CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE DIGESTS

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
CASE DIGESTS
I. Constitutional Law
1. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,

MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997
Ponente: J. Bellosillo
Topic: Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Provisions - Filipino First Policy
Synopsis:
When the GSIS decided to sell by public bidding up to 51% ownership of the Manila Hotel on September
1995, a Malaysian company appeared to be the winning bidder, giving rise to the issue of whether the
Filipino First policy can be applied to oppose the transfer of the hotel which has attained national
landmark status. The Supreme Court decided in the affirmative, stating that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII
of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs
no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. — For more than eight (8)
decades Manila Hotel has borne mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the
Filipinos. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter
for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will
have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
Digest:
FACTS
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not
self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement.
Respondents argued that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) x x x
x Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be existing laws “to lay down conditions under
which business may be done.”
ISSUE(S)
WON Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy
since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation
RULING
The Provision is self-executing.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions
command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish
an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing. Thus, a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of
the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the
subject is referred to the legislature for action.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. lt is
per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, it means just that—qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares
that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. ###
2. Macalintal v. COMELEC
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO

ROMULO, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN,
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, respondents.
G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003
Ponente: J. Austria-Martinez
Topic: Constitutional Construction
Synopsis:
Romulo Macalintal filed a petition for certiorari before the supreme court as a lawyer and a taxpayer,
questioning the constitutionality of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). The petitioner
raises as one of the questions the fact that the statute in question effectively grants COMELEC the power
to canvass the votes for president and vice-president, a power granted by the 1987 Constitution
exclusively upon Congress. The Supreme Court ruled that Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC
to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the
power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the
winners for the said positions. The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land
should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the
votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the entire
nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
Digest:
FACTS
Romulo Macalintal filed a petition for certiorari before the supreme court as a lawyer and a taxpayer,
questioning the constitutionality of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). The petitioner
raises the following questions:
1. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or
permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing
their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of
Article V of the Constitution.
2. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates
for national offices and party list representatives including the President and the Vice-President
violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the
winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by
Congress.
3. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of
Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgate without violating the
independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not RA 9189 should be declared unconstitutional
RULING
The petition is partly granted.
1. Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffrage may be exercised by (1)
all citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise disqualified by law, (3) at least eighteen years of
age, (4) who are residents in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. Under Section 5(d) of
R.A. No. 9189, one of those disqualified from voting is an immigrant or permanent resident who
is recognized as such in the host country unless he/she executes an affidavit declaring that
he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three
years from approval of his/her registration under said Act.
2. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to
it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for
president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions. The
provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the
proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation
must remain in the hands of Congress.
3. The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body
except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions, orders and
rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive
legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the
COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the COMELEC to issue the
necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty
days from the effectivity of this Act. This provision of law follows the usual procedure in drafting
rules and regulations to implement a law the legislature grants an administrative agency the
authority to craft the rules and regulations implementing the law it has enacted, in recognition of
the administrative expertise of that agency in its particular field of operation.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority.
Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under
such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in
declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
3. SWS v. DDB
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner, vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), respondents.
G.R. No. 157870. November 3, 2008
Ponente: J. Velasco
Topic: Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy – Mandatory drug testing for elective offices
Synopsis:
Does R.A. 9165, or the Comprehensive Drugs Act, indirectly prescribe a new qualification for the holding
of elective offices? The Supreme Court said that it is, because the mandatory drug test is obviously used
as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator, or, with like effect, a condition
sine qua non to be voted upon. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which
all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their
defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
Digest:
FACTS
The petitioners in these consolidated cases assail the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office
with certain offenses, among other personalities. Specifically, petitioner Aquilino Pimentel contends that
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on
candidates for senator.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be
a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and
COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for
senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
ISSUE(S)
Are the assailed provisions unconstitutional for indirectly imposing another qualification for elective
candidates?
RULING
Yes. Pimentel’s contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby
declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively
enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched,
said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously
as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition
sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution
completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the
duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context,
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what
the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-
free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no
moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with
the drug-testing requirement.
4. Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad
TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, petitioner, vs. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT,

respondent.
G.R. No. 166471. March 22, 2011
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy – Indirect violations of the constitution
Synopsis:
What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. It is this unwritten rule that served as the
final nail in the coffin for Section 47 of PD No. 198, which granted LTWD a legislative franchise over the
waterworks of Barangay Tawang. The 1935, 1973, and 1987 constitutions expressly and consistently
prohibit against grants of exclusive franchises by the Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary branches of
government. The assailed law however, provided that no other franchise shall be granted except upon
resolution by the board of directors of the district, subject to review by the Local Water District
Administration.
Digest:
FACTS
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an
application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in
Barangay Tawang. La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) opposed TMPC’s application. LTWD claimed that,
under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive. Section 47 states that “no
franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for domestic, industrial or commercial water
service within the district or any portion thereof unless and except to the extent that the board of
directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such resolution, however, shall be
subject to review by the Administration.”
The NWRB approved TMPC’s application for a CPC. In its 15 August 2002 Decision, the NWRB held that
LTWD’s franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional. LTWD appealed to
the RTC and the latter set aside the NWRB’s Resolution and 15 August 2002 Decision and cancelled
TMPC’s CPC. The RTC held that Section 47 is valid.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, is valid
RULING
No, it is invalid (unconstitutional). The Supreme Court ruled that the President, Congress and the Court
cannot create directly franchises for the operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. The
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of franchises that are
exclusive in character. Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:
“No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws
of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such
franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.”
Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, allows the BOD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that
are exclusive in character which is unconstitutional. Jurisprudence dictates that in case of conflict
between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is the
basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and
to declare void all laws that do not conform to it.
The dissenting opinion states two “reasonable and legitimate grounds” for the creation of exclusive
franchise: (1) protection of “the government’s investment,” and (2) avoidance of “a situation where
ruinous competition could compromise the supply of public utilities in poor and remote areas.” The
majority ruled that there is no “reasonable and legitimate” ground to violate the Constitution. The
Constitution should never be violated by anyone. Right or wrong, the President, Congress, the Court, the
BOD and the LWUA have no choice but to follow the Constitution. Any act, however noble its intentions,
is void if it violates the Constitution. This rule is basic.
On the issue that the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character is a valid exercise of police
power, the SC ruled that police power does not include the power to violate the Constitution. Police
power is the plenary power vested in Congress to make laws not repugnant to the Constitution. This rule
is basic. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., the Court held
that, “Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution.” In Carlos
Superdrug Corp. v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, the Court held that, police power “is
‘the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances x x x not repugnant to the constitution.’” In
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court held that, “police power, as an inherent
attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances x x x not repugnant to
the Constitution.
5. Oposa v. Factoran
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, et. al., petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993
Ponente: J. Davide, Jr.

Topic: Self-Executing Provisions – Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology
Synopsis:
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment. Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR’s duty—under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987—to protect and advance the said
right.
Digest:
FACTS
In this case, herein petitioners, through their representatives, prays that the DENR be compelled to
cancel all existing timber licenses in the country, as well as to enjoin the department from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. In its cause of action,
petitioner alleges that defendant’s refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA’s is manifestly contrary to
the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in effect, violates the
constitutional provision on the protection and advancement of the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.’ (Section 16, Article II. id.) Secretary
Factoran claims that the petitioners failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right
involved or a specific legal wrong committed.
ISSUE(S)
Do the petitioners have a proper cause of action anchored on a legal right?
RULING
Yes. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right—the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration
of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important
than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation—
aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners—the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless
the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when
all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come—generations which
stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment. Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR’s duty—under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987—to protect and advance the said
right.
Concurring opinion of J. Feliciano:

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners’ cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of
Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form.
6. Gamboa v. Secretary of Finance
WILSON P. GAMBOA, petitioner, vs. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES, FINANCE

UNDERSECRETARY JOHN P. SEVILLA, AND COMMISSIONER RICARDO ABCEDE OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS
CHAIR AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE PRIVATIZATION COUNCIL, CHAIRMAN
ANTHONI SALIM OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD. IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF METRO
PACIFIC ASSET HOLDINGS INC., CHAIRMAN MANUEL V. PANGILINAN OF PHILIPPINE LONG
DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT) IN HIS CAPACITY AS MANAGING DIRECTOR OF
FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD., PRESIDENT NAPOLEON L. NAZARENO OF PHILIPPINE LONG
DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, CHAIR FE BARIN OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, and PRESIDENT FRANCIS LIM OF THE PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE,
respondents.
PABLITO V. SANIDAD and ARNO V. SANIDAD, petitioners-in-intervention.
G.R. No. 176579. June 28, 2011
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Self-Executing Provisions – 60%/40% Rule
Synopsis:
The foreign ownership of about 81% of PLDT’s shareholdings is violative of the constitution. The
60%/40% rule is self-executing, as it aims to reserve to Filipinos specific areas of investment, such as the
development of natural resources and ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising
business. In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered
self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether,
they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which
could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
Digest:
FACTS
The Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 3436 which granted PLDT franchise and the right to engage in
telecommunications business. General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE), an American
company, sold 26% of the outstanding common shares of PLDT to Philippine Telecommunications
Investment Corporation (PTIC). In 1977, Prime Holdings, Inc. (PHI) became the owner of 114,415 shares
of stock of PTIC.
In 1986, the said shares were sequestered by PCGG and were later declared by the Court to be owned by
the Republic of the Philippines.
In 1999, First Pacific a Bermuda-registered, Hong Kong based investment firm, acquired the remaining
54% of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC. On November 20, 2006, the Inter-Agency Privatization
Council (IPC) of the Philippine Government announced that it would sell the 114,415 PTIC shares through
public bidding. During the bidding, Parallax won the bid.
Thereafter, First Pacific announced that it would exercise its right of first refusal as a PTIC stockholder
and buy the 114,415 PTIC stockholder and buy said stocks by matching the bid price of Parallax. But First
Pacific failed to do so and instead, yielded its right to PTIC itself which was given by PTIC itself which
was then given by IPC until March 2, 2007 to buy the PTIC shares. First Pacific, through its subsidiary,
Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), entered into a Conditional sale and purchase agreement of
said shares with the Philippine Government and the sale was completed.
With the sale, First Pacific’s common shareholdings increased from 30.7% to 37 %, thereby increasing
the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. Which violates Sec.11, Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution which limits the foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than
40%.
ISSUE(S)
Whether Sec. 11, Article XII is self-executing
RULING
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the Constitution expressly reserving to
Filipinos specific areas of investment, such as the development of natural resources and ownership of
land, educational institutions and advertising business, is self-executing. There is no need for legislation
to implement these self-executing provisions of the Constitution. The rationale why these constitutional
provisions are self-executing was explained in Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, thus:
“x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing.
. . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they
shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.”
7. Tobias vs. Abalos
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and

ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994
Ponente: J. Bidin
Topic: Constitutional Construction – One-Title-One-Subject Policy
Synopsis:
The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct
from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of
its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and
contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong. Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been
invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
Digest:
FACTS
The case arose because of Rep. Ronaldo Zamora’s proposed law converting the municipality of
Mandaluyong into Highly Urbanized City. It became a law on February 9, 1994. A plebiscite was held on
April 10, 1994. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless,
18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results,R.A. No. 7675 was deemed
ratified and in effect.
Petitioners come before the Supreme Court, contending RA 7675 as unconstitutional.
ISSUE(S)
1. Was there gerrymandering (a manipulation of electoral constituency to achieve one’s purposes)?

2. Did the law violate the one-title-one-subject policy?
3. Are the people of San Juan properly excluded from the plebiscite of RA 7675?
RULING
1. The Solicitor General respondent is correct, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the
author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/ Mandaluyong
district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep.
Zamora’s constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be
considered as favorable to him. Thus, there is no gerrymandering;
2. No, it did not violate the one title-one subject rule under the Constitution which provide that
"Sec. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof."The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong
is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized
city but is a natural and logical consequence of such conversion. Further, a liberal construction of
the “one title-one subject” rule has been invariably adopted by the Supreme Court so as not to
cripple or impede legislation;
3. Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the
plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The
contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district repre-
sentation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded
from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring
Mandaluyong.
8. Santiago v. COMELEC
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN
PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the People’s Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents
G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997
Ponente: J. Davide, Jr.

Topic: Constitutional Construction – Initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Synopsis:
Under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6735, the people are not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution” through the system of initiative—they can only do
so with respect to “laws, ordinances, or resolutions.”—Contrary to the assertion of public respondent
COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The
inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane
nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and
local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As
pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are
not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution” through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to “laws, ordinances, or
resolutions.”
Digest:
FACTS
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission
on Elections a petition to amend the Constitution by people’s initiative, particularly with respect to the
proposed lifting of the term limits of all elective officials. On December 18 of the same year, herein
petitioners filed this case for special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65, contending that the
constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law
to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed. Furthermore, while it is true that R.A. No. 6735
provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local
legislation, it nevertheless failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the
other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate
omission indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future
law. Petitioners also cited the privilege speech of former Senator Arturo Tolentino, which he delivered on
the Senate floor in 1994, stating: “There is not a single word in that law which can be considered as
implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been
obviously left to a separate law.”
ISSUE(S)
Do the people have the right to propose the lifting of the term limits of elective officials, an amendment
of the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, by initiative?
RULING
No. Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress
provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while theConstitution has recognized or granted that
right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation. In short, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of
the Constitution is not self-executory. Under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6735, the people are not accorded the
power to “directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution” through the
system of initiative—they can only do so with respect to “laws, ordinances, or resolutions.”—Contrary to
the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads: SECTION 2. Statement and Policy.—The power
of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. The
inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane
nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and
local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As
pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are
not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution” through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to “laws, ordinances, or
resolutions.”
If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the
order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. While
the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous
silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on
national and local laws.
9. Lambino v. COMELEC
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED

VOTERS, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 174153. October 25, 2006
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Amendments to the Constitution – Two-Part Test
Synopsis:
In our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test in determining whether the proposed changes
amends or revises the constitution: the (1) quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test
asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial
entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions."36 The court
examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change. The
(2) qualitative test inquiries into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The
main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision.
Digest:
FACTS
On 15 February 2006, Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups
and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act
No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735"). The Lambino Group alleged that their
petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all
registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its
registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article
VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proposed
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government.
COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the
Santiago Vs. COMELEC ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the initiative petition an amendment or revision.
2. Whether the Lambino’s Group initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.
3. Whether the initiative petition of the Lambino Group violated the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group’s petition.
RULING
1. It was a Revision of the Constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in
the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances.
There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change
affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a
change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally
affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific
provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like
in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the (1) quantitative test and the qualitative
test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to
change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous
existing provisions."36 The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider
the degree of the change.The (2) qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed
change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision."
2. No. According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a people’s initiative.
The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal
by the People
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of the
draft petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. With only 100,000 printed copies
of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to
have seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the
Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever,
not more than one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets.
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the
signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative
void.
3. Yes, The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not
to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and
revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
4.No, The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino
petition. In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this
Court's ruling in Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
COMELEC.52 For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the
COMELEC.
10. Province of North Cotabato v. GRP
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN

and/or VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIÑOL, for and in his own behalf, petitioners, vs. THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL
DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY.
SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR.,
the latter in his capacity as the present and duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process (OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process,
respondents
G.R. No. 183591. October 14, 2008
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Elements of a State – The international law concept of “association”
Synopsis:
The failed MOA-AD which was supposed to be signed between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels,
was questioned by several petitioners. The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with
the international legal concept of association. These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things,
that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely
approximating it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
Digest:
FACTS
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their
respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia.
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon
motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-
AD, SC issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
The Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition for Mandamus and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its
attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of
the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the
MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUE(S)
WON contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws
RULING
YES.
In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to
the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local
government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some
of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to
a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the
international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept,
indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind.
Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4

on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last-mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to
describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government.
“4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be
associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on
executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the
comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact
specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE.” (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The nature of the “associative” relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the
still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of “association” in
international law, and the MOA-AD—by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR—placed
itself in an international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in
understanding the use of the term “associative” in the MOA-AD.
MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of
association, specifically the following: the BJE’s capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with
foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE’s participation in
meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of
the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE’s right to participate in Philippine
official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of
revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the
ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be
consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the
status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
11. Magallona v. Ermita
PROF. MERLIN MAGALLONA, et al., petitioners, vs. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al., respondents
G.R. No. 187167. August 16, 2011
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Territory – UNCLOS III, as incorporated by R.A. 9522
Synopsis:
The Supreme Court found RA 9522 constitutional, even with respect to what appeared to petitioners as
reduction of Philippine maritime territory. On the contrary, the law only seeks to demarcate the territorial
waters pursuant to the UNCLOS III. Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters
into archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an
archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines,
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic
sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over
waters and air space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein.
Digest:
FACTS
R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the terms of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984.
Merlin Magallona questioned the constitutionality of of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the
law decreased the national territory of the Philippines as follows:
1. It reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign
power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of
Paris and ancillary treaties.
2. It opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and
aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions.
3. Its treatment of Kalayaan Island Group as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a
large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law should be declared unconstitutional
RULING
No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime
Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory. It is a vital step in
safeguarding the country’s maritime zones. It also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the
breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf.
Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk
the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power
that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance
from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the
status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil
and the resources therein.
The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely
describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no way
affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.
12. Lansang v. CA
AMADO J. LANSANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BLIND,
INC., and JOSE IGLESIAS, respondents
G.R. No. 102667. February 23, 2000
Ponente: J. Quisumbing
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Acts performed in bad faith
Synopsis:
A claim for damages based on the alleged reneging of a public officer on a verbal contract of lease, an
act done in apparent bad faith, is not a suit against the state. The doctrine of state immunity from suit
applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The
rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against
the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of
the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where the
public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of
others.
Digest:
FACTS
Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) were allegedly awarded a verbal contract of
lease in Rizal Park by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC). However, this verbal contract
accommodation was unclear because there was no document or instrument involved. With the change of
government, the new Chairman of NPDC, petitioner Amado J. Lansang, sought to clean up Rizal Park and
terminated the said verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that they vacate the area.
The notice was signed by the president of GABI, private respondent Jose Iglesias, allegedly to indicate his
conformity to its contents but later on claimed that he was deceived into signing the notice. On the day
of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the RTC against the
petitioner but it was dismissed, ruling that the complaint was actually directed against the state which
could not be sued without its consent.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that a government
official being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protest such official from liability for acts done
without or in excess of his authority.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not private respondents' complaint against petitioner Lansang, as Chairman of NPDC, is in
effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued without its consent
RULING
NO. The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts
done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the
state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself
to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to
the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts
that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal
capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. Neither does it apply where the public
official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts
complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.
13. Heirs of Mendoza v. DPWH
HEIRS OF DIOSDADO M. MENDOZA, namely: LICINIA V. MENDOZA, PETER VAL V. MENDOZA,

CONSTANCIA V. MENDOZA YOUNG, CRISTINA V. MENDOZA FIGUEROA, DIOSDADO V.
MENDOZA, JR., JOSEPHINE V. MENDOZA JASA, and RIZALINA V. MENDOZA PUSO,
petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, and the DPWH
SECRETARY, respondents
G.R. No. 203834. July 9, 2014
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Acts jure imperii vs. Acts jure gestionis
Synopsis:
The general rule is that a state may not be sued, but it may be the subject of a suit if it consents to be
sued, either expressly or impliedly. In order to determine implied waiver when the State or its agency
entered into a contract, there is a need to distinguish whether the contract was entered into in its
governmental capacity. The contracts that the DPWH entered into with Mendoza for the construction of
Packages VI and IX of the HADP were done in the exercise of its governmental functions. Hence,
petitioners cannot claim that there was an implied waiver by the DPWH simply by entering into a
contract.
Digest:
FACTS
Diosdado M. Mendoza, the owner of a business named D’ Superior Builders, was the winning bidder for
the construction of the 15-kilometer Madaymen Masala Amsuling Road in Benguet and the engineers’
quarters and laboratory, designated as Package VI, of the Highland Agriculture Development Project
(HADP) of the DPWH. He also won the bidding for Package IX of the project. Subsequently however,
Mendoza filed a case for specific performance and damages against the DPWH, contending that the
named defendants conspired to make it appear that Superior Builders incurred negative slippage of 29%
and recommended the forfeiture of Package VI, and that the DPWH did not execute any contract for
Package IX despite the Superior Builders’ compliance with all the post-evaluation requirements. The
DPWH also recommended the rebidding of Package IX. Package IX was, in effect, canceled together with
the forfeiture of the contract for Package VI. In ruling for the plaintiff (Mendoza), the trial court ruled that
in entering into a contract, the DPWH divested itself of immunity from suit and assumed the character of
an ordinary litigant.
ISSUE(S)
Did the acts of the DPWH, in entering the contracts with Mendoza, serve as implied waiver of the State’s
immunity from suit?
RULING
No. The general rule is that a state may not be sued, but it may be the subject of a suit if it consents to
be sued, either expressly or impliedly. There is express consent when a law so provides, while there is
implied consent when the State enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation. The Supreme
Court explained that to determine implied waiver when the State or its agency entered into a contract,
there is a need to distinguish whether the contract was entered into in its governmental or proprietary
capacity. The Court described the DPWH as an unincorporated government agency without any separate
juridical personality of its own, and thus it enjoys immunity from suit.
The contracts that the DPWH entered into with Mendoza for the construction of Packages VI and IX of
the HADP were done in the exercise of its governmental functions. Hence, petitioners cannot claim that
there was an implied waiver by the DPWH simply by entering into a contract. Thus, the Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that the DPWH enjoys immunity from suit and may not be sued without its consent.
14. Secretary of Health v. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, and MA. MARGARITA M. GALON,

petitioners, vs. PHIL PHARMAWEALTH, INC., respondent
G.R. No. 182358. February 20, 2013.
Ponente: J. Del Castillo

Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Unincorporated agencies performing jure imperii
Synopsis:
DOH is an unincorporated agency which performs sovereign or governmental functions. An
unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity
from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages
against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However,
the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental
function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of
the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in
favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was
essentially a business.
Digest:
FACTS
Administrative Order (AO) No. 27 series of 1998 was issued by then Department of Health (DOH)
Secretary Romualdez, which set the guidelines and procedure for accreditation of government suppliers
of pharmaceutical products for sale or distribution to the public, such accreditation to be valid for 3 years
but subject to annual review.
On January 25, 2000, Sec. Romualdez issued AO 10 series of 2000 which amended AO 27. Under Sec.
VII, the accreditation period for government suppliers of pharmaceutical products was reduced to two
years. Moreover, such accreditation may be recalled, suspended or revoked after due deliberation and
proper notice by the DOH Accreditation Committee, through its Chairman.
Sec. VII of AO 10, was later amended by AO 66 series of 2000, which provided that the 2 year
accreditation period may be recalled, suspended or revoked only after due deliberation, hearing and
notice by the DOH Accreditation Committee, through its Chairman.
On August 28, 2000, the DOH issued Memorandum No. 171-C which provided for a list and category of
sanctions to be imposed on accredited government suppliers of pharmaceutical products in case of
adverse findings regarding their products or violations committed by them during accreditation. In line
with this, former Undersecratary Galon, issued Memorandum No. 209 series of 2000, inviting
representatives of 24 accredited drug companies, including Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. (PPI) to a meeting.
During which the undersecretary handed them copies of a document entitled “Report on Violative
Products” issued by BFAD. Specifically, the BFAD found that PPI’s products which were being sold to the
public were unfit for human consumption. PPI including the 24 drug companies present were directed to
submit within 10 days, their respective explanations on their adverse findings contained in the report.
But instead of submitting its explanation, PPI belatedly sent a letter addressed to the Undersecretary.
However, PPI did not indicate when its reply would be submitted; nor did it seek an extension of the 10
day period, which had expired, much less offer any explanation for its failure to timely submit its reply.
In a letter-reply, Undersecretary Galon found “untenable” PPI’s and therein informed PPI that, effective
immediately, its accreditation has been suspended for two years pursuant to AO 10 and Memorandum
No. 171-C. However, in another letter, PPI questioned the suspension.
PPI filed before the RTC of Pasig City a Complaint seeking to declare null and void certain DOH
Administrative issuances, with prayer for damages and injunction against the DOH, the former Secretary
and Undersecretary. But the trial court dismissed the case, declaring the case to be one instituted against
the state, in which case the principle of state immunity from suit is applicable.
PPI appealed to the CA and the CA reversed the trial court ruling and ordered the remand of the case for
the conduct of further proceedings.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the DOH can validly invoke state immunity
RULING
Yes. As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly or impliedly,
then it may be the subject of a suit. There is express consent when a law, either special or general, so
provides. On the other hand, there is implied consent when the state “enters into a contract or it itself
commences litigation.” However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not
automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability. The State “will be deemed to have impliedly
waived its non-suability [only] if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity.
[However,] when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity[,] x x x no such waiver
may be implied.” “Statutory provisions waiving [s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For,
waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.”
The DOH can validly invoke state immunity.
a) DOH is an unincorporated agency which performs sovereign or governmental functions.
The ruling in Air Transportation Office v. Ramos is relevant, viz.:
An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys
immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for
damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated.
However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing
governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been
upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has
not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of
government but was essentially a business.
b) The Complaint seeks to hold the DOH solidarily and jointly liable with the other defendants for
damages which constitutes a charge or financial liability against the state.
Moreover, it is settled that if a Complaint seeks to “impose a charge or financial liability against the
state,” the defense of non-suability may be properly invoked. In this case, PPI specifically prayed, in its
Complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint, for the DOH, together with Secretaries Romualdez
and Dayrit as well as Undersecretary Galon, to be held jointly and severally liable for moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit. Undoubtedly, in the event that PPI succeeds in its
suit, the government or the state through the DOH would become vulnerable to an imposition or financial
charge in the form of damages. This would require an appropriation from the national treasury which is
precisely the situation which the doctrine of state immunity aims to protect the state from.
The mantle of non-suability extends to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the
performance of their official functions.
“The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his
official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will
result in a charge or financial liability against the government.” Otherwise stated, “public officials can be
held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties
where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith.” Moreover, “[t]he rule is that if
the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the
suit must be regarded as against the state x x x. In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the
[C]omplaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.”
15. UP v. Dizon
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN, RUBEN P.

ASPIRAS, EMMANUEL P. BELLO, WILFREDO P. DAVID, CASIANO S. ABRIGO, and JOSEFINA R.
LICUANAN, petitioners, vs. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, STERN BUILDERS, INC., and
SERVILLANO DELA CRUZ, respondents
G.R. No. 171182. August 23, 2012
Ponente: J. Bersamin
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Garnishment pursuant to a judgment award
Synopsis:
The RTC cannot direct the garnishment of public funds to satisfy a judgment debt, because the
constitution prohibits payment out of the national treasury unless it is by an appropriation made by
Congress. Further, Trial judges should not immediately issue writs of execution or garnishment against
the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities to enforce money judgments.
They should bear in mind that the primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle all claims of any sort
due from the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities pertains to the
Commission on Audit (COA)
Digest:
FACTS
On August 30, 1990, the UP entered into a contract with respondent Stern Builders Corporation for the
construction of the extension building and the renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences Building in
the campus of the University of the Philippines in Los Baños (UPLB).
The contractor billed three (3) progress billings but the UP only paid two (2) billings. The 3rd billing
amounting to P273,729.47 was not paid due to disallowance by COA. However, despite the lifting of COA
of the disallowance, the obligation was not paid. Thus, they sought the aid of the court.
RTC directed the garnishment of public funds mounting to PhP16,370,191.74 belonging to the UP to
satisfy the writ of execution issued to enforce already the final and executor judgment against the UP.
CA affirmed the RTC.
Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the funds of the UP were the proper subject of garnishment in order to satisfy the judgment
award
RULING
No, an appropriation by Congress was required before the judgment that rendered the UP liable for moral
and actual damages (including attorney’s fees) would be satisfied considering that such monetary
liabilities were not covered by the “appropriations earmarked for the said project.” The Constitution
strictly mandated that “(n)o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.”
Further, Trial judges should not immediately issue writs of execution or garnishment against the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities to enforce money judgments.
1They should bear in mind that the primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle all claims of any sort
due from the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities pertains to the
Commission on Audit (COA) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1445(Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines).
16. ATO v. Spouses Ramos
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN, RUBEN P.

ASPIRAS, EMMANUEL P. BELLO, WILFREDO P. DAVID, CASIANO S. ABRIGO, and JOSEFINA R.
LICUANAN, petitioners, vs. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, STERN BUILDERS, INC., and
SERVILLANO DELA CRUZ, respondents
G.R. No. 171182. August 23, 2012
Synopsis:
The State’s immunity from suit does not extend to the petitioner because it is an agency of the State
engaged in an enterprise that is far from being the State’s exclusive prerogative.
The CA correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not
performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management
and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in
its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit.
Digest:
FACTS
Spouses Ramos discovered that a portion of their land was being used as part of the runway and running
shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO). On August
11, 1995, the respondents agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the
ATO for ₱778,150.00. However, ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands. Thus,
respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials in the RTC.
In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the
respondents’ affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to entertain the action without the State’s consent considering that the deed of sale had been
entered into in the performance of governmental functions.
The RTC denied the ATO’s motion for a preliminary hearing of the affirmative defense and likewise
denied the ATO’s motion for reconsideration. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari.
The RTC rendered its decision on the merits in favor of the respondents. ATO appealed to the CA, which
affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE(S)
WON the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent
RULING
The petition for review has no merit.

The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of
the State, is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, Section 3. The State may not be
sued without its consent. The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a
sovereign, can do no wrong.
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends. "Car on peut bien recevoir loy d'autruy, mais il est impossible par nature de
se donner loy." Bodin, Republique, 1, chap. 8, ed. 1629, p. 132; Sir John Eliot, De Jure Maiestatis, chap.
3. Nemo suo statuto ligatur necessitative. Baldus, De Leg. et Const. Digna Vox, 2. ed. 1496, fol. 51b, ed.
1539, fol. 61. - Justice Holmes in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank:
Practical considerations dictate the establishment of an immunity from suit in favor of the State.
Otherwise, and the State is suable at the instance of every other individual, government service may be
severely obstructed and public safety endangered because of the number of suits that the State has to
defend against.
[A] continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the
inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to
the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well-known
propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy
required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an
effective obstacle, could very well be imagined.
upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function;
it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of
government but was essentially a business. – Fr. Bernas
Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from
suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized. The rule is thus
stated in Corpus Juris:
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in private or non-
governmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for public
purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than
functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The latter
is true, although the state may own stock or property of such a corporation for by engaging in business
operations through a corporation, the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by
implication consents to suits against the corporation. - National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, supra,
pp. 206-207
The CA correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not
performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management
and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in
its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for
compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation
proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a citizen. In
exercising the right of eminent domain, the Court explained, the State exercised its jus imperii, as
distinguished from its proprietary rights, or jus gestionis; yet, even in that area, where private property
had been taken in expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit
could not be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owners. - De los Santos v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,
Whether or not the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent has been rendered moot by the
passage of RA 9497, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008. which abolished the
ATO, to wit:
Section 4. Creation of the Authority. - There is hereby created an independent regulatory body with
quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers and possessing corporate attributes to be known as the Civil
Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), herein after referred to as the "Authority" attached to the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) for the purpose of policy coordination. For
this purpose, the existing Air transportation Office created under the provisions of Republic Act No. 776,
as amended is hereby abolished.
xxx
Under its Transitory Provisions, R.A. No. 9497 established in place of the ATO the Civil Aviation Authority
of the Philippines (CAAP), which thereby assumed all of the ATO’s powers, duties and rights, assets, real
and personal properties, funds, and revenues,
With the CAAP having legally succeeded the ATO pursuant to R.A. No. 9497, the obligations that the ATO
had incurred by virtue of the deed of sale with the Ramos spouses might now be enforced against the
CAAP.
WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petition for review on certiorari, and affirms the decision promulgated
by the Court of Appeals.
- RIVERA
17. Hermano Oil vs. Toll Regulatory Board
HERMANO OIL MANUFACTURING & SUGAR CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. TOLL

REGULATORY BOARD, ENGR. JAIME S. DUMLAO, JR., PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION (PNCC) and DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS (DPWH), respondents
G.R. No. 167290. November 26, 2014
Synopsis:
The issue to be determined concerns the demand of the petitioner to have access to the North Luzon
Expressway (NLEX) by way of an easement of right of way. The demand was rebuffed by the
respondents and upheld by both the trial and appellate courts. The Supreme Court ruled that, as the TRB
and the DPWH were exercising governmental functions, they were invested with the inherent power of
sovereignty. Being unincorporated agencies or entities of the National Government, they could not be
sued as such.
Digest:
FACTS
Hermano Oil Manufacturing & Sugar Corporation owned a parcel of land at NLEX. The petitioner
requested that respondent Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) grant an easement of right of way, for it had
been deprived of its enjoyment and possession by the fence that barred its entry. TRB denied based on
the Limited Access Highway Act.
Hence, petitioner sued TRB and Engr. Dumlao demanding specific performance, the grant of the
easement of right of way and damages being deprived of its property without due process, just
compensation and equal protection of the law.
In its order dated March 6, 2002,10 the RTC granted the motion to dismiss, observing as follows:The
present action against the defendants Toll Regulatory Board and its Executive Director, Engr. Jaime S.
Dumlao, Jr., could be considered as a suit against the state without its consent as among the reliefs
prayed for in the complaint is to require the said defendants to pay, jointly and severally, a just and
reasonable compensation of the plaintiff's property which, if awarded in the judgment against said
defendants, would ultimately involve an appropriation by the state of the amount needed to pay the
compensation and damages so awarded. Moreover, as pointed out by the defendants-movants,
defendant Jaime S. Dumlao, Jr. is sued in his official capacity so that the instant complaint against him is
tantamount to a claim against the state which cannot be sued without its consent.
On October 27, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed judgment, affirming the RTC's dismissal of the
complaint
ISSUE(S)
Whether the respondents can validly invoke the state immunity from suit
RULING
In our view, the TRB, Dumlao and the DPWH correctly invoked the doctrine of sovereign immunity in
their favor. The TRB and the DPWH performed purely or essentially government or public functions. As
such, they were invested with the inherent power of sovereignty. Being unincorporated agencies or
entities of the National Government, they could not be sued as such. On his part, Dumlao was acting as
the agent of the TRB in respect of the matter concerned.
18. Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR SOERATMIN, and MINISTER

COUNSELLOR AZHARI KASIM, petitioners, vs. JAMES VINZON, doing business under the
name and style of VINZON TRADE AND SERVICES, respondent
G.R. No. 154705. June 26, 2003
Ponente: J. Azcuna
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Restrictive Theory
Synopsis:
The rules of International Law, however, are neither unyielding nor impervious to change. The increasing
need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge
of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity. This concept, the
restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts
or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. Submission by a foreign
state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal. It must be given explicitly or by necessary
implication.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance
Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services.
The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified
equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official
residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin.
Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of the said agreement, they informed
respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of
Administration, Minister Counsellor Azhari Kasim. When Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position
of Chief of Administration he allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in
compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy
terminated the agreement. Petitioners claim, moreover, that they had earlier verbally informed
respondent of their decision to terminate the agreement.
Respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, respondent filed a
complaint against petitioners in RTC. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the Republic of
Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-
defendant in the Philippines.
ISSUE(S)
WON Petitioner has sovereign immunity from suit
RULING
Yes. International law is founded largely upon the principles of reciprocity, comity, independence, and
equality of States which were adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution. The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence
of the principles of independence and equality of States. As enunciated in Sanders v. Veridiano II, the
practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived
from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet
imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary
attitude would “unduly vex the peace of nations.”
The rules of International Law, however, are neither unyielding nor impervious to change. The increasing
need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge
of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity. This concept, the
restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts
or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal. It must be given
explicitly or by necessary implication. We find no such waiver in this case. ###
19. China National Machinery and Equipment Corp. v. Santamaria
CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP. (GROUP), petitioner, vs. HON. CESAR
D. SANTAMARIA, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 145, Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL,
ROMEL R. BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER FRANCISCO C. BOLASTIG, LEAGUE OF URBAN POOR FOR
ACTION (LUPA), KILUSAN NG MARALITA SA MEYCAUAYAN (KMM-LUPA CHAPTER), DANILO
M. CALDERON, VICENTE C. ALBAN, MERLYN M. VAAL, LOLITA S. QUINONES, RICARDO D.
LANOZO, JR., CONCHITA G. GOZO, MA. TERESA D. ZEPEDA, JOSEFINA A. LANOZO, and
SERGIO C. LEGASPI, JR., KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY), EDY
CLERIGO, RAMMIL DINGAL, NELSON B. TERRADO, CARMEN DEUNIDA, and EDUARDO
LEGSON, respondents.
G.R. No. 185572. February 7, 2012.
Ponente: J. Sereno
Synopsis:
Admittedly, the Loan Agreement was entered into between EXIM Bank and the Philippine government,
while the Contract Agreement was between Northrail and CNMEG. Although the Contract Agreement is
silent on the classification of the legal nature of the transaction, it nonetheless reveals the intention of
the parties to the Northrail Project to classify the whole venture as commercial or proprietary in
character. Adhering to the restrictive theory, the petitioner is therefore not entitled to immunity from suit.
Digest:
FACTS
On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (CNMEG), represented
by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the North Luzon
Railways Corporation for the conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway line from Manila to San
Fernando, La Union.
On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Department of Finance of the
Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding, wherein China agreed to extend
Preferential Buyer’s Credit to the Philippine government to finance the Northrail Project. The Chinese
government designated EXIM Bank as the lender, while the Philippine government named the DOF as the
borrower. Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend an amount not exceeding USD
400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years, with a 5-year grace period, and at the rate of 3%
per annum.
On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Wang Chungui, wrote a letter to DOF
Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho informing him of CNMEG’s designation as the Prime Contractor for the
Northrail Project. On 30 December 2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract Agreement for the
construction of Section I, Phase I of the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan to Malolos on a
turnkey basis (the Contract Agreement). The contract price for the Northrail Project was pegged at USD
421,050,000.
On 26 February 2004, the Philippine government and EXIM Bank entered into a counterpart financial
agreement, the Buyer Credit Loan Agreement. In the Loan Agreement, EXIM Bank agreed to extend
Preferential Buyer’s Credit in the amount of USD 400,000,000 in favor of the Philippine government in
order to finance the construction of Phase I of the Northrail Project.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the Northrail contracts are products of an executive agreement between two sovereign
states
RULING
No. Petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) is not entitled to immunity from suit,
and the Contract Agreement is not an executive agreement. CNMEG’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is DENIED for being moot and academic.
The Court explained the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Holy See v. Rosario, to wit:
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity
of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with
regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or
governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to commercial,
private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act
involved – whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary,
functions. As held in United States of America v. Ruiz.
Admittedly, the Loan Agreement was entered into between EXIM Bank and the Philippine government,
while the Contract Agreement was between Northrail and CNMEG. Although the Contract Agreement is
silent on the classification of the legal nature of the transaction, the foregoing provisions of the Loan
Agreement, which is an inextricable part of the entire undertaking, nonetheless reveal the intention of the
parties to the Northrail Project to classify the whole venture as commercial or proprietary in character.
Thus, piecing together the content and tenor of the Contract Agreement, the Memorandum of
Understanding dated 14 September 2002, Amb. Wang’s letter dated 1 October 2003, and the Loan
Agreement would reveal the desire of CNMEG to construct the Luzon Railways in pursuit of a purely
commercial activity performed in the ordinary course of its business.
20. Arigo v. Swift
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, D.D., Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa, et al., petitioners,
versus SCOTT H. SWIFT, in his capacity as Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet, et al.,
respondents
G.R. No. 206510. September 16, 2014
Ponente: J. Villarama, Jr.

Synopsis:
In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US
Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission
resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were
performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will
require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one
against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this
Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Roblin.
Digest:
FACTS
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012,
the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit
the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine
ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for
Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the
northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one
was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil. On April 17, 2013, the
above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective sector/organization and
others, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition against Scott H. Swift in his
capacity as Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet, et. al. as respondents. Petitioners claim that the grounding,
salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental
damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo,
Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events
violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this
Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of
environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.
ISSUE(S)
Whether this Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or
manifestation in this case
RULING
NO. The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-
suability of the State, is expressly provided in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states
that “the State may not be sued without its consent.” The rule that a state may not be sued without its
consent, as expressed in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted
principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Section 2, Article
II.
In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals, we further expounded on the immunity of foreign states
from the jurisdiction of local courts, as follows: “The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of
a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with the
personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made
to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state
itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by
its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the
complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a
representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not
accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim — par
in parem, non habet imperium — that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over
one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount
needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state
itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.”
In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US
Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission
resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were
performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will
require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one
against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this
Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Roblin.
21. Basco v. PAGCOR
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO

SANCHEZ, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR), respondent
G.R. No. 91649. May 14, 1991
Ponente: J. Paras
Topic: Local Autonomy
Synopsis:
The principle of local autonomy does not make local governments sovereign within the state, it simply
means decentralization. Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or
state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of
government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an
intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners here seek the annulment the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
Charter—PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because it
constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the
Manila City government’s right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law. Moreover,
the law has intruded into the local government’s right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in
contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy. The petitioners are
particularly assailing Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder
from paying any “tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of
whatever nature, whether National or Local.”
ISSUE(S)
Does the PAGCOR Charter violate the principle of fiscal autonomy?
RULING
No. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. The
Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it.
Its “power to tax” therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed
upon by the state itself which has the “inherent power to tax”.
The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to “create and abolish municipal
corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over
Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can
also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
22 Kilosbayan v. Morato
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA,

EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO,
JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE
CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP.
JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners, vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, respondents
G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Topic: Non-Self-Executing Provisions
Synopsis:
By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined that consistently with
these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That is why we
said with respect to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, “the morality of gambling
is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. ...It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as
it sees fit.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners seek reconsideration for the Courts decision in this case. They insists that the decision in the
first case has already settled (Please see Kilosbayan vs. Guingona) 1.) Whether Kilosbayan, Inc. has a
standing to sue and 2.) Whether under its charter the PCSO can enter into any form of association or
collaboration with any party in operating an online lottery. Consequently, petitioners contend, these
questions can no longer be reopened.
Furthermore the petitioners contented that (1) that the constitutional policies and principles
invoked by petitioners, while not supplying the basis for affirmative relief from the courts, may
nonetheless be resorted to for striking down laws or official actions which are inconsistent with them and
(2) that the Constitution, by guaranteeing to independent people’s organizations “effective and
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision-making” (Art. XIII, §16),
grants them standing to sue on constitutional grounds.
The policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by petitioner read:

ART. II, §5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.
Id., §12. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Id., §13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism
and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Id., §17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to
foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and
development.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the constitutional policies and principles invoked by petitioners is self-executing
RULING
No. the provisions are not self-executing. They do not confer rights which can be enforced in the courts
but only provide guidelines for legislative or executive action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for
charity, Congress has in effect determined that consistently with these policies and principles of the
Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That is why we said with respect to the opening by
the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, “the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling
is not illegal per se. ...It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit.” (Magtajas v. Pryce
Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 (1994))
23 Tanada v. Angara
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the Philippine

Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as members of the
House of Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and HORACIO R.
MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC
PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES,
LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION
MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and
PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in representation of various taxpayers and as non-
governmental organizations, petitioners, vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO,
LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON,
NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEÑA, SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA,
RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in their respective capacities as
members of the Philippine Senate who concurred in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization; SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA,
in her capacity as National Treasurer; RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of
Trade and Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture;
ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, respondents
G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997
Ponente: J. Panganiban
Topic: Constitutional Construction – Filipino First Policy
Synopsis:
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair—the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy.
Digest:
FACTS
In order to hasten the recovery after the World War I, member countries ratified World Trade
Organization with the signing of the “Final Act” in Marrakesh, Morocco. The Philippines joined to WTO
thru Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of DTI representing the Republic of the Philippines
signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Negotiation.
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from
the President of the Philippines, stating among others that “the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby
submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.”
The Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which ratified the agreement establishing the WTO.
ISSUE(S)
Whether letter the “spirit and intent” of the Constitution is violated by the WTO Agreement which states
“develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give
preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials
and locally produced goods”
RULING
No, decision of the Senate to ratify the WTO Agreement is not defiant of the Constitution. What the
Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable
is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers
and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and
economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After
all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a
member.
Further, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on
the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair—the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy.-
24 Estrada v. Escritor
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, complainant, vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent

A.M. No. P-02-1651. June 22, 2006.
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P)
Ponente: J. Puno
Topic: Separation of Church and State
Synopsis:
The theory of benevolent neutrality or accommodation is premised on a different view of the “wall of
separation,” associated with Williams, founder of the Rhode Island colony. Unlike the Jeffersonian wall
that is meant to protect the state from the church, the wall is meant to protect the church from the state.
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that religion plays an important role in the public life of the United
States as shown by many traditional government practices which, to strict neutrality, pose Establishment
Clause questions.
Digest:
FACTS
Soledad Escritor was a member of Jehova’s Witnesses. In 2000, complainant Alejandro Estrada requested
Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr. of the Las Piñas RTC to investigate Escritor, for the purpose of initiating an
administrative complaint. Estrada believes that, by living with a man not her husband and having borne a
child out of this living arrangement, she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the
court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court
condones her act. Respondent was consequently charged with disgraceful and immoral conduct under
the Revised Administrative Code. In her defense, Escritor claims that as a member of the religious sect
known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation. In fact,
after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.”
ISSUE(S)
Given that Escritor’s defense hinges on religious concerns, is the court, in interpreting the Revised
Administrative Code in her favor, in effect violating the constitutional mandate against enacting laws
respecting an establishment of religion?
RULING
No. In this case, the Supreme Court through Justice Puno elucidated that the Philippines adheres to the
benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the separation clause in the constitution. Under these
circumstances, respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a
case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court
recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms—including religious freedom—may
be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable
to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so
compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In
the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the
Infinite.
Justice Puno’s discussion on the three theories in church and state separation:
Strict Separation; Words and Phrases; The Strict Separationist believes that the Establishment Clause
was meant to protect the state from the church, and the state’s hostility towards religion allows no
interaction between the two.—The Strict Separationist believes that the Establishment Clause was meant
to protect the state from the church, and the state’s hostility towards religion allows no interaction
between the two. According to this Jeffersonian view, an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of
religion and state needs to be erected. Religious institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or
indirect, from the state. Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to alleviate burdens the programs
placed on believers. Only the complete separation of religion from politics would eliminate the formal
influence of religious institutions and provide for a free choice among political views, thus a strict “wall of
separation” is necessary.
Unlike the strict separationists, the strict neutrality view, which is a tamer version of the strict
separationist view, believes that the “wall of separation” does not require the state to be their adversary
—rather, the state must be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers.
“State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.”—The tamer
version of the strict separationist view, the strict neutrality or separationist view, (or, the governmental
neutrality theory) finds basis in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1946), where the Court
declared that Jefferson’s “wall of separation” encapsulated the meaning of the First Amendment.
However, unlike the strict separationists, the strict neutrality view believes that the “wall of separation”
does not require the state to be their adversary. Rather, the state must be neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and non-believers. “State power is no more to be used so as to handicap
religions than it is to favor them.” The strict neutrality approach is not hostile to religion, but it is strict in
holding that religion may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of governmental action,
whether the action confers rights or privileges or imposes duties or obligations. Only secular criteria may
be the basis of government action. It does not permit, much less require, accommodation of secular
programs to religious belief.
Benevolent Neutrality or Accommodation; Words and Phrases; The theory of benevolent neutrality or
accommodation is premised on a different view of the “wall of separation,” in that, unlike the
Jeffersonian wall that is meant to protect the state from the church, the wall is meant to protect the
church from the state.—The theory of benevolent neutrality or accommodation is premised on a different
view of the “wall of separation,” associated with Williams, founder of the Rhode Island colony. Unlike the
Jeffersonian wall that is meant to protect the state from the church, the wall is meant to protect the
church from the state. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that religion plays an important role in the public
life of the United States as shown by many traditional government practices which, to strict neutrality,
pose Establishment Clause questions. Among these are the inscription of “In God We Trust” on American
currency; the recognition of America as “one nation under God” in the official pledge of allegiance to the
flag; the Supreme Court’s time-honored practice of opening oral argument with the invocation “God save
the United States and this Honorable Court”; and the practice of Congress and every state legislature of
paying a chaplain, usually of a particular Protestant denomination, to lead representatives in prayer.
These practices clearly show the preference for one theological viewpoint—the existence of and potential
for intervention by a god—over the contrary theological viewpoint of atheism. Church and government
agencies also cooperate in the building of low-cost housing and in other forms of poor relief, in the
treatment of alcoholism and drug addiction, in foreign aid and other government activities with strong
moral dimension.
25 Republic v. Galang
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. NESTOR GALANG, respondent

G.R. No. 168335. June 6, 2011
Ponente: J. Brion
Topic: State Policies – The Family
Synopsis:
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social
institution, and marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected
by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence
presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered
into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was
celebrated, we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
Digest:
FACTS
While they got married on March 9, 1994 in Pampanga, on August 4, 1999, the respondent filed with the
RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy alleging that Juvy was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she was a kleptomaniac
and a swindler; that she stole his ATM card and his parents’ money, and often asked money from their
friends and relatives on the pretext that Christopher (son) was confined in a hospital; that she suffers
from "mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and
affection [towards him and their] child.". He posited that Juvy’s incapacity was "extremely serious" and
"appears to be incurable."
In his testimony, the respondent alleged that he was the one who prepared their breakfast because Juvy
did not want to wake up early; Juvy often left their child to their neighbors’ care; and Christopher almost
got lost in the market when Juvy brought him there
Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist, who
testified that she conducted a psychological test on the respondent. Psychological findings tend to
confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders. These disorders are
manifested through her grave dependency on gambling and stealing money. She doesn’t manifest any
sense of responsibility and loyalty and these disorders appear to be incorrigible.
After a careful perusal of the evidence in the instant case and there being no controverting evidence, the
RTC nullified the marriage in its decision of January 22, 2001 finding that the psychological incapacity of
respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations of his marriage with petitioner, which Dr.
Gerardo Veloso said can be characterized by (a) gravity because the subject cannot carry out the normal
and ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary
circumstances of life and work; (b) antecedence, because the root cause of the trouble can be traced to
the history of the subject before marriage although its overt manifestations appear over after the
wedding; and (c) incurability, if treatments required exceed the ordinary means or subject, or involve
time and expense beyond the reach of the subject - are all obtaining in this case.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto, while also subsequently denying the motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE(S)
WON the totality of the evidence presented by the respondent was insufficient to establish Juvy’s
psychological incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations
RULING
Yes, it was insufficient. Therefore, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner), challenging the decision of the CA was granted.
The respondent’s testimony merely showed the acts of Juvy which do not per se rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that the law requires since psychological incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. It is essential that he or
she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical, illness.
In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage - had to be shown. A cause has to be
shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.
The respondent’s testimony failed to show that Juvy’s condition is a manifestation of a disordered
personality rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that rendered her unable
to discharge her essential marital obligation. In this light, the acts attributed to Juvy only showed
indications of immaturity and lack of sense of responsibility, resulting in nothing more than the difficulty,
refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations.
The submitted psychological report hardly helps the respondent’s cause, as it glaringly failed to establish
that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital duties at the material time
required by Article 36 of the Family Code. The psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her
conclusions exclusively from the information given her by the respondent. Expectedly, the respondent’s
description of Juvy would contain a considerable degree of bias; thus, a psychological evaluation based
on this one-sided description alone can hardly be considered as credible or sufficient.
The psychologist’s report simply stressed Juvy’s negative traits which she considered manifestations of
Juvy’s psychological incapacity
In the end, the psychologist opined - without stating the psychological basis for her conclusion - that
"there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform
her marital duties as a wife and mother to their only son.
Finally, the allegations, even if true, all occurred during the marriage. The testimony was totally devoid of
any information or insight into Juvy’s early life and associations, how she acted before and at the time of
the marriage, and how the symptoms of a disordered personality developed. Simply put, the psychologist
failed to trace the history of Juvy’s psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the
time of the celebration of the marriage. She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the elements of gravity
and incurability.
26 Garcia v. Executive Secretary
MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, AFP (RET.), petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, representing the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GEN. EDUARDO SL. OBAN, JR., and LT. GEN. GAUDENCIO S. PANGILINAN, AFP (RET.),
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, respondents
G.R. No. 198554. July 30, 2012
Ponente: J. Peralta
Topic: Parens Patriae – Equal protection
Synopsis:
The application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in accordance with the
Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution; The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state’s duly-
constituted authorities.
Digest:
FACTS
Garcia, tried by the Special General Court Martial NR 2, was charged with and convicted of violation of
the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) and violation of the 97th Article
of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) for failing to disclose all his assets in
his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by RA 3019, as
amended in relation to RA 6713.
Garcia, among others, argued that the confirmation issued by the Office of the President directing his
two-year detention in a penitentiary had already been fully served following his preventive confinement
subject to Article 29 of the RPC (Revised Penal Code). He was released on December 16, 2010 after a
preventive confinement for six years and two months. He was initially confined at his quarters at Camp
General Emilio Aguinaldo before he was transferred to the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (ISAFP) Detention Center, and latter to the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center.
Hence, on September 16, 2011, or a week after the OP confirmed the sentence of the court martial
against him, Garcia was arrested and detained and continues to be detained, for 2 years, at the
maximum security compound of the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. The OP stated that Art 29 of the
RPC is not applicable in Military Courts for it is separate and distinct from ordinary courts.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE(S)
(1) Whether or not Article 29 of the RPC is applicable in Military Courts
(2) Whether or not the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in accordance with
the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution
RULING
(1) The Court ruled that applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (Period of
preventive imprisonment deducted from time of imprisonment), the time within which the petitioner was
under preventive confinement should be credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of the
President, subject to the conditions set forth by the same law.
The Court held that “the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the word and acts
as a criminal court.” As such, certain provisions of the RPC, insofar as those that are not provided in the
Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary. “[A]bsent any provision as to
the application of a criminal concept in the implementation and execution of the General Court Martial’s
decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29 should be applied. In fact, the
deduction of petitioner’s (Garcia) period of confinement to his sentence has been recommended in the
Staff Judge Advocate Review.”
(2) The Court further held that the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in
accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. “The concept of equal justice
under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification,” held the Court.
27 ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S.

ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R.
SANDOVAL, petitioners, vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his capacity as Commissioner of Bureau
of Customs, respondents
G.R. No. 166715. August 14, 2008
Ponente: J. Corona
Topic: Separation of Powers
Synopsis:
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations before
they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the
form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It
radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress
a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.
Digest:
FACTS
This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act
(RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005). They assailed among others that the creation of a congressional
oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the
legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law,
the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law.
Respondents said that the creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances,
rather than violates, separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as
a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the executive and the implementing agencies.
ISSUE(S)
WON the provision of RA 9335 creating congressional oversight violated the principle of separation of
powers
RULING
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations before
they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the
form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It
radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress
a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress
or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be
unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling
made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional. ###
28 Belgica v. Executive Secretary
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA, JOSE M. VILLEGAS, JR., JOSE L. GONZALEZ, REUBEN
M. ABANTE, and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON, SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT,
and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his
capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, respondents
G.R. No. 208566. November 19, 2013
Ponente: J. Perlas-Bernabe
Topic: Separation of Powers/Non-Delegation of Legislative Power
Synopsis:
The Congessional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional, for violating certain constitutional principles,
particularly the separation of powers and the non-delegation of legislative powers. As a rule, the
budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive,
on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the
executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the
GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds
should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted.
Furthermore, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his
PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to
appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not
lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can
delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
Digest:
FACTS
Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It
underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development
Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may
request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is
approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential
pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this
has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of
PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six
whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork
barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in
funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations) which
would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact
going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results
thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
2. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
RULING
1. NO. the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional for violating the following principles:
i. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse).
The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a
part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening
was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects
their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation
of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled
that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as
the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.
ii. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the
people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned).
That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which
was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
a. delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
b. authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his
PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to
appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not
lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can
delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
iii. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA
which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact
that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his
PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the
appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of
budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”
iv. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives,
what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on
claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national
officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy
embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork
barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. YES. The presidential pork barrel is valid.

