POLITICAL LAW - STRATEGIC LECTURE IN POLITICAL LAW (Prof. Gito) PDF

STRATEGIC
LECTURE IN
POLITICAL LAW
JUDGE GENER M. GITO, LL.M., D.C.L.
AMENDMENT AND
REVISION
Who may propose changes to the
Constitution?
Congress, upon a vote of three-fourth
of its members (Sec. 1(1), Art. XVII).
A constitutional convention (Sec. 1(2),
Art. XVII)
People through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters therein (Sec.
2, Art. XVII).
What are the two ways by which
the Constitution may be changed?
Amendment Revision
Revision vs. Amendment
• Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic
principle in the constitution. There is also revision if
the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution.
• Amendment broadly refers to a change that adds,

reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle
involved. Revision generally affects several provisions
of the constitution, while amendment generally affects
only the specific provision being amended (Lambino
vs. COMELEC, October 25, 2006).
Tests to Determine the
Kind of Change
Quantitative test
•It inquires into the number of provision
altered, deleted or changed.
Qualitative test
•It inquires into the qualitative effect of
the proposed changed.
May people’s initiative be used to
revise the Constitution?
• No. People’s initiative cannot be sued to revise
the Constitution. The rationale for the answer
lies in the constitutional text.
• Section 1, Article XVII provides that amendment

or revision may be proposed by Congress and
Constitutional Convention.
• While Section 2 provides that amendment may

likewise be proposed by the people.
NATIONAL
TERRITORY
Is the definition of national territory under
our Constitution internationally binding?
• No. The definition of the Philippine territory

under the 1987 Constitution is not binding
internationally. It should be noted that a
constitution is a municipal law. Being such,
it only binds the nation promulgating it.
Thus, for it to be binding internationally, the
extent of national territory under the 1987
Constitution must be supported by proofs
which are acceptable under international law.
What is an archipelago?
• An archipelago is a body of water studded with
islands.
• Under the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNLCOS III), archipelago is defined as
‚a group of islands, including parts of islands,
interconnecting waters and other natural features
which are so closely interrelated that such islands,
waters and other natural features form an intrinsic
geographical, economic and political entity, or
which historically have been regarded as such‛
(Art. 46[b]).
What is an archipelagic state?
Archipelagic state means a

State constituted wholly by
one or more archipelagos and
may include other islands
(Art. 46[a], UNCLOS III).
What is archipelagic doctrine?
Archipelagic doctrine prescribes a principle

that archipelago should be considered one
integrated unit instead of being divided into
several islands. This can be effected by
connecting the outermost point of the
outermost island of the archipelago with a
straight baseline and all the waters inside the
baseline shall be considered internal waters.
Is archipelagic doctrine reflected in the
definition of territory under Article I?
• Yes. Article I reflects the archipelagic
doctrine. The last sentence of Article I
provided that ‚[T]he waters around,
between, and connecting the islands
of the archipelago, regardless of their
breadth and dimensions, form part of
the internal waters of the
Philippines.‛
Is archipelagic doctrine binding under
international law?
• NO. archipelagic doctrine is not yet

accepted under international law. The
United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) does not
treat the waters inside the baseline as
internal waters. UNCLOS III treats
them as ‚archipelagic waters.‛
What is the difference between internal water
and archipelagic water?
• When a water is considered internal, it subject to the plenary
jurisdiction of the state over which it has sovereignty and
jurisdiction. Such state can disallow the passage of foreign
vessels. Such vessels may only be allowed passage upon the
consent of the controlling state.
• Archipelagic water are those waters inside the archipelagic

baselines drawn joining the outermost points of the
outermost island of the archipelago. Under UNCLOS III, the
archipelagic state has sovereignty over archipelagic water. The
sovereignty extends to air space, as well as to its sea bed and
subsoil and resources contained therein. However, unlike
internal water, archipelagic water is subject to the right of
innocent passage, which right is provided by Article 52 of the
UNCLOS III.
Magallona vs. Ermita,
August 16, 2011
• (a) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime
territory, and logically, the reach of the
Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation
Petitioners of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying
questioned the the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary
treaties, and
constitutionality • (b) RA 9522’s adaptation of UNCLOS “regime of
of RA 9522 on islands” to determine maritime zones of
Kalayaan Group of Island and Scarborough
two grounds: shoal is inconsistent with its claim of
sovereignty over these areas thus violating
Article I of the Constitution.
Magallona vs. Ermita
First Issue
• Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for
UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the
extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves.
• In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine
areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights,
namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters
(Article 2, UNCLOS III), the jurisdiction to enforce customs,
fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous
zone (Article 33, UNLCOS III), and the right to exploit the
living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic
zone (Article 56, UNCLOS III) and continental shelf (Article
77, UNCLOS III)
Second Issue
• The Baseline Law, by adopting UNCLOS ‚regime of
islands‛ does not dismember Kalayaan group of
islands and Scarborough shoal from the national
territory. The Philippine sovereignty and jurisdiction
were not diminished by the Baseline Law.
• Under UNCLOS, archipelagic state has the right to
draw baselines but "[t]he drawing of such baselines
shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago" (Article 47
(3) of UNCLOS III).
• Kalayaan Group of Islands are located at an
appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the
Philippine archipelago.
What are the maritime zones?
• It is a sea, the breadth of which

Territorial does not exceed 12 nautical miles
sea from the baseline (Art. 3, UNCLOS
III).
• It is a sea, the breadth of which

Contiguous does not exceed 24 nautical miles
zone from the baseline (Art. 33[2],
UNCLOS III).
What are the maritime zones?
Exclusive Economic Zone
• It is a sea, the breadth of which does not exceed 200 nautical miles
from the baseline (Art. 57, UNCLOS III).
Continental Shelf
• The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the
outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental
margin does not extend up to that distance (Art. 76[1], UNCLOS
III).
Rights of Coastal States to
Maritime Zones
• The coastal state has

sovereignty over the
Territorial territorial sea subject to
sea this Convention and to
other rules of international
law (Art. 2, UNCLOS III).
Maritime Zones
• The coastal state has the right to
exercise control necessary to
• (a) prevent infringement of its
customs, fiscal, immigration or
Contiguous sanitary laws and regulations within
its territory or territorial sea; and,
zone
• (b) punish infringement of the above
laws and regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea
(Art. 33, UNCLOS III).
Maritime Zones
• The coastal state has the sovereign rights

for the purpose of exploring and
Exclusive exploiting, conserving and managing the
natural resources. It has also jurisdiction
over the establishment and use of
economic artificial islands, installations and
structures; marine scientific research;
zone and, the protection and preservation of
the marine environment (Art. 56,
UNCLOS III)
Maritime Zones
•The coastal state has

the exclusive right to
Continental
explore and exploit its
shelf
natural resources
(Art. 77, UNCLOS III).
Doctrine of State
Immunity from Suit
Constitutional Basis
“The State may not be sued without its

consent.”
Article XVI, Section 3

Immunity covers other States
• Immunity is enjoyed by other States

in accordance with the
international law principle “par in
parem non habet imperium.”
Immunity also covers the
following:
• State diplomatic agents

• Foreign agent, as long as it can be
established that he is acting within the
directives of the sending State
• United Nations, as well as its organs and
specialized agencies
• International organizations or agencies
Suit Against the Officer of the
Government
• It is important to determine if the State is
the real party in interest, that the claim if
proved will be the direct liability of the
State and not merely the officer
impleaded.
• The test is whether, assuming the
decision is rendered against the public
officer impleaded, the enforcement
thereof will require an affirmative act of
the State.
Exception when public officer may be
sued even without prior consent
• To compel him to do an act required by law
• To restrain him from performing an illegal act
• To compel payment of damages from an
already appropriated assurance fund or to
refund tax over payments
• To secure judgment that the officer may
satisfy himself without the state having to a
positive act.
• Where the government itself violated a law
because the State cannot be an instrument
of injustice.
Waiver of Immunity
• The State may be sued with its consent.
• There are forms of consent:
o Express
o Implied May be manifested
either by general or
special law
When it commences
litigation or enters into
a contract
Express Consent
• Laws giving consent to be sued
oAct no. 3088
oC.A. No. 327 as amended by P.D.
No. 1445
oCharters of municipal
corporations
Implied Consent
• When the state commences litigation
• When the state enters into business contract. BUT:
But when the State enters

Where the contract into a contract, it is not
is in pursuit of a automatic that it already
sovereign activity, waives its immunity. It
there is no waiver of must be distinguished in
immunity, and no what capacity the
implied consent government is entering
may be derived into contract. Is it jus
therefrom . imperii or jus gestationis
Suit against Government Agencies
• Determination must be made whether an agency
is:
o incorporated
o unincorporated Suability is found
in the charter
If unincorporated, inquire into

the principal function of the
agency. If governmental, no
waiver. If proprietary, there is
waiver
Scope of Consent
• Consent to be sued does not include
consent to the execution of judgment
against it. But the funds belonging to
government owned and
controlled corporation are not
exempt from garnishment.
• However, the funds of LGU may not be

garnished. It requires appropriation
through ordinance. But, mandamus may
lie.
Important Cases
• Amigable vs. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360 – payment of just
compensation. The doctrine cannot be used to
perpetrate injustice.
• Santiago vs. Republic, 87 SCRA 294 – in revocation of
deed of donation, consent is not required. Neither
notice to COA is required because it is not money
claim.
• Republic vs. Villasor, 54 SCRA 84 – consent to be used
does not cover consent to pay.
• UP vs. Dizon, 679 SCRA 54 – the funds of UP cannot be
garnished because it is governmental.
• Lockheed Detective vs. UP, 670 SCRA 206 – can be
garnished, but file the claim first with COA.
Important Cases
• US vs. Ruiz, 221 Phil. 179 – the fact the government
enters into contract would not be taken to mean that
it waives it immunity. Inquiry must be had into what
capacity the government enters into contract.
• China National Machinery vs. Sta. Maria, 665 SCRA
189
• German Agency for Technical Cooperation vs. CA,
585 SCRA 150 – the claim of immunity by foreign
government agency must be substantiated by
evidence.
• Holy See vs. Rosario, 238 SCRA 524 – certification by
DFA that an entity is immune from suit must be
respected by the Court.
Separation of Powers
What is the constitutional basis of the
principle of separation of powers?
• The constitutional basis of the principle of
separation of powers is the allocation of powers
by the Constitution to the three great
departments of the government and
Constitutional Commission. Thus, these three
departments must discharge their respective
functions within the limits of authority
conferred by the Constitution (Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation vs. Republic,
G.R. Nos. 177857-58, September 17, 2009).
When is there is violation of principle
of separation of power?
• The principle of separation of powers may be
violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "[o]ne branch may
interfere impermissibly with the other's
performance of its constitutionally assigned
function"; and "alternatively, the doctrine may be
violated when one branch assumes a function that
more properly is entrusted to another." In other
words, there is a violation of the principle when
there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b)
assumption of another department's functions (Belgica
vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013).
Jurisprudential Illustrations
Flores vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993
Santiago vs. Guingona, G.R. No. 134577, 18 November

