STRATEGIC

LECTURE IN
POLITICAL LAW
JUDGE GENER M. GITO, LL.M., D.C.L.
AMENDMENT AND
REVISION
Who may propose changes to the
Constitution?
Congress, upon a vote of three-fourth
of its members (Sec. 1(1), Art. XVII).
A constitutional convention (Sec. 1(2),
Art. XVII)
People through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters therein (Sec.
2, Art. XVII).
 What are the two ways by which
the Constitution may be changed?

Amendment Revision
 Revision vs. Amendment
• Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic
principle in the constitution. There is also revision if
the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution.

• Amendment broadly refers to a change that adds,

reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle
involved. Revision generally affects several provisions
of the constitution, while amendment generally affects
only the specific provision being amended (Lambino
vs. COMELEC, October 25, 2006).
 Tests to Determine the
Kind of Change
Quantitative test
•It inquires into the number of provision
altered, deleted or changed.

Qualitative test
•It inquires into the qualitative effect of
the proposed changed.
May people’s initiative be used to
revised the Constitution?
• No. People’s initiative cannot be sued to revise
the Constitution. The rationale for the answer
lies in the constitutional text.

• Section 1, Article XVII provides that amendment

or revision may be proposed by Congress and
Constitutional Convention.

• While Section 2 provides that amendment may

likewise be proposed by the people.
NATIONAL
TERRITORY
What is archipelagic doctrine?

Archipelagic doctrine prescribes a principle

that archipelago should be considered one
integrated unit instead of being divided into
several islands. This can be effected by
connecting the outermost point of the
outermost island of the archipelago with a
straight baseline and all the waters inside the
baseline shall be considered internal waters.
Is archipelagic doctrine reflected in the
definition of territory under Article I?
• Yes. Article I reflects the archipelagic
doctrine. The last sentence of Article I
provided that “[T]he waters around,
between, and connecting the islands
of the archipelago, regardless of their
breadth and dimensions, form part of
the internal waters of the
Philippines.”
Is archipelagic doctrine binding under
international law?

• NO. archipelagic doctrine is not yet

accepted under international law. The
United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) does not
treat the waters inside the baseline as
internal waters. UNCLOS III treats
them as “archipelagic waters.”
What is the difference between internal water
and archipelagic water?
• When a water is considered internal, it subject to the plenary
jurisdiction of the state over which it has sovereignty and
jurisdiction. Such state can disallow the passage of foreign
vessels. Such vessels may only be allowed passage upon the
consent of the controlling state.

• Archipelagic water are those waters inside the archipelagic

baselines drawn joining the outermost points of the
outermost island of the archipelago. Under UNCLOS III, the
archipelagic state has sovereignty over archipelagic water. The
sovereignty extends to air space, as well as to its sea bed and
subsoil and resources contained therein. However, unlike
internal water, archipelagic water is subject to the right of
innocent passage, which right is provided by Article 52 of the
UNCLOS III.
 Magallona vs. Ermita,
August 16, 2011
• (a) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime
territory, and logically, the reach of the
Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation
Petitioners of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying
questioned the the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary
treaties, and
constitutionality • (b) RA 9522’s adaptation of UNCLOS “regime of
of RA 9522 on islands” to determine maritime zones of
Kalayaan Group of Island and Scarborough
two grounds: shoal is inconsistent with its claim of
sovereignty over these areas thus violating
Article I of the Constitution.
Magallona vs. Ermita
 First Issue
• Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for
UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the
extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves.
• In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine
areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights,
namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters
(Article 2, UNCLOS III), the jurisdiction to enforce customs,
fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous
zone (Article 33, UNLCOS III), and the right to exploit the
living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic
zone (Article 56, UNCLOS III) and continental shelf (Article
77, UNCLOS III)
 Second Issue
• The Baseline Law, by adopting UNCLOS “regime of
islands” does not dismember Kalayaan group of
islands and Scarborough shoal from the national
territory. The Philippine sovereignty and jurisdiction
were not diminished by the Baseline Law.
• Under UNCLOS, archipelagic state has the right to
draw baselines but "[t]he drawing of such baselines
shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago" (Article 47
(3) of UNCLOS III).
• Kalayaan Group of Islands are located at an
appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the
Philippine archipelago.
What are the maritime zones?

• It is a sea, the breadth of which

Territorial does not exceed 12 nautical miles
sea from the baseline (Art. 3, UNCLOS
III).