The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides that no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD
1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to
wit:
i. PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain
energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall
be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the
President may direct;
ii. PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be
allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government
infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
29 Pimentel v. COMELEC
AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC

SITTING AS THE NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, THE SPECIAL PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS FOR MAGUINDANAO CHAIRED BY ATTY. EMILIO S. SANTOS, and JUAN MIGUEL
F. ZUBIRI, respondents.
G.R. No. 178413. March 13, 2008
Ponente: Chico-Nazario
Topic: Exclusivity of Qualifications to the Legislature (Senate)
Synopsis:
The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with
the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have
no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must
be observed. In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election
laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a
candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such
power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
Digest:
FACTS
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing
the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with
the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution
read as follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36(g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides that “all candidates for public office x x x
both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.”
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re-election in the May
10, 2004 elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to
nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already
provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No.
6486. In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally
impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions
on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5)
residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any
other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The
Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard,
evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Section 36(g) of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional
RULING
YES. The Court says that it is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. In the same vein, the
COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to
what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such
additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the
democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution. Section 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the
assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec.
3, Art. VI of the Constitution which is declared to be unconstitutional.
30 Asistio v. Pe-Aguirre
LUIS A. ASISTIO, petitioner, versus Hon. Thelma Canlas Trinidad Pe-Aguirre, et al.,
respondents
G.R. No. 191124. April 27, 2010
Ponente: Nachura
Topic: Residency and Domicile
Synopsis:
"Residence," as used in political law is doctrinally settled to mean "domicile," importing not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a person’s acts, activities, and utterances
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an
actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose.
Digest:
FACTS
On January 26, 2010, private respondent Enrico R. Echiverri filed against petitioner Luis A.Asistio a
Petition for Exclusion before the MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City alleging that Asistio is not a resident of
Caloocan City, specifically not of 123 Interior P. Zamora St. Barangay 15, Caloocan City, the address
stated in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor in the 2010 Elections. Upon verification by private
respondent, petitioner was listed as a registered voter of Barangay 15 but his declared address , in truth,
falls under Barangay 17 where he is not listed in the CVL. Subsequently, the petition was granted by the
MeTC.
ISSUE(S)
Should Asistio be excluded from the permanent list of voters for failure to meet the residency
requirements?
RULING
No. Section 117 of The Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang 881) echoed in Section 9
of The Voters Registration Act of 1996 (Republic Act No. 8189) states that for a voter to be registered,
he/she must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year, and six months in the place where they
seek to be registered. "Residence," as used in the law is doctrinally settled to mean "domicile," importing
not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a person’s acts, activities, and utterances.
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an
actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose. Asistio has
always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years and his family is known
to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as
representative, having been elected as such in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In 2007, he
also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking
these circumstances into consideration, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to
qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has established domicile elsewhere, or
that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City.
31 Fernandez v. HRET
REPRESENTATIVE DANILO RAMON S. FERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND JESUS L. VICENTE, respondents
G.R. No. 187478. December 21, 2009
Ponente: J. Leonardo-De Castro

Topic: The House of Representatives - Qualifications
Synopsis:
The Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a property owner in the district where
he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at least a year prior to election day—to use
ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or
residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement, and the
Supreme Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office,
which property requirement would be unconstitutional.
Digest:
FACTS
On July 5, 2007, private respondent Vicente filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET, praying
that petitioner be declared ineligible to hold office as a Member of the House of Representatives
representing the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioner’s election and
proclamation be annulled and declared null and void. Private respondent’s main ground for the quo
warranto petition was that petitioner lacked the required one-year residency requirement provided under
Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The HRET ruled in favor of the private respondent, basing
its decision on documentary evidence where the petitioner stated that his birthplace is Pagsanjan,
Laguna, which is within the Fourth District of said province, as well as testimonies of barangay health
workers claiming that they never saw petitioner at his purported leased residence in Villa de Toledo,
Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
ISSUE(S)
Is the evidence sufficient to justify the disqualification of Fernandez for non-compliance of the one-year
residency requirement?
RULING
No. The only thing these pieces of documentary evidence prove is that petitioner’s domicile of origin was
Pagsanjan, Laguna and it remained his domicile up to 2005, at the latest. On the other hand, what
petitioner asserted in his 2007 COC is that he had been a resident of Sta. Rosa, Laguna in the First
District of Laguna as of February 2006 and respondent’s evidence failed contradict that claim. The fact
that a few barangay health workers attested that they had failed to see petitioner whenever they
allegedly made the rounds in Villa de Toledo is of no moment.
Furthermore, the HRET puts undue emphasis on the fact that petitioner is only leasing a townhouse in
Sta. Rosa while he owns houses in Pagsanjan and Cabuyao. His ownership of properties in other places
has been taken to mean that petitioner did not intend to make Sta. Rosa his permanent residence or that
he had not abandoned his domicile of origin. Although it is true that the latest acquired abode is not
necessarily the domicile of choice of a candidate, there is nothing in the Constitution or our election laws
which require a congressional candidate to sell a previously acquired home in one district and buy a new
one in the place where he seeks to run in order to qualify for a congressional seat in that other district.
Certainly, the Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a property owner in the
district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at least a year prior to election
day. To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile
or residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement.
32 Sema v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 177597. July 16, 2008.*

BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P.
DILANGALEN, respondents.
Ponente: J. Tinga
Topic(s): Powers of Congress
Synopsis:
The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts
out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not
through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of
Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through
a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995), we held that the
“power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws,”
and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.
Digest:
FACTS
These consolidated petitions seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan. The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for the
Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.
Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its
Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).
Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, it is not
part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held
in November 1989. On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising
its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight
municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.
ISSUE(S)
Does the ARMM have the power to create provinces and legislative districts?
RULING
No. The Supreme Court in this case ruled that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to
the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to
Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the
creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only
Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a
legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district.
Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a
district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly
operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
Consequently, MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan, was declared void.
33 Aldaba v. COMELEC
G.R No. 188078. January 25, 2010.*

VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, and MINERVA
ALDABA MORADA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic(s): House of Representatives – Legislative Districts
Synopsis:
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have “a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.” The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which
is based on demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no
basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because based
on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010.
Digest:
FACTS
The province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. The 1st Legislative
District comprised of of the city of Malolos and the municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan,
and Paombong. On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos’ City Charter, by creating a
separate legislative district for the city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress
in 2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162 (later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986,
the population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested
fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a
Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that “the projected population of the Municipality
of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to
2000.”
Petitioners, filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the
minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress provided under
the Constitution.
ISSUE(S)
Whether RA 9591 is unconstitutional
RULING
Yes. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have “a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.”
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without
legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification.
The Certification is also void on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population
of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal demographic projections
cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is
entitled to have a legislative district only in the “immediately following election” after the attainment of
the 250,000 population.
34 Aquino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 189793. April 7, 2010.*

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its
Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, respondents.
Ponente: J. Perez
Topic(s): House of Representatives – Legislative Districts
Synopsis:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must
compose a legislative district. As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the
framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district. The
second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: “Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.” The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a
district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers
and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.” Hence, the
first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined
with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by
Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the
proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not RA 9716 is unconstitutional for running afoul with Section 5(3) of Article VI of the
Constitution
RULING
No, RA 9716 is a valid law. The apportioning of the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd)
Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District
From Such Reapportionment” is a VALID LAW despite the fact that the new district is less than
250,000.00 in population.
While Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000
to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be
entitled to an additional district.
35 Bagabuyo v. COMELEC
35. G.R. No. 176970 December 8, 2008

ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Ponente: J. Perez
Topic(s): House of Representatives – Reapportionment of legislative districts
Synopsis:
A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of
a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out
any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast,
no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.
Digest:
FACTS
RA. 9371 increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to two. For the election of May 2007,
Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district,
depending on their place of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own
representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. On March 13,
2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 7837 implementing R.A. No. 9371.
Petitioner Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC on March 27, 2007 asking for the
nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds arguing that the
COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for
the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local government
unit. He prayed for the issuance of an order directing the respondents to cease and desist from
implementing R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, and to revert instead to COMELEC
Resolution No. 7801 which provided for a single legislative district for Cagayan de Oro.
Since the Court did not grant the petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction, the May 14 National and Local Elections proceeded according to R.A. No. 9371 and
Resolution No. 7837.
One of the commecnts of the respondent to the petition was that xxx3) the criteria established under
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case,
no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took
place; and 4) R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro's territory, population and
income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts
and divides the City of Cagayan de Oro as a local government unit, and does not merely provide for the
City's legislative apportionment.
ISSUE(S)
WON R.A. No. 9371 involve the division and conversion of a local government unit and violates the
equality of representation doctrine
RULING
NO.The petition is totally without merit. Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary
as the determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may
send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the
population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the
districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts
brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation.
Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the rules on legislative
apportionment under its Section 5 which provides:
Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
fifty members unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
xxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, continuous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
In its strict and proper sense, a municipality has been defined as "a body politic and corporate
constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose of local government
thereof." The creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of local government units,
i.e., of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, are covered by the Article on Local Government
(Article X). Section 10 of this Article provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit directly affected.
As above stated, the aim of legislative apportionment is "to equalize population and voting power among
districts.”
A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of
a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out
any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast,
no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision .
R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with
the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. Its core provision -
Section 1 - provides:
SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. - The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan de Oro is
hereby apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act.
Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon,
San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan,
Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise
the first district while barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth,
Macansandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo and
Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second
district.
Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate entity takes place
or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided
along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of
another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of representation
in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not come into play
and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.
Admittedly, the legislative reapportionment carries effects beyond the creation of another congressional
district in the city by providing, as reflected in COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, for additional Sangguniang
Panglunsod seats to be voted for along the lines of the congressional apportionment made. The effect on
the Sangguniang Panglunsod, however, is not directly traceable to R.A. No. 9371 but to another law -
R.A. No. 663641 - whose Section 3 provides:
SECTION 3. Other Cities. - The provision of any law to the contrary notwithstanding the City of
Cebu, City of Davao, and any other city with more than one representative district shall have
eight (8) councilors for each district who shall be residents thereof to be elected by the qualified
voters therein, provided that the cities of Cagayan de Oro, Zamboanga, Bacolod, Iloilo and other
cities comprising a representative district shall have twelve (12) councilors each and all other
cities shall have ten (10) councilors each to be elected at large by the qualified voters of the said
cities: Provided, That in no case shall the present number of councilors according to their
charters be reduced.
However, neither does this law have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political
and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide the city either territorially or as a corporate entity,
the effect is merely to enhance voter representation by giving each city voter more and greater say, both
in Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod.
The principle of equality of representation.
The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative districts is unequal. District 1 has only 93,719
registered voters while District 2 has 127,071. District 1 is composed mostly of rural barangays while
District 2 is composed mostly of urban barangays. Thus, R.A. No. 9371 violates the principle of equality
of representation.
The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a
province, not the number of registered voters therein.
The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in
gauging equality of representation.In fact, for cities, all it asks is that " each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand shall have one representative ," while ensuring representation for every
province regardless of the size of its population. To ensure quality representation through commonality of
interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is
that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Thus, the Constitution leaves the local government units as they are found and does not require
their division, merger or transfer to satisfy the numerical standard it imposes. Its requirements are
satisfied despite some numerical disparity if the units are contiguous, compact and adjacent as far as
practicable.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
36 Abayon v. HRET/Palparan v. HRET, GR. No. 189506
G.R. No. 189466. February 11, 2010.*

DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C.
DOROGA, respondents.
G.R. No. 189506. February 11, 2010.*
CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR., petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M.
REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN, ANTONIO FLORES and JOSELITO USTAREZ, respondents
Ponente: J. Abad
Topic: House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
Synopsis:
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House
of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan are the chosen representatives of the party list Aangat Tayo and Bantay,
respectively, during the 2007 elections. Quo warranto proceedings were initiated against them before the
HRET, claiming that they were not qualified to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
embodied by their party list. Abayon countered that in his complaint, Lucaban collaterally attacked the
qualification of Aangat party list when it claimed that the latter itself did not represent marginalized
sectors, a question that belongs to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, and not the HRET. For his part,
Palparan questioned the jurisdiction of the HRET over his person, since it was actually the party-list
Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan
claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first
nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-
list group, not before the HRET.
ISSUE(S)
Does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualification of nominees of elected party list organizations?
RULING
Yes. Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: members who shall be
elected from legislative districts and those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. It means that, from the Constitution’s point of
view, it is the party-list representatives who are “elected” into office, not their parties or organizations.
These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list system that the Constitution
authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations
or parties to which such party-list representatives belong. It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-
List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as “members of the House of Representatives.”
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House
of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
37 Banat v. COMELEC
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT),

petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers),
respondent. ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, intervenor. AANGAT TAYO,
intervenor. COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(SENIOR CITIZENS), intervenor.
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: House of Representatives – Party List
Synopsis:
In computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is
unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats
exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional
seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
Digest:
FACTS
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC
counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. BANAT filed petition as quoting
the COMELEC of using the Panganiban formula used in Veterans case in allocating party-list seats. BANAT
contend that Article 6 Section 5 should be followed and that 20%of party-list representatives shall be
proclaimed. COMELEC denied said petition. BANAT filed mandamus for certiorari.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Article 6 Section 5
(2) of the Constitution mandatory?
2. Is the two percent threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
3. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
4. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?
RULING
1. Petition has partial merit.
The party-list election has four inviolable parameters stated in Veterans.
(1)First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected
under the party list; (2)Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
(3)Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained,
is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats;
(4)Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
2. Yes, We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the
two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number
of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”—We therefore strike down the two
percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause
of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the
full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
3. Procedure in determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of
R.A. No. 7941.—In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of
R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions
shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. 3. Those garnering
sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. 4. Each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. The remaining available seats
for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats.—In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List
System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.
No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
4. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in
the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings.
By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties
from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
38 Alliance for Rural & Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc. (ARARO) v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 192803. December 10, 2013.*

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC., ALSO KNOWN AS ARARO
PARTY-LIST, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Ponente: J. Leonen
Synopsis:
Votes cast validly for a party-list group listed in the ballot but later on disqualified should be counted as
part of the divisor. To do otherwise would be to disenfranchise the voters who voted on the basis of good
faith that that ballot contained all the qualified candidates. However, following this rationale, party-list
groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose
disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such
elections should not be included in the divisor.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner was a duly accredited party-list under Republic Act No. 7941. Petitioner then filed an election
protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal questioning the Resolution of the
Commission on Elections that proclaimed the 28 party-list groups.
Without waiting for the resolution of HRET, the petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and TRO The petitioner asks that this Court modify the
Commission on Elections’ interpretation of the formula stated in BANAT v. COMELEC by making the
divisor for the computation of the percentage votes, from total number of votes cast minus the votes for
the disqualified party-list candidates, to the total number of votes cast regardless whether party-list
groups are disqualified.
ISSUE(S)
W/ON COMELEC used the correct divisor for the computation of the percentage votes for the party-list
system
RULING
The petitioner claims that there should be no distinction in law between valid and invalid votes. Invalid
votes include those votes that were made for disqualified party-list groups, votes that were spoiled due to
improper shading, erasures in the ballots, and even those that did not vote for any party-list candidate at
all.50 All of the votes should be included in the divisor to determine the 2% threshold.
We agree with the petitioner but only to the extent that votes later on determined to be invalid due to no
cause attributable to the voter should not be excluded in the divisor. In other words, votes cast validly for
a party-list group listed in the ballot but later on disqualified should be counted as part of the divisor. To
do otherwise would be to disenfranchise the voters who voted on the basis of good faith that that ballot
contained all the qualified candidates. However, following this rationale, party-list groups listed in the
ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose disqualification was
reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not
be included in the divisor.
Not all votes cast in the elections should be included in the divisor. Contrary to the argument of the
petitioner, Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only those votes cast for the party-list
system shall be considered in the computation of the percentage of representation:
b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats. (Emphasis provided)
The total votes cast do not include invalid votes. The invalid votes, for the determination of the
denominator, may be votes that were spoiled or votes that resulted from the following: improper shading
or having no shade at all;51 existence of stray or ambiguous marks;52 tears in the ballot; and/or ballots
rejected by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines under the paper-based53 automated
election system. All these are causes that nullify the count for that vote that can be attributable to the
voter’s action.
Votes cast for the party-list system should, however, include all votes cast for party-list groups contained
in the ballot even if subsequently they are disqualified by the Commission on Elections or by our courts.
Thus, the content of the divisor in the formula to determine the seat allocation for the party-list
component of the House of Representatives should be amended accordingly.
We qualify that the divisor to be used in interpreting the formula used in BANAT is the total votes cast for
the party-list system. This should not include the invalid votes. However, so as not to disenfranchise a
substantial portion of the electorate, total votes cast for the party-list system should mean all the votes
validly cast for all the candidates listed in the ballot. The voter relies on the ballot when making his or her
choices.
To the voter, the listing of candidates in the official ballot represents the extent of his or her choices for
an electoral exercise. He or she is entitled to the expectation that these names have properly been vetted
by the Commission on Elections. Therefore, he or she is also by right entitled to the expectation that his
or her choice based on the listed names in the ballot will be counted.
Thus, the formula to determine the proportion garnered by the party-list group would now henceforth be:

Number of votes of party-list Proportion or

Total number of valid votes for = Percentage of votes
party-list candidates garnered by party-list

The total votes cast for the party-list system include those votes made for party-list groups indicated in
the ballot regardless of the pendency of their motions for reconsideration or petitions before any tribunal
in relation to their cancellation or disqualification cases. However, votes made for those party-list groups
whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections should be excluded if the electorate is
notified of the finality of their disqualification by the Commission on Elections. The divisor also shall not
include invalid votes. ###
39 ATONG PAGLAUM, Inc., et al., v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 203766. April 2, 2013.*

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, petitioner, vs.
*Partially abandoned Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC & BANAT vs COMELEC rulings
Ponente: J. Carpio
Synopsis:
the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who
lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political
parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in
a national election system like the party-list system of elections. If the party-list system is only reserved
for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from
running for a seat in the lower house.
Digest:
FACTS
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May
2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-list
representatives
RULING
NO. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT.
However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now
provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases.
The new guidelines are as follows:
1. Parameters. In qualifying party-list representatives, the COMELEC must use the following
parameters:
2. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
3. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented”
sector.
4. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major
or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections
only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.
5. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in
“well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and
underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined
political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
6. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized
and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
“well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that
represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
7. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from
participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a
statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that
they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage
them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented”
and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when
they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that
it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political
system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of
the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987
Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized
and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national
or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined
political constituencies”. The common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have
the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but
they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly
excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It should be
noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral
representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still
qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as
they are ideologically marginalized.
40 Abang Lingkod Party List v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 206952. October 22, 2013.*

ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST (ABANG LINGKOD), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
Ponente: J. Reyes
Synopsis:
Contrary to the COMELEC’s claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no
longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they have
undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient
that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s,
which they represent. If at all, evidence showing a track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is only required from nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented who do not factually belong to the sector represented
by their party or organization.
Digest:
FACTS
On May 31, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD manifested before the COMELEC its intent to participate in the May
2013 elections. COMELEC then issued Resolution No. 9513,2 which, inter alia, required previously
registered party-list groups that have filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to undergo summary
evidentiary hearing for purposes of determining their continuing compliance with the requirements under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 79413 and the guidelines set forth in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC. ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC’s August 9, 2012 Resolution, filed with the
COMELEC pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No.
7941.
After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Banc, in a Resolution dated November 7, 2012, cancelled ABANG
LINGKOD’s registration as a party-¬list group. The COMELEC En Banc pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD
failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it
merely offered photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections. The
COMELEC En Banc further opined that ABANG LINGKOD failed to show that its nominees are themselves
marginalized and underrepresented or that they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the
plight of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the registration of ABANG
LINGKOD under the party-list system
RULING
YES. It was ruled that under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, groups intending to register under the party-list
system are not required to submit evidence of their track record; they are merely required to attach to
their verified petitions their “constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement, and other relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC.” Track record is not the
same as the submission or presentation of “constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement, and other relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC,” which are but
mere pieces of documentary evidence intended to establish that the group exists and is a going concern.
The said documentary evidence presents an abstract of the ideals that national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations seek to achieve. This is not merely a matter of semantics; the delineation of what
constitutes a track record has certain consequences in a group’s bid for registration under the party-list
system.
Moreover, contrary to the COMELEC’s claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD,
are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they
have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is
sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the
sector/s, which they represent. If at all, evidence showing a track record in representing the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors is only required from nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented who do not factually belong to the sector represented
by their party or organization.
41 Amores v. HRET
G.R. No. 189600. June 29, 2010.*

MILAGROS E. AMORES, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
and EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Ponente: J. Carpio Morales

Synopsis:
As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-five
(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must be that a candidate
who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this mandate is
contained in RA No. 7941, the Party List System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-
list representative seats.
What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party and sectoral
affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral party-list organizations are
qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system. Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral
affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the
change has been effected at least six months before the elections.
Digest:
FACTS
Milagros E. Amores filed a quo warranto petition questioning the legality of the assumption of office of
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva as representative of the party-list organization Citizens’ Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of Representatives. In her petition, petitioner alleged: that he was
disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his certificates
of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to
Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, and that his change of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to
its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least six months prior to the
May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA No.
7941.
In his defense, private respondent alleged that the age qualification for youth sectoral nominees applied
only to to those nominated as such during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the
Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing the
youth sector, which CIBAC, a multi-sectoral organization, is not. He further stated that his shift of
affiliation does not serve to make Section 15 applicable to him, as there had been no resultant change in
the party-list affiliation.
ISSUE(S)
Does Section 9 and 15 of the Party List Act apply to private respondent?
RULING
Yes. As to Section 9, the Court found no support for respondent’s contention that it does not apply to
those sectoral parties representing the youth registered after 1998. As the law states in unequivocal
terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election, so it must be that a candidate who is more than 30 on election
day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the
Party List System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats.
Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails to find even an iota of textual support for public
respondent’s ratiocination that the provision did not apply to private respondent’s shift of affiliation from
CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector as there was no resultant
change in party-list affiliation. What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both
political party and sectoral affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral
party-list organizations are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system. Hence, a nominee
who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the
new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the elections. Again,
since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation.
42 Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.
Topic: Party List – Registration
Synopsis:
A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of
the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to
constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and
4,044 members in its electronic discussion group. Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG
LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any
of these regions. Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection
and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled
that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under
RA 7941.
Digest:
FACTS
Incorporated in 2003, ANG LADLAD LGBT Party first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006,
seeking to represent the sector composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT
community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of
their sexual orientation and gender identity. COMELEC however, dismissed the petition on moral grounds,
contending that such a party list advocates sexual immorality. Furthermore, respondent also argues that
Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it had nationwide existence
through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field
personnel, it was shown that "save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in
almost all provinces in the country."
ISSUE(S)
Is the alleged misrepresentation sufficient to deny ANG LADLAD’s accreditation as party list?
RULING
No. Firstly, the argument that a party’s accreditation should be denied because of misrepresentation as to
the extent of its organization is unfounded. Furthermore, a cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial petition
shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the
LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had
16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group.
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise
that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELEC’s findings
are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlad’s
principal place of business. Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated
its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral
objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever
found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the
requisites under RA 7941.
43 Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago v. COMELEC
MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO, petitioner, versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

respondent.
G.R. No. 190793. June 19, 2012
Ponente: J. Sereno
Synopsis:
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that seek
to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means shall be denied registration. This
disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that no political party which seeks
to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation. Violence is the unjust or
unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury. It also
denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed against
common right, against the laws, and against public liberty. In the present case, the Oakwood incident
was one that was attended with violence. As publicly announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the
siege, their objectives were to express their dissatisfaction with the administration of former President
Arroyo, and to divulge the alleged corruption in the military and the supposed sale of arms to enemies of
the state. The assertions of MAGDALO that no one was held hostage or that no shot was fired do not
mask its use of impelling force to take over and sustain the occupation of Oakwood.
Digest:
FACTS
On 2 July 2009, Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO), represented by its Chairperson, Senator
Antonio Trillanes IV, filed its Petition for Registration with the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or
accreditation as a regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in
the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. On 26 October 2009, the COMELEC Second Division denied
the petition, on the ground that the partys organizer and Chairman and some members participated in
the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein
several innocent civilian personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in full battle gear
at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful means to
achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of organized societies. In the immediate case,
Magdalo claims that the COMELEC abused its discretionary power in the following instances: it took
judicial notice of the Oakwood incident; it found that Magdalo uses violence or unlawful means to achieve
its goals; and that the latter fact served as a prejudgment of the criminal case filed against Magdalo
members, which was still pending at the time the COMELEC refused the organization accreditation as a
party list.
ISSUE(S)
Did the COMELEC abuse its discretion in denying Magdalo’s petition for registration?
RULING
No. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may be taken of matters that are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration. Further, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Revised Administrative Code, specifically empowers administrative agencies to admit and give probative
value to evidence commonly acceptable by reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of judicially
cognizable facts. The Supreme Court, in a string of cases, has already taken judicial notice of the factual
circumstances surrounding the Oakwood standoff.
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that seek
to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means shall be denied registration. This
disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that no political party which seeks
to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation. Violence is the unjust or
unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury. It also
denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed against
common right, against the laws, and against public liberty. In the present case, the Oakwood incident
was one that was attended with violence. As publicly announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the
siege, their objectives were to express their dissatisfaction with the administration of former President
Arroyo, and to divulge the alleged corruption in the military and the supposed sale of arms to enemies of
the state. The assertions of MAGDALO that no one was held hostage or that no shot was fired do not
mask its use of impelling force to take over and sustain the occupation of Oakwood.
Lastly, the power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the
COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is
purely administrative in character. In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether
the party or organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts
considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature. In the case at bar, the
challenged COMELEC Resolutions were issued pursuant to its administrative power to evaluate the
eligibility of groups to join the elections as political parties, for which the evidentiary threshold of
substantial evidence is applicable. In finding that MAGDALO resorts to violence or unlawful acts to fulfil its
organizational objectives, the COMELEC did not render an assessment as to whether the members of
petitioner committed crimes, as respondent was not required to make that determination in the first
place.
44 V.C. Cadangen c. COMELEC
V.C. CADANGEN and ALLIANCE OF CIVIL SERVANTS, INC., petitioners, versus THE
G.R. No. 177179. June 5, 2009
Ponente: J. Nachura
Synopsis:
In the registration of a party, organization, or coalition under R.A. No. 7941, the COMELEC may require
the submission of any relevant information; and it may refuse, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition based on any of the
grounds enumerated in Section 6 thereof, among which is that the organization has declared untruthful
statements in its petition. The COMELEC, after evaluating the documents submitted by petitioner, denied
the latter’s plea for registration as a sectoral party, not on the basis of its failure to prove its nationwide
presence, but for its failure to show that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Further, the COMELEC found that petitioner made an untruthful statement in
the pleadings and documents it submitted.
Digest:
FACTS
Alliance of Civil Servants, Inc. (Civil Servants) filed a petition for registration as a sectoral organization
under RA No. 79413 or the Party-List System Act. It claimed that it had been in existence since December
2004 and it sought to represent past and present government employees in the party-list system.
The COMELEC Second Division issued an order requiring them to file a memorandum that would prove its
presence or existence nationwide, track record, financial capability to wage a nationwide campaign,
platform of government, officers and membership, and compliance with the provisions of said law and
the 8-point guideline laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC.
Civil Servants consequently filed the required memorandum attaching thereto: (1) copies of its letters to
the respective election directors/officers/registrars of the Cordillera Administrative Region, Second District
of Quezon City, and the cities of Iloilo, Cotabato, Urdaneta and Dagupan, informing them of the names
and addresses of its members in the said localities; (2) revised list of its members as of November 30,
2006; (3) list of its incorporators with brief descriptions of their credentials, including their
designations/appointments in government offices; (4) printed screen shot of the Internet homepage of its
on-line forum; (5) summary of its major activities and accomplishments since its inception; (6) financial
statement showing its net asset of P399,927.00; (7) platform of government; and (8) list of its current
officers with a summary of their credentials. However, the COMELEC Second Division denied the Civil
Servants petition for registration, for failing to prove its existence nationwide and for having declared an
untruthful statement in its memorandum.
Aggrieved petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the COMELEC en banc assailed the resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division and denied the motion.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the COMELEC erred in denying the petitioner’s petition for registration
RULING
No. In the registration of a party, organization, or coalition under R.A. No. 7941, the COMELEC may
require the submission of any relevant information; and it may refuse, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition based on any of the
grounds enumerated in Section 6 thereof, among which is that the organization has declared untruthful
statements in its petition.
45 Bantay Republika v. COMELEC
BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941, represented by MR. AMEURFINO E. CINCO,

Chairman, AND URBAN POOR FOR LEGAL REFORMS (UP-LR), represented by MRS. MYRNA P.
PORCARE, Secretary-General, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.,
respondents
G.R. No. 177271 May 4, 2007
Ponente: J. Garcia
Synopsis:
Petitioners BA-RA 7941’s and UP-LR’s posture that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously determining the qualifications of their
nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a
party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. And as aptly
pointed out by private respondent Babae Para sa Kaunlaran (Babae Ka), Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941
requires a petition for registration of a party-list organization to be filed with the COMELEC "not later than
ninety (90) days before the election" whereas the succeeding Section 8 requires the submission "not later
than forty-five (45) days before the election" of the list of names whence party-list representatives shall
be chosen.
COMELEC should disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or
organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections. COMELEC cannot justify its assailed
non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it
does, on a fundamental right to information.
Digest:
FACTS
On January 12, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to
govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of names of nominees under the
party-list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a
number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations.
In the first of these consolidated petitions, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act
(BA-RA 7941, for short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail the various
COMELEC resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the
forthcoming party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining whether or not their
respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the
"Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to
represent.
In the second petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan
Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn COMELEC Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007
effectively denying their request for the release or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the
fourteen (14) accredited participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales’ previous letter-
request.
ISSUE(S)
1. Should the COMELEC’s accreditation of a party list include a simultaneous determination of its
qualifications?
2. Should the COMELEC disclose the names of party list nominees?
RULING
1. No. Petitioners BA-RA 7941’s and UP-LR’s posture that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously determining the
qualifications of their nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that
the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an
organization. And as aptly pointed out by private respondent Babae Para sa Kaunlaran (Babae Ka),
Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941 requires a petition for registration of a party-list organization to be filed with
the COMELEC "not later than ninety (90) days before the election" whereas the succeeding Section 8
requires the submission "not later than forty-five (45) days before the election" of the list of names
whence party-list representatives shall be chosen.
2. Yes, COMELEC should disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or
organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections. COMELEC cannot justify its assailed
non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it
does, on a fundamental right to information.
46 Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 179431-32 June 22, 2010

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION
(CIBAC), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Respondents.
Topic: Party List – Nomination
Synopsis:
Although the power to make laws cannot be delegated by the Legislature to any other authority, a power
that is not legislative in character may be delegated. Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can
delegate to executive officers and administrative boards the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To
render such delegation lawful, the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal
principles that are to control in given cases.
For as long as the policy is laid down and a proper standard is established by statute, there can be no
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power when the Legislature leaves to selected instrumentalities
the duty of making subordinate rules within the prescribed limits,
The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the operation
and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather administrative in
nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however, subvert or be contrary to
existing statutes.
Indeed, administrative or executive acts shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution
To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and
4. It must be reasonable.
The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, has neither the authority
nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs
the COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the law to be implemented, and should
not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law
they intend to carry out.
Digest:
FACTS
CIBAC (Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption), through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted
a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required
number of qualifying votes to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections.
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees whereby it withdrew the nomination of (among
others) Lokin. Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC
Chairperson transmitting therewith the signed petitions of more than 81% of the CIBAC members, in
order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of (among others) Lokin and the substitution of Borje.
On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. The
motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales. On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 8219, whereby it resolved to set the matter pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the
nominations of Lokin and 2 others and the substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The
case was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054.
In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, issued National
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007 to partially proclaim CIBAC, along
with others, as having won in the May 14, 2007 elections. The COMELEC en banc issued another
resolution, NBC Resolution No. 07-72 dated July 18, 2007, proclaiming CIBAC (along with others) to an
additional seat each; and holding in abeyance the proclamation of the nominees of said parties,
organizations and coalitions with pending disputes until the final resolution of their respective cases. With
the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos, purportedly
as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of the House of
Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that Lokin be formally
sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office. Nazareno replied, however, that
the request of Delos Santos could not be granted because COMELEC Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had
notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054.
On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-054 and approved the withdrawal
of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin (along with others) and the substitution. As a result, the
COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC her oath of office
as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007.
In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent
COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC while In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin
assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January 12, 2007; and the resolution dated
September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 alleging that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. the law that the COMELEC seeks to thereby implement.
The COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in law due to the
proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as Representative and her assumption of that office; that Lokin’s proper
recourse was an electoral protest filed in HRET and that, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the
matter being raised by Lokin.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List System
Act
RULING
YES. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization or coalition shall

submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less
than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number
of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing
may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person who
has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or
alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent
sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall
not be considered resigned.
The provision is daylight clear.
When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or
construction, but only for application. Section 8 does not unduly deprive the party-list organization of its
right to choose its nominees, but merely divests it of the right to change its nominees or to alter the
order in the list of its nominees’ names after submission of the list to the COMELEC. It enumerates only
three instances in which the party-list organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee
whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the
nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes incapacitated.
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:

Section 13. Substitution of nominees. - A party-list nominee may be substituted only when he dies, or his
nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated to continue as such, or he withdraws
his acceptance to a nomination. In any of these cases, the name of the substitute nominee shall be
placed last in the list of nominees.
No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls.
Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the fourth being
when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party." The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
expanding to four the three statutory grounds for substituting a nominee.
The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941 because it has merely reworded and rephrased the statutory provision’s phraseology. To reword
means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is to phrase anew or in a new
form. Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word or phrase is not altered.
The COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, because it
established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision. The new ground granted to the
party-list organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC,
which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done. Neither was the grant of the unilateral right
contemplated by the drafters of the law, who precisely denied the right to withdraw the nomination (as
the quoted record of the deliberations of the House of Representatives has indicated). The grant thus
conflicted with the statutory intent to save the nominee from falling under the whim of the party-list
organization once his name has been submitted to the COMELEC, and to spare the electorate from the
capriciousness of the party-list organizations. The new ground would not secure the object of R.A. No.
7941 of developing and guaranteeing a full, free and open party-list electoral system. The success of the
system could only be ensured by avoiding any arbitrariness on the part of the party-list organizations, by
seeing to the transparency of the system, and by guaranteeing that the electorate would be afforded the
chance of making intelligent and informed choices of their party-list representatives.
The insertion of the new ground was invalid. An axiom in administrative law postulates that
administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of their IRRs, but
must ensure that their IRRs are reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If the IRRs are
shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were authorized to be issued, they
must be held to be invalid and should be struck down.
The COMELEC’s approval of CIBAC’s petition of withdrawal of the nominations and its recognition of
CIBAC’s substitution, both through its assailed September 14, 2007 resolution, should be struck down for
lack of legal basis.
WHEREFORE petitions for certiorari and mandamus are granted.
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was declared invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a
party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to
the Commission on Elections.
- RIVERA
Notes: (read or not is entirely up to you) As for the issue of jurisdiction.

An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the
defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to
determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to
hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has
been voted for in the preceding elections.
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the
winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not
to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a
contest where the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the
respondent may be unseated.
The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest (it is not one in which a nominee of a
particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list
organization ) nor an action for quo warranto(considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility
and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification
for her) , for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second
nominee of CIBAC.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review
of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the
1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The
constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission
on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65
to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.
Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping

Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It may
arise: (a) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision
(other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; or (b) if, after having filed a petition in the Supreme
Court, a party files another petition in the Court of Appeals, because he thereby deliberately splits
appeals "in the hope that even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another
case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open"; or (c) where a party attempts to obtain a writ of
preliminary injunction from a court after failing to obtain the writ from another court.
What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation
caused to the courts and the litigants by a party who accesses different courts and administrative
agencies to rule on the same or
related causes or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the
possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issue.
The filing of identical petitions in different courts is prohibited, because such act constitutes forum
shopping, a malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and as abusing their
processes. Forum shopping is an improper conduct that degrades the administration of justice.
Nonetheless, the mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute
forum shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances. The actions must also raise identical causes of action, subject matter,
and issues. Elsewise stated, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, or
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.
Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to proclaim him as the second
nominee of CIBAC upon the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 (announcing CIBAC’s entitlement to an
additional seat in the House of Representatives), and to strike down the provision in NBC Resolution No.
07-60 and NBC Resolution No. 07-72 holding in abeyance "all proclamation of the nominees of concerned
parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final
resolution of their respective cases." He has insisted that the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to
proclaim him due to his being CIBAC’s second nominee; and that the COMELEC had no authority to
exercise discretion and to suspend or defer the proclamation of winning party-list organizations with
pending disputes.
On the other hand, Lokin has resorted to the petition for certiorari to assail the September 14, 2007
resolution of the COMELEC (approving the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and
the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee and Borje as the third nominee); and to
challenge the validity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, the COMELEC’s basis for allowing CIBAC’s
withdrawal of Lokin’s nomination.
Applying the test for forum shopping, the consecutive filing of the action for certiorari and the action for
mandamus did not violate the rule against forum shopping even if the actions involved the same parties,
because they were based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were different.
47 Philippine Guardians Bros., Inc. (PGBI) v. COMELEC
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI), represented by its Secretary-General

GEORGE FGBF GEORGE DULDULAO, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010.
Ponente: J. Brion
Topic: Party List – Delisting of party list representatives
Synopsis:
The law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b)
fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. The word or is a disjunctive term
signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a
rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear
and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Minero
therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a
party-list organization in an election as like a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote.
The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should therefore
be understood in light of the Banat (BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009) ruling that
party-list groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat
in the allocation of additional seats.
Digest:
FACTS
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No.
8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was
delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007
elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any national, regional sectoral party
or organizations or coalitions adversely affected can personally or through its authorized representative
file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009.
PGBI opposed, stating that the resolution negates the right of movant and those similarly situated to
invoke Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941, which allows any party, organization and coalition already registered
with the Commission to no longer register anew; the party though is required to file with the
Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to
participate in the party-list system; since PGBI filed a Request/Manifestation seeking a deferment of its
participation in the 2007 elections within the required period prior to the 2007 elections, it has the option
to choose whether or not to participate in the next succeeding election under the same conditions as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed;
ISSUE(S)
Was there a legal basis in the delisting of PGBI?
RULING
No. In this case, the Supreme Court had the occasion to rule that the Minero ruling, which the COMELEC
hinged its main defense on, in which Minero was delisted as it failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and
did not participate at all in the 2004 elections, is erroneous.
First, the law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b)
fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. The word or is a disjunctive term
signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a
rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear
and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Minero
therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a
party-list organization in an election as like a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote.
The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should therefore
be understood in light of the Banat (BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009) ruling that
party-list groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat
in the allocation of additional seats. To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate
grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the
disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be
understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered. PGBIs situation, a party list group or organization
that failed to garner 2% in a prior election and immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding
election is something that is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941.
48 COCOFED v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 207026 August 6, 2013

COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
Ponente: J. Brion
Topic: Party List – Nominees
Synopsis:
Section 8 of RA No. 7941 does not only use the word "shall" in connection with the requirement of
submitting a list of nominees; it uses this mandatory term in conjunction with the number of names to be
submitted that is couched negatively, i.e., "not less than five." The use of these terms together is a plain
indication of legislative intent to make the statutory requirement mandatory for the party to undertake.
all registered parties who wished to participate in the May 2013 party-list elections that they "shall file
with the COMELEC a Manifestation of Intent to participate in the part-list election together with its list of
at least five (5) nominees, no later than May 31, 2012."
Under Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941, violation of or failure to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections is a ground for the cancellation of registration.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) is an organization and
sectoral party whose membership comes from the peasant sector, particularly the coconut farmers and
producers. On May 29, 2012, COCOFED manifested with the COMELEC its intent to participate in the
party-list elections of May 13, 2013 and submitted the names of only two nominees – Atty. Emerito S.
Calderon (first nominee) and Atty. Domingo P. Espina.
In its November 7, 2012 resolution, the COMELEC cancelled COCOFED’s registration and accreditation as
a party-list organization on several grounds. Notably, the Concurring Opinion of Commissioner Christian
Lim cited, as additional ground, that since COCOFED submitted only two nominees, then it failed to
comply with Section 8 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 that requires the party to submit to COMELEC a list
of not less than five nominees. In its defense, COCOFED interposed that its failure to submit the required
number of nominees was based on the good faith belief that its submission was sufficient for purposes of
the elections and that it could still be remedied since COCOFED could simply submit the names of its
additional two nominees. COCOFED adds that the number of nominees becomes significant only "when a
party-list organization is able to attain a sufficient number of votes which would qualify it for a seat in the
House of Representatives."
ISSUE(S)
Did COMELEC gravely err in cancelling the registration of COCOFED?
RULING
No. Failure to submit the list of five nominees before the election warrants the cancellation of its
registration. The law, through Section 8 of RA No. 7941, expressly requires the submission of a list
containing at least five qualified nominees. As early as February 8, 2012, the COMELEC had informed,
through Resolution No. 9359, COCOFED’s failure to submit a list of five nominees, despite ample
opportunity to do so before the elections, is a violation imputable to the party under Section 6(5) of RA
No. 7941.
First, the language of Section 8 of RA No. 7941 does not only use the word "shall" in connection with the
requirement of submitting a list of nominees; it uses this mandatory term in conjunction with the number
of names to be submitted that is couched negatively, i.e., "not less than five." The use of these terms
together is a plain indication of legislative intent to make the statutory requirement mandatory for the
party to undertake. all registered parties who wished to participate in the May 2013 party-list elections
that they "shall file with the COMELEC a Manifestation of Intent to participate in the part-list election
together with its list of at least five (5) nominees, no later than May 31, 2012."
Under Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941, violation of or failure to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections is a ground for the cancellation of registration. However, not every kind of violation
automatically warrants the cancellation of a party-list group’s registration. Since a reading of the entire
Section 6 shows that all the grounds for cancellation actually pertain to the party itself, then the laws,
rules and regulations violated to warrant cancellation under Section 6(5) must be one that is primarily
imputable to the party itself and not one that is chiefly confined to an individual member or its nominee.
Second, while COCOFED’s failure to submit a complete list of nominees may not have been among the
grounds cited by the COMELEC in earlier canceling its registration, this is not sufficient to support a
finding of grave abuse of discretion. Apart from the clear letter of Section 8 of RA No. 7941 and the
COMELEC resolutions issued more or less a year before the 2013 elections, COCOFED’s belated
submission of a Manifestation with Urgent Request to Admit Additional Nominees several days after the
elections betrays the emptiness of COCOFED’s formalistic plea for prior notice.
49 Coalitions of Associations of Senior Citizens v. COMELEC
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [SENIOR

CITIZENS PARTY-LIST], represented herein by its Chairperson and First Nominee,
FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. Nos. 206844-45 July 23, 2013

Topic: Party List – Term Sharing
Synopsis:
The term-sharing agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. This fact
was manifested by the Arquiza Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the COMELEC
En Banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group manifested that it was withdrawing its petition for
confirmation and approval of Rep. Kho’s replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in
E.M. No. 12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself refused to recognize the term-sharing agreement and the
tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even declared that no vacancy was created despite the
execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was also no indication that the nominees of
SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing
agreement. Before the Supreme Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of non-
implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat
and served his term as a member of the House of Representatives, in accordance with COMELEC
Resolution No. 9366 and the COMELEC En Banc ruling in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the COMELEC is
silent on this point.
Digest:
FACTS
On March 2007, COMELEC accredited Senior Citizen as a party-list organization. Senior Citizen then
participated in the May 2007 elections, however failed to get the 2% total votes cast. In accordance with
the procedure set forth in BANAT for the allocation of additional seats under the party-list system, Senior
Citizen was given one seat.
Subsequently, Senior Citizen was allowed to participate in the May 2010 elections. After the conduct of
the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all the party-list candidates and
was allocated two seats in the House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first nominee,
Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho).
Later, David Kho tendered his resignation letter as representative which was followed by a board
resolution of Senior Citizen accepting such resignation in accordance with the term-sharing agreement
made between the nominees of the party-list. COMELEC, however, did not recognize the resignation
saying that it is against public policy. The term of public officials cannot be made subject to any
agreement of private parties for public office is not a commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be
made subject to any private agreement. COMELEC resolved to cancel the registration of the Senior
Citizens as party-list.
On December 11, 2012, SC initially granted status quo ante orders of Senior Citizens and directed
COMELEC to include the name of Senior Citizens in the printing of official ballots for the May 2013
elections. SC later ruled that the cancellation of registration was in order. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE(S)
Was the COMELEC justified in cancelling the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS for implementing a term-
sharing agreement?
RULING
No. The term-sharing agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. This
fact was manifested by the Arquiza Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the
COMELEC En Banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group manifested that it was withdrawing its
petition for confirmation and approval of Rep. Kho’s replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June
27, 2012 in E.M. No. 12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself refused to recognize the term-sharing
agreement and the tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even declared that no vacancy was
created despite the execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was also no indication that the
nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less succeeded in implementing, the term-
sharing agreement. Before the Supreme Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact
of non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold
his seat and served his term as a member of the House of Representatives, in accordance with COMELEC
Resolution No. 9366 and the COMELEC En Banc ruling in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the COMELEC is
silent on this point.
Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it
appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized
by the COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when
its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an
election law, rule, or regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and
the cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no legal leg to stand on.
50 Pobre v. Santiago
A.C. No. 7399. August 25, 2009.*

ANTERO J. POBRE, complainant, vs. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, respondent.
Ponente: J. Velasco, Jr.

Topic: Legislative Department – Parliamentary Immunity
Synopsis:
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of
parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance
of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look
diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the
country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in
the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an
unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the
Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not
the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary
immunity.
Digest:
FACTS
Pobre invited the Court’s attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s
speech delivered on the Senate floor:
“x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am

humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle
years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was
to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of
idiots x x x.”
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of
court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against
the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not
deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered
by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the
discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee.
ISSUE(S)
W/ON imputations of Senator Santiago is covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary
immunity
RULING
Yes. This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of
parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance
of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look
diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the
country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in
the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an
unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the
Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not
the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary
immunity.
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or
disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a
disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.
It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter. A careful re-reading of her
utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at
not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the
pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used
as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as
armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an
individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal
benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them. ###
51 Santiago v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 128055. April 18, 2001

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E.
GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING
JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION, respondents.
Ponente: J. Vitug
Topic: Legislative Department – Punitive Powers
Synopsis:
It is true that the Constitution provides that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its members, as
well as suspend or expel a member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides that any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a
simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending
in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
Digest:
FACTS
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of Immigration
and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Allegedly, herein petitioner, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in
the exercise of her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the
application for legalization of the stay of several aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1,
1984 in violation of Executive Order no. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said
disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified, thereby giving unwarranted benefits
to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused. Pursuant to the
information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order for
the arrest of petitioner, who then posted a cash bail without need for physical appearance as she was
then recuperating from injuries sustained in a vehicular accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her
provisional liberty until 05 June 1991 or until her physical condition would warrant her physical
appearance in court. In 1995, a motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago,
who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to
suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE(S)
Does the Sandiganbayan have the authority to suspend a member of the Senate without violating the
constitution?
RULING
Yes. It is true that the Constitution provides that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its members, as
well as suspend or expel a member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides that any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a
simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending
in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In the immediate case, the order of suspension prescribed by the law is distinct from the disciplinary
powers of Congress. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive
measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as the case may be,
upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019,
which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is
not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore,
the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
52 Trillanes v. Judge Pimentel
G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner, vs. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG, MGEN. BENJAMIN DOLORFINO,
AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO OBEÑA, respondents.

Topic: Legislative Department – Officers in custody
Synopsis:
Petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to serve his mandate, after
the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus
Motion is tantamount to removing him from office, depriving the people of proper representation,
denying the people’s will, repudiating the people’s choice, and overruling the mandate of the people. The
assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior
term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation
does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a
criminal charge.
Digest:
FACTS
A group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded
the resignation of the President and key national officials. Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out
the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his
comrades, with coup d’ etat. Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw
his hat in the political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on
June 30, 2007.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an “Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be
Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests” (Omnibus Motion) that include among other be
allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate; be allowed to set up a working
area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with
a personal desktop computer and the appropriate communications equipment; be allowed to receive
members of his staff at the said working area at his place of detention; be allowed to give interviews and
to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to the press or the media regarding the important issues
affecting the country and the public; and be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of
officers of the Senate and related activities. The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which the trial court just the same denied the motion.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Senator Trillanes can perform his duties or profession while in detention
RULING
NO. In the case of People v. Hon. Maceda, the Court ruled that “as a matter of law, when a person
indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in
actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He
must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court
to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive
detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of
arrest and detention.” The presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and
political rights.
53 Limkaichong v. COMELEC
JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N.

CAMERO and RENALD F. VILLANDO, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 178831-32. April 1, 2009.
Ponente: J. Peralta
Topic: Legislative Department – HRET
Synopsis:
The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has invariably held that
once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the
lower house, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a
winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of
the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper
proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a
Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter’s election, returns and qualifications.
The use of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC
underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests relating to its
members.
Digest:
FACTS
Two petitions were consolidated on the issue about the qualifications of Jocelyn Limkaichong to run for,
be elected to, and assume and discharge the position as Representative of the 1st District of Negros
Oriental. The contention of the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born
citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In
the election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the
highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has since performed her duties and
responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives. About 2 days after the counting of votes,
COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate.
On the following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the
COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted
elections. This is in compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending
the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without
prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the
proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras’ petition arguing
that since she is now the proclaimed winner, the COMELEC can no longer exercise jurisdiction over the
matter. It should be the HRET which should exercise jurisdiction from then on. COMELEC agreed with
Limkaichong.
ISSUE(S)
Does the HRET have jurisdiction over the matter?
RULING
Yes. The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has invariably held
that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of
the lower house, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a
winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of
the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper
proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a
Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter’s election, returns and qualifications.
The use of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC
underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests relating to its
members.
54 Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RENATO J.

UNICO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172131. April 2, 2007.
Ponente: J. Callejo, Sr.

Synopsis:
As for the phrase "election, returns, and qualifications", the Court ruled that it should be interpreted in
its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. But if it is necessary to
specify, it can be said that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters,
the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes; "returns" to the canvass of
the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the
board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could
be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or
ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. The Court has invariably held that once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner Chato and respondent Renato J. Unico were among the candidates for the lone congressional
district of Camarines Norte during the May 10, 2004 elections. Subsequently, the provincial board of
canvassers of Labo proclaimed Unico as representative-elect. Petitioner filed charges before the
COMELEC, alleging certain manifest errors or obvious discrepancies in the election returns from various
precincts of the municipality of Labo. On July 2, 2004, the COMELEC (First Division) ordered the
suspension of the effects of the proclamation of respondent Unico. On July 23, 2004, it lifted the said
order on the ground that respondent Unico’s proclamation and taking of oath of office had not only
divested the Commission of any jurisdiction to pass upon his election, returns, and qualifications, but also
automatically conferred jurisdiction to another electoral tribunal.
ISSUE(S)
Does the COMELEC still have jurisdiction to pass upon the suspension order?
RULING
No. The COMELEC did not err in ruling against the suspension of the effects of the proclamation of Unico.
In interpreting Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court ruled that the Senate
and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are the "sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members," thereby
divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over election cases
pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa. As for the phrase "election, returns,
and qualifications", the Court ruled that it should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters
affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. But if it is necessary to specify, it can be said that "election"
referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign,
and the casting and counting of votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of
the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the
authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto
proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his
certificate of candidacy. The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and
the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has
already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of Representatives;
hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato’s petition.
55 Reyes v. COMELEC
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, vs. COMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH

SOCCORO B. TAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 207264. October 22, 2013.
Ponente: J. Perez
Topic: House of Representatives – HRET
Synopsis:
The action for cancellation of petitioner’s COC, the decision in which is the indispensable determinant of
the right of the petitioner to proclamation, was correctly lodged in the COMELEC. The decision of the
COMELEC sealed petitioner’s ineligibility as a candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The decision
erected the bar to the petitioner’s proclamation. The HRET’s constitutional authority opens, over the
qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes so only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first
and unavoidable step towards such membership.
Digest:
FACTS
Reyes had the highest votes as a candidate for a Representative position in Marinduque. However prior
to proclamation COMELEC issued a resolution that her COC is cancelled which is a definite bar to her
proclamation. Petitioner posits that it is the HRET who has jurisdiction over her qualifications as a
Member of the House of Representative.
ISSUE(S)
Whether HRET has jurisdiction
RULING
No. She is not a member of the House at present. The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as the
rightful winner in the election for such membership. The action for cancellation of petitioner’s COC, the
decision in which is the indispensable determinant of the right of the petitioner to proclamation, was
correctly lodged in the COMELEC. The decision of the COMELEC sealed petitioner’s ineligibility as a
candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to the petitioner’s
proclamation. The HRET’s constitutional authority opens, over the qualification of its MEMBER, who
becomes so only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first and unavoidable step towards such
membership.
56 Abayon v. HRET
HARLIN C. ABAYON, Petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and

RAUL A. DAZA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 222236. May 3, 2016
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Synopsis:
The HRET, as the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the House of Representative, may annul election results if in its determination, fraud, terrorism or
other electoral irregularities existed to warrant the annulment.
Digest:
FACTS
Abayon and Daza were contenders for the position of Rep. in the First legislative District of Northern
Samar during the May 2013 elections. Abayon emerged as the winner after obtaining the majority vote.
Daza placed second. The difference was 52 votes. The Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar
proclaimed Abayon as the duly elected member of the House of Representatives for the said legislative
district. Daza filed his election protest challenging the election results in 25 clustered precincts in the
Municipalities of Biri, Capul, Catarman, Lavezares, San Isidro and Victoria. In his protest, he bewailed that
there was massive fraud, vote-buying, intimidation, employment of illegal and fraudulent devices and
schemes before, during and after the elections benefiting Abayon and that terrorism was committed by
the latter and his unidentified cohorts, agents, and supporters.
ISSUE(S)
Whether HRET has jurisdiction to annul the election
RULING
Yes. The HRET, as the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the House of Representative, may annul election results if in its determination, fraud,
terrorism or other electoral irregularities existed to warrant the annulment. Because in doing so, it is
merely exercising its constitutional duty to ascertain who among the candidates received the majority of
the votes cast.
57 Velasco v. Belmonte
LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO, Petitioner, vs. HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR.,
SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN1 B. BARUA-YAP AND REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 211140

Synopsis:
The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives. And to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption
of office.
Digest:
FACTS
On October 2012, one Joseph Soccoro Tan, in his capacity as a registered voter, initiated a petition
before the COMELEC for the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of herein respondent Reyes for
representative of the lone district of the Province of Marinduque. In his petition, Tan alleged that Reyes
made several material misrepresentations in her COC with respect to his residence and citizenship. The
COMELEC First Division granted the petition, but pending the appeal of Reyes, the 2013 election
happened, and despite receipt of the COMELEC en banc affirmation of the Tan petition, the Marinduque
Board of Canvassers proclaimed Reyes as the winner. Velasco, having attained the second highest
number of votes, thus filed an election protest and a quo warranto proceeding before the HRET. The
COMELEC en banc resolution attained finality in the interim. In line with these, Velasco requested
Speaker Belmonte that he be allowed to take the seat as representative of the lone district, and then
subsequently requested Secretary General Barua-Yap that the name of Reyes be stricken from the Roll of
members and his name be placed therein. His efforts proving futile, he filed a mandamus case against
the respondents. Reyes however, countered, stating that the COMELEC had, in the first place, no
jurisdiction to rule on the cancellation of her COC, seeing as the HRET is the sole forum that decides
election protests and contests relating to the House of Representatives.
ISSUE(S)
Is the annulment made by the COMELEC valid?
RULING
Yes. In the present cases, before respondent Regina Reyes was proclaimed on May 18, 2013, the
COMELEC En Banc, in its Resolution of May 14, 2013, had already resolved that the COMELEC First
Division correctly cancelled her COC on the ground that she lacked the Filipino citizenship and residency
requirements. Thus, the COMELEC nullified her proclamation. When Regina Reyes challenged the
COMELEC actions, the Supreme Court En Banc, in its Resolution of June 25, 2013, upheld the same. With
the COMELEC's cancellation of respondent Regina Reyes' COC, resulting in the nullification of her
proclamation, the Tribunal cannot assume jurisdiction over the present petitions. The jurisdiction of the
HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives. And to be
considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
58 Lico v. COMELEC
ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO et. al. petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC and
the self-styled sham ATING KOOP PARTYLIST represented by AMPARO T. RIMAS,
respondent.
G.R. No. 205505. September 29, 2015.*
Ponente: C.J. Sereno

Synopsis:
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on
the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires
jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the
nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives. In this case, the
COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he
assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has
jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
In the present case, the fact that petitioner Lico was a member of Congress at the time of his expulsion
from Ating Koop removes the matter from the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. The rules on intra-party
matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel concepts that do not intersect. Rather, the
operation of the rule on intra-party matters is circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET is
exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter touching on the validity of
the title of the proclaimed winner.
Digest:
FACTS
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization which was registered on 16 November 2009 under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941. Under Ating Koop’s Constitution and By-Laws, its highest policy-making
body is the National Convention. The Central Committee, however takes over when the National
Convention is not in session.
Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation for
the May 2010 Elections. On March 6, 2010, it filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees. On
December 8, 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups.
Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list organizations, Ating Koop issued
Cental Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term sharing agreement signed by its
nominees. Under the agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the 1st year
of the three-year term. On May 14, 2011, Ating Koop held its 2nd National Convention, during which it
introduced amendments to its Constitution and Bylaws. In effect, the amendments cut short the three-
year term of the incumbent members of the Central Committee.
Almost 1 year after Lico had assumed office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating
Koop for disloyalty. On December 8, 2011, Congressman Lico filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
Interim Central Committee, which subsequently denied the same.
On March 16, 2012, the Rimas Group, claiming to represent Ating Koop, filed with COMELEC a Petition
against Lico. In a Resolution, the COMELEC 2nd Division upheld the expulsion of Lico from Ating Koop
and declare Mascarina as the duly qualified nominee. Consequently, the Lico Group filed a Motion for
Reconsideration from the 2nd Division’s Resolution, which the COMELEC En Banc denied for lack of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the COMELEC En Banc erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction
RULING
No, but yes in respect to the action of the COMELEC in upholding the validity of the expulsion of Lico
from Ating Koop.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on
the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires
jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the
nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives. In this case, the
COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he
assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has
jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
In the present case, the fact that petitioner Lico was a member of Congress at the time of his expulsion
from Ating Koop removes the matter from the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. The rules on intra-party
matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel concepts that do not intersect. Rather, the
operation of the rule on intra-party matters is circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET is
exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter touching on the validity of
the title of the proclaimed winner.
In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico’s expulsion from the House of Representatives is
anchored on his expulsion from Ating Koop, which necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A
party-¬list nominee must have been, among others, a bona fide member of the party or organization for
at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election. Needless to say, bona fide membership in the
party-list group is a continuing qualification. We have ruled that qualifications for public office, whether
elective or not, are continuing requirements. They must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election, or of assumption of office, but during the officer’s entire tenure.
Consequently, the COMELEC failed to recognize that the issue on the validity of petitioner Lico’s expulsion
from Ating Koop is integral to the issue of his qualifications to sit in Congress. This is not merely an error
of law but an error of jurisdiction correctible by a writ of certiorari; the COMELEC should not have
encroached into the expulsion issue, as it was outside its authority to do so.
59 Drilon v. De Venecia
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, as President and in Representation of the LIBERAL PARTY OF THE

PHILIPPINES, et al., Petitioners, vs. Hon. Jose De Venecia, in his official capacity as Speaker
of the House of Representatives, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 180055. July 31, 2009.

