term. It also goes without saying that an
27
 incumbent elective local official against whom a recall election is
initiated and who nevertheless wins in a recall election must be
viewed as being a continuing term of office and not as a break in
reckoning three consecutive terms. - A recall election term then, not
being a full three-year term, is not to be counted or used as a basis
for disqualification whether it is held prior or subsequent to the
nine-year full three-term limit. (Mendoza v. COMELEC, 2013).

100. Article 10. Section 10 provides “No province, city, municipality, or

barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.” Who should participate in the plebiscite?

The voters of the unit or units directly affected (Tan vs. Comelec,
[1986]).

101. Cabanatuan City, by virtue of the EO issued by the President, was

converted to a highly urbanized city. The issue is: who should
participate in the plebiscite, the only the registered voters of
Cabanatuan City or the whole registered voters of the province of
Nueva Ecija?

The whole province of Nueva Ecija. In interpreting the phrase:

“subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected” under Section 10, Art. X, the SC
ruled that the province of Nueva Ecija will be directly affected by the
conversion of Cabanatuan City to highly urbanized city. The province
of Nueva Ecija will be impacted economically and politically.
Economically because Cabanatuan City will be segregated from the
province of Nueva Ecija; thus, the territory of the Nueva Ecija will be
substantially reduced. Consequently, the IRA that is allotted to Nueva
Ecija will also be reduced. The province will also lose income from the
conversion as the taxes of the highly urbanized city will acrrue
exclusively to the HUC. Politically, province of Nueva Ecija will also
be impacted. Duties, privileges and obligations appertaining to HUCs
will attach to Cabanatuan City if it is converted into an HUC. This
includes the right to be outside the general supervision of the province
and be under the direct supervision of the President. An HUC is not
subject to provincial oversight because the complex and varied
problems in an HUC due to a bigger population and greater economic
activity require greater autonomy. The provincial government stands
to lose the power to ensure that the local government officials of
Cabanatuan City act within the scope of its prescribed powers and

28
 functions, to review executive orders issued by the city mayor, and to
approve resolutions and ordinances enacted by the city council. The
province will also be divested of jurisdiction over disciplinary cases
concerning the elected city officials of the new HUC, and the appeal
process for administrative case decisions against barangay officials of
the city will also be modified accordingly. Likewise, the registered
voters of the city will no longer be entitled to vote for and be voted
upon as provincial officials (Umali vs. COMELEC, 2014).

102. Who are the impeachable officers?

The following are the impeachable officers: 1) President; 2) Vice

President; 3) Chief Justice of the SC and it justices; 4) Chairmen and
Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions; 5) Ombudsman.

103. What are the grounds for impeachment?

Culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and

corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust (Article XI,
Section 2).

104. What is the procedure for impeachment?

First. A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any

member of the HoR or by any citizen upon a Resolution of
endorsement by any Member.
Second. included in the order of business within 10 session days, and
referred to proper committee within 3 sessions days.
Third. The Committee upon majority vote of all its members, shall
submit its report which should be done within 60 days after referral.
Fourth. If the verified complaint is filed by at least 1/3 of all the
members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment.
Fifth. A vote of at least 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution or override its
contrary resolution.

105. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same

official more than once within a period of one year. What is meant
by “initiation”?

The SC gives the term “initiate” different from “filing.” The

impeachment is deemed initiated when the complaint (with
accompanying resolution of endorsement) has been filed with the HoR
and referred to appropriate Committee (Francisco vs. House of
Representatives).
29
106. Can there be multiple grounds in an impeachment complaint?

Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives, Feb. 25, 2011, rules that
“an impeachment complaint need not alleged only one impeachable
offense.” In fact, multiple complaints may be considered so long as
they would all be simultaneously referred or endorsed to the proper
committee.

107. What is “regalian doctrine”?

All lands are owned by the “Crown.” This is reflected in the 1987
Constitution. Thus: “All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State.”

108. What is the consequence of the regalian doctrine?

The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources

shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. Any person
claiming ownership of a portion of the public domain must be able to
show title from the state according to any of the recognized modes of
acquisition of title.

109. If a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are

discovered, does his ownership of such land give him the right to
extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the
State?