1998
Arroyo vs. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14,

1997
Abakada Guru Party-list vs. Purisima, G.R. No.

166715, August 14, 2008
Abakada vs. Purisima, GR 166715,
August 14, 2008
• SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – There is hereby
created a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee composed
of seven Members from the Senate and seven Members from
the House of Representatives. The Members from the Senate
shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at least two
senators representing the minority. The Members from the
House of Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker with
at least two members representing the minority. After the
Oversight Committee will have approved the implementing
rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter
become functus officio and therefore cease to exist.
Abakada vs. Purisima, GR 166715,
August 14, 2008
• From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision
of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to
play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law violates the principle of separation of powers and is
thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that
requires Congress or its members to approve the
implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect
shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows
Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling
made by the members of the executive branch charged with the
implementation of the law.
What is legislative veto?
• Legislative veto is a statutory provision
requiring the President or an administrative
agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law
to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a "right" or
"power" to approve or disapprove such
regulations before they take effect (Abakada
Guru Party-list vs. Purisima, G.R. No.
166715, August 14, 2008).
Is legislative veto constitutional?
• No. Legislative veto is unconstitutional.
Legislative veto violates the principle of
separation of powers. From the moment the law
becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to
play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional (Abakada Guru Party-list vs.
Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008).
What is a pork barrel system?
• Pork Barrel System as the collective body of
rules and practices that govern the manner by
which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily
intended for local projects, are utilized through
the respective participations of the Legislative
and Executive branches of government,
including its members. (Belgica vs. Executive
Secretary, November 19, 2013).
Two kinds of pork barrel
system
Congressional
pork barrel
system
Presidential
pork barrel
system
Congressional Pork Barrel
Belgica
vs. It is defined as a kind of lump-sum,
Executive discretionary fund wherein
Secretary, legislators, either individually or
November collectively organized into
19, 2013
committees, are able to effectively
control certain aspects of the fund’s
utilization through various post-
enactment measures and/or
practices.
Presidential Pork Barrel
Belgica
vs.
Executive
Secretary,
November It is defined as a kind of lump-sum,
19, 2013 discretionary fund which allows the
President to determine the manner
of its utilization.
Does “pork barrel system” violate the
• YES. The ‚pork barrel system‛ violates the
principle of separation of powers. The
distinguishing factor of a pork barrel system,
especially ‚Congressional Pork Barrel‛ is the
authority of the legislator to participate in the
post-enactment phases of project
implementation.
• (Belgica vs. Executive Secretary, November 19,
2013)
Does “pork barrel system” violate the
• These post-enactment measures which govern
the areas of project identification, fund release
and fund realignment are not related to
functions of congressional oversight and, hence,
allow legislators to intervene and/or assume
duties that properly belong to the sphere of
budget execution.
2013)
Problem No. 1
• Supposing Congressman Manhikmanaog of the 1st
district of Oriental Mindoro, during the budget
deliberation in Congress allocated a total of 70M worth
of projects in his district. All congressmen followed suit.
Each of them allocated 70M worth of project to their
respective districts. Because senators would not want to
be left out, each of them identified projects worth 200M.
They were approved and they were all carried out in the
GAA which was eventually passed and approved.
• Are the actions of the legislators as reflected in the
GAA constitutional?
Answer
• The action of the legislators as reflected in the GAA is
not unconstitutional.
• What is prohibited under the Constitution is the
participation of the legislators in the post-enactment
phases of project implementation. This is proscribed
because it violates the constitutional principle of
separation of powers. However, when project
identification is done during congressional budget
deliberation, the same will not violate separation of
powers. The project identification happened while
Congress is performing its very function, which is
legislation.
How does DAP violate
separation of powers?
• The act of the President of allotting or redirecting
funds for certain programs, activities or projects
well beyond to what Congress had intended,
arrogate unto himself a power that belongs to
Congress. While the president is authorized to
spend in line with his mandate to execute the laws
(including the GAA’s), such authority should not
translate to unfettered discretion that allows him
to substitute his own will for that of Congress.
• (Araullo vs. Aquino III, 728 SCRA 1)
Delegation of Powers
What is the basis of non-
delegation of power?
• It is based upon the ethical principle that such
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a
duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not
through the intervening mind of another (U.S. vs.
Barrias, 11 Phil. 327, 330). A further delegation of
such power, unless permitted by the sovereign
power, would constitute a negation of this duty in
violation of the trust reposed in the delegate
mandated to discharge it directly (Cruz & Cruz,
Philippine Political Law, 2014, at page. 160).
Problem No.1
• Section 17, Article XII provides that “in times of
national emergency, when the public interest so
requires, the State may, during the emergency and
under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with
public interest.” Can this provision be legally
invoked by the President to temporarily take over
or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public
interest during without authority from Congress?
Answer
• No. Without legislation, the President has not
power to take over privately-owned public
utility of business affected with public
interest. In short, the President has no
absolute authority to exercise all the power of
the State under Section 17, Article XII in the
absence of an emergency powers act passed
by Congress (David vs. Arroyo, 489 SCRA
161).
Tests for Valid Delegation
Completeness
test The law must be complete in all its
essential terms when it leaves the
legislature so that there will be nothing
left for the delegate to do when it reaches
him except to enforce it. A law is
complete when it sets forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate (Pelaez vs.
Auditor General, 122 Phil. 965).
Tests for Valid Delegation
Sufficient
standard test A sufficient standard is intended to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority by defining
the legislative policy and indicating the
circumstances under which it is to be pursued. The
purpose of sufficient standard is to prevent a total
transference of legislative power from law making
body to the delegate, who is not allowed to step
into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative (Eastern Shipping
Lines vs. POEA, 166 SCRA 533, 543-544).
Problem No. 2
• Section 8 of PD 910 (Law governing the
disposition of Malampaya Funds) pertinently
provides:
• ‚All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board
x x x shall form part of a Special Fund to be
used to finance energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the
government and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President.‛
Answer
• The provision is invalid as it constitute an undue
delegation of legislative power. The phrase "and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD
910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President's authority with respect to the purpose
for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.
2013).
Legislative Department
Legislative Power
It is the authority to make laws,

alter and repeal.
Who may exercise legislative
power?
Section 1, Article VI
•The legislative power shall be vested in
the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of the Senate and a House
of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision
on initiative and referendum.
The Senate
• Article VI, Section 2
• The Senate shall be
composed of twenty-
four Senators who
shall be elected at
large by the qualified
voters of the
Philippines, as may
be provided by law.
Qualifications of the Senate
• Article VI, Section 3
• No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-

born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of
the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able
to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident
of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election.
Qualifications of a Senator
• Natural-born citizen
Article • Least thirty-five years of age
on the day of election
VI, • Able to read and write
• Registered voter
Section • Resident of the Philippines for
not less than two years
3 immediately preceding the
day of the election.
Who is a natural born citizen?
•Natural-born citizens are those
who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or
Article IV, perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Section 2 •Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof
shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.
Social Justice Society vs. DDB,
November 3, 2008
• Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,

(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002):
• All candidates for public office whether

appointed or elected both in the national or
local government shall undergo a mandatory
drug test.
November 3, 2008
• (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486:

• SECTION 1. Coverage.—All candidates for
public office, both national and local, in the
May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and
Local Elections shall undergo mandatory
drug test in government forensic laboratories
or any drug testing laboratories monitored
and accredited by the Department of Health.
November 3, 2008
• SC declared Section 36(g) and

Section 1 of Comelec Resolution
No. 6486 unconstitutional as it
adds the constitutional
qualification for senator which is
fixed by the constitution.
The House of Representatives
• Article VI, Section 5 (1)
• The House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number
of their respective inhabitants, and
on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
The House of Representatives
District representative Party list representative
• Shall be elected from • Shall be elected through a

party-list system of
legislative districts
registered national,
apportioned among the regional, and sectoral
provinces, cities, and the parties or organizations.
Metropolitan Manila area in • The party-list
accordance with the representatives shall
number of their respective constitute twenty per
inhabitants, and on the centum of the total number
basis of a uniform and of representatives
progressive ratio. including those under the
party list.
Apportionment of
Legislative District
• Constitutional underpinnings:
o Legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio (Section 5(1), Article VI).
o Each legislative districts shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory (Sec. 5(2), Article VI).
o Each city with a population of at least 250,000 or each
province shall have at least one representative (Sec.
5(3), Article VI).
“Gerrymandering”
• The formation of one district legislative
district out of separate territories for the
purpose of benefiting a candidate or a party.
• This is unconstitutional because of the
constitutional requirement that each
legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory.
Projections
Cases • Bagabuyo vs. Comelec, G.R.

176970, Dec. 8, 2008
for • Aquino III vs. Comelec,

G.R. 189793, April 7, 2010
• Aldaba vs. Comelec, G.R.
2017 1880778, Jan. 25, 2010
• Sema vs. Comelec, G.R. No.
Bar 177597, July 18, 2008
Party-list Representatives
• The house of Representatives is
composed not only of the regular district
representatives but also of the party-list
representatives. The party-list
representatives shall constitute 20% of
the total membership of the body,
including such representatives
How is the number of party-list
representatives computed?
No. of Seats of available
District Reps.
_________________ x .20 = No. of PLR
.80
For every four (4) district representatives, there

must be one (1) party list representative
BANAT VS COMELEC
Who may participate in party-
list election?
Three •National parties and
different organizations
groups may •Regional parties or
participate organizations
in the •Sectoral parties and
party-list organizations
system: Atong Paglaum vs. Comelec,
April 2, 2013
•National parties or
Is it required the
organizations and regional
parties or
organization be parties or organizations do not
organized along need to organize along sectoral
sectoral lines or be lines and do not need to
marginalized and represent any ‚marginalized
underrepresented? and underrepresented‛ sector.
Atong Paglaum vs. Comelec,

April 2, 2013
May a political party participate in
party-list election?
• Political parties can participate in
party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system
and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections.
April 2, 2013
May a political party participate in
party-list election?
• Political parties can participate in

party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system
and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections.
April 2, 2013
Can a political party which field
candidate in district election participate
in party-list election?
• It can participate in party-list election, only

through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is link to a political party.

April 2, 2013
Parliamentary Immunity
• A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while
the Congress is in session. No Member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other
place for any speech or debate in the Congress
or in any committee thereof.
Parliamentary
Immunities
Privilege from Arrest
Privilege from Speech

and Debate
Illustrative Case
Pobre vs. The Court is not hesitant to impose some form
Santiago, of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty.
597 Santiago for what otherwise would have
SCRA 1, constituted an act of utter disrespect on her
part towards the Court and its members. The
J.
factual and legal circumstances of this case,
Velasco. however, deter the Court from doing so, even
without any sign of remorse from her. Basic
constitutional consideration dictates this
kind of disposition.
Forbidden Office
• No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during
his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created
or the emoluments thereof increased during the term
for which he was elected.
Problem No. 3
• Congressman Abaya, the Chair of the
Committee on Transportation in the 16th
Congress, authored bill creating a
Department of Transportation (DOTr). The
bill was approved and eventually signed by
the President into law.
• May Congressman Abaya be appointed as
Cabinet Secretary of the newly created
DOTr.?
Answer
• No. Congressman Abaya cannot be
appointed as Secretary of DOTr. The last
sentence of Section 13, Article VI provides
that no member of Congress may be
appointed to any office which may have been
created or the emoluments thereof increased
during the term for which he was elected.
Electoral Tribunals
• Section 17, Article VI
• The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunals
The sole judge of all contests

relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the
members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives.
When does the jurisdiction
of the Comelec over the
candidates for House end
and when does the
jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunal begins?
Reyes vs. Comelec,
June 25, 2013
The
jurisdiction of
an Electoral •Proclaimed
Tribunal
begins once a •Taken his oath
winning
candidate has
•Assumed office
been:
May Comelec entertain petition for
disqualification of candidate for
Representative, Senator and President?
• No. There is absence of an authorized proceeding
for determining before election the qualifications of
candidate for Representative, Senator and President.
• To disqualify a candidate, there must be a
declaration by a final judgment of a competent court
that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is
guilty of or found by the Commission to be
suffering from any disqualification provided by law
or the Constitution."
• (Poe vs. Comelec, March 8, 2016)
Powers of Congress
Abas Kida vs. Senate,
October 18, 2011
• Congress provided that a law it had passed may re-
amended or revised by the Congress of the
Philippines upon the vote of two thirds (2/3) of the
members of the House of Representatives and the
Senate.
• The SC declared this unconstitutional for Congress
cannot pass an irrepealable laws. SC said ‚where the
legislature by its own act, attempts to limits its
power to amend or repeals laws, the Court has the
duty to strike down such act for interfering with the
plenary powers of Congress.‛
Classification of Powers of
the Congress
• 1. Legislative (P-E-T-A-L-O)
oGeneral Plenary power
oExpropriation
oTaxation
oAppropriation
oLegislative investigations
oOversight Function
Classification of Powers of
the Congress
• 2. Non-Legislative (C-D-C-P-I)
o Canvassing of presidential elections

o Declaration of existence of a state of war
o Giving Concurrence to treaties and
amnesties
o Power to Propose amendments
o Power to Impeach
Limitations of Legislative Power
Substantive Procedural
• It curtails the contents of the • It pertains to the manner
law. It may express or of passing laws.
implied.
• Art. III (Bill of Rights)
• Art. VI, Secs. 25 & 29 • Art.VI, Section 26:
• Art. VI, Secs. 28, 29 • One subject, One title
• Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3) • Three readings on
• Art. VI, Sec. 30 separate day.
• Art. VI, Sec. 31
• Non-delegation
• Irrepealable laws
Procedure for the Approval of
the Bill
 1. A bill introduced by any member of the
House or the Senate Non-Legislative.
 2. The first reading which involves the reading
of the number and title of the bill and the
referral of the bill to the appropriate
committee.
 3. The may be killed in the committee or it
may be recommended for approval with or
without amendments. If there are other bills
of similar nature, the will be consolidated
under a common authorship or committee
bill.
Procedure for the approval
of the Bill
 4. Once reported out, the bill shall be
calendared for second reading. It is at this
stage that the bill is read in its entirety,
scrutinized, debated upon and amended
when desired.
 5. The bill as approved on the second reading
is printed in its final form and copies thereof
are distributed at least three days before the
third reading. On the third reading, the bill will
be approved or disapproved. No debate is
allowed.
Procedure for the approval
of the Bill
• 6. Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent
to the other chamber, where it will also
undergo three readings. If there are
differences between the version of the two
chambers, a bicameral conference
committee will draft the compromise version
that if ratified by the Senate and House, will
then be submitted to the President.
A bill is Third
Transmission
introduced Reading
Second Bi-Cam
First Reading
Reading Conference
Committee Committee Submission

Action Report to President
Procedural Aspect of
Legislation
• Only one subject to be expressed in the title of the
bill (Sec. 26[1], Art. VI)
• Three (3) reading on separate days and printed copies
thereof are distributed to all its members before its
passage (Sec. 26[2], Art. VI)
• Except when the President certifies its immediate
enactment to meet public calamity or emergency
(id.,)
• Upon the third reading, no amendment is allowed.
(id.)
Issues in the Procedural
Aspect of Legislation
• One subject embraced in the title of the law
• Title is not required to be an index of the contents
of the bill. It is sufficient compliance if the title
expresses the general subject, and all the provisions
are germane to that subject. (Philconsa vs.
Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479; Lidasan vs. Comelec,
21 SCRA 496)
• The reason for certifying the urgent passage of the
law cannot be inquired by the SC (Tolentino vs.
Secretary of Finance)
Bills which should originate
from the House
 Appropriations bills – the primary purpose

of which is to authorize the release of funds
from the treasury
 Revenue bills – primary and specific
purpose is to raise revenue
 Tariff bills – specifies rate and duties on
imported articles
 Bills Increasing public debts – floating
bonds for public subscription redeemable
after a certain period of time
Approval of the Bills
(Section 27, Article VI)
How • When the president signs it.

• When the president vetoes it, but
does a the veto was overridden by two
thirds of all the members of the
bill House.
become • When the president does not act

upon it within thirty days after it
a law? shall have been presented to him
May the President approve
some part or parts of the bill and
veto the rest?
As a general rule, if the President disapproves a

bill approved by Congress, he should veto the
entire bill. He is not allowed to veto separate
items of a bill. It is only in the case of
appropriation, revenue, and tariff bills that he is
authorized to exercise item veto.
Item Veto
Section 27 (2)
The President shall have the power to

veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill,
but the veto shall not affect the item or
items to which he does not object.
What an item?
• Item in ―an indivisible some of money dedicated to
stated ―purpose‖ and not some general provision
of law which happens to be put in an appropriation
bill.
• The power to disapprove any item or items in an

appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto
a part of an item and to approve the remaining
portion of the same item. (Gonzales v. Macaraig,
Jr., 191 SCRA 452, 464 [1990])
Appropriation, Defined
• An appropriation measure may be defined as
a statute the primary and specific purpose of
which is to authorize the release of public
funds from the treasury.
• A law creating an office and providing funds

therefore is not an appropriation law since
the main purpose is not to appropriate funds
but to create the office.
Classification of Appropriation
General Special
 It is passed annually  It is designed for a

is intended to provide specific purpose such
for the financial as the creation of a
operations of the fund for the relief of
entire government typhoon victims.
during one fiscal
period.
Limitations on Appropriation
IMPLIED
Appropriation must be
devoted to a public
purpose
The sum authorized must

be determinate or at least
determinable
Constitutional Limitations
• Sec. 24, Art. VI
o All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills, shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
• Sec. 25(1), Art. VI
o Section 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the
appropriations recommended by the President for the
operation of the Government as specified in the
budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation
of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
• Section 25(2), Art VI
o No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the
general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically
to some particular appropriation therein. Any such
provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation
to the appropriation to which it relates.
• Sec. 25(3), Art. VI
o The procedure in approving appropriations for the
Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for
approving appropriations for other departments and
agencies.
o A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose
for which it is intended, and shall be supported by
funds actually available as certified by the National
Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue
proposal therein.
• Sec. 25(6), Art. VI
o Discretionary funds appropriated for particular
officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to
be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to
such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
o No public money or property shall be appropriated,
applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other
religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
• Aglipay vs. Ruiz:
o The Philippine Government authorized a

special stamp issue on the occasion of the
observance of in Manila of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress under
sponsorship of the Catholic Church. The stamp
reflects a map of the Philippines under which
appeared the Caption ‚Seat, 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937‛
Automatic Re-appropriation
• Article VI, Section 25(7)
o If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress
shall have failed to pass the general
appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal
year, the general appropriations law for the
preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-
enacted and shall remain in force and effect
until the general appropriations bill is
passed by the Congress.
DAP Controversy
Provisions involved: Araullo vs. Aquino, July 1,
2014
Section 29(1) - No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in

pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Section 25(5) - No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of

appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
Araullo vs. Aquino, July 1, 2014
• DAP is a program by which the president
accumulates or gathers the supposed ‚savings‛
from the offices under the office of the president to
create a pool of funds. This pool of funds will be
the source of funds for the priority projects of the
government. This is intended to accelerate
governmental spending.
• The source of funds are the supposed ‚savings‛

which were derived from ‚unreleased
appropriations‛ and ‚unobligated allotment.‛
• What are “savings” under the law.
• 1. Funds which are still available after the
completion or final discontinuance or
abandonment of the work, activity or purpose
for which the appropriation is authorized.
• 2. There can be savings when there is unpaid
compensation and related costs pertaining to
vacant positions.
• 3. There can be savings from cost-cutting
measures adopted by government agencies.
• Therefore:
• ‚Unreleased appropriations and

withdrawn unobligated allotments‛ are
not savings.
• What are the acts considered
unconstitutional?
• The pooling of funds from ‚unreleased

appropriations and withdrawn
unobligated allotments‛, being not
savings, violates Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI.
unconstitutional?
• The transfer of funds from DAP to

augment deficient items not provided
in the GAA violates Sec. 29(1) of Art.
VI.
unconstitutional?
• Cross-border augmentations from

savings were violative of Sec. 25(5) of
Art. VI.
Requisites for the valid transfer of
appropriated funds under Section 25(5),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
There is a law authorizing the transfer funds within

their respective offices;
The funds to be transferred are savings generated from

the appropriations for their respective offices; and
The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the

general appropriations law for their respective offices.
Legislative Inquiries
• Article VI, Section 21.
• The Senate or the House of Representatives or

any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure.
The rights of persons appearing in, or affected
by, such inquiries shall be respected.
Question Hour
• Article VI, Section 22.
• The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with
the consent of the President, or upon the request of either
House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining
to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to
the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the
security of the State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.
Sec. 21 vs. Sec. 22
• It relates to the power to • It pertains to the power to
conduct inquiries in aid of conduct question hour to
legislation, the aims to which obtain information in pursuit
is to elicit information that of Congress’ oversight
may used for legislation. function.
• In the exercise of its power • In the exercise of its power
under Sec. 21, Congress can under, Sec. 22, Congress can
compel the appearance of only request the appearance
cabinet secretaries. of the secretaries of the
executive department.
Senate vs. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1

Who has the power?
The Senate or the House of

Representatives or any of its
respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.
Extent of Power of Inquiry
Sabio vs. Gordon, October 17, 2006
EO No. 1, Section 4(b) – ‚no member or staff of the

PCGG shall be required to testify or produce evidence
in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceedings concerning matters within its official
cognizance.‛ This is repugnant to Section 21,
Article VI. The provision of law cannot pose a
limitation to this broad power of Congress in the
absence of any constitutional basis.
• Senate vs. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1
• It involves the constitutionality of EO 464 directing certain
officials of the government to secure prior consent from
the president before they appear before in Congress.
• Unconstitutional. It violates Sec. 21, Article VI
• When Congress exercise its power of inquiry in aid of
legislation, heads of department cannot refuse appearance
during the inquiry on the claim that they have not secured
prior president’s consent. They can only refuse appearance
on a valid claim of executive privilege. They are not exempt
by the mere fact that they are department heads.
• When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way
for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by
a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere
fact that they are department heads. Only one executive
official may be exempted from this power — the President
on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment.