Topic: Legislative Department – Representation in the Commission on Appointments
Synopsis:
The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally
defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the
seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly
confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill
the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber exercises the power to choose, within
constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each
chamber’s respective electoral tribunal.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners
may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioner’s direct recourse to this Court is
premature.
Digest:
FACTS
In August 2007, the Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents to the
Commission on Appointments (CA).
In the 2nd week of August 2007, petitioners in G.R. 180055, went to respondent to ask for one seat for
the Liberal Party in the CA but the Speaker merely said that he would study the demand. During the
session of the House of Representatives, Rep. Tanada, requested from the House one seat in the CA for
the Liberal Party. To his request Rep. Gonzales II begged the indulgence of the Liberal Party “to allow the
Legal Dept. to make a study on the matter.” In a separate move Rep. Tanada by letter requested the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives the reconstruction of the House contingent in the CA
to include one seat for the Liberal Party in compliance with the Constitution.
However no report or recommendation was proffered hence this petition.
Meanwhile, Senator Madrigal of PDP-Laban by separate letter to Senator Villar and Speaker Nograles,
claimed that the composition of the Senate contingent in the CA violated the constitutional requirement
of proportional representation. Thus, she requested the reorganization of the membership of the CA and
that in the meantime, “all actions of the CA be held in abeyance as the same may be construed as illegal
and unconstitutional.” Hence, she filed a petition G.R. No. 183055.
ISSUE(S)
Whether Senator Madrigal erred in seeking direct recourse before the SC
RULING
Yes. “The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who
may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their
members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the
Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber exercises
the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the
allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners
may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioner’s direct recourse to this Court is
premature.
Note: G.R. No. 180055 was declared moot and academic with the designation of Rep. Umali Jr. of the
Liberal Party as a member of the House of Representative contingent in the CA in replacement of Rep.
Gullas of KAMPI.
60 Garcillano v. House of Representatives

Virgilio O. Garcillano (‘er) vs House of Representatives Committees on Public Information,
Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications
Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (‘dents)
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
Ponente: J. Nachura
Topic: Senate Inquiry – Publication
Synopsis:
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without
duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. Section 21,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives,
or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure.”
Digest:
FACTS
This is a consolidated case pertaining to illegal act of wiretapping. The first case GR no. 170338 involve
the "Hello Garci" tapes. It allegedly contained the President's instructions to COMELEC Commissioner
Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings
were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both
Houses of Congress. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the
admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the
House.
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely and
had decided to prepare reports out of the recordings and the testimonies of the resource speaker.
Alarmed by this, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition
and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Without reaching finality, the proceedings stopped. After two years of being held in abeyance. Senator
Lacson delivered a prevelege speech promising to expose "the whole unvarnished truth — the what's,
when's, where's, who's and why's" of the alleged wiretap.
On the second case, GR no. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili filed before same Court for the
issuance of TRO seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. The Court
did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its proceedings on the “Halu Garci”.
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, but they have different
objectives — the first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent
inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate
inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and
grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the Senate may be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative
inquiry without duly published rules of procedure
RULING
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to
continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure,
in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides that “[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.” The
requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of
1. injustice to punish or
2. otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or
3. rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[l]aws shall
take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the
1. Official Gazette, or in a
2. newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.”
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general
circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however,
of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the
publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
PS. As to G.R. No. 170338 the Court dismissed for being moot and academic; The exercise by the Court
of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies.
61 Lerias v. Mercado
ROSETTE YNIGUEZ LERIAS, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL and ROGER G. MERCADO, respondent.
G.R. No. 97105 October 15, 1991
Ponente: J. Paras
Topic: Judicial Review of Decisions of the HRET
Synopsis:
The independence of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, (HRET, for brevity) as a
constitutional body has time and again been upheld by this Court in many cases. The power of the HRET,
as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election returns and qualifications of its members is
beyond dispute. (Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution) Thus, judicial review of decisions or final
resolutions of the HRET is possible only in the exercise of this Court's so-called "extra-ordinary
jurisdiction" – upon a determination that the tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in
excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such a grave abuse of discretion
that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. Then only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown that the Court interferes with the HRET's judgment or decision.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner Lerias was a candidate of the UPP-KBL for the position of Representative for the lone district of
Southern Leyte in the May 11, 1987 elections while respondent Mercado was the administration
candidate for the same position.
In the provincial board's copy of the certificate of canvass for the municipality of Libagon, Lerias received
1,811 votes while Mercado received 1,351. Thus, if said copy would be the one to be included in the
canvass, Lerias would have received 35,939 votes as against Mercado's 35,793 votes, giving Lerias a
winning margin of 146 votes. But, the provincial board of canvassers ruled that their copy of the
certificate of canvass contained erasures, alterations and superimpositions and therefore, cannot be used
as basis of the canvass. It rejected the explanation of the members of the municipal board of canvassers
of Libagon that said corrections were made to correct honest clerical mistakes which did not affect the
integrity of the certificate and said corrections were made in the presence of the watchers of all the nine
(9) candidates for the position, including those of Mercado who offered no objection.
Lerias appealed the ruling of the provincial board of canvassers to the COMELEC praying that the
Commission order the provincial board of canvassers to use their copy of the certificate of canvass for
Libagon.
At the scheduled hearing on June 5, 1987, the counsel for Lerias, agreed to use the COMELEC copy of
the certificate of canvass provided that it be found to be authentic and genuine. A similar reservation was
made by counsel for Mercado.
The COMELEC’s copy showed that Lerias received only 1,411 votes in Libagon because in Precincts 6, 10,
18 and 19 she received in each of the said precincts 100 votes less than what she received as shown in
the provincial board of canvasser's copy of the certificate of canvass. Nevertheless, the COMELEC,
(Second Division) in its Resolution dated June 6, 1987, directed the provincial board of canvassers to
complete the canvass by crediting Mercado 1,351 votes and Lerias 1,411 votes, the votes received by
them, respectively, as shown in the COMELEC copy of the certificate of canvas. So, on June 7, 1987, the
provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Mercado, as the winning candidate,
On June 7, 1987, Lerias filed an urgent ex-parte motion for the reconsideration of the June 6, 1987
resolution praying that the members of the municipal board of canvassers be summoned to testify on the
authenticity and veracity of the COMELEC copy of the certificate of canvass and statement of votes
submitted to the COMELEC and that the election returns for the 4 precincts produced.
On June 15, 1987 Lerias filed with the COMELEC a petition (SPC No. 87-488) for the annulment of the
canvass and proclamation of Mercado, praying that the ballot boxes of the 4 precints be ordered opened
and the votes therein recounted. On June 21, 1987, she filed a motion to suspend the effects of the
proclamation of Mercado.
There being no action taken by the COMELEC on the said motion and since the term of office of the
members of the House of Representatives would commence on June 30, 1987, Lerias filed on June 30,
1987 before this Court a petition (G.R. No. 78833) for the annulment of the COMELEC resolution of June
6, 1987 and the proclamation of Mercado.
Meanwhile, in SPC-87-488, the COMELEC en banc required Mercado to file an answer. Instead of filing an
answer, however, Mercado filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (a) the resolution dated June 6,
1987 had already become final because the motion for reconsideration filed by Lerias was ex-parte and
did not stop the running of the period to appeal therefrom and (b) since Lerias filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for the annulment of the COMELEC's June 6, 1987 resolution and the subsequent
proclamation of Mercado, she had abandoned her previous petition with the COMELEC.
At the scheduled hearing on June 16, 1987 of SPC-87-488, the members of the municipal board of
canvassers of Libagon and the school teachers who served as inspectors of the 4 Precincts 6, 10, 18 and
19 were present and manifested that they were ready to testify. The COMELEC did not want to hear the
case on the merits opting instead to merely hear Mercado's motion to dismiss. The said witnesses were
not given the chance to testify.
On June 17, 1987, the COMELEC resolved to dismiss SPC-87-488 because the petitioner had filed a case
with the Supreme Court and had, therefore, abandoned her case with the COMELEC.
On July 22, 1987 Lerias filed with this Court a second petition to set aside not only the COMELEC's
resolution of July 6, 1987 but also the resolution of July 17, 1987.
The petition was heard on oral argument and on September 10, 1987, this Court dismissed the petition
because (a) the COMELEC resolution of June 6, 1987 and the proclamation of Mercado had already
become executory inasmuch as five days had elapsed from receipt of a copy of said resolution by
petitioner and no restraining order had been issued by the Court citing Sec. 246 of the Omnibus Election
Code, and (b) Lerias thru counsel had agreed before the COMELEC (Second Division) during the hearing
therein on June 5, 1987 to use the COMELEC copy of the certificate of canvass.
Lerias filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, on October 1, 1987, she filed
an election protest with respondent HRET.
Lerias contested the results of the election in the 4 Precincts asserting that the total votes credited to her
in the said four precincts (1,411 votes) were less than or short by 400 votes from that actually obtained
by her (1,811 votes) and if the provincial board of canvassers' copy of the certificate of canvass for
Libagon were to be used as basis of the canvass instead of the COMELEC copy, she would have garnered
35,930 votes as against Mercado's 35,793 votes or a winning margin of 146 votes.
Mercado filed his Answer with Counter-Protest, denying the material allegations of the protest and
counter-protesting the results of the elections in 377 precincts. He alleged that the votes cast for him
were (a) intentionally misread in favor of Lerias; (b) not counted or tallied, and/or counted or tallied in
favor of Lerias; (c) considered marked or were intentionally marked and; (d) tampered and changed. The
counter-protest also charged that blank spaces in the ballots were filled with Lerias' name; that various
ballots for Lerias, pasted with stickers, were considered valid and counted for Lerias; that votes in the
election returns were tampered with and altered in favor of Lerias, and that terrorism and massive vote-
buying were employed by her.
The initial hearing was scheduled for August 22, 1988, but on March 7, 1988 unidentified uniformed
armed men raided the municipal building of Libagon and stole the ballot boxes for the 20 precincts of
Libagon stored in the office of the municipal treasurer. Fortunately, these armed mem overlooked the
ballot box which was kept in the office of the election registrar at the second floor of said municipal
building. Said ballot box contained all the copies of the election returns of Libagon which were used in
the municipal canvass. It is in the said office that said ballot box remained until a representative of the
HRET went to Libagon on March 23 and 24, 1988 to take possession of the contents of the same
particularly the election returns kept in said ballot box.
On December 6, 1990, the Tribunal (by a vote of 5-4) promulgated its now assailed Decision Protestee
Mercado wins by a plurality of 46 votes)
ACCORDINGLY, THE PROTEST of protestant Lerias is dismissed. The Tribunal declared Mercado the duly
elected Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Southern Leyte,
The dissenting opinon of Justice Ameurfina M. Herrera, Honorable, Justice Isagani Cruz, Justice Emilio
Gancayco , Representative Antonio H. Cerilles was in favor of Lerias as the winner since the “the plurality
of 20 votes obtained by her in the counter-protested precincts according to the outcome of the
appreciation of ballots, must be added the 400 votes that should have been counted in her favor in the
municipality of Libagon and that Protestant Lerias should, therefore, be credited with a total of 36,008
votes as against 35,588 votes for Protestee Mercado, or a margin of four hundred twenty (420) votes.
“I cannot help noting that, as in several earlier cases, all the five members representing the majority
party are again voting together in favor of the Protestee, who also happens to belong to their party.
Whatever this coincidence may import, I repeat my observation in the Ong cases (HRET Nos. 13 and 15,
Nov. 6, 1989) that `although the composition of the Tribunal is predominantly legislative, the function of
this body is purely judicial, to be discharged on the basis solely of legal considerations, without regard to
political, personal and other irrelevant persuasions.”
– J. Cruz
Lerias filed a motion for reconsideration. Mercado also filed a partial motion for reconsideration. The
Tribunal Resolved to DENY protestant's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. Protestee's Partial
Motion for Reconsideration, is hereby GRANTED.
Honorable Justice Herrera revised her Dissenting Opinion finding that the Plurality of Protestant Lerias -
12 votes (instead of 20 in the original dissent) while Justice Cruz maintained his original dissent.
Representative Cerilles filed a "Dissenting Opinion on Denial of Protestant's Motion for Reconsideration"
saying “In sum, Protestant should therefore be declared winner in the May 11, 1987 election for the Lone
District of Southern Leyte having obtained a plurality of four hundred four (404) votes over the Protestee,
and thus further declare Protestant Rosette Y. Lerias as the duly elected Representative of the Lone
District of Southern Leyte. “
“We have read and examined, with utmost interest and care, the contentions of the parties, the majority
opinion of the five members of the Tribunal as well as the separate dissenting opinions of the chairperson
and some members of the electoral tribunal, and the Court arrived at the conclusion, without any
hesitation, reservation, or doubt, that the Tribunal (the majority opinion) in rendering its questioned
Decision and Resolution had acted whimsically and arbitrarily and with very grave abuse of discretion. It
is for this reason that We cannot bring ourselves to agree with their decision. “
Lerias contended that in the 4 precincts of Libagon where her votes were determined to be 1,411 only,
the same were allegedly reduced by 100 votes in each precinct, thus totalling 400. Should her claimed
votes as aforestated be sustained Lerias' total votes from the municipality of Libagon shall be 1,811
votes. In such an eventuality, Lerias shall have been able to recover 400 votes, more than sufficient to
overcome the winning margin of Mercado, thereby prevailing by a plurality of 146 votes.
To prove her contention, Lerias submitted original copies of the certificate of canvass of the municipal
board of canvassers and the provincial board of canvassers. She also invoked the original copy of the
election returns for the municipal board of canvassers of Libagon.
Mercado relied mainly on the xerox copy of the certificate of canvass for the COMELEC.
The HRET majority opinion rejected the election returns and sustained the certificate of canvass because
(1) the COMELEC found that the COMELEC copy of the certificate of canvass is "regular, genuine and
authentic on its face" and said finding of the COMELEC had been sustained by the Supreme Court; (2)
the protestant (meaning Lerias) had agreed during the pre-proclamation proceedings to the use of the
COMELEC copy of the certificate of canvass; and (3) the authenticity of the election returns from the four
(4) disputed precincts had not been established.
The reasons given by the majority for doubting the authenticity of the election returns are: (a) the non-
production of the election returns during the entire pre-proclamation proceedings definitely creates much
doubt as to their authenticity especially so when they surfaced only almost a year later after the ballots
had been stolen; (b) during that time, the election returns may have been tampered with and "doctored"
to Lerias' advantage; (c) no proof whatsoever was offered to show that the integrity of the ballot box in
which they were kept was not violated; and (d) thewitnesses presented by Lerias had shown their
partisanship in her favor by executing affidavits to support her protest.
The foregoing findings and pronouncements of the HRET (majorirty opinion) are totally bereft of any
support in law and settled jurisprudence.
In an election contest where what is involved is the correctness of the number of votes of each
candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves. But where the ballots
cannot be produced or are not available, the election returns would be the best evidence. Canvassing
boards, the COMELEC and the HRET must exercise extreme caution in rejecting returns and may do so
only upon the most convincing proof that the returns are obviously manufactured or fake. And,
conformably to established rules, it is the party alleging that the election returns had been tampered
with, who should submit proof of this allegation.
At this juncture, it is well to stress that the evidence before the HRET is the original copy of the election
returns while the COMELEC's copy of the certificate of canvass, is merely a xerox copy, the original
thereof had not been produced.
Under the best evidence rule, "there can be no evidence of a writing, the contents of which are the
subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself" except only in the cases enumerated in Rule 130,
Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court. The exceptions are not present here. Moreover, the xerox copy of the
certificate of canvass is inadmissible as secondary evidence because the requirements of Sec. 4 of the
same Rule have not been met. The finding of the COMELEC in the pre-proclamation proceedings that its
copy of the certificate of canvass is "genuine and authentic" and which finding was sustained by this
Court (G.R. No. 78833; 79882-83) is not binding and conclusive.
Anent the pronouncement of the HRET (majority opinion) that having agreed to the use of the
COMELEC's copy of the certificate of canvass, Lerias is now estopped from assailing it, suffice it to state
that Lerias agreed to the use of said copy because she was not aware then that the figures therein had
been altered. It is a matter of record that she immediately objected after she discovered the discrepancy.
At any rate, she cannot be estopped from protesting a falsification of the voters' will because such
estoppel would contravene public policy. (Dissent of J. Cruz, p. 5) Moreover, as indicated in the
discussion hereinabove, under the circumstances relating to pre-proclamation, estoppel certainly cannot
apply.
The authenticity of said returns, particularly those of the four disputed precincts, had been further
established by the testimonies of the members of the Board of Election Inspectors of said precincts
during the hearing before the Tribunal and before the hearing officer designated to hear the case. More
importantly, examination of said returns conclusively established the Identity of said returns as the very
same ones prepared by the respective Board of Election Inspectors during the counting of the votes. It
would appear then that the votes of Lerias as indicated in the COMELEC copy of the Certificate of
Canvass had been systematically reduced by 100 votes in each of the four precincts.
The number of votes received by protestant and protestee in the four disputed precincts of Libagon as
shown in the election returns for said precincts is substantiated by documentary evidences. Also, the fact
that the members of the board of election inspectors in the disputed precincts had executed affidavits in
support of the claim of Lerias cannot be considered as partisanship since it is the duty of said members of
the board to inform the COMELEC, of the actual results of voting in their respective precincts.
All told, the Court is of the considered opinion that the HRET (majority opinion) had no basis at all in
considering the election returns from Precincts 6, 10, 18 & 19 as not authentic.
The Counter-Protest:
Where only the first name of the candidate is written on line 1 for senator, the neighborhood rule will not
apply. According to the majority the neighborhood rule itself is but an exception to that accepted rule on
appreciation that the candidate's name placed in another line not the proper space for the position he is
aspiring is a stray vote, and being already an exception the same must be applied most rigidly and very
strictly. Thus, according to the majority, ballots with "Rosette" or "roset" or "rosit" written on line 1 for
senators, even if the space for congressman is blank and no other candidate for congress is written on
the ballot, were rejected and denied admission by the majority.
In said particular ballots they cannot be considered as votes cast for senatorial candidate Yniguez
inasmuch as in the same ballot Yniguez had also been voted for as senator in the proper space for
senators.
Some of the ballots rejected by the majority also contain the name "Lerias" on line 1 for Senator. These
ballots were written by assistors, and therefore, were admitted as valid. (Timbol v. Lazatin, HRET Case
No. 46, 22 March 1990). The majority rejected these ballots by discounting the applicability of the
"neighborhood rule".
SC’s Conclusio:
Considering the indubitable evidence on record the 400 votes fraudulently taken away from Lerias should
be returned to her. So that in the entire municipality of Libagon, she received 1,811 votes. From the
original 35,539 votes, Lerias should be credited with 35,939 votes as against the 35,793 votes of Mercado
giving her a margin of 146 votes. Whatever the results of the review of the ballots in the counter-
protested precincts would be, Lerias would still be the winner.
ISSUE(S)
WON the SC (in this case) can excercise the power of judicial review over decisions and orders of the
HRET and if in the negative, is it present in this case the exception
RULING
“The General rule, no. as for the exception, there is none.” This conclusion is according to PADILLA, J
dissenting opinion as can be read below.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:

“xxx In the present case, the questioned decision of the House Electoral Tribunal revolves around
questions of fact in the connection with alleged irregularities in the conduct of a congressional election.
Regardless of how far we may differ from the factual findings of the House Electoral Tribunal, under the
Constitution, is the sole judge thereof.
The farmers of the 1987 Constitution, in no certain terms, provided that:

SEC. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respecti ve
member. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate of the House of Representatives, as the case my be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The Senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its chairman. 1
(Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that the intent of the 1987 Constitution is to make the Electoral Tribunals of both the Senate
and the House of Representatives the sole of all election contests concerning their respective Members.
The use the words "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred on the House
Electoral Tribunal such that judicial review of final decisions or resolutions of the House Electoral Tribunal
is possible only in the exercise of the Supreme Court's 'extra-ordinary jurisdiction', i.e., upon a
determination tha the electoral tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered, without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident
use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a clear unmitigated error, manifestly consituting such a
grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. 3
The House Electoral Tribunal is not an ordinary agency established by statute or executive fiat to better
handle administrative concerns assumed by line departments of the executive branch. It is a
constitutional body created precisely to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the House of Representative.
The House Electoral Tribunal, being the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, the Supreme Court may not review its
decisions except when the Tribunal is lcearly shown to have issued them with grave abuse of discretion
as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 5 It is fundamental that for grave abuse of discretion to
exist, there must be a "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; or that the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice or personal hostility, amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The House Electoral Tribunal is a tribunal in the true in the true and strict sense of the term, with the
limited but exclusive jurisdiction granted to it by the fundamental law and its functions are properly
judicial. This power granted by the Constitution is not as abstract or empty as a carcass, but real and
positive, with all the attributes for effective manifestation in the external world and, like all human
powers, needs the tools and instruments linking the cause and effect.
I submit that the Supreme Court cannot excercise the power of judicial review over decisions and orders
of the House Electoral Tribunal, except only upon the strongest showing that a constitutional norm-like
the mandate of natural-born citizenship for members of the House of Representative-has been violated,
or a patently manifest grave abuse of authority committed; for "courts are mere creatures of the state
and of its power, and while their life as courts continues, they must obey the law of their creator.
The records of this case, disclose that the petitioners anchors her arguments on alleged election
abormalities. And yet, all her allegations are based on questions of fact the appreciation of which vests
solely within the jurisdiction and competence of the House Electoral Tribunal. Nowhere in the records of
this case is it disclosed that the House Electoral Tribunal resorted to arbitrary or improvident use of its
power as to constitute a denial of due process nor is there any evidence of a clear unmitigated error
manifestly constituting such a grave abuse of discretion for which the Court should afford a remedy. The
absence of grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the facts, is demonstrated by the fact that the
Tribunal was so closely divided, which means that the facts were susceptible of appreciation one way or
the other. It is precisely because of such situations that the Constitution has constituted the House
Electoral Tribunal-not this Court-as the sole judge of all election contests involving members of the House
of Representatives. The proper role for the Court to perform is to apply the law based on the findings of
fact of the electoral tribunal. This inevitably leads to a dismissal of the petition in this case.
This Court cannot remedy, as the majority would have it, a situation where the House Electoral Tribunal
has arrived at a conclusion which, in the perception of the majority in this Court, is gravely erroneous.
The Supreme Court is, in my opinion, powerless to review, much more, revise the decision of the House
Electoral Tribunal in this case; for otherwise it can be charged with usurping power not granted to it by
the Constitution. The Supreme Court, moreover, is not a trier of facts and can do no more than to abide
by the House Electoral Tribunal's appreciation of the facts in cases within its unquestioned exclusive
jurisdiction. True, the circumstance that the decisions of the House Electoral Tribunal are final and
without appeal may seem unreasonable, or better still, inequitable, but then the decisions of this Court in
matters within its jurisdiction are likewise final and without appeal. "There must be a final tribunal
somewhere for deciding every question in the world. Injustice may take place in all tribunals for all
human institutions are imperfect-courts as well as commissions and legislatures ... It may be that our
legislatures , (or, in this case, our electoral tribunals), are invested with too much power, open as they
are, to influences so dangerous to the interests of individuals, corporations and society. But such is the
Constitution of our republican form of government and we are bound to abide by it until it can be
corrected in a legitimate way. 9 After all, "the courts are without authority to repress evil save as the law
has proscribed it and then only according to law. 10
Believing, therefore, that what the Court seeks to do today in this case carries unwarranted and even
dangerous consequences four our state, government and people, in that it blurs (if not demolishes) the
constitutional boundaries between the Court and the Electoral Tribunals in matters where the latter are,
by express constitutional design, and mandate, made sole judges, I vote to DISMISS the petition.”
62 Dela Paz v. Senate
SPOUSES PNP DIRECTOR ELISEO D. DELA PAZ (Ret.) and MARIA FE C. DELA PAZ, petitioners,
vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS and the SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS
JOSE BALAJADIA, JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 184849. February 13, 2009
Ponente: J. Nachura
Topic: Judicial Review of House Rules of Proceeding
Synopsis:
The exercise of the power of each house to determine the rules of its proceedings is generally exempt
from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident
use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.—Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution states: “Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings.” This provision has been
traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in the
formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally
exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.
Digest:
FACTS
In October 2008, Gen. De La Paz, a senior officer of the PNP, headed a delegation of 8 to attend an
Interpol GA. De La Paz brought with him his wife and 3 days after the scheduled GA, de la Paz is also
scheduled to retire. After the GA, De La Paz was apprehended in the departure area for he was carrying
with him €105,000.00 (P6,930,000.00). He was also carrying with him €45,000.00 (P2,970,000.00). He
failed to declare in writing that he is carrying such an amount and this is in violation of the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime. De La Paz and his group was later released but the €s were confiscated by the Russians. Upon
arrival to the Philippines, De La Paz was issued a subpoena by the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations for the investigation it was to conduct involving the Moscow incident. De La Paz averred that
the said committee does not have jurisdiction of the case. De La Paz argued that the Committee is devoid
of any jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow incident as the matter does not involve state to state
relations as provided in paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure (Senate
Rules). They further claim that respondent Committee violated the same Senate Rules when it issued the
warrant of arrest without the required signatures of the majority of the members of respondent
Committee. They likewise assail the very same Senate Rules because the same were not published as
required by the Constitution, and thus, cannot be used as the basis of any investigation involving them
relative to the Moscow incident.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the said Committee has jurisdiction over the matter
RULING
The SC ruled against De La Paz. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states:”Each
House shall determine the rules of its proceedings.” This provision has been traditionally construed as a
grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and
promulgation of its own rules. The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, raised by petitioner in the case at bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a matter
that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question.
Also, the signatures were properly obtained as evidenced by the approval of the Senate president and it
is shown that the gathering of the signatures is in accordance with the Rules. It is also shown that the
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation were also published in two newspapers of
general circulation.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and ED
VINCENT S. ALBANO, Petitioners, versus THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA; HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CESAR PURISIMA; and
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 168056. September 1, 2005
Topic: Legislative Department – How a Bill Becomes a Law
Synopsis:
The no-amendment rule refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with
regard to bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house
for its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to proscribe any further
changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the
other house of Congress would be deprived of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to
said bill.
Digest:
FACTS
This case is a consolidation of several petitions for prohibition, praying that the Supreme Court enjoin the
enactment of Republic Act 9335, or the Attrition Act of 2005. One such petition is a petition for certiorari
filed by several members of the House of Representatives, led by Rep. Escudero, questioning the
propriety of the insertion by the Bicameral Conference of several sections of the proposed House Bill No.
3705 and Senate Bill No. 1950. Specifically, it questions whether the changes made violate Article VI,
Section 26(2) as well as Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.
ISSUE(S)
1. Does the law violate the no-amendment rule?
2. Does the law violate the constitutional rule on tariff bills originating from HR?
RULING
No. As to the first point, petitioners argue that the practice where a bicameral conference committee is
allowed to add or delete provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill after these had passed three
readings is in effect a circumvention of the no amendment rule. However, the Court ruled that the no-
amendment rule refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to
bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for its
concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to proscribe any further
changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the
other house of Congress would be deprived of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to
said bill.
Secondly, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in
the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the
whole. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may
be produced. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to
deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. It would
be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the
House superior to the Senate.
64 Senate v. Ermita
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, et al., Petitioners, vs.

EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and Alter-Ego of President
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. No. 169659. April 20, 2006.

Topic: Legislative Investigation – Question Hour
Synopsis:
The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987
Constitution. The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’
oversight function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it had issued, the department heads’ appearance is merely requested.
Digest:
FACTS
This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China
National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the
Fertilizer scam.
The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials
for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent
a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to
“afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they
may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation.” Senate refused the request.
On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated
that “all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec.
Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the
meeting since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and
Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court
marshal for such attendance.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress
RULING
To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two different functions
of the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and the power to conduct inquiry
during question hour.
Question Hour:
The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
“The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such
House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so
states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.”
The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight
function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it had issued, the department heads’ appearance is merely requested.
The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the appearance of department
heads during question hour as it explicitly referred to Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
In aid of Legislation:
The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in Article 6,
section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing
in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.”
The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation
is intended to affect or change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of
inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege”. This is the power of the
government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized
only to certain types of information of a sensitive character. When Congress exercise its power of inquiry,
the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They
are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one official may be exempted
from this power -- the President.
Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is
broad. In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such
invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office
authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged.
The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive privilege
or that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the
recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the
lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The letter assumes
that the invited official possesses information that is covered by the executive privilege. Certainly,
Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does
not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is
so.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is
not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely
invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent.
65 Chartered Bank v. Senate
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, et al., Petitioners, vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS,

FINANCIAL INSTITUTINOS, AND CURRENCIES, as represented by its Chairperson HON.
EDGARDO J. ANGARA
G.R. No. 167173. December 27, 2007
Ponente: J. Nachura
Topic: Legislative Inquiry – Pending Cases
Synopsis:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court
or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it
would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of
instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative
authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
Digest:
FACTS
On February 1, 2005, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent, delivered a privilege
speech entitled “Arrogance of Wealth” before the Senate based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo
denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities
Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of
legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. Prior to the privilege
speech, Senator Enrile had introduced P.S. Resolution No. 166 to direct the Committee on Banks,
Currencies, and Financial Institutions, to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the reported sale of
unregistered and high-risk securities by Standard Chartered Bank which resulted in billions of losses to
the investing public.”
Respondent invited petitioners, among others, to attend the hearing, requesting them to submit their
written position paper. Petitioners, through counsel, submitted to respondent a letter dated February 24,
2005 presenting their position, particularly stressing that there were cases pending in court allegedly
involving the same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction
of respondent to continue with the inquiry.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the cases pending in regular court involving the same issues of the legislative inquiry bar
the Congress to conduct hearing in aid of legislation
RULING
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a
court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation.
Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the
convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign
legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation. As succinctly stated in the landmark case
Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950) — The power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information —
which is not infrequently true — recourse must be had to others who possess it.
66 Araullo v. Aquino (with MR on Feb. 3, 2015)
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN; JUDY M.

TAGUIWALO, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON,
PAGBABAGO; HENRI KAHN, CONCERNED CITIZENS MOVEMENT; REP. LUZ ILAGAN,
GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP. CARLOS ISAGANI ZARATE, BAY AN
MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE; RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF
BAYAN; MANUEL K. DAYRIT, CHAIRMAN, ANG KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER MARI E.
CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR VILLANUEVA, CONVENOR, YOUTH ACT
NOW, Petitioners, vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 209287. July 1, 2014.
Topic: Legislative Department – Appropriations
Synopsis:
DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation in Section 29(1),
Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an
appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the
GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP. However, the Court in this case ruled that the transfers
made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of the
other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds,
however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”.
Digest:
FACTS
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the
economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio
Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will
then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as
economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by
the Supreme Court).
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of
then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but
was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within
the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded. This prompted Maria
Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens
to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their
contentions was that DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides
that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
ISSUE(S)
Is the DAP in violation of Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution?
RULING
No. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional
provision cited The DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation
made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were
merely being realigned via the DAP. However, the Court in this case ruled that the transfers made
through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of the other
branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however,
such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-
Executive agencies.
67 Giron v. COMELEC (En banc decision)
HENRY R. GIRON, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent, ALMARIO E.

FRANCISCO, FEDERICO S. JONG JR., and RICARDO L. BAES JR., petitioners-in-intervention.
G.R. No. 188179. January 22, 2013.

Topic: Legislative Department – One-Subject-One-Title Rule
Synopsis:
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient
if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to
effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing
of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The assailed Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) are indeed
germane to the subject expressed in the title of R.A. 9006: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free,
Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.
Digest:
FACTS
Henry R. Giron (Giron) asserts that the insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates
Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically requires: “Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” Petitioner avers
that these provisions are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the political
ad ban. Section 12 refers to the treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates after the official
ballots have been printed, while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67 (Candidates holding
elective office) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67
of this law concerns the ipso facto resignation of elective officials immediately after they file their
respective certificates of candidacy for an office other than that which they are currently holding in a
permanent capacity.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the inclusion of Sec. 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates the “one subject-one title rule”
RULING
No. To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that—
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient
if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to
effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing
of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The assailed Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) are indeed
germane to the subject expressed in the title of R.A. 9006: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free,
Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices. The title was worded
broadly enough to include the measures embodied in the assailed sections. Consequently, we dismiss the
Petition and the petitions-in-intervention for failure to establish a clear breach of the Constitution.
68 Soliven v. Makasiar
Maximo Soliven, Antonio V. Roces, Frederick Agcaoili and Godofredo Manzanas (‘ers) vs
Ramon Makasiar, Undersecretary Silvestre Bello III, Luis Victor, Corazon Aquino (‘dents)
G.R. No. 82585, Nov 14, 1988.
Ponente: PER CURIAM

Topic: Executive Department – Presidential Immunity
Synopsis:
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise
of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the government is a job that demands undivided attention. But this privilege of
immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office, and may thus be invoked only by he
holder of the office. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving
the privilege. Thus, if so minded, the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege as a
defense to prevent the case from proceeding.
Digest:
FACTS
This is a consolidated case (the full text-not stating the complete elaboration of facts of the case).
On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the
resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against
petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of
Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioner's contention that they have
been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.
Petitioners now seek the help of SC to reverse the adverse decision against them.
ISSUE(S)
(1) Whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against
them although the finding of the existence of aprima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of
Justice and, subsequently, by the President
(2) Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a
warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause
RULING
1. No, due process is not denied. It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the
allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that
instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect
waiving his right to refute the complaint by filling counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require
that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to
submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
2. No, RTC judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion. "What the Constitution underscores is the
exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require
the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly
laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating
on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. On June 30,1978, the Supreme Court
unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The
procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution."
69 Estrada v. Disierto
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, Petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as

Oombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, et al., Respondents
G.R. No. 146710-15. March 2, 2001.
Ponente: J. Puno
Synopsis:
To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment
proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil
cases may already be filed against him. Indeed, incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from
being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the
peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and
thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his
criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.
Digest:
FACTS
In the wake of the stepping down from office of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, and the assumption of
office by then Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, several criminal cases were filed against the
former. In his defense, Estrada posits the contention that such cases should be dismissed, as he has not
actually been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him, raising the presidential privilege of
immunity from suit.
ISSUE(S)
Is Estrada immune from suit?
RULING
No. The contention that the President cannot be prosecuted absent a conviction in the impeachment
court is unavailing. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the
prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the
Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.
Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he
should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would
put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will
place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment
proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the
Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to
the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him.
Indeed, incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of
their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the
impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency,
petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the
Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.
70 Lozada v. PGMA
RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA, JR., VIOLETA LOZADA and ARTURO LOZADA, petitioners, vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA, AVELINO RAZON, ANGEL
ATUTUBO and SPO4 ROGER VALEROSO,** respondents
G.R. No. 184379-80. April 24, 2012.
Ponente: J. Sereno
Synopsis:
It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys immunity from suit during his or her tenure of
office or actual incumbency. Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a
non-sitting president even for acts committed during his or her tenure. In the case at bar, the events that
gave rise to the present action, as well as the filing of the original petition and the issuance of the CA
decision, occurred during the incumbency of former President Arroyo. In that respect, it was proper for
the court a quo to have dropped her as respondent on account of her presidential immunity from suit. It
must be underscored however, that since her tenure of office has already ended, the former president
can no longer invoke the privilege as a defense to evade judicial determination of her responsibility for
the alleged violation or threatened violation of the right to life, liberty, and security of Lozada.
Digest:
FACTS
The instant Petition stems from the alleged corruption scandal precipitated by a transaction between the
Philippine government, represented by the National Broadband Network (NBN), and ZTE Corporation, a
Chinese manufacturer of telecommunications equipment. Former NEDA Secretary Neri sought the
services of Lozada as an unofficial consultant in the ZTE-NBN deal. The latter avers that during the
course of his engagement, he discovered several anomalies in the said transaction involving certain public
officials. These events impelled the Senate of the Philippines Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct an
investigation thereon, for which it issued a subpoena directing Lozada to appear and testify on 30
January 2008.
Lozada did not appear at the Blue Ribbon Committee. DENR Sec. Atienza announced that Lozada was in
an official trip to London. Because of this, Senate issued an order (1) citing Lozada in contempt; (2)
ordering his arrest and detention; (3) directing the sergeant-at-arms to implement such order and make
a return.
Lozada asked Sec. Atienza if he can go back to the Philippines. Upon approval, he informed his family
that he would be arriving in Manila, Feb 5 at 4 pm.
In his petition, Lozada claims that upon disembarking, several men held his arms and took his bag. He
allegedly insisted on joining his family but realized that it would be wiser to go with the men when he
heard them say in their handheld radio ‘[H]wag kayong dumaan diyan sir nandyan ang mga taga
senado.’
Lozada asked to go to the comfort room and while there, called his brother, Arturo and informed him of
his situation. He observed that there were several cars tailing their car. Sec. Atienza called him and
assured him that he was with government people and that Sec. Atienza would confer with ES and Ma’m.
Lozada surmised them to be ES Ermita and the President. He was also told to pacify his wife, Violeta,
who was making public statements asking for her husband’s return. Along the way, the men asked
Lozada to draft an antedated letter requesting police protection. Lozada asked to be brought to his home
in Pasig, but was refused due to security risks. They stopped at Outback restaurant to meet with Atty.
Antonio Bautista and Col. Mascarinas, Lozada claimed that he was made to fill in the blanks of an
affidavit. He was then brought to LSGH per his request. He observed that policemen, purportedly
restraining his liberty and threatening the security of his, his family and the LS brothers, guarded the
perimeter of LSGH.
On Feb 6, Col. Mascarinas supposedly brought Lozada to the office of Atty. Bautista to finalize and sign
an affidavit. On the same day his wife petitioned for Habeas Corpus and his brother petitioned for a Writ
of Amparo with the Supreme Court, and prayed for the issuance of (a) the writ of amparo; (b) a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO); and (c) Inspection and Production Orders as regards documents
related to the authority ordering custody over Lozada, as well as any other document that would show
responsibility for his alleged abduction.
Lozada alleged that he was made to sign a letter requesting police protection. On 7 February 2008,
Lozada decided to hold a press conference and contact the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, who served the
warrant of arrest on him. He claimed that after his press conference and testimony in the Senate, he and
his family were since then harassed, stalked and threatened.
Respondents: Lozada had knowledge and control of what happened from the time of his arrival, he
voluntarily entrusted himself to their company and was never deprived of his liberty and that since Feb 8,
Lozada has been in the custody of the Senate.
CA’s decisions:
1. Habeas Corpus case moot.
2. Denied issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Presentation of Hostile Witnesses and Adverse
Parties – irrelevant to Amparo Case, to require them to testify would be a fishing expedition.
3. Dropped Pres. Arroyo as a respondent because she enjoys immunity from suit as president.
4. Dismissed Writ of Amparo. – Petitioners unable to prove through substantial evidence that respondents
violated Lozada’s right to life, liberty and security.
ISSUE(S)
Whether circumstances are adequately alleged and proven by petitioner Lozada to entitle him to the
protection of the writ of amparo
RULING
NO. The writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief to
protect the people’s right to life, liberty and security. Having been originally intended as a response to the
alarming cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in the country, it serves both
preventive and curative roles to address the said human rights violations. It is preventive in that it breaks
the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the
subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.
As it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, or to threats thereof. Considering that this remedy is aimed at addressing these serious
violations of or threats to the right to life, liberty and security, it cannot be issued on amorphous and
uncertain grounds, or in cases where the alleged threat has ceased and is no longer imminent or
continuing. Instead, it must be granted judiciously so as not to dilute the extraordinary and remedial
character of the writ, thus: The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and
guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the
quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to
the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be
resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined
by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs
and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.
Writ of Amparo Denied

In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty or security has already ceased, it is necessary for
the petitioner in an amparo action to prove the existence of a continuing threat.
In the present case, the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioners failed to meet the threshold of
substantial evidence. Sifting through all the evidence and allegations presented, the crux of the case boils
down to assessing the veracity and credibility of the parties’ diverging claims as to what actually
transpired on 5-6 February 2008. In this regard, this Court is in agreement with the factual findings of
the CA to the extent that Lozada was not illegally deprived of his liberty from the point when he
disembarked from the aircraft up to the time he was led to the departure area of the airport, as he
voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of respondents.
• He was able to go to the men’s bathroom and call his brother
• He was avoiding the people from the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, detour appears to
explain why they did not get out at the arrival area, where [Lozada] could have passed through
immigration so that his passport could be properly stamped
• No evidence on record that Lozada struggled or made an outcry for help
• He testified that nobody held, shouted, or was hostile to him
• He knew and agreed with the plan that he would be fetched at the airport because at that time,
it was his decision not to testify before the Senate
• it must be emphasized that if Lozada had in fact been illegally restrained, so much so that his
right to liberty and security had been violated, the acts that manifested this restraint had already ceased
and has consequently rendered the grant of the privilege of the writ ofamparo moot.
• The supposed announcement of General Razon over the radio that [Lozada] was in the custody
of the PNP can neither be construed as a threat to [Lozada’s] life, liberty and security. Certainly, no
person in his right mind would make that kind of media announcement if his intent was indeed to
threaten somebody’s life, liberty and security
• Presence of armed men riding in motorcycle passing outside the LSGH premises where he and
his family are staying and by alleged threats of armed men around him at places where he went to.
Again, these alleged threats were not proven by any evidence at all, as having originated from any of the
respondents
• Installation of the surveillance camera at the De La Salle and at St. Scholastica as indirect threat
to his right to life, liberty and security. He claims that these are spy cameras. However, save for
[Lozada’s] self-serving claim, he simply failed to prove that they were installed or ordered installed by the
respondents for the purpose of threatening his right to life, liberty and security
• No evidence on record that the bomb threats were made by the respondents or done upon their
instigation.
• He did not ascertain from the Bureau of Immigration whether his name was actually in the official
watch list of the Bureau
• [Lozada] himself testified that he does not know whether the respondents or any of the
respondents ordered the filing of these ‘frivolous’ cases against him. In any event, said purported cases
are to be determined based on their own merits and are clearly beyond the realm of the instant amparo
petition filed against the respondents
• The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the
performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does
not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence (Yano v. Sanchez)
Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo petition should a criminal action have, in
the meanwhile, been commenced.
Sec. 23, on the other hand, provides that when the criminal suit is filed subsequent to a petition for
amparo, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action where the Amparo Rule shall
nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule.
71 Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan
ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, vs. The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division)

and the PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 152259. July 29, 2004
Synopsis:
Executive immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President. It could not be used to shield a
non-sitting President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office. The reasoning
of petitioner must therefore fail, since he derives his immunity from one who is no longer sitting as
President. Verily, the felonious acts of public officials and their close relatives are not acts of the State,
and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on the same footing as any other
trespasser.
Digest:
FACTS
The PCGG, on July 12, 1989, in behalf of the People of the Philippines, filed an information before the
anti-graft court charging herein accused with violation of R.A. 3019. Allegedly, herein petitioner-accused,
brother-in-law of former president Ferdinand E. Marcos, intervened directly in a contract between the
National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and controlled corporation and
the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the majority stocks of
which is owned by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and
conveyed to the BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests over all equipment and facilities
including structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable
assets, located at the Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island Shops including some of its
equipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in its
shipbuilding and ship repair program for the amount of P5,000,000.00. Romualdez however argued that
he enjoys derivative immunity, because he allegedly served as a high-ranking naval officer -- specifically,
as naval aide-de-camp -- of former President Marcos.
ISSUE(S)
Does the presidential immunity privilege extend to Romualdez?
RULING
No. Primarily, as the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the defense of immunity from suit is not applicable to
petitioner because the immunity amendment became effective only in 1981 while the alleged crime
happened in 1975. Furthermore, executive immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President.
It could not be used to shield a non-sitting President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done
while sitting in office. The reasoning of petitioner must therefore fail, since he derives his immunity from
one who is no longer sitting as President. Verily, the felonious acts of public officials and their close
relatives are not acts of the State, and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on
the same footing as any other trespasser.
72 Neri v. Senate
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner, vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC

OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND
SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 180643. September 4, 2008.*

Topic: Executive Department – Presidential Communications Privilege
Synopsis:
The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez, affirmed that the presidential communications
privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of
powers under the Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita, the case relied upon by respondent Committees,
reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumerated the cases in which the claim of executive privilege
was recognized, among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), and Chavez v. PEA. The Court articulated in these cases that “there are certain
types of information which the government may withhold from the public,” that there is a “governmental
privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
national security matters”; and that “the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as
‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about 11 hours on matters
concerning NBN Project, a project awarded by DOTC to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
(“ZTE”). Petitioner disclosed that then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in
exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo of
the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further
on President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking “executive privilege.” To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or
not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these three questions by requiring
him to appear and testify once more. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent
Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive
privilege.
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed
might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Given the
confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the
Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is
designed to protect. In light of the above considerations, they are constrained to invoke the settled
doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.
ISSUE(S)
W/ON Petitioner can invoke executive privilege on matters pertaining to diplomatic relations
RULING
There Is a Recognized Presumptive Presidential Communications Privilege
Respondent Committees ardently argue that the Court’s declaration that presidential communications are
presumptively privileged reverses the “presumption” laid down in Senate v. Ermita11 that “inclines
heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.” Respondent Committees then claim that the
Court erred in relying on the doctrine in Nixon.
Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of the presidential
communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That is far from the truth. The
Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez, affirmed that the presidential communications privilege
is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under
the Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita, the case relied upon by respondent Committees, reiterated this
concept. There, the Court enumerated the cases in which the claim of executive privilege was recognized,
among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), and
Chavez v. PEA. The Court articulated in these cases that “there are certain types of information which the
government may withhold from the public,” that there is a “governmental privilege against public
disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security
matters”; and that “the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged
information’ under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations,
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.” ###
73 Biraogo v. Truth Commission
LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010,
respondent.
G.R. No. 192935-193036. December 7, 2010.
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Topic: Powers of the President – Creation of Ad Hoc Committees
Synopsis:
Reorganization refers to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or
alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision. To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the
President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the
term “restructure”—an “alteration of an existing structure.”
The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the
recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power
to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws
have been faithfully executed. It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can
be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power to
appropriate funds where there is only allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
Digest:
FACTS
The Philippine Truth Commission is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and
thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
Though it has been described as an “independent collegial body,” it is essentially an entity within the
Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad
hoc body is one.
Barely a month after its creation, the petitioners asked the court to declare it unconstitutional and enjoin
the PTC to performing its functions. One of the arguments presented were, that the provision of Book III,
Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. 1 because the
delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hither to inexistent like the “truth commission.”
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the PTC fall within the ambit of power to reorganize as expressed in Sec. 31 of the
Administrative Code.
2. Whether the President has the power to create ad hoc committees.
RULING
1. NO. Section 31 contemplates “reorganization” as limited by the following functional and structural
lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring
any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3)
transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa.
Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These points refer to situations where a body or an office
is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is
nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. To say that the PTC is borne out of a
restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the
plainest meaning attributable to the term “restructure”—an “alteration of an existing structure.” Evidently,
the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive
Order No. 1.
2. YES. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One
of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the
power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if
laws have been faithfully executed. It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so
that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power to
appropriate funds where there is only allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
74 PhilConsA v. Enriquez
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and A. GONZALES,

petitioners, vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and Management; HON.
VICENTE T. TAN, as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
G.R. No. 113105. August 19, 1994.
Ponente: J. Quiason
Topic: Powers of the President – Duty of Faithful Execution
Synopsis:
There is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to
guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper
or inappropriate. The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds authorized by
Congress is simply an exercise by the President of his constitutional duty to see that the laws are
faithfully executed (1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17). Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the
President has the power to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into execution the law.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994. GAA contains a special
provision that allows any members of the Congress the Realignment of Allocation for Operational
Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded. Philconsa claims that only the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are the ones authorized under the
Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress themselves. President signed the
law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain provisional conditions: that the AFP
Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension funds under the Retirement and
Separation Benefits of the AFP.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution
RULING
Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings, and 2) the
transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer to be made.
As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the
Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. the
AFP Chief of Staff may not be given authority.
75 Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Ermita
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, et al. vs. EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA

G.R. No. 164978. October 13, 2005
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Powers of the President – Appointment
Synopsis:
Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that “[t]he President may temporarily designate
an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of
an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person
not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.
Ad interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them
are effective upon acceptance. But ad interim appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad
interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection;
acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments.
Digest:
FACTS
The Congress commenced their regular session on July 26, 2004. The Commission on Appointment, was
constitutes on August 25, 2004. Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments to the following as
acting secretaries of their respective departments:
Appointee Department Date of Appointment

Arthur C. Yap Agriculture 15 August 2004
Alberto G. Romulo Foreign Affairs 23 August 2004
Raul M. Gonzalez Justice 23 August 2004
Florencio B. Abad Education 23 August 2004
Avelino J. Cruz, Jr. National Defense 23 August 2004
Rene C. Villa Agrarian Reform 23 August 2004
Joseph H. Durano Tourism 23 August 2004
Michael T. Defensor Environment and 23 August 2004
Natural Resources
Congress adjourned. Respondents took their oath of office and assumed duties as acting secretaries.
President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to
which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the acting appointments are valid.
2. Whether the ad interim appointments are valid.
RULING
1. YES. The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5,
Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that “[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive
branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government
service, as long as the President deems that person competent.
2. YES. Ad interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of
them are effective upon acceptance. But ad interim appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad
interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection;
acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a
way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the
need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. However, we find no abuse in the present
case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim
appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one
year.
76 Rufino, et al., v. Endriga, et al.
RUFINO, et al. vs. ENDRIGA, et al. / ENDRIGA, et al. vs. RUFINO, et al.
G.R. No. 139554/ 139565 July 21, 2006.
Ponente: J. Carpio
Synopsis:
The present case involves the interpretation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with
respect to the appointment of this fourth group (lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress
may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards) of officers. The
President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The
President appoints the second and third groups of officers without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. The President appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the
appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to
appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the
President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because the trustees fall under the third group of
officers.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent appointing power of their fellow
trustees. The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the President’s power
to appoint.
Digest:
FACTS
Then President Marcos issued E.O. 30 creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed
by a Board of Trustees of 7 members to preserve and promote Philippine culture. Soon after the
declaration of Martial Law, President Marcos issued P.D. 15, the CCP’s charter, which converted the CCP
under E.O 30 into a non-municipal public corporation free from the “pressure or influence of politics.”
P.D.15 increased the members of CCP’s Board from 7 to 9 trustees. Later Executive Order No. 1058,
increased it further to 11.
On December 22, 1998, then President Estrada appointed 7 new trustees to the CCP Board for a term of
4 years to replace the Endriga group as well as 2 other incumbent trustees. Except for Tantoco, the
Rufino group took their oaths of office and assumed the performance of their duties in early January
1999.
On January 6, 1999, the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before this Court questioning
President Estrada’s appointment of 7 new members to the CCP Board. They alleged that under Sec. 6(b)
of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board “shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees
helf at the next regular meeting x x x.” In case “only one trustee survive(s), the vacancies shall be filled
by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the [CCP].” The Endriga group
claimed that it is only when the CCP Board entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such
vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the President has the power to appoint the trustees in the CCP Board.
2. Whether Sec. 6 b and c of PD 15 is inherently in conflict with the President’s power to appoint.
RULING
1. YES. The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the
Constitution provides otherwise. Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative and
Judicial branches violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in our democratic republican
government. Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups
of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to
those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under the same
Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law
vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The present case involves the
interpretation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with respect to the appointment of this
fourth group of officers. The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the second and third groups of officers without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the third group of officers if the law
is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency,
commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is
found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because the trustees fall
under the third group of officers.
2. YES. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent appointing power of their
fellow trustees. The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the President’s
power to appoint. This inherent conflict has spawned recurring controversies in the appointment of CCP
trustees every time a new President assumes office. In the present case, the incumbent President
appointed the Endriga group as trustees, while the remaining CCP trustees elected the same Endriga
group to the same positions. This has been the modus vivendi in filling vacancies in the CCP Board,
allowing the President to appoint and the CCP Board to elect the trustees. In effect, there are two
appointing powers over the same set of officers in the Executive branch. Each appointing power insists
on exercising its own power, even if the two powers are irreconcilable.
77 Matibag v. Benipayo
MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, et al.

G.R. No. 149036. April 2, 2002
Ponente: J. Carpio
Synopsis:
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.
The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to
disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be
revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment
because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new
appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.
(A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission
on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on
Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent
such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee.)
Digest:
FACTS
The COMELEC en banc appointed Matibag (petitioner) as “Acting Director IV” of the Education and
Information Department (EID). On February 15, 2000, then Chairperson Demetriou renewed the
appointment of petitioner in a “Temporary Capacity.” On February 15, 2001, Commissioner Javier again
renewed her appointment to the same position in a “Temporary” capacity.
On March 22, 2001, President Arroyo appointed, ad interim Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Borra
and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of 7 years. Benipayo took his oath of office and
assumed the position of COMELEC Chairman. Borra and Tuason likewise took their oaths of office and
assumed their positions. The Office of the President submitted to the Commission on Appointments
(COA) the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason. However, the COA did not act on said
appointments.
On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
to the same positions and for the same term. They took their oaths of office for the second time. The
Office of the President transmitted their appointments to COA for confirmation.
Congress adjourned before the COA could act in their appointments. Thus President Arroyo renewed
again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions. The Office of
President transmitted their appointments for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments. They took
their oaths of office anew.
In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum addressed to petitioner as

Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of
the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department, COMELEC EID Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol
K. Sadain objected to petitioner’s reassignment in a Memorandum addressed to the COMELEC en banc.
Commissioner Sadain questioned Benipayo’s failure to consult the Commissioner-in-Charge of the EID in
the reassignment of petitioner.
On April 16, 2001, petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of EID and her
reassignment to the Law Department. But Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration. During the
pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, Matibag filed the instant petition questioning the
appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason as Chairman and
Commissioners of COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and
reappointments of its Chairman and members.
In the meantime, President Arroyo renewed once again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason and they took their oaths of office anew.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the assumption of office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by the Constitution.
2. Whether the renewal of the ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the same
positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under the Constitution.
RULING
1. NO. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it
is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The
second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows: “The President shall
have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the ad interim
appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer
be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any
time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis.
2. NO. The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither
to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be
revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment
because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new
appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that “[t]he Chairman and the Commissioners shall
be appointed x x x for a term of seven years without reappointment.”(Emphasis supplied) There are four
situations where this provision will apply. The first situation is where an ad interim appointee to the
COMELEC, after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, serves his full seven-year term. Such
person cannot be reappointed to the COMELEC, whether as a member or as a chairman, because he will
then be actually serving more than seven years. The second situation is where the appointee, after
confirmation, serves a part of his term and then resigns before his seven-year term of office ends. Such
person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or as a chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement
because a reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than seven years. The third
situation is where the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired term of someone who died or
resigned, and the appointee completes the unexpired term. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether
as a member or chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the
appointee also serving more than seven years.
The fourth situation is where the appointee has previously served a term of less than seven years, and a
vacancy arises from death or resignation. Even if it will not result in his serving more than seven years, a
reappointment of such person to serve an unexpired term is also prohibited because his situation will be
similar to those appointed under the second sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
This provision refers to the first appointees under the Constitution whose terms of office are less than
seven years, but are barred from ever being reappointed under any situation. Not one of these four
situations applies to the case of Benipayo, Borra or Tuason.
Note:
A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on
Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on
Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent
such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee.
78 Fetalino v. COMELEC
FETALINO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 191890. December 4, 2012
Ponente: J. Brion
Synopsis:
The termination of the petitioners’ ad interim appointments could hardly be considered as incapacity
since it was not the result of any disability that rendered them incapable of performing the duties of a
Commissioner. Thus, petitioners cannot claim to be entitled to the five-year lump sum gratuity under
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 on the basis of incapacity.
Digest:
FACTS
President Ramos extended an interim appointment to Fetalino and Calderon as COMELEC Commissioners,
each for a term of 7 years. Then, 11 days later, Pres. Ramos renewed the petitioners’ ad interim
appointments for the same position. Congress, however, adjourned in May 1998 before the CA could act
on their appointments. The constitutional ban on presidential appointments late took effect and the
petitioners were no longer re-appointed as COMELEC Commissioners. Thus, Fetalino and Calderon served
as COMELEC Commissioners for more than 4 months.
Subsequently, the petitioners applied for their retirement benefits and monthly pension with the
COMELEC. Initially the application was approved pursuant to Resolution No. 06-1369. On February 6,
2007, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0202 granting the petitioners a pro-rated gratuity and pension.
Then on October 5, 2007, the petitioners asked for a re-computation of their retirement pay on the
principal ground that R.A. No. 1568, does not cover a pro-rated computation of retirement pay. In
response, COMELEC issued a resolution referring the matter to its Financial Services Dept. for comment
and recommendation. On July 14, 2009, the COMELEC issued another resolution referring the same to its
Law Dept. for study and recommendation.
In the presently assailed Resolution No. 8808, on the basis of the Law Dept.’s study, completely
disapproved the petitioners’ claim for a lump sum.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the petitioners are entitled to the lump sum gratuity.
2. Whether petitioners were denied due process.
RULING
1. NO. To be entitled to the five-year lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, any of the
following events must transpire:
(1) Retirement from the service for having completed the term of office;
(2) Incapacity to discharge the duties of their office;
(3) Death while in the service; and
(4) Resignation after reaching the age of sixty (60) years but before the expiration of the term
of office.
In addition, the officer should have rendered not less than twenty years of service in the government at
the time of retirement. Death during the service obviously does not need to be considered in the present
case, thus leaving retirement, incapacity and resignation as the event that must transpire in order to be
entitled to the lump sum gratuity.
We note that the termination of the petitioners’ ad interim appointments could hardly be considered as
incapacity since it was not the result of any disability that rendered them incapable of performing the
duties of a Commissioner. Thus, incapacity is likewise effectively removed from active consideration.
“Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and
renounces the further right to it. To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or
employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of
relinquishment.” In this sense, resignation likewise does not appear applicable as a ground because the
petitioners did not voluntarily relinquish their position as Commissioners; their termination was merely a
consequence of the adjournment of Congress without action by the CA on their ad interim appointments.
The petitioners obviously did not retire under R.A. No. 1568, as amended, since they never completed
the full seven-year term of office prescribed by Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution; they
served as COMELEC Commissioners for barely four months, i.e., from February 16, 1998 to June 30,
1998.
2. NO. “[a] party cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due process if he was accorded the
opportunity of a hearing, through either oral arguments or pleadings. There is no denial of due process
when a party is given an opportunity through his pleadings.” In the present case, the petitioners cannot
claim deprivation of due process because they actively participated in the COMELEC proceedings that
sought for payment of their retirement benefits under R.A. No. 1568. The records clearly show that the
issuance of the assailed COMELEC resolution was precipitated by the petitioners’ application for
retirement benefits with the COMELEC. Significantly, the petitioners were given ample opportunity to
present and explain their respective positions when they sought a re-computation of the initial pro-rated
retirement benefits that were granted to them by the COMELEC. Under these facts, no violation of the
right to due process of law took place.
79 Kida v. Senate
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in representation of

MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,
Petitioners, vs SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, et al., Respondents
G.R. No. 196271
Ponente: J. Brion
Synopsis:
The power of supervision is defined as “the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers
perform their functions in accordance with law.” This is distinguished from the power of control or “the
power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.”
The petitioners’ apprehension regarding the President’s alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted
in their belief that the President’s appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at will.
In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as
representatives of the President and not of the people.
The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the
Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will
remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in
this provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made.
Digest:
FACTS
The herein petitioners assailed the Supreme Court’s Decision dated October 18, 2011, where the latter
upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153 – An Act Providing for the Synchronization of
the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local
Elections and for Other Purposes. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No.
10153 postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which
were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013
and recognized the President’s power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these
positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.
The petitioners assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the President the power to appoint OICs in elective
positions, violates Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, which merely grants the President the power
of supervision over autonomous regions.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not R.A. No. 10153 violates Section 16, Article X of the Constitution
RULING
NO. There is no incompatibility between the President’s power of supervision over local governments and
autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No.
10153, to appoint OICs.
The power of supervision is defined as “the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers
perform their functions in accordance with law.” This is distinguished from the power of control or “the
power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.”
The petitioners’ apprehension regarding the President’s alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted
in their belief that the President’s appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at will.
In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as
representatives of the President and not of the people.
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners’ supposition. The provision states:
“Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the
Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in
the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.”
The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the
Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will
remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in
this provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made.
80 ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Executive Secretary
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and ED
VINCENT S. ALBANO, Petitioners, versus THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA; HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CESAR PURISIMA; and
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 168056. September 1, 2005
Topic: Legislative Department – Bicameral Conference
Synopsis:
To reconcile or harmonize disagreeing provisions, the Bicameral Conference Committee may then (a)
adopt the specific provisions of either the House bill or Senate bill, (b) decide that neither provisions in
the House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill would be carried into the final form of the bill, and/or
(c) try to arrive at a compromise between the disagreeing provisions. In the present case, the changes
introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee on disagreeing provisions were meant only to
reconcile and harmonize the disagreeing provisions for it did not inject any idea or intent that is wholly
foreign to the subject embraced by the original provisions.
Digest:
FACTS
This case is a consolidation of several petitions for prohibition, praying that the Supreme Court enjoin the
enactment of Republic Act 9335, or the Attrition Act of 2005. One such petition is a petition for certiorari
filed by several members of the House of Representatives, led by Rep. Escudero, questioning the
propriety of the insertion by the Bicameral Conference of several sections of the proposed House Bill No.
3705 and Senate Bill No. 1950.
ISSUE(S)
Does the Bicameral Conference have the power to delete or add provisions to a proposed bill?
RULING
Yes. The creation of such conference committee was apparently in response to a problem, not addressed
by any constitutional provision, where the two houses of Congress find themselves in disagreement over
changes or amendments introduced by the other house in a legislative bill. Given that one of the most
basic powers of the legislative branch is to formulate and implement its own rules of proceedings and to
discipline its members, may the Court then delve into the details of how Congress complies with its
internal rules or how it conducts its business of passing legislation? Note that in the present petitions, the
issue is not whether provisions of the rules of both houses creating the bicameral conference committee
are unconstitutional, but whether the bicameral conference committee has strictly complied with the rules
of both houses, thereby remaining within the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Congress. In the
immediate case, the high Court observed that here was a necessity for a conference committee because
a comparison of the provisions of House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 on one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950
on the other, reveals that there were indeed disagreements.
To reconcile or harmonize disagreeing provisions, the Bicameral Conference Committee may then (a)
adopt the specific provisions of either the House bill or Senate bill, (b) decide that neither provisions in
the House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill would be carried into the final form of the bill, and/or
(c) try to arrive at a compromise between the disagreeing provisions. In the present case, the changes
introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee on disagreeing provisions were meant only to
reconcile and harmonize the disagreeing provisions for it did not inject any idea or intent that is wholly
foreign to the subject embraced by the original provisions.
81 League of Provinces v. Executive Secretary
LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES and HON. ANGELO T. REYES, in his capacity as
Secretary of DENR, respondents
G.R. No. 175368. April 11, 2013
Ponente: J. Peralta
Topic: Powers of the President – Control
Synopsis:
Section 3, Article X of the Constitution mandated Congress to “enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.” The power of
the President over local government units is only that of general supervision, and not of control.
Digest:
FACTS
Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation (Golden Falcon) filed with DENR Mines and Geosciences
Bureau Regional Office No. III (MGB R-III) and Application for Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA).
The MGB R-III issued an Order denying their application for failure to secure area clearances from the
Forest Management Sector and Lands Management Sector of the DENR Regional Office No. III.
Therefore, Golden Falcon filed an appeal with the DENR Mines and Geosciences Bureau Central Office
(MGB-Central Office), and sought reconsideration of the Order dated April 29, 1988.
Pending appeal, Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz, Gerardo Cruz and Liberato Sembrano filed with the
PENRO of Bulacan of their respective Applications for Quarry Permit, which covered the same area
subject of Golden Falcon’s application.
On July 16, 2004 the MGB-Central Office issued an Order denying Golden Falcon’s appeal.
On September 13, 2004, Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) filed with the PENRO of Bulacan
an Application for Exploration Permit covering 5,281 hectares of the area covered by Golden Falcon’s
Appplication.
On October 19, 2004, DENR-MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos, in response to MGB R-III Director Arnulfo
V. Cabantog’s memorandum query dated September 8, 2004, categorically stated that the MGB-Central
Office’s Order dated July 16, 2004 became final on August 11, 2004, fifteen (15) days after Golden Falcon
received the said Order. Through letters AMTC notified the PENRO of Bulacan and the MGB R-III Director,
that the subject Applications for Quarry Permit fell within its (AMTC’s) existing valid and prior Application
for Exploration Permit, and the former area of Golden Falcon was open to mining location only on August
11, 2004 per the Memorandum dated October 19, 2004 of the MGB Director, Central Office.
AMTC filed with the PMRB of Bulacan a formal protest against the aforesaid Applications for Quarry
Permit. On August 8, 2005 the said application was endorsed to Gov. dela Cruz and aforesaid application
had been converted to Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit of Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz,
Gerardo Cruz and Lucila Valdez (formely Liberato Sembrano).
The PENRO Bulacan issued 4 memoranda recommending to Gov. dela Cruz the approval of the
applications. Subsequently, AMTC appealed to the respondent DENR Secretary for the grant of said
permit saying that the PMTB of Bulacan erred in giving due course to the applications. The DENR
Secretary rendered a decision in favor of AMTC.
Hence this petition, petitioner contends that Sec. 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the LGC of 1991 and Sec. 24 of RA
7076, which confer upon respondents DENR and DENR Secretary the power and control are
unconstitutional, as the Constitution states that the President has the power of supervision only, not
control, over acts of the local government units, and grants the local government units autonomy.
ISSUE(S)
Whether Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076,
which confer upon respondents DENR and the DENR Secretary the power of control is unconstitutional
RULING
No. Section 4, Article X (Local Government) of the Constitution states that “[t]he President of the
Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments,” and Section 25 of the Local
Government Code reiterates the same. General supervision by the President means no more than seeing
to it that laws are faithfully executed or that subordinate officers act within the law.
The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X,
Sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical
language, the decentralization of government authority. It does not make local governments sovereign
within the State. Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but subject to limitations
like following national policies or standards, and those provided by the Local Government Code, as the
structuring of local governments and the allocation of powers, responsibilities, and resources among the
different local government units and local officials have been placed by the Constitution in the hands of
Congress under Section 3, Article X of the Constitution.
Section 3, Article X of the Constitution mandated Congress to “enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.”
82 Gudani v. Senga
Francisco Gudani and Alexander Balutan (‘ers) vs Generoso S. Senga (COS AFP), Gilberto
Jose ROA, The Provost Marshall General of The AFP, General Court Martial (‘dents)
G.R. NO. 1701165 August 15, 2006
Ponente: J. Tinga
Topic: Powers of the President – Control/Military
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners are Military Officials who seek the annulment of a directive from President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo enjoining them and other military officers from testifying before Congress without the President's
consent. The prohibition occurred as a result of invitation from the Senate on September 2005
concerning the conduct of 2004 election which allegedly exposed to massive cheating. At the time of the
2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a member, of "Joint
Task Force Ranao" by the AFP Southern Command. "Joint Task Force Ranao" was tasked with the
maintenance of peace and order during the 2004 elections in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao
del Sur.
On 27 Sept 2005 at around 10:10pm, PGMA released an instruction stating that “No AFP Personnel shall
appear before any congressional or Senate hearing without her approval. The following day, Petitioners,
during the hearing informed the Senators that they were not given authority by PGMA to appear before
the hearing. However, the petitioners both testified as to the conduct of the 2004 elections.
A few hours after petitioners concluded their testimony, they were charged with violation of Article 65-
willfully disobeying superior officer. Hence, they will be subjected to general court martial proceedings.
They were likewise both relieved from their respective assignments.