• It is a sea, the breadth of which

Contiguous does not exceed 24 nautical miles
zone from the baseline (Art. 33[2],
UNCLOS III).
What are the maritime zones?
Exclusive Economic Zone
• It is a sea, the breadth of which does not exceed 200 nautical miles
from the baseline (Art. 57, UNCLOS III).

Continental Shelf
• The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the
outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental
margin does not extend up to that distance (Art. 76[1], UNCLOS
III).
 Rights of Coastal States to
Maritime Zones

• The coastal state has

sovereignty over the
Territorial territorial sea subject to
sea this Convention and to
other rules of international
law (Art. 2, UNCLOS III).
 Rights of Coastal States to
Maritime Zones
• The coastal state has the right to
exercise control necessary to
• (a) prevent infringement of its
customs, fiscal, immigration or
Contiguous sanitary laws and regulations within
its territory or territorial sea; and,
zone
• (b) punish infringement of the above
laws and regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea
(Art. 33, UNCLOS III).
 Rights of Coastal States to
Maritime Zones

• The coastal state has the sovereign rights

for the purpose of exploring and
Exclusive exploiting, conserving and managing the
natural resources. It has also jurisdiction
over the establishment and use of
economic artificial islands, installations and
structures; marine scientific research;
zone and, the protection and preservation of
the marine environment (Art. 56,
UNCLOS III)
 Rights of Coastal States to
Maritime Zones

•The coastal state has

the exclusive right to
Continental
explore and exploit its
shelf
natural resources
(Art. 77, UNCLOS III).
Separation of Powers
 What is the constitutional basis of the
principle of separation of powers?
• The constitutional basis of the principle of
separation of powers is the allocation of powers
by the Constitution to the three great
departments of the government and
Constitutional Commission. Thus, these three
departments must discharge their respective
functions within the limits of authority
conferred by the Constitution (Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation vs. Republic,
G.R. Nos. 177857-58, September 17, 2009).
 When is there is violation of principle
of separation of power?
• The principle of separation of powers may be
violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "[o]ne branch may
interfere impermissibly with the other's
performance of its constitutionally assigned
function"; and "alternatively, the doctrine may be
violated when one branch assumes a function that
more properly is entrusted to another." In other
words, there is a violation of the principle when
there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b)
assumption of another department's functions (Belgica
vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013).
 What is legislative veto?
• Legislative veto is a statutory provision
requiring the President or an administrative
agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law
to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a "right" or
"power" to approve or disapprove such
regulations before they take effect (Abakada
Guru Party-list vs. Purisima, G.R. No.
166715, August 14, 2008).
 Is legislative veto constitutional?
• No. Legislative veto is unconstitutional.
Legislative veto violates the principle of
separation of powers. From the moment the law
becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to
play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional (Abakada Guru Party-list vs.
Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008).
 What is congressional pork
barrel system?
• It is a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
wherein legislators, either individually or
collectively organized into committees, are
able to effectively control certain aspects of
the fund's utilization through various post-
enactment measures and/or practices.
• (Belgica vs. Executive Secretary,
November 19, 2013).
 Does “pork barrel system” violate the
principle of separation of powers?
• YES. The “pork barrel system” violates the
principle of separation of powers. The
distinguishing factor of a pork barrel system,
especially “Congressional Pork Barrel” is the
authority of the legislator to participate in the
post-enactment phases of project
implementation.
• (Belgica vs. Executive Secretary, November 19,
2013)
 Does “pork barrel system” violate the
principle of separation of powers?
• These post-enactment measures which govern
the areas of project identification, fund release
and fund realignment are not related to
functions of congressional oversight and, hence,
allow legislators to intervene and/or assume
duties that properly belong to the sphere of
budget execution.
• (Belgica vs. Executive Secretary, November 19,
2013)
 Problem No. 1
• Supposing Congressman Manhikmanaog of the 1st
district of Oriental Mindoro, during the budget
deliberation in Congress allocated a total of 70M worth
of projects in his district. All congressmen followed suit.
Each of them allocated 70M worth of project to their
respective districts. Because senators would not want to
be left out, each of them identified projects worth 200M.
They were approved and they were all carried out in the
GAA which was eventually passed and approved.
• Are the actions of the legislators as reflected in the
GAA constitutional?
 Suggested Answer
• The action of the legislators as reflected in the GAA is
not unconstitutional.
• What is prohibited under the Constitution is the
participation of the legislators in the post-enactment
phases of project implementation. This is proscribed
because it violates the constitutional principle of
separation of powers. However, when project
identification is done during congressional budget
deliberation, the same will not violate separation of
powers. The project identification happened while
Congress is performing its very function, which is
legislation.
 How does DAP violate
separation of powers?
• The act of the President of allotting or redirecting
funds for certain programs, activities or projects
well beyond to what Congress had intended,
arrogate unto himself a power that belongs to
Congress. While the president is authorized to
spend in line with his mandate to execute the laws
(including the GAA’s), such authority should not
translate to unfettered discretion that allows him
to substitute his own will for that of Congress.
• (Araullo vs. Aquino III, 728 SCRA 1)
Delegation of Powers
 What is the basis of non-
delegation of power?
• It is based upon the ethical principle that such
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a
duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not
through the intervening mind of another (U.S. vs.
Barrias, 11 Phil. 327, 330). A further delegation of
such power, unless permitted by the sovereign
power, would constitute a negation of this duty in
violation of the trust reposed in the delegate
mandated to discharge it directly (Cruz & Cruz,
Philippine Political Law, 2014, at page. 160).
 Problem No.2
• Section 17, Article XII provides that “in times of
national emergency, when the public interest so
requires, the State may, during the emergency and
under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with
public interest.” Can this provision be legally
invoked by the President to temporarily take over
or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public
interest during without authority from Congress?
 Answer
• No. Without legislation, the President has not
power to take over privately-owned public
utility of business affected with public
interest. In short, the President has no
absolute authority to exercise all the power of
the State under Section 17, Article XII in the
absence of an emergency powers act passed
by Congress (David vs. Arroyo, 489 SCRA
161).
 Tests for Valid Delegation
Completeness
test The law must be complete in all its
essential terms when it leaves the
legislature so that there will be nothing
left for the delegate to do when it reaches
him except to enforce it. A law is
complete when it sets forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate (Pelaez vs.
Auditor General, 122 Phil. 965).
 Tests for Valid Delegation
Sufficient
standard test A sufficient standard is intended to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority by defining
the legislative policy and indicating the
circumstances under which it is to be pursued. The
purpose of sufficient standard is to prevent a total
transference of legislative power from law making
body to the delegate, who is not allowed to step
into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative (Eastern Shipping
Lines vs. POEA, 166 SCRA 533, 543-544).
 Problem No. 3
• Section 8 of PD 910 (Law governing the
disposition of Malampaya Funds) pertinently
provides:
• “All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board
x x x shall form part of a Special Fund to be
used to finance energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the
government and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President.”
 Answer
• The provision is invalid as it constitute an undue
delegation of legislative power. The phrase "and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD
910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President's authority with respect to the purpose
for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.
• (Belgica vs. Executive Secretary, November 19,
2013).
Legislative Department
 Legislative Power