No. The minerals are owned by the State under the “regalian
doctrine”. The land is thus converted into mineral land. For the loss
sustained by the owner, he is entitled to compensation (Republic vs.
CA, 160 SCRA 228).

110. Are there lands which are not covered by regalian doctrine?

Yes. When, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been
held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be
presumed that to have been held in the same way from before the
Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land (Carino vs.
Insurer, 41 Phil. 935; Cruz vs. DENR).

111. Who are qualified to take part with the State in the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources?

30
 The State may enter into “co-production, joint venture, or production
sharing agreement with Filipino citizens, or corporations, associations
at least sixty per cent of whose capital is owned by Filipino citizens.

112. May foreign corporation participate in the EDU of mineral

resources?

Yes. The President may enter into agreements with Foreign-owned

corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large
scale EDU of mineral, petroleum and other mineral oils (Sec. 2).

113. When husband and wife purport to buy land, and the husband is
alien while the wife is Filipino, is the property conjugal such that it
may not be disposed of without the consent of the husband?

The property cannot be deemed conjugal because of the incapability of

the alien husband to own private land. Thus, the alien husband has no
capacity to question the sale made by the Filipino wife (Cheesman vs.
IAC, 193 SCRA 93).

114. May a Filipino seller question the legality of sale he made in favour
of an alien. Will pari delicto apply?

The seller may question the sale made to the alien. The principle of pari
delicto is not applicable (Philippine Banking corporation vs. Lui She,
[1967]).

115. Section 11, Article 12 provides: “No franchise, certificate, or any

other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall
be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor
shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in
character or for a longer period than fifty years.” What is the
meaning of 60% capital ownership?

Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino owned

“capital” required in the Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60
percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of
the voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial ownership of
60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of
Filipino nationals in accordance with the constitutional mandate.
Otherwise, the corporation is “considered as non-Philippine
national[s]” (Gamboa vs. Finance Secretary, [2011]).

31
 Since the constitutional requirement of at least 60 percent Filipino
ownership applies not only to voting control of the corporation but
also to the beneficial ownership of the corporation, it is therefore
imperative that such requirement apply uniformly and across the
board to all classes of shares, regardless of nomenclature and category,
comprising the capital of a corporation. Under the Corporation Code,
capital stock consists of all classes of shares issued to stockholders, that
is, common shares as well as preferred shares, which may have
different rights, privileges or restrictions as stated in the articles of
incorporation. (Gamboa vs. Finance Secretary, MR [2012])

116. Does the Commission on Human Rights enjoy fiscal autonomy?

It enjoys fiscal autonomy only to the extent that it appropriation shall

be automatically regularly released (CHR Employees Association vs.
CHR, 2006).

117. Does CHR have jurisdiction over cases involving socio-economic

rights?

No. The Constitution provides that the CHR has the power to
“investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights.” (Section
18, Article XIII; Simon, Jr. vs. CHR, [1994]).

118. What is police power?

It is the power of the State to regulate liberty and property for the
common good. The power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining the use of liberty and property.

119. May the power of eminent domain be used as an implement of

police power? Give example.

To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe

retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power
for the regulation of private property in accordance with the
Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in
excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under
the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation
is imperative (Association of Small Landowers vs. DAR).

120. What power is implemented in giving senior’s citizen’s discount of

20%?

32
 Police power (Manila Memorial Park, Inc., vs. Secretary, December
13, 2013).

121. What are the two (2) tests to determine the validity of the exercise of
police power?

Lawful subject – the interest of the public generally, as distinguished

from those of a particular class, require the exercise of police power.

Lawful means – the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and must not be unduly oppressive.

122. A LGU passed an ordinance levying a special assessment equivalent

to one-half percent (0.5%) of the assessed value of Land in excess of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) shall be collected by
the City Treasurer which shall accrue to the Socialized Housing
Programs of the Quezon City Government. The special assessment
shall accrue to the General Fund under a special account to be
established for the purpose. The fund will be used for the benefit of
informal settlers. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the
ordinance on the ground that people should not be required to pay
for the services that the government is mandated to do. Further, It is
a form of class legislation since it favors informal settlers who
occupy property not their own and pay no taxes, over law-abiding
real property owners who pay income and realty taxes.

Is the ordinance constitutional?