This triggered the petitioners to (1) petition with the SC for certiorari and prohibition seeking to declare
as unconstitutional the order of PGMA to seek first approval from her office in order to appear in any
congressional/senate hearing and (2) to enjoin respondents in trying the petitioners for the violation of
Article 65 due to their appearance in the Senate on 25 September 2005.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether or not the order of GMA for the petitioners to seek prior approval from her office in order to
appear in any congressional/senate hearing is constitutional
2. Whether or not the legislative body seeking testimony of the petitioners may seek judicial relief to
compel their attendance despite the opposition of PGMA
RULING
1. Yes, PGMA can validly impose said order. Critical to military discipline is obeisance to the military chain
of command. Willful disobedience of a superior officer is punishable by court-martial under Article 65 of
the Articles of War. “An individual soldier is not free to ignore the lawful orders or duties assigned by his
immediate superiors. For there would be an end of all discipline if the seaman and marines on board a
ship of war [or soldiers deployed in the field], on a distant service, were permitted to act upon their own
opinion of their rights [or their opinion of the President’s intent], and to throw off the authority of the
commander whenever they supposed it to be unlawfully exercised.” Further traditional restrictions on
members of the armed forces are those imposed on free speech and mobility.
2. Yes, if the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a member of the AFP to appear before
Congress, the legislative body seeking such testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the attendance.
Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between
the legislative and executive branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of power;
And if emphasis be needed, if the courts so rule, the duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as
commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the
President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the
Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.
83 David v. Arroyo
PROF. RANDOLF DAVID, LORENZO TANADA III, et al., Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, Executive Secretary EDUARDO ERMITA, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 171396. May 3, 2006.
Ponente: J. Sandoval-Guttierez
Topic: Powers of the President – Military/Emergency
Synopsis:
The 1987 Constitution has adopted a balanced power structures within the three pillars of government.
Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and the Supreme
Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in
times of emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the other. This
system does not weaken the President, it just limits his power. In other words, in times of
emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic
integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within
carefully prescribed procedural limitations.
Digest:
FACTS
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. On March 3, 2006, exactly one
week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petitions had been filed,
the President lifted PP 1017. In defense of the proclamation, the herein respondents stated that there
was conspiracy among some military officials, leftist NPA agents, and other members of the political
opposition. During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General argued that the intent
of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of
calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was
without factual bases, and that it was not the job of the herein respondents to prove the factual bases of
the proclamation in the outset.
ISSUE(S)
Does the executive enjoy unfettered (monopolized) power in times of emergency?
RULING
NO. The 1987 Constitution has adopted a balanced power structures within the three pillars of
government. Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and
the Supreme Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of
power in times of emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the other.
This system does not weaken the President, it just limits his power. In other words, in times of
emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic
integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within
carefully prescribed procedural limitations.
84 Kulayan v. Tan
JAMAR M. KULAYAN, TEMOGEN S. TULAWIE, HJI. MOH. YUSOP ISMI, JULHAJAN AWADI, and
SPO1 SATTAL H. JADJULI, Petitioners,
- versus -
GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, in his capacity as Governor of Sulu; GEN. JUANCHO SABAN, COL.
EUGENIO CLEMEN PN, P/SUPT. JULASIRIM KASIM and P/SUPT. BIENVENIDO G. LATAG, in
their capacity as officers of the Phil. Marines and Phil. National Police, respectively,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 187298. July 3, 2012.
Ponente: J. Sereno
Topic: Powers of the President – Calling Out/Military
Synopsis:
Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief of the Republic One
executive, one commander-in-chief. While the President exercises operational supervision over the police,
and may exercise control only in day-to-day operations. Only the President has full discretion to call the
military when in his judgement it is necessary to do in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. Kidnapping situation cannot be considered a calamity or disaster as contemplated
by Sec. 465 of the LGC, which allows the Chief Executive to “carry out emergency measures as may be
necessary during and in the aftermath of a man-made and natural calamities.
Digest:
FACTS
15 January 2009, 3 members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped
in Patikul Sulu by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A task force was created by the ICRC and PNP which then
organized a parallel local group - Local Crisis Committee later renamed Sulu Crisis Management
Committee under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu.
Gov. Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) (embodied in a "Memorandum of Understanding"
between the provincial government of Sulu, AFP and PNP) - a group of armed male civilians coming from
different municipalities, who were redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul. The Whereas clauses of
the Memorandum alluded to the extraordinary situation in Sulu, and the willingness of civilian supporters
of the municipal mayors to offer their services in order that "the early and safe rescue of the hostages
may be achieved." This Memorandum, which was labeled ‘secret’ on its all pages, also outlined the
responsibilities of each of the party signatories.
4 April 2009, the office of Gov Tan distributed to civic organizations, copies of the "Guidelines for the
Implementation of Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 Declaring a State of Emergency in the Province of
Sulu."
16 April 2009, some residents of Patikul Sulu, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
claiming that Proclamation 1-09 was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article III of the 1987 Constitution;
that it violates Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority
to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and
commander-in-chief of the armed forces; and that the Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law
to create civilian armed forces.
ISSUE(S)
Whether Proclamation No. 1 S. 2009 is constitutional
RULING
NO. Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief of the Republic One
executive, one commander-in-chief. There is one repository of executive powers, and that is the
President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of
executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. - Villena v. Secretary of Interior.
Article VII of the Constitution "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This
means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no
other. Only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided
under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers
under Section 7, Article VII thereof.
While the President exercises operational supervision over the police, and may exercise control only in
day-to-day operations. Only the President has full discretion to call the military when in his judgement it
is necessary to do in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Kidnapping
situation cannot be considered a calamity or disaster as contemplated by Sec. 465 of the LGC, which
allows the Chief Executive to “carry out emergency measures as may be necessary during and in the
aftermath of a man-made and natural calamities.
85 Risos-Vidal and Lim v. COMELEC and Estrada
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, petitioner, ALFREDO S. LIM, petitioner-intervenor, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, respondents.
G.R. No. 206666. January 21, 2015.

Topic: Powers of the President – Pardon
Synopsis:
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The
sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the
accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted
together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. If former President Arroyo intended for the
pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought
to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself.
Digest:
FACTS
In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder
and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007,
however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to
former President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights.
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of the disqualification
cases against him prospered but he only placed second in the results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this
time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the COMELEC stating that
Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on
Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC).
The COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek
public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M.
Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest
votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal
and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
ISSUE(S)
May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been convicted of the crime of
plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office
RULING
Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording
of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is
likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by former President
Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred that former
President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to
hold public office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her
intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the
President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive
clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and
regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President
may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a
final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there
was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act
of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The
sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the
accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted
together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of
the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms,
Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In
other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty
after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold
any public office, whether local or national position.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph
Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes
the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to
suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering
the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights" as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a
preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the
reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part
of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this
case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does
not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the
fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent
or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s promise never to
seek a public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon
itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the
Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to
the pardon extended to former President Estrada. (Risos-Vidal vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January
21, 2015)
86 Bayan Muna v. Romulo
BAYAN MUNA, as represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, and Rep.
LIZA L. MAZA, petitioner, vs. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and
BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, respondents
G.R. No. 159618. February 1, 2011
Topic: Powers of the President – Negotiation/Representation in International Relations
Synopsis:
The Court has, in Eastern Sea Trading, as reiterated in Bayan, given recognition to the obligatory effect
of executive agreements without the concurrence of the Senate. As it were, the Agreement is but a form
of affirmance and confirmance of the Philippines’ national criminal jurisdiction. National criminal
jurisdiction being primary, as explained above, it is always the responsibility and within the prerogative of
the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the
jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide to try “persons” of the US, as the term is
understood in the Agreement, under our national criminal justice system. Or it may opt not to exercise its
criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US “persons” committing high crimes in the country
and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them.
Digest:
FACTS
Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International
Criminal Court (ICC) with “the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes
of international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.”
Philippines is signatory to Rome Statute.
In connection with this, Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note to DFA proposing the
terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement between the USA and the RP.
Via Exchange of Notes, the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the
US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with
the US government. In esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as “persons” of
the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international
tribunals. It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and defense partnership between
the two countries.
It was said that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under
international law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of
the US Senate. For their part, respondents alleged that the Agreement, being in the nature of an
executive agreement, does not require Senate concurrence for its efficacy.
ISSUE(S)
W/ON RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement requires Senate concurrence
RULING
NO. The RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirmance of the Philippines’
national criminal jurisdiction.
The Court has, in Eastern Sea Trading, as reiterated in Bayan, given recognition to the obligatory effect
of executive agreements without the concurrence of the Senate.
As it were, the Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirmance of the Philippines’ national
criminal jurisdiction. National criminal jurisdiction being primary, as explained above, it is always the
responsibility and within the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally covered
by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide to try
“persons” of the US, as the term is understood in the Agreement, under our national criminal justice
system. Or it may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US “persons”
committing high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over
them. ###
87 Saguisag v. Executive Secretary
SAGUISAG VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 212426 January 12, 2016
Ponente: J. Sereno
Synopsis:
The power of the President to enter into binding executive agreements without Senate concurrence is
already well-established in this jurisdiction. That power has been alluded to in our present and past
Constitutions. As the sole organ of our foreign relations and the constitutionally assigned chief architect
of our foreign policy, the President is vested with the exclusive power to conduct and manage the
country’s interface with other states and governments. This constitutional mandate emanates from the
inherent power of the President to enter into agreements with other states, including the prerogative to
conclude binding executive agreements that do not require further Senate concurrence.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners prayed for the declaration of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) entered
into by the respondents for the Philippine government, with the United States of America,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID and to permanently enjoin its implementation.
Petitioners claim the Court erred when it ruled that EDCA was not a treaty. In connection to this,
petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the constitutional
restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign military bases, troops, and
facilities. Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on the issues of telecommunications, taxation, and
nuclear weapons
Petitioners assert that the Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the word "allowed in" to refer to
the initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based on the fact that the plain meaning of the
provision in question referred to prohibiting the return of foreign bases, troops, and facilities except
under a treaty concurred in by the Senate
Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an initial entry, the Court has simply applied the
plain meaning of the words in the particular provision. Necessarily, once entry has been established by a
subsisting treaty, latter instances of entry need not be embodied by a separate treaty. After all, the
Constitution did not state that foreign military bases, troops, and facilities shall not subsist or exist in the
Philippines.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.) is constitutional
RULING
EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops has long been authorized under a valid
and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Reading the VFA along with the
longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) led the Court to the conclusion that an executive agreement
such as the EDCA was well within the bounds of the obligations imposed by both treaties.
Thus, the Court find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the
Philippines' legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government's continued
policy to enhance our military capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may
arise. This Motion for Reconsideration has not raised any additional legal arguments that warrant
revisiting the Decision.
The settled rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be
construed as such and should not be given a construction that changes its meaning
Honorable Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno's theory of "initial entry" mentioned above ventured
into a construction of the provisions of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution which is patently
contrary to the plain language and meaning of the said constitutional provision.
Petitioners' own interpretation and application of the verba legis rule will in fact result in an absurdity,
which legal construction strictly abhors.
88 Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary
SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., REPRESENTATIVE ETTA ROSALES, et al., Petitioners, vs.
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, and THE DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 158088. July 6, 2005
Ponente: J. Puno
Synopsis:
The President cannot be compelled by mandamus to transmit a copy of an executive agreement for
concurrence by Senate. Under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to
the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding
its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse
to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it.
Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that
should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot
be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus.
Digest:
FACTS
The petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000 through Charge d’
Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations. Its provisions, however, require
that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states.
It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international
law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed
copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of
treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome
Statute under treaty law and customary international law. Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose
of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they have made their intention
clear not to become parties to the treaty.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to
transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the
United Nations even without the signature of the President
RULING
NO. In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ
and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. In the
realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of
the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President,
subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or
withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the
President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification,
refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a
serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President
alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus.
89 Macalintal v. PET
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner, vs. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 191618. November 23, 2010.
Ponente: J. Nachura
Topic: Non-Transmissibility of the Power of Appointment
Synopsis:
Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon the
Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The result of the enactment may be
likened to the fact that courts of first instance perform the functions of such ordinary courts of first
instance, those of court of land registration, those of probate courts, and those of courts of juvenile and
domestic relations. It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining when the municipal court of a
provincial capital exercises its authority, pursuant to law, over a limited number of cases which were
previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of first instance. In all of these instances, the court
(court of first instance or municipal court) is only one, although the functions may be distinct and, even,
separate. Hence, the enactment of Republic Act No. 1793, does not entail an assumption by Congress of
the power of appointment vested by the Constitution in the President. It merely connotes the imposition
of additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme Court.
Digest:
FACTS
In this case, Atty. Romulo Macalintal questions the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,
contending that the creation of a separate tribunal, complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, and a
set of personnel and confidential employees through RA No. 1793 is an assumption by Congress of the
Executive power of appointment.
ISSUE(S)
Is the creation of the PET valid?
RULING
Yes. Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon the
Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The result of the enactment may be
likened to the fact that courts of first instance perform the functions of such ordinary courts of first
instance, those of court of land registration, those of probate courts, and those of courts of juvenile and
domestic relations. It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining when the municipal court of a
provincial capital exercises its authority, pursuant to law, over a limited number of cases which were
previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of first instance. In all of these instances, the court
(court of first instance or municipal court) is only one, although the functions may be distinct and, even,
separate. Hence, the enactment of Republic Act No. 1793, does not entail an assumption by Congress of
the power of appointment vested by the Constitution in the President. It merely connotes the imposition
of additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme Court.
90 Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor
children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT
CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 204819. April 8, 2014.
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Topic: Judicial Department – Power of Judicial Review
Synopsis:
The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since
its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in
consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after
said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of
proscribing the actions under review.
Digest:
FACTS
The consolidated cases herein (14 petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention) question the propriety and
constitutionality of R.A. 10354, otherwise known as the Reproductive Health Law. Shortly after the
President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came
knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional
disobedience. Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various
sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes
down constitutional disobedience. In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand however,
the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect the
compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic
process" and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency."
ISSUE(S)
May the Supreme Court exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy surrounding the RH
Law?
RULING
Yes. In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and
the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due
respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be
clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains
not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere. Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. In this connection, it bears adding that
while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the
kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or
otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their
collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective
authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no
constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under
review. In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review
is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of
powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of
the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the
only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.
91 Resident Marine Mammals v. Secretary Angelo Reyes
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT, e.g.,

TOOTHED WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE)
G.R. No. 180771/ G.R. No. 181527. April 21, 2015
Ponente: J. Leonen
Synopsis:
In our jurisprudence, there is neither reason nor any legal basis for the concept of implied petitioners,
most especially when the implied petitioner was a sitting President of the Republic. In the immediate
case, petitioners impleaded former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as an unwilling co-petitioner for
her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect Tanon Strait. Besides, the
President cannot be a party to the suit. Furthermore, the President cannot be presumed to need to resort
to a co-equal branch, the judiciary, merely to compel his alter-egos to enforce the law.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners are Resident Marine Mammals and Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC),
who questions the legality of SC-46 and the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX’s oil exploration activities.
The Government of the Philippines, through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration
Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX, which involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon
Strait. JAPEX assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas
sampling in Tañon Strait.
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration,
development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 sq. km.
offshore Tañon Strait. And from May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the
Strait.
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the 2nd sub-phase of the project. Since the well was
to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared
protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment
requirements pursuant to PD 1586.
On January 31, 2007, the PAMB- Tañon Strait issued a resolution wherein it adopted the Initial
Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and recommended the approval of JAPEX’s
application for an ECC.
On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted the ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for offshore oil
and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. Months later, JAPEX began to drill and exploratory well and it
lasted until February 8, 2008.
Petitioners alleged that after the seismic survey the fish catch was drastically reduced and the fisherfolk
were barred from entering and fishing within a 7km radius from where the oilrig was located, an area
greater that the 1.5 km radius stated in the IEE.
But the public respondents through the Sol. Gen., contend that petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and
Stewards have no legal standing to file present petition and the SC-46 does not violate the constitution.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether petitioner has locus standi
2. Whether SC-46 is constitutional
RULING
1. Yes. Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which allow
for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our
environmental laws:
SEC. 5. Citizen suit.—Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations
yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing
of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of
action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in
the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a
newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said
order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions.
Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, commented:
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants
enforcing environmental rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all
cases filed enforcing environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest,
on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine
first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn.
2. Yes. Paragraph 4, with the safeguards in place, is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article
XII. The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bugal:
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral
oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or
uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and
avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement
is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels
to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that
branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-¬46 is indeed null and void for
noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.
92 Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board
ATTY. THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, et. Al., Petitioners, vs. TOLL REGULATORY

BOARD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATINO AND COMMUNICATIONS,
et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 181293. February 23, 2015.

Topic: Executive Department – Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
Synopsis:
There can be no valid objection to the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary, because he was
authorized by the President to do so by virtue of EO 497. Also, the phrase subject to the approval of the
President does not mean that the presidential approval must be obtained prior to the execution of a
contract, or that the approval be made personally by the President. The presidential approval may be
obtained under the doctrine of qualified political agency, which states that acts of the alter-egos of the
President are considered his own acts unless refuted by the latter.
Digest:
FACTS
On 30 August 1995, Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) and PT Citra Lamtoro Gung
Persada (CITRA) entered into a Business and Joint Venture Agreement and created the Citra Metro
Manila Tollways Corporation (CMMTC). CMMTC was a joint venture corporation organized under
Philippine laws to serve as a channel through which CITRA shall participate in the construction and
development of the Skyway project.
On 27 November 1995, the Republic of the Philippines — through the Toll Regulations Board (TRB) — as
Grantor, CMMTC as Investor, and PNCC as Operator executed a Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement
(STOA) covering Stage 1, Phases 1 and 2; and Stage 2, Phase 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. The
operation and maintenance of the project roads became the primary and exclusive privilege and
responsibility of the PNCC Skyway Corporation (PSC), a wholly owned subsidiary of PNCC.
On 18 July 2007, the Republic of the Philippines, through the TRB, CMMTC, and PNCC executed the
assailed Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (ASTOA). The ASTOA incorporated
the amendments, revisions, and modifications necessary to cover the design and construction of Stage 2
of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Also under the ASTOA, Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO) replaced
PSC in performing the operations and maintenance of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway.
Pursuant to the authority granted to him under Executive Order No. (E.O.) 497 dated 24 January 2006,
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) Secretary Leandro Mendoza approved the
ASTOA through the challenged Memorandum dated 20 July 2007.
Meanwhile, on 28 December 2007, petitioner PNCC Traffic Management and Security Department
Workers Organization (PTMSDWO) filed a Notice of Strike against PSC on the ground of unfair labor
practice, specifically union busting. The Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over
the dispute in an Order dated 31 December 2007 and set the initial hearing of the case on 2 January
2008.
On 3 January 2008, petitioners PTMSDWO and PNCC Skyway Corporation Employees Union (PSCEU) filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 258 (RTC), a complaint against respondents
TRB, PNCC, PSC, CMMTC, and SOMCO. The RTC dismissed the case without prejudice. The RTC likewise
denied the motion for partial reconsideration dated 13 June 2008. Hence, this appeal for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the following:
Xxx
2. The Memorandum dated 20 July 2007 of the Secretary of Transportation and Communications,
approving the Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement;
xxx
The annulment of the above is sought for being unconstitutional, contrary to law, and grossly
disadvantageous to the government. Petitioners also seek to prohibit Skyway O & M Corporation from
assuming operations and maintenance responsibilities over the Skyway toll facilities.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary was valid
RULING
Yes, the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary was valid. The doctrine of qualified political
agency declares that, save in matters on which the Constitution or the circumstances require the
President to act personally, executive and administrative functions are exercised through executive
departments headed by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are presumptively the acts of the President
unless disapproved by the latter.
There can be no question that the act of the secretary is the act of the President, unless repudiated by
the latter. In this case, approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary had the same effect as approval by
the President. The same would be true even without the issuance of E.O. 497, in which the President, on
24 January 2006, specifically delegated to the DOTC Secretary the authority to approve contracts entered
into by the TRB.
Further, the power to grant franchises or issue authorizations for the operation of a public utility is not
exclusively exercised by Congress as claimed by the petitioners. Second, except where the situation falls
within that special class that demands the exclusive and personal exercise by the President of
constitutionally vested power, the President acts through alter egos whose acts are as if the Chief
Executive's own.Third, no lease, transfer, grant of usufruct, sale, or assignment of franchise by PNCC or
its merger with another company ever took place.
93 Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., Petitioners, vs. ANTI-TERRORISM

COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et. Al., Respondents
G.R. No. 178552. October 5, 2010.

Topic: Judicial Department – Judicial Review
Synopsis:
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that the power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases or controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at
abstraction could only leads to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated
to actualities. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination. In the immediate case, petitioners have failed to show that the challenged
provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they seek to do.
Digest:
FACTS
Consolidated in this case are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372, or
the Human Security Act of 2007. In justifying their locus standi and controversy raised, some of the
petitioners contend that they have been subject to close security surveillance by state security forces,
and that they have been branded as enemies of the state.
ISSUE(S)
Given the allegations, may the court exercise judicial review in determining the constitutionality of the
law?
RULING
No. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that the power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases or controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at
abstraction could only leads to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated
to actualities. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination. In the immediate case, petitioners have failed to show that the challenged
provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they seek to do. No
demonstrable theat has been established, much less a real and existing one. Petitioners’ obscure
allegations of sporadic surveillance and being tagged as communist fronts in no way approximate a
credible threat of prosecution. Under these circumstances, the Court is being lured to render an advisory
opinin, which is outside of its office.
94 PhilConSa v. Philippine Government
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President

Ferdinand Martin G. Romualdez, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ARCHBISHOP RAMON C. ARGUELLES,
ARCHBISHOP ROMULO T. DE LA CRUZ, ARCHBISHOP FERNANDO R. CAPALLA, and
NORBERTO B. GONZALES, Petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT (GPH), represented by
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, and MIRIAM CORONEL FERRER, MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION
FRONT, FLORENCIO B. ABAD, and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents
G.R. No. 218406. November 29, 2016.
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Judicial Department – Power of Judicial Review
Synopsis:
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution spells out what judicial power is, in that it includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Pursuant to
this constitutional provision, it is clear that the Court's judicial review power is limited to actual cases or
controversies. The Court generally declines to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or
feigned problems, or mere academic questions.
Digest:
FACTS
Herein are consolidated petitions challenging the constitutionality and validity of the Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) entered
into between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on 27
March 2014 and 12 October 2012. The framework for the Bangsamoro law has been in inception since
the time of President Ramos. The assailed agreements however, were penned at the time of President
Aquino III. On November 2016, President Duterte issued EO No. 08, expanding the membership and
functions of the Bangsamoro Transition Commission, which include drafting proposals for a Bangsamoro
Basic Law, to be submitted to the Office of the President for submission to Congress, and recommending
to Congress or the people proposed amendments to the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Furthermore, the
Court held in Montesclaros v. COMELEC that it has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or
unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act
of Congress.
ISSUE(S)
Should the court take cognizance of the case given its power of judicial review?
RULING
No. Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution spells out what judicial power is, in that it includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Pursuant to
this constitutional provision, it is clear that the Court's judicial review power is limited to actual cases or
controversies. The Court generally declines to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or
feigned problems, or mere academic questions. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrast of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. In the present case, however,
the Court agrees with the Solicitor General that there is no actual case or controversy requiring a full-
blown resolution of the principal issue presented by petitioners.
Unlike the unconstitutional MOA-AD (see Province of North Cotabato v. GRP), the CAB, including the FAB,
mandates the enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic Law in order for such peace agreements to be
implemented. In the MOA-AD case, there was nothing in the MOA-AD which required the passage of any
statute to implement the provisions of the MOA-AD, which in essence would have resulted in dramatically
dismembering the Philippines by placing the provinces and areas covered by the MOA-AD under the
control and jurisdiction of a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity. Further, under the MOA-AD, the Executive
branch assumed the mandatory obligation to amend the Constitution to conform to the MOA-AD. Even if
there were today an existing bill on the Bangsamoro Basic Law, it would still not be subject to judicial
review. The Court held in Montesclaros v. COMELEC that it has no power to declare a proposed bill
constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on
a proposed act of Congress.
95 Baguio Market Vendors v. Executive Judge

BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE (BAMARVEMPCO), represented
by RECTO INSO, Operations Manager, petitioner, vs. HON. ILUMINADA CABATO-CORTES,
Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, respondent.
G.R. No. 165922. February 26, 2010.*
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Judicial Department – Rule-Making Power
Synopsis:
The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous charters by
deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress’ subsidiary and corrective power. This glaring and
fundamental omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice that this Court’s
power to promulgate judicial rules “is no longer shared by this Court with Congress”:
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative is a credit cooperative organized under RA
6938 or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines. Article 62(6) of RA 6938 exempts cooperatives: from the
payment of all court and sheriff’s fees payable to the Philippine Government for and in connection with all
actions brought under this Code, or where such action is brought by the Cooperative Development
Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative.
In 2004, petitioner, as mortgagee, filed with the Clerk of Court of RTC Baguio a petition to extrajudicially
foreclose a mortgage under Act 3135, as amended. Under Section 7(c) of Rule 141, as amended,
petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure are subject to legal fees based on the value of the mortgagee’s
claim. Invoking Article 62(6) of RA 6938, petitioner sought exemption from payment of the fees.
ISSUE(S)
W/ON petitioner’s application for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt from legal fees under Article 62(6) of
RA 6938
RULING
NO. The court hold that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 does not apply to petitioner’s foreclosure proceeding.
The scope of the legal fees exemption Article 62(6) of RA 6938 grants to cooperatives is limited to two
types of actions, namely: (1) actions brought under RA 6938; and (2) actions brought by the Cooperative
Development Authority to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of cooperatives. By
simple deduction, it is immediately apparent that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner to
claim exemption from the payment of legal fees in this proceeding because first, the fees imposable on
petitioner do not pertain to an action brought under RA 6938 but to a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure
of mortgage under Act 3135. Second, petitioner is not the Cooperative Development Authority which can
claim exemption only in actions to enforce payments of obligations on behalf of cooperatives.
The Court also discussed the Power of the Legislature vis a vis the Power of the Supreme Court to Enact
Judicial Rules.
The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous charters by
deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress’ subsidiary and corrective power. This glaring and
fundamental omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice that this Court’s
power to promulgate judicial rules “is no longer shared by this Court with Congress”:
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive.
Thus, as emphazised: “[T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this
Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by
Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the power to promulgate
rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain.” ###
96 Agdeppa v. Ombudsman, et al.
RODOLFO M. AGDEPPA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,

Respondent
G.R. No. 146376 April 23, 2014

Topic: Judicial Department – Judicial Review
Synopsis:
Not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse
of discretion. While the prosecutor or the investigating officers of the Ombudsman may err or even abuse
the discretion lodged in them by law, such error or abuse alone does not render their act amenable to
correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. The requirement for judicial intrusion
is still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Unless such a clear demonstration is made, the
intervention is disallowed in deference to the doctrine of non-interference.
Digest:
FACTS
Junia, then Group Manager for the Project Technical Services Group of the National Housing Authority
(NHA), filed a Complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against several NHA officials, together with
Agdeppa and Castillo, resident auditors of the Commission on Audit (COA) at the NHA. Junia’s Complaint
was docketed as OMB-0-99-1015. Junia alleged that Supra Construction (SupraCon), the contractor for
the NHA project was overpaid in the total amount of P2,044,488.71. The overpayment was allegedly
facilitated through the dubious and confusing audit reports prepared by Agdeppa and endorsed by
Castillo, to the detriment, damage, and prejudice of the Government.
Agdeppa filed his Answer on July 26, 1999, denying Junia’s allegations against him and praying for the
dismissal of the Complaint in OMB-0-99-1015 for utter lack of merit. Jarlos-Martin issued a Resolution in
OMB-0-99-1015 finding probable cause to indict Agdepa and Castillo for violation of section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act relative to the overpayment of the amount of P182,543.43 to SUPRA
Construction and orders that an information be filed against them in the proper court.
Meanwhile, as his Motion to Resolve in OMB-0-99-1015 was still unacted upon, Agdeppa filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman an Affidavit-Complaint against Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia, docketed as
OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470. Agdeppa accused Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia of violating Section 3(a),
(e), (f), and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019; and Rule II, Section 4(a), (b), and (g) of Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 07, dated April 10, 1990, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE(S)
Whether respondent Jarlos-Martin caused damage and injury to Agdeppa because she set aside the
records of OMB-0-99-1015, which was already complete when she issued her Order dated 6 October
1999
RULING
To warrant the indictment of the respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, it is not enough
that the act of the respondents in the discharge of their official function caused undue injury to Agdeppa.
It behooves Agdeppa to prove that the assailed act must have been done with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence (Alejandro vs. People, 170 SCRA 400). Moreover, unlike in
actions for torts, undue injury in Section 3(e) of RA 3019 cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a
violation of right has been established, its existence must be proven as one of the elements of the crime,
and that the injury be specified, quantified, and proven to the point of moral certainty. They cannot be
based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon speculation, conjecture or guesswork; mere
inconvenience is not constitutive of undue injury (Llorente vs. Sandiganbayan, 287 SCRA 382).
There is no merit to Agdeppa’s contention that by dismissing his Affidavit-Complaint in OMB-MIL-CRIM-
00-0470, the Office of the Ombudsman tolerated the realignment of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure
and violation of Agdeppa’s right to the speedy disposition of his case. There is utter lack of evidence
presented by Agdeppa that Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia conspired to maliciously and deliberately
conduct the preliminary investigation in OMB-0-99-1015 to Agdeppa’s prejudice.
97 League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), Represented by LCP National President

MAYOR JERRY TRENAS, CITY OF ILOILO, et al., Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, et. al., Respondents
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Local Government
Synopsis:
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in
the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The
Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the
creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
Digest:
FACTS
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect
on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual
income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The
rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush"
of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment
despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to
hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the
conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood
Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
ISSUE(S)
Are the Cityhood Laws in violation of Article X of the Constitution?
RULING
Yes. The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established
in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other
law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to
insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-
discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the
criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from
P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that
moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy
the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement.

G.R. No. 209287. July 1, 2014.
Topic: Executive Department – Power of Executive Impoundment
Synopsis:
Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or
deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there
will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless,
there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
Digest:
FACTS
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will
then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as
economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by
the Supreme Court).
contentions was that DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides
that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
ISSUE(S)
1. Is the DAP in violation of Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution?
2. Is the DAP a form of executive impoundment?
RULING
No. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional
provision cited The DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation
made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were
merely being realigned via the DAP.
The DAP is likewise also not considered executive impoundment. Impoundment of funds refers to the
President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever
reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at
bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
However, the Court in this case ruled that the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It
is true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by
the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be
made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed.
But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were
being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
99 Republic v. Manalo
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL,
petitioner, vs. RAFAEL A. MANALO, GRACE M. OLIVA, and FREIDA Z. RIVERA-YAP,
respondents.
G.R. No. 192302. June 4, 2014.*
Topic: Judicial Department – Moot and Academic Issues
Synopsis:
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be
of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would
be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline
jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness, as a judgment in a case which
presents a moot question can no longer be enforced.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented in this case by the Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC), filed a complaint for civil forfeiture, entitled “Republic v. R.A.B. Realty (Civil Case No. 03-
107308). Subsequently, it filed a second complaint for civil forfeiture, entitled “Republic v. Ariola, Jr., et
al.,” (Civil Case No. 03-107325) before the same court. The Republic sought the forfeiture in its favor of
certain deposits and government securities maintained in several bank accounts by the defendants
therein, which were related to the unlawful activity of fraudulently accepting investments from the public,
in violation of the Securities Regulation Code[10] as well as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001.
On September 2006, herein respondents filed separate Motions for Leave to Intervene and Admit
Attached Answer-in-Intervention. In the civil forfeiture cases, respectively, alleging, inter alia, that they
have a valid interest in the bank accounts subject thereof. In this relation, they asserted that in a
separate petition for involuntary insolvency proceedings filed before the RTC of Makati City, where they
were appointed as assignees of the properties of Spouses Saturnino and Rosario Baladjay (Sps. Baladjay)
(as well as their conduit companies) who were impleaded as defendants in the aforementioned civil
forfeiture cases.
The Manila RTC rendered a Joint Order denying respondents’ separate motions for intervention.
Dissatisfied, respondents moved for reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the Manila RTC in an
Order dated January 10, 2008, prompting them to elevate the case to the CA on certiorari.
The CA granted respondents’ petition, ruling that the Manila RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying
respondents’ separate motions for intervention. It found that respondents were able to establish their
rights as assignees in the insolvency case filed by Sps. Baladjay. As such, they have a valid interest in the
bank accounts subject of the civil forfeiture cases.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the separate motion for intervention
RULING
No. The petition must be dismissed for having become moot and academic.
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be
of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would
be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline
jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness, as a judgment in a case which
presents a moot question can no longer be enforced.
Note: During the pendency of the petition, the Manila RTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. Civil
Case No. 03-107325 and Civil Case No. 03-107308, which ordered the assets subject of said cases
forfeited in favor of the government. In view thereof, the Republic prayed it be excused from filing the
required reply which the Court granted in a Resolution dated June 3, 2013.
100 Philippine Migrant Rights Watch v. OWWA
Philippine Migrants Rights Watch, Inc. vs. Overseas Workers Welfare Administration
G.R. No. 166923. November 26, 2014.
Ponente: J. Peralta
Topic: Judicial Department – Jurisdiction on Constitutionality
Synopsis:
The RTC has jurisdiction in resolving the constitutionality of a:
1. statute,
2. presidential decree (PD),
3. executive order (EO), or
4. administrative regulation, as recognized in
Section 2(a), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Digest:
FACTS
On September 19, 2003, respondent Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) issued Board
Resolution No. 038 entitled the OWWA Omnibus Policies to provide guidelines on matters concerning
OWWA membership and its coverage, collection of contributions, and availment of benefits. Petitioners
filed a complaint before the RTC of Pasay assailing the unconstitutionality of the policy. On August 31,
2004, the RTC promulgated its Order dismissing the complaint saying that it has no jurisdiction over the
complaint. As such, it ruled that the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the subject issuance was
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the RTC committed reversible error of law in dismissing the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction to try cases involving the constitutionality of administrative rules and regulations
RULING
Yes, RTC erred in dismissing the complaint of the petitioners. It is settled in law and jurisprudence that
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a
1. statute,
2. presidential decree (PD),
3. executive order (EO), or
4. administrative regulation, as recognized in
Section 2(a), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.-
Further, RTC erred in saying that the proper remedy is a special civil action under Rule 65. Certiorari, as a
special civil action, is available only if: (1) it is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is
no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
101 De Castro v. JBC
DE CASTRO VS. JBC AND PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO

G.R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010
Topic: Judicial Department – Allowance of Midnight Appointments in the Judiciary
Synopsis:
The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments in the Judiciary. They aver that the Court either ignored or refused to apply many
principles of statutory construction. The movants gravely err in their posture. For one, the movants,
disregarding the absence from Section 15, Article VII of the express extension of the ban on
appointments to the Judiciary, insist that the ban applied to the Judiciary under the principle of verba
legis. That is self-contradiction at its worst. Another instance is the movants’ unhesitating willingness to
read into Section 4(1) and Section 9, both of Article VIII, the express applicability of the ban under
Section 15, Article VII during the period provided therein, despite the silence of said provisions thereon.
Yet, construction cannot supply the omission, for doing so would generally constitute an encroachment
upon the field of the Constitutional Commission. Rather, Section 4(1) and Section 9 should be left as they
are, given that their meaning is clear and explicit, and no words can be interpolated in them. Had the
framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Digest:
FACTS
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) passed a Resolution to process for the filling up of the position of the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court upon the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
days after the then coming 2010 presidential elections. In its February 8, 2010 meeting, the JBC decided
to proceed with the process of announcing to the public the names of the candidates for the position.
Included in the list of applicants are: (1) Brion, Arturo D.; (2) Carpio, Antonio T.; (3) Corona, Renato C.;
(4) Carpio Morales, Conchita; (5) Leonardo-de Castro, Teresita J.; and (6) Sandoval, Edilberto G.
Petitioner Arturo de Castro entreats the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the JBC to send the
list of nominees for Chief Justice to the incumbent President when the position becomes vacant upon the
retirement of Chief Justice Puno. Subsequently, petitions were filed by several interested parties and the
Court consolidated the petitions and required the JBC and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file
their respective comments.
ISSUE(S)
1) Whether or not the case at bar presents a justiciable controversy.
2) Whether or not Section 15 of Article VII applies to appointments in the Judiciary.
RULING
Yes. The petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. There is
no need to await the occurrence of the vacancy by May 17, 2010 in order for the principal issue to ripe
for judicial determination by the Court. It is enough that one alleges conduct arguably affected with a
constitutional interest, but seemingly proscribed by the Constitution. A reasonable certainty of the
occurrence of the perceived threat to a constitutional interest is sufficient to afford a basis for bringing a
challenge, provided the Court has sufficient facts before it to enable it to intelligently adjudicate the
issues. Herein, the facts are not in doubt, for only legal issues remain.
No. The movants gravely err in their posture, and are themselves apparently contravening their avowed
reliance on the principles of statutory construction. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely
in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.
The Court cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order
to suit the purposes of any quarter.
Moreover, the Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their conscience and the merits of the
issues. Any claim to the contrary proceeds from malice and condescension. Neither the outgoing
President nor the present Members of the Court had arranged the current situation to happen and to
evolve as it has. None of the Members of the Court could have prevented the Members composing the
Court when she assumed the Presidency about a decade ago from retiring during her prolonged term and
tenure, for their retirements were mandatory. Yet, the president is now left with an imperative duty
under the Constitution to fill up the vacancies created by such inexorable retirements within 90 days from
their occurrence. Her official duty she must comply with. So must we ours who are tasked by the
Constitution to settle the controversy.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality
102 Chavez v. JBC (with MR on April 16, 2013)
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH
G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Topic: Judicial Department – Duality of Congressional Membership in the JBC
Synopsis:
The phrase “a representative of congress” should be construed as to having only one representative that
would come from either house, not both. The framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of
the JBC to be allotted for the legislative.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role
of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play
between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that
the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation
because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term
“Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
Digest:
FACTS
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one
from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings
held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas,
Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that
petitioner has questioned in this petition. it should mean one representative each from both Houses
which comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends that the phrase “ a representative of
congress” refers that both houses of congress should have one representative each, and that these two
houses are permanent and mandatory components of “congress” as part of the bicameral system of
legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one representative
from congress.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives
making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution
RULING
Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a representative of congress” should
be construed as to having only one representative that would come from either house, not both. That the
framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the legislative.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role
of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play
between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that
the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation
because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term
“Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the
JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
103 Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Sereno
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA Petitioner, vs. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 213181 August 19, 2014
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Topic: Supervisory Power of the SC over the JBC
Synopsis:
Constitutional Law; Judicial and Bar Council; Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for
the creation of the JBC. The Supreme Court was given supervisory authority over it. Section 8 reads: “A
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court…”
Supervision; As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and scope of supervision. It
is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures
that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and complied
with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such
rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may
order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own
manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules
are followed.
Digest:
FACTS
Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council announce an opening
for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza, incumbent Solicitor
General of the Republic was included in the list of candidates. Hence, he was interviewed.
However, Chief Justice Sereno invoked the unanimity rule against him, Rule 2, Section 10 of JBC-009,
questioning Jardeleza’s integrity. During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information
which characterized Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza answered that he would defend himself
provided that due process would be observed. His request was denied and he was not included in the
shortlist. Jardeleza then filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to
include him in the list.
JBC filed its comment contending that Jardeleza’s petition lacked procedural and substantive bases that
would warrant favorable action by the Court. For the JBC, certiorari is only available against a tribunal, a
board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The JBC, in its exercise of its mandate to
recommend appointees to the Judiciary, does not exercise any of these functions. In a pending case,
Jardeleza himself, as one of the lawyers for the government, argued in this wise: Certiorari cannot
issue against the JBC in the implementation of its policies.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the subject petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus by virtue of its power of supervision
RULING
YES.
The Court’s Power of Supervision over the JBC
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the creation of the JBC. The Court was given
supervisory authority over it. Section 8 reads:
“A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.”:
As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and scope of supervision. It is

the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures
that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and complied
with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such
rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may
order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own
manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules
are followed.
Based on this, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC covers the
overseeing of compliance with its rules. In this case, Jardeleza’s principal allegations in his
petition merit the exercise of this supervisory authority. ###
104 Villanueva v. JBC
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN,

COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, Respondent.
G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015
Ponente: J. Reyes
Topic: Judicial Department – JBC Rules
Synopsis:
The assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can
qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have been published, as these are rules implementing
the Constitution. Furthermore, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and
regulations exempted from the publication requirement. The assailed policy involves a qualification
standard by which the JBC shall determine proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal
regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the members of the JBC and their staff.
Notably, the selection process involves a call to lawyers who meet the qualifications in the Constitution
and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a natural
consequence thereof that potential applicants be informed of the requirements to the judicial positions,
so that they would be able to prepare for and comply with them.
Digest:
FACTS
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level
court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad,
Agusan Del Sur. The JBC however, did not include him in the short list for either of the said courts, due
to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among
others, incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five years, and since the
petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. Petitioner then filed
a certiorari and mandamus case before the SC, arguing that the Constitution already prescribed the
qualifications of an RTC judge, and the JBC could add no more The petitioner also averred that the
assailed policy violates procedural due process for lack of publication and non-submission to the
University of the Philippines Law Center Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR). The
petitioner said that the assailed policy will affect all applying judges, thus, the said policy should have
been published.
ISSUE(S)
Is the practice of the JBC in allowing only incumbent judges of lower courts with at least 5 years tenure
to be promoted to second-level courts in compliance with constitutional mandates?
RULING
No. While the Supreme Court determined that the assailed JBC policy need not be published in the ONAR,
nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before
they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have been published, as these are rules
implementing the Constitution. Furthermore, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the
administrative rules and regulations exempted from the publication requirement. The assailed policy
involves a qualification standard by which the JBC shall determine proven competence of an applicant. It
is not an internal regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the members of the JBC
and their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call to lawyers who meet the qualifications in the
Constitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a
natural consequence thereof that potential applicants be informed of the requirements to the judicial
positions, so that they would be able to prepare for and comply with them.
Note:
Unfortunately for petitioner, the Supreme Court ended up dismissing the case anyway, because it ruled
that mandamus cannot lie against the JBC, as Villanueva has no clear legal right to become part of the
shortlist. The function of the JBC to select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial positions is
discretionary, not ministerial. Moreso, the petitioner cannot claim any legal right to be included in the list
of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for
appointment to the judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one's name be included in the list of
candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the list of the candidates depends on the discretion of
the JBC.
105 Aguinaldo v. Aquino (with MR on February 21, 2017)
HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, et. al. vs. HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C.
AQUINO III, et. al.
G.R. No. 224302 February 21, 2017

Topic: JBC – Power of Recommendation
Synopsis:
It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the
President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth
appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints
someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid. On this score, the Court finds herein that
President Aquino was not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from each of the
six shortlists submitted by the JBC, especially when the clustering of nominees into the six shortlists
encroached on President Aquino's power to appoint members of the Judiciary from all those whom the
JBC had considered to be qualified for the same positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
Digest:
FACTS
On June 11, 1978, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) issued Presidential Decree No. 1486,
creating a special court called the Sandiganbayan, composed of a Presiding Judge and eight Associate
Judges to be appointed by the President, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and
employees, including those in government¬ owned or controlled corporations. A few months later, on
December 10, 1978, President Marcos also issued Presidential Decree No. 1606, which elevated the rank
of the members of the Sandiganbayan from Judges to Justices, co-equal in rank with the Justices of the
Court of Appeals; and provided that the Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of three Justices each.5
Republic Act No. 7975 was approved into law on March 30, 1995 and it increased the composition of the
Sandiganbayan from nine to fifteen Justices who would sit in five divisions of three members each.
Republic Act No. 10660, recently enacted on April 16, 2015, created two more divisions of the
Sandiganbayan with three Justices each, thereby resulting in six vacant positions.
On July 20, 2015, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) published in the Philippine Star and Philippine Daily
Inquirer and posted on the JBC website an announcement calling for applications or recommendations for
the six newly created positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.8 After screening and selection
of applicants, the JBC submitted to President Aquino six shortlists contained in six separate letters, all
dated October 26, 2015.
President Aquino issued on January 20, 2015 the appointment papers for the six new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices, namely: (1) respondent Musngi; (2) Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz (R. Cruz); (3)
respondent Econg; (4) Justice Maria Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega (Mendoza-Arcega); (5) Justice Karl B.
Miranda (Miranda); and (6) Justice Zaldy V. Trespeses (Trespeses). The appointment papers were
transmitted on January 25, 2016 to the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, who took their oaths
of office on the same day all at the Supreme Court Dignitaries Lounge. Respondent Econg, with Justices
Mendoza-Arcega and Trespeses, took their oaths of office before Supreme Court Chief Justice Maria
Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Sereno); while respondent Musngi, with Justices R. Cruz and Miranda, took their
oaths of office before Supreme Court Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza).
According to petitioners, the JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution to reduce the politicization of
the appointments to the Judiciary. It is the function of the JBC to search, screen, and select nominees
recommended for appointment to the Judiciary. It shall prepare a list with at least three qualified
nominees for a particular vacancy in the Judiciary to be submitted to the President, who, in turn, shall
appoint from the shortlist for said specific vacancy. Petitioners emphasize that Article VIII, Section 9 of
the 1987 Constitution is clear and unambiguous as to the mandate of the JBC to submit a shortlist of
nominees to the President for "every vacancy" to the Judiciary, as well as the limitation on the President's
authority to appoint members of the Judiciary from among the nominees named in the shortlist submitted
by the JBC.
In this case, the JBC submitted six separate lists, with five to seven nominees each, for the six vacancies
in the Sandiganbayan, particularly, for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st Associate Justices.
Petitioners contend that only nominees for the position of the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice may
be appointed as the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and the same goes for the nominees for each
of the vacancies for the 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. However, on
January 20, 2016, President Aquino issued the appointment papers for the six new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether petitioners have locus standi considering that the present Petition involves an issue of
transcendental importance to the people as a whole, an assertion of a public right, and a subject matter
of public interest
2. Whether President Aquino, under the circumstances, was limited to appoint only from the
nominees in the shortlist submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy
RULING
1. Yes. Since the Petition at bar involves a question of constitutionality, the Court must determine the
locus standi or legal standing of petitioners to file the same. The Court will exercise its power of judicial
review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the
constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged; while "interest" refers to material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by
the decree or act assailed, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. The interest of the plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to
vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.
While neither petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. nor petitioner IBP have legal standing to file a petition for quo
warranto, they have legal standing to institute a petition for certiorari.
The clustering of nominees by the JBC, which the President, for justifiable reasons, did not follow, could
have caused all nominees direct injury, thus, vesting them with personal and substantial interest, as the
clustering limited their opportunity to be considered for appointment to only one of the six vacant
positions for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice instead of all the six vacant positions to which the JBC
found them as qualified for appointment.
2. The Court answers in the negative.
The JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution with the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary.47 It is a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial
appointment process, intended to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political
pressure and partisan activities.48 The extent of the role of the JBC in recommending appointees vis-a-
vis the power of the President to appoint members of the Judiciary was discussed during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) on July 10, 1986
It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the
President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth
appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints
someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid. On this score, the Court finds herein that
President Aquino was not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from each of the
six shortlists submitted by the JBC, especially when the clustering of nominees into the six shortlists
encroached on President Aquino's power to appoint members of the Judiciary from all those whom the
JBC had considered to be qualified for the same positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
“The Court had recognized that “[ s ]upervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is
certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in
order to render the power real and effective.”
“In the exercise of its power of supervision over the JBC, the Court shall take up the aforementioned
Item Nos. 2 and 3 as a separate administrative matter and direct the JBC to file its comment on the
same.”
106 Re: Seniority among the 4 Most Recent Appointments to the CA
RE: SENIORITY AMONG THE FOUR (4) MOST RECENT APPOINTMENTS TO THE POSITION OF
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
A.M. No. 10-4-22-SC. September 28, 2010
Ponente: C.J. Corona

Topic: The Court of Appeals – Seniority
Synopsis:
For purposes of completion of the appointment process, the appointment is complete when the
commission is signed by the executive, and sealed if necessary, and is ready to be delivered or
transmitted to the appointee. Thus, transmittal of the commission is an act which is done after the
appointment has already been completed. It is not required to complete the appointment but only to
facilitate the effectivity of the appointment by the appointee’s receipt and acceptance thereof.
For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, therefore, the date the commission has been signed by
the President (which is the date appearing on the face of such document) is the date of the appointment.
Such date will determine the seniority of the members of the Court of Appeals in connection with Section
3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246. In other words, the earlier the date of the commission
of an appointee, the more senior he/she is over the other subsequent appointees.
Digest:
FACTS
On March 10, 2010, the Office of the President transmitted to the Supreme Court the appointments of
Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justices Myra G. Fernandez, Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., Ramon Paul L.
Hernando and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela in the following order:
Appointees Positions
5 Hon. Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela Associate Justice, CA

6 Hon. Myra G. Fernandez Associate Justice, CA
7 Hon. Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. Associate Justice, CA
8 Hon. Ramon Paul L. Hernando Associate Justice, CA
On the other hand, the respective appointment papers of Justices Fernandez, Peralta, Jr., Hernando and
Antonio-Valenzuela bore the following dates and bar code numbers:
Name of Associate Justice Date of Appointment Bar Code No.
Justice Fernandez (as most senior) February 16, 2010 55466

Justice Peralta, Jr. (as most junior) February 16, 2010 55467
Justice Hernando (as most junior) February 16, 2010 55468
Justice Antonio Valenzuela (as most junior) February 24, 2010 55465
The ranking was based in a letter dated March 25, 2010 submitted by the members of the CA Committee
on Rules to CA Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
This caused confusion as to who among the appointed justices is the most senior that will act as the
Acting Chairperson of the Division. Section 1, Rule I and Section I, Rule II of 2009 Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals (2009 IRCA), provide –
Section 1, Rule I
Composition of the Court of Appeals. — Unless otherwise provided by law, the Court of Appeals
is composed of a Presiding Justice and sixty-eight (68) Associate Justices. It sits en banc, or in
twenty-three (23) Divisions of three (3) Justices each. The members of the Court are classified
into three groups according to the order of their seniority. The date and sequence of the
appointment of the Justices determine their seniority courtwide.
When a senior member is designated to act as Chairperson of a Division, he/she shall be

designated as an “Acting Chairperson”. In like manner, a junior member designated to act as
senior member of a Division shall be an “Acting Senior Member”.
Section I, Rule II
Concept. — The Presiding Justice enjoys precedence over all the other members of the Court in
all official functions. The Associate Justices shall have precedence according to the
order of their appointments as officially transmitted to the Supreme Court.”
According to the CA Committee on Rules, any conflict between or confusion engendered by the
above-quoted provisions should be resolved in accordance with Republic Act No. 8246 that the
determination of the order of precedence seniority of this Court’s Justices is according to the dates of
their respective appointments.
Justice Antonio-Valenzuela, on the other hand, disagreed with the interpretation of the CA
Committee on Rules, insisting that she is the most senior among the four newly appointed CA
Associate Justices pursuant to Section 1, Rule 2 of the 2009 IRCA which provides that seniority of the
Associate Justices shall be determined “according to the order of their appointments as transmitted
to the Supreme Court.”
ISSUE(S)
Whether the seniority of the Associate Justices shall be determined according to the order of their
appointments as transmitted to the Supreme Court as provided in Sec. 1, Rule II of IRCA
RULING
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that for purposes of completion of the appointment process, the
appointment is complete when the commission is signed by the executive, and sealed if necessary, and is
ready to be delivered or transmitted to the appointee. Thus, transmittal of the commission is an act
which is done after the appointment has already been completed. It is not required to complete the
appointment but only to facilitate the effectivity of the appointment by the appointee’s receipt and
acceptance thereof.
For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, therefore, the date the commission has been signed
by the President (which is the date appearing on the face of such document) is the date of the
appointment. Such date will determine the seniority of the members of the Court of Appeals in
connection with Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246. In other words, the earlier
the date of the commission of an appointee, the more senior he/she is over the other subsequent
appointees. It is only when the appointments of two or more appointees bear the same date that the
order of issuance of the appointments by the President becomes material. This provision of statutory
law (Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246) controls over the provisions of the
2009 IRCA which gives premium to the order of appointments as transmitted to this Court. Rules
implementing a particular law cannot override but must give way to the law they seek to implement.
107 In the Matter of: SC Judicial Independence vs. Abolishment of JDF
IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL
AUTONOMY MOVEMENT VS. ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND
REDUCTION OF FISCAL AUTONOMY.
UDK-15143 January 21, 2015
Ponente: J. Leonen
Topic: Power of Judicial Review
Synopsis:
Basic in litigation raising constitutional issues is the requirement that there must be an actual case or
controversy. The Supreme Court cannot render an advisory opinion. The power of judicial review is a
duty to make a final and binding construction of law.
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In private
suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest." The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in
public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action,
does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from
any other person.
Digest:
FACTS
This case involves the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund and replacing it with the
"Judiciary Support Fund." Funds collected from the proposed Judiciary Support Fund shall be remitted to
the national treasury and Congress shall determine how the funds will be used. Petitioner Rolly Mijares
prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel this court to exercise its judicial
independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of Congress. The controversy arose out
of the promulgation of the PDAF ruling, which, according to petitioner, led to Congress filing two separate
bills (first by Ilocos Norte Representative Rodolfo Farinas and then by Iloilo Representative Niel Tupas,
Jr.) which would require this court to remit its Judiciary Development Fund collections to the national
treasury. On the same day as the second bill, President Aquino gave a speech condemning the SC
decision on the PDAF case.
In the letter-petition, Mijares alleges that he is "a Filipino citizen, and a concerned taxpayer[.]" He filed
this petition as part of his "continuing crusade to defend and uphold the Constitution" because he
believes in the rule of law. Petitioner points out that Congress is exercising its power "in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility by abolishing the ‘Judiciary Development Fund’
(JDF) of the Supreme Court." Petitioner prays that this court exercise its powers to "REVOKE/ABROGATE
and EXPUNGE whatever irreconcilable contravention of existing laws affecting the judicial independence
and fiscal autonomy as mandated under the Constitution to better serve public interest and general
welfare of the people."
ISSUE(S)
Does the petition-letter comply with all the requisites of judicial review?
RULING
No.
In the outset, there is no actual case or controversy presented. Basic in litigation raising
constitutional issues is the requirement that there must be an actual case or controversy.
The Supreme Court cannot render an advisory opinion. The power of judicial review is a duty
to make a final and binding construction of law. The rationale that defines the extent of the
doctrines laying down exceptions to the rules on justiciability are clear: Not only should the pleadings
show a convincing violation of a right, but the impact should be shown to be so grave, imminent, and
irreparable that any delayed exercise of judicial review or deference would undermine fundamental
principles that should be enjoyed by the party complaining or the constituents that they legitimately
represent. Petitioner’s allegations show that he wants this court to strike down the proposed
bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund. This court, however, must act only within
its powers granted under the Constitution. This court is not empowered to review proposed
bills because a bill is not a law.
Secondly, petitioner likewise has no locus standi to file the case. Locus standi is defined as "a right
of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In private suits, standing is governed by
the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest." The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
"public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general
public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a
"stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or ‘taxpayer." Our Court adopted the "direct injury" test in
our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result." Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury
if the proposed bill is passed into law. While his concern for judicial independence is laudable, it
does not, by itself, clothe him with the requisite standing to question the constitutionality of a proposed
bill that may only affect the judiciary.
Note:
This court, however, has occasionally relaxed the rules on standing when the issues involved are of
"transcendental importance" to the public.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants
formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of
the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.
108 Re: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Hearing
RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING
HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG,
SANDIGANBAYAN
A.M. No. SB-14-21-J September 23, 2014
[Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB]
Ponente: PER CURIAM

Topic: Judicial Powers – Discipline of Judges
Synopsis:
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while •"gross" has
been defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be
excused." We agree with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with Napoles during
the pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal,
constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of corruption or bribery in
the rendition of the said judgment.
Digest:
FACTS
In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving billions of government funds channeled
through bogus foundations. Dubbed as the “pork barrel scam,” as the money was sourced from the PDAF
allotted to members of the House of Representatives and Senate. In the course of the investigation
conducted by the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon
Committee), the names of certain government officials among whom is incumbent Justice Gregory Ong.
Respondent in a letter to Chief Justice Sereno explained the photograph that Rappler published online,
particularly in connection with the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan’s Fourth Division in the Kevlar
Helmet Cases, which convicted some of the accused but acquitted Mrs. Napoles.
Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu proprio under
this Court’s power of administrative supervision over members of the judiciary and members of the legal
profession. During the investigation, Benhur testified, saying that Napoles mentioned to him the Kevlar
case, then pending in the Sandiganbayan, saying she has a “connect” in that court who would help her.
Benhur further testified that even before the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated, Napoles and
Justice Ong were already communicating with each other. Therefore, she was sure the decision would be
in her favor.
Continuing with his testimony, Benhur declared that in 2012, respondent went twice to Napoles’ office.
Benhur said during the visit, Napoles has placed so much money being placed at the AFPSLAI which
offered 13% interest annually. That Napoles called Benhur telling him that Justice Ong would like to avail
of such interest for BDO Check of 25.5 million. To arrange this, Napoles informed Benhur that she would
just deposit respondent’s check in her personal account with Metrobank. Then she would issue to
respondent 11 checks each amounting to 282,000.00 as monthly interest equivalent to the 13% interest.
Upon Justice Ong’s suggestion, the checks should be paid to cash.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct, impropriety and dishonesty under the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
RULING
Yes.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while •"gross" has
been defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be
excused." We agree with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with Napoles during
the pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal,
constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of corruption or bribery in
the rendition of the said judgment.
Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was grossly improper
and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect on
June 1, 2004.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that fraternizing with
litigants tarnishes this appearance. Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the
subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
We do not share the view that the rule on propriety was intended to cover only pending and prospective
litigations.
Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of partiality
and impropriety. Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[p ]ropriety and the
appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge." Section 2 further
provides:
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges
shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
The Court also finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before the
administrative complaint was filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of Canon
3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray." Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the
service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that
has no place in the Judiciary.
109 Re: Anonymous Letter Complaint on the alleged…of Ms. Dolores Lopez,...
Re: ANONYMOUS LETTERCOMPLAINT ON THE ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT AND FOR ENGAGING

IN THE BUSINESS OF LENDING MONEY AT USURIOUS RATES OF INTEREST OF MS. DOLORES
T. LOPEZ, SC CHIEF JUDICIAL STAFF OFFICER, AND MR. FERNANDO M. MONTALVO, SC
SUPERVISING JUDICIAL STAFF OFFICER, CHECKS DISBURSEMENT DIVISION, FISCAL
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET OFFICE.
A.M. No. 2010-21-SC September 30, 2014
Topic: Judicial Powers – Discipline of Court Personnel
Synopsis:
Lopez violated Administrative Circular No. 5 (Re: Prohibition for all officials and employees of the
Judiciary to work as insurance agents) dated 4 October 1988, which prohibited all officials and employees
of the Judiciary from engaging directly in any private business, vocation or profession, even outside their
office hours. Further, there is no doubt about her onerous lending activities greatly diminishing the
reputation of her office and of the Court itself in the esteem of the public. Considering that the official
and personal conduct and deportment of all the people who work for the Judiciary mirrored the image of
the Court itself, they should strive to comport themselves with propriety and decorum at all times, and to
be above suspicion of any misdeed and misconduct. Misconduct in office refers to any unlawful behavior
by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office that is willful in character. The term embraces acts
that the office holder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of
an affirmative duty to act.
Digest:
FACTS
An undated letter-complaint addressed to the Complaints and Investigation Division (CID) of the Office of
Administrative Services (OAS) of the Supreme Court triggered this administrative matter. The letter-
complaint, purportedly sent by a concerned employee who chose to remain anonymous, assailed the
profitable money-lending with usurious interest scheme engaged in by respondents Dolores T. Lopez, an
SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, and Fernando M. Montalvo, an SC Supervising Judicial Staff Officer, both of
the Checks Disbursement Division of the Court's Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO). It stated
that the respondents had been involved in the money-lending activities targeting the low-salaried
employees of the Court like the drivers and employees of the janitorial services; that such money-lending
had been going on with the help of the personnel of the Checks Disbursement Division of FMBO by
enticing employees of the Court to pledge forthcoming benefits at a discounted rate; and that around 300
Automated Teller Machine (ATM) cards were surrendered by the borrowers to the respondents as
collateral for the individual borrowings.
On March 24, 2011, the OAS submitted its report and recommendations, whereby it recommended the
dismissal of the letter-complaint against Montalvo for lack of merit; but endorsed Lopez's suspension "for
thirty (30) days for lending money with interest to a number of economically challenged employees and
janitors; and directed her to immediately cease and desist from engaging in any form of personal
business and other financial transactions, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in
the future will be dealt with more severely."
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Lopez should be admonished for her money lending business while being employed as a
Court employee
RULING
Yes, Lopez violated Administrative Circular No. 5 (Re: Prohibition for all officials and employees of the
Judiciary to work as insurance agents) dated 4 October 1988, which prohibited all officials and employees
of the Judiciary from engaging directly in any private business, vocation or profession, even outside their
office hours. Further, there is no doubt about her onerous lending activities greatly diminishing the
reputation of her office and of the Court itself in the esteem of the public. Considering that the official
and personal conduct and deportment of all the people who work for the Judiciary mirrored the image of
the Court itself, they should strive to comport themselves with propriety and decorum at all times, and to
be above suspicion of any misdeed and misconduct. Misconduct in office refers to any unlawful behavior
by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office that is willful in character. The term embraces acts
that the office holder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of
an affirmative duty to act.
110 Ampong v. CSC
SARAH P. AMPONG, Petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, CSC-Regional Office No.
11, Respondent.
G.R. No. 167916. August 26, 2008.
Ponente: J. Reyes, R.T.