It is the authority to make laws,

alter and repeal.
 Social Justice Society vs. DDB,
November 3, 2008

• (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486:

• SECTION 1. Coverage.—All candidates for
public office, both national and local, in the
May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and
Local Elections shall undergo mandatory
drug test in government forensic laboratories
or any drug testing laboratories monitored
and accredited by the Department of Health.
 Social Justice Society vs. DDB,
November 3, 2008

• SC declared Section 36(g) and

Section 1 of Comelec Resolution
No. 6486 unconstitutional as it
adds the constitutional
qualification for senator which is
fixed by the constitution.
 The House of Representatives
• Article VI, Section 5 (1)
• The House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number
of their respective inhabitants, and
on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
 The House of Representatives
District representative
• Shall be elected from
legislative districts
apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the
number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio.
Party list representative
• Shall be elected through a
party-list system of
registered national,
regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
• The party-list
representatives shall
constitute twenty per
centum of the total number
of representatives
including those under the
party list.
 Apportionment of
Legislative District
• Constitutional underpinnings:
o Legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio (Section 5(1), Article VI).
o Each legislative districts shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory (Sec. 5(2), Article VI).
o Each city with a population of at least 250,000 or each
province shall have at least one representative (Sec.
5(3), Article VI).
 “Gerrymandering”
• The formation of one district legislative
district out of separate territories for the
purpose of benefiting a candidate or a party.
• This is unconstitutional because of the
constitutional requirement that each
legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory.
 Projections

Cases • Bagabuyo vs. Comelec, G.R.