YES. Section 6, Article XII provides that the use of property bears a
social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the
common good. Individuals and private groups, including
corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall
have the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises,
subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to
intervene when the common good so demands. Property rights of
individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
fulfill the objectives of the government in the exercise of police power.
In this jurisdiction, it is well-entrenched that taxation may be made
the implement of the state's police power (Ferrer vs. Bautista, 2015).

123. A law is passed requiring is required to also publish information as

to the name of the person, candidate, party or organization who
commissioned or paid for the survey. Is the law valid?

We sustain the validity of Resolution No. 9674. The names of those

who commission or pay for election surveys, including subscribers of
33
 survey firms, must be disclosed pursuant to Section 5.2(a) of the Fair
Election Act. This requirement is a valid regulation in the exercise of
police power and effects the constitutional policy of “guarantee[ing]
equal access to opportunities for public service[.]” Section 5.2(a)’s
requirement of disclosing subscribers neither curtails petitioners’ free
speech rights nor violates the constitutional proscription against the
impairment of contracts (SWS vs. COMELEC, 2015).

124. Is survey an election propaganda?

YES. The inclusion of election surveys in the list of items regulated by

the Fair Election Act is a recognition that election surveys are not a
mere descriptive aggregation of data. Publishing surveys are a means
to shape the preference of voters, inform the strategy of campaign
machineries, and ultimately, affect the outcome of elections. Election
surveys have a similar nature as election propaganda. They are
expensive, normally paid for by those interested in the outcome of
elections, and have tremendous consequences on election results.

125. What is the power of eminent domain?

The power to take private property for public use upon payment of
just compensation.

126. What is the remedy of the land owner if the government refused to
pay the just compensation?

If after five (5) years after the finality of judgment in an expropriation

proceeding, the government failed to pay the just compensation, the
land owner has the right to file an action for the recovery of possession
of the property (Republic vs. Lim, 482 SCRA 265).

127. The Congress passed a law proving for a formula by which the Court
can compute the amount of just compensation. Is the Court bound
by the formula?

The LBP correctly argued that consideration of the valuation factors

under Section 17 of RA 6657 and the formula under DAR A.O. No. 05-
98 35 is mandatory in ascertaining just compensation for purposes of
agrarian reform cases. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Gonzalez, we
held that although the determination of just compensation is
fundamentally a judicial function vested in the RTC, the judge must
still exercise his discretion within the bounds of law.

He ought to take into full consideration the factors specifically

identified in RA 6657 and its implementing rules, as contained under
34
 the pertinent Administrative Orders of the DAR, such as DAR A.O.
No. 05-98, which contains the basic formula of the factors enumerated
under said law. He may not disregard the procedure laid down therein
because unless an administrative order is declared invalid courts have
no option but to apply it.

Otherwise, the judge runs the risk of violating the agrarian reform law
should he choose not to use the formula laid down by the DAR for the
determination of just compensation. The Court reaffirmed this
established jurisprudential rule in Alfonso v. Land Bank of the Philippines
when it categorically gave "full constitutional presumptive weight and
credit to Section 17 of RA 6657, DAR AO No. 5 (1998) and the resulting
DAR basic formulas." (LDP vs. Spouses Esteban, 2017).

128. What are the two aspects of due process?

Substantive due process and procedural due process.

129. What are the requisites of substantive due process?

First, the interest of the public in general as distinguished from a

particular class, requires the intervention of the state. Second, the
means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose, and must not be duly oppressive.

130. What is void for vagueness rule?

"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle." (SPARK vs. Quezon
City, GR No. 225442, August 20, 2017).

131. The curfew ordinance does not provide enforcement parameters to

guide the local authorities in the proper apprehension of suspected
curfew offenders. Is curfew ordinance invalid for vagueness?

Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters

to guide the local authorities in the proper apprehension of suspected
curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct
the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the
ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms related to
35
 the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters
of policy that are best left for the political branches of government to
resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not
the sole consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather,
petitioners must show that this perceived danger of unbridled
enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that
allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular conduct
is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous
provision of law contravenes due process because agents of the
government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct the law permits
and/or forbids (SPARK vs. Quezon City, GR No. 225442, August 20,
2017).

132. Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional

because they deprive parents of their natural and primary right in
the rearing of the youth without substantive due process. In this
regard, they assert that this right includes the right to determine
whether minors will be required to go home at a certain time or will
be allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose
curfews is primarily with parents and not with the State, the latter's
interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling.

Is the contention tenable?

NO. While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be

stressed that "when actions concerning the child have a relation to the
public welfare or the well-being of the child, the [S]tate may act to
promote these legitimate interests." Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to
the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace,
order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may
override the parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of their
children." (SPARK vs. Quezon City, GR No. 225442, August 20, 2017).

133. What are three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the
reasonableness of classifications?

The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes
with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties
guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes. The
intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does not
involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened
scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and legitimacy.
Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered
by the first two tests (SPARK vs. Quezon City, GR No. 225442,
August 20, 2017).

36
134. What test should be applied on restriction of fundamental rights of
the people like the right to travel?

Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal

system guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny test
is the applicable test.

Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes

with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. Thus,
the government has the burden of proving that the classification (i) is
necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is
narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest (SPARK vs. Quezon City,
GR No. 225442, August 20, 2017).

135. When does life begin?

Life commences upon “conception” that is upon fertilization. When

the egg cell and sperms meet, then there life begins. Hence, the
obligation upon the State to “equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of an unborn from conception” prevents the legislature from
legalizing abortion (Imbong vs. Ochoa).

136. In a preliminary investigation, is the respondent entitled to be

furnished of copies of the counter-affidavit of their co-respondents?

No. There is no law or rule which requires the investigating prosecutor

to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents. The rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation
are limited to those granted by procedural law. "The rights conferred
upon accused persons to participate in preliminary investigations
concerning themselves depend upon the provisions of law by which
such rights are specifically secured, rather than upon the phrase 'due
process of law'. (Estrada vs. Ombudsman, January 21, 2015).

137. Is administrative due process applicable in preliminary

investigation?

NO. This is because a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial

proceeding since the prosecutor in a preliminary does not determine
the guilt or innocence of the respondent (Estrada vs. Ombudsman,
January 21, 2015).

138. What is equal protection clause?

37
 All persons or things similarly situated shall be treated a like both as
to the rights conferred and responsibilities imposed (Ichong vs.
Hernandez).

139. What are the requirement of valid classification?

It must be based on substantial distinction.

It must be germane to the purpose of law.
It must not be limited to existing. conditions.
It must apply equally to all members of the same class.

140. Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 otherwise known as "The General

Banking Law of 2000" which took effect on June 13, 2000, amended
Act No. 3135. The law provides: “Notwithstanding Act 3135, juridical
persons whose property is being sold pursuant to an extrajudicial
foreclosure, shall have the right to redeem the property in
accordance with this provision until, but not after, the registration of
the certificate of foreclosure sale with the applicable Register of
Deeds which in no case shall be more than three (3) months after
foreclosure, whichever is earlier. Owners of property that has been
sold in a foreclosure sale prior to the effectivity of this Act shall
retain their redemption rights until their expiration.” Is the law
valid?

The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural

persons was based on the nature of the properties foreclosed —
whether these are used as residence, for which the more liberal one-
year redemption period is retained, or used for industrial or
commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed
necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership of
property and enable mortgagee-banks to dispose sooner of these
acquired assets. It must be underscored that the General Banking Law
of 2000, crafted in the aftermath of the 1997 Southeast Asian financial
crisis, sought to reform the General Banking Act of 1949 by fashioning
a legal framework for maintaining a safe and sound banking system.
In this context, the amendment introduced by Section 47 embodied one
of such safe and sound practices aimed at ensuring the solvency and
liquidity of our banks. It cannot therefore be disputed that the said
provision amending the redemption period in Act 3135 was based on
a reasonable classification and germane to the purpose of the law
(Goldenway Merchandizing Corporation vs. Equitable PCI, March
13, 2013).

141. Is RA 9262, a class legislation, hence violates equal protection clause

under the Constitution?

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 NO. RA 9262 did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring
women over men as victims of violence and abuse. The distinction lies
on the unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact
that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the
wide spread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for
real differences justifying the classification under the law (Garcia vs.
Drilon, GR No. 179267, June 25, 2013).