Topic: Judicial Power – Discipline of Court Employees
Synopsis:
It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. As defined under the
Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision,
and instrumentality of the government, and government-owned or controlled corporations. However, the
Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative supervision over all courts
and judicial personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’
and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It may take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, this Court
ruled that the Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of a judge on the powers granted to it by the
Constitution. It violates the specific mandate of the Constitution granting to the Supreme Court
supervisory powers over all courts and their personnel; it undermines the independence of the judiciary.
Digest:
FACTS
November 10, 1991, a Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) was held in Davao City. At
the time, petitioner Ampong (then a public teacher) impersonated Decir (also a public teacher) in the
PBET exam and received a passing mark. In 1993 Ampong became a Court Interpreter III in RTC Alabel,
Sarangani Province.
July 5, 1994 a woman representing herself as Evelyn Decir went to the Civil Service Regional Office
(CSRO) to claim a copy of her PBET Certificate of Eligibility. It was confirmed that the person claiming the
eligibility was different from the one who took the examinations since it was actually Ampong who took
and passed the examinations under the name Evelyn Decir. It was found out that the picture attached in
the Picture Seat Plan were not the same compared to the picture attached in the CSC Form 212 of Evelyn
Junio-Decir. There was also a marked difference in the signatures affixed in the said annexes.
The CSRO conducted a preliminary investigation and determined the existence of a prima facie case
against Decir and Ampong for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service.
Even before filing an Answer, petitioner Ampong voluntarily appeared at the CSRO on February 2, 1995
and admitted to the wrongdoing. When reminded that she may avail herself of the services of counsel,
petitioner voluntarily waived said right. She reiterated her admission in her sworn Answer dated March
16, 1995:
The CSC found petitioner Ampong and Decir guilty of dishonesty, dismissing them from the service.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the issue of jurisdiction arguing that
the exclusive authority to discipline employees of the judiciary lies with the Supreme Court
The CSC denied the motion for reconsideration saying “to allow petitioner to evade administrative liability
would be a mockery of the country’s administrative disciplinary system.” as it differentiated between
administrative supervision exercised by the Supreme Court and administrative jurisdiction granted to the
Commission over all civil service employees – “While it is true that this Commission does not have
administrative supervision over employees in the judiciary, it definitely has concurrent jurisdiction over
them. Such jurisdiction was conferred upon the Civil Service Commission pursuant to existing law
specifically Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No.
292) which provides as follows:
"(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or through it directly or on appeal, including
contested appointment, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it
x x x."
The fact that court personnel are under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court does not
totally isolate them from the operations of the Civil Service Law. An appointment of all officials and
employees in the judiciary is governed by the Civil Service Law (Section 5(6), Article VIII, 1987
Constitution).
Via petition for review under Rule 43, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA. CA denied the petition for
lack of merit.The appellate court opined that while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a
party’s active participation in the proceedings before a court, tribunal or body will estop such party from
assailing its jurisdiction.A member of the judiciary may be under the jurisdiction of two different bodies.
As a public school teacher or a court interpreter, petitioner was part of the civil service, subject to its
rules and regulations. When she committed acts in violation of the Civil Service Law, the CSC was clothed
with administrative jurisdiction over her.
ISSUE(S)
WON the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over an employee of the Judiciary for acts committed while
said employee was still with the Executive or Education Department
RULING
Negative. It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. As defined under
the Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and government-owned or controlled corporations.
Pursuant to its administrative authority, the CSC is granted the power to "control, supervise, and
coordinate the Civil Service examinations." This authority grants to the CSC the right to take cognizance
of any irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations
However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative supervision
over all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It may take the
proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation. No other branch of government
may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, this
Court ruled that the Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of a judge on the powers granted to it by
the Constitution. It violates the specific mandate of the Constitution granting to the Supreme Court
supervisory powers over all courts and their personnel; it undermines the independence of the judiciary.
That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC does not take her case out
of the administrative reach of the Supreme Court. The bottom line is administrative
jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the
offense was committed before or after employment in the judiciary.
However, the Court was constrained to uphold the ruling of the CSC based on the principle of estoppel.
The previous actions of petitioner have estopped her from attacking the jurisdiction of the CSC. A party
who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions to
secure an affirmative relief may not afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Under the principle of estoppel, a party may not be permitted to adopt a different theory on appeal to
impugn the court’s jurisdiction. “A party who fully participated in the proceedings before the CSC and was
accorded due process is estopped from subsequently attacking its jurisdiction”- Emin v. De Leon,
Petitioner was given ample opportunity to present her side and adduce evidence in her defense before
the CSC. She filed with it her answer to the charges leveled against her. When the CSC found her guilty,
she moved for a reconsideration of the ruling. These circumstances all too clearly show that due process
was accorded to petitioner.
“We will not tolerate dishonesty for the Judiciary expects the best from all its
employees.38Hindi namin papayagan ang pandaraya sapagkat inaasahan ng Hudikatura ang
pinakamabuti sa lahat nitong kawani.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
NOTES:
Petitioner’s admission of guilt stands.
In police custodial investigations, the assistance of counsel is necessary in order for an extra-judicial
confession to be made admissible in evidence against the accused in a criminal complaint. If assistance
was waived, the waiver should have been made with the assistance of counsel.
But while a party’s right to the assistance of counsel is sacred in proceedings criminal in nature, there is
no such requirement in administrative proceedings. In Lumiqued v. Exevea, the Court ruled that a party
in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel. Moreover, the administrative body is
under no duty to provide the person with counsel because assistance of counsel is not an absolute
requirement.
Petitioner’s admission was given freely.

The CSC found petitioner guilty of dishonesty. It is categorized as "an act which includes the procurement
and/or use of fake/spurious civil service eligibility, the giving of assistance to ensure the commission or
procurement of the same, cheating, collusion, impersonation, or any other anomalous act which amounts
to any violation of the Civil Service examination." Petitioner impersonated Decir in the PBET exam, to
ensure that the latter would obtain a passing mark. By intentionally practicing a deception to secure a
passing mark, their acts undeniably involve dishonesty.
The Court has defined dishonesty as the "(d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." Petitioner’s dishonest act as a civil
servant renders her unfit to be a judicial employee.
“The image of a court, as a true temple of justice, is mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest
of its personnel”
- RIVERA
111 Re: Complaint dated January 28, 2014 of Wenefredo Parreno… (J. Bersamin)
RE: COMPLAINT DATED JANUARY 28, 2014 OF WENEFREDO PARREÑO, ET AL., AGAINST
HON. CELIA C. LIBREA-LEAGOGO, HON. ELIHU A. YBAÑEZ AND HON. AMY C. LAZARO-
JAVIER, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP NO.
108807
OCA IPI NO. 14-220-CA-J
Topic: Judicial Department – Speedy Disposition of Cases
Synopsis:
The Constitution mandates a lower collegiate court like the Court of Appeals (CA) to resolve a case within
twelve (12) months from the submission of the last required pleading or as set by the court itself.
Although often holding that a heavy caseload is insufficient reason to excuse a Judge from disposing his
cases within the reglementary period, the Court has applied this rule by considering the causes of the
delay. In Marquez v. Manigbas, the Court relieved the respondent judge from liability because the delay
had been caused by the sudden deluge of cases brought about by the expansion of the jurisdiction of the
municipal trial courts. The delay in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 could not be said to have been incurred by
Justice Ybañez with malice or deliberate attempt to impede the dispensation of justice. He assigned C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of his legal staff, but the latter had fallen seriously ill in the meantime,
forcing him to hire a contractual-lawyer for the purpose.
Digest:
FACTS
This case is about an administrative complaint against Court of Appeals Justices who rendered judgment
of a case raised on appeal beyond the reglementary period for deciding the case for decision. It appears
that on June 26, 2012, the Special Sixteenth (16th) Division of the CA issued its resolution submitting
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 for decision. However, the complainants lament that from the issuance of the
resolution until the filing of their complaint on February 8, 2014, the respondents, who comprised the
Special 16th Division of the CA, had not rendered the decision, which the complainants insist was in
patent violation of the mandatory period within which the respondents should decide under Section 15
(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the respondents liable for undue delay in deciding C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807
RULING
The administrative complaint is without merit.
The Constitution mandates a lower collegiate court like the CA to resolve a case within 12 months from
the submission of the last required pleading or as set by the court itself. This is clear from paragraphs (1)
and (2), Section 15 of Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 15.
(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme
Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
Justice Librea-Leagogo and Justice Lazaro-Javier were not accountable for the delay in rendering the
judgment. Justice Librea-Leagogo had a limited participation in respect of C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807
because the reorganization of the CA ensuing after the promulgation of the resolution by the Special 16th
Division on June 26, 2012 caused her transfer to the 15th Division through CA Office Order No.220-12-
ABR, terminating her responsibility in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807.
Justice Ybañez, as the ponente for C.A. G.R. SP No. 108807, carried the case with him when he was
transferred to the 13th Division. But whether or not he was administratively liable for the delay of eight
months should depend on the relevant circumstances. Although often holding that a heavy caseload is
insufficient reason to excuse a Judge from disposing his cases within the reglementary period, the Court
has applied this rule by considering the causes of the delay. In Marquez v. Manigbas, the Court relieved
the respondent judge from liability because the delay had been caused by the sudden deluge of cases
brought about by the expansion of the jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts. The delay in C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 108807 could not be said to have been incurred by Justice Ybañez with malice or deliberate attempt
to impede the dispensation of justice. He assigned C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of his legal
staff, but the latter had fallen seriously ill in the meantime, forcing him to hire a contractual-lawyer for
the purpose. The latter subsequently joined another agency of the Government on a permanent basis.
Thus, Justice Ybañez could promulgate the decision only on February 28, 2014. His explanation for the
delay, being entirely plausible, is accepted.’’’’’’’’’’’
112 Reyes v. Reyes
PROSECUTOR ROMANA R. REYES, Complainant, versus JUDGE JULIA A. REYES, Metropolitan

Trial Court, Branch 69, Pasig City, Respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1623 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1635-MTJ]. September 18, 2009
Ponente: PER CURIAM

Topic: Judicial Department – Judicial Ethics
Synopsis:
A judge is a visible representation of the judiciary and, more often than not, the public cannot separate
the judge from the judiciary.—The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (New Code
of Judicial Conduct), which took effect on June 1, 2004, mandates: SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order
and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall
require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction
or control. Respecting Judge Reyes’ frequent nocturnal “gimmicks,” suffice it to state that her presence in
the above-mentioned places impairs the respect due her, which in turn necessarily affects the image of
the judiciary. A judge is a visible representation of the judiciary and, more often than not, the public
cannot separate the judge from the judiciary. Moreover, her act of bringing some of her staff to her
weekday “gimmicks,” that causes them to be absent or late for work disrupts the speedy administration
of service. She thus also failed to heed the mandate of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, viz.: SECTION
1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. SEC. 2. As a
subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall
conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Digest:
FACTS
Complainants depicted Judge Reyes as very unethical. One time, in the presence of a stranger, Judge
Reyes uttered, “Ano kaya kung mag-hearing ako ng hubo’t hubad tapos naka-robe lang, pwede kaya?” At
one time, Armie overheard Judge Reyes utter over the phone “Hayaan mo, Farah, pag natikman ko na
siya, ipapasa ko sa iyo, ha ha ha!”
Judge Reyes exhibited conduct unbecoming a judge for repeatedly inviting her staff and other court
employees to join her to a drinking spree in the courtroom after office hours. Judge Reyes was also
unfriendly to litigants. Complainants claimed that Judge Reyes was anti-public service. She instructed the
staff to lock the door entrance to the room occupied by the staff and not to answer phone calls during
court hearings even if there were employees in the staff room to attend to calls and queries. Judge Reyes
hurled invectives in front of the staff and lawyers. Several times, Judge Reyes conducted staff meetings
wearing T-shirt, slippers and faded “maong” folded a little below the knee, as if she was in her house.
Oftentimes, she would wear the same clothes she wore the previous day, which showed that she resided
in the chambers. Judge Reyes was lazy and inefficient, as she delegated decision-writing to Juliet. Since
her appointment, she was able to promulgate only three or four decisions of her own writing.
ISSUE(S)
WON Judge Julia is guilty of gross immoral conduct, and should be dismissed
RULING
YES. The Court finds that Judge Julia Reyes should indeed be dismissed from the service.
By judges’ appointment to the office, the people have laid on them their confidence that they are
mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, members of
the judiciary are expected to be fearless in their pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any
person, interest or power, and to be equipped with moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations
lurking in their office.80 Unfortunately, respondent Judge failed to resist the temptations of power which
eventually led her to transgress the very law she swore to protect and uphold.
Being a dispenser of justice, Judge Reyes, a lady judge at that, should have demonstrated finesse in her
choice of words. In this case, the words used by her was hardly the kind of circumspect language
expected of a magistrate. The use of vulgar and curt language does not befit the person of a judge who
is viewed by the public as a person of wisdom and scruples.84 Remarks such as “Ano kaya kung mag-
hearing ako ng hubo’t hubad tapos naka-robe lang, pwede kaya?”; “Hayaan mo, Farah, pag natikman ko
na siya, ipapasa ko sa iyo, ha ha ha!”; and “Alam mo na ang dami intriga dito; nireport ba naman na
nakatira ako dito, ano kaya masama dun? Alam ko staff ko rin nagsumbong eh, PUTANG INA NILA,
PUTANG INA TALAGA NILA!” have no place in the judiciary.
Those who don the judicial robe must observe judicial decorum which requires magistrates to be at all
times temperate in their language, refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric or from resorting to
the language of vilification.
Judge Reyes failed to heed this injunction, however. Her inability to control her emotions her act of
walking out of the courtroom during hearings, and her shouting invectives at her staff and lawyers
indicate her unfitness to sit on the bench. They betray her failure to exercise judicial temperament at all
times, and maintain composure and equanimity.
Judge Reyes’ questioned actions reflect her lack of patience, an essential part of dispensing justice; and
of courtesy, a mark of culture and good breeding. Her demonstrated belligerence and lack of self-
restraint and civility have no place in the government service.87
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (New Code of Judicial Conduct), which took
effect on June 1, 2004, mandates:
“SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient,
dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals
in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others
subject to their influence, direction or control.”
Respecting Judge Reyes’ frequent nocturnal “gimmicks,” suffice it to state that her presence in the
above-mentioned places impairs the respect due her, which in turn necessarily affects the image of the
judiciary. A judge is a visible representation of the judiciary and, more often than not, the public cannot
separate the judge from the judiciary. Moreover, her act of bringing some of her staff to her weekday
“gimmicks,” that causes them to be absent or late for work disrupts the speedy administration of service.
She thus also failed to heed the mandate of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, viz.:
“SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges
shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.”89
As for Judge Reyes’ act of borrowing money from her staff, the same constitutes conduct unbecoming a
judge. While there is nothing wrong per se with borrowing money, it must be borne in mind that she
exerted moral ascendancy over her staff, who may not have had the means but may have been forced to
find a way in order not to displease her.
Respecting Judge Reyes’ failure to put into writing her judgment, she having merely required the accused
to read it from the computer screen in camera without the presence of counsel, she violated the
Constitution. She could have simply printed and signed the decision. Offering to a party’s counsel a
diskette containing the decision when such counsel demands a written copy thereof is unheard of in the
judiciary. A verbal judgment is, in contemplation of law, in esse, ineffective. “It is a requirement of due
process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.” ###
113 CSC v. DBM
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

G.R. No. 158791 February 10, 2006

Topic: Constitutional Commissions – Fiscal Autonomy
Synopsis:
The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy
is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy
without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides that the Commission shall
enjoy fiscal autonomy and that their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly
released. This conclusion is consistent with the Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the
enforcement of a ―no report, no release‖ policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal
autonomy by the Constitution. Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy
only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To
hold that the CSC may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue
shortfall would, to that extent, place CSC and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal
footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy.
Digest:
FACTS
“Automatic release” of approved annual appropriations to Civil Service Commission, a constitutional
commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to
fund releases to it may be imposed. The total funds appropriated by General Appropriations Act of 2002
(GAA) for Civil Service Commission (CSC) was P285,660,790.44. CSC complains that the total funds
released by Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving
an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30. CSC contends that the funds were intentionally withheld by
DBM on the ground of their ―no report, no release‖ policy. Hence, CSC filed a petition for mandamus
seeking to compel the DBM to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it
seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not DBM‘s policy “no report, no release” is constitutional
RULING
DBM‘s act of withholding the subject funds from CSC due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared
unconstitutional.
The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy
is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy
without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides that the Commission shall
enjoy fiscal autonomy and that their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly
released. The Court held in the case of, Batangas v. Romulo, ―automatic release‖ in Section 6, Article X
of the Constitution is defined as ―an automatic manner; without thought or conscious intention.‖ Being
―automatic,‖ thus, connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. As such the LGUs are
not required to perform any act to receive the ―just share‖ accruing to them from the national coffers.
By parity of construction, ―automatic release‖ of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a
constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that
no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. This conclusion is consistent with the Resolution of
this Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a ―no report, no release‖ policy against the
Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution. Furthermore, the Constitution
grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, of which
petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that the CSC may be subjected to withholding or
reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place CSC and the other
entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same
autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution.
114 Funa v. Villar

DENNIS A. B. FUNA, petitioner, vs. THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REYNALDO A.
VILLAR, respondent
G.R. No. 192791. April 24, 2012

Topic: Constitutional Commissions – Terms of Office
Synopsis:
The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the
uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7)
years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional.
The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration
of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.
Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or impeachment)
shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be
less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec.
1(2), Art. IX(D).
Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full term of seven
years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the
Commission.
A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an
appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman.
Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the
length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not
exceed seven (7) years.
Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Digest:
FACTS
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Guillermo N. Carague (Carague) as Chairman of the
Commission on Audit (COA) for a term of seven (7) years. Carague’s term of office started on February 2,
2001 to end on February 2, 2008.
On February 7, 2004, President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Reynaldo A. Villar as the third member of
the COA for a term of seven (7) years starting February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA
Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008.
Subsequently, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA and shortly thereafter, on
June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as
Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original
term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.
Villar insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of seven (7) years which
is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2,
2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.
On the other hand, Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as
Chairman of the Commission on Audit. Petitioner asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the
1987 Constitution proscribes reappointment of any kind within the commission, the point being that a
second appointment, be it for the same position (commissioner to another position of commissioner) or
upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.
Villar’s promotional appointment, so it is argued, is void from the start, constituting as it did a
reappointment enjoined by the Constitution, since it actually needed another appointment to a different
office and requiring another confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
ISSUE(S)
(1) Whether Chairman Villar be accorded a fresh term period of seven (7) years and (2) whether the
appointment of Chairman Villar constitutes as reappointment, hence, proscribed by the Constitution
RULING
1. NO. The explicit command of the Constitution is that the “Chairman and the Commissioners shall
be appointed by the President for a term of seven years and appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.” To repeat, the President has two and only two
options on term appointments. Either he extends an appointment for a full 7-year term when the vacancy
results from the expiration of term, or for a shorter period corresponding to the unexpired term of the
predecessor when the vacancy occurs by reason of death, physical disability, resignation or
impeachment. If the vacancy calls for a full seven-year appointment, the Chief Executive is barred from
extending a promotional appointment for less than seven years. Else, the President can trifle with terms
of office fixed by the Constitution.
2. NO. Jurisprudence tells us that the word “reappointment” means a second appointment to one
and the same office. As Justice Arsenio Dizon (Justice Dizon) aptly observed in his dissent in Visarra v.
Miraflor, 8 Phil. 1 (1963), the constitutional prohibition against the reappointment of a commissioner
refers to his second appointment to the same office after holding it for nine years. As Justice Dizon
observed, a promotion from commissioner to chairman, albeit entailing a second appointment, involves a
different office and, hence, not, in the strict legal viewpoint, a reappointment. Stated a bit differently,
“reappointment” refers to a movement to one and the same office. Necessarily, a movement to a
different position within the commission (from Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute an
appointment, or a second appointment, to be precise, but not reappointment.
A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an
appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman.
Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the
length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not
exceed seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from
death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that “reappointment” found
in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner
or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different
position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in
the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.
To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz.:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration
of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven
(7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional.
The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration
of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or
impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such
appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of
terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full term of
seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the
Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also covered
by the prohibition against reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible
for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing
chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate
period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor
will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman
resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that
“reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office
(Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving
a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new
appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting

capacity.
115 Funa v. Agra
DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner vs. ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTIEC ALBERTO C. AGRA, IN

HIS OFFICIAL CONCURRENT CAPACITIES AS ACTING SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE AND AS ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R.
MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191644. February 19, 2013
Topic: Constitutional Commissions – Incompatible Offices
Synopsis:
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor
General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, which provides that the
President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They
shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted
by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Digest:
FACTS
President Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Secretary
Agnes VST Devanadera in order to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon Province. On March 5, 2010,
President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in concurrent capacity. Thus Funa, , in
his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced this suit to challenge the
constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations, claiming it to be prohibited under
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
But Agra’s contention is that, he was then the Government Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo
designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been
appointed as the Secretary of Justice. On March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the
Acting Secretary of Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in
order to run for Congress representing a district in Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that he
then relinquished his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the appointment
of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor General.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his position as
Acting Solicitor General is unconstitutional
2. What is the effect of declaration of unconstitutionality of Agra’s Appointment?
RULING
1. YES. Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate
in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
conduct of their office.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor
General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and spirit
were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment
during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided.
Note:
According to Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, the only two exceptions against the holding of multiple
offices are: (1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the
Vice President to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by Executive officials
specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of the officials’ offices.
2. De facto Doctrine
That notwithstanding, Agra was a de facto officer during his tenure as Acting Secretary of Justice. In Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, the Court said:
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as
such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. It has been held that “in cases where there is
no de jure, officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has
discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in
an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. This
doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public should
benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such
services. Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual
services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if
the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is
in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant
authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a
mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those
of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.
In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting
Secretary of Justice, assuming that was his later designation, were presumed valid, binding and effective
as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office. This clarification is necessary in
order to protect the sanctity of the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority
emanates from the State. Agra’s official actions covered by this clarification extend to but are not limited
to the promulgation of resolutions on petitions for review filed in the Department of Justice, and the
issuance of department orders, memoranda and circulars relative to the prosecution of criminal cases.
116 Public Interest Center, Inc., v. Elma
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., LAUREANO T. ANGELES and JOCELYN P. CELESTINO,

Petitioners,
vs.
MAGDANGAL B. ELMA, as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel and as Chairman of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, and RONALDO ZAMORA, as Executive
Secretary, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 138965 June 30, 2006
Ponente: J. Chico-Nazario
Synopsis:
The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official to hold
more than one office only if "allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position." (Compatibility
test) Incompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the functions of the two, where one office
is not subordinate to the other, nor the relations of the one to the other such as are inconsistent and
repugnant, there is not that incompatibility from which the law declares that the acceptance of the one is
the vacation of the other. The force of the word, in its application to this matter is, that from the nature
and relations to each other, of the two places, they ought not to be held by the same person, from the
contrariety and antagonism which would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially
discharge the duties of one, toward the incumbent of the other.
Digest:
FACTS
Respondent Elma was appointed as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) on 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second appointment, but waived any renumeration
that he may receive as CPLC. Petitioners sought to have both appointments declared as unconstitutional
under Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and, therefore,
null and void.
Citing the Resolution in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, respondents allege that the strict
prohibition against holding multiple positions provided under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution applies only to heads of executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries; it does not cover other public officials given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, or
Assistant Secretary. Respondents claim that it is Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution
that should be applied in their case. This provision, according to the respondents, would allow a public
officer to hold multiple positions if (1) the law allows the concurrent appointment of the said official; and
(2) the primary functions of either position allows such concurrent appointment. Respondents also
alleged that since there exists a close relation between the two positions and there is no incompatibility
between them, the primary functions of either position would allow respondent Elma’s concurrent
appointments to both positions.
ISSUE(S)
Do the two appointments constitute incompatible offices?
RULING
Yes. The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official to
hold more than one office only if "allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position."
(Compatibility test) Incompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the functions of the two,
where one office is not subordinate to the other, nor the relations of the one to the other such as are
inconsistent and repugnant, there is not that incompatibility from which the law declares that the
acceptance of the one is the vacation of the other. The force of the word, in its application to this matter
is, that from the nature and relations to each other, of the two places, they ought not to be held by the
same person, from the contrariety and antagonism which would result in the attempt by one person to
faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of one, toward the incumbent of the other. In the
immediate case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The
duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of
various executive departments and agencies and to review investigations involving heads of executive
departments and agencies, as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an
agency under the Executive Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the
review of the CPLC. As CPLC, respondent Elma will be required to give his legal opinion on his own
actions as PCGG Chairman and review any investigation conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission, which may involve himself as PCGG Chairman. In such cases, questions on his impartiality
will inevitably be raised. This is the situation that the law seeks to avoid in imposing the prohibition
against holding incompatible offices.
117 Funa v. Executive Secretary
DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Office of

the President, SEC. LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, in his official capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications, USEC. MARIA ELENA H. BAUTISTA, in
her official capacities as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications and as Officer-in-Charge of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA),
Respondents.
G.R. No. 184740. February 11, 2010

Synopsis:
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein,
without additional compensation in an ex officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of said office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise “any other office” within
the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and
functions on said officials. Apart from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any
compensation when she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her
designation as such OIC was in an ex officio capacity as required by the primary functions of her office as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
Digest:
FACTS
President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary
of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). Bautista was designated as
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated
October 23, 2006.
Following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as
Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC
Undersecretary. Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the
instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is
proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment.
On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of the
MARINA and she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the designation of Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport constitutional
RULING
YES. Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate
in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
conduct of their office.”
Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter
prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in
Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the primary
functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex officio capacity, which is
the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein,
without additional compensation in an ex officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of said office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise “any other office” within
the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and
functions on said officials. Apart from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any
compensation when she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her
designation as such OIC was in an ex officio capacity as required by the primary functions of her office as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
118 Funa v. Duque
G.R. No. 191672. November 25, 2014.

DENNIS A. B. FUNA, petitioner, vs. THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, respondents.
Topic: Civil Service Commission – Incompatible Offices
Synopsis:
The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their respective charters with various powers and
functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created. While powers and functions associated
with appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career development, employment status, rights,
privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF
are also tasked to perform other corporate powers and functions that are not personnel-related. All of
these powers and functions, whether personnel-related or not, are carried out and exercised by the
respective Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a
member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may exercise these
powers and functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman, such as
imposing interest on unpaid or unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines for the accreditation of health
care providers, or approving restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid loan amortizations.
Digest:
FACTS
President Arroyo appointed Duque as Chairman of the CSC. The Commission of Appointments confirmed
Duque’s appointment on February 3, 2010.
On February 22, 2010, she issued EO 864 which states the inclusion of the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission in the board of trustees/directors of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and the HDMF. Pursuant to the EO,
Duque was designated as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the aforesaid GOCCs.
Petitioner Dennis Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition
challenging the constitutionality of EO 864 was well as Sec. 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292,
otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987, and the designation of Duque as a member of the
Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HMDF.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the designation of Duque is unconstitutional
RULING
Yes. Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet position, Duque was thus covered
by the general rule enunciated under Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B. He can hold any other office
or employment in the Government during his tenure if such holding is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position.
Section 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their respective charters with various powers and
functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created. While powers and functions associated
with appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career development, employment status, rights,
privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF
are also tasked to perform other corporate powers and functions that are not personnel-related. All of
these powers and functions, whether personnel-related or not, are carried out and exercised by the
respective Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a
member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may exercise these
powers and functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman, such as
imposing interest on unpaid or unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines for the accreditation of health
care providers, or approving restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid loan amortizations. The
Court also notes that Duque’s designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem, a form of additional compensation that is disallowed by
the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its clear contravention of the proscription set by Section
2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes against the principle behind an ex officio
position, and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.
Note.—The only two exceptions against the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those provided
for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice President to become a
member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII
without additional compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of the officials’ offices. (Funa vs. Agra, 691 SCRA 196 [2013]
119 Pareno v. COA
2nd LT. SALVADOR PARREÑO represented by his daughter Myrna P. Caintic, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
G.R. No. 162224. June 7, 2007.*
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: The Commission on Audit – Jurisdiction
Synopsis:
The jurisdiction of the COA over money claims against the government does not include the power to rule
on the constitutionality or validity of laws. The 1987 Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare unconstitutional a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in this Court and in all Regional Trial Courts. Petitioner’s
money claim essentially involved the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Hence, the
COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s money claim.
Digest:
FACTS
Salvador Parreño (petitioner) served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 32 years. On 5
January 1982, petitioner retired from the Philippine Constabulary with the rank of 2nd Lieutenant.
Petitioner availed, and received payment, of a lump sum pension equivalent to three years pay. In 1985,
petitioner started receiving his monthly pension amounting to P13,680.
Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen. In January 2001, the AFP
stopped petitioner’s monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 (PD
1638), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1650. Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, provides that a
retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits
terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner requested for reconsideration but the Judge Advocate General of the AFP denied the request.
Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension, but the COA denied
his claim for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, but the COA in its
Resolution dated January 13, 2004, denied the said motion.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the COA has jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 27 of PD 1638, as amended
RULING
No. Section 2(1), Article IX (D) of the 1987 Constitution prescribes the powers of the COA, as follows:
Sec. 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and
settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters, and on a post-audit basis; (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been
granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental
entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are
required by law or the granting institution to submit such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity.
However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may
adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to
correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as
may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.”
The jurisdiction of the COA over money claims against the government does not include the power to rule
on the constitutionality or validity of laws. The 1987 Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare unconstitutional a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in this Court and in all Regional Trial Courts. Petitioner’s
money claim essentially involved the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Hence, the
COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s money claim.
120 Carolino v. Senga
ADORACION CAROLINO (SPOUSE AND IN SUBSTITUTION OF THE DECEASED JEREMIAS A.

CAROLINO), Petitioner, v. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP); BRIG. GEN. FERNANDO ZABAT, AS CHIEF OF THE AFP
FINANCE CENTER; COMMO. REYNALDO BASILIO, AS CHIEF OF THE AFP-GHQ MANAGEMENT
AND FISCAL OFFICE; AND COMMO. EMILIO MARAYAG, PENSION AND GRATUITY OFFICER,
PENSION AND GRATUITY MANAGEMENT CENTER, AFP FINANCE CENTER, Respondent.
G.R. No. 189649, April 20, 2015
Ponente: J. Peralta
Topic: Judicial Review – Pure Questions of Law
Synopsis:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the
same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. However, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies need not be adhered to when the question is purely legal. This is because issues
of law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer
would only be an exercise in futility. Here, the question raised is purely legal, i.e., what law should be
applied in the payment of retirement benefits of petitioner's husband. Thus, there was no need to
exhaust all administrative remedies before a judicial relief can be sought.
Digest:
FACTS
Jeremias A. Carolino retiree of Armed Forces of the Philippines with a rank of Colonel under General
Order no. 1208 dated Nov. 28, 1976, pursuant to Section 1 (A) and 10 of RA no. 340, as amended. He
received a retirement pay of PhP18,315 until Dec. 1976 until it was held in abeyance on March 2005.
Pension and Guatuity Officer of AFP Finance center informed Jeremias that his loss of Filipino Citizenship
caused the deletion of his name in the alpha list of AFP Pensioners’ payroll effective March 5, 2005 the
only remedy to restore the benefits is by complying with requirements prescribed under RA 9225 or the
Dual Citizenship Act.
The removal from the retirement pay is hinge on the provision of Section 4-6 of RA 340 wihch states that
retired military personnel are disqualified from receiving pension benefits once incapbable to render
military service as a result of his having sworn allegiance to a foreign country.
Jeremias filed with RTC of QC a petition for Mandamus seeking reinstatement of his name in the AFP
retired officers under RA no. 340 and reimbursement of all retirement pay and benefits which accrued
after it was stopped. RTC granted the petition. The CA reversed RTC. Hence the petition to SC.
ISSUE(S)
a. Whether or not Jeremias is entitled to retirement pay
b. Whether or not petition for Mandamus will apply in this case
RULING
a. Yes, Jeremias is entitled for the payment of the retirement pay based on RA 340. The new law which is
PD no. 1638 was enacted into law on September 10, 1979 by Pres. Marcos. Jeremias at that time was
already receiving his pension before the law was enacted. Under Art 4 of NCC, it is provided that laws
shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. It is said that the law looks to the future
only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal
provisions; that all statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the purpose
and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily
implied from the language used; and that every case of doubt must be resolved against retrospective
effect. These principles also apply to amendments of statutes. PD No. 1638 does not contain any
provision regarding its retroactive application, nor the same may be implied from its language
b. Yes, the petition for mandamus filed by petitioner’s husband with the RTC was for the payment of his
terminated retirement benefits, which has become vested, and being a ministerial duty on the part of the
respondents to pay such claim, mandamus is the proper remedy to compel such payment.
A writ of mandamus can be issued only when petitioner’s legal right to the performance of a particular
act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. A clear legal right is a right which is
indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. A doctrine well-embedded in our
jurisprudence is that mandamus will issue only when the petitioner has a clear legal right to the
performance of the act sought to be compelled and the respondent has an imperative duty to perform
the same. The remedy of mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public
officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial.
121 Maritime Industry Authority v. COA
MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.

G.R. No. 185812 January 13, 2015
Ponente: J. Leonen
Topic: The Commission on Audit – Double Compensation
Synopsis:
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any
present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government. The disallowed benefits and
allowances of petitioner Maritime Industry Authority’s officials and employees were not excluded by law
or an issuance by the Department of Budget and Management. Thus, these were deemed already given
to the officials and employees when they received their basic salaries. Their receipt of the disallowed
benefits and allowances was tantamount to double compensation.
Digest:
FACTS
Maritime Industry Authority is an attached agency of the Department of Transportation and
Communication and created under Presidential Decree No. 474. On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758,
otherwise known as "An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the
Government and For Other Purposes" took effect. The law standardizes the salary rates of government
officials and employees. Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758 provides that:
All allowances, except for representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry
allowances; xxx and such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may
be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein
prescribed.
On September 30, 1989, the Department of Budget and Management issued National Compensation
Circular Nos. 56 and 59 implementing Republic Act No. 6758.
In the memorandum dated February 10, 2000, the Administrator of Maritime Industry Authority
recommended to then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada the approval and/or restoration of the financial
incentives, benefits, or allowances of its officers and employees. The request to restore these benefits or
allowances was premised on "inflation-caused difficulties resulting to [sic] the exodus of
technically/specially trained personnel into the private sector or abroad who shall carry on the delicate
and unique functions of the agency and in consideration of the additional functions of the agency."
The Resident Auditor subsequently issued notices of disallowance on the allowances and incentives
received by the officers and employees of Maritime Industry Authority by the officers or employees from
January to May 2001 on the ground that it constituted double compensation to public officers and
employees proscribed by Article IX(b) of the 1987 Constitution, in relation to Section 229 of the
Government Accounting and Auditing Manual or GAAM Volume 1. Further, the President’s approval of the
memorandum was not the law contemplated by the Constitution as an exception to the prohibition on
double compensation. The Legal and Adjudication Office of the Commission on Audit upheld the notices
of disallowance issued. The Commission on Audit affirmed the notices of disallowance. Thus, this petition
for certiorari was filed by Maritime Industry Authority.
ISSUE(S)
Did the COA err in affirming the disallowances?
RULING
No. Article IX(B), Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any
present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.
Petitioner Maritime Industry Authority argues that the rule against double compensation does not apply
because National Compensation Circular No. 59 is ineffectual due to its non-publication.
Respondent Commission on Audit counters that the disallowed allowances is tantamount to additional
compensation proscribed by Article IX(B), Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution. This is because these
allowances are not authorized by law.
Republic Act No. 6758 deems all allowances and benefits received by government officials and employees
as incorporated in the standardized salary, unless excluded by law or an issuance by the Department of
Budget and Management. The integration of the benefits and allowances is by legal fiction.
The disallowed benefits and allowances of petitioner Maritime Industry Authority’s officials and employees
were not excluded by law or an issuance by the Department of Budget and Management. Thus, these
were deemed already given to the officials and employees when they received their basic salaries. Their
receipt of the disallowed benefits and allowances was tantamount to double compensation.
122 NTC v. COA
NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, ATTY.

JOSEPHINE A. TILAN, REGIONAL CLUSTER DIRECTOR AND MR. ROBERTO G. PADILLA, STATE
AUDITOR IV, Respondents.
G.R. No. 204800, October 14, 2014
Ponente: J. Peralta
Topic: The Commission on Audit – Grant of Additional Benefits
Synopsis:
Entitlement to separation pay does not disqualify the separated employee who is likewise qualified to
receive loyalty award pursuant to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular. Accordingly,
the Court sustains the allowance of the loyalty awards granted to the qualified employees of Transco in
accordance with the CSC Memorandum Circular. At any rate, even assuming that the payment of loyalty
award is unwarranted, as to the employees who received the same without participating in the approval
thereof, they cannot be said to be either in bad faith or grossly negligent in so doing. The imprimatur
given by the approving officers on such award certainly gave it a color of legality from the perspective of
these employees. Being in good faith, they cannot, following Blaquera v. Alcala, 295 SCRA 366 (1998), be
compelled to refund the benefits already granted to them.
Digest:
FACTS
In 2003, the National Power Corporation (NPC) underwent reorganization pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law),wherein NPC
was split into two (2):the NPC, which became in-charge of the generation of electricity, and the National
Transmission Corporation (Transco),which was charged with the transmission of electricity to the power
customers. Consequently, Transco was created effective June 24, 2001 and acquired all the transmission
assets of the NPC. Meanwhile, due to such reorganization, the services of all the employees of the NPC
were terminated effective February 28, 2003, wherein they received their separation benefits and
terminal leave pay. However, on March 1, 2003, some of the said employees were rehired by Transco.
On February 9, 2004, the Officer-in-Charge of the Human Resources Department of Transco, Noli E.
Pomperada, sent a query to the Civil Service Commission (CSC),on the entitlement to loyalty award of
Transco employees who were previously employed with the NPC and who were re-hired by Transco with
no gap in service. On July 5, 2005, the Legal and Adjudication Sector (LAS) of the Commission on Audit,
Cordillera Administrative Region (COA-CAR),La Trinidad, Benguet, through its Regional Cluster Director,
Atty. Josephine A. Titan, issued ND No. 05-037, disallowing the payment of loyalty award to Transco
NLO&M employees, on the ground that they had not met the 10-year continuous government service
required. Aggrieved, Transco elevated it’s Appeal to the COA however the latter denied their petition.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the NPC employees who were separated from the service because of the reorganization
of the electric power industry and who received their separation pay under the EPIRA Law are still
entitled to receive loyalty awards under the CSC Memorandum Circular
RULING
Yes. Before the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA Law) was enacted, the National Power
Corporation (NPC) employees had a fixed right to the loyalty award under the terms and conditions then
obtaining. They could not therefore be excluded from its enjoyment just because they have received
separation pay for the termination of their services in view of the reorganization, without violating basic
precepts of fairness and due process. The purpose or intent of the Electric Power Industry Reform Act
(EPIRA Law) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR) was only to limit the claim for future
separation benefits of employees who may be absorbed or rehired by any government agency or
government-owned or -controlled corporations (GOCCs).
The loyalty award is granted pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No.
292, as well as Section 7(e), Rule 10 of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations Implementing
Book V of E.O. No. 292, which provides that all members of the government workforce shall receive
incentive awards, including the grant of loyalty award based on continuous and satisfactory service. The
particular agency where the employee or official completed the required years of service, which in this
case is Transco, is responsible for granting the award. With respect to the purpose thereof, as correctly
pointed out by petitioner, the CSC Memorandum Circular aims to reward employees who have efficiently
served the government for more than a decade, and opted to serve the government instead of taking
employment elsewhere. It is a valuable component of an organization’s overall employee recognition
efforts — to reward long and dedicated service.
The grant of the loyalty award under the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular and of
the separation benefits under the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA Law) should be distinctly
and separately treated.
The payment of separation pay is a statutory right designed to provide the employee with the
wherewithal during the period that he/she is looking for another employment.-
Entitlement to separation pay does not disqualify the separated employee who is likewise qualified to
receive loyalty award pursuant to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular. Even
assuming that the payment of loyalty award is unwarranted, as to the employees who received the same
without participating in the approval thereof, they cannot be said to be either in bad faith or grossly
negligent in so doing. —It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that petitioner was of the honest belief that
Transco Circular No. 2004-37 was valid and enforceable in accordance with the aforesaid CSC letter.
Accordingly, the Court sustains the allowance of the loyalty awards granted to the qualified employees of
Transco in accordance with the CSC Memorandum Circular. At any rate, even assuming that the payment
of loyalty award is unwarranted, as to the employees who received the same without participating in the
approval thereof, they cannot be said to be either in bad faith or grossly negligent in so doing. The
imprimatur given by the approving officers on such award certainly gave it a color of legality from the
perspective of these employees. Being in good faith, they cannot, following Blaquera v. Alcala, 295 SCRA
366 (1998), be compelled to refund the benefits already granted to them.
Separation Pay; As correctly pointed out by petitioner, what is avoided is a situation wherein an employee
who was separated from service and availed himself of the separation package under the Electric Power
Industry Reform Act (EPIRA Law), would still use the accrued years of service in National Power
Corporation (NPC) for purposes of computing their future separation benefits to be settled by the
absorbing government agency or government-owned successor corporation.
123 Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, DR. DANTE G. GUEV ARRA
and ATTY. AUGUSTUS F. CEZAR, Respondents.
G.R. No. 176162 : October 9, 2012
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Topic: The Civil Service Commission – Jurisdiction
Synopsis:
The Civil Service Commission shall hear and decide administrative cases instituted by, or brought before
it, directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its
offices and of the agencies attached to it. Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the
Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and
suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct,
discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees.
CSC may take cognizance of an administrative case filed directly with it against an official or employee of
a chartered state college or university. This is regardless of whether the complainant is a private citizen
or a member of the civil service and such original jurisdiction is shared with the Board of Regents of the
school.
The board of regents of a state university has the sole power of administration over a university, in
accordance with its charter and R.A. No. 8292. With regard to the disciplining and removal of its
employees and officials, however, such authority is not exclusive to it because all members of the civil
service fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Digest:
FACTS
Respondents Guevarra and Cezar were the Officer-in-Charge/President and the Vice President for
Administration, respectively, of PUP. Petitioner Honesto L. Cueva, then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an
administrative case against Guevarra and Cezar. CSC issued a resolution charging Guevarra with
Dishonesty and Cezar with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service after a prima facie
finding that they had committed acts punishable under the Civil Service Law and Rules.
Guevarra and Cezar to CA questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC over the administrative complaint filed
against them by Cueva. CA nullified CSC’s resolution for allegedly being rendered without jurisdiction,
stating that “heads of agencies and instrumentalities “shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide
matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction,” thus, it
bestows upon the Board of Regents the jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against respondents Guevarra and Cezar. In addition, the CA noted that the CSC erred
in recognizing the complaint filed by Cueva, reasoning out that the latter should have exhausted all
administrative remedies by first bringing his grievances to the attention of the PUP Board of Regents.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the CSC has jurisdiction over administrative cases filed directly with it against officials of a
chartered state university
RULING
YES. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the power to appoint and
discipline its officials and employees and to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought
before it directly or on appeal. Section 2(1), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution defines the scope of
the civil service:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341,18 PUP became a chartered state university, thereby
making it a government-owned or controlled corporation with an original charter whose employees are
part of the Civil Service.
This Court acknowledged that the board of regents of a state university has the sole power of
administration over a university, in accordance with its charter and R.A. No. 8292. With regard to the
disciplining and removal of its employees and officials, however, such authority is not exclusive to it
because all members of the civil service fall under the jurisdiction of the CSC.
As to the disciplinary jurisdicition of CSC, there is no cogent reason to differentiate between a complaint
filed by a private citizen and one filed by a member of the civil service, especially in light of Section
12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the same E.O. No. 292 which confers upon the CSC the
power to “hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal”
without any qualification. ###
124 Department of Finance v. Hon. Mariano Dela Cruz
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, REPRESENTED BY HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS SECRETARY, AND THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, REPRESENTED BY HON.
ROZZANO RUFINO B. BIAZON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS, Petitioners, v. HON. MARINO M. DELA CRUZ, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, HON. FELICITAS O. LARON-CACANINDIN, IN HER
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 17, RONNIE
C. SILVESTRE, EDWARD P. DELA CUESTA, ROGEL C. GATCHALIAN, IMELDA D.CRUZ,
LILIBETH S. SANDAG, RAYMOND P. VENTURA, MA. LIZA S. TORRES, ARNEL C. ALCARAZ, MA.
LOURDES V. MANGAOANG, FRANCIS AGUSTIN Y. ERPE, CARLOS T. SO, MARIETTA D.
ZAMORANOS, CARMELITA M. TALUSAN,1] AREFILES H. CARREON,2] AND ROMALINO G.
VALDEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 209331, August 24, 2015
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: The Civil Service Commission – Jurisdiction
Synopsis:
The CSC has jurisdiction over all employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. The CSC is the
sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service. The rule is that disciplinary cases and cases
involving personnel actions, including "appointment through certification, promotion, transfer,
reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation," are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the CSC. Under Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Civil Service,
"[a] detail is the movement of an employee from one department or agency which is temporary in
nature, which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of
another appointment." A reading of the petition filed before the RTC shows that respondents were
questioning their mass detail and reassignment to CPRO. According to respondents, their detail was
carried out in bad faith and was meant to remove them from their permanent positions in the BOC. The
action appears to be a personnel action under the jurisdiction of the CSC.
Digest:
FACTS
EO No. 140 created the Customs Policy Research Office or CRPO in the Department of Finance. This
executive order states that the CPRO shall be responsible for reviewing the customs administration
policies, rules and procedures, and thereafter providing sound recommendations for the improvement of
the same, and shall be composed of its organic personnel, as approved by the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) upon recommendation of the DOF Secretary, augmented and reinforced by DOF and
BOC personnel as well as those detailed or seconded from other agencies, whether attached to the DOF
or not. On the same day of the publication of EO 140, Bureau of Customs (BOC) Commissioner Rozzano
Rufino B. Biazon (Commissioner Biazon) issued Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 (CPO 189-
2013) detailing 27 BOC personnel holding the positions of Collector of Customs V and VI, including
respondents in this case, to CPRO "effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked." On 30
September 2013, respondents filed an action for Declaratory Relief with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
On 21 October 2013, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before this Court, with
prayer for the issuance of a TRO or a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Petitioners alleged that
the case involves personnel action affecting public officers which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission (CSC).
ISSUE(S)
Does the CSC have jurisdiction over the case for declaratory relief?
RULING
The CSC has jurisdiction over all employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. The CSC is the
sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service. The rule is that disciplinary cases and cases
involving personnel actions, including "appointment through certification, promotion, transfer,
reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation," are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the CSC. Under Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Civil Service,
"[a] detail is the movement of an employee from one department or agency which is temporary in
nature, which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of
another appointment." A reading of the petition filed before the RTC shows that respondents were
questioning their mass detail and reassignment to CPRO. According to respondents, their detail was
carried out in bad faith and was meant to remove them from their permanent positions in the BOC. The
action appears to be a personnel action under the jurisdiction of the CSC.
Note:
However, the petition went beyond questioning the detail of respondents. Respondents further assailed
the validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013. Respondents alleged that CPO 189-2013 was issued
even before EC) 140, pursuant to which CPO 189-2013 was issued, became effective. Respondents
alleged that CPO 189-2013 was issued to beat the deadline of the Commission on Elections' ban on
personnel movement from 28 September 2013 to 20 October 2013 due to the scheduled barangay
elections. When respondents raised the issue of validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013, the issue
took the case beyond the scope of the CSC's jurisdiction because the matter is no longer limited to
personnel action. Thus, the RTC did not abuse its discretion in taking cognizance of the action.
125 CSC v. Pobre
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. HERMOGENES P. POBRE, respondent.