176970, Dec. 8, 2008

for • Aquino III vs. Comelec,

G.R. 189793, April 7, 2010
• Aldaba vs. Comelec, G.R.
2017 1880778, Jan. 25, 2010
• Sema vs. Comelec, G.R. No.
Bar 177597, July 18, 2008
 Party-list Representatives
• The house of Representatives is
composed not only of the regular district
representatives but also of the party-list
representatives. The party-list
representatives shall constitute 20% of
the total membership of the body,
including such representatives
Who may participate in party-
list election?
Three •National parties and
different organizations
groups may •Regional parties or
participate organizations
in the •Sectoral parties and
party-list organizations
system: Atong Paglaum vs. Comelec,
April 2, 2013
 •National parties or
Is it required the
organizations and regional
parties or
organization be parties or organizations do not
organized along need to organize along sectoral
sectoral lines or be lines and do not need to
marginalized and represent any “marginalized
underrepresented? and underrepresented” sector.

Atong Paglaum vs. Comelec,

April 2, 2013
May a political party participate in
party-list election?
• Political parties can participate in
party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system
and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections.
Atong Paglaum vs. Comelec,
April 2, 2013
May a political party which fields
participate in party-list election?

• Political parties can participate in

party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system
and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections.
Atong Paglaum vs. Comelec,
April 2, 2013
 Can a political party which field
candidate in district election participate
in party-list election?

• It can participate in party-list election, only

through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is link to a political party.

Atong Paglaum vs. Comelec,

April 2, 2013
 Parliamentary Immunity
Section 11, Article VI
• A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while
the Congress is in session. No Member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other
place for any speech or debate in the Congress
or in any committee thereof.
 Parliamentary
Immunities

Privilege from Arrest

Privilege from Speech

and Debate
 Illustrative Case
Pobre vs. The Court is not hesitant to impose some form
Santiago, of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty.
597 Santiago for what otherwise would have
SCRA 1, constituted an act of utter disrespect on her
part towards the Court and its members. The
J.
factual and legal circumstances of this case,
Velasco. however, deter the Court from doing so, even
without any sign of remorse from her. Basic
constitutional consideration dictates this
kind of disposition.
 Electoral Tribunals
• Section 17, Article VI
• The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunals

The sole judge of all contests

relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the
members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives.
When does the jurisdiction
of the Comelec over the
candidates for House end
and when does the
jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunal begins?
 Reyes vs. Comelec,
June 25, 2013
The
jurisdiction of
an Electoral •Proclaimed
Tribunal
begins once a •Taken his oath
winning
candidate has
•Assumed office
been:
 May Comelec entertain petition for
disqualification of candidate for
Representative, Senator and President?
• No. There is absence of an authorized proceeding
for determining before election the qualifications of
candidate for Representative, Senator and President.
• To disqualify a candidate, there must be a
declaration by a final judgment of a competent court
that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is
guilty of or found by the Commission to be
suffering from any disqualification provided by law
or the Constitution."
• (Poe vs. Comelec, March 8, 2016)
Powers of Congress
 Legislative Power
Authority under the Constitution to
make laws and to alter and repeal
them (Gov’t. of the Phils. v. Springer,
50 Phil. 259)
 Abas Kida vs. Senate,
October 18, 2011
• Congress provided that a law it had passed may re-
amended or revised by the Congress of the
Philippines upon the vote of two thirds (2/3) of the
members of the House of Representatives and the
Senate.
• The SC declared this unconstitutional for Congress
cannot pass an irrepealable laws. SC said “where the
legislature by its own act, attempts to limits its
power to amend or repeals laws, the Court has the
duty to strike down such act for interfering with the
plenary powers of Congress.”
Araullo vs. Aquino III, Feb. 3, 2015

Provisions involved:

Section 29(1) - No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in

pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

Section 25(5) - No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of

appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
 Important Notes in Araullo

Withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations

are not savings, hence they may not be used for augmentation.

Strict construction on the accumulation and utilization of savings

The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existing projects.

Cross-border transfers are constitutionally impermissible.