142. Does the issuance of PO’s under RA 9262 violates due process?

NO. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as

violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary
attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the
time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the
defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, 102 in the same way,
the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing
experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if
notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented.
It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interests, 103 among which is protection of women and children
from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. (Garcia
vs. Drilon, GR No. 179267, June 25, 2013).

143. Does the issuance of BPO unconstitutional because of undue

delegation of judicial power?

NO. "(T)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into
the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to
determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts
may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial
powers." (Garcia vs. Drilon, GR No. 179267, June 25, 2013).

144. Government workers cannot be considered ‘conscientious objectors’

in the implementation of the RH Law. Is this constitutional?

“This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause.

The conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the
religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible
distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the
mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious
objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without
distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector.”
(Imbong vs. Ochoa, April 8, 2014).

39
145. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the RH Law on the
argument that they bound to fund a program of the government
which contrary to their religion?

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the
government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can
or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone,
nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do
so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.

Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that

the State cannot enhance its population control program through the
RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary
to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue
its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the
policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply
because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between
Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that
are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's (Imbong vs.
Ochoa, April 8, 2014).

146. Is the duty to refer under the RH Law, constitutional?

No. In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious

objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor,
there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious
objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the
abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a
clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an
illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose
religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.

The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH
Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious
objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient
seeking information on modern reproductive health products,
services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately
burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his
beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas)
has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience." (Imbong vs. Ochoa, April 8,
2014).

40
147. Sec. 10. Money Claims. — . . . In case of termination of overseas
employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by
law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent
(12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less. Is this constitutional?

The supreme Court ruled that the subject clause violates Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3,
Article XIII on labor as a protected sector (Serrano vs. Gallant, GR No.
167614, March 24, 2009).

148. Can Congress re-enact a law which was already declared by the SC
unconstitutional?

NO. Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is

inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by
reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or
provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared
unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so
changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion (Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency vs. Cabiles, GR No. 170139, August 5, 2014).

149. Is Section 2 Article III invokable against barangay tanod?

The Barangay Tanod was considered as agents of person in authority

under Article 388 of the Local Government Code. Hence they are not
considered to be private individuals (Del Castillo vs. People, January
30, 2012).

150. How is probable cause determined in the issuance of search

warrant?

It is determined by personally examining in the form of searching

questions and answer, in writing and under oath, the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them.
(Section 5, Rule 126).
151. How is probable cause determined in the issuance of warrant of
arrest?

It can be determined on the basis of the personal examination by the

judge of the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor (Soliven vs. Makasiar, Nov. 14, 1988).

41
152. The judge issued warrant when what was submitted was only the
Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor and Affidavits of the
complainant. The prosecutor did not attached copies of the affidavit
of the witnesses for the complainant and the counter-affidavit of the
respondent. Is the Judge correct?

NO. Because it was not the Judge who determine probable cause but
the Prosecutor because the judge relied only to the finding of probable
cause by the prosecutor (Okabe vs. Judge Gutierrez, May 27, 2004).

153. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. — When a

computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the
provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or
block access to such computer data (Section 19, RA 10175,
Cybercrime Law). Is this constitutional?

NO. Government in effect, seizes and places the computer data under
its control and disposition without warrant. DOJ order cannot
substitute judicial warrant (Disini vs ES, February 14, 2014).

154. What are the exceptions to arrest with warrant?

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,

is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another (Section 5, Rule 113).

155. What are the elements of arrest in flagrante delicto?

(a) The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating

that he had just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit;
(b) Such overt act is done within the view of the arresting officer
(Antiquera vs. People, December 11, 2013).

156. What are the requisites of plain view?

42
 a. the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can
view a particular area;
b. the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and
c. it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to
seizure (People vs. Chi Chan Liu, January 21, 2015).

157. The accused was driving a motorcycle without a helmet in violation

of a traffic ordinance. The police officer arrested the accused and
searched his pocket finding a sachet of shabu. Is the sachet of shabu
admissible in evidence?

NO. A person caught for traffic violation should not be arrested. He

should only be issued a citation ticket. Thus, if he should be arrested
for violation of traffic ordinance, then his arrest is invalid.
Consequently, the evidence obtained as a result of an illegal arrest is
inadmissible in evidence (Luz vs. People, GR No. 197788, February
29, 2012).