G.R. No. 160568. September 15, 2004
Ponente: J. Corona
Topic: The Civil Service Commission - Jurisdiction
Synopsis:
While the determination of leave benefits is within the functions of the CSC as the central personnel
agency of the government, the duty to examine accounts and expenditures relating to such benefits
properly pertains to the COA. Where government expenditures or use of funds is involved, the CSC
cannot claim exclusive jurisdiction simply because leave matters are involved. In this case therefore, the
jurisdiction of the CSC is not exclusive, as it is shared with COA. Here, there is no conflicting ruling to
speak of because the COA is yet to render its opinion on PRCs query regarding respondent Pobres claim
for terminal leave benefits.
Digest:
FACTS
Respondent Hermogenes P. Pobre is a former government official who retired from the government
service three times. Respondent first retired as commissioner of the Commission on Audit (COA) on
March 31, 1986. He reentered the government and retired as chairman of the Board of Accountancy on
October 31, 1990. He was then appointed as associate commissioner of the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) of which he retired eventually as chairman on February 17, 2001. The first two times
he retired, respondent Pobre received his terminal leave pay amounting to P310,522.60 and P55,000,
respectively.
On his third retirement, respondent Pobre claimed payment of his terminal leave based on his highest
monthly salary as PRC chairman but to be reckoned from the date he first entered the government
service as budget examiner in the defunct Budget Commission in 1958. He invoked Section 13 of
Commonwealth Act 186:
Sec. 13. Computation of service. - The aggregate period of service which forms the basis for
retirement and calculating the amount of annuity described in section eleven hereof shall be
computed from the date of original employment, whether as a classified or unclassified employee
in the service of an employer, including periods of service at different times and under one or
more employers.
Doubtful of the legality of the claim, successor PRC chairperson Antonieta Fortuna-Ibe sought the opinion
of two constitutional commissions, petitioner CSC and the COA. The CSC, through a resolution, claimed
that all that Pobre was entitled to were his terminal leave benefits based only on his accrued leave credits
from the date of his assumption to office as PRC chairman and not his total terminal leave credits,
including those earned in other government agencies from the beginning of his government service.
When elevating the matter by petition for review, the CA set aside the resolutions of petitioner CSC and
declared that it was the COA, not petitioner CSC, which had jurisdiction to adjudicate respondent Pobres
claim for terminal leave benefits.
ISSUE(S)
1. Who has jurisdiction over the case?
2. Is Pobre entitled to have his terminal leave benefit computed from his earliest instance of government
service?
RULING
1. While the determination of leave benefits is within the functions of the CSC as the central personnel
agency of the government, the duty to examine accounts and expenditures relating to such benefits
properly pertains to the COA. Where government expenditures or use of funds is involved, the CSC
cannot claim exclusive jurisdiction simply because leave matters are involved. In this case therefore, the
jurisdiction of the CSC is not exclusive, as it is shared with COA. Here, there is no conflicting ruling to
speak of because the COA is yet to render its opinion on PRCs query regarding respondent Pobres claim
for terminal leave benefits.
Note:
Given these circumstances, the Supreme Court declined to pronounce a ruling with respect to the
substantive issue of the case (issue #2) until the COA rules on the claim.
126 Nacion v. COA, et al.
ATTY. JANET D. NACION v. COA

GR No. 204757, Mar 17, 2015
Ponente: J. Reyes
Topic: The Commission on Audit – Powers of COA
Synopsis:
Given the COA’s mandate to look after the compliance with laws and standards in the handling of funds
of government agencies where they are assigned to, COA personnel must prevent any act that may
influence them in the discharge of their duties. The primary function of an auditor is to prevent irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant expenditure of government funds. To be able to properly perform
their constitutional mandate, COA officials need to be insulated from unwarranted influences, so they can
act with independence and integrity. The removal of the temptation and enticement the extra
emoluments may provide is designed to be an effective way of vigorously and aggressively enforcing the
Constitutional provision mandating the COA to prevent or disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner was administratively charged by Commission on Audit (COA) for grave misconduct. She was
assigned by COA in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewage System (MWSS). During the petitioner’s
assignment in MWSS from 2001 to 2003, she availed of the MWSS Multi-Purpose Loan Program, such as
car loan, housing loan, and received benefits and bonuses from the latter.
Petitioner avers that she availed of the housing and car loan in an honest belief that she could avail of
the benefits in the absence of any prohibition thereon, considering that COA Resolution that prohibited
COA personnel from availing of all forms of loan, monetary benefits from agencies under their jurisdiction
was issued only on 2004. She denied receiving any allowances and bonuses and argued that the
documents submitted to establish the same are not conclusive evidence that she indeed received the
money. COA cited violation of Sec. 18 of RA 6758 prohibiting COA personnel from receiving salaries,
bonuses, allowances or other emoluments from government entity, local government unit, GOCCs and
government financial institution, except the compensation directly paid by COA. She was give one-year
suspension as penalty, finding in her favor mitigating circumstances her waiver of the formal investigation
and admission of availment of MWSS Housing and Car Loans.
The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. She avers that she was denied of the right to due
process as she argues that the records during her tenure with the MWSS should not have been included
by the audit team in its investigations, as no office order covering it was issued by the COA Chairman.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in finding Nacion guilty of grave misconduct
and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations
RULING
NO. Given the COA’s mandate to look after the compliance with laws and standards in the handling of
funds of government agencies where they are assigned to, COA personnel must prevent any act that may
influence them in the discharge of their duties. The primary function of an auditor is to prevent irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant expenditure of government funds. To be able to properly perform
their constitutional mandate, COA officials need to be insulated from unwarranted influences, so they can
act with independence and integrity. The removal of the temptation and enticement the extra
emoluments may provide is designed to be an effective way of vigorously and aggressively enforcing the
Constitutional provision mandating the COA to prevent or disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
127 Espinas, et al. v. COA
ARNALDO M. ESPINAS, LILLIAN N. ASPRER, and ELEANORA R. DE JESUS, petitioners, vs.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent
G.R. No. 198271. April 1, 2014
Synopsis:
The CoA’s audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check-and-balance
system inherent in our system of government. As an essential complement, the CoA has been vested
with the exclusive authority to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those
for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures or uses of government funds and properties. As an independent constitutional body
conferred with such power, it reasonably follows that the CoA’s interpretation of its own auditing rules
and regulations, as enunciated in its decisions, should be accorded great weight and respect. Findings of
administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are
not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only
when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings.
Digest:
FACTS
On April 16, 2007, the Office of the CoA Auditor, through Priscilla DG. Cruz, the Supervising Auditor
assigned to the LWUA, issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM), revealing that the 31 LWUA
officials were able to reimburse P16,900,705.69 in EME, including expenses for official entertainment,
service awards, gifts and plaques, membership fees, and seminars/conferences. Out of the said amount,
P13,110,998.26 was reimbursed only through an attached certification attesting to their claimed
incurrence “certification”. According to the AOM, this violated CoA Circular No. 2006-01[10] dated
January 3, 2006 (CoA Circular No. 2006-01), which pertinently states that the “claim for reimbursement
of such expenses shall be supported by receipts and/or other documents evidencing disbursements.”
After the post-audit of the LWUA EME account for the same period, SA Cruz issued Notice of
Disallowance, disallowing the EME reimbursement claims of the 31 LWUA officials, in the total amount of
P13,110,998.26, for the reason that they were not supported by receipts and/or [other] documents
evidencing disbursements as required under [Item III(3)] of [CoA Circular No. 2006-01].
Petitioners appealed the notice of disallowance to the CoA Cluster Director, contending that the
“certification” they attached in support of their EME reimbursement claims was originally allowed under
Section 397 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual, Volume I (GAAM-Vol. I), which is a
reproduction of Item III(4) of CoA Circular No. 89-300. Further, petitioners alleged that CoA Circular No.
2006-01 is violative of the equal protection clause since officials of GOCCs, such as the LWUA officials,
are, among others, prohibited by virtue of the same issuance from supporting their reimbursement claims
with “certifications,” unlike officials of the national government agencies (NGAs) who have been so
permitted. Finally, petitioners submitted that CoA Circular No. 2006-01 was not duly published in the
Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation and thus, unenforceable.
The COA Cluster Director affirmed the issuance of Notice of Disallowance which also affirmed by
Commission Proper.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not grave abuse of discretion attended the CoA’s ruling in this case
RULING
The CoA’s audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check-and-balance
system inherent in our system of government. As an essential complement, the CoA has been vested
with the exclusive authority to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those
for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures or uses of government funds and properties. This is found in Section 2, Article IX-D of the
1987 Philippine Constitution which provides that: Sec. 2. x x x. (2) The Commission shall have exclusive
authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination,
establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules
and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
As an independent constitutional body conferred with such power, it reasonably follows that the CoA’s
interpretation of its own auditing rules and regulations, as enunciated in its decisions, should be accorded
great weight and respect. In the recent case of Delos Santos v. CoA, 703 SCRA 501 (2013), the Court
explained the general policy of the Court towards CoA decisions reviewed under certiorari parameters:
[T]he CoA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant
and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government’s, and ultimately, the people’s
property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life
to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government. x x x [I]t is the general policy of
the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-
created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their
presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are
accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or
arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings.
128 The Law Firm of Laguesma, etc. v. COA
THE LAW FIRM OF LAGUESMA MAGSALIN CONSULTA AND GASTARDO, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT and/or REYNALDO A. VILLAR and JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR. in
their capacities as Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, Respondents.
G.R. No. 185544 January 13, 2015
Ponente: J. Leonen
Topic: The Commission on Audit – Rule-Making Power
Synopsis:
The OGCC is mandated by law to provide legal services to GOCCs. Thus, as a general rule, GOCCs are not
allowed to engage the legal services of private counsels. Some of the exemptions to this rule are
provided for under COA Circular No. 86-255, pursuant to the Commission’s exclusive authority to
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. The COA rules provide that it is only in
extraordinary or exceptional cases that it may be allowed to engage the services of private counsels.
Digest:
FACTS
Sometime in 2001, officers of Clark Development Corporation, a GOCC, approached the law firm of
Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo to assist in handling CDCs labor cases. CDC then sought the
approval of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for the engagement of the private law firm.
The OGCC initially denied the request, but later acquiesced to CDC, and furnished the company with a
pro forma retainership contract. However, before it could secure the authorization and clearance from
OGCC, which required the concurrence of the COA, CDC had already begun making use of the services of
Laguesma. Subsequently, COA denied CDCs request for clearance, citing its failure to secure a prior
written concurrence of the COA and the approval with finality of the OGCC.
ISSUE(S)
Did COA err in disallowing the payment of the legal fees to Laguesma as CDCs private counsel?
RULING
No. The OGCC is mandated by law to provide legal services to GOCCs. Thus, as a general rule, GOCCs
are not allowed to engage the legal services of private counsels. Some of the exemptions to this rule are
provided for under COA Circular No. 86-255, pursuant to the Commission’s exclusive authority to
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. The COA rules provide that it is only in
extraordinary or exceptional cases that it may be allowed to engage the services of private counsels.
Furthermore, COA Circular 86-255 provides that before the hiring or employment of private counsel, the
written conformity and acquiescence of the OGCC and COA must first be secured.
The Supreme Court found that the labor cases petitioner handled were not of a complicated or peculiar
nature that could justify the hiring of a known expert in the field. On the contrary, these were standard
labor cases of illegal dismissal and collective bargaining agreement negotiations. Furthermore, CDC had
failed to secure the necessary final approval of the OGCC before it engaged the services of petitioner.
129 TESDA v. COA
TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (TESDA), Petitioner, v. THE

COMMISSION ON AUDIT; CHAIRMAN REYNALDO A. VILLAR; COMMISSIONER JUANITO G.
ESPINO, JR.; AND COMMISSIONER EVELYN R. SAN BUENAVENTURA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015
Synopsis:
The COA is endowed with latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It has the power to ascertain whether
public funds were utilized for the purpose for which they had been intended by law. The Constitution has
made COA “the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to
government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property, including the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish techniques and methods for such
review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations.” Thus, the COA is generally
accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty and responsibility to examine and
audit expenditures of public funds, particularly those which are perceptibly beyond what is sanctioned by
law.
Digest:
FACTS
DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas issued A.O. No. 430, authorizing the payment of healthcare maintenance
allowance of P5,000.00 to all officials and employees of the DOLE, including its bureaus and attached
agencies. AO No. 430 was purportedly based on CSC Memorandum Circular No. 33 and Sec. 34 of the
2003 GAA.
Upon post-audit, COA State Auditor IV Valenzuela issued AOM No. 04-005, and later endorsed the matter
to the COA Director of the LOA-National for appropriate legal action.
Atty. Mislang, OIC of the COA LOA-National, subsequently issued Notice of Disallowance No. 2006-015,
addressed to then TESDA Director Syjuco, indicating that the payment of the allowance had no legal
basis, it being contrary to RA No. 6758 (Salary Standardization Law of 1989).
TESDA filed an appeal before the COA Commission Proper, assailing the disallowance by the LAO-
National. However, the COA Commissioner Proper, denied the appeal for lack of merit.
ISSUE(S)
Whether COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the payment of healthcare maintenance
allowance
RULING
No. The COA is endowed with latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It has the power to
ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purpose for which they had been intended by law.
The Constitution has made COA “the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all
accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property,
including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish techniques
and methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations.” Thus, the
COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty and responsibility
to examine and audit expenditures of public funds, particularly those which are perceptibly beyond what
is sanctioned by law.
130 PEZA v. COA
PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA), Petitioner, versus COMMISSION ON

AUDIT and REYNALDO A. VILLAR, Chairman, Commission on Audit, Respondents.
July 3, 2012

Topic: The Commission on Audit
Synopsis:
PEZA has no legal basis to pay ex officio members of its Board. PEZA cannot claim that it was not aware
of circumstances pointing to the possible illegality of the disbursements of per diems to the ex officio
members of the Board. In Civil Liberties Union, this Court clarified the prohibition under Section 13,
Article VII of the Constitution and emphasized that a public official holding an ex officio position as
provided by law has no right to receive additional compensation for the ex officio position.
Digest:
FACTS
PEZA has 13 members which include Undersecretaries which serve in ex office capacity and were granted
per diem by PEZA for every attendance in a board meeting. The auditor issued Notice of Disallowance for
the payment of the per diems to ex officio members amounting to PhP5.4Mn for the period 2001-2006.
The PEZA move to reconsider the disallowance. However, the COA denied the PEZA’s petition. Hence, the
petition to Supreme Court.
ISSUE(S)
Does the PEZA have legal basis in granting per diems to the ex officio members of its Board?
RULING
No, PEZA has no legal basis to pay ex officio members of its Board. PEZA cannot claim that it was not
aware of circumstances pointing to the possible illegality of the disbursements of per diems to the ex
officio members of the Board. In Civil Liberties Union, this Court clarified the prohibition under Section
13, Article VII of the Constitution and emphasized that a public official holding an ex officio position as
provided by law has no right to receive additional compensation for the ex officio position.
131 Re: COA opinion on the Computation of Appraised Value of Properties…
Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by
the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court.
A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC July 31, 2012
Ponente: PER CURIAM

Topic: The Commission on Audit – Limitations
Synopsis:
In agreeing with Atty. Candelaria, the Supreme Court declared that while the COA’s authority to conduct
post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1),
Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that COA shall have the power, authority, and duty
to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or
uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, nevertheless this authority must be read not only in light of
the Court’s fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial
independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters.
Digest:
FACTS
The present administrative matter stems from the two Memoranda, dated July 14, 2011 and August 10,
2010, submitted by Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer,
Office of Administrative Services, to the Office of the Chief Justice. These memoranda essentially ask the
Court to determine the proper formula to be used in computing the appraisal value that a retired Chief
Justice and several Associate Justices of the Supreme Court have to pay to acquire the government
properties they used during their tenure. On June 8, 2010, the Legal Services Sector of COA found that
an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices
purchased from the Supreme Court several personal properties assigned o them during their incumbency
in the Court (mostly vehicles, and a TV set). The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the
Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the
purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the subject motor
vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23,
1997 when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A dated August 5,
1998. Recommendations of the Office of Administrative Services In her Memorandum dated August 10,
2010, Atty. Candelaria recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house computation
based on the CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned the authority of
the Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of
government property since these were issued in 1997.
ISSUE(S)
Should the retired justices have complied with the COA computation?
RULING
No. In agreeing with Atty. Candelaria, the Supreme Court declared that while the COA’s authority to
conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under
Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that COA shall have the power,
authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of,
and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, nevertheless this authority must be
read not only in light of the Court’s fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions
on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters.
One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy.
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman
contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and
dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees,
fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay
plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed
by them in the course of the discharge of their functions. The Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy is realized
through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its head, and of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise
of administrative control and supervision of the courts and its personnel. As the Court En Banc’s
Resolution (dated March 23, 2004) in A.M. No. 03-12-01 reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary
serves as the basis in allowing the sale of the Judiciary’s properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme
Court and the appellate courts. Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and its
independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where,
when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court
personnel within the parameters of the Court’s granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and
restrictions of the grant as grantor. In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula
provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Court’s exercise of its discretionary authority to
determine the manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of
interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only
violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the
constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the
Judiciary’s own affairs.
132 Causing v. COMELEC
ELSIE S. CAUSING, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERNAN D. BIRON, SR.,
respondents.
G.R. No. 199139. September 9, 2014.
Topic: Election Law/The Commission on Elections – Ban on Details and Transfers
Synopsis:
The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 were transfer and detail.
Transfer is defined in the Resolution as “any personnel movement from one government agency to
another or from one department, division, geographical unit or subdivision of a government agency to
another with or without the issuance of an appointment”; while detail as defined in the Administrative
Code of 1987 is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an
appointment. Physical transfer of location over a short distance is not what the law contemplates.
Digest:
FACTS
Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. On May 28, 2010, Mayor
Biron issued Memorandum No. 12, Series of 2010 which states that Causing is being detailed at the
Office of the Municipal Mayor. On the same date Mayor Biron also issued Office Order No. 13 detailing
Belonio, to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar to assume the functions and duties as Local Civil
Registrar-designate effective upon receipt of order.
On June 1, 2010, Mayor Biron issued to Causing Memorandum No. 17, Series on 2010, and Memorandum
No. 17-A, Series of 2010, which directed her to report to the Office of the Mayor effective immediately.
In view of the foregoing issuances by Mayor Biron, Causing filed the complaint-affidavit dated June 8,
2010 in the Office of the Regional Election Director, Region VI, in Iloilo City, claiming that Office Order
No. 12 dated May 28, 2010 issued by Mayor Biron ordering her detail to the Office of the Municipal
Mayor, being made within the election period and without prior authority from the COMELEC, was illegal
and violative of Section 1, Paragraph A, No. 1, in connection with Section 6(B) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8737, Series of 2009.
ISSUE(S)
Are the acts of Mayor Biron made in violation of the OEC and the COMELEC resolution?
RULING
No, the only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 were transfer and detail.
appointment. Having acquired technical and legal meanings, transfer and detail must be construed as
such. Obviously, the movement involving Causing did not equate to either a transfer or a detail within the
contemplation of the law if Mayor Biron only thereby physically transferred her office area from its old
location to the Office of the Mayor “some little steps” away. Petitioner’s argument, therefore, that the
phrase “any transfer or detail whatsoever” encompassed “any and all kinds and manner of personnel
movement,” including the mere change in office location.
133 Balajonda v. COMELEC
ELENITA I. BALAJONDA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION) and

MARICEL S. FRANCISCO, respondents
G.R. No. 166032. February 28, 2005.
Ponente: J. Tinga
Topic: The Commission on Elections – Procedure
Synopsis:
In the case of Batul v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court affirmed a similar order of the COMELEC First
Division directing the immediate execution of its own judgment. Despite the silence of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, there is no
reason to dispute the COMELECs authority to do so, considering that the suppletory application of the
Rules of Court is expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Batul is
different from this case in that in Batul the decision subject of the order of immediate execution was
rendered by the poll body in the exercise of its original jurisdiction while the decision in this case was
promulgated in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Still, there is no reason to dispose of this petition
in a manner different from Batul. The Court has consistently employed liberal construction of procedural
rules in election cases to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be
defeated by mere technical objections.
Digest:
FACTS
Balajonda was proclaimed as the duly elected Barangay Chairman (Punong Barangay), having won the
office in the barangay elections. Francisco duly filed a petition for election protest, within ten (10) days
from the date of proclamation, lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch
35.
The MeTC ordered the revision of ballots in sixty-nine (69) ballot boxes, and eventually, the ballots in
thirty-nine (39) precincts were revised. After trial, MeTC dismissed the protest with its finding that
Balajonda still led Francisco by four hundred eighteen (418) votes. Francisco appealed the MeTC Decision
to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The COMELEC First Division reversed the MeTC, finding that
Francisco won over Balajonda. Balajonda seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC
First Division’s Resolution. In the meantime, Francisco filed a Motion for Execution.
The COMELEC First Division after due hearing granted the motion and directed the issuance of a Writ of
Execution, ordering Balajonda to cease and desist from discharging her functions as Barangay Chairman
and relinquish said office to Francisco.
In support of her thesis that the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
execution pending appeal, Balajonda in essence submits the following grounds, thus: (1) that the
COMELEC may order the immediate execution only of the decision of the trial court but not its own
decision; (2) that the order of execution which the COMELEC First Division issued is not founded on good
reasons as it is a mere pro forma reproduction of the reasons enunciated in pertinent jurisprudence for
the grant of execution pending appeal.
ISSUE(S)
May the COMELEC order the immediate execution of its judgment or final order?
2. Is the order of execution founded on good reasons?
RULING
1. Yes. In the case of Batul v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court affirmed a similar order of the COMELEC
First Division directing the immediate execution of its own judgment. Despite the silence of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, there is no
reason to dispute the COMELECs authority to do so, considering that the suppletory application of the
Rules of Court is expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which
provides that absent any applicable provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court shall
be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. Batul is different from this case in that in
Batul the decision subject of the order of immediate execution was rendered by the poll body in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction while the decision in this case was promulgated in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. Still, there is no reason to dispose of this petition in a manner different from Batul.
The public policy underlying the suppletory application of Sec. 2(a), Rule 39 is to obviate a hollow victory
for the duly elected candidate as determined by either the courts or the COMELEC. Because of this, the
Court has consistently employed liberal construction of procedural rules in election cases to the end that
the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
2. Yes. Public interest is best served if the herein Protestant who actually received the highest number of
votes should be immediately be installed. It is likewise true that the remaining period or the unexpired
term is too short that to further prolong the tenure of the protestee is a virtual denial of the right of the
protestant, the duly elected barangay captain, to assume office. Considering that there are good reasons
for the issuance of an Order of Execution, to wit: dictates of public policy and the shortness of the
remaining period, the motion is proper.
134 Galang v. Geronimo
FESTO R. GALANG, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. RAMIRO R. GERONIMO, as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch 81; and NICASIO M. RAMOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 192793. February 22, 2011.
Ponente: CJ. Corona

Topic: The Commission on Elections – Power to Issue Writs
Synopsis:
Interpreting the phrase “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,” the Supreme Court held in J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. that if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body,
then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an
appeal from the decision of the regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal
officials, then it is also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner was proclaimed winner for the mayoralty race during the May 10, 2010 Automated Elections for
the Municipality of Cajidiocan, Province of Romblon. Subsequently, private respondent Nicasio Ramos,
who was also a mayoralty candidate in the same election, requested the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to conduct a manual reconciliation of the votes cast. The COMELEC granted said request. The
manual reconciliation was done on May 20, 2010 at the Sangguniang Bayan Session Hall, after which
proceedings the eight winning Sangguniang Bayan Members were also proclaimed. The MBOC made
erasures and corrections using correction fluid on the COCP for the Sangguniang Bayan Members to
reflect the results of the manual reconciliation. As for the COCP for the previously proclaimed mayoralty
and vice-mayoralty candidates, the total number of votes for each of the candidates remained the same
even after the manual reconciliation; hence, only the date was erased and changed to read “May 20,
2010” to correspond with the date of the manual reconciliation.
Private respondent filed an election protest case against petitioner before the RTC. The following day, the
court sheriff went to petitioner’s residence to serve summons with a copy of the petition. The Sheriff’s
Return of Summons3 stated that the sheriff was able to serve Summons on petitioner by leaving the
same and the attached copy of the protest with a certain Gerry Rojas, who was then at petitioner’s
residence. Petitioner, together with his then counsel of record, Atty. Abner Perez, appeared in court and
requested a copy of the summons with a copy of the election protest.
The trial court then issued the assailed Order dated June 24, 2010, finding the service of Summons on
petitioner on May 28, 2010 as valid, and declaring the Answer filed on June 11, 2010, as filed out of time.
Hence this petition
ISSUE(S)
Does the COMELEC have the power to issue a writ of certiorari?
RULING
Yes. Interpreting the phrase “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,” the Supreme Court held in J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. that if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or
body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of
certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This was reiterated in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, where
the Court stated that a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court
has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.
Note that Section 8, Rule 14 of the 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts
Involving Elective Municipal Officials states that:
“Sec. 8. Appeal.—An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the COMELEC within five (5) days
after promulgation, by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy
served on the adverse counsel or on the adverse party who is not represented by counsel.”
Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the
regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC
which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Clearly, petitioner
erred in invoking the Supreme Court’s power to issue said extraordinary writ.
135 Bulilis v. Nuez
CERIACO BULILIS, petitioner, vs. VICTORINO NUEZ, HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, 6th MCTC,
UBAY, BOHOL, HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 52, TALIBON, BOHOL, respondents.
G.R. No. 195953. August 9, 2011.

Topic: The Commission on Elections – Jurisdiction
Synopsis:
Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the
regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC
which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Clearly, petitioner
erred in invoking this Court’s power to issue said extraordinary writ.” Plainly, from the foregoing, this
Court recognizes the COMELEC’s appellate jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari against all acts or
omissions of courts in election cases.
Digest:
FACTS
Ceriaco Bulilis (Bulilis) was proclaimed winner of the elections for punong barangay of Barangay Bulilis,
Ubay, Bohol. He won over respondent Victorino Nuez (Nuez) by a margin of four (4) votes. Nuez filed an
Election Protest ) with the 6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Ubay, Bohol.
Bulilis, through counsel, filed an Answer, denying the allegations in the protest and praying for its
dismissal on the ground that the MCTC had no jurisdiction since the protest failed to implead the
Chairman and the Members of the Board of Election Inspectors who were purportedly indispensable
parties.
Bulilis filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Talibon, Bohol. However, in an Order dated December 22, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition on the
ground that it is the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) that has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari in election cases involving municipal and barangay officials. Bulilis’s motion for
reconsideration of the RTC Decision was denied.
ISSUE(S)
Does the COMELEC enjoy exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the case?
RULING
Yes. As the RTC correctly observed, the Court had in a subsequent issuance, A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC (which
amended, among others, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court), clearly provided that:
“In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall
be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.”
Plainly, from the foregoing, this Court recognizes the COMELEC’s appellate jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari against all acts or omissions of courts in election cases. Indeed, in the recent case of Galang, Jr.
v. Geronimo, the Court had the opportunity to rule that a petition for certiorari questioning an
interlocutory order of a trial court in an electoral protest was within the appellate jurisdiction of the
COMELEC. To quote the relevant portion of that decision:
“The question then is, would taking cognizance of a petition for certiorari questioning an interlocutory
order of the regional trial court in an electoral protest case be considered in aid of the appellate
jurisdiction of the COMELEC? The Court finds in the affirmative.
Interpreting the phrase “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,” the Court held in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Jaramillo, et al. that if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said
court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. This was reiterated in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, where the Court stated that a
court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to
review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.
Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the
decision of the regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal officials,
then it is also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. Clearly, petitioner erred in invoking this Court’s power to issue said
extraordinary writ.”
Although Galang involved a petition for certiorari involving an interlocutory order of a regional trial court
in a municipal election contest, the rationale for the above ruling applies to an interlocutory order issued
by a municipal trial court in a barangay election case. Following the Galang doctrine, it is the COMELEC
which has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari involving acts of the municipal trial courts in such
election contests.
In all, the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
This being the case, the Court finds it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by petitioner.
136 Fernandez v. COMELEC
INDIRA R. FERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (First Division)

and MARK ANTHONY B. RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 176296. June 30, 2008.
Ponente: J. Nachura
Topic: The Commission on Elections – Jurisdiction
Synopsis:
The 1987 Constitution vests in the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Construed in relation to the provision in
R.A. No. 7160 that includes in the enumeration of barangay officials the SK chairman, the constitutional
provision indeed sanctions the appellate review by the COMELEC of election protests involving the
position of SK chairman, as in the instant case. Hence, there is nothing improper in the COMELEC’s
assumption of jurisdiction over respondent’s appeal.
Digest:
FACTS
In the July 2002 synchronized barangay and SK Elections Rodriguez emerged as the winning candidate
for SK Chairman of Brgy. Pandan del Sur, Pandan Catanduanes, over his opponent Fernandez.
Discontented with the results, petitioner instituted an election protest with the 4th MCTC of Pandan-
Caramoan. The MCTC rendered its Decision declaring petitioner the duly elected SK Chairman and
ordering her proclamation as such.
Respondent appealed the case to the COMELEC. The COMELEC 1st Division rendered the assailed
Resolution nullifying the MCTC’s decision. The COMELEC 1st Division also denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration for having filed out of time and found no necessity to refer the same to the COMELEC En
Banc.
ISSUE(S)
Does the COMELEC have appellate jurisdiction over contests involving SK officials decided by trial courts
of limited jurisdiction?
RULING
Yes, the 1987 Constitution vests in the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Construed in relation to the provision in
R.A. No. 7160 that includes in the enumeration of barangay officials the SK chairman, the constitutional
provision indeed sanctions the appellate review by the COMELEC of election protests involving the
position of SK chairman, as in the instant case. Hence, there is nothing improper in the COMELEC’s
assumption of jurisdiction over respondent’s appeal.
137 Cawasa v. COMELEC
MAYOR JUN RASCAL CAWASA, COUNCILORS MAASIRAL DAMPA, H. ACKIL MAMANTUC,

MOMOLAWAN MACALI, ANDAR TALI, ALLAN SANAYON, and AMIN SANGARAN, petitioners,vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDULMALIK M. MANAMPARAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 150469. July 3, 2002.
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: The Commission on Elections – Failure of Elections
Synopsis:
As clearly provided by the law, the location of polling places shall be the same as that of the preceding
regular election. However, changes may be initiated by written petition of the majority of the voters of
the precinct or agreement of all the political parties or by resolution of the COMELEC after notice and
hearing. But ultimately, it is the COMELEC which determines whether a change is necessary after notice
and hearing.
BEI shall be composed of a chairman and two members, all of whom are public school teachers. If there
are not enough public school teachers, teachers in private schools, employees in the civil service or other
citizens of known probity and competence may be appointed. It was highly irregular to replace the duly
constituted members of the BEI, who were public school teachers, with military personnel.
The pre-conditions for declaring a failure of election are: (1) that no voting has been held in any precinct
or precincts because of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes and (2) that
the votes not cast therein are sufficient to affect the results of the elections. The concurrence of these
two circumstances justifies the calling of special elections. Here, the COMELEC found that the special
elections were vitiated by fraud due to the illegal transfer of the polling places and the appointment of
military personnel as members of the BEI
Digest:
FACTS
Cawasa and Manamparam were among the candidates for mayor in Nunungan, Lanao de Norte. Out of
the 40 precincts only 36 functioned, as there was a failure of election in the remaining 4. After
canvassing the election returns from the 36 precincts, the MBOC of Nunungan deferred the proclamation
of all winning candidates due to failure of said 4 precincts to function. Special elections were set
considering that the number of registered voters in the remaining 4 precincts would affect the election
results. The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 4630 authorizing the conduct of special elections in
the affected areas. As scheduled the special elections covering the 4 precincts were conducted.
The MBOC canvassed the election returns of the 4 precincts. After canvassing of the election returns the
MBOC proclaimed the winning candidates. During the May 14, 2001 regular elections, the lead of Cawasa
was 86. After May 30, 2001 Manamparan overcame the margin with a lead of 297 votes. Cawasa was
proclaimed Mayor and his co-petitioners were proclaimed as councilors.
Manamparan filed an appeal and petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner Cawasa, but was
dismissed by the COMELEC 2nd Division. Manamparan filed a petition for“Annulment of Election Results
during the May 30, 2001 Special Elections in Precincts No. 2A, 2A1/2A2, 3A, and 10A/10A1 of Nunungan,
Lanao Del Norte, and Annulment of Canvass and Proclamation with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.” The COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution
annulling the results of the special elections of the 4 precincts and annulled the proclamation of all
winning candidates insofar as the results in the 4 contested precincts affect the standing of candidates.
They held that “the special elections in the 4 contested precincts were not genuinely held and resulted in
failure to elect on account of fraud.”
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the transfer of polling place is valid.
2. Whether the appointment of military personnel as BEI is valid.
3. Whether COMELEC erred in deciding the special elections were not genuinely held.
RULING
1. No, the transfer was made not only in blatant disregard of COMELEC Resolution No. 4360 issued on
May 21, 2001 specifying the polling places but also Sections 153 and 154 of the Election Code. As clearly
provided by the law, the location of polling places shall be the same as that of the preceding regular
election. However, changes may be initiated by written petition of the majority of the voters of the
precinct or agreement of all the political parties or by resolution of the COMELEC after notice and
hearing. But ultimately, it is the COMELEC which determines whether a change is necessary after notice
and hearing.
The COMELEC has unequivocally stated that “nothing in the records showed that notice was given to the
political candidates and registered voters affected by the transfer.” Private respondent Manamparan has
categorically denied petitioners’ claim that all the political parties and municipal candidates agreed to the
transfer of venue. The Court discerns no substantiation of petitioners’ claim regarding the agreement to
transfer. There is then no cogent reason for us to disturb the findings of the COMELEC on this matter.
Indeed, the factual findings of the COMELEC supported by substantial evidence shall be final and non-
reviewable. Thus, it has been held that findings of fact of the COMELEC based on its own assessments
and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon this Court, more so, in the absence of a
substantiated attack on the validity of the same. Moreover, there is no question that the transfer of
venue was made within the prohibited period of thirty days before the special election.
2. No, there was absolutely no legal basis for the appointment of military personnel as members of the
BEI. Verily, the appointments were devoid of any justification other than the bare assertion, again, that
“the political parties and municipal candidates agreed on the said arrangement.”
Clearly, the BEI shall be composed of a chairman and two members, all of whom are public school
teachers. If there are not enough public school teachers, teachers in private schools, employees in the
civil service or other citizens of known probity and competence may be appointed. It was highly irregular
to replace the duly constituted members of the BEI, who were public school teachers. Nothing in
petitioners’ pleadings would even suggest that the substitution was made for cause and after hearing.
The importance of the constitution of the BEI to the conduct of free, honest and orderly elections cannot
be overemphasized. The Court has held that, “the members of the board of election inspectors are the
front line election officers. They perform such duties and discharge such responsibilities that make them,
in a real sense, foot soldiers who see to it that elections are free, honest and orderly. They are essential
to the holding of elections.”
3. No, the pre-conditions for declaring a failure of election are: (1) that no voting has been
held in any precinct or precincts because of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes and (2) that the votes not cast therein are sufficient to affect the results of
the elections. The concurrence of these two circumstances justifies the calling of special elections.
Here, the COMELEC found that the special elections were vitiated by fraud due to the illegal transfer of
the polling places and the appointment of military personnel as members of the BEI Inevitably, the
COMELEC could not ascertain who voted during the special elections. The circumstances were such that
the entire electoral process was not worthy of faith and credit, hence, in practical effect no election was
held.
138 COMELEC v. Espanol
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner, vs. HON. DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL, Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 149164-73. December 10, 2003.

Topic: The Commission on Elections – Power to Conduct Preliminary Investigations
Synopsis:
Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the petitioner, through its duly authorized legal officers, has
the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the
Omnibus Election Code, and to prosecute the same. The petitioner may avail of the assistance of the
prosecuting arms of the government. In Section 2, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, all
Provincial and City Prosecutors and/or their respective assistants are given continuing authority as its
deputies to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under election laws
and to prosecute the same. The complaints may be filed directly with them or may be indorsed to them
by the petitioner or its duly authorized representatives. The respondent’s assertion that Section 2, Rule
34, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is a violation of Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code has
been laid to rest by this Court in Margarejo vs. Escoses, wherein this Court ruled that until revoked, the
continuing authority of the Provincial or City Prosecutors stays.
Digest:
FACTS
Bautista was the official candidate of the Lakas for the position of Municipal Mayor of Kawit, Cavite. He
executed an Affidavit-Complaint charging the incumbent Municipal Mayor Atty. Federico “Hit” Poblete,
Vice-Mayor Reynaldo Aguinaldo, Bienvenido Pobre, Arturo Ganibe, Leonardo Llave, Diosdado del Rosario,
Manuel Ubod, Angelito Peregrino, Mario Espintu, Salvador Olaes and Pedro Paterno, Jr. of violation of
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (vote buying) and filed the same
with the Law Department of the COMELEC.
On February 25, 1999, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 99-0346, which directs the Law
Department to file the necessary information against respondents before the proper Regional Trial Court
of Cavite for violation of Section 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code; and to authorize the
Director IV of the Law Department to designate a COMELEC prosecutor to handle the prosecution of the
case until termination thereof, with the duty to submit periodic report after every hearing of the case;
and (b) to file a Motion before the Court for the preventive suspension for a period of ninety (90) days of
Mayor Bienvenido Pobre, Vice-Mayor Reynaldo Aguinaldo and Sangguniang Bayan members Leonardo
Llave, Diosdado del Rosario, Angelita Peregrino, Mario Espiritu, Salvador Olaes and Pedro Paterno, Jr.,
while the case is pending.
The RTC issued an order directing the Law Department of the petitioner to conduct the reinvestigation of
the case. In the meantime Macapagal and Rodelas filed a criminal complaint for violation of Sec. 261(a)
of OEC (vote selling) against Bautista (I.S. No. 1-99-1080). The Office of the Cavite Provincial Prosecutor
issued a resolution finding probable cause against the respondents. Respondents appealed the resolution
contending that the COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct the preliminary investigation thereof,
and to prosecute the same. But the respondents filed an “Urgent Motion to Withdraw or Revoke the
Delegated Authority of the Law Department to Direct the said Office to Suspend or Move for the
Suspension of the Prosecution” The COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 00-2453 to declare the
Resolution of the Prosecutor as null and void and to direct the law department to file a motion to dismiss
before the proper court the cases against the accused.
ISSUE(S)
Whether there is no need for an En Banc resolution revoking the authority of the Prosecution from
handling the case
RULING
Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the petitioner, through its duly authorized
legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code, and to prosecute the same. The
petitioner may avail of the assistance of the prosecuting arms of the government. In Section
2, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, all Provincial and City Prosecutors and/or
their respective assistants are given continuing authority as its deputies to conduct
preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under election laws and
to prosecute the same. The complaints may be filed directly with them or may be indorsed to
them by the petitioner or its duly authorized representatives. The respondent’s assertion that
Section 2, Rule 34, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is a violation of Section 265 of the Omnibus
Election Code has been laid to rest by this Court in Margarejo vs. Escoses, wherein this Court ruled that
until revoked, the continuing authority of the Provincial or City Prosecutors stays.
The deputation of the Provincial and City Prosecutors is necessitated by the need for prompt investigation
and dispensation of election cases as an indispensable part of the task of securing fine, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections. Enfeebled by lack of funds and the magnitude of its workload, the
petitioner does not have a sufficient number of legal officers to conduct such investigation and to
prosecute such cases. The prosecutors deputized by the petitioner are subject to its authority, control
and supervision in respect of the particular functions covered by such deputation. The acts of such
deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated authority are, in legal contemplation, the acts of the
petitioner itself. Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn any time by the petitioner,
either expressly or impliedly, when in its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is
necessary to protect the integrity of the process to promote the common good, or where it
believes that successful prosecution of the case can be done by the petitioner. Moreover, being
mere deputies or agents of the petitioner, provincial or city prosecutors deputized by the petitioner are
expected to act in accord with and not contrary to or in derogation of the resolutions, directives or orders
of the petitioner in relation to election cases such prosecutors are deputized to investigate and prosecute.
Otherwise, the only option of such provincial or city prosecutor is to seek relief from the petitioner as its
deputy.
The withdrawal by the petitioner of its deputation of the provincial or city prosecutors may not be
interfered with or overruled by the trial court. In this case, the petitioner had resolved to approve the
recommendation of its Law Department and nullified the Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor in I.S.
No. 1-99-1080, and directed its Law Department, not the Provincial Prosecutor, to implement the said
resolution and file the necessary motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7960-00 to 7969-00 pending with
the respondent judge. The Law Department did file before the respondent a “Motion to Dismiss” the said
cases and a motion for the respondent to, in the meantime, suspend the proceedings. Atty. Michael L.
Valdez, a legal officer of the petitioner’s Law Department, entered his appearance for the petitioner. The
Provincial Prosecutor was thereby relieved of his deputation to represent the petitioner in connection with
the said motion. However, the Provincial Prosecutor refused to give way to the Legal Officer of the
petitioner and even opposed the said motion. The act of the Provincial Prosecutor constituted a defiance
of the resolution of the petitioner and should have been ignored by the respondent judge.
It bears stressing that when the Provincial Prosecutor conducted the preliminary investigation of I.S. No.
1-99-1080, and filed the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 7960-00 to 7969-00, he did so because he
had been duly deputized by the petitioner. He did not do so under the sole authority of his office. The
resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 was subject to appeal by the aggrieved party
to the petitioner and may be reversed by the petitioner in the exercise of its supervision and control of its
deputies/subordinates.
139 Mutilan v. COMELEC
DR. MAHID M. MUTILAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ZALDY UY

AMPATUAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 171248. April 2, 2007.
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: The Commission on Elections – Failure of Elections
Synopsis:
There are three instances where a failure of elections may be declared, thus:
“(a)the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
(b)the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or
(c)after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody
or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.”
In all three instances, there is a resulting failure to elect. In the first instance, the election has not been
held. In the second instance, the election has been suspended. In the third instance, the preparation and
the transmission of the election returns give rise to the consequent failure to elect; the third instance is
interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as a winner.
Digest:
FACTS
Dr. Mahid M. Mutilan and Zaldy Ampatuan were candidates for Governor during the August 2005
elections in the ARMM. Ampatuan was proclaimed as the duly elected Governor of the ARMM.
Petitioner filed an Electoral Protest and/or Petition to Annul the Elections. Petitioner contested the results
of the elections in Maguindanao, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, and Sulu on the ground that no actual election was
conducted in the precincts in these four provinces. Petitioner alleged that the voters did not actually vote
and that the ballots were filled up by non-registered voters in the four provinces. Petitioner also
contested the results in the municipalities of Butig, Sultan Gumander, Calanogas, Tagoloan, Kapai, Masiu,
and Maguing in Lanao del Sur where massive substitute voting allegedly took place.
ISSUE(S)
Whether there is failure of elections
RULING
None, There are three instances where a failure of elections may be declared, thus:
“(a)the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
(b)the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or
(c)after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody
or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.”
In all three instances, there is a resulting failure to elect. In the first instance, the election has not been
held. In the second instance, the election has been suspended. In the third instance, the preparation and
the transmission of the election returns give rise to the consequent failure to elect; the third instance is
interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as a winner.
None of the three instances is present in this case. In this case, the elections took place. In fact, private
respondent was proclaimed the winner.
140 Sevilla v. COMELEC
MAMERTO T. SEVILLA, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RENATO R. SO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 203833. March 19, 2013.
Ponente: J. Brion
Topic: The Commission on Elections - Majority
Synopsis:
The Supreme Court has previously ruled that a majority vote requires a vote of four members of the
COMELEC en banc. In Marcoleta v. Commission on Elections, we declared “that Section 5(a) of Rule 3 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution require that a majority
vote of all the members of the COMELEC [en banc], and not only those who participated and took part in
the deliberations, is necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling.”
In the present case, while the October 6, 2012 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc appears to have
affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s Resolution and, in effect, denied Sevilla’s motion for
reconsideration, the equally divided voting between three Commissioners concurring and three
Commissioners dissenting is not the majority vote that the Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure require for a valid pronouncement of the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution of the COMELEC
en banc.
Digest:
FACTS
Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Brgy. Sucat, Muntinlupa City. The
Board of Election Tellers proclaimed Sevilla as the winner. So filed an election protest with the MeTC on
the ground that Sevilla committed electoral fraud, anomalies and irregularities in all the protested
precincts. Folloing the recount of the ballots in the pilot protested precincts, the MeTC issued an Order
dismissing the election protest. So filed a motion for reconsideration the dismissal order instead of a
notice of appeal; he also failed to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period. The MeTC denied
the Motion on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading.
In response, So filed a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the MeTC Judge. So faults the MeTC for its non-observance of the rule that in the appreciation of
ballots, there should be a clear and distinct presentation of the specific details of how and why a certain
group of ballots should be considered as having been written by one or two persons. The COMELEC
Second Division granted So’s petition. The COMELEC en banc, by a vote of 3-3, affirmed the COMELEC
Second Division’s ruling in its October 6, 2012 Resolution.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the COMELEC En Banc resolution has legal effect
RULING
No, Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution requires that “[e]ach Commission shall decide by a majority
vote of all its members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution.”
Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required.—(a) When sitting en banc, four (4) Members of the Commission
shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of transacting business. The concurrence of a majority of the
Members of the Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or
ruling.
The Supreme Court has previously ruled that a majority vote requires a vote of four members of the
COMELEC en banc. In Marcoleta v. Commission on Elections, we declared “that Section 5(a) of Rule 3 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution require that a majority
vote of all the members of the COMELEC [en banc], and not only those who participated and took part in
the deliberations, is necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling.”
In the present case, while the October 6, 2012 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc appears to have
affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s Resolution and, in effect, denied Sevilla’s motion for
reconsideration, the equally divided voting between three Commissioners concurring and three
Commissioners dissenting is not the majority vote that the Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure require for a valid pronouncement of the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution of the COMELEC
en banc.
In essence, based on the 3-3 voting, the COMELEC en banc did not sustain the COMELEC Second
Division’s findings on the basis of the three concurring votes by Commissioners Tagle, Velasco and
Yusoph; conversely, it also did not overturn the COMELEC Second Division on the basis of the three
dissenting votes by Chairman Brillantes, Commissioner Sarmiento and Commissioner Lim, as either side
was short of one (1) vote to obtain a majority decision. Recall that under Section 7, Article IX-A of the
Constitution, a majority vote of all the members of the Commission en banc is necessary to arrive at a
ruling. In other words, the vote of four (4) members must always be attained in order to decide,
irrespective of the number of Commissioners in attendance. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the
assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc had no legal effect whatsoever except to
convey that the COMELEC failed to reach a decision and that further action is required.
141 Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., for and in behalf of 139 members, represented by its
President, Amado P. Macasaet and its Executive Director Ermin F. Garcia, Jr., petitioner, vs.
G.R. No. 119694. May 22, 1995.
Ponente: J. Feliciano
Topic: The Commission on Elections – Police Power
Synopsis:
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a showing of
existence of a national emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without
regard to the individual business condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in differing
parts of the country, to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was
made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted
the COMELEC and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and calibrated
response to such necessity available to the COMELEC.
Digest:
FACTS
PPi is assailing the constitutional validity of Resolution No. 2772 by the COMELEC. Petitioner also
contends that the March 22, 1995 letter directives of COMELEC requiring publishers to give free
“COMELEC Space” and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute
impositions of involuntary servitude contrary to the provisions of Sec. 18(2), Art. III of the 1987
Constitution. PPI argues that Sec. 8 of Resolution 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.
Sec. 2. COMELEC Space.—The Commission shall procure freeprint space of not less than one half (1/2)
page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city for use as ‘COMELEC
Space’ from March 6, 1995 in the case of candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until May 12,
1995. In the absence of said newspaper, ‘COMELEC Space’ shall be obtained from any magazine or
periodical of said province or city.
Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers.___No newspaper or publication

shall allow to be printed or published in the news, opinion, features, or other sections of the newspaper
or publication accounts or comments which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party by
unduly or repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or political party.
ISSUE(S)
Whether Sec. 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional
RULING
Yes, there was no effort (and apparently no inclination on the part of COMELEC) to show that the police
power—essentially a power of legislation—has been constitutionally delegated to respondent Commission.
Secondly, while private property may indeed be validly taken in the legitimate exercise of the police
power of the state, there was no attempt to show compliance in the instant case with the requisites of a
lawful taking under the police power.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a showing of
existence of a national emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without
regard to the individual business condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in differing
parts of the country, to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was
made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted
the COMELEC and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and calibrated
response to such necessity available to the COMELEC. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of
the police power of the State.
Note: Sec. 8’s petition was dismissed for lack of an actual justiciable case or controversy.
142 Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Phils. v. COMELEC
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and GMA

NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 132922. April 21, 1998.
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Synopsis:
All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave
frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are
frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by
Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that “any such franchise or right granted . . .
shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so
requires.”
Digest:
FACTS
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc and GMA Network Inc., challenge the
validity of Sec. 92 of Resolution 2772 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of the
law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and broadcast companies the equal protection
of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
operation of media communication or information during the period of election.
ISSUE(S)
Whether Sec. 92 is constitutional
RULING
Yes, SEC. 92. COMELEC time.—The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as
“COMELEC Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area
of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting
and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge,
during the period of the campaign. (Sec. 46, 1978 EC)
All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave
frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are
frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by
Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that “any such franchise or right granted . . .
shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so
requires.”
Note: COMELEC is authorized to supervise or regulate by Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution, among other
things, is the use by media of information of their franchises or permits, while what Congress (not the
COMELEC) prohibits is the sale or donation of print space or airtime for political ads. In other words, the
object of supervision or regulation is different from the object of the prohibition. It is another fallacy for
petitioners to contend that the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. This may have
force if the object of the power were the same.
143 GMA Network, Inc., et al. v. COMELEC
GMA NETWORK, INC. et.al. petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. No. 205357. September 2, 2014.*
Ponente: J. Peralta
Synopsis:
Section 9(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution) limits the broadcast and radio advertisements
of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred
twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes respectively. The assailed rule on
“aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the
ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the
adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits — leveling the playing field — does not
constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of
candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of
government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a
prohibitive measure. In this particular instance, what the COMELEC has done is analogous to letting a
bird fly after one has clipped its wings.
Digest:
FACTS
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution) limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates
and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120)
minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation
on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well
as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the
forthcoming elections.
During the previous elections of May 14, 2007 and May 10, 2010, COMELEC issued Resolutions
implementing and interpreting Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006, regarding airtime limitations, to mean that a
candidate is entitled to the aforestated number of minutes “per station.”7 For the May 2013 elections,
however, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 dated January 15, 2013, changing the
interpretation of said candidates’ and political parties’ airtime limitation for political campaigns or
advertisements from a “per station” basis, to a “total aggregate” basis.
Thereafter, on February 1, 2013, respondent issued Resolution No. 9631 amending provisions of
Resolution No. 9615. Nevertheless, petitioners still found the provisions objectionable and oppressive.
ISSUE(S)
Whether Sec. 9 is unconstitutional
RULING
Yes, the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly
restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with
the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits — leveling the
playing field — does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial
restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies,
platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for
the imposition of such a prohibitive measure. In this particular instance, what the COMELEC has done is
analogous to letting a bird fly after one has clipped its wings.
It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on broadcast
time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There are also a lot
of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national
candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary
that he conveys his message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may
more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly
hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself — a form of suppression of his political speech.
144 1-Utak v. COMELEC
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

respondent.
G.R. No. 206020. April 14, 2015.
Ponente: J. Reyes
Topic: The Commission on Elections – Power of Supervision
Synopsis:
The COMELEC does not have the constitutional power to regulate public transport terminals owned by
private persons. The ownership of transport terminals, even if made available for use by the public
commuters, likewise remains private. Although owners of public transport terminals may be required by
local governments to obtain permits in order to operate, the permit only pertains to circumstances
affecting the operation of the transport terminal as such. The regulation of such permit to operate should
similarly be limited to circumstances affecting the operation of the transport terminal. A regulation of
public transport terminals based on extraneous circumstances, such as prohibiting the posting of election
campaign materials thereon, amounts to regulating the ownership of the transport terminal and not
merely the permit to operate the same.
Digest:
FACTS
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the rules
implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and
subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda,
pertinently provides:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda.—During the campaign period, it is unlawful:

xxxx
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside of authorized
common poster areas, in public places, or in private properties without the consent of the owner thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the following:
xxxx
5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles,
whether motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks,
piers, train stations, and the like.
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the public
utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the transportation service and/or terminal
liable for an election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by Section 18(n)
of these Rules.
Petitioner sought clarification from the COMELEC as regards the application of Resolution No. 9615,
particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis-à-vis privately-owned public
utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. The petitioner explained that the prohibition stated in the
aforementioned provisions impedes the right to free speech of the private owners of PUVs and transport
terminals. The petitioner then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the assailed
provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post election campaign materials
on their vehicles and transport terminals.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the prohibition is within the powers of the COMELEC to regulate and supervise
RULING
No, in the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory
powers to the COMELEC during an election period. As worded, Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution
only grants COMELEC supervisory and regulatory powers over the enjoyment or utilization “of all
franchises or permits for the operation,” inter alia, of transportation and other public utilities. The
COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated powers of supervision and regulation do not extend to the
ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals, but only to the franchise or permit to operate the
same.
The COMELEC does not have the constitutional power to regulate public transport terminals owned by
private persons. The ownership of transport terminals, even if made available for use by the public
commuters, likewise remains private. Although owners of public transport terminals may be required by
local governments to obtain permits in order to operate, the permit only pertains to circumstances
affecting the operation of the transport terminal as such. The regulation of such permit to operate should
similarly be limited to circumstances affecting the operation of the transport terminal. A regulation of
public transport terminals based on extraneous circumstances, such as prohibiting the posting of election
campaign materials thereon, amounts to regulating the ownership of the transport terminal and not
merely the permit to operate the same.
Accordingly, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within the constitutionally
delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the franchise or permit to operate of
transportation utilities. The posting of election campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or
on transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also an act of ownership — it has
nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal.
145 Maruhom v. COMELEC
JAMELA SALIC MARUHOM, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and MOHAMMADALI

“Mericano” A. ABINAL, respondents.
G.R. No. 179430. July 27, 2009.
Topic: Election Law – Misrepresentation
Synopsis:
COMELEC could not consider both registrations valid because it would then give rise to the anomalous
situation where Maruhom could vote in two precincts at the same time. This would be a dangerous
precedent that would open the floodgates to massive election cheating and fraud. This was precisely the
situation that the COMELEC intended to address when it issued its Minute Resolution No. 00-1513 on 25
July 2000, seven years prior to the 14 May 2007 elections in which Maruhom intended to run. To foster
honesty and credibility in the registration of voters, so as to avoid the padding of vote registration,
COMELEC laid down the rule in Minute Resolution No. 00-1513 that while the first registration of any
voter subsists, any subsequent registration thereto is void ab initio.
Digest:
FACTS
Maruhom and Abinal were mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Marantao, Lanao del Sur. Both
Maruhom and Abinal filed their respective sworn COCs for the said position with the COMELEC Election
Officer of Marantao. Abinal was then the incumbent Mayor of Marantao who was seeking re-election.
Abinal filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification and Deny Due Course to or Cancel
the COC under Sec. 78 of BP 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines,
against Maruhom. Abinal alleged that Maruhom was a double registrant, being a registered voter in
Precinct No. 0208A, Brgy. Panggao Saduc, Marawi City and Precinct No. 0040A, Brgy. Kialdan Proper,
Marantao. Maruhom registered as a voter in Marawi on July 26, 2003. Only 3 days thereafter, on on 29
July 2003, Maruhom registered again as a voter in Marantao, without canceling her Marawi registration.
There being double registration, Maruhom’s subsequent registration in Marantao was null and void ab
initio. And, not being a registered voter in Marantao, Maruhom was disqualified from running for
municipal mayor of said municipality. Abinal also averred that Maruhom made false material
representations in her registrations in Marawi and Marantao and her COC.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether Maruhom made false representations in her COC
2. Whether both registrations should be declared valid
RULING
1. Yes, under Section 78 of the OEC, a false representation of material fact in the COC is a ground for the
denial or cancellation of the COC. The false representation must pertain to a material fact that affects the
right of the candidate to run for the election for which he filed his COC. Such material fact refers to a
candidate’s eligibility or qualification for elective office like citizenship, residence or status as a registered
voter. Aside from the requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other
words, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s
qualifications for public office. COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts
was made in the COC.
If the candidate states a material representation in the COC that is false, the COMELEC is empowered to
deny due course to or cancel the COC. The person whose COC is denied due course or cancelled under
Section 78 of the OEC is not treated as a candidate at all, as if such person never filed a COC.
Evidence on record supports the following facts: Maruhom registered as a voter in Marawi on 26 July
2003; only three days after, on 29 July 2003, Maruhom again registered as a voter in Marantao, without
first canceling her registration in Marawi; and on 28 March 2007, Maruhom filed her COC declaring that
she was a registered voter in Marantao and eligible to run as a candidate for the position of mayor of said
municipality.
2. No, COMELEC could not consider both registrations valid because it would then give rise to the
anomalous situation where Maruhom could vote in two precincts at the same time. This would be a
dangerous precedent that would open the floodgates to massive election cheating and fraud. This was
precisely the situation that the COMELEC intended to address when it issued its Minute Resolution No.
00-1513 on 25 July 2000, seven years prior to the 14 May 2007 elections in which Maruhom intended to
run. To foster honesty and credibility in the registration of voters, so as to avoid the padding of vote
registration, COMELEC laid down the rule in Minute Resolution No. 00-1513 that while the first
registration of any voter subsists, any subsequent registration thereto is void ab initio.
146 Gunsi, Sr. v. COMELEC
ANTONIO B. GUNSI, SR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSIONERS, COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS and DATU ISRAEL SINSUAT, respondents.
G.R. No. 168792. February 23, 2009
Ponente: J. Nachura
Topic: Election Law – Registration of Voters
Synopsis:
A qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality
wherein he resides to be able to vote in any election. To register as a voter, he shall personally
accomplish an application form for registration as prescribed by the Commission in three (3) copies
before the Election Officer on any date during office hours after having acquired the qualifications of a
voter. The application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures of the applicant, clear
and legible rolled prints of his left and right thumbprints, with four identification size copies of his latest
photograph, attached thereto, to be taken at the expense of the Commission.”
Digest:
FACTS
Sinsuat filed a petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of the COC of Gunsi in connection
with the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections. Essentially, Sinusat sought the
disqualification of Gunsi for Mayor for South Upi, Maguindanao, alleging that: a) Gunsi was not a
registered voter in the Municipality of South Upi, Maguindanao since he failed to sign his application for
registration; (b) Gunsi’s name was inserted illegally in the List of Applicants and Voters by Alice Lim,
Acting Election Officer of South Upi, Maguindanao; and (c) the unsigned application for registration has
no legal effect.
Gunsi asseverated that his failure to sign his application for registration did not affect the validity of his
registration since he possesses the qualifications of a voter set forth in Section 116 of the Omnibus
Election Code as amended by Section 9 of Republic Act 8189.
ISSUE(S)
Whether Gunsi is a registered voter
RULING
No. Gunsi’s arguments are annihilated by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189, The Voter’s Registration
Act of 1996, which explicitly provides in pertinent part:
“SECTION 10. Registration of Voters.—A qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent list of

voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides to be able to vote in any election. To
register as a voter, he shall personally accomplish an application form for registration as
prescribed by the Commission in three (3) copies before the Election Officer on any date
during office hours after having acquired the qualifications of a voter.
xxxx
x x x The application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures of the applicant,
clear and legible rolled prints of his left and right thumbprints, with four identification size copies
of his latest photograph, attached thereto, to be taken at the expense of the Commission.”
Only a photocopy of Gunsi’s application for registration was submitted in evidence before Investigating
Officer Bedol as the original thereof was purportedly lost. The photocopy of the document clearly shows
that Gunsi failed to sign parts 2 and 3 thereof. The administering officer, Joel Ellano, likewise did not sign
part 3 of said document. These parts refer to the oath which Gunsi should have taken to validate and
swear to the veracity of the contents appearing in the application for registration.
147 Quinto v. COMELEC
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 189698. December 1, 2009.
Ponente: J. Nachura
Topic: Election Law – Requirements for Filing Certificate of Candidacy
Synopsis:
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be
complied with.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons
holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of
the law. The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position
to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The
measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by
eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations
rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of
civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the
performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
Digest:
FACTS
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436, entitled “AN ACT AUTHORIZING
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998
NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES,
PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.” Section 11 (par. 3) thereof reads:
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than one hundred
twenty (120) days before the elections: Provided, That, any elective official, whether
national or local, running for any office other than the one which he/she is holding in a
permanent capacity, except for president and vice president, shall be deemed resigned only
upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the position for which he/she is
running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall
take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period:
Almost a decade thereafter, Congress amended the law by enacting RA No. 9369, which amended Sec.
11 of R.A 8436, thus: (par.3)
“For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person
who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a
candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy:
Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and
officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of
the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of
Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local
Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
“SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—
a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government- owned or controlled corporations,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.—The certificate of candidacy shall be filed on regular
days, from November 20 to 30, 2009, during office hours, except on the last day, which shall be until
midnight.”
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs,
petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the
government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and
certiorari, seeking the declaration of the aforequoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and
void.
ISSUE(S)
Whether 3rd paragraph of Sec. 13 of RA 9369, Sec. 66 of the OEC and Sec. 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8678 is constitutional
RULING
Yes, in considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the
filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones,
the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction
between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass
the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid
classification be complied with.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of
persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the
purposes of the law. The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on
the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the
public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political
considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition
that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or
inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to
their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be
constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the
classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive
office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones.
The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The
measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in
Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
148 Luna v. COMELEC
JOY CHRISMA B. LUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TOMAS LAYAO,

SOLOMON LALUGAN III, NELIA LAZAGA, ANTHONY LAYAO, CIPRIANO LAPEZ, JR., VICTORIA
LAYAO, MODERNO LAPEZ, RODRIGO PARIÑAS, and EUGENIO CABER DONATO, respondents.
G.R. No. 165983. April 24, 2007.
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Election Law – Substitution of Candidates
Synopsis:
“Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another.—If after the last day for
the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies,
withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political
party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified.
The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy
for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of election day of
the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election
and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the
political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire
electorate of the country, with the Commission.”
Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC found that Luna complied with
all the procedural requirements for a valid substitution, Luna can validly substitute for Hans Roger.
Digest:
FACTS
Luna filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of vice-mayor of Lagayan, Abra as a substitute for
Hans Roger, who withdrew his certificate of candidacy on the same date. Blanco, Election Officer of
Lagayan, Abra removed the name of Hans Roger from the list of candidates and placed the name of
Luna. Private respondents filed a petition for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy or
disqualification of Luna. Private respondents alleged that Luna made a false material representation in
her certificate of candidacy because Luna is not a registered voter of Lagayan, Abra but a registered
voter of Bangued, Abra. Private respondents also claimed that Luna’s certificate of candidacy was not
validly filed because the substitution by Luna for Hans Roger was invalid. Private respondents alleged
that Hans Roger was only 20 years old on Election Day and, therefore, he was disqualified to run for vice-
mayor and cannot be substituted by Luna
The COMELEC First Division granted the petition and denied due course to the substitution of Luna for
Hans Roger. Luna then filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc. Luna added that
the 4 June 2004 Resolution was issued in violation of her right to due process because she was not given
the opportunity to present evidence on her behalf with the COMELEC First Division. The COMELEC En
Banc denied the motion for reconsideration and affirmed with modification the Resolution. The COMELEC
En Banc affirmed the finding that Hans Roger, being underage, may not be validly substituted by Luna.
The COMELEC En Banc also ruled that Luna’s right to due process was not violated because Luna was
notified of the petition and was given the opportunity to be heard. However, the COMELEC En Banc ruled
that Luna was a registered voter of Lagayan, Abra.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the substitution is valid
RULING
Yes, When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive
and acknowledge its receipt. Section 76 of the Omnibus Election Code (Election Code) provides:
“Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt.—The Commission, provincial election
supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of election inspectors
under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the
certificate of candidacy.”
In this case, when Hans Roger filed his certificate of candidacy on 5 January 2004, the COMELEC had the
ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy. Thus, the
COMELEC had the ministerial duty to give due course to Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy.
On 15 January 2004, Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy. The Election Code allows a person
who has filed a certificate of candidacy to withdraw the same prior to the election by submitting a written
declaration under oath. There is no provision of law which prevents a candidate from withdrawing his
certificate of candidacy before the election.
On the same date, Luna filed her certificate of candidacy as substitute for Hans Roger. Section 77 of the
Election Code prescribes the rules on substitution of an official candidate of a registered political party
who dies, withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of certificate of
candidacy. Section 77 of the Election Code provides:
“Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another.—If after the last day for
for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of election day of
and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the
political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire
electorate of the country, with the Commission.”
Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC found that Luna complied with
all the procedural requirements for a valid substitution, Luna can validly substitute for Hans Roger.
149 Cerafica v. COMELEC
OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. No. 205136. December 2, 2014.*
Ponente: J. Perez
Topic: Election Law – Substitution of Candidates
Synopsis:
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another.—If after the last day for
for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of Election Day of
and mid-day of Election Day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the
political subdivision where he is candidate or, in case of candidates to be voted for by the entire
electorate of the country, with the Commission.
Under the express provision of Sec. 77 of B.P. Blg. 881, not just any person, but only “an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party” may be substituted. In the case at bar, Kimberly
was an official nominee of the Liberal Party; thus, she can be validly substituted.
Digest:
FACTS
Kimberly filed her COC for Councilor, City of Taguig for the 2013 Elections. Her COC stated that she was
born on October 29, 1992, or that she will be 20 on the days of the elections, in contravention of the
requirement that one must be at least 23 yrs. of age on the days of the elections as set in RA 8487.
Kimberly was summoned to a clarificatory hearing due to the age qualification. Instead of attending the
hearing she filed a sworn Statement of Withdrawal of COC. Simultaneously, Olivia filed her own COC as a
substitute of Kimberly. Owing to these events, the clarificatory hearing no longer pushed through.
Director Amora-Ladra of the COMELEC Law Department recommended the cancellation of Kimberly’s
COC, and consequently, the denial of the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia. She opined that it is as if no
COC was filed by Kimberly; thus, she cannot be substituted. In a Special En Banc Meeting of the
COMELEC, the COMELEC adopted the recommendation of Director Amora-Ladra.
ISSUE(S)
Whether Kimberly can be validly substituted
RULING
Yes. Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another.—If after the last
day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political
party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the
same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or
was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his
certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than
mid-day of Election Day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between
the day before the election and mid-day of Election Day, said certificate may be filed with any board of
election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is candidate or, in case of candidates to be voted
for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.
Under the express provision of Sec. 77 of B.P. Blg. 881, not just any person, but only “an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party” may be substituted. In the case at bar, Kimberly
was an official nominee of the Liberal Party; thus, she can be validly substituted.
150 Jalover v. Osmena and COMELEC
G.R. No. 209286. September 23, 2014.*

LINA DELA PEÑA JALOVER, GEORGIE A. HUISO and VELVET BARQUIN ZAMORA,
petitioners,vs. JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC),
respondents.
Ponente: J. Brion
Topic: Election Law – Residency Requirements
Synopsis:
As the COMELEC aptly found, Osmeña had sufficiently established by substantial evidence his residence
in Toledo City, Cebu. As early as April 24, 2006, Osmeña applied for the transfer of his voter’s registration
record to Toledo City, which was granted on April 24, 2012. Osmeña likewise purchased a parcel of land
in Ibo, Toledo City in 1995 and commenced the construction of an improvement, which would eventually
serve as his residence since 2004. Osmeña even acquired another parcel of land in Das, Toledo City in
December 2011 and transferred his headquarters to Poblacion and Bato, Toledo City as early as 2011.
The existence of Osmeña’s headquarters in Bato, Toledo City, was even confirmed by the Mr. Orlando
Pama Casia, witness for the petitioners. Finally, Osmeña has always maintained profound political and
socio-civic linkages in Toledo City — a fact that the petitioners never disputed. The law does not require a
person to be in his home 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement.
Digest:
FACTS
Osmeña filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor, Toledo City, Cebu. In his COC,
Osmeña indicated that he had been a resident of Toledo City for fifteen (15) years prior to the May 2013
elections. Before running for the mayoralty position, Osmeña also served as the representative of the 3rd
Congressional District of the Province of Cebu from 1995-1998, which incidentally includes the City of
Toledo.
Soon thereafter, petitioners filed before the COMELEC a “Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification.”
The petitioners alleged before the COMELEC that Osmeña made material misrepresentations of fact in the
latter’s COC and likewise failed to comply with the residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local
Government Code. In particular, the petitioners claimed that Osmeña falsely declared under oath in his
COC that he had already been a resident of Toledo City fifteen (15) years prior to the scheduled May 13,
2013 local elections.
The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition on the ground that Osmeña did not commit any
material misrepresentation in his COC. The petitioners timely moved for a reconsideration of the April 3,
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC. Before the COMELEC resolved the motion, however, the Board of
Canvassers of Toledo City proclaimed Osmeña as the winning candidate for the mayoralty seat. The
COMELEC En Banc subsequently denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE(S)
Whether Osmeña should be disqualified
RULING
No. As the COMELEC aptly found, Osmeña had sufficiently established by substantial evidence his
residence in Toledo City, Cebu. As early as April 24, 2006, Osmeña applied for the transfer of his voter’s
registration record to Toledo City, which was granted on April 24, 2012. Osmeña likewise purchased a
parcel of land in Ibo, Toledo City in 1995 and commenced the construction of an improvement, which
would eventually serve as his residence since 2004. Osmeña even acquired another parcel of land in Das,
Toledo City in December 2011 and transferred his headquarters to Poblacion and Bato, Toledo City as
early as 2011. The existence of Osmeña’s headquarters in Bato, Toledo City, was even
confirmed by the Mr. Orlando Pama Casia, witness for the petitioners. Finally, Osmeña has
always maintained profound political and socio-civic linkages in Toledo City — a fact that the petitioners
never disputed. The law does not require a person to be in his home 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to
fulfill the residency requirement.
151 Timbol v. COMELEC
JOSEPH B. TIMBOL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. No. 206004. February 24, 2015.
Ponente: J. Leonen
Topic: Election Law – Disqualification of Nuisance Candidates
Synopsis:
Respondent declared petitioner a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to explain his bona fide
intention to run for office. Respondent had already issued Resolution No. 9610 on January 11, 2013 when
petitioner appeared before Election Officer Valencia in a clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2013. This
was an ineffective opportunity to be heard.
That petitioner was able to file a Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates did not cure the
defect in the issuance of Resolution No. 9610. First, he would not have to file the Petition had he been
given an opportunity to be heard in the first place.
While the case was deemed moot and academic, the SC nevertheless set forth such controlling and
authoritative doctrines to be observed by the COMELEC in motu proprio denying due course to or
cancelling certificates of candidacy of alleged nuisance candidates. This motu proprio authority is always
subject to the alleged nuisance candidate’s opportunity to be heard — an essential element of procedural
due process.
Digest:
FACTS
Timbol filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
Second District of Caloocan City. On January 15, 2013, he received a Subpoena7 from COMELEC Election
Officer Dinah A. Valencia, ordering him to appear before her office on January 17, 2013 for a clarificatory
hearing in connection with his COC. Timbol, together with his counsel, appeared before Election Officer
Valencia. During the clarificatory hearing, Timbol argued that he was not a nuisance candidate. He
pointed out before the clarificatory hearing panel that his name already appeared in the list of nuisance
candidates posted in the COMELEC website pursuant to Resolution No. 9610 dated January 11, 2013. The
clarificatory hearing panel allegedly assured him that his name would be deleted from the list and that his
Certificate of Candidacy would be given due course.
Despite Election Officer Valencia’s favorable recommendation, Timbol’s name was not removed from the
list of nuisance candidates posted in the COMELEC’s website. With the printing of ballots for the
automated elections, , Timbol filed on February 2, 2013 a Petition13 praying that his name be included in
the certified list of candidates for the May 13, 2013 elections. In a Minute Resolution COMELEC denied
the Petition for being moot, considering that the printing of ballots has already begun.
ISSUE(S)
Whether COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying Timbol’s Petition for Inclusion in the certified
list of candidates
RULING
Yes. Respondent declared petitioner a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to explain his
bona fide intention to run for office. Respondent had already issued Resolution No. 9610 on January 11,
2013 when petitioner appeared before Election Officer Valencia in a clarificatory hearing on January 17,
2013. This was an ineffective opportunity to be heard.
That petitioner was able to file a Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates did not cure the
defect in the issuance of Resolution No. 9610. First, he would not have to file the Petition had he been
given an opportunity to be heard in the first place. Second, in the Minute Resolution dated February 5,
2013, respondent denied petitioner’s Petition on the sole ground that the printing of ballots had already
begun on February 4, 2013.
Nevertheless, “insurmountable and tremendous operational constraints and costs implications” of

reprinting ballots had respondent ordered the inclusion of petitioner’s name in the certified list of
candidates. The ballots already printed would have to be recalled, leading to the waste of the ballots
previously printed. It should be noted that these ballots are special as they have the capability of being
optically scanned by Precinct Count Optical Scan machines. Reprinting another batch of ballots would,
indeed, be costly.
Still, “automation is not the end-all and be-all of an electoral process.”49 Respondent should also balance
its duty “to ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly, and peaceful”50 with the right of a
candidate to explain his or her bona fide intention to run for public office before he or she is declared a
nuisance candidate.
Note: The case was dismissed for being moot and academic. We may no longer act on petitioner’s
prayer that his name be included in the certified list of candidates and be printed on the ballots as a
candidate for Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Petitioner filed with this court his Petition for
Certiorari on March 15, 2013, 39 days after respondent began printing the ballots on February 4, 2013.
Also, the May 13, 2013 elections had been concluded, with the winners already proclaimed.
That this case is moot and academic, however, does not preclude us from setting forth “controlling and
authoritative doctrines” to be observed by respondent in motu proprio denying due course to or
cancelling certificates of candidacy of alleged nuisance candidates. This motu proprio authority is always
subject to the alleged nuisance candidate’s opportunity to be heard — an essential element of procedural
due process.
152 Penera v. COMELEC
ROSALINDA A. PENERA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T.

ANDANAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 181613. November 25, 2009.
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Election Law – Campaign Rules
Synopsis:
A candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before.
The law is clear as daylight—any election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any
election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable
for premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, the assailed
Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law. The Decision rationalizes that a candidate
who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified or prosecuted only after the start of the
campaign period. This is not what the law says. What the law says is “any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.” The plain meaning
of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate
is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political
acts are lawful.
Digest:
FACTS
Panera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar (Andanar) were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica
during the 14 May 2007 elections. Upon the petition of Andanar before the Office of the Regional Election
Director (ORED), Caraga Region (Region XIII) Panera was disqualified from running for the office of
Mayor in Sta. Monica Surigao del Norte, for the reason that she participated in a motorcade before the
campaign period started and was thus charged with premature election campaigning.
ISSUE(S)
Whether Panera is guilty of premature campaigning
RULING
No, a line in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, provides that “any unlawful act or
omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.”
In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done
during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight—any election offense that may be
committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign
period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the start
of the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law. The
Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified or
prosecuted only after the start of the campaign period. This is not what the law says. What the law says
is “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period.” The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political
acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the
campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that partisan political acts done by a candidate
before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign
period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign
period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. This is clearly
not the language of the law. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal
act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.
Congress has laid down the law—a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the
campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that “any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate
at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.” Neither can this Court
turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that “any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.”
153 Poe v. Macapagal-Arroyo

RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., protestant, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, protestee.
P.E.T. Case No. 002. March 29, 2005.*
Topic: Election Law – Substitution of Protester
Synopsis:
Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the
second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President,
as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within
thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. By this
express enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined the real parties in interest concerning an
on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner had not been truly voted
upon by the electorate, the candidate who received that 2nd or the 3rd highest number of votes would
be the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.
Digest:
FACTS
As movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ claims that because of the untimely demise of her husband and in
representation not only of her deceased husband but more so because of the paramount interest of the
Filipino people, there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late husband in the
election protest initiated by him to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the 2004
elections. In support of her assertion, she cites De Castro v. Commission on Elections, and Lomugdang v.
Javier, to the effect that the death of the protestant does not constitute a ground for the dismissal of the
contest nor oust the trial court of the jurisdiction to decide the election contest. She stresses nevertheless
that even if the instant protest case succeeds, she is cognizant that as a mere substitute she cannot
succeed, assume or be entitled to said elective office, and her utmost concern is not personal but one
that involves the public interest.
In her Comment, the Protestee, Mrs. GMA, relying on Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias and subsequent cases
including analogous cases decided by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), asserts
that the widow of a deceased candidate is not the proper party to replace the deceased protestant since
a public office is personal and not a property that passes on to the heirs. She points out that the widow
has no legal right to substitute for her husband in an election protest, since no such right survives the
husband, considering that the right to file an election protest is personal and non-transmissible.
Protestee also contends Mrs. FPJ cannot substitute for her deceased husband because under the Rules of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the registered candidates who obtained the 2nd and 3rd highest
votes for the presidency may contest the election of the president and patently, Mrs. FPJ did not receive
the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for she was not even a candidate for the presidency in the election that is
being contested.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the protestant’s widow could intervene and/or substitute for the deceased party
RULING
No, Rule 14. Election Protest.—Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the
Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the
President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. By this
express enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined the real parties in interest concerning an
on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner had not been truly voted
upon by the electorate, the candidate who received that 2nd or the 3rd highest number of votes would
be the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.
Note: Two aspects

1. It is in pursuit of one’s right to public office.
2. It is imbued with public interest.
154 Santiago v. Ramos
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, protestant, vs. FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS, protestee.

P.E.T. Case No. 001. February 13, 1996.*
Ponente: J. Melo
Topic: Election Law – Abandonment of Election Protests
Synopsis:
The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three of which
coincides with the last three years of the term of the President elected in the 11 May 1992 synchronized
elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiago’s term if she would succeed in proving in the instant
protest that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, the
Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the very least, in the language of
Moraleja, abandoned her “determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter
of who is the real choice of the electorate.” Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot
the instant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would
dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the
all—too crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.
Digest:
FACTS
In her motion of 16 August 1995, reiterated in her Comment of 29 August 1995, Protestant Miriam
Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision of ballots in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be
dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed completed. The Supreme Court
deferred action on that motion and required the Protestant and the Protestee to submit their respective
memoranda on the issue of whether the issue of the protest to the presidential election results had been
rendered moot by the election of the Protestant as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her
assumption of office as such on 30 June 1995.
The Protestant answers this issue in the negative, asserting that an election contest involves not only an
adjudication and settlement of the private interests of the rival candidates, but more importantly, the
paramount need to dispel, once and for all, the uncertainty that beclouds the true choice of the
electorate. Hence, it is imbued with, public interest and should be pursued to its final conclusion to
determine the bona fide winner. She further asserts that an election case may be rendered moot only if
the term of the contested office has expired, thus her election as Senator and assumption of office as
such cannot be construed as an abandonment of the instant protest.
ISSUE(S)
Whether Sen. Santiago deemed abandoned her election protest
RULING
Yes. The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three of
which coincides with the last three years of the term of the President elected in the 11 May 1992
synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiago’s term if she would succeed in proving in
the instant protest that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In assuming the office of Senator
then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the very least, in the
language of Moraleja, abandoned her “determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in
the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.” Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to
render moot the instant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it
would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election, thereby
enhancing the all—too crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.
In assuming the office of Senator, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn
her protest, or at the very least, abandoned her, “determination to protect and pursue the
public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate,” such
abandonment or withdrawal operating to render moot the protest.
155 Legarda v. De Castro
P.E.T. Case No. 003. January 18, 2008.

LOREN B. LEGARDA, protestant, vs. NOLI L. DE CASTRO, protestee.
Synopsis:
The protestant, in assuming the office of Senator and discharging her duties as such, has effectively
abandoned or withdrawn her protest, or abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the public
interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.—We are also in agreement that
the protestant, in assuming the office of Senator and discharging her duties as such, which fact we can
take judicial notice of, has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest, or abandoned her
determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of
the electorate.
Digest:
FACTS
On June 23, 2004, Congress sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) proclaimed protestee Noli
L. de Castro the duly elected Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines. The official count of the
votes cast for Vice-President in the May 10, 2004 elections showed that the protestee obtained the
highest number of votes, garnering 15,100,431 votes as against the 14,218,709 votes garnered by the
protestant Loren B. Legarda, who placed second, in a field consisting of four candidates for Vice-
President. Legarda filed an election protest praying for the annulment of the protestees proclamation as
the duly elected Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines. In the interim however, protestant was
elected as a Philippine senator.
ISSUE(S)
Whether Sen. Legarda deemed abandoned her election protest
RULING
Yes. The protestant, in assuming the office of Senator and discharging her duties as such, has effectively
abandoned or withdrawn her protest, or abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the public
interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.—We are also in agreement that
the protestant, in assuming the office of Senator and discharging her duties as such, which fact we can
take judicial notice of, has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest, or abandoned her
determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of
the electorate.
156 Roxas v. Binay
MANUEL A. ROXAS, protestant, vs. JEJOMAR C. BINAY protestee.

P.E.T. No. 004. August 16, 2016.
Synopsis:
The term of the Office of Vice President being contested by the parties had expired at noon of June 30,
2016, thus, the protest and counter-protest that are the subject matter of this case have become moot
and academic.—The term of the office of Vice President being contested by the parties had expired at
noon of June 30, 2016. Vice President Robredo has assumed the office thereby contested. Clearly, the
protest and the counter-protest that are the subject matter of this case have become moot and
academic. As such, the Tribunal is constrained to dismiss the protest and the counter-protest. It is settled
rule that the Tribunal should not anymore proceed in this case because any decision that may be
rendered hereon will have no practical or useful purpose, and cannot be enforced. Proceeding in this case
until its resolution will then be an exercise in futility considering that there is no longer any practical
reason why the Tribunal should still determine who had won as Vice President in the and Local Elections
if the term of such office had already expired.
Digest:
FACTS
On June 9, 2010, the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed Jejomar Binay as the Vice President duly
elected during the May 10, 2010 elections. Roxas initiated an election protest on July 9, 2010. However,
in the interim, the term of office of Vice President being contested had expired at noon of June 30, 2016,
upon the taking of the oath by Vice President Robredo.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the electoral protest has been rendered moot and academic
RULING
Yes. The term of the Office of Vice President being contested by the parties had expired at noon of June
30, 2016, thus, the protest and counter-protest that are the subject matter of this case have become
moot and academic.—The term of the office of Vice President being contested by the parties had expired
at noon of June 30, 2016. Vice President Robredo has assumed the office thereby contested. Clearly, the
protest and the counter-protest that are the subject matter of this case have become moot and
academic. As such, the Tribunal is constrained to dismiss the protest and the counter-protest. It is settled
rule that the Tribunal should not anymore proceed in this case because any decision that may be
rendered hereon will have no practical or useful purpose, and cannot be enforced. Proceeding in this case
until its resolution will then be an exercise in futility considering that there is no longer any practical
reason why the Tribunal should still determine who had won as Vice President in the and Local Elections
if the term of such office had already expired.
157 Vinzons-Chato v. HRET/Panotes v. HRET

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner, vs.HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and ELMER E. PANOTES, respondents.
G.R. No. 199149. January 22, 2013.
Topic: Election Law – Revision of Ballots
Synopsis:
The Constitution mandates that the HRET “shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications” of its members. By employing the word “sole,” the Constitution is emphatic
that the jurisdiction of the HRET in the adjudication of election contests involving its members is intended
to be its own—full, complete and unimpaired. The Tribunal, thus, unequivocally asserted its exclusive
control in Rule 7 of the 2011 HRET Rules, as follows:
Rule 7. Exclusive Control of Functions.—The Tribunal shall have exclusive control, direction, and
supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and operation.
There can be no challenge, therefore, to such exclusive control absent any clear showing, as in this case,
of arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power that constitutes a denial of due process of
law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse
of discretion that there has to be a remedy therefor.
Digest:
FACTS
Chato renewed her bid in the May 2010 elections as Representative of the Second Legislative District of
Camarines Norte. She lost to Panotes who was proclaimed the winner. Chato filed and electoral protest
before the HRET, assailing the results in all 160 clustered precincts in 4 municipalities. Panotes lost no
time in moving for suspension of the proceedings in the case and praying that a preliminary hearing be
set in order to determine first the intergrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes used in the elections. He
further urged that, should it be shown during such hearing that the ballots and ballot bozes were not
preserved, the HRET should direct the printing of the picture images of the ballots of the questioned
precincts store in the data storage for said precincts. The motion was prompted by certain irregularities in
the condition of the ballot boxes subject of the revision.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the continuation of the revision of the
ballots
RULING
No, The Constitution mandates that the HRET “shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications” of its members. By employing the word “sole,” the Constitution is
emphatic that the jurisdiction of the HRET in the adjudication of election contests involving its members
is intended to be its own—full, complete and unimpaired. The Tribunal, thus, unequivocally asserted its
exclusive control in Rule 7 of the 2011 HRET Rules, as follows:
Rule 7. Exclusive Control of Functions.—The Tribunal shall have exclusive control, direction, and
supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and operation.
There can be no challenge, therefore, to such exclusive control absent any clear showing, as in this case,
of arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power that constitutes a denial of due process of
law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse
of discretion that there has to be a remedy therefor.
158 Mayor Emmanuel Maliksi v. COMELEC
MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HOMER T.

SAQUILAYAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 203302. April 11, 2013.
Topic: Election Law – Due Process
Synopsis:
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commission on Elections, the
power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its cases should still
be exercised only after giving to all the parties the opportunity to be heard on their opposing claims. The
parties’ right to be heard upon adversarial issues and matters is never to be waived or sacrificed, or to be
treated so lightly because of the possibility of the substantial prejudice to be thereby caused to the
parties, or to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc should not have upheld the First Division’s
deviation from the regular procedure in the guise of speedily resolving the election protest, in view of its
failure to provide the parties with notice of its proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, the most
basic requirements of due process.
Digest:
FACTS
During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for the
position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of
votes, brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite alleging that there
were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a
revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor
of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office.
Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution
pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor.
The COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount the ballots through
the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. The First Division issued a resolution
nullifying the RTC’s decision and declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor. Maliksi filed a motion for
reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to due process because he had not been
notified of the decryption proceedings. The COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny the Motion for
Reconsideration.
ISSUE(S)
Whether petitioner was afforded due process
RULING
No, it bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have conducted the assailed recount
proceedings because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which no existing rule of
procedure allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance. The recount proceedings authorized under
Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended, are to be conducted by the COMELEC
Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests involving
elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial and city officials.
The First Division arbitrarily arrogated unto itself the conduct of the recount proceedings, contrary to the
regular procedure of remanding the protest to the RTC and directing the reconstitution of the Revision
Committee for the decryption and printing of the picture images and the revision of the ballots on the
basis thereof. Quite unexpectedly, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the First Division’s unwarranted
deviation from the standard procedures by invoking the COMELEC’s power to “take such measures as
[the Presiding Commissioner] may deem proper,” and even citing the Court’s minute resolution in Alliance
of Barangay Concerns (ABC) Party-List v. Commission on Elections to the effect that the “COMELEC has
the power to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its cases. The Court will not
interfere with its exercise of this prerogative so long as the parties are amply heard on their opposing
claims.”
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commission on Elections, the
power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its cases should still
be exercised only after giving to all the parties the opportunity to be heard on their opposing claims. The
parties’ right to be heard upon adversarial issues and matters is never to be waived or sacrificed, or to be
treated so lightly because of the possibility of the substantial prejudice to be thereby caused to the
parties, or to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc should not have upheld the First Division’s
deviation from the regular procedure in the guise of speedily resolving the election protest, in view of its
failure to provide the parties with notice of its proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, the most
basic requirements of due process.
159 Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC
DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and AGAPITO J.

CARDINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 193237. October 9, 2012.
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Election Law – Qualifications for Candidacy
Synopsis:
The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by final
judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not
eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a
candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of
candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest
number of votes for the position of Mayor.
Digest:
FACTS
Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May
2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term. Cardino filed a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino
asserted that Jalosjos made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when he
declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor. Cardino claimed that long before
Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already been convicted by final judgment for
robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC) of Cebu City.
Cardino asserted that Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated
that he had already been granted probation. Cardino countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos’ probation
in an Order dated 19 March 1987. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an Order
dated 5 February 2004 declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation. Jalosjos
further stated that during the 2004 elections the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification filed
against him on the same grounds.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the COC of Jalosjos is valid
RULING
No. The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by final
judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not
eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a
candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of
candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest
number of votes for the position of Mayor.
Note: Penalty of perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory
penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as
distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence.
160 Maquiling v. COMELEC
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL

ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, respondents.
G.R. No. 195649. April 16, 2013.
Ponente: CJ. Sereno

Topic: Election Law – Allegiance Requirement
Synopsis:
Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport effectively negated his “Affidavit of Renunciation.” This
does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact
did. It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively
disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and
political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain
allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the
right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their
foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided
allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
Digest:
FACTS
Arnado (mayoralty candidate) is a natural born Filipino Citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the US, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnaldo applied for
repatriation under RA 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco and took the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008. On the same day an Order of
Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009 Arnado
again took his Oath to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
Balua another mayoralty candidate filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his COC for
municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the May 2010 election. Balua contended that Arnado
is not a resident of Kauswagan and that he is a foreigner.
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for cancellation of a COC based on misrepresentation, the
COMELEC 1st Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s contention that Arnado is a
resident of the US was dismissed upon finding that “Balua failed to present any evidence to support his
contention,” whereas the 1st Division still could not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the 1-year
residency requirement under the LGC. In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the 1st Division
disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen. Meanwhile Maquiling another candidate for
mayor, intervene in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration
together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. He stated that the 1st
Division did not erred in disqualifying Arnado. COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the
1st Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE(S)
Whether Arnado should be disqualified
RULING
Yes, This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure. Once any of the
required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x.
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at
the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of
renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
The Supreme Court agrees with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that “Arnado’s act of
consistently using his US passport effectively negated his “Affidavit of Renunciation.” This does not mean,
that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did. It was after
complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively disqualified him from
running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and
political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain
allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the
right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their
foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided
allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
Note: Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when there has not yet been
any proclamation of the winner.
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.―Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong.
161 Federico v. COMELEC
RENATO M. FEDERICO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMELEC EXECUTIVE

DIRECTOR and OSMUNDO M. MALIGAYA, respondents
G.R. No. 199612. January 22, 2013.
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Topic: Election Law – Substitution
Synopsis:
The substitute for a candidate who died or suffered permanent incapacity or disqualified by final
judgment, may file his certificate of candidacy up to mid-day of election day. If the death or permanent
disability should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, the substitute
candidate may file the certificate with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where
he is a candidate, or in the case of a candidate for President, Vice-President or Senator, with the Law
Department of the Commission on Elections in Manila. No person who has withdrawn his candidacy for a
position shall be eligible as substitute candidate for any other position after the deadline for filing of
certificates of candidacy.
Digest:
FACTS
Edna Sanchez and Maligaya were candidates for Mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas in the May 2010
elections. Amando Sanchez, husband of Edna and Governatorial candidate died. 2 days later Edna
withdrew her COC for the position of mayor. She then filed a new COC and the corresponding Certificate
of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) for the position of governor as substitute candidate for her
deceased husband.
Frederico file with the Office of the Election Officer of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, his COC and CONA as the
officical candidate of the Nationalista Party and as substitute for Edna. Maligaya filed his Petition to deny
due course and cancel COC of Federico before the COMELEC. Maligaya sought to have Federico declared
ineligible to run as substitute for Edna because the periof to file the COC had already lapsed.
In Resolution No. 8889, the COMELEC En Banc gave due course to the COC of Edna as substitute
gubernatorial candidate in the Batangas province and to that of Federico as substitute mayoralty
candidate in Sto. Tomas.By that time, however, the official ballots had already been printed. Expectedly,
on May 10, 2010, the day of elections, the name “SANCHEZ, Edna P.” was retained in the list of
candidates for Mayor of Sto. Tomas, and garnered the highest number of votes. The Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBOC) printed the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidates
(COCVP) showing “SANCHEZ Edna P.” as the winning mayoralty candidate. This action of MBOC
prompted Maligaya to file his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Edna Sanchez. This petition was, however,
later withdrawn, as agreed upon by the parties, and the case was dismissed by the COMELEC First
Division.
On June 1, 2010, upon learning of the proclamation of Federico as the winning mayoralty candidate by
the MBOC, Maligaya filed his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Respondent Renato M. Federico as mayor
of Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
ISSUE(S)
RULING
No, Regarding the May 10, 2010 automated elections, the COMELEC came out with Resolution No. 8678.
On substitution, Section 13 thereof provides:
SEC. 13. Substitution of Candidates, in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another.—If after

the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered political party
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, he may be substituted by a candidate belonging to, and
nominated by, the same political party. No substitute shall be allowed for any independent candidate.
The substitute for a candidate who withdrew may file his certificate of candidacy as herein
provided for the office affected not later than December 14, 2009.
The substitute for a candidate who died or suffered permanent incapacity or disqualified by final
judgment, may file his certificate of candidacy up to mid-day of election day. If the death or permanent
disability should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, the substitute
candidate may file the certificate with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where
he is a candidate, or in the case of a candidate for President, Vice-President or Senator, with the Law
Department of the Commission on Elections in Manila.
No person who has withdrawn his candidacy for a position shall be eligible as substitute candidate for any
other position after the deadline for filing of certificates of candidacy.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, it is clear from the foregoing that different deadlines were set to
govern the specific circumstances that would necessitate the substitution of a candidate due to death,
disqualification or withdrawal. In case of death or disqualification, the substitute had until midday of the
election day to file the COC. In case of withdrawal, which is the situation at bench, the substitute should
have filed a COC by December 14, 2009.
The reason for the distinction can easily be divined. Unlike death or disqualification, withdrawal is
voluntary. Generally, a candidate has sufficient time to ponder on his candidacy and to withdraw while
the printing has not yet started. If a candidate withdraws after the printing, the name of the substitute
candidate can no longer be accommodated in the ballot and a vote for the substitute will just be wasted.
When Batangas Governor Armando Sanchez died on April 27, 2010, Edna withdrew her candidacy as
mayor and substituted her late husband as gubernatorial candidate for the province on April 29, 2010.
The party actually had the option to substitute another candidate for Governor aside from Edna. By
fielding Edna as their substitute candidate for Governor, the party knew that she had to withdraw her
candidacy for Mayor. Considering that the deadline for substitution in case of withdrawal had already
lapsed, no person could substitute her as mayoralty candidate. The sudden death of then Governor
Armando Sanchez and the substitution by his widow in the gubernatorial race could not justify a belated
substitution in the mayoralty race.
162 Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

G.R. No. 205033. June 18, 2013.*
Topic: Election Laws – Effect of Disqualification
Synopsis:
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for
public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the
COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the
convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction.
The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other
government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.
Digest:
FACTS
On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision convicting petitioner by final judgment of two
(2) counts of statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness. Consequently, he was sentenced
to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal for each count,
respectively, which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article
41 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued an order commuting his
prison term to sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and three (3) days (Order of Commutation). After
serving the same, he was issued a Certificate of Discharge From Prison on March 18, 2009.
Petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because of his previous conviction,
his application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the Election Registration Board (ERB),
prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters (Petition for Inclusion)
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City, Branch 1 (MTCC). Pending resolution of the
same, he filed a CoC seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections. ). In
his CoC, petitioner stated, inter alia, that he is eligible for the said office and that he is a registered voter
of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City. The MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his
perpetual absolute disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election.
Meanwhile, five (5) petitions were lodged before the COMELEC’s First and Second Divisions (COMELEC
Divisions), praying for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner’s CoC. Pending
resolution, the COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 on January 15, 2013,
resolving “to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos as
Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections” due to his perpetual absolute
disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration requirement.
ISSUE(S)
Whether COMELEC can cancel motu proprio a candidate’s COC absence any petition initiating a quasi-
judicial proceeding
RULING
Yes, The foregoing matter is not without established precedent. In Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino, the Court
held that the COMELEC’s denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC in view of a candidate’s
disqualification to run for elective office based on a final conviction is subsumed under its mandate to
enforce and administer all laws relating to the conduct of elections. Accordingly, in such a situation, it is
the COMELEC’s duty to cancel motu proprio the candidate’s CoC, notwithstanding the absence of any
petition initiating a quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution of the same. Thus, the Court stated:
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final
judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for
public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part
of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive
branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification, it
is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is
addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to “[e]nforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.” The disqualification of a
convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment
of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of “all laws” relating to
the conduct of elections.
To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of one
suffering from perpetual special disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases so grotesquely
exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was elected and served twice as
mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to “enforce and
administer all laws” relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from
running for public office those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a
final judgment.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its
quasi-judicial functions when it issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any
pending petition or resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions. Rather, it merely
performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling petitioner’s CoC on
the basis of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been
established by his final conviction. In this regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its
administrative functions, dispensing with the need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling
under Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial
proceedings.
Lest it be misunderstood, while the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of one’s CoC generally
necessitates the exercise of the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions commenced through a petition based
on either Sections 12 or 78 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC, when the grounds therefor are
rendered conclusive on account of final and executory judgments — as when a candidate’s
disqualification to run for public office is based on a final conviction — such exercise falls
within the COMELEC’s administrative functions, as in this case.
163 Aratea v. COMELEC
EFREN RACEL ARATEA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D.

ANTIPOLO, respondents.
G.R. No. 195229. October 9, 2012.*
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Election Law – Disqualification
Synopsis:
The disqualification of Lonzanida is not simply anchored on one ground. On the contrary, it was
emphasized in our En Banc resolution that Lonzanida’s disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated
the constitutional fiat on the three-term limit; and second, as early as December 1, 2009, he is known to
have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code. In other words, on election day, respondent Lonzanida’s disqualification is
notoriously known in fact and in law. Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for the
position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes.
Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post
and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales.
Digest:
FACTS
Lonzanida and Antipolo were were candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010
National and Local Elections. Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. On 8
December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on
the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4)
consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that
Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified
under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought election.
The COMELEC 2nd Division cancelled Lonzanida’s COC. Lonzanida’s Motion for Reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea
(Aratea) garnered the highest number of votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor and on the same day, Aratea wrote the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) and requested for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was
legally required to assume the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanida’s disqualification. DILG Legal
Opinion No. 117, S. 2010 stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal
conviction. As a consequence of Lonzanida’s disqualification, the Office of the Mayor was deemed
permanently vacant. Thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without
prejudice to the COMELEC’s resolution of Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration. In another letter dated
6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to take the oath of office as Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales. In his response dated 24 August 2010, then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed
Aratea to take an oath of office as “the permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without
prejudice however to the outcome of the cases pending before the [COMELEC].”
On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying Lonzanida from running for
Mayor in the May 2010 elections.
ISSUE(S)
Whether Antipolo should be declared the mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
RULING
Yes, Antipolo, the alleged “second placer,” should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate of
candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida
were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of
votes for the position of Mayor.
The disqualification of Lonzanida is not simply anchored on one ground. On the contrary, it was
emphasized in our En Banc resolution that Lonzanida’s disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated
the constitutional fiat on the three-term limit; and second, as early as December 1, 2009, he is known to
have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code. In other words, on election day, respondent Lonzanida’s disqualification is
notoriously known in fact and in law. Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for the
position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes.
Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post
and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales.
Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for
Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial
because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his
certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May
2010 elections—Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.
164 Talaga v. COMELEC
MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

RODERICK A. ALCALA, respondents.
G.R. No. 196804. October 9, 2012.
Topic: Election Law – Eligibility for Substitution
Synopsis:
No, the law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot
be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. The Court emphasized that the candidate
obtaining the second highest number of votes for the contested office could not assume the office
despite the disqualification of the first placer because the second placer was “not the choice of the
sovereign will.”
The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning candidate is
when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
disqualified; and (b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s disqualification
as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the
votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. The exception did not apply in favor of Castillo simply because
the second element was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not the least aware of the fact of
Barbara Ruby’s illegibility as the substitute.
Digest:
FACTS
On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009, Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo (Castillo)
respectively filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City to be
contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010 national and local elections. Ramon, the official candidate of the
Lakas-Kampi-CMD, declared in his CoC that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to.
Four days later, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated as In the Matter of the Petition to
Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having
Already Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena.
Ramon countered that that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from office during his
second and third terms; and that the three-term limit rule did not then apply to him pursuant to the
prevailing jurisprudence7to the effect that an involuntary separation from office amounted to an
interruption of continuity of service for purposes of the application of the three-term limit rule.
COMELEC 1st Division disqualified Talaga, Jr. to run for Mayor. Barbara Ruby filed her own COC for
Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon, attaching hereto the CONA issued by Lakas-Kampi-CMD,
the party that nominated Ramon. But on election day the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots
but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate,
resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as against Castillo’s 39,615 votes.
Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking the suspension of
Barbara Ruby’s proclamation.
It was only on May 13, 2010 when the COMELEC En Banc, upon the recommendation of its Law
Department gave due course to Barbara Ruby’s CoC and CONA, thereby including her in the certified list
of candidates. Consequently, the CBOC proclaimed Barbara Ruby as the newly-elected Mayor of Lucena
City. Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the COMELEC, he alleged that Barbara
Ruby could not substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due course; and
Barbara Ruby could not be considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc had approved her
substitution three days after the elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be considered stray.
Alcala , the duly-elected Vice-Mayor, sought to intervene, saying that he should be Mayor. But the
COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed Castillo’s petition and Alcala’s petition-in-intervention. But COMELEC En
Banc reversed the ruling of the COMELEC 2nd Division.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the substitution is valid
2. Whether Castillo should be declared as winner
RULING
1. No, Ramon was absolutely precluded from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for
the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and ineffectual ab initio for containing the
incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility to run. The invalidity and inefficacy of
his CoC made his situation even worse than that of a nuisance candidate because the nuisance candidate
may remain eligible despite cancellation of his CoC or despite the denial of due course to the CoC
pursuant to Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
A non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute. As Miranda v. Abaya aptly put it:
Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the concept of a
substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the place
of somebody who does not exist or who never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all
the instances enumerated in Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate
of candidacy seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non.
2. No, the law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election
cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. The Court emphasized that the
candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes for the contested office could not assume the
office despite the disqualification of the first placer because the second placer was “not the choice of the
sovereign will.”
The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning candidate is
when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
disqualified; and (b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s disqualification
as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the
votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. The exception did not apply in favor of Castillo simply because
the second element was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not the least aware of the fact of
Barbara Ruby’s illegibility as the substitute. In fact, the COMELEC En Banc issued the Resolution finding
her substitution invalid only on May 20, 2011, or a full year after the elections.
165 Hayudini v. COMELEC
MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MUSTAPHA J.

OMAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 207900. April 22, 2014.*
Ponente: J. Peralta
Topic: Election Law – Eligibility for Candidacy
Synopsis:
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his CoC “that he is eligible for said office.” A
candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a candidate is not actually eligible
because he is not a registered voter in the municipality where he intends to be elected, but still he states
under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate
clearly makes a false material representation, a ground to support a petition under Section 78. It is
interesting to note that Hayudini was, in fact, initially excluded by the ERB as a voter. On November 30,
2012, the ERB issued a certificate confirming the disapproval of Hayudini’s petition for registration. This is
precisely the reason why he needed to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in
Barangay Bintawlan before the MCTC. Thus, when he stated in his CoC that “he is eligible for said office,”
Hayudini made a clear and material misrepresentation as to his eligibility, because he was not, in fact,
registered as a voter in Barangay Bintawlan.
Had the COMELEC not given due course to Omar’s petition solely based on procedural deficiencies, South
Ubian would have a mayor who is not even a registered voter in the locality he is supposed to govern,
thereby creating a ridiculously absurd and outrageous situation. Hence, the COMELEC was accurate in
cancelling Hayudini’s certificate of candidacy.
Digest:
FACTS
Hayudini filed his COC for the position of Mayor in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. 10 days after Omar filed a
Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Hayudini’s COC. Omar basically asserted that Hayudini should be
disqualified for making false representation regarding his residence. He claimed that Hayudini declared in
his CoC that he is a resident of the Municipality of South Ubian when, in fact, he resides in Zamboanga
City. Thereafter, Hayudini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in Barangay
Bintawlan, South Ubian before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). Despite the opposition of Ignacio
Aguilar Baki, the MCTC granted Hayudini’s petition. On that same day, the COMELEC’s First Division
dismissed Omar’s earlier petition to cancel Hayudini’s CoC ) for lack of substantial evidence that Hayudini
committed false representation as to his residency. The COMELEC 2nd Division canceled Hayudini’s COC.
Hayudini, thus filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the COMELEC En banc denied said Motion.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the COMELEC erred in declaring Hayudini’s COC invalid
RULING
No, Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his CoC “that he is eligible for said office.” A
candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a candidate is not actually eligible
because he is not a registered voter in the municipality where he intends to be elected, but still he states
under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate
clearly makes a false material representation, a ground to support a petition under Section 78. It is
interesting to note that Hayudini was, in fact, initially excluded by the ERB as a voter. On November 30,
2012, the ERB issued a certificate confirming the disapproval of Hayudini’s petition for registration. This is
precisely the reason why he needed to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in
Barangay Bintawlan before the MCTC. Thus, when he stated in his CoC that “he is eligible for said office,”
Hayudini made a clear and material misrepresentation as to his eligibility, because he was not, in fact,
registered as a voter in Barangay Bintawlan.
Had the COMELEC not given due course to Omar’s petition solely based on procedural deficiencies, South
Ubian would have a mayor who is not even a registered voter in the locality he is supposed to govern,
thereby creating a ridiculously absurd and outrageous situation. Hence, the COMELEC was accurate in
cancelling Hayudini’s certificate of candidacy.
166 E.R. Ejercito v. COMELEC and San Luis
EMILIO RAMON “E.R.” P. EJERCITO, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
EDGAR “EGAY” S. SAN LUIS, respondents.
G.R. No. 212398. November 25, 2014.
Ponente: J. Peralta
Topic: Election Law – Campaign Rules
Synopsis:
Notably, R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements donated to the candidate shall not
be broadcasted without the written acceptance of the candidate, which shall be attached to the
advertising contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC, and that, in every case, advertising
contracts shall be signed by the donor, the candidate concerned or by the duly authorized representative
of the political party. Conformably with the mandate of the law, COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 requires
that election propaganda materials donated to a candidate shall not be broadcasted unless it is
accompanied by the written acceptance of said candidate, which shall be in the form of an official receipt
in the name of the candidate and must specify the description of the items donated, their quantity and
value, and that, in every case, the advertising contracts, media purchase orders or booking orders shall
be signed by the candidate concerned or by the duly authorized representative of the party and, in case
of a donation, should be accompanied by a written acceptance of the candidate, party or their authorized
representatives. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 also unambiguously states that it shall be unlawful to
broadcast any election propaganda donated or given free of charge by any person or broadcast entity to
a candidate without the written acceptance of the said candidate and unless they bear and be identified
by the words “airtime for this broadcast was provided free of charge by” followed by the true and correct
name and address of the donor.
Digest:
FACTS
Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed
by San Luis before the Office of the COMELEC Clerk in Manila against Ejercito, who was a fellow
gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the Province of Laguna.
First cause of action was, Ejercito, during the campaign period for 2013 local election, distributed to the
electorates of the province of Laguna the so-called “Orange Card” with an intent to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters in voting for his favor.
Second Cause of Action was, based on the records of the Provincial COMELEC, the Province of Laguna
has a total of 1,525,522 registered electorate. In this regard, par. (a), Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 9615, otherwise known as the Rules and Regulations Implementing FAIR ELECTION ACT provides
and I quote:
“Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Parties.—The aggregate amount that a candidate or party may
spent for election campaign shall be as follows:
a. For candidates – Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where
the candidate filed his certificate of candidacy.
b. For other candidates without any political party and without any support from any political party – Five
pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his
certificate of candidacy.
c. For Political Parties and party list groups – Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the
constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates.
Accordingly, a candidate for the position of Provincial Governor of Laguna is only authorized to incur an
election expense amounting to FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
SIXTY-SIX (P4,576,566.00) PESOS. However, Ejercito exceeded his expenditures in relation to his
campaign for the 2013 election. For television campaign commercials alone, he already spent the sum of
Php23,730,784. Even assuming that he was given 30% discount as prescribed under the Fair Election
Act, he still exceeded in the total allowable expenditures for which he paid the sum of P16,611,549.
ISSUE(S)
Whether Ejercito should be disqualified
RULING
Yes. Notably, R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements donated to the candidate
shall not be broadcasted without the written acceptance of the candidate, which shall be attached to the
advertising contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC, and that, in every case, advertising
contracts shall be signed by the donor, the candidate concerned or by the duly authorized representative
of the political party. Conformably with the mandate of the law, COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 requires
that election propaganda materials donated to a candidate shall not be broadcasted unless it is
accompanied by the written acceptance of said candidate, which shall be in the form of an official receipt
in the name of the candidate and must specify the description of the items donated, their quantity and
value, and that, in every case, the advertising contracts, media purchase orders or booking orders shall
be signed by the candidate concerned or by the duly authorized representative of the party and, in case
of a donation, should be accompanied by a written acceptance of the candidate, party or their authorized
representatives. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 also unambiguously states that it shall be unlawful to
broadcast any election propaganda donated or given free of charge by any person or broadcast entity to
a candidate without the written acceptance of the said candidate and unless they bear and be identified
by the words “airtime for this broadcast was provided free of charge by” followed by the true and correct
name and address of the donor.
Note: Does not apply. , independent expenditures They refer to those expenses made by an individual, a
group or a legal entity which are not authorized or requested by the candidate, an authorized committee
of the candidate, or an agent of the candidate; they are expenditures that are not placed in cooperation
with or with the consent of a candidate, his agents, or an authorized committee of the candidate.
167 Maturan v. COMELEC
JOEL T. MATURAN, Petitioner, vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ALLAN PATIÑO,

Respondents.
G.R. No. 227155
Topic: Election Law – Statement of Contributions and Expenditures
Synopsis:
Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or reports in connection with
electoral contributions and expenditures are required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for
which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One thousand pesos
(₱l,000.00) to Thirty thousand pesos (₱30,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. The fine shall be
paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a
writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender.
The petitioner should have paid heed to the 1995 ruling in Pilar v. Commission of Elections, which the
COMELEC properly cited in its assailed resolution. Based on Pilar, every candidate, including one who
meanwhile withdraws his candidacy, is required to file his SOCE by Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166.
Accordingly, the petitioner could not invoke good faith on the basis of his having withdrawn his candidacy
a day before the 2013 elections.
Digest:
FACTS
The petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Provincial Governor of Basilan to be
contested in the 2016 National and Local Elections. Allan Patiño, claiming to be a registered voter of
Basilan, filed a petition for the disqualification of the petitioner on the ground that based on the list
issued by the COMELEC Campaign Finance Officer the latter had failed to file his SOCE corresponding to
the 2010 and 2013 elections.
Petitioner opposed the petition for his disqualification by arguing that the petition had been rendered
moot on account of his withdrawal from the mayoralty race during the 2013 elections; and that,
consequently, he could only be held accountable for the failure to file his SOCE corresponding to the
2010 elections when he ran for Provincial Governor of Basilan, and for which he had already paid a fine
of ₱l5,000.00. The COMELEC First Division issued the first assailed resolution finding merit in the petition
for his disqualification, and declaring the petitioner disqualified to hold public office.
ISSUE(S)
Whether a candidate who withdraws his candidacy should file a SOCE
RULING
Yes, Section 14. Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. - Every
candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election,
file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all
contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.
xxxx
Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or reports in connection with
electoral contributions and expenditures are required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for
which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One thousand pesos
(₱l,000.00) to Thirty thousand pesos (₱30,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be
enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender.
xxxx
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this section, the administrative fine shall be
from Two thousand pesos (₱2,000.00) to Sixty thousand pesos (₱60,000.00), in the discretion of the
Commission. In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
The petitioner should have paid heed to the 1995 ruling in Pilar v. Commission of Elections, which the
COMELEC properly cited in its assailed resolution. Based on Pilar, every candidate, including one who
meanwhile withdraws his candidacy, is required to file his SOCE by Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166.
Accordingly, the petitioner could not invoke good faith on the basis of his having withdrawn his candidacy
a day before the 2013 elections.
168 Pundaodaya v. Noble
MAKIL U. PUNDAODAYA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ARSENIO

DENSING NOBLE, respondents.
G.R. No. 179313. September 17, 2009.
Ponente: J. Ynares-Santiago
Topic: Election Law – Residency Requirement
Synopsis:
Thus, in Perez v. Commission on Elections, it was held that a person’s registration as voter in one district
is not proof that he is not domiciled in another district. The registration of a voter in a place other than
his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence.
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct
indicative of that intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and
probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode.
Digest:
FACTS
Pundaodaya is married to Judith Pundaodaya, who ran against Noble for the position of municipal mayor
of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections. Noble filed his Certificate of Candidacy, indicating
therein that he has been a resident of Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental for 15
years. Pundaodaya filed a petition for disqualification against Noble alleging that the latter lacks the
residency qualification prescribed by existing laws for elective officials. Pundaodaya claimed that Noble is
in fact a resident of Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, where he also maintains a business.
The 2nd Division of the COMELEC ruled in favor of Pundaodaya and disqualified Noble from running.
Noble filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In the meantime, he garnered the highest number of votes and
was proclaimed the winner. Pundaodaya then filed an Urgent Motion to Annul proclamation. The
COMELEC En Banc reversed the decision and declared Noble qualified to run.
ISSUE(S)
Whether COMELEC En Banc erred in declaring Noble qualified to run
RULING
Yes, the above pieces of Documentary evidence, however, fail to convince us that Noble successfully
effected a change of domicile. As correctly ruled by the COMELEC Second Division, private respondent’s
claim that he is a registered voter and has actually voted in the past 3 elections in Kinoguitan, Misamis
Oriental do not sufficiently establish that he has actually elected residency in the said municipality.
Indeed, while we have ruled in the past that voting gives rise to a strong presumption of residence, it is
not conclusive evidence thereof. Thus, in Perez v. Commission on Elections, it was held that a person’s
registration as voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another district. The
registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have
abandoned or lost his residence.
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct
indicative of that intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and
probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode.
In this case, Noble’s marriage to Bernadith Go does not establish his actual physical presence in
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. Neither does it prove an intention to make it his permanent place of
residence. We are also not persuaded by his alleged payment of water bills in the absence of evidence
showing to which specific properties they pertain. And while Noble presented a Deed of Sale for real
property, the veracity of this document is belied by his own admission that he does not own property in
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. Thus we find Noble’s alleged change of domicile was effected soley for the
purpose of qualifying as a candidate in the 2007 elections.
169 Sabili v. COMELEC
MEYNARDO SABILI, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA,

respondents.
G.R. No. 193261. April 24, 2012.*
Ponente: J. Sereno
Topic: Election Law – Due Process
Synopsis:
SEC. 6. Promulgation.—The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a Division
shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served in advance upon the parties or
their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax or thru the fastest means of
communication.
However, the COMELEC Order dated 4 May 2010 suspended Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696
by ordering that “all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation”
in view of “the proximity of the Automated National and Local Elections and lack of material time.”
The COMELEC Order that the exigencies attendant to the holding of the country’s first automated
national elections had necessitated that the COMELEC suspend the rule on notice prior to promulgation,
and that it instead direct the delivery of all resolutions to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate
promulgation.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a
resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Prior to the 2010 elections, he had been twice
elected (in 1995 and in 1998) as Provincial Board Member representing the 4th District of Batangas.
During the 2007 elections, petitioner ran for the position of Representative of the 4th District of
Batangas, but lost. The 4th District of Batangas includes Lipa City. However, it is undisputed that when
petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral
home in Barangay Sico, San Juan, Batangas.
Librea filed a “Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a
Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification” against him. Respondent alleged that
petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in the latter’s COC and likewise failed to comply with
the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. Allegedly, petitioner
falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a resident of Lipa City for two years and
eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local elections.
The COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition of private respondent, declared petitioner as
disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa City, and canceled his Certificate of Candidacy for his
not being a resident of Lipa City and for his failure to meet the statutory one-year residency requirement
under the law. Petitioner move for reconsideration but the COMELEC en Banc denied the Motion in its
resolution dated August 17, 2010. Although he was able to receive a copy of this resolution, no prior
notice setting the date of promulgation of sai resolution was received by him.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abused of discretion when it failed to promulgate its resolution
RULING
No, “SEC. 6. Promulgation.—The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a
Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served in advance upon the
parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax or thru the fastest means of
communication.
However, the COMELEC Order dated 4 May 2010 suspended Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696
by ordering that “all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation”
in view of “the proximity of the Automated National and Local Elections and lack of material time.”
The COMELEC Order that the exigencies attendant to the holding of the country’s first automated
national elections had necessitated that the COMELEC suspend the rule on notice prior to promulgation,
and that it instead direct the delivery of all resolutions to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate
promulgation. Notably, the Supreme Court saw no prejudice to the parties caused thereby. The
COMELEC’s Order did not affect the right of the parties to due process. They were still furnished a copy
of the COMELEC Decision and were able to reckon the period for perfecting an appeal. In fact, petitioner
was able to timely lodge a Petition with this Court.
Note:
Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that “(t)o successfully challenge a winning candidate’s qualifications,
the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional
and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the
people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions
that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote.”
Japzon v. Commission on Elections, we concluded that “when the evidence of the alleged lack of
residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly
appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victor’s right to the office,
the will of the electorate should be respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather
than frustrate, the will of the voters.”
170 Jalover v. Osmena
G.R. No. 209286. September 23, 2014.*

LINA DELA PEÑA JALOVER, GEORGIE A. HUISO and VELVET BARQUIN ZAMORA,
petitioners,vs. JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC),
respondents.
Ponente: J. Brion
Topic: Election Law – Residency Requirements
Synopsis:
As the COMELEC aptly found, Osmeña had sufficiently established by substantial evidence his residence
in Toledo City, Cebu. As early as April 24, 2006, Osmeña applied for the transfer of his voter’s registration
record to Toledo City, which was granted on April 24, 2012. Osmeña likewise purchased a parcel of land
in Ibo, Toledo City in 1995 and commenced the construction of an improvement, which would eventually
serve as his residence since 2004. Osmeña even acquired another parcel of land in Das, Toledo City in
December 2011 and transferred his headquarters to Poblacion and Bato, Toledo City as early as 2011.
The existence of Osmeña’s headquarters in Bato, Toledo City, was even confirmed by the Mr. Orlando
Pama Casia, witness for the petitioners. Finally, Osmeña has always maintained profound political and
socio-civic linkages in Toledo City — a fact that the petitioners never disputed. The law does not require a
person to be in his home 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement.
Digest:
FACTS
Osmeña filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor, Toledo City, Cebu. In his COC,
Osmeña indicated that he had been a resident of Toledo City for fifteen (15) years prior to the May 2013
elections. Before running for the mayoralty position, Osmeña also served as the representative of the 3rd
Congressional District of the Province of Cebu from 1995-1998, which incidentally includes the City of
Toledo.
Soon thereafter, petitioners filed before the COMELEC a “Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification.”
The petitioners alleged before the COMELEC that Osmeña made material misrepresentations of fact in the
latter’s COC and likewise failed to comply with the residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local
Government Code. In particular, the petitioners claimed that Osmeña falsely declared under oath in his
COC that he had already been a resident of Toledo City fifteen (15) years prior to the scheduled May 13,
2013 local elections.
The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition on the ground that Osmeña did not commit any
material misrepresentation in his COC. The petitioners timely moved for a reconsideration of the April 3,
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC. Before the COMELEC resolved the motion, however, the Board of
Canvassers of Toledo City proclaimed Osmeña as the winning candidate for the mayoralty seat. The
COMELEC En Banc subsequently denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE(S)
Whether Osmeña should be disqualified
RULING
No. As the COMELEC aptly found, Osmeña had sufficiently established by substantial evidence his
residence in Toledo City, Cebu. As early as April 24, 2006, Osmeña applied for the transfer of his voter’s
registration record to Toledo City, which was granted on April 24, 2012. Osmeña likewise purchased a
parcel of land in Ibo, Toledo City in 1995 and commenced the construction of an improvement, which
would eventually serve as his residence since 2004. Osmeña even acquired another parcel of land in Das,
Toledo City in December 2011 and transferred his headquarters to Poblacion and Bato, Toledo City as
early as 2011. The existence of Osmeña’s headquarters in Bato, Toledo City, was even
confirmed by the Mr. Orlando Pama Casia, witness for the petitioners. Finally, Osmeña has
always maintained profound political and socio-civic linkages in Toledo City — a fact that the petitioners
never disputed. The law does not require a person to be in his home 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to
fulfill the residency requirement.
171 In re: Vicente Ching
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR, vs. VICENTE D. CHING,
applicant.
BAR MATTER No. 914. October 1, 1999
Ponente: J. Kapunan
Topic: Citizenship – Admission to the Bar
Synopsis:
The Supreme Court cannot agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen years had
lapsed and it’s way beyond the allowable 7 year period. The Supreme Court even noted that the period is
originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems it can’t be extended any further). Ching’s
special circumstances can’t be considered. It is not enough that he considered all his life that he is a
Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship
are in place. Further, Ching didn’t give any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship
(but I guess it’s simply because he never thought he’s Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process.
All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and,
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained delay in
making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Digest:
FACTS
In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually
passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be
allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino
citizen. His parents were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate
child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching
maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant – a
profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a municipality in La Union.
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a
Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; that under
prevailing jurisprudence, “upon reaching the age of majority” is construed as within 7 years after
reaching the age of majority (in his case 21 years old because he was born in 1964 while the 1935
Constitution was in place).
Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14
years after reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, the Solicitor-General recommended that the rule
be relaxed due to the special circumstance of Ching.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath
RULING
No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court cannot agree with the
recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen years had lapsed and it’s way beyond the allowable 7
year period. The Supreme Court even noted that the period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7
years. (It seems it can’t be extended any further). Ching’s special circumstances can’t be considered. It is
not enough that he considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer
(was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn’t give any
explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess it’s simply because he never
thought he’s Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest
civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed
over.
172 Cabiling v. Commissioner of Immigration

BALGAMELO CABILING MA, FELIX CABILING MA, JR., AND VALERIANO CABILING MA,
Petitioners, vs. COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
ARTHEL B. CARONOÑGAN, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JOSE DL. CABOCHAN, ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER TEODORO B. DELARMENTE AND ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER FRANKLIN Z.
LITTAUA, in their capacities as Chairman and Members of the Board of Commissioners
(Bureau of Immigration), and MAT G. CATRAL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 183133. July 26, 2010
Ponente: J. Perez
Topic: Citizenship – Electing Filipino Citizenship
Synopsis:
Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father, who executed
an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the government upon
reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately file the documents of election with the
nearest civil registry, be considered foreign nationals subject to deportation as undocumented aliens for
failure to obtain alien certificates of registration? NO. If positive acts of citizenship have publicly,
consistently and continuously been done, this will suffice as constructive registration.
Digest:
FACTS
Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born under aegis of the 1935
Philippine Constitution in the years 1948, 1951, and 1957, respectively.
They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for almost sixty (60) years; they
spent their whole lives, studied and received their primary and secondary education in the country; they
do not speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and do not know any
relative of their father; they have not even traveled abroad; and they have already raised their respective
families in the Philippines.
During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of
Registration (ACRs).
Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship in accordance with
Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution. Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine
citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as
required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625.
A complaint was filed in the Bureau of Immigration alleging that Felix (Yao Kong) Ma and his seven (7)
children are undesirable and overstaying aliens. The Legal Department of BI charged them for violation of
Sections 37(a)(7)16 and 45(e)17 of Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. The charge reads, in part: “That Respondents x x x, all Chinese
nationals, failed and continuously failed to present any valid document to show their respective status in
the Philippines. They likewise failed to produce documents to show their election of Philippines (sic)
citizenship, hence, undocumented and overstaying foreign nationals in the country.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father, who
executed an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the
government upon reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately file the documents of
election with the nearest civil registry, be considered foreign nationals subject to deportation as
undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien certificates of registration
RULING
NO. Petitioners have passed decades of their lives in the Philippines as Filipinos. Their present status
having been formed by their past, petitioners can no longer have any national identity except that which
they chose upon reaching the age of reason.
Corollary to this fact, we cannot agree with the view of the Court of Appeals that since the ACR presented
by the petitioners are no longer valid on account of the new requirement to present an E-series ACR,
they are deemed not properly documented. On the contrary, petitioners should not be expected to secure
E-series ACR because it would be inconsistent with the election of citizenship and its constructive
registration through their acts made public, among others, their exercise of suffrage, election as public
official, and continued and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines since birth. The failure to register as
aliens is, obviously, consistent with petitioners’ election of Philippine citizenship. ###
173 Republic v. Sagun
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. NORA FE SAGUN, Respondent.