 Araullo vs. Aquino, July 1, 2014
Requisites for the valid transfer of
appropriated funds under Section 25(5),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

There is a law authorizing the transfer funds within

their respective offices;

The funds to be transferred are savings generated from

the appropriations for their respective offices; and

The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the

general appropriations law for their respective offices.
 Section 13, Article VII
• The President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. x x x
x.
 Section 7, Article IX-B
 No elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to
any public office or position during his tenure.
• Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
 Civil Liberties Union vs. ES,
Feb. 22, 1991
• Executive Order No. 284
• Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary
functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive
officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to
his primary position, hold not more than two positions in
the government and government corporations and receive the
corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this
limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or
committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the
President is the Chairman.
 Civil Liberties Union vs. ES,
Feb. 22, 1991

• Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII

of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet
members, their deputies or assistants are
concerned admit of the broad exceptions
made for appointive officials in general
under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB?
 Civil Liberties Union vs. ES,
Feb. 22, 1991
• All other appointive officials in the civil service are
allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of their positions.
However, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by
the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-
XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable
only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
 Reiteration of the Rule
Funa vs. Executive Secretary, February 11,
2010

Funa vs. Acting Justice Secretary,

February 19, 2013

Public Interest Center vs. Elma, June 30,

2006
POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT
 Executive Privilege

• The power of the president and high-level

executive branch officers to withhold
information from Congress, the courts and
the ultimately the public (Senate vs. Ermita,
488 SCRA 1)
 Presidential
Communication Privilege
• The protected communication must relate to a
quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.
• The communication must be authored or “solicited and
received” by close advisors of the president or the
president himself. The judicial test is that an advisor
must be in “operational proximity” with the President.
• The presidential communication privilege remains
qualified privilege that may overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought :likely
contains important evidence and by the unavailability of
the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority. (Neri vs. Senate, 549 SCRA 77)
 EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Article VII

EXECUTIVE POWER
- The power to
belongs PRESIDENT
enforce and
administer the laws.

 The scope of executive power is set forth in Article VII

of the 1987 Constitution
 POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
• Appointing Power • Article VII, Section 16
• Power of Control • Article VII, Section 17
• Military Power • Article VII, Section 18
• Pardoning Power • Article VII, Section 19
• Borrowing Power • Article VII, Section 20
• Diplomatic Power • Article VII, Section 21
• Budgetary Power • Article VII, Section 22
• Informing Power • Article VII, Section 23
Is the executive power of the president
limited to those specified in the
Constitution?
Marcos vs. Executive power is more than the sum of
Manglapus
specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. It includes residual powers not
specifically mentioned in the Constitution.

The Power involved is the President’s residual

power to protect the general welfare of the
people. It is founded on the duty of the
president as the steward of the people.
 Power to Appoint
• Section 16, Article VII
• The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the 1) heads of the executive
departments, 2) ambassadors, 3) other public ministers and consuls,
or 4) officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and 5) other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.
 Power to Appoint
• Section 16, Article VII
• The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall
be effective only until after disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress.
 Classification of Appointment
in relation to the Power of C.A.
REGULAR
 A regular appointment is one made
by the President while Congress is in
session; takes effect only after
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, and once approved,
continues until the end of the term of
the appointee.
 Classification of Appointment
in relation to the Power of C.A.

AD INTERIM
 Ad interim appointment is one made
by the President while Congress is in
recess; takes effect immediately until
revoked by the Commission on
Appointments.
 Cases on Presidential
Appointment
Sarmiento vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 549

Calderon vs. Carale, 208 SCRA 254

Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2, 2002

Pimentel vs. Ermita, October 13, 2005

Abas Kida vs. Senate, February 28, 2012

Flores vs. Drilon, June 22, 1993

 Section 15, Art. VII
• Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall
not make appointments except temporary
appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
 Power to Remove
• Gonzalez vs. Office of the President,
September 4, 2012.
• Gonzalez vs. Office of the President, January
28, 2014.
o Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting
disciplinary authority in the President over
the Deputy Ombudsman violates the
independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman and is thus unconstitutional.
The same treatment should be given to
Special Prosecutor.
 Military Power
 What is the sequence of graduated military powers
of the President?
Section 18 grants the President, as Commander
in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. These
are:
the calling out power
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus
the power to declare martial law.
 Diplomatic Power

Sec. 21. No treaty or international

agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by
at least two-thirds of all the
member of the Senate.
 Pimentel vs. Executive
Secretary, 462 SCRA 622
• The Senate does not have the power to ratify treaty.
That power belongs exclusively to the president.
• The power of the Senate is limited to giving or
withholding consent to the ratification.
• Thus, the President cannot be compelled to submit
to the Senate the treaty ratified by the president for
Senate’s concurrence.
• The president cannot be compelled by mandamus.
Judicial Department
 Judicial Department
(Article VIII)
 Article VIII, Section 1
 The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
 Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
 Carpio-Morales vs. CA,
Nov. 15, 2015
• Section 14. Restrictions. — No writ of injunction
shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
under this Act, unless there is a prima facie
evidence that the subject matter of the
investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the
Office of the Ombudsman.
• No court shall hear any appeal or application for
remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure
question of law.
 Carpio-Morales vs. CA,
Nov. 15, 2015
• The second paragraph: “No court shall hear any appeal
or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court,
on pure question of law” was declared
unconstitutional for violating Section 30, Article
VI.
• “SECTION 30. No law shall be passed
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and concurrence.”
 Carpio-Morales vs. CA,
Nov. 15, 2015