158. What is a right to privacy?

It is the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person

or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person’s sensibilities (Social Justice Society vs. DBB,
570 SCRA 410)

159. What are the two tests in determining whether one is entitled to the
right of privacy?

In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to

privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The FIRST is a
subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or
legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The SECOND
is an objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one
society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable (Disini vs. ES,
February 11, 2014).

160. Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC),
uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates
(Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their
undergarments. Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said
photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her
students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the
said pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.

43
 Is the right of the children to privacy violated?

Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online

Social Networking (OSN) activity, it is first necessary that said user, in
this case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep
certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent
access thereto or to limit its visibility.

This intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of

the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy
tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of
his or her right to informational privacy (Vivares vs. St. Theresa
College).

161. Distinguish content based regulation and content neutral

regulation?

In Content based regulation Restriction is based on the subject matter

of the utterance or speech. While Content neutral regulation, it is
merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one which
merely controls the time, place, or manner of expression under well-
defined standards.

Content based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity

and is measured against the clear and present danger rule. It will pass
constitutional muster only if justified by compelling reason. In so
testing its validity, the Court will apply strict scrutiny test. Content
neutral regulation only needs substantial government interest is
required for its validity. They are not subject to strictest form of judicial
scrutiny but an intermediate approach – something which is in the
middle of rational basis test or strict scrutiny test.

162. DOJ and NTC issued a warning if TV and Radio stations plays the
“Garci Tape”, their franchises would be revoked. Is it content based
regulation or content neutral regulation?

According to SC, it is a content-based regulation because the focus of

the restraint is on the content of the expression (Chavez vs. Gonzalez,
February 15, 2008)

163. Is the regulation as to the size of tarpaulin where the expression is

to be made considered as content-based regulation or content-
neutral?

44
 SC ruled that it is content-based. The form of expression is just as
important as the information conveyed that it forms part of the
expression. Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to time and
place. They are fundamentally part of expression protected under
Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution.

Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support

their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin.
However, all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political
parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any
political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the
enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by
a non-candidate in this case. (Diocese of Bacolod vs. Comelec,
January 21, 2015).

164. COMELEC Resolution limits the broadcast and radio

advertisements of candidates and political parties for national
election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120)
minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. Is it
constitutional?

The assailed rule on "aggregate-based" airtime limits is unreasonable

and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of
candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the
people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the "aggregate-based"
airtime limits — leveling the playing field — does not constitute a
compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial
restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to
communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of
government (GMA Network vs. COMELEC, September 2, 2014).

165. Section 4 (c) (3) of Cyber Crime Law – Unsolicited Commercial

Communications is unconstitutional.

To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person

the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads
addressed to him.

Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not

accorded the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless
entitled to protection.

The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited

45
 advertisements are legitimate forms of expression (Disini vs. DOJ,
February 18, 2014).

166. What is First Amendment Challenge?

It is a facial challenge on the validity of the law. It is launched to assail

the validity of statutes concerning not only protective speech, but also
other rights in the First Amendment. This includes religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances
(Imbong vs. Ochoa, 721 SCRA 146).

167. What is overbreath doctrine?

Under this doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally

subject to regulation, may not be achieved be means that unnecessarily
sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of proactive
freedom (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, February 18, 2014).

168. What is benevolent neutrality approach?

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that accommodation of

religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored
form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance. The purpose of accommodations is to
remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of religious profession
(Estrada vs. Escritor).

169. When is one considered under custodial investigation?

Any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person

has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in some significant way.

It starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry

into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and
propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements.

170. Is police line-up part of custodial investigation?

Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right
to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at
this stage. This is because during a police line-up, the process has not
yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually
the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a
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 statement in the course of the line-up (People v. Amestuzo, 413 Phil.
500 (2001; People vs. Escordial, January 16, 2002).

171. Should the right to counsel be made available during preliminary

investigation?

The right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be

deemed 'critical stages' in the criminal process. The preliminary
investigation can be no different from the in-custody interrogations
by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary
investigation will be subjected to no less than the State's processes,
oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might
be liable for criminal prosecution (People vs. Bonkingco, 2011).