• By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also
exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency,
judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each
member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of
separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and
the constitutional independence of the judiciary.
• Neri vs. Senate, 549 SCRA 77
• Invocation of presidential
communication privilege would
exempt a department head from
answering question from Congress in
the latter’s performance of its power
in inquiry.
• Neri vs. Senate, 549 SCRA 77
• Requisites of presidential communication privilege
• First, communications must relate to ―quintessential and
non-delegable power of the President
• Second, the communications are received by the President
close advisors.
• Third, there is no adequate showing of compelling need
that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere.
Limitations of Power
•Bengzon vs. Senate Blue

Ribbon, 203 SCRA 767.
In aid of •Standard Charter Bank
legislation vs. Senate Committee
on Banks, December 7,
2007.
•Neri vs. Senate,

Duly March 25, 2008.
published •Garcillano vs.
rules House of Rep,
December 23, 2008.
Rights of •Sabio vs. Gordon,

persons supra.
should •Standard Charter Bank
be vs. Senate Committee
on Banks, supra.
respected
Executive Department
CANVASS OF ELECTION RETURNS
 Article VII, Section 4
 The returns of every election for President and Vice-
President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress,
directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not
later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all
the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House
of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and
due execution thereof in the manner provided by law,
canvass the votes. The Congress shall promulgate its rules
for the canvassing of the certificates.
Does Section 18.5 R.A. 9189
(Absentee Voting Law)
empowering the COMELEC to
proclaim the winning candidates
for national offices and party list
representatives including the
President and the Vice-President
constitutional?
Lopez vs. Senate, June 8, 2004
• Congress may validly delegate the
initial determination of the
authenticity and due execution of the
certificate of canvass to a Joint
Congressional Committee. Anyway,
the recommendation of the Joint
Congressional Committee is subject to
the approval of Congress.
Macalintal vs. PET, Nov. 23, 2010
• Sec. 4, Art. VII –
• ‚The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.‛
• Petitioner questions the constitutionality of PET on
the ground that the SC, sitting en banc can well
perform its function as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, qualifications and returns of
president and vice-president. There is therefore no
need for the establishment of PET.
Macalintal vs. PET, Nov. 23, 2010
• The constitution of PET was in accordance with
the mandate of Sec. 4, Art. VII. Although the
method by which the SC exercises this authority
is not specified in the provision, the grant of
power does not contain any limitation on SC’s
exercise thereof.
• PET is not separate and distinct from the SC,
albeit is has functions peculiar only to tribunal.
Vacancy that Occurs at the
Start of the Term
(Section 7)
REASON FOR VACANCY SUCCESSION
1. Failure to elect the President 1. The Vice-President becomes acting
President until a President is elected.
2. Failure of the President-elect to 2. The Vice-President becomes acting
qualify. President until a President qualifies.
3. Death or permanent disability of the 3. The Vice-President-elect shall
President-elect. become the President.
4. When both the President and Vice- 4. The Senate President or the Speaker
President shall not have been chosen in that order acts as President until a
or have failed to qualify or when both President or Vice- President qualifies.
shall have died or become
permanently incapacitated at the start
of the term.
5. When both the Senate President 5. Congress shall enact as law as to
shall have died or become who shall become the acting President
permanently incapacitated or failed to
assume.
Vacancy that occurs
during the term
(Section 8)
REASON FOR VACANCY SUCCESSION

1. When the incumbent President dies 1. The vacancy created is thus
or is permanently disabled, is permanent. The Vice- President
removed or resigns. becomes President.
2. When both the President and the 2. The Senate President or the
Vice-President die, or are permanently Speaker-in that order shall act as
disabled, are removed, or resign. acting president until the President
and Vice President is elected.
3. When the Acting President dies, or 3. Congress will determine by law

is permanently incapacitated, or who will act as President until a new
resigned. President or Vice- President shall have
elected and qualified.
Section 13, Article VII
• The President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. x x x
x.
Section 7, Article IX-B
 No elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to
any public office or position during his tenure.
• Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
Civil Liberties Union vs. ES,
Feb. 22, 1991
• Executive Order No. 284
• Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary
functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive
officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to
his primary position, hold not more than two positions in
the government and government corporations and receive the
corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this
limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or
committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the
President is the Chairman.
Feb. 22, 1991
• Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII

of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet
members, their deputies or assistants are
concerned admit of the broad exceptions
made for appointive officials in general
under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB?
Feb. 22, 1991
• All other appointive officials in the civil service are
allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of their positions.
However, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by
the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-
XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable
only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Reiteration of the Rule
Funa vs. Executive Secretary, February 11,
2010
Funa vs. Acting Justice Secretary,

February 19, 2013
Public Interest Center vs. Elma, June 30,

2006
POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Article VII
EXECUTIVE POWER
- The power to
belongs PRESIDENT
enforce and
administer the laws.
 The scope of executive power is set forth in Article VII

of the 1987 Constitution
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
• Appointing Power • Article VII, Section 16
• Power of Control • Article VII, Section 17
• Military Power • Article VII, Section 18
• Pardoning Power • Article VII, Section 19
• Borrowing Power • Article VII, Section 20
• Diplomatic Power • Article VII, Section 21
• Budgetary Power • Article VII, Section 22
• Informing Power • Article VII, Section 23
Is the executive power of the president
limited to those specified in the
Constitution?
Marcos vs. Executive power is more than the sum of
Manglapus
specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. It includes residual powers not
specifically mentioned in the Constitution.
The Power involved is the President’s residual

power to protect the general welfare of the
people. It is founded on the duty of the
president as the steward of the people.
Power to Appoint
• Section 16, Article VII
• The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the 1) heads of the executive
departments, 2) ambassadors, 3) other public ministers and consuls,
or 4) officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and 5) other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.
Power to Appoint
• Section 16, Article VII
• The President shall have the power to
make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall
be effective only until after disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress.
Classification of Appointment
in relation to the Power of C.A.
REGULAR
 A regular appointment is one made
by the President while Congress is in
session; takes effect only after
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, and once approved,
continues until the end of the term of
the appointee.
Classification of Appointment
in relation to the Power of C.A.
AD INTERIM
 Ad interim appointment is one made
by the President while Congress is in
recess; takes effect immediately until
revoked by the Commission on
Appointments.
Cases on Presidential
Appointment
Sarmiento vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 549
Calderon vs. Carale, 208 SCRA 254
Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2, 2002
Pimentel vs. Ermita, October 13, 2005
Abas Kida vs. Senate, February 28, 2012
Flores vs. Drilon, June 22, 1993

Section 15, Art. VII
• Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall
not make appointments except temporary
appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
Does Sec. 15, Art. VII apply to appointment
in judiciary?
• NO.
• Prohibition under Section 15, Article
VII does not apply to appointments to
fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or
to other appointments to the Judiciary
Power to Remove
• Gonzalez vs. Office of the President, September 4,
2012.
• Gonzalez III was removed by the office of the
president on the ground of betrayal of public trust. It
should be noted that under the Ombudsman Law (RA
6770), the grounds for removing deputy ombudsman
are the same grounds for removing Ombudsman.
These are: 1) culpable violation of the constitution; 2)
treason; 3) bribery; 4) graft and corruption; 5) other
high crimes; 6) betrayal of public trust.
Power to Remove
• Gonzalez vs. Office of the President, September 4,
2012.
• Would every negligent act or misconduct in the

performance of a Deputy Ombudsman's duties
constitute betrayal of public trust warranting immediate
removal from office?
Power to Remove
• Gonzalez vs. Office of the President, September 4, 2012.
• NO.
• The Constitutional Commission eventually found it reasonably
acceptable for the phrase betrayal of public trust to refer to
"[a]cts which are just short of being criminal but
constitute gross faithlessness against public trust,
tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence of
duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary
powers." In other words, acts that should constitute betrayal
of public trust as to warrant removal from office may be less
than criminal but must be attended by bad faith and of such
gravity and seriousness as the other grounds for impeachment.
Power to Remove
• Gonzalez vs. Office of the President, January
28, 2014.
o Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting disciplinary
authority in the President over the Deputy
Ombudsman violates the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman and is thus
unconstitutional. The same treatment should be
given to Special Prosecutor.
Power of Control
Section 17, Article VII
•The President shall have
control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.
The power of an officer
to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what
a subordinate officer
Control had done in the
performance of his
duties and to substitute
the judgment of the
former for that of the
latter.
It means overseeing or
the power or authority
of an officer to see
that subordinate
Supervision officer performs their
duties. If the latter fail
or neglect to fulfill
them, then the former
may take such action
or steps as prescribed
by law to make them
perform these duties.
POWER OF CONTROL
CONTROL SUPERVISION
An officer in control lays down the Supervision does not cover the
rules in the doing of an act. authority to lay down the rules.
Supervisor or superintendent
merely sees to it that the rules are
followed.
If rules are not followed, he may, If the rules are not observed, he
in his discretion, order the act may order the work done or
undone, redone by his subordinate redone but only to conform to the
or he may decide to do it himself. prescribed rules. He may not
prescribe his own manner for the
doing of the act. He has no
judgment on this matter except to
see to it that the rules are
followed. (Drilon v. Lim)
Illustrative Cases
Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil 328
Lacson-Magallanes Co., vs. Pano, 21

SCRA 895
Drilon vs. Lim, August 4, 1994

Doctrine of Qualified
Political Agency
 The acts of the secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive presumptively, the acts of the
Chief Executive‛ (Villena v. Sec. of Interior)
 Put simply, when a department secretary makes a
decision in the course of performing his or her
official duties, the decision, whether honorable or
disgraceful, is presumptively the decision of the
President, unless he quickly and clearly disowns it.
But: doctrine of qualified
political agency does not apply to:
 The acts of the cabinet members who are ex-
officio members of the Board of Directors of
GOCC. Such members are not acting are cabinet
secretaries BUT as responsible members of the
Board and not as the alter egos of the President
(Trade and Investment Development Corp.,
Philippines vs. Manalang-Demigillo, March 5,
2013).
‚Take care clause‛
• Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission, 637
SCRA 78 –
• The President's power to conduct investigations to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. It
flows from the faithful-execution clause of the
Constitution under Article VII, Section thereof. As the
Chief Executive, the president represents the government
as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the
officials and employees of his department. He has the
authority to directly assume the functions of the
executive department.
Military Power
Article VII,
IT INCLUDES:
Section 18
The power to The power to The power to

command the suspend the declare martial
Armed Forces of privilege of writ law
the Philippines of habeas corpus
Military Power
 What is the sequence of graduated military powers
of the President?
Section 18 grants the President, as Commander
in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. These
are:
the calling out power
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus
the power to declare martial law.
Limitation on Military Power
 He may call out the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion only.
 The grounds for the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the
proclamation of martial law are now limited
only to invasion or rebellion.
 The duration of such suspension or
proclamation shall not exceed sixty days,
following which it shall be automatically lifted.
 Within forty-eight hours after such suspension or
proclamation, the President shall personally
or in writing report his action to the
Congress. If not in session, Congress must
convene within 24 hours.
 The Congress may then, by majority votes of
all its members voting jointly, revoke his action.
The revocation may not set aside by the
President.
By the same vote and in the same manner,

the Congress may, upon initiative of the
President, extend his suspension or
proclamation for a period to be
determined by the Congress if the
invasion or rebellion shall continue and
the public safety requires extension.
 The action of the President and the Congress

shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court
which shall have the authority to determine the
sufficiency of the factual basis of such action.
This matter is no longer considered a political
question and may be raised in an appropriate
proceeding by any citizen. Moreover, the
Supreme Court must decide the challenge
within thirty days from the time it is filed.
Martial law does not automatically

suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or the operation of the
Constitution. The civil courts and the
legislative bodies shall remain open.
Military courts and agencies are not
conferred jurisdiction over civilians
where the civil courts are functioning.
 The suspension of the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus shall apply only to persons
facing charges of rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with
invasion.
 Any person arrested for such offenses must
be judicially charged therewith within three
days. Otherwise shall be released.
David vs. Arroyo, May 3, 2006
• The power to call out the AFP is discretionary sole
dependent on the wisdom of the president. But the
exercise of the power may be inquired into to
determine whether it is exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.
• Despite the declaration of national emergency, the
president cannot exercise emergency powers
under Section 17, Article XII.
• This must be related to Sec. 23 (2), Art. VII. “In times
of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may, by law, authorize the President.…..”
BAR QUESTION
• What do you mean by the

"Calling-out Power" of the
President under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution?
ANSWER
• Under Article VII, Sec. 18 of the 1987
Constitution, whenever it becomes
necessary, the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, may call out
the armed forces to aid him in
preventing or suppressing lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.
SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE OF
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
What is the writ of habeas corpus?