• The first paragraph: “No writ of injunction

shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman under this Act was declared
ineffective until the Court adopts the same as
part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued therefor.
 Carpio-Morales vs. CA,
Nov. 15, 2015
• Section 5(5), Article VIII
• Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
 Role of Congress
The Congress shall have the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts. (Art. VII, Sec. 2)

No law shall be passed increasing the appellate

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in
this Constitution without its advice and
concurrence (Art. VI, Sec. 30)
 In order to decongest the cases pending
before the Supreme Court, the Congress
passed a law which provides that the
judgement of the Court of Appeals in
criminal cases imposing a penalty of
reclusion perpetua is final and executory and
that said decision may not anymore be
questioned by whatever procedural means.
IS THE LAW CONSTITUTIONAL?
 Answer
The law is unconstitutional. While it may be true
that the Congress shall have the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts, it may not deprive the Supreme
Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5, Article VIII. Under Section 5, Article
VIII, the Supreme Court has the power to review,
revise, modify or affirm decisions of the lower
court in criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
 Judicial and Bar Council

Ex-Officio Members Regular Members*

 1. SC Chief Justice  4. Representative of IBP

 2. Secretary of  5. Professor of Law
 6. Retired Member of
Justice Supreme Court
 3. Representative  7. Representative of
of Congress private sector
*Subject to confirmation of
Commission on
Appointments
 Judicial and Bar Council
 Function of JBC. JBC’s principal function is to
recommend to the President appointees to the
Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions
and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.

 Rationale for Creation of JBC. The Council was

principally designed to eliminate politics from the
appointment and judges and justices. Thus,
appointments to the Judiciary do not have to go
through a political Commission on Appointments.
Judicial and Bar Council
Appointment
• Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court
and judges of lower courts shall be appointed
by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. Such appointments
need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the
President shall issue the appointments within
ninety days from the submission of the list.
 Judicial and Bar Council
 De Castro vs. JBC, March 7, 2010 – the prohibition to
appoint in Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointment in Judiciary. Its applicability is limited to
appointment in the executive department.
 Chavez vs. JBC, July 17, 2012 – there should only be
one representative of Congress because the
constitution says “a representative of Congress”.
 Aguinaldo vs. Aquino, III, November 29, 2016 –
Clustering in the list submitted for the vacancy for
Associate Justice in the Sandiganbayan is
unconstitutional as it impinged on the power of the
president to appoint.
Power of Judicial Review
• ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY
• IT MUST BE RAISED BY A PROPER
PARTY
• IT MUST BE RAISED AT THE
EARLIEST PROPER OPPORTUNITY
• IT MUST BE NECESSARY TO THE
DETERMINATION OF THE CASE
 Already moot, but court
may still decide:
• There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
• The exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is
involved;
• When the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public;
• The case is capable of repetition yet
evading review; (David vs. Arroyo)
Constitutional
Commission
 Fiscal Autonomy
(Section 5, Article IX-A)
 CSC vs. DBM, July 22, 2005
 The “no report no release” policy of the
COA may not be validly enforced
against offices vested with fiscal
autonomy for whom, according to the
Constitution, appropriation must be
automatically released.
 Rotational Scheme of
Appointments
 The first appointees shall serve for terms of seven,
five, and three years, respectively.
 In order to preserve the periodic succession
mandated by the Constitution, the rotational plan
requires two conditions:
 The term of the first commissioners should start
on a common date
 Any vacancy before expiration should be filled
only for the unexpired balance (Gaminde vs.
COA, December 13, 2000)
Funa vs. Chairman of COA,
April 24, 2012