172. Is the person facing extradition proceedings allowed to post bail?

YES. In Govt. of Hongkong vs. Olalia, April 19, 2007, the SC ruled
that that the right to bail is granted by the Universal Declaration of
Human rights of which the Philippine is a signatory. While not a
treaty, its principles, including the right to bail, are recognized as
customarily binding upon the members of the community. If the right
to bail is granted to a deportee, there is no reason why the right should
be deprived of the extradite.

173. What are the requisites of double jeopardy?

a. Valid complaint or information

b. Filed before competent court
c. Valid plea
d. Previous acquittal or conviction or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accuse.

174. What are the requisites for the validity of an administrative

regulation?

a. Its promulgation must be authorized by law

b. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the statute.
c. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed
procedure.
d. It must be reasonable.

175. Are issuances of the JBC required to published in Office of the

National Administrative Register?

No. The publication requirement in in the ONAR is confined to

issuances of administrative agencies under the executive branch of the
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 government. Since JBC is a body under the supervision of the SC, it is
not covered by the publication requirement of the Administrative
Code (Villanueva vs. JBC, GR No. 211833, April 7, 2015).

176. What are the requisites for the validity of administrative rule with
penal sanction?

a. The law itself must make a violation of the administrative

regulations regulation punishable.
b. The law itself must impose and specify the penalty for violation of
the regulation.
c. The regulation must be published.

177. What is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort?

The doctrine holds that if a case is such that its determination requires
the expertise, specialized training, and knowledge of an
administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before resort to the court is had even if the matter may well
be within the latter's proper jurisdiction. The objective of the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it
should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an
administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect
of some question arising in the proceeding before the court (Nestle,
Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Uniwide Sales, Inc., et al., 648 Phil. 451, 459
(2010).

178. What is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party

must first avail of all administrative processes available before seeking
the courts' intervention. The administrative officer concerned must be
given every opportunity to decide on the matter within his or her
jurisdiction. Failing to exhaust administrative remedies affects the
party's cause of action as these remedies refer to a precedent condition
which must be complied with prior to filing a case in court (Ongsuco
v. Malones, 619 Phil. 492-513 [2009]).

179. What is a petition to deny due course the certificate of candidacy and
on what ground?

A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate

of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that
any “material representation” contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later
than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
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 candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election. (Section 78, OEC).

180. What is matter is materially misrepresented?

Material matters are: “qualification for elective office” Examples: 1)

residency; 2) age; 3) citizenship; 4) or any other legal qualifications
necessary to run for local elective office, couple with the showing that
there was an intent to deceive the electorate. The candidate nick name
does not pertain to his eligibility or qualification for office, and cannot
be considered a misrepresentation (Villafuerte vs. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 206698, February 25, 2014).

181. What is the effect if the certificate of candidacy is declared void for
lack of material misrepresentation?

A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a

valid candidacy, much less valid votes. If one’s certificate of candidacy,
much less valid votes. If one’s certificate is void ab initio, then there was
never a candidate. The Court ruled that a cancelled certificate of
candidacy void ab ignition cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and
much less to valid votes. Thus, the “second placer” candidate is
deemed to have garnered the highest number of votes and is entitled
to hold the corresponding elective position (Aratea vs. COMELEC,
2012).

182. When can there be substitution?

SECTION 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or

withdrawal of another. — If after the last day for the filing of
certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political
party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who
died, withdrew or was disqualified. x x x x.

Please take note:

Considering that Sec. 77 requires that there be a candidate in order for

substitution to take place, as well as the precept that a person without
a valid CoC is not considered as a candidate, it necessary follows that
if a person’s CoC had been denied due course, he cannot be validly
substituted, Thus, the existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua
non for a disqualified candidate to validly substituted (Talaga vs.
COMELEC, October 9, 2012).

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183. How is petition for disqualification different from petition to deny
due course the “CoC”?

The disqualification case under Section 68 is hinged on either (1) a

candidate’s possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign
country; or, his commission of certain acts of disqualification, e.g. vote-
buying, terrorism, overspending, soliciting or making prohibited
contributions. If a candidate is disqualified, he technically to have been
considered a candidate.

Denial of due course of CoC is premised on person’s misrepresentation

of any of the material qualifications required for elective office aspired
for.

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