•The writ of habeas corpus is a writ directed to the
person detaining another, commanding him to
produce the body of the prisoner at a designated
time and place, with the day and cause of his
caption and detention, to do, to submit to, and
receive whatever the court or judge awarding the
writ shall consider in hi behalf.
Suspension of Privilege of Writ of
Habeas Corpus
What is
•It is the right to have an
the immediate
privilege determination of the
of writ of legality of the
deprivation of physical
habeas liberty.
corpus?
Habeas Corpus
What is the meaning of the suspension privilege

of writ of habeas corpus?
• Suspension of the privilege does not suspend the writ itself, but
only it’s privilege. This means that when the court receives an
application for the writ, and it finds the petition in proper form,
it will issue the writ as a matter of course, If the return to the
writ shows that the person in custody was apprehended and
detained in areas where the privilege of the writ has been
suspended or for crimes mentioned in the executive
proclamation, the court will suspend further proceedings in the
action.
Suspension of the Privilege of Writ
Habeas Corpus
General
•1. Time limit of 60 days
Limitations
•2. Review and possible
on the
revocation by
Power to
Congress
Suspend
•3. Review and possible
the
nullification by SC
Privilege.
Habeas Corpus
To Whom Applicable
•The suspension of the privilege of
the writ shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.
Habeas Corpus
GROUNDS
Invasion When public safety

Rebellion requires
Habeas Corpus
Role of Congress
Congress convenes
Congress may revoke
Congress may extend
Habeas Corpus
Role of Supreme Court
 The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
Martial Law
• Martial law in its strict sense refers to that
law which has application when civil
Definition authority calls upon the military arm to
aid it in its civil function. Military arm
of Martial does not supersede civil authority.
• Martial law in the Philippines is imposed
Law: by the Executive as specifically
authorized and within the limits set by
the Constitution
Martial Law
GROUNDS
Invasion When public safety

Rebellion requires
Martial Law
General Limitations on Martial Law

• 1. Time limit of 60 days
• 2. Review and possible revocation by
Congress
• 3. Review and possible nullification by SC
Martial Law
Proclamation of martial law does not:
•1. Suspend the operation of the Constitution
•2. Supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies
•3. Authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over where civil
courts are able to function
•Automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
Martial Law
Role of Congress
Congress convenes
Congress may revoke
Congress may extend
Martial Law
Role of Supreme Court
 The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
Bar Question
• The President issued a Proclamation No. 1018 placing
the Philippines under Martial Law on the ground that a
rebellion staged by lawless elements is endangering the
public safety. Pursuant to the Proclamation, suspected
rebels were arrested and detained and military tribunals
were set up to try them. Robert dela Cruz, a citizen,
filed with the Supreme Court a petition questioning the
validity of Proclamation No. 1018.
• Does Robert have standing to assail Proclamation
No. 1018?
Answer
• Yes, Robert has standing. Under Article
VIII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution,
the Supreme Court may review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law. As citizen
therefore, Robert may file the petition
questioning Proclamation No. 1018.
Bar Question
• In the same suit, the Solicitor General
contends that under the Constitution, the
President as Commander-in-Chief,
determines whether the exigency has arisen
requiring the exercise of his power to
declare Martial Law and that his
determination is conclusive upon the courts.
How should the Supreme Court rule?
Answer
• The Supreme Court should rule that his determination is
not conclusive upon the courts. The 1987 Constitution
allows a citizen, in an appropriate proceeding, to file a
petition questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of
said proclamation. Moreover, the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to
impose martial law involve the curtailment and suppression
of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and
thus necessitate safeguards by Congress and review by the
Supreme Court (IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284,
August 15, 2000).
Bar Question
• The Solicitor General argues that, in any
event, the determination of whether the
rebellion poses danger to public safety
involves a question of fact and the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts. What should be
the ruling of the Court?
Answer
• Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution
specifically grants the Supreme Court the power to
review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
of martial law. Thus, in the matter of such declaration,
two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual
invasion or rebellion; and (2) public safety must require it.
The Supreme Court cannot renege on its constitutional
duty to determine whether or not the said factual
conditions exist (IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284,
August 15, 2000).
Lagman vs. Medialdea, July 4, 2017
• What kind of proceeding should be initiated to

question the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the suspension or proclamation under Sec. 18,
Art. VII?
o The phrase ―in an appropriate proceeding‖ appearing
in the 3rd paragraph of Art. VII refers to any action
initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of
the Chief executive’s emergency power. It could be
denominated as complaint, a petition, or matter to be
resolved by the Court.
• Should the president be factually correct in his

basis for declaration of martial law?
o No. In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the declaration and/or suspension, the court
should look into the full complement or totality of the
factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither
should the Court expect absolute correctness of the
facts stated in the proclamation and in the written
report as the President could not be expected to verify
the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him
due to urgency of the situation.
• What factual situation should be considered by

the Court in determining whether there is
sufficient for the President’s the declaration
and/or suspension?
• The determination of the Court as to whether there
is sufficient basis for the declaration and sufficiency
must be based only on the facts or information
known and available to the President at the time he
made the declaration or suspension which facts and
information are found in the proclamation as well as
the written report submitted to Congress.
• What quantum of proof does the

President need to satisfy for the
declaration and/or suspension?
• What the President need to satisfy is only

the standard of probable cause for a valid
declaration of martial law and suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus.
• In a given emergency situation, is it required of the

President to follow the sequence of graduated
powers?
• No. the determination of what power to employ in a

given situation is solely dependent on the president to
decide. Thus, judicial review should not extend to
calibrating the president’s decision pertaining to which
extra-ordinary power to avail given a set of facts or
conditions.
Pardoning Power
(executive clemency)
Article Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may
VII, grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons,
Section and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction
19 by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant

amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the
Congress.
Pardoning Power
(Executive Clemency)
Forms of Executive Clemency
1. Reprieves
2. Commutations
3. Pardons
4. Remission of fines
5. Forfeitures
6. Amnesty
Limits on Executive Clemency
Constitutional Limitations
 1. It cannot be exercised in cases of impeachment
 2. Reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remission of fines and forfeitures can be given only
‚after conviction by final judgment;
 3. A grant of amnesty must be with the concurrence of
a ‚majority of all the Members of Congress‛
 4. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of
sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and
regulations shall be granted by the President without
the favorable recommendation of COMELEC.
Limits on Executive Clemency
Other Limitations
1. A pardon cannot be extended to a
person convicted of legislative contempt or
civil contempt.
2. Pardon cannot also be extended for the
purpose of absolving the pardonee of civil
liability, including judicial costs.
3. Pardon will not restore offices forfeited
Diplomatic Power
Sec. 21. No treaty or international

agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by
at least two-thirds of all the
member of the Senate.
Pimentel vs. Executive
Secretary, 462 SCRA 622
• The Senate does not have the power to ratify treaty.
That power belongs exclusively to the president.
• The power of the Senate is limited to giving or
withholding consent to the ratification.
• Thus, the President cannot be compelled to submit
to the Senate the treaty ratified by the president for
Senate’s concurrence.
• The president cannot be compelled by mandamus.
Judicial Department
Judicial Department
(Article VIII)
 Article VIII, Section 1
 The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
 Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Carpio-Morales vs. CA,
Nov. 15, 2015
• Section 14. Restrictions. — No writ of injunction
shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
under this Act, unless there is a prima facie
evidence that the subject matter of the
investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the
Office of the Ombudsman.
• No court shall hear any appeal or application for
remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure
question of law.
Nov. 15, 2015
• The second paragraph: ‚No court shall hear any appeal
or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court,
on pure question of law‛ was declared
unconstitutional for violating Section 30, Article
VI.
• “SECTION 30. No law shall be passed
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and concurrence.”
Nov. 15, 2015
• The first paragraph: ‚No writ of injunction shall be
issued by any court to delay an investigation
being conducted by the Ombudsman under
this Act was declared ineffective until the Court
adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure
through an administrative circular duly issued
therefor.
Nov. 15, 2015
• Section 5(5), Article VIII
• Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Independence of Judiciary
1. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body.
It cannot be abolished nor may its
membership or the manner of its meeting be
changed by mere legislation. (Art. 8 §4)
2. The members of the Supreme Court may
not be removed except by impeachment. (Art.
11 §2)
3. The SC may not be deprived of its
minimum original and appellate jurisdiction
as prescribed in Article VIII, Section 5. (Art. 8
§2)
 4. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may
not be increased by law without its advice or
concurrence. (Art. 6 §30)
 Fabian vs. Disierto
 Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals
 5. Appointees to the judiciary are now nominated by the
Judicial and Bar Council and no longer subject to
confirmation by Commission on Appointments. (Art. 8
§9)
 De Castro vs. JBC
 6. The Supreme Court now has administrative
supervision over all lower courts and their personnel.
(Art. 8 §6)
 Maceda vs. Ombudsman
 7. The Supreme Court has exclusive power to
discipline judges of lower courts. (Art 8 §11)
 8. The members of the Supreme Court and all
lower courts have security of tenure, which
cannot be undermined by a law reorganizing the
judiciary. (Art. 8 §11)
 9. They shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions. (Art. 8 §12)
 10. The salaries of judges may not be reduced
during their continuance in office. (Art. 8 §10)
 11. The judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy
(Art. 8§3)
 12. Only the Supreme Court may order the
temporary detail of judges (Art. 8 §5[3])
 13. The Supreme Court can appoint all officials
and employees of the judiciary. (Art. 8 §5[6])
Judicial Power
A. Judicial Power, where vested
•Judicial power shall be bested with the Supreme
Court and in such other courts as may be
established by law.
B. Definition of Judicial Power

•The duty of the court of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable
Judicial Power
What is •The power to determine

the whether or not there has been
broadened a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
concept of jurisdiction on the part of any
judicial branch or instrumentality of
the Government.
power?
Role of Congress
The Congress shall have the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts. (Art. VII, Sec. 2)
No law shall be passed increasing the appellate

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in
this Constitution without its advice and
concurrence (Art. VI, Sec. 30)
In order to decongest the cases pending
before the Supreme Court, the Congress
passed a law which provides that the
judgement of the Court of Appeals in
criminal cases imposing a penalty of
reclusion perpetua is final and executory and
that said decision may not anymore be
questioned by whatever procedural means.
IS THE LAW CONSTITUTIONAL?
Answer
The law is unconstitutional. While it may be true
that the Congress shall have the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts, it may not deprive the Supreme
Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5, Article VIII. Under Section 5, Article
VIII, the Supreme Court has the power to review,
revise, modify or affirm decisions of the lower
court in criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
Fabian vs. Desierto
• Facts: Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major
stockholder and President of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation which
was engaged in the construction business.
Private respondent Nestor Agustin was the
District Engineer of the First Metro Manila
Engineering District. PROMAT participated in
the bidding for government construction
projects, and private respondent, reportedly
taking advantage of his official position,
inveigled petitioner into an amorous
relationship.
Fabian vs. Desierto
• Their affair lasted for some time, in the
course of which, private respondent gifted
PROMAT with public works contracts and
interceded for it in problems concerning the
same in his office. When petitioner tried to
terminate their relationship, private
respondent refused and resisted her
attempts to do so to the extent of
employing acts of harassment, intimidation
and threats. Petitioner filed an administrative
complaint against private respondent.
Fabian vs. Desierto
• Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of
misconduct and meted out the penalty of
suspension without pay for 1 year. After private
respondent moved for reconsideration, the
Ombudsman discovered that the private
respondent‟s new counsel had been his
classmate and close associate, hence, he
inhibited himself. The case was transferred to
respondent Deputy Ombudsman who
exonerated private respondent from the
administrative charges. Petitioner appealed to
the SC by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
Fabian vs. Desierto
• Issue: Whether or not Section 27 of
RA 6770 which provides for
appeals in administrative
disciplinary cases from the Office
of the Ombudsman to the SC in
accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is valid
Fabian vs. Desierto
Held: The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the SC via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Under
the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through
a petition for review on certiorari but only from
judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated
in Sec. 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final
orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to
be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review,
under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43
which was precisely formulated and adopted to
provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for
quasi-judicial agencies.
Fabian vs. Desierto
Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly
authorize an appeal to the SC from
decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases. It consequently violates the
proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the
Constitution against a law which
increases the appellate jurisdiction of the
SC.
Limitations on the Role of Congress
1. Congress may not deprive the Supreme Court of its

jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5. (Art. 8 §2)
2. No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when

it undermines the security of tenure of its Members. (Art.
8 §2)
3. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may

not be increased by law except upon its advice and
concurrence. (Art. 6 §30)
The Supreme Court
 A. Composition
Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in
its discretion, in division of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.
The Supreme Court
• B. Qualification
Section 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the

Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the
Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must
have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court
or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges
of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge
thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a
member of the Philippine Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
Judicial and Bar Council
Ex-Officio Members Regular Members*
 1. SC Chief Justice  4. Representative of IBP

 2. Secretary of  5. Professor of Law
 6. Retired Member of
Justice Supreme Court
 3. Representative  7. Representative of
of Congress private sector
*Subject to confirmation of
Commission on
Appointments
 Function of JBC. JBC‟s principal function is to
recommend to the President appointees to the
Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions
and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
 Rationale for Creation of JBC. The Council was

principally designed to eliminate politics from the
appointment and judges and justices. Thus,
appointments to the Judiciary do not have to go
through a political Commission on Appointments.
Appointment
• Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court
and judges of lower courts shall be appointed
by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. Such appointments
need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the
President shall issue the appointments within
ninety days from the submission of the list.
• Why at least 3? The reason for requiring at
least three nominees for every vacancy is to
give the President enough leeway in the
exercise of his discretion when he makes his
appointment. If the nominee were limited to
only one, the appointment would in effect be
made by the Judicial and Bar Council, with
the President performing only the
mathematical act of formalizing the
commission.
How may Supreme Court
Justices be Removed?
By Impeachment. The Members of
the Supreme Court are removable
only by impeachment. They can be
said to have failed to satisfy the
requirement of “good behaviour”
only if they are guilty of the offenses
which are constitutional grounds of
impeachment.
Supreme Court Justices
 Grounds for Removal*
1. Culpable violation of the Constitution;
2. Treason;
3. Bribery;
4. Graft and Corruption;
5. Other High Crimes
6. Betrayal of Public Trust
*(Article XI, Section 2)
May a disbarment case be
filed against sitting
Supreme Court Justice?
Answer
• A Supreme Court Justice cannot be charged in
a criminal case or a disbarment proceeding,
because the ultimate effect of either is to
remove him from office, and thus circumvent
the provision on removal by impeachment thus
violating his security of tenure (In Re: First
Endorsement from Hon. Raul Gonzalez,
A.M. No. 88-4-5433)
Powers of Supreme Court
• Judicial power includes the duty of the

General courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which
Power are legally demandable
enforceable, and to determine whether
and
(Judicial or not there has been a grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess
Power) of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.
Judicial Powers
1) To decide all cases involving the
constitutionality of a treaty, international or
executive agreement, or law, including those
involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances,
and other regulations.
Article VIII, Section 4(5)
Judicial Powers
• 2) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases
affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus.
• Article VIII, Section 5(1)
Judicial Powers
 (3) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
Judicial Powers
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax,
impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed
in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower
court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of
law is involved.
What are the cases that may be heard by the
Supreme Court en banc?
 All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
international or executive agreement, or law.
 All other cases which under the Rules of Court are
required to be heard en banc.
 All cases involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations.
 Cases where the majority votes cannot be obtained in
division.
 Cases where the SC modifies doctrine or principle of law.
Are the decisions of a division appealable
to SC en banc?
• NO. Decision or resolutions of a division of

a court is not appealable to en banc.
Decision or resolution promulgated by a
division is actually a decision or resolution
of the Supreme Court. SC en banc is not
an appellate court with respect to the
decisions or resolutions of a division. Each
division is not considered as inferior to SC
en banc.
Rule Making Power
 Article VIII, Section 5(5)
 Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-
privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules
of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.
Rule Making Power
 THUS: SC has the power to promulgate rules
concerning:
 1.The protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights;
 2. Pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts;
 3. The admission to the practice of law,
 4. The Integrated Bar;
 5. Legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Rule Making Power
 HOWEVER: SC power to promulgate rules has
limitations:
 1. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases.
 2. They shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade.
 3. They shall not diminish, increase, modify
substantive rights.
Rule Making Power
 One of the limitations on SC rule making power
is that it must not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights.
 Substantive law vs. Procedural law
 Substantive law creates, defines and regulates
rights while Procedural law prescribes the
method of enforcing rights or obtains redress
for their invasion
Estipona vs. Lobrigo, August 15, 2017
• This case involves the constitutionality of

Section 23 of RA 9165 which provides:
• SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. -Any
person charged under any provision of
this Act regardless of the imposable
penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the
provision on plea-bargaining.
Estipona vs. Lobrigo, August 15, 2017
• The SC declared unconstitutional for violation of the

rule making power of the SC under Sec. 5(5) of Art.
VIII.
• Plea bargaining is a matter of procedure. the rules on
Plea bargaining neither creates a right nor take away a
vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to
implement an existing right by regulating the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
In Re Cunanan
 What is involved in this case is the Constitutionality
of R.A. 972 (Bar Flunkers Act of 1953). This law
provided that those bar examiners who obtained a
certain grade from 1946 to 1955 should be allowed
admission to the bar.
 It should be noted that at that time, the 1935
Constitution gives the Congress the power to
repeal, alter or supplement the rules promulgated
by the SC.
In Re Cunanan
 In determining whether the law is valid the SC
distinguished the authority to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and the
actual admission to practice through the application of
these rules.
 According to the Court, the first is a legislative or quasi-
legislative function and in it the legislature had been
given a revisory role subordinate to the role of the
Court. The second is a judicial function and the
legislature exercised no revisory role.
In re: Atty. Marcial Edillon
• In this case, Atty. Edillon the requirement

of membership in the Integrated Bar as a
pre-condition for the practice of law.
• Specifically, Atty. Edillon questioned the
payment of dues as condition for
continued membership in the Integrated
Bar.
 To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate.
 Integration does not make a lawyer a member of
any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the
Bar examinations. All that integration actually does
is to provide an official national organization for
the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is a ready a member.
 Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate
with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse
to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program —
the lawyers.
 We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court,
under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of
the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent
acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged
class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to
which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds
for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
In re: Petition to Disqualify
Atty. De Vera
 This is a petition to disqualify Atty. De Vera
to be elected a governor of IBP Eastern
Mindanao.
 Atty. De Vera contended that the Court has

no jurisdiction over the controversy as it
involved internal matter which is primarily
governed by IBP By-Laws.
In re: Petition to Disqualify
Atty. De Vera
 The contention of Atty. De Vera is untenable. Section
5(5) confers on the Court the power to promulgate rules
affecting the IBP. Implicit in this constitutional grant is
the power to supervise all activities of the IBP including
the election of its officers. Even the IBP By-Laws
recognizes this power of the Supreme Court. In fact
Section 44 thereof gives the Court the power to remove
members of Board of Governors.
Power of Judicial Review
• It is the power of the Supreme Court
to declare a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential
decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance or regulation
unconstitutional.
Power of Judicial Review
• ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY
• IT MUST BE RAISED BY A PROPER
PARTY
• I MUST BE RAISED AT THE EARLIEST
PROPER OPPORTUNITY
• IT MUST BE NECESSARY TO THE
DETERMINATION OF THE CASE
Actual Case or Controversy
 Actual case or controversy involves conflicts of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolutions.
 There is no actual case or controversy if the
petitioner’s merely ask for opinion or the case is
already considered moot.
 The controversy must be definite and concrete,
touching the legal relations of the parties having
adverse legal interest.
Actual Case or Controversy
CORONA vs. Senate
• The petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the proceedings
in the Senate. It was dismissed for being moot.
PACU vs. Secretary of Education

• Petitioner questioned the regulation of the respondent requiring
private colleges and universities to operate to first obtain permit
before they can operate.
PHILCONSA vs. Villareal

• It was a petition to compel the Speaker to produce the book
accounts of that body in which were recorded the amounts
appropriated by legislators for their allowances.
Already moot, but court
may still decide:
• There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
• The exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved;
• When the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public;
• The case is capable of repetition yet evading review;
(David vs. Arroyo)
Proper Party (standing)
 A proper party is one who has sustained or is
in immediate danger of sustaining an injury
as a result of the act complained of.
 Unless and until such actual or potential
injury is established, the complaint cannot
have the legal personality to raise
constitutional question.
 Is substantial or potential injury rule
absolute?
 Jurisprudence allow the ―liberal approach‖ to
standing. When the subject in issue is of
transcendental interest to the public, the Court
entertain the suit even if those suing have no
personal or direct interest such that they are
stand to suffer harm.
 What are the exceptions to the
general rule on standing?
 Overbreadth doctrine
 Taxpayer suits
 Third party standing
 Doctrine of transcendental
importance.
Overbreadth as an Exception to
the General Rule on Standing
• The overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes
in free speech cases, also known under the
American Law as First Amendment cases.
• Simply put, the validity of the law may be
facially challenged if it tends to reach and make
punishable the constitutionally protected
speech.
Overbreadth as an Exception to the
General Rule on Standing
 Why is this an exception to the general rule on
standing?
 The factor that motivates courts to depart from
the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with
the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad
statute on third parties not courageous enough
to bring suit. The Court assumes that an
overbroad law‟s "very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression."
An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that
deterrent effect on the speech of those third
parties.
Overbreadth as an Exception to the
 In other words, anybody, not necessarily the

one actually affected or would tend to be
affected by the statute, may challenge the
validity of the law on its face.
 Thus, the general rule on standing does not
apply.
Third Party Standing as an Exception to the
Third party standing is the right of the litigant

to bring suit in behalf of third party.
Third party standing to be applicable the

following requisites must be present:
• Injury-in-fact
• Close relation to third party
• Hindrance to third party’s ability to protect his or his
interest
White Light Corporation vs.
City of Manila
 Ordinance No. 7774: ―An Ordinance

Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-
Time Admission Rates, and Wash Up Rate
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging
Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
Establishment in the City of Manila
City of Manila
 The Petitioners in this case are owners of the
motels whose business will be greatly affected
by implementation of the ordinance. None of
the patrons who avail of short-time services or
wash up schemes questioned the validity of
the ordinance.
 Petitioners assail the validity of the Ordinance
on grounds of due process: 1) as to them,
deprivation of property; 2) as to their patrons,
restriction of their liberty.
City of Manila
 Can petitioners invoke as ground for the

invalidity of the Ordinance that which is
properly invocable by their patrons who
were not impleaded or part of the suit?
City of Manila
 "We have recognized the right of litigants
to bring actions on behalf of third parties,
provided three important criteria are
satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an
„injury-in-fact,‟ thus giving him or her a
"sufficiently concrete interest" in the
outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant
must have a close relation to the third
party; and there must exist some
hindrance to the third party's ability to
protect his or her own interests.”
City of Manila
 Herein, it is clear that the business
interests of the petitioners are
likewise injured by the Ordinance.
They rely on the patronage of their
customers for their continued
viability which appears to be
threatened by the enforcement of
the Ordinance.
Tax Payer Auit
Taxpayer suit may be allowed if the case involves
expenditure of public funds, provided it can be shown:
• That he has sufficient interest in preventing

the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation
• That he will sustain a direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the questioned
statute.
Gonzales vs. Narvasa
August 14, 2000
 The Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created
by President Estrada on November 26, 1998
by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O.
No. 43) in order ―to study and recommend
proposed amendments and/or revisions to
the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of
implementing the same.‖
August 14, 2000
Petitioner disputes the constitutionality
of the PCCR on Two Grounds.
•First, he contends that it is a public office which
only the legislature can create by way of a law.
•Secondly, petitioner asserts that by creating such a
body the President is intervening in a process from
which he is totally excluded by the Constitution –
the amendment of the fundamental charter.
August 14, 2000
A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing
to raise a constitutional issue when it is
established that public funds have been
disbursed in alleged contravention of the
law or the Constitution. Thus payer’s action
is properly brought only when there is an
exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power.
August 14, 2000
In this case, there is no exercise by Congress
of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR
was created by the President by virtue of
E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70.
Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount
of P3 million is ‚appropriated‛ for its
operational expenses ‚to be sourced from
the funds of the Office of the President.‛
August 14, 2000
The appropriations for the PCCR were
authorized by the President, not by Congress.
In fact, there was no an appropriation at all.
The funds used for the PCCR were taken from
funds intended for the Office of the President,
in the exercise of the Chief Executive’s power
to transfer funds pursuant to section 25 (5) of
article VI of the Constitution.
August 14, 2000
In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined ‘as

nothing more than the legislative authorization
prescribed by the Constitution that money may be
paid out of the Treasury’, while appropriation made
by law refers to ‘the act of the legislature setting
apart or assigning to a particular use a certain
sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues
from the State to its creditors.
Political Question
 ―Political questions‖ doctrine constitutes
another limitation on the power of judicial
review. This is one class of cases which the
Court refuses to touch.
 But what is ―political questions‖? When can

we say that an issue in a case is a political
question?
Political Question
 “Those questions which under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity or in
regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the
government.”
 Tanada vs. Cuenco
Political Question
 Baker vs. Carr: Cases are of political
complexion if:
 "Textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department.‖
In other words, if it is clear from the language
of the constitution that the resolution of the
issue is committed to a coordinate political
department.
POLITICAL QUESTION
 Baker vs. Carr: Cases are of political complexion if:
 A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it.
 Or it is impossible for the court to decide without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion.
Political Question
 Baker vs. Carr: Cases are of political
complexion if:
 The impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of
government.
 An unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made.
 The potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
Political Question
 However, because of the expanded definition of
judicial power under the 1987 Constitution, the
criteria of political question in Baker vs. Carr are
not applicable.
 But, it should not be misconstrued that the 1987
Constitution has not nullified the long standing
doctrine on political question. They are still
applicable but not as frequently applied during the
aegis of the 1973 Constitution when the Philippine
was under the dictatorship.
Cases where political question
was applied
 Arroyo vs. De Venecia, August 14, 1997
 Where the issue was whether the Court
could intervene in the case where the House
was said to have disregarded its own rule.
The Court said it could not because the
matter of formulating rules and
implementing those rules belongs to
Congress.
Cases where political questions
were applied
 Santiago vs. Guingona, November
18, 1998
 The Court refused to intervene in the
dispute as to who would occupy to the
position not created by the
Constitution but by the Rules of the
Senate.
Cases where political questions
doctrine was applied
 International Catholic Migration vs.
Hon. Calleja, September 28, 1990
 The conferment by the executive of
diplomatic immunity is essentially a
political question which the courts
cannot look into.
Effect of
Unconstitutionality
 The Supreme Court has rejected the view that
an unconstitutional act confers no rights,
imposes no duties, and affords no protection
whatsoever. Instead, the Court has adopted the
view that before an act is declared
unconstitutional, it is an ―operative fact‖ which
can be a source of rights and duties.
 This is the doctrine of operative fact.
Power of Supervision
 Article VIII, Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have
administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.
 Article VIII, Section 11. The Supreme Court en banc
shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority
of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon
 May the Ombudsman investigate irregularities

in the performance of a judge independently
of any administrative action taken by the
Supreme Court?
Answer
 NO
 Maceda vs Vasquez
 The power of administrative supervision of the
Supreme Court includes the power to discipline
judges of the lower courts or judiciary personnel.
The exclusivity of this power is zealously guarded by
the SC. Thus, as held in Maceda vs. Vasquez, the
Ombudsman may not investigate a judge
independently of any administrative action of the
Supreme Court.
 Judge Caoiles vs. Ombudsman
 Likewise the Ombudsman cannot determine for
itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint
against a judge, or court employee, involves an
administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty
bound to have all cases against judges and court
personnel filed before it, referred to Supreme
Court for determination as to whether an
administrative aspect is involved therein.
Constitutional
Commission
Fiscal Autonomy
(Section 5, Article IX-A)
 CSC vs. DBM, July 22, 2005
 The ‚no report no release‛ policy of the
COA may not be validly enforced
against offices vested with fiscal
autonomy for whom, according to the
Constitution, appropriation must be
automatically released.
Rotational Scheme of
Appointments
 The first appointees shall serve for terms of seven,
five, and three years, respectively.
 In order to preserve the periodic succession
mandated by the Constitution, the rotational plan
requires two conditions:
 The term of the first commissioners should start
on a common date
 Any vacancy before expiration should be filled
only for the unexpired balance (Gaminde vs.
COA, December 13, 2000)
Funa vs. Chairman of COA,
April 24, 2012
May an incumbent
commissioner be
appointed as
Chairman?
Section 1(2), Article IX-D
• The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven
years, one Commissioner for five years, and the
other Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Funa vs. Chairman of COA
 On February 15, 2001, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-
Arroyo) appointed Guillermo N. Carague
(Carague) as Chairman of the Commission on
Audit (COA) for a term of seven (7) years,
pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. Carague’s
term of office started on February 2, 2001 to end
on February 2, 2008.
• Meanwhile, on February 7, 2004, President
Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Reynaldo A.
Villar (Villar) as the third member of the
COA for a term of seven (7) years starting
February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011.
• Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008
and during the fourth year of Villar as COA
Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting
Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14,
2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was
nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA up to
Feb. 2, 2011. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the
Commission on Appointments confirmed his
appointment.
• He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly
indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration
of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner
or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in this recourse,
Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold
on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as
COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of seven (7)
years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that
his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2,
2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he
was appointed to that position.
Carague’s term Villar’s term as

as Chairman: Commissioner:
February 2, 2001
February 2, 2004
to end on
until February 2,
February 2, 2008.
2011
(7 years)
• 1. The appointment of members of any of the three
constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the
uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners,
shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an
appointment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional.
• The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the
full term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of
the term as this will result in the distortion of the
rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.
• 2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from
certain causes (death, resignation, disability
or impeachment) shall only be for the
unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor, but such appointments cannot
be less than the unexpired portion as this will
likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid
down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
• 3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA,
COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for
a full term of seven years and who served the
entire period, are barred from reappointment
to any position in the Commission.
Corollarily, the first appointees in the
Commission under the Constitution are also
covered by the prohibition against
reappointment.
• 4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the
Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an
appointment to the position of Chairman for the
unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman.
Such appointment is not covered by the ban on
reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the
length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of
the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and
provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman
resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by
impeachment.
• 4. The Court clarifies that ‚reappointment‛ found in
Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and
the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or
Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an
appointment involving a movement to a different
position or office (Commissioner to Chairman)
would constitute a new appointment and, hence,
not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred
under the Constitution.
Powers of the Comelec
(Section 2, Article IX-C)
• 3. ‚Decide, except those involving the
right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of
the number of and location of the
polling places appointment of election
officials and inspections and
registration of voters.
Jurisdiction over Election Contest
• Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all

contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials
• And appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts
of limited jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over Election Contests
Article IX-C, Section 3

• ‚The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in
order to expedite disposition of election cases, including
pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases
shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided
by the Commission en banc. ‛
 Who has jurisdiction over the

qualifications of party-list? Comelec
or HRET?
 The Comelec has jurisdiction. However,
with respect to the qualification of the
nominees of party list, it is the HRET
which has jurisdiction.
 Layug vs. Comelec, (February 28, 2012)
Does Comelec had certiorari,

prohibition and mandamus
power?
Yes, only in election cases.
Relampagos vs. Cumba, (1995)
 What is the jurisdiction of Comelec division

vis-à-vis Comelec en banc?
 The Court held that it is the commission sitting
in division, and not the Commission en banc,
which has jurisdiction over petitions to cancel
certificate of candidacy. The Commission sitting
en banc does not have the power to hear and
decide election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies, in first instance, as
the Comelec in division has such authority
 Pacificador vs. Comelec, March 13, 2009
Sarmiento vs. Comelec, 212

SCRA 307
• The SC set aside the resolutions of the Comelec
because the Comelec en banc took original cognizance
of the cases without referring them first to the
appropriate division.
 Abad vs. Comelec, December 10,

1999
• Even cases appealed from the Regional Trial Court or
Municipal Trial Court have to be heard and decided first
in the Division before they may be heard en banc upon
the filing of the motion for reconsideration of the
Division decision.
When En Banc May Entertain
 Municipal Board of Canvassers vs.

Comelec, October 23, 2003
• Thus, the rule that all election cases, including pre-
proclamation cases, should first be heard and decided by
the Comelec in division applies only when the comelec
exercises it adjudicatory or quasi-judicial function, not
when it exercises purely administrative functions
(Canicosa vs. Comelec, December 5, 1997)
When En Banc May Entertain
• Petition for correction of manifest errors alleges an
erroneous copying of figures from election return to the
Statement of Votes by precinct. Such error in tabulation
of results, which merely requires clerical correction
without opening the ballot boxes or examining the
ballots, demands only the exercise of the administrative
power of the Comelec. (Jaramilla vs. Comelec, October
23, 2003)
SC’s Jurisdiction over
Comelec’ Decision
• Only decisions of the Comelec en banc may be brought
to SC under Rule 65.
• However, the decision referred to above is that one
issued in the Comelec’s exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial function. Where the decision being
questioned is one that is issued the Comelec’s exercise of
its administrative function, the same may be brought to
an appropriate Court. (Filipinas Engineering &
Machine Shop vs. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25)
Procedural Flow of Election Contest
Elective
Regional, Supreme
Provincial, Comelec Court thru
Comelec
City official: en banc: Certiorari
Qualification, Division
thru MR under RC,
Election,
64, 64
Return
Procedural flow of Election Contest
Supreme
Comelec
Elective Comelec Court thru
Regional Division
Municipal en bank Certiorari
Trial Court thru
Officials thru MR under RC
Appeal
64, 65
Procedural flow of Election Contest
Supreme
Comelec
Elective Comelec Court thru
First Level Division
Barangay en bank Certiorari
Court thru
Officials thru MR under RC
Appeal
64, 65
Does the Comelec have jurisdiction
over exclusion or inclusion of voters?
 No. Under Section (3), Article IX-C,

the Comelec can decide all question
relating to election except the right
to vote?
Jurisdiction of Comelec vis-à-vis the
jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunals
 When does the jurisdiction of the Comelec end and
when does the jurisdiction of electoral tribunal
begin?
 The jurisdiction of the Electoral tribunal begins
once the winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office, for it is only
after the occurrence of these events that a candidate
can be considered of as either a member of the
House or Senator.
 Limchaichong vs. Comelec (April 1, 2009); Reyes
vs. Comelec, June 25, 2013
Article X
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Section 1
• The territorial and political subdivisions of

the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
Can Congress pass a law creating an
Autonomous Region in Southern
Tagalog?
• No. Under Section 1, Article X,

autonomous regions can only be
established in Muslim Mindanao
and Cordelleras.
Section 5
• The territorial and political

subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy.
National Government vs. Local
Government
• Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties (1994)
• An Ordinance prohibiting the issuance of
business permit to, and cancelling business
permit of any establishment allowing its
premises to be used as a casino, and the
ordinance prohibiting the issuance of casino
were declared invalid for being contrary to
P.D. 1869 (Charter of PAGCOR) which has
the character or force of a statute.
Government
• LLDA vs. CA (1995)
• The LLDA and not the LGU which has the jurisdiction
and authority to issue permits for the enjoyment of
fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay. While the LGC
grants power to municipalities to issue permit for the
enjoyment of fishery privileges on municipal waters, it
does not repeal the LLDA law. Special law prevails over
general law.
Government
• Batangas CATV vs. CA (2004)
• LGU cannot regulate the subscriber rates charged

by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction.
It is the NTC which has regulatory powers over the
CATV industry.
Government
• Dadole vs. COA (2003)
• The COA cannot interfere with the

authority of the LGU by reducing the
allowances they give to judges and
prosecutors. The power to grant allowances
to judges and prosecutors is allowed by the
LGC.
Requisites of a Valid Ordinance
• It must not be contrary to the Constitution
or law
• It must not be unfair or oppressive
• It must not be partial or discriminatory
• It must not prohibit but regulate trade
• It must not be unreasonable
Section 4
• The President of the Philippines shall
exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to
component cities and municipalities, and
cities and municipalities with respect to
component barangays, shall ensure that the
acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.
Power of Control
CONTROL SUPERVISION
An officer in control lays Supervision does not cover the

down the rules in the doing authority to lay down the rules.
Supervisor or superintendent
of an act. merely sees to it that the rules are
followed.
If rules are not followed, If the rules are not observed, he
he may, in his discretion, may order the work done or
redone but only to conform to the
order the act undone, prescribed rules. He may not
redone by his subordinate prescribe his own manner for the
or he may decide to do it doing of the act. He has no
himself. judgment on this matter except to
see to it that the rules are
followed.
When Section 187 of the LGC authorizes
the SDOJ to pass judgment on the
constitutionality or legality of a tax
ordinance, does he not exercise the power
of control
No. He does not thereby dictate what the law

should be but merely ensures that the ordinance
is in accordance with law. (Drilon vs. Lim, [1994])
Does the President have the
power to suspend or remove
governor?
• Yes. The power of general supervision

of the President includes the power to
investigate and remove. (Ganzon vs.
CA, August 5, 1991)
May the Secretary of LC annul the
election of officers of federation of
barangay?
• No. Such annulment would amount

to control and therefore in excess of
executive and supervisory powers
(Taule vs. Secretary, [1991])
Section 5
• Each local government unit shall have the power
to create its own sources of revenues and to
levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local governments.
May the power of local governments to
raise revenues be limited by administrative
order?
• No. Under Section 5, Article X, only

guidelines and limitations that may be
established by Congress can define and
limit such power of local governments?
(John Hay vs. Lim, 2003)
Section 6
• Local government units shall have
a just share, as determined by law,
in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them.
May Congress impose conditions for the
release of IRA?
• No. It is proscribed by Section 6, Article X
which provides that Local government units
shall have a just share, as determined by law,
in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them. (Batangas
vs. Executive Secretary, [2004])
Section 8
• The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
When will the 3 term limit of local
elective officials apply?
Two requisites:
Official must have

He must have served
been elected to the
three full terms
same position 3 times
Rules on Terms Limits
• When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective
position and the official merely assumed the position
pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC,
then his service for the unexpired portion of the
term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one
full term as contemplated under the subject
constitutional and statutory provision that service
cannot be counted in the application of any term
limit (Borja, Jr. v. Comelec, [1998]).
• If the official runs again for the same
position he held prior to his assumption of
the higher office, then his succession to said
position is by operation of law and is
considered an involuntary severance or
interruption (Montebon v. Comelec,
[2008])
• An elective official, who has served for three
consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective
position for what could be his fourth term, but later
won in a recall election, had an interruption in the
continuity of the official’s service. For, he had
become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd
term up to the recall election, a private citizen
(Adormeo v. Comelec, [2002]); Socrates v.
Comelec, [2002]).
• The abolition of an elective local office due
to the conversion of a municipality to a city
does not, by itself, work to interrupt the
incumbent official’s continuity of service
(Latasa v. Comelec, [2003]).
• Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting
event as the elective officer’s continued stay and
entitlement to the office remain unaffected during
the period of suspension, although he is barred
from exercising the functions of his office during
this period (Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC [2009])
• When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an
elective position and assumes office, his term is
interrupted when he loses in an election protest and
is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from
serving what would otherwise be the unexpired
portion of his term of office had the protest been
dismissed (Lonzanida v. Comelec, [1999])
• The break or interruption need not be for a full
term of three years or for the major part of the 3-
year term; an interruption for any length of time,
provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to
break the continuity of service (Socrates v.
Comelec; Lonzanida v. Commission on
Elections).
• When an official is defeated in an election protest and said
decision becomes final after said official had served the full
term for said office, then his loss in the election contest
does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to
serve the term from start to finish. His full service, despite
the defeat, should be counted in the application of term
limits because the nullification of his proclamation came
after the expiration of the term (Ong v. Alegre, [2006];
Rivera III v. Comelec, [2007]
• A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent
elective local official merely served the balance of the latter’s
term of office; it is not a full three-year term. It also goes
without saying that an incumbent elective local official against
whom a recall election is initiated and who nevertheless wins
in a recall election must be viewed as being a continuing term
of office and not as a break in reckoning three consecutive
terms. - A recall election term then, not being a full three-year
term, is not to be counted or used as a basis for
disqualification whether it is held prior or subsequent to the
nine-year full three-term limit. [Mendoza v. COMELEC,
2013]
Naval vs. Comelec, July 8, 2014
• Naval was elected provincial board member for 2 consecutive
terms. He was elected as provincial board member of the second
district of the province of Camarines Sur. RA 9716 was passed
apportioning the legislative districts of the province of
Camarines Sur: from 4 legislative districts to 5 legislative district.
Consequently, there was a change in the composition of each
legislative districts and one legislative district was created. The
former second district of the province was renamed as the Third
District. This is the district that elected Naval into office.
• Naval is seeking to run for the fourth time, contending that he
was formerly elected in the second district. Thus, the district that
he is intending to run is entirely different district. Thus, the 3
term limit rules does not apply to him.
Naval vs. Comelec, July 8, 2014
• This numerical fact renders the new Third District as essentially,
although not literally, the same as the old Second District. Hence,
while Naval is correct in his argument that Sanggunian members
are elected by district, it does not alter the fact that the district
which elected him for the third and fourth time is the same one
which brought him to office in 2004 and 2007.
• Naval's ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-
term limit rule, does not undermine the right to equal
representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or
without him, the renamed Third District, which he labels as a
new set of constituents, would still be represented, albeit by
another eligible person.
Section 10
• No province, city, municipality, or barangay
may be created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered, except
in accordance with the criteria established
in the local government code and subject
to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.
May ARMM Assembly create
a province?
• No. Only Congress can create a province.
Because the creation of a province carries
with the creation of a legislative district.
And the power to apportion legislative
district belong to Congress alone. (Sema vs.
Comelec, [2008])
Who should participate in the
plebiscite?
• The voters of the unit or units

directly affected (Tan vs.
Comelec, [1986])
Umali vs. Comelec,
April 22, 2014
• Cabanatuan City, by virtue of the EO issued
by the President, was converted to a highly
urbanized city. The issue is: who should
participate in the plebiscite, the only the
registered voters of Cabanatuan City or the
whole registered voters of the province of
Nueva Ecija?
Umali vs. Comelec,
April 22, 2014
• In interpreting the phrase: ―subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected” under Section 10, Art. X,
the SC ruled that the province of Nueva
Ecija will be directly affected by the
conversion of Cabanatuan City to highly
urbanized city.
Umali vs. Comelec,
April 22, 2014
• The province of Nueva Ecija will be impacted
economically and politically.
• Economically because Cabanatuan City will be
segregated from the province of Nueva Ecija; thus,
the territory of the Nueva Ecija will be substantially
reduced. Consequently, the IRA that is allotted to
Nueva Ecija will also be reduced. The province will
also lose income from the conversion as the taxes
of the highly urbanized city will acrrue exclusively
to the HUC.
Umali vs. Comelec,
April 22, 2014
• Politically, province of Nueva Ecija will also be
impacted.
• Duties, privileges and obligations appertaining to
HUCs will attach to Cabanatuan City if it is
converted into an HUC. This includes the right to
be outside the general supervision of the province
and be under the direct supervision of the
President.
Umali vs. Comelec,
April 22, 2014
• An HUC is not subject to provincial oversight because
the complex and varied problems in an HUC due to a
bigger population and greater economic activity require
greater autonomy. The provincial government stands to
lose the power to ensure that the local government
officials of Cabanatuan City act within the scope of its
prescribed powers and functions, to review executive
orders issued by the city mayor, and to approve
resolutions and ordinances enacted by the city council.
Umali vs. Comelec,
April 22, 2014
• The province will also be divested of jurisdiction
over disciplinary cases concerning the elected city
officials of the new HUC, and the appeal process
for administrative case decisions against barangay
officials of the city will also be modified
accordingly. Likewise, the registered voters of the
city will no longer be entitled to vote for and be
voted upon as provincial officials.
What are the criteria?
• In accordance with the LGC. If not,

then the law creating LGU is
unconstitutional (League of Cities
vs. Comelec. [2011])

POLITICAL LAW - STRATEGIC LECTURE IN POLITICAL LAW (Prof. Gito) PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

POLITICAL LAW - STRATEGIC LECTURE IN POLITICAL LAW (Prof. Gito) PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

STRATEGIC

• Amendment broadly refers to a change that adds,

• Section 1, Article XVII provides that amendment

• While Section 2 provides that amendment may

• No. The definition of the Philippine territory

Archipelagic state means a

Archipelagic doctrine prescribes a principle

• NO. archipelagic doctrine is not yet

• Archipelagic water are those waters inside the archipelagic

• It is a sea, the breadth of which

• It is a sea, the breadth of which

• The coastal state has

• The coastal state has the sovereign rights

•The coastal state has

“The State may not be sued without its

Article XVI, Section 3

• Immunity is enjoyed by other States

• State diplomatic agents

But when the State enters

If unincorporated, inquire into

• However, the funds of LGU may not be

Santiago vs. Guingona, G.R. No. 134577, 18 November

Arroyo vs. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14,

Abakada Guru Party-list vs. Purisima, G.R. No.

It is the authority to make laws,

• No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-

• Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,

• All candidates for public office whether

• (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486:

• SC declared Section 36(g) and

• Shall be elected from • Shall be elected through a

Cases • Bagabuyo vs. Comelec, G.R.

for • Aquino III vs. Comelec,

For every four (4) district representatives, there

Atong Paglaum vs. Comelec,

• Political parties can participate in

• It can participate in party-list election, only

Atong Paglaum vs. Comelec,

Privilege from Arrest

Privilege from Speech

The sole judge of all contests

o Canvassing of presidential elections

Committee Committee Submission

 Appropriations bills – the primary purpose

How • When the president signs it.

become • When the president does not act

As a general rule, if the President disapproves a

The President shall have the power to

• The power to disapprove any item or items in an

• A law creating an office and providing funds

 It is passed annually  It is designed for a

The sum authorized must

o The Philippine Government authorized a

Section 29(1) - No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in

Section 25(5) - No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of

• The source of funds are the supposed ‚savings‛

• ‚Unreleased appropriations and

• The pooling of funds from ‚unreleased

• The transfer of funds from DAP to

• Cross-border augmentations from

There is a law authorizing the transfer funds within

The funds to be transferred are savings generated from

The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the