May an incumbent
commissioner be
appointed as
Chairman?
 Section 1(2), Article IX-D
• The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven
years, one Commissioner for five years, and the
other Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
 Funa vs. Chairman of COA
 On February 15, 2001, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-
Arroyo) appointed Guillermo N. Carague
(Carague) as Chairman of the Commission on
Audit (COA) for a term of seven (7) years,
pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. Carague’s
term of office started on February 2, 2001 to end
on February 2, 2008.
 Funa vs. Chairman of COA
• Meanwhile, on February 7, 2004, President
Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Reynaldo A.
Villar (Villar) as the third member of the
COA for a term of seven (7) years starting
February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011.
 Funa vs. Chairman of COA
• Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008
and during the fourth year of Villar as COA
Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting
Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14,
2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was
nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA up to
Feb. 2, 2011. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the
Commission on Appointments confirmed his
appointment.
 Funa vs. Chairman of COA
• He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly
indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration
of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner
or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in this recourse,
Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold
on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as
COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of seven (7)
years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that
his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2,
2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he
was appointed to that position.
 Funa vs. Chairman of COA

Carague’s term Villar’s term as

as Chairman: Commissioner:

February 2, 2001
February 2, 2004
to end on
until February 2,
February 2, 2008.
2011
(7 years)
 Funa vs. Chairman of COA
• 1. The appointment of members of any of the three
constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the
uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners,
shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an
appointment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional.
• The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the
full term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of
the term as this will result in the distortion of the
rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.
 Funa vs. Chairman of COA
• 2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from
certain causes (death, resignation, disability
or impeachment) shall only be for the
unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor, but such appointments cannot
be less than the unexpired portion as this will
likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid
down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
 Funa vs. Chairman of COA
• 3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA,
COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for
a full term of seven years and who served the
entire period, are barred from reappointment
to any position in the Commission.
Corollarily, the first appointees in the
Commission under the Constitution are also
covered by the prohibition against
reappointment.
 Funa vs. Chairman of COA
• 4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the
Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an
appointment to the position of Chairman for the
unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman.
Such appointment is not covered by the ban on
reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the
length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of
the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and
provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman
resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by
impeachment.
 Funa vs. Chairman of COA
• 4. The Court clarifies that “reappointment” found in
Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and
the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or
Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an
appointment involving a movement to a different
position or office (Commissioner to Chairman)
would constitute a new appointment and, hence,
not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred
under the Constitution.
 Powers of the Comelec
(Section 2, Article IX-C)
• 3. “Decide, except those involving the
right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of
the number of and location of the
polling places appointment of election
officials and inspections and
registration of voters.
Jurisdiction over Election Contest

• Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all

contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials
• And appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts
of limited jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over Election Contests

Article IX-C, Section 3

• “The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in
order to expedite disposition of election cases, including
pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases
shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided
by the Commission en banc. ”
 Article X
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
 Section 8
• The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
When will the 3 term limit of local
elective officials apply?

Two requisites:

Official must have

He must have served
been elected to the
three full terms
same position 3 times
 Rules on Terms Limits
• When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective
position and the official merely assumed the
position pursuant to the rules on succession
under the LGC, then his service for the
unexpired portion of the term of the replaced
official cannot be treated as one full term as
contemplated under the subject constitutional
and statutory provision that service cannot be
counted in the application of any term limit
(Borja, Jr. v. Comelec, [1998]).
 Rules on Terms Limits
• If the official runs again for the same
position he held prior to his assumption
of the higher office, then his succession
to said position is by operation of law
and is considered an involuntary
severance or interruption (Montebon v.
Comelec, [2008])
 Rules on Terms Limits
• An elective official, who has served for three
consecutive terms and who did not seek the
elective position for what could be his fourth
term, but later won in a recall election, had an
interruption in the continuity of the official’s
service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e.,
from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall
election, a private citizen (Adormeo v. Comelec,
[2002]); Socrates v. Comelec, [2002]).
 Rules on Terms Limits
• The abolition of an elective local office
due to the conversion of a municipality
to a city does not, by itself, work to
interrupt the incumbent official’s
continuity of service (Latasa v. Comelec,
[2003]).
 Rules on Terms Limits
• Preventive suspension is not a term-
interrupting event as the elective officer’s
continued stay and entitlement to the office
remain unaffected during the period of
suspension, although he is barred from
exercising the functions of his office during
this period (Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC [2009])
 Rules on Terms Limits
• When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for
an elective position and assumes office, his
term is interrupted when he loses in an election
protest and is ousted from office, thus
disenabling him from serving what would
otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term
of office had the protest been dismissed
(Lonzanida v. Comelec, [1999])
 Rules on Terms Limits
• The break or interruption need not be for a full
term of three years or for the major part of the
3-year term; an interruption for any length of
time, provided the cause is involuntary, is
sufficient to break the continuity of service
(Socrates v. Comelec; Lonzanida v.
Commission on Elections).
 Rules on Terms Limits
• When an official is defeated in an election protest and
said decision becomes final after said official had
served the full term for said office, then his loss in the
election contest does not constitute an interruption
since he has managed to serve the term from start to
finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should be
counted in the application of term limits because the
nullification of his proclamation came after the
expiration of the term (Ong v. Alegre, [2006]; Rivera
III v. Comelec, [2007]
 Rules on Terms Limits
• A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent
elective local official merely served the balance of the
latter’s term of office; it is not a full three-year term. It
also goes without saying that an incumbent elective local
official against whom a recall election is initiated and
who nevertheless wins in a recall election must be viewed
as being a continuing term of office and not as a break
in reckoning three consecutive terms. - A recall election
term then, not being a full three-year term, is not to be
counted or used as a basis for disqualification whether it
is held prior or subsequent to the nine-year full three-
term limit. [Mendoza v. COMELEC, 2013]
 Naval vs. Comelec, July 8, 2014
• Naval was elected provincial board member for 2 consecutive
terms. He was elected as provincial board member of the second
district of the province of Camarines Sur. RA 9716 was passed
apportioning the legislative districts of the province of
Camarines Sur: from 4 legislative districts to 5 legislative district.
Consequently, there was a change in the composition of each
legislative districts and one legislative district was created. The
former second district of the province was renamed as the Third
District. This is the district that elected Naval into office.
• Naval is seeking to run for the fourth time, contending that he
was formerly elected in the second district. Thus, the district
that he is intending to run is entirely different district. Thus, the
3 term limit rules does not apply to him.
 Naval vs. Comelec, July 8, 2014
• This numerical fact renders the new Third District as
essentially, although not literally, the same as the old
Second District. Hence, while Naval is correct in his
argument that Sanggunian members are elected by district,
it does not alter the fact that the district which elected him
for the third and fourth time is the same one which brought
him to office in 2004 and 2007.
• Naval's ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the
three-term limit rule, does not undermine the right to equal
representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur.
With or without him, the renamed Third District, which he
labels as a new set of constituents, would still be
represented, albeit by another eligible person.
 Section 10
• No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.
May ARMM Assembly create
a province?

• No. Only Congress can create a

province. Because the creation of a
province carries with the creation of a
legislative district. And the power to
apportion legislative district belong to
Congress alone. (Sema vs. Comelec,
[2008])
 Who should participate in
the plebiscite?
• The voters of the unit or units
directly affected (Tan vs.
Comelec, [1986])
 What are the criteria?
• In accordance with the LGC.
If not, then the law creating
LGU is unconstitutional
(League of Cities vs.
Comelec. [2011])
 Impeachment
Impeachable officers:
• President
• Vice president
• Justices of the SC
• Ombudsman
• Chairman and commissioners of
Constitutional commissions
 Impeachment
Grounds
• Culpabable violation of the Constitution
• Treason
• Bribery
• Graft and Corruption
• Other high crimes
• Betrayal of public trust
 Impeachment
Betrayal of Public Trust
• Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for impeachment
under the 1987 Constitution added to the existing
grounds of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption and other high crimes. While
it was deemed broad enough to cover any violation of the
oath of office, the impreciseness of its definition also
created apprehension that "such an overarching standard
may be too broad and may be subject to abuse and
arbitrary exercise by the legislature."
 Impeachment
Betrayal of Public Trust
• Indeed, the catch-all phrase betrayal of public trust that
referred to "all acts not punishable by statutes as penal
offenses but, nonetheless, render the officer unfit to
continue in office" could be easily utilized for every
conceivable misconduct or negligence in office.
However, deliberating on some workable standard by
which the ground could be reasonably interpreted, the
Constitutional Commission recognized that human
error and good faith precluded an adverse conclusion.
 Impeachment
Betrayal of Public Trust
• The Constitutional Commission eventually found it reasonably
acceptable for the phrase betrayal of public trust to refer to
"[a]cts which are just short of being criminal but constitute
gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of
power, inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross
exercise of discretionary powers.“ In other words, acts that
should constitute betrayal of public trust as to warrant removal
from office may be less than criminal but must be attended by
bad faith and of such gravity and seriousness as the other
grounds for impeachment. (Gonzales vs. OP, September 4,
2012)
 Impeachment
Impeachment Process
•“One year period” – “No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated complainant shall
be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.” (Sec. 3(5),
Article XI)
•It shall be counted from the time the verified
complaint was referred to the proper committee
(Francisco vs. HoR, 415 SCRA 44).