G.R. No. 187567. February 15, 2012

Topic: Citizenship – Judicial Declaration of Citizenship
Synopsis:
There is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an
individual. There is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare
that a given person is part of our citizenry. Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific
declaration of respondent’s Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the courts
competence.
Digest:
FACTS
Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a
Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she
executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized but was
not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
In 2005, Sagun applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied due to the citizenship of her
father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship.
Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship averring that she
was raised as a Filipino and she is a registered voter in Baguio City and had voted in local and national
elections as shown in the Voter Certification. She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has
effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her record of birth so as to
entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.
After hearing, the trial court granted the petition and declaring Sagun a Filipino citizen.
Petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed a petition for review on certiorari, pointing out that while Sagun
executed an oath of allegiance before a notary public, there was no affidavit of her election of Philippine
citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance which was not registered with the nearest local civil
registry was executed when she was already 33 years old or 12 years after she reached the age of
majority.
ISSUE(S)
1. Is an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship procedurally and
jurisdictionally permissible?
2. Has Norma complied with the procedural requirements in the election of Philippine citizenship?
RULING
1. No. There is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual. There is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial
proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial
court to make a specific declaration of respondent’s Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not
within the courts competence.
2. When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution,
which declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
174 Bengson v. HRET
ANTONIO BENGSON, III, Petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL AND TEODORO C. CRUZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001.
Ponente: J. Kapunan
Topic: Citizenship – Effect of Repatriation
Synopsis:
Where naturalization is a lengthy process, repatriation simply refers to the taking of the oath of allegiance
to the Republic and registering such oath before the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality, which
means that a naturalized Filipino will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen,
whereas natural-born citizens are likewise restored accordingly. Thus, respondent Cruz is deemed to still
be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen when he was elected.
Digest:
FACTS
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, but on November 5, 1985, he enlisted in
the U.S. Marine Corps, and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States, for which he lost his Philippine citizenship pursuant to C.A. No. 63. In
1990, he was naturalized as a U.S. Citizen.. On March 17, 1994 however, he reacquired Filipino
citizenship by repatriation pursuant to R.A. No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as representative of the
second district of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. Petitioner thus filed a case for quo warranto,
questioning respondent’s qualifications, as he has allegedly ceased being a citizen in view of the loss and
renunciation of such citizenship on his part.
ISSUE(S)
Can respondent Cruz still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship?
RULING
Yes. Under the Constitution, a natural-born citizen is one who are citizens from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, naturalized citizens are
those who have become citizens through the process of naturalization. Where naturalization is a lengthy
process, repatriation simply refers to the taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic and registering
such oath before the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality, which means that a naturalized Filipino will
be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen, whereas natural-born citizens are likewise
restored accordingly. Thus, respondent Cruz is deemed to still be considered a natural-born Filipino
citizen when he was elected.
175 AASJS v. Datumanong
AASJS Member HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SIMEON
DATUMANUNG, in his official capacity as Secretary of Justice, Respondent.
G.R. No. 160869. May 11, 2007.
Topic: Citizenship – Dual Citizenship vs. Dual Allegiance
Synopsis:
The legislative intent behind the law is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63, which
takes away Filipino citizenship from those who become naturalized citizens in foreign countries. In merely
allowing dual citizenship, the law does not condone dual allegiance, which implies that subjecting to the
supreme authority of the Philippine Republic is to renounce foreign citizenship. Instead, the lawmakers
conveniently shifted the burden of confronting the issue of dual allegiance to the concerned foreign
country. What R.A. 9225 simply concerns itself with is the fact that a Filipino may still retain his
citizenship, and all the rights beholden to the status, notwithstanding acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner here questions the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act, as it violates the constitutional prohibition against dual allegiance (Section 5, Article
IV). Petitioner avers that the law cheapens Philippine citizenship, as it allows all Filipinos to retain their
citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship.
ISSUE(S)
Is R.A. No. 9225 unconstitutional?
RULING
No. The legislative intent behind the law is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63,
which takes away Filipino citizenship from those who become naturalized citizens in foreign countries. In
merely allowing dual citizenship, the law does not condone dual allegiance, which implies that subjecting
to the supreme authority of the Philippine Republic is to renounce foreign citizenship. Instead, the
lawmakers conveniently shifted the burden of confronting the issue of dual allegiance to the concerned
foreign country. What R.A. 9225 simply concerns itself with is the fact that a Filipino may still retain his
citizenship, and all the rights beholden to the status, notwithstanding acquisition of foreign citizenship.
176 Lewis v. COMELEC
LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, GREGORIO B. MACABENTA, ALEJANDRO A. ESCLAMADO, ARMANDO

B. HEREDIA, REUBEN S. SEGURITAN, ERIC LACHICA FURBEYRE, TERESITA A. CRUZ,
JOSEFINA OPENA DISTERHOFT, MERCEDES V. OPENA, CORNELIO R. NATIVIDAD, EVELYN D.
NATIVIDAD, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 162759. August 4, 2006.
Ponente: J. Garcia
Topic: Citizenship – Dual Citizens
Synopsis:
There is no provision in the dual citizenship law—R.A. 9225—requiring “duals” to actually establish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the
contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are most likely non-residents, grants under
its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot
be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas
Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary
conditions, are qualified to vote. It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for
Section 2 [Article V] immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of
necessary implication in statutory construction, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the
Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1
with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified
Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the
residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which
accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004 national and
local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as “overseas absentee voter” only to be
advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of
Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their
lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however,
urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voter’s registration, as
the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals who would likely
be eligible to vote in future elections.
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to the COMELEC’s
refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., filed
on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and mandamus.
A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections, COMELEC filed a Comment, therein praying for
the denial of the petition. As may be expected, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said
elections.
ISSUE(S)
Whether petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine
citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189
RULING
Yes. There is no provision in the dual citizenship law—R.A. 9225—requiring “duals” to actually establish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the
contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are most likely non-residents, grants under
its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot
be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas
Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary
conditions, are qualified to vote. Thus, wrote the Court in Macalintal:
“It is clear from these discussions of the … Constitutional Commission that [it] intended to enfranchise as
much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The
Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents’
domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 [Article V] immediately
after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory
construction, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for
an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad.
The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be
allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution.
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that
law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that “duals” may now exercise the right of
suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters.
177 Cordora v. COMELEC
GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S.

TAMBUNTING, respondents.
G.R. No. 176947. February 19, 2009.
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Public Officers/Citizenship – Dual Citizenship vs. Dual Allegiance
Synopsis:
Dual allegiance refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individual’s volition.
Persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
Digest:
FACTS
Cordora asserted that Tambunting made false assertions in his COC. Cordora stated that Tambunting was
not eligible to run for local public office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship
requirements. Tambunting on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in
his COC. To refure Cordora’s claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino, Tambunting presented
a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American
father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen.
ISSUE(S)
Whether Tambunting is eligible to run
RULING
Yes, Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position.
“To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of
the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
Persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
178 Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M.

BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR, and WILMA P. PAGADUAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 198742. August 10, 2012
Ponente: J. Reyes
Topic: Public Officers – Non-Electivity of Dual Citizens/Judicial Powers of the Commission on Elections
Synopsis:
R.A. 9225 allows the retention and reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic. This oath itself is an abbreviated process of repatriation that restores all the civil and
political rights of the person seeking restoration of his/her status, subject to the limitations provided
under Section 5 of the same law, which provides, among others, that those seeking elective office need
to meet the qualifications as required by the Constitution and, at the time of the filing of their certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen born of Filipino parents. Her marriage to a certain Kevin
Thomas Condon caused her to elect to be naturalized as an Australian citizen. On December 2005, and
before the Philippine embassy in Canberra, Australia, she filed an application to reacquire Filipino
citizenship under Republic Act 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. She
took her oath on December 5, 2005 and renounced by declaration her Australian citizenship on
September 18, 2006. She then ran for Vice-Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2010
elections, having previously lost as Mayor in the 2007 elections. Herein respondents filed separate quo
warranto proceedings against her, questioning her eligibility before the RTC on the ground of her being a
dual citizen. She denied the claims against her, contending that she ceased to be an Australian citizen on
September 27, 2006, her act of executing a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship was in
sufficient compliance of R.A. 9225. She also claimed that her act of running for office served as an
abandonment of her Australian citizenship.
The trial court ruled that she failed to comply with R.A. 9225, as her Declaration was not made under
oath. The COMELEC Second Division on the other hand, dismissed her appeal for failure to pay docket
fees. On motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC en banc reinstated her appeal, and in the same
issuance, the commission gave due course to the substantive aspect of the case, concurring with the
RTC, and granting the motion by the respondents for execution pending appeal.
ISSUE(S)
(substantive) Is petitioner disqualified from running for office?
(procedural)
1. May the COMELEC en banc, in a single resolution, reinstate an appeal and resolve its merits?
2. May the COMELEC en banc order the execution of a judgment rendered by a trial court?
RULING
(substantive)
Yes. R.A. 9225 allows the retention and reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance
to the Republic. This oath itself is an abbreviated process of repatriation that restores all the civil and
political rights of the person seeking restoration of his/her status, subject to the limitations provided
under Section 5 of the same law, which provides, among others, that those seeking elective office need
to meet the qualifications as required by the Constitution and, at the time of the filing of their certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath. While petitioner pleads the court to interpret the sworn
renunciation to be a mere pro forma requirement, but the Supreme Court decided that there was no
ambiguity in the law which could open it up for interpretation. Petitioner likewise failed to sufficiently
prove the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, on which her Declaration hinges, thereby failing to obtain
judicial notice thereof.
(procedural)
1. Yes. The power of the COMELEC en banc to decide motions for reconsideration in election cases is
provided by Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, as complemented by Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the
COMELEC rules. In either of these provisions, there is nothing that sets any limits on the prerogative of
the COMELEC en banc from directly adjudicating the substantive merits of an appeal after ruling for its
reinstatement instead of remanding the same to the division that initially dismissed it.
2. Yes. There is no reason to dispute the authority of the COMELEC to order discretionary execution of
judgment in view of the fact that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly sanctioned
by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, execution pending appeal may be issued by an appellate court after the trial court has lost its
jurisdiction.
179 Republic v. Batuigas
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS, respondent.

G.R. No. 183110. October 7, 2013.*

Topic: Citizenship - Naturalization
Synopsis:
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization
under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the “Administrative
Naturalization Law of 2000”). A third option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien
women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that: “[a]ny
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”
Digest:
FACTS
Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. After all the
jurisdictional requirements mandated by Sec. 9 of CA 473 had been complied with, the OSG filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engage in a lawful occupation or
in some known lucrative trade. The RTC denied said Motion.
Thereafter, the hearing for the reception of evidence was set, but neither the OSG nor the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor appeared on the day of the hearing. The RTC found that Azucena has amply
supported allegations in her petition and granted said petition.
But the OSG in its Omnibus Motion, argued that the ex-parte presentation of evidence before the Branch
Clerk of Court violates Sec. 10 of CA 473, as the law mandates public hearing. Rejecting this argument,
the RTC held that the public has been fully apprised of the naturalization proceedings and was free to
intervene.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether Azucena’s citizenship should be granted
2. Whether Sec. 4 of CA 473 was violated
3. Whether Sec. 10 of CA 473 was violated
RULING
1. Yes. Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial
naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the
“Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000”). A third option, called derivative naturalization, which is
available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which
provides that: “[a]ny woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and
who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”
Foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it
is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time
of their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization.
As stated in Moy Ya Lim Yao, the procedure for an alien wife to formalize the conferment of Filipino
citizenship is as follows:
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to
acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The
alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among
other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her
husband’s citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing
of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her
Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the
cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen x x x, the Bureau of Immigration conducts an
investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition. Records
however show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. 030705 by
reason of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. The CID granted her application. However, the Ministry of
Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it found no sufficient evidence that Azucena’s husband is a
Filipino citizen as only their marriage certificate was presented to establish his citizenship.
Having been denied of the process in the CID, Azucena was constrained to file a Petition for judicial
naturalization based on CA 473. While this would have been unnecessary if the process at the CID was
granted in her favor, there is nothing that prevents her from seeking acquisition of Philippine citizenship
through regular naturalization proceedings available to all qualified foreign nationals. The choice of what
option to take in order to acquire Philippine citizenship rests with the applicant. In this case, Azucena has
chosen to file a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473. The fact that her application for
derivative naturalization under Section 15 of CA 473 was denied should not prevent her from seeking
judicial naturalization under the same law.
2. No. Under No. 4, Section 2 of CA 473 provides as qualification to become a Philippine citizen: 4. He
must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or
must have known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation. Azucena is a teacher by profession
and has actually exercised her profession before she had to quit her teaching job to assume her family
duties and take on her role as joint provider, together with her husband, in order to support her family.
Together, husband and wife were able to raise all their five children, provided them with education, and
have all become professionals and responsible citizens of this country. Certainly, this is proof enough of
both husband and wife’s lucrative trade. Azucena herself is a professional and can resume teaching at
any time. Her profession never leaves her, and this is more than sufficient guarantee that she will not be
a charge to the only country she has known since birth.
3. No. The OSG had the opportunity to contest the qualifications of Azucena during the initial hearing
scheduled on May 18, 2004. However, the OSG or the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor failed to appear
in said hearing, prompting the lower court to order ex parte presentation of evidence before the Clerk of
Court on November 5, 2004. Since the government who has an interest in, and the only one who can
contest, the citizenship of a person, was duly notified through the OSG and the Provincial Prosecutor’s
office, the proceedings have complied with the public hearing requirement under CA 473.
180 Tabasa v. Court of Appeals
JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION and WILSON
SOLUREN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 125793 August 29, 2006

Topic: Citizenship – Repatriation
Synopsis:
The law provides that repatriation is for only two types of persons which include the following:
1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and
2. natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on
account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the
manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended.
Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his "repatriation" on June 13, 1996. The privilege under
RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation.
Digest:
FACTS
Joevanie Tabasa is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. He acquired derivative naturalization as an
American after his father, Rodolfo Tabasa succeeded in obtaining an American Citizenship.
On August 3, 1995, Joevanie went back to the Philippines to escape his pending case at the US for crime
of illegal possession and battery as informed by the Consul General of the US. Further, they informed
their Philippine counterparts that the passport of Joevanie has been revoke, hence he became an
undocumented alien in the country.
On May 23, 1996, Joevanie was apprehended by the Intelligence Operatives and was held in custody for
deportation. He was summarily adjudged to be deported by virtue of having no passport. Joevanie filed
a Habeas Corpus case and Preliminary Injunction and allege that he was not afforded due process.
Further, the CA ordered the Bureau to produce the body of Joevanie. He filed a supplemental petition
stating that he acquired his Filipino Citizenship by repatriation via RA 8171 and that because he was
already a Filipino, he cannot be deported back to the United States or detained by the Bureau.
ISSUE(S)
Whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171. If there is no valid
repatriation, then he can be summarily deported for his being an undocumented alien
RULING
No, Joevanie has not reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171. The law provides that repatriation
are for only two types of persons which include the following:
1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and
2. natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on
account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the
manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended.
Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his "repatriation" on June 13, 1996. The privilege under
RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation.
While it is true that renunciation of allegiance to one’s native country is necessarily a political act, it does
not follow that the act is inevitably politically or economically motivated. An alien whose passport is
canceled after his admission into the country becomes an undocumented alien who can be summarily
deported.
181 Japzon v. COMELEC
MANUEL B. JAPZON, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAIME S. TY,

respondents.
G.R. No. 180088. January 19, 2009.
Topic: Public Officers – Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship
Synopsis:
For a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
That Ty complied with the second requirement is beyond question. On 19 March 2007, he personally
executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate
of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28
March 2007, he had already effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine
citizenship.
Digest:
FACTS
Japzon and Ty were candidates for Mayor in the Municipality of Gen. Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the
May 2007 local elections. Japzon filed before the COMELEC a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Ty’s COC
on the ground of material representation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-
born Filipino, because Ty eventually migrated to the US and because a citizen thereof. That Ty had been
residing in the US for the last 25 yrs. When Ty filed his COC on March 28, 2007, he falsly represented
therein that he was a resident of Brgy. 6 Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for 1 yr. before
May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country. While Ty may have
applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he actually never resided in Brgy. 6 Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for 1 yr. immediately preceding the date of election. In fact, even
after filing his application for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the
USA. Moreover, although Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he
continued to comport himself as an American citizen proven by his travel records. He also failed to
renounce his foreign citizenship as required by RA 9225.
Pending the submission by of their respective position papers, elections were already held. Ty acquired
the highest number of voted and was declared Mayor. The COMELEC 1st Division found that Ty complied
with the requirement of Sec. 3 and 5 of RA 9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship. Japzon filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but the COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion and affirmed the decision of the
1st Division.
ISSUE(S)
Whether Ty had renounced his American Citizenship for him to run for public office
RULING
Yes, For a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
That Ty complied with the second requirement is beyond question. On 19 March 2007, he personally
executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate
of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28
March 2007, he had already effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine
citizenship.
182 Republic v. Huang Te Fu a.k.a. Robert Uy
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HUANG TE FU a.k.a. ROBERT UY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 200983. March 18, 2015.

Topic: Requisites for Naturalization
Synopsis:
Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law or CA 473 requires, among others, that an applicant for
naturalization must be of good moral character and must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or
lawful occupation. In regard to the requirement that the applicant must have a known lucrative trade,
this ponente declared:
Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of "some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation" means "not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary
necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an
appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in
the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one’s becoming the object of
charity or a public charge." His income should permit "him and the members of his family to live with
reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the
demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization."
Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income, the courts should
consider only the applicant’s income; his or her spouse’s income should not be included in the
assessment. The spouse’s additional income is immaterial "for under the law the petitioner should be the
one to possess ‘some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation’ to qualify him to become a
Filipino citizen." Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the applicant’s qualifications must be
determined as of the time of the filing of his petition.
Digest:
FACTS
Herein respondent Huang Te Fu, a.k.a. Robert Uy – a citizen of the Republic of China (Taiwan) – filed a
sworn Declaration of Intent to Become a Citizen of the Philippines with the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) and later filed with the RTC of Quezon City (trial court) a Petition for Naturalization which was
granted. Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA contending in its Appellant’s Brief that respondent may not
become a naturalized Filipino citizen because: (1) he does not own real estate in the Philippines; (2) he
does not have some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation; (3) he is not gainfully
employed, as he merely worked in the business owned by his family and was merely given allowances by
his parents for the daily expenses of his family; (4) in an August 2001 Deed of Sale14 covering a parcel
of land in Antipolo City he and his wife supposedly purchased, respondent falsely misrepresented himself
as a Filipino citizen, thus exemplifying his lack of good moral character; (5) his income tax returns for the
years 2002, 2003 and 2004 reveal that his actual monthly income differs from his monthly income as
declared in his petition for naturalization, leading to the conclusion that either he is evading taxes or
concealing the truth regarding his income; and, (6) on cross-examination by petitioner, he could not cite
any of the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution which he is supposed to believe in. The appeal
was denied, hence the instant petition.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the respondent has duly complied with the rigid requisites prescribed by the Revised
Naturalization Law or Commonwealth Act No. 473, as to entitle him to be admitted as a citizen of the
Philippines
RULING
No. Respondent has failed to satisfy the law which renders him completely undeserving of Filipino
citizenship. The appellate court’s reliance upon the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals is misplaced
because in the present case, respondent is not at all listed on the payroll of his parent’s business, where
he is supposed to be its general manager. As a result, there is absolutely no basis for the correct
determination of his income. It also insufficient to generate a conclusion that respondent is carrying on a
lucrative trade; he cannot support his family from his declared income.
Moreover, respondent’s admitted false declaration under oath contained in the August 2001 deed of sale
that he is a Filipino citizen is further proof of respondent’s lack of good moral character. It is also a
violation of the constitutional prohibition on ownership of lands by foreign individuals. His defense that he
unknowingly signed the deed is unacceptable. As a foreigner living in a foreign land, he should conduct
himself accordingly in this country – with care, circumspect, and respect for the laws of the host. As an
educated and experienced businessman, it must be presumed that he acted with due care and signed the
deed of sale with full knowledge of its import. Finally, naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and
strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon
the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of law.
183 Jacot v. Dal
Jacot vs. Dal

G.R. No. 179848. November 27, 2008
Topic: Public Officers – Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship
Synopsis:
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the
requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct
requirements to be complied with for different purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already
naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship. By the oath, the the Filipino swears
allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Precisely, a situation might arise under Republic Act No. 9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship by
also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship. The law categorically
requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those
who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a
public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of
candidacy.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution1 dated 28 September 2007 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the
COMELEC Second Division2 disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman,
Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a
personal renouncement of his United States (US) citizenship.
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13
December 1989.
Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as
the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles,
California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval4 of petitioner’s request,
and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice
Consul Edward C. Yulo. 5 On 27 September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification
Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines.
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-
Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. 7
In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered the
highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor.
On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution11 disqualifying the petitioner
from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite
renunciation of his US citizenship.
ISSUE(S)
Whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his
failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship
RULING
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the
requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct
requirements to be complied with for different purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already
naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship.
By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but
there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might arise under
Republic Act No. 9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his
Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship.
The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in the Certificate of
Candidacy which must be executed by any person who wishes to run for public office in Philippine
elections.
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine
citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing
of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized
as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the
oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public
offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
184 Mercado v. Manzano
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, Petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999.
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Topic: Citizenship – Jus Sanguinis vs. Jus Soli
Synopsis:
Manzano’s parents are Filipino, and he is born in US. He acquires Philippine citizenship under the principle
of jus sanguinis, and American citizenship under the principle jus soli. Dual citizenship is different from
dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance,
such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto
and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice
mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The
results of the election were as follows: Manzano- 103,853; Mercado-100,894; Daza III- 54,2751
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification
filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines
but of the United States.
The petition further provides that respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of
Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is registered as a
foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged
that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was
born in the United States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an
American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not
lose his Filipino citizenship.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Manzano, a dual citizen, should be disqualified
RULING
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of
the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of
Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis,while the United States
follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the
Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in
Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent “effectively renounced his
U.S. citizenship under American law,” so that now he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is
not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation
was made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should
have been made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American citizenship,
the COMELEC must have in mind §349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, which
provided that “A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall
lose his nationality by: . . .(e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election
or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory.” To be sure this provision was declared
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v.Rusk16as beyond the power given to the U.S.
Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran
for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect
renounced his American citizenship.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner’s contention that the oath of allegiance contained
in private respondent’s certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of
his American citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioner’s contention that, to be effective, such
renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law
requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age. ###
185 Tecson v. COMELEC
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs. COMELEC, FPJ and
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, Respondents.
G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004
Ponente: J. Vitug
Topic: Citizenship – 1935 Constitution
Synopsis:
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondent Poe’s birth, provided
that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a
Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate. The 1935
Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus,
the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed
marriage had no bearing on respondent’s citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation
evidenced by the public documents presented.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly
misrepresented material facts in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural
Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. COMELEC dismissed the petition, holding that
Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, contending that only the
Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino
citizen.
RULING
1. The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding “qualification of a candidate” for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or
"Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections.
2. COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen. The 1935
Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondent’s birth, provided that among
the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latter’s death
certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In the absence of any
other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of
residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization"
that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzo’s citizenship would have extended to his
son, Allan---respondent’s father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a
Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate. The 1935
Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus,
the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed
marriage had no bearing on respondent’s citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation
evidenced by the public documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that
he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
186 David v. Agbay
RENATO M. DAVID, petitioner, vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent
G.R. No. 199113. March 18, 2015

Topic: Citizenship – Reacquisition
Synopsis:
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens
before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is “Retention of Philippine
Citizenship”, the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms “re-acquire” and “retain” to describe
the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident
from the title of the law using both re-acquisition and retention.
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at
the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63,
the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country
was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he
reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a
consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is
concerned.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their
retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a lot in
Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, in the year 2004, they came to
know that the portion where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino
citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian
citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE(S)
May David be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application
despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225?
RULING
YES. R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,” was
signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law
read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: xxx Natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath (Emphasis supplied).
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens
before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is “Retention of Philippine
Citizenship”, the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms “re-acquire” and “retain” to describe
the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident
from the title of the law using both re-acquisition and retention.
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at
the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63,
the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country
was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he
reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a
consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is
concerned.
187 Dennis Go v. Republic

DENNIS L. GO, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 202809. July 2, 2014.
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Topic: Citizenship – Qualifications for Naturalization
Synopsis:
In this case, while there was no question as to the moral inclinations of the witnesses, there was likewise
no showing that they were qualified with respect to the qualifications prescribed by naturalization laws.
Simply put, no evidence was proffered showing the witnesses’ good standing I the community, honesty,
moral uprightness, and most importantly, reliability. As a consequence therefore, their statements do not
possess the measure of credibility required of a naturalization proceeding. Furthermore, it was shown
that the witnesses only provided general statements, without specifying particular acts or events that
would exhibit petitioner’s state worthy of the grant of Philippine citizenship.
Finally, the OSG is also correct in contending that failure to state all former residences was fatal to
petitioner’s application for naturalization. Indeed, his omission had deprived the court of jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case. The inclusion of present and former places of residence is a jurisdictional
requirement, without which the petition suffers from a fatal and congenital defect which cannot be cured
by evidence on the omitted matter at the trial.
Digest:
FACTS
On October 13, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization under C.A. No. 473, the Revised
Naturalization Law, before the RTC. In this proceeding, petitioner presented the necessary documentary
and testamentary evidence to prove that he has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
naturalization. The OSG posed no objection to the relevancy of any of the evidence presented, and even
manifested that it had no evidence to present. However, the solicitor general later sought to reopen the
case by reason of a report received on November 23, 2006, issued by the NBI, stating that petitioner has
a previous criminal record. Petitioner contested, stating that he had a clearance issued by the NBI, and
that he was not the same Dennis Go who was the subject of the NBI Investigation Report presented by
the OSG. The RTC denied the petition of the OSG and granted petitioner’s naturalization. The OSG thus
filed a motion for reconsideration, posing different pieces of evidence this time, particularly the fact that
petitioner’s character witnesses were not credible (petitioner presented the testimony of two doctors who
had conducted physical and psychological examinations on him, a family friend, a relative by affinity, and
a businessman friend). The OSG also contends that the fact that petitioner’s failure to state all his former
places of residence was fatal to his petition for naturalization. Again, the RTC denied its motion to reopen
the case, but the Court of Appeals thereafter reversed the judgment in favor of the OSG, hence, this
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE(S)
Should the petition for naturalization be granted?
RULING
No. It is a well-entrenched rule that Philippine citizenship should not easily be given away. All those
seeking to acquire it must prove, to the satisfaction of the court that they have complied with all the
requirements of the law. Indeed, naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most discriminating as
well as delicate and exacting nature, affecting, as it does, public interest of the highest order, and which
may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed by law therefor. The law requires that a
vouching witness should have actually known an applicant for whom he testified for the requisite period
prescribed therein to give him the necessary competence to act as such. The reason behind this
requirement is that a vouching witness is in a way an insurer of the character if the petitioner. In this
case, while there was no question as to the moral inclinations of the witnesses, there was likewise no
showing that they were qualified with respect to the qualifications prescribed by naturalization laws.
Simply put, no evidence was proffered showing the witnesses’ good standing I the community, honesty,
moral uprightness, and most importantly, reliability. As a consequence therefore, their statements do not
possess the measure of credibility required of a naturalization proceeding. Furthermore, it was shown
that the witnesses only provided general statements, without specifying particular acts or events that
would exhibit petitioner’s state worthy of the grant of Philippine citizenship.
Finally, the OSG is also correct in contending that failure to state all former residences was fatal to
petitioner’s application for naturalization. Indeed, his omission had deprived the court of jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case. The inclusion of present and former places of residence is a jurisdictional
requirement, without which the petition suffers from a fatal and congenital defect which cannot be cured
by evidence on the omitted matter at the trial.
188 Republic v. Li Ching Chung
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LI CHING CHUNG, a.k.a. BERNABE LUNA LI,
a.k.a. STEPHEN LEE KENG, respondent.
G.R. No. 197450. March 20, 2013.
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Topic: Citizenship – Period for Filing Petition for Naturalization
Synopsis:
The period of one year required therein is the time fixed for the State to make inquiries as to the
qualifications of the applicant. If this period of time is not given to it, the State will have no sufficient
opportunity to investigate the qualifications of the applicants and gather evidence thereon. An applicant
may then impose upon the courts, as the State would have no opportunity to gather evidence that it may
present to contradict whatever evidence that the applicant may adduce on behalf of his petition. The only
exception to the mandatory filing of a declaration of intention is specifically stated in Section 6 of CA No.
473, or those who were born in the Philippines and have received their primary and secondary education
in public schools or those recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality, and
those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or more before filing
their application. Unquestionably, respondent does not fall into the category of such exempt individuals
that would excuse him from filing a declaration of intention one year prior to the filing of a petition for
naturalization. Contrary to the CA finding, respondent’s premature filing of his petition for naturalization
before the expiration of the one-year period is fatal.
Digest:
FACTS
Bernabe Luna Li or Stephen Lee Keng, a Chinese national, filed his Declaration of Intention to Become a
Citizen of the Philippines before the OSG. Almost seven months after filing his declaration of intention,
respondent filed his Petition for Naturalization before the RTC. On April 5, 2008, respondent filed his
Amended Petition for Naturalization.
Consequently, the petition was set for initial hearing on April 3, 2009 and its notice was posted in a
conspicuous place at the Manila City Hall and published in the Official Gazette on June 30, 2008, July 7,
2008 and July 14, 2008, and in the Manila Times, on May 30, 2007, June 6, 2008 and June 13, 2008.
Thereafter, respondent filed the Motion for Early Setting praying that the hearing be moved from April 3,
2009 to July 31, 2008 so he could acquire real estate properties. The OSG filed its Opposition, arguing
that the said motion was a “clear violation of Sec. 1, of RA 530, which provides that hearing on the
petition should be held not earlier than 6 months from the date of last publication of the notice.” The
opposition was already late as the RTC denied the respondent’s motion.
Accordingly, the RTC ordered the suspension of the judicial proceedings until all the requirements of the
statute of limitation would be completed. The OSG filed a motion to dismiss, but the RTC denied the
same and granted respondent’s application for naturalization.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the respondent should be admitted as a Filipino citizen despite his undisputed failure to comply
with the requirements provided for in CA No. 473, as amended―which are mandatory and jurisdictional
in character―particularly: the filing of his petition for naturalization within the one (1) year proscribed
period from the date he filed his declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen
RULING
No. Section 5 of CA No. 473,4 as amended, expressly states:
Section 5. Declaration of intention.―One year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to
Philippine citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship shall file with the Bureau of
Justice (now Office of the Solicitor General) a declaration under oath that it is bona fide his
intention to become a citizen of the Philippines. Such declaration shall set forth name, age,
occupation, personal description, place of birth, last foreign residence and allegiance, the date of arrival,
the name of the vessel or aircraft, if any, in which he came to the Philippines, and the place of residence
in the Philippines at the time of making the declaration. No declaration shall be valid until lawful entry for
permanent residence has been established and a certificate showing the date, place, and manner of his
arrival has been issued. The declarant must also state that he has enrolled his minor children, if any, in
any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education of the
Philippines, where Philippine history, government, and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the
school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the
hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen. Each declarant must furnish two
photographs of himself. (Emphasis supplied)
As held in Tan v. Republic, “The period of one year required therein is the time fixed for the State to
make inquiries as to the qualifications of the applicant. If this period of time is not given to it, the State
will have no sufficient opportunity to investigate the qualifications of the applicants and gather evidence
thereon. An applicant may then impose upon the courts, as the State would have no opportunity to
gather evidence that it may present to contradict whatever evidence that the applicant may adduce on
behalf of his petition.”
The only exception to the mandatory filing of a declaration of intention is specifically stated in Section 6
of CA No. 473, to wit:
Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention.―Persons

born in the Philippines and have received their primary and secondary education in public
schools or those recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality,
and those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or
more before filing their application, may be naturalized without having to make a
declaration of intention upon complying with the other requirements of this Act. To such
requirements shall be added that which establishes that the applicant has given primary and
secondary education to all his children in the public schools or in private schools recognized
by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality. The same shall be understood
applicable with respect to the widow and minor children of an alien who has declared his
intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, and dies before he is actually naturalized. (Emphases
supplied)
Unquestionably, respondent does not fall into the category of such exempt individuals that would excuse
him from filing a declaration of intention one year prior to the filing of a petition for naturalization.
Contrary to the CA finding, respondent’s premature filing of his petition for naturalization before the
expiration of the one-year period is fatal.
189 Ledesma v. CA
ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANIANO A.
DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, HON. ALEBARDO L. APORTADERA, in his capacity
as Assistant Ombudsman, and OMBUDSMAN FACT FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU,
Represented by Director AGAPITO ROSALES
G.R. No. 161629. July 29, 2005.
Topic: Public Officers – Powers of the Ombudsman
Synopsis:
The contention as to whether the findings of the Ombudsman is only advisory arose from the
Constitutional provision in Section 3 paragraph 3 Article XI which states that: Direct the officer (Head of
BI) concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend
his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. By
stating therefore that the Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken against an erring officer or
employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the
order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID. Further,
that the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to penalize
an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the
Ombudsman’s “recommendation” is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the
bounds of the law.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma is the Chairman of the First Division of the Board of Special Inquiry
(BSI) of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID).In a letter-complaint filed by Augusto Somalio
with the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, an investigation
was requested on alleged anomalies surrounding the extension of the Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs)
of two (2) foreign nationals. The FFIB investigation revealed seven (7) other cases of TRV extensions
tainted with similar irregularities.
Petitioner together with two other employees i.e. Caronongan and Ang which are subordinate by
petitioner in his division were charged by FFIB in Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The complaint against petitioner, Caronongan and Ang alleged the following illegal acts: (a)
irregularly granting TRVs beyond the prescribed period; and (b) using "recycled" or photocopied
applications for a TRV extension without the applicants affixing their signatures anew to validate the
correctness and truthfulness of the information previously stated therein. Specifically, petitioner and
Caronongan allegedly signed the Memorandum of Transmittal to the Board of Commission (BOC) of the
BID, forwarding the applications for TRV extension of several aliens whose papers were questionable.
Ombudsman suspended Ledesma for 1 year while the other two were favorably dismissed from their
involvement. CA affirmed decision but lessen the period of suspension to 6 months.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the CA is correct in concluding that the Ombudsman is not merely advisory on the Bureau of
Immigration in penalizing the petitioner
2. Whether Ledesma is liable for the anomalous approval of the TRVs
RULING
1. The CA is correct. The contention as to whether the findings of the Ombudsman is only advisory arose
from the Constitutional provision in Section 3 paragraph 3 Article XI which states that: Direct the officer
(Head of BI) concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken
against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the
implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case would be the head
of the BID.
Further, that the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to
penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the
Ombudsman’s “recommendation” is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the
bounds of the law. It is clear that the framers of our Constitution intended to create a stronger and more
effective Ombudsman, independent and beyond the reach of political influences and vested with powers
that are not merely persuasive in character.
2. Ledesma is liable. Practicality and efficiency in the conduct of government business dictate that the
gritty details be sifted and reviewed by the time it reaches the final approving authority; The Chairman of
the First Division of Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) of the BID has direct supervision over its proceedings
and cannot therefore feign ignorance or good faith when irregularities in the Temporary Resident Visa
(TRV) extension applications are so patently clear on its face.
190 Francisco v. House of Representatives
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, Jr., Petitioner vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al.,

Respondents
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.
Ponente: J. Carpio-Morales
Topic: House of Representatives – Impeachment
Synopsis:
The term “initiate” means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. The initiation starts with the
filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers
to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint.
The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee
on Justice. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning
of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following
Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
Digest:
FACTS
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).”
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for
“culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint
was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,
and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2)
of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
“sufficient in form, “but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in
accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and 3 weeks since the filing of the 1st complaint, the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third
District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third (1/3) of
all the Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the 2nd impeachment complaint is valid
RULING
No. The term “initiate” means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. The initiation starts with
the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It
refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said
complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the
Committee on Justice.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and
referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
191 Guttierez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice
G.R. No. 193459. February 15, 2011

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
Topic: House of Representatives – Impeachment
Synopsis:
There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole and “one section is not to be allowed to defeat another.” Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch
of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.” The Court finds it well-within
its power to determine whether public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely
abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or
excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court.
The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent of

the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of Representatives which committed
such determinative function to public respondent. In the discharge of that power and in the exercise of
its discretion, the House has formulated determinable standards as to the form and substance of an
impeachment complaint.
Digest:
FACTS
Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010, Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim,
and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against
petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.
A day after the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27, 2010, Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary
General of the House of Representatives, transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker
Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. who, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the Committee on Rules to
include it in the Order of Business.
On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos,
Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint
against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares,
Teodoro Casiño, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus. On even
date, the House of Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceddings of the 14th Congress. By letter still of even date, the Secretary General transmitted the
Reyes group’s complaint to Speaker Belmonte, who by Memorandum of August 9, 2010, also directed the
Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
House Majority Floor Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules, instructed
Atty. Adasa, Jr., Deputy Sec. Gen. for Operations, through Atty. Pareja, Exec. Director of the Plenary
Affair Department to include the two complaints in the Order of Business for the following day.
On August 11, 2010, during its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred
both complaints to public respondent. After hearing, House of Representatives Committee on Justice
(public respondent), by Resolution of September 1, 2010 found both complaints sufficient in form, which
complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly at the same time. Meanwhile, the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published.
On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion for reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution.
Public respondent refused to accept the motion, however for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to
await the notice for her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her
motion to each of the 55 members of the public respondent. After hearing, public respondent, by
Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of
substance of the complaints by the public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their
allegations.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the checks and
balances.
2. Whether the public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and substance of the
complaints on the basis of standards set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment rules.
3. Whether the impeachment complaints filed violated the one-year bar rule.
RULING
1. NO, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole and “one section is not to be allowed to defeat another.” Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch
of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.”
The power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari jurisdiction of this Court reflects,
includes the power to “determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
In the present case, petitioner invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil
actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well-within its power to
determine whether public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its
discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of
jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court.
Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply
upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.
2. NO, The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an

exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of Representatives
which committed such determinative function to public respondent. In the discharge of that power and in
the exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated determinable standards as to the form and
substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations behoove the Court to respect the
compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any
contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines.
Contrary to petitioner’s position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible
standards in determining the sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in
echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a “verified complaint or
resolution,” and that the substance requirement is met if there is “a recital of facts constituting the
offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.”
Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of
form and substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly
found in the organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution basically merely requires a
“hearing.” In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of
form and substance in an impeachment complaint is vital “to effectively carry out” the impeachment
process, hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.
3. NO, Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: “No impeachment proceedings shall
be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”
Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against
her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits
that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and
referred to public respondent.
Contrary to petitioner’s asseveration, Francisco states that the term “initiate” means to file the complaint
and take initial action on it. The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be
accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the
House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.
Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that “no second verified
impeachment may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action” which contemplates
a situation where a first impeachment complaint had already been referred. Bernas and Regalado, who
both acted as amici curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the act of initiating includes the act of taking initial
action on the complaint.
“From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term “to initiate” refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.”
The purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: “to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to
allow the legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation,”
192 Estarija v. Ranada
EDGARDO V. ESTARIJA, Petitioner, vs. EDWARD F. RANADA and the HONORABLE

OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO (now succeeded by HON. SIMEON MARCELO) and his
Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, HON. ANTONIO E. VALENZUELA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 159314. June 26, 2006.
Synopsis:
Through the enactment of RA No. 6770, specifically Section 15(3), the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman
such powers to sanction erring officials and employees, except members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
Therefore, the powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory for his office was given teeth
to render this constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, under RA 6770 and the
1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government
service an erring public official such as herein petitioner Edgardo V. Estarija.
Digest:
FACTS
Herein respondent, Edward F. Ranada, a member of the Davao Pilots Association, Inc. (DPAI) and Davao
Tugboat and Allied Services, Inc., (DTASI) filed an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct before
the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, against herein petitioner Captain Edgardo V. Estarija, Harbor
Master of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), Davao City, alleging in his complaint that Estarija had been
demanding monies for the approval and issuance of berthing permits, and monthly contribution from the
DPAI. The complaint further alleged that in order to stop the mulcting and extortion activities of
petitioner, the association reported the latter to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which later
caught Estarija red-handed in its entrapment operation. The Ombudsman rendered a decision in the
administrative case, finding Estarija guilty of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. Estarija timely filed his
Motion for Reconsideration claiming that his dismissal is unconstitutional for the Ombudsman’s
administrative authority is merely recommendatory. This was denied by the Ombudsman. On appeal, the
CA upheld the decision of the Ombudsman. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether or not there substantial evidence to hold petitioner liable for dishonesty and grave
misconduct.
2. Whether the power of the Ombudsman to directly remove, suspend, demote, fine or censure erring
officials is constitutional or not.
RULING
1. Yes. In an administrative proceeding, the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only
substantial evidence, that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. As in this case, Estarija does not deny that he went to the DPAI office to
collect the money and that he actually received the money. Since there was no pending transaction
between the PPA and the DPAI, he had no reason to go to the latter’s office to collect any money. Even if
he was authorized to assist in the collection of money due the agency, he should have issued an official
receipt for the transaction, but he did not do so. Patently, petitioner had been dishonest about accepting
money from DPAI. Therefore, his conduct convinced the Court that there is indeed substantial evidence
to hold him liable for dishonestly and grave misconduct.
2. Yes, Sections 15, 21, 22 and 25 of RA 6770 are constitutionally sound. Through the enactment of RA
No. 6770, specifically Section 15(3), the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring
officials and employees, except members of Congress, and the Judiciary. Therefore, the powers of the
Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory for his office was given teeth to render this constitutional
body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, under RA 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public
official such as herein petitioner Edgardo V. Estarija.
193 Macalino v. Sandiganbayan
FELICITO S. MACALINAO, Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 140199-200. February 6, 2002.
Ponente: J. Pardo
Topic: Public Officers – Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
Synopsis:
Inasmuch as the PNCC has no original charter as it was incorporated under the general law on
corporations, it follows inevitably that petitioner is not a public officer within the coverage of R. A. No.
3019, as amended. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him. The only instance when the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges him either as a
co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer who has been charged with a crime within the
jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.
Digest:
FACTS
On September 16, 1992, two informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner,being
then the Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division and the Head of the Loans Administration &
Insurance Section of the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), a government-controlled
corporation, and his wife, Liwayway S. Tan, charging them with estafa through falsification of official
documents and frustrated estafa through falsification of mercantile documents. Upon arraignment,
petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges.
However, during the initial presentation of evidence for the defense, petitioner moved for leave to file a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him since he is not a
public officer because the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), formerly the Construction
and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation with original charter.
On August 5, 1999, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss
for lack of merit.
ISSUE(S)
Whether petitioner, an employee of the PNCC, is a public officer within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as
amended
RULING
Inasmuch as the PNCC has no original charter as it was incorporated under the general law on
corporations, it follows inevitably that petitioner is not a public officer within the coverage of R. A. No.
3019, as amended. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him. The only instance when the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges him either as a
co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer who has been charged with a crime within the
jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.
194 Gonzales III v. Office of the President
EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Acting through and represented by EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 196231. January 28, 2014.
Ponente: J. Brion
Topic: Public Officers – The Ombudsman
Synopsis:
The Supreme Court held that the power of the President to discipline and to dismiss the deputy
ombudsman violates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Digest:
FACTS
Gonzales, Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other Law Enforcement Officers (MOLEO), directed the
NAPOLCOM to turn over to his office the records of Rolando Mendoza, a robbery, grave threat, robbery
extortion and physical injury case. After preparing a draft decision on Mendoza, et al.’s case, Gonzales
forwarded the entire records to the Office of then Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez for her review. In his
draft decision, Gonzales found Mendoza, et al. guilty of grave misconduct and imposed on them the
penalty of dismissal from the service.
Mendoza, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration. Pending final action by the Ombudsman on Mendoza,
et al.’s case, Mendoza hijacked a tourist bus and held the 21 foreign tourists and the four Filipino tour
assistants on board as hostages. While the government exerted earnest attempts to peacefully resolve
the hostage-taking, it ended tragically, resulting in the deaths of Mendoza and several others on board
the hijacked bus.
In the aftermath, President Benigno C. Aquino III directed the Department of Justice and the Department
of Interior and Local Government to conduct a joint thorough investigation of the incident.
The IIRC found the Ombudsman and Gonzales accountable for their "gross negligence and grave
misconduct in handling the case against Mendoza." The IIRC stated that the Ombudsman and Gonzales’
failure to promptly resolve Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration, "without justification and despite
repeated pleas" xxx "precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking." The IIRC recommended the
referral of its findings to the OP for further determination of possible administrative offenses and for the
initiation of the proper administrative proceedings.
Accordingly, Gonzales was formally charged before the OP for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency
in the Performance of Official Duty and for Misconduct in Office
Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy
Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the Ombudsman who exercises administrative
disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not OP’s administrative disciplinary jurisdiction and removal power over a Deputy
Ombudsman as provided for in Section 8 Paragraph 2 of R.A. No. 6770 is constitutional
RULING
No. Initially, in G.R. No. 196232. September 4, 2012, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 which grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. But, On motion for reconsideration and further reflection, the
Court votes to grant Gonzales’ petition and to declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with
respect to the Office of the Ombudsman.
In more concrete terms, it was rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by
the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the
Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of
the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key
officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately,
intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did.
By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to
the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation
of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as
agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected
to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as she is, if only
because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for complete trust is
true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines where graft and
corruption is still a major problem for the government. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
(providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared void. ###
195 Dichaves v. Ombudsman
JAIME DICHAVES, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL DIVISION
OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
GR. NOS. 206310-11 (OMB-0-01-0211 and OMB-0-01 0291; Sandiganbayan Special Division-
Criminal Case No. 26558), December 07, 2016
Ponente: J. Leonen
Synopsis:
As a general rule, the Supreme Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's exercise of
its constitutional mandate. Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770126 (The Ombudsman Act of
1989) give the Ombudsman wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and
government employees. The rule on non-interference is based on the "respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman."
The Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate. As an independent constitutional
body, the Office of the Ombudsman is "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people[,] and
[is] the preserver of the integrity of the public service." Thus, it has the sole power to determine whether
there is probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal case against an accused. This function is
executive in nature.
Digest:
FACTS
Jaime Dichaves, who was identified as one of the John Does in People vs Estrada was charged with
plunder along with President Estrada and many others. On January 29, 2002, a warrant of arrest was
issued against Dichaves, but he could not be located as he already slipped out the country. No subpoena
was served on him. Estrada was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of plunder and was
later pardoned by Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
On November 9, 2010, Dichaves resurfaced and filed a Motion to Quash/or a Motion for Reinvestigation,
seeking for a preliminary investigation of his case as none was conducted. The Sandiganbayan granted
the motion for reinvestigation and directed the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation of
the case. On September 18, 2011, it resolved to recall Dichaves’ warrant of arrest. The Anti-graft court
denied Dichaves’ Motion to Quash.
The Office of the Ombudsman Special Panel issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause to charge
Dichaves with plunder. Dichaves’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Ombudsman. to charge
Dichaves with plunder. Dichaves’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Ombudsman.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman is correct in finding probable cause against petitioner
RULING
Yes. As a general rule, the Supreme Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's
exercise of its constitutional mandate. Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770126 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989) give the Ombudsman wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public
officials and government employees. The rule on non-interference is based on the "respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman."
The Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate. As an independent constitutional
body, the Office of the Ombudsman is "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people[,] and
[is] the preserver of the integrity of the public service." Thus, it has the sole power to determine whether
there is probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal case against an accused. This function is
executive in nature.
196 Salumbides v. Ombudsman
ATTY. VICENTE E. SALUMBIDES, JR., and GLENDA ARAA, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
RICARDO AGON, RAMON VILLASANTA, ELMER DIZON, SALVADOR ADUL, and AGNES FABIAN,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 180917. April 23, 2010
Topic: Public Officers – Neglect of Duty
Synopsis:
Simple Neglect of Duty is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a task expected from an
employee resulting from either carelessness or indifference. In the resent case, petitioners fell short of
the reasonable diligence required of them, for failing to exercise due care and prudence in ascertaining
the legal requirements and fiscal soundness of the projects before stamping their imprimatur and giving
their advice to their superior.
Digest:
FACTS
Salumbides and Araña were appointed in July 2001 as Municipal Legal Officer/ Administrator and
Municipal Budget Officer, respectively, of Tagkawayan, Quezon. Towards the end of 2001 Mayor
Salumbides III saw the urgent need to a construct 2-classroom building with a fence for the Tagkawayan
Municipal High School. On how to solve the classroom shortage, the mayor consulted Salumbides who
suggested that the construction of the 2-classroom building be charged to the account of the
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses/Repair and Maintenance of Facilities (MOOE/RMF) and
implemented “by administration,” as had been done in a previous classroom building project.
Upon, consultation, Araña advised Salumbides, that there were no more available funds that could be
taken from the MOOE/RMF, but the savings of the municipal government were adequate to fund the
projects. She added, however, that the approval by the Sangguniang Bayan of a proposed supplemental
budget must be secured. But the members of the Sangguniang Bayan has already gone into recess for
the Christmas holidays. So, Araña and Salumbides advised the mayor to source the funds from the Php
1,000,000 MOOE/RMF allocation in the approved Municipal Annual Budget for 2002.
Thus, the mayor ordered the Municipal Engineer to proceed with the construction of the projects based
on the program of work and bill of materials. And Upon advice of Municipal Planning and Development
Officer, the mayor included the project in the list of government projects scheduled for bidding.
The construction of the projects commenced without any approved appropriation and ahead of the public
bidding. Hence, a complaint has been filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman found
Salumbides and Araña guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the petitioners are guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty
RULING
YES. Simple Neglect of Duty is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a task expected from an
their advice to their superior.
Public servants must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty.
197 Khan, Jr. v. Ombudsman
G.R. No. 125296. July 20, 2006

ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR. and WENCESLAO L. MALABANAN, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), ROSAURO F. TORRALBA and CELESTINO
BANDALA, respondents.
Ponente: J. Corona
Topic: Public Officers – Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
Synopsis:
The Office of the Ombudsman exercises jurisdiction over public officials/employees of GOCCs with original
charters. This being so, it can only investigate and prosecute acts or omissions of the officials/employees
of government corporations. The phrase “with original charter” means “chartered by special law as
distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code.” Therefore, although the
government later on acquired the controlling interest in PAL, the fact remains that the latter did not have
an “original charter” and its officers/employees could not be investigated and/or prosecuted by the
Ombudsman.
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested
with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of
the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. “Public officers” are those endowed with the
exercise of sovereign executive, legislative or judicial functions. Clearly, as then public officers of PAL,
were not public officers.
Digest:
FACTS
Torralba and Bandala charged petitioners before the Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) for violation of RA
3019. They accused petitioners of using their positions in PAL to secure a contract for Synergy Services
Corporation, a corporation engaged in hauling and janitorial services in which they were shareholders.
Petitioners filed an omnibus motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: 1. The
Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over them since PAL was a private entity and 2. They were not public
officers, hence outside the application on RA 3019. In a resolution, the Deputy Ombudsman denied
petitioner’s omnibus motion to dismiss.
Petitioners appealed the order to the Ombudsman. There, they raised the same issues. Treating the
appeal as a motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman dismissed it. He held that petitioners’ were
officers of a GOCC, hence, he had jurisdiction over them.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether the Quimpo case is applicable.
3. Whether petitioners are Public Officers.
RULING
1. NO, The 1987 Constitution states the powers and functions of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Specifically, Article XI, Section 13(2) provides:
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled
corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop,
prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties. (italics supplied)
Based on the foregoing provision, the Office of the Ombudsman exercises jurisdiction over public
officials/employees of GOCCs with original charters. This being so, it can only investigate and prosecute
acts or omissions of the officials/employees of government corporations. Therefore, although the
government later on acquired the controlling interest in PAL, the fact remains that the latter did not have
an “original charter” and its officers/employees could not be investigated and/or prosecuted by the
Ombudsman.
In Juco v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court ruled that the phrase “with original charter”
means “chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation
Code.” PAL, being originally a private corporation seeded by private capital and created under the general
corporation law, does not fall within the jurisdictional powers of the Ombudsman under Article XI, Section
13(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the latter is devoid of authority to investigate or prosecute
petitioners.
2. NO, In Quimpo, the government acquired PETROPHIL to “perform functions related to government
programs and policies on oil.”11 The fact that the purpose in acquiring PETROPHIL was for it to
undertake governmental functions related to oil was decisive in sustaining the Tanodbayan’s jurisdiction
over it. This was certainly not the case with PAL. The records indicate that the government acquired the
controlling interest in the airline as a result of the conversion into equity of its unpaid loans in GSIS. No
governmental functions at all were involved.
Furthermore, Quimpo was decided prior to the 1987 Constitution. In fact, it was the 1973 Constitution
which the Court relied on in concluding that the Tanodbayan had jurisdiction over PETROPHIL’s accused
officers. Particularly, the Court cited Article XIII, Section 6:
SEC. 6. The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the Ombudsman, to be known as the
Tanodbayan, which shall receive and investigate complaints relative to public office, including those in
government-owned or -controlled corporations, make appropriate recommendations, and in case of
failure of justice as defined by law, file and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil, or administrative
case before the proper court or body.
The term “government-owned or controlled corporations” in the 1973 Constitution was qualified by the
1987 Constitution to refer only to those with original charters.
3. NO, A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested
with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of
the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. “Public officers” are those endowed with the
exercise of sovereign executive, legislative or judicial functions. Clearly, as then public officers of PAL,
were not public officers.
198 Ombudsman v. Estandarte
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. HEIDI M. ESTANDARTE and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, TWENTIETH DIVISION, respondents.
G.R. No. 168670. April 13, 2007

Synopsis:
The better rule in the event of conflict between two courts of concurrent jurisdiction as in the present
case, is to allow the litigation to be tried and decided by the court which, under the circumstances
obtaining in the controversy, would, in the mind of this Court, be in a better position to serve the
interests of justice, considering the nature of the controversy, the comparative accessibility of the court
to the parties, having in view their peculiar positions and capabilities, and other similar factors.
Considering that the respondent is a public school teacher who is covered by the provisions of Rep. Act
No. 4670, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, the DECS-Region VI is in a better position to
decide the matter. Moreover, the DECS has already commenced proceedings over the administrative case
by constituting the Special Investigating Committee pursuant to Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670.
Digest:
FACTS
People’s Graftwatch through its chairman Dr. Tan, referred to the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) ,
for immediate investigation a complaint of the Faculty Club and Department Heads of the Ramon Torres
National High School against Heidi Estandarte, the school principal. The complaint consisted of 33
allegations of improprieties ranging from illegal handling of school funds, irregular financial transactions,
perjury and abuse of authority. However, the complaint was not subscribed and sworn to by the
complainant, and not supported by the sworn statements of witnesses. The complaint also lacked a
statement of non-forum shopping as required. The Ombudsman treated the matter as a request for
assistance.
On August 31, 1998, the Ombudsman forwarded the complaint to DECS-Region VI and COA for
appropriate action pursuant to Sec. 15 (2) of RA 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The DECS-Region VI found that the complaint didn’t comply with the formalities under EO 292. Thus, it
dismissed the complaint, without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate one.
The Faculty Club filed a formal complaint with DECS-Region VI, however the said office dismissed the
complaint outright for lack of verification and certification against forum shopping. On March 22, 1999,
DECS-Region VI received the requisite verification and certification. Thereafter, a special investigating
committee was created to hear the case. DECS-Region VI approved the composition of the Committee in
a 1st indorsement.
On September 17, 1999, the committee held a pre-hearing conference. It issued a 1st indorsement on
December 6, 1999, recommending the dismissal of the case on the ground of forum shopping.
Meanwhile, the COA referred the complaint against Estandarte to the Provincial Auditor. Pursuant thereto,
the provincial auditor conducted an investigation and submitted his report to the Ombudsman. He found
that Estandarte’s actions in connection with 24 of the 33 allegations in the complaint were “within the
bounds of propriety.”
The Ombudsman decided to refer the administrative aspect of the case to DECS-Region VI for
administrative adjudication pursuant to Sec. 23 (2) of RA 6770. However DECS-Region VI did not receive
this referral. The Ombudsman inquired about the progress of the case from DECS Region VI, and when it
did not answer, it sent another letter-inquiry on September 21, 2000. Finally, on November 22, 2000, the
Ombudsman received a letter from them informing that the latter did not receive any referral concerning
the case. Hence, the Ombudsman again forwarded the records of the case to DECS which received them
on December 26, 2000. DECS-Region VI directed the consolidation of the case.
Thereafter, the hearing of the case by the Special Investigating Committee resumed. In view of the
referral to DECS-Region VI, the ombudsman considered the administrative aspect of the case closed and
terminated. In a letter dated April 29, 2002, the faculty club requested, the Ombudsman to take over for
speedier disposition. Consequently, on July 5, 2002, the Ombudsman informed the DECS-Region VI that
it would not object if the case is returned to it. So, DECS-Region VI turned over the records of the case to
the Ombudsman, stating that “ it is the impression of this Office that the complainants intend that their
case be heard by the Office of the Ombudsman and that Office had also manifested its willingness to
reassume jurisdiction of the same.
On November 6, 2002, the Ombudsman set the case for preliminary conference. In the meantime,
Estandarte filed an urgent motion to remand the case to DECS-Region VI on the ground that jurisdiction
is now exclusively vested on the latter. The Ombudsman denied the motion ratiocinating that it was not
barred from assuming jurisdiction over the complaint after the DECS-Region VI had relingquished its
jurisdiction over the same.
On June 14, 2005, the CA issued the assailed decision granting the petition and remanding the case to
the Special Investigating Committee of the DECS-Region VI.
ISSUE(S)
Whether DECS-Region VI has jurisdiction over the case
RULING
YES, we do not agree with petitioner’s contention that it could assume jurisdiction over the administrative
case after the DECS Region VI had voluntarily relinquished its jurisdiction over the same in favor of the
petitioner. Jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the
parties but continues until the case is terminated. When the complainants filed their formal complaint
with the DECS-Region VI, jurisdiction was vested on the latter. It cannot now be transferred to petitioner
upon the instance of the complainants, even with the acquiescence of the DECS and petitioner.
Nonetheless, even if we hold that the Ombudsman (Visayas) had concurrent jurisdiction over the
administrative case, we would still sustain the DECS’ authority to decide the administrative case. In one
case, the Court pronounced that—
“In any event, since We are not dealing with jurisdiction but mainly with venue, considering both court
concerned do have jurisdiction over the cause of action of the parties herein against each other, the
better rule in the event of conflict between two courts of concurrent jurisdiction as in the
present case, is to allow the litigation to be tried and decided by the court which, under the
circumstances obtaining in the controversy, would, in the mind of this Court, be in a better
position to serve the interests of justice, considering the nature of the controversy, the
comparative accessibility of the court to the parties, having in view their peculiar positions
and capabilities, and other similar factors. x x x x”
Considering that the respondent is a public school teacher who is covered by the provisions of Rep. Act
No. 4670, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, the DECS-Region VI is in a better position to
decide the matter. Moreover, the DECS has already commenced proceedings over the administrative case
by constituting the Special Investigating Committee pursuant to Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670.
199 Ombudsman v. CA (Ombudsman v. Lucero, November 24/ 2006)
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. FARIDA T. LUCERO and COURT OF APPEALS
(Cebu City), respondents.
G.R. No. 168718. November 24, 2006.

Synopsis:
All these provisions in Republic Act No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers
to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These provisions
cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive
complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon
witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive suspension public officers
and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public
officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said penalty.
Digest:
FACTS
Lucero was appointed on November 18, 1999 as Clerk II of the Land Transportation Office, Regional
Office No. VII, and was assigned at the Chief Finance Division in order to augment the personnel
complement thereat. In a Memorandum, which was issued by Regional Director Apor, she was likewise
directed to assist the Regional Cashier in collecting and receiving miscellaneous fees/revenues.
OIC-Regional Director Mendoza of the LTO, Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City requested COA to conduct
an audit in the Cash Section of the Operations Division of their office in order to determine the extent of
malversation of funds just discovered covering the period from 11/18/1999 to 9/30/2000. Acting on said
request, on October 2, 2000 an audit was conducted.
After conducting the audit, State Auditor Tiu prepared an Audit Observation Memorandum revealing
petitioner to have issued 69 altered miscellaneous receipts. As a consequence thereof, a Notice of Charge
was issued by the COA, LTO Region VII, receipt of which was acknowledged by the former Regional
Directors Apor and Mendoza of the LTO. Thereafter an administrative case for dishonesty was filed
against the petitioner in the Office of the Ombudsman (VIsayas).
On July 20, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered its Decision finding the petitioner guilty of
dishonesty upon which a penalty of dismissal from service with accessory penalties of FORFEITURE OF
ALL BENEFITS AND DISQUALIFICATION TO HOLD PUBLIC OFFICE IS IMPOSED.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the Ombudsman is empowered to order the removal of public officials or employees in
administrative cases
RULING
YES, the issue raised in this Court has already been resolved in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of
Appeals. In that case, the Court declared that in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority
under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770, the Office of the
Ombudsman is empowered not merely to recommend, but to impose the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault.
The Court stated that this was the manifest intent of the legislature:
All these provisions in Republic Act No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers
to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These provisions
cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive
complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon
witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive suspension public officers
and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public
officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said penalty.
200 Garcia v. Miro
MAYOR ALVIN B. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE PRIMO C. MIRO, in his capacity as
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, VIRGINIA PALANCA-SANTIAGO, in her capacity as
Director, Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), ALAN FRANCISCO S. GARCIANO, in his
capacity as Graft Investigation Officer 1, Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), respondents.
G.R. No. 148944. February 5, 2003.
Ponente: J. Azcuna
Synopsis:
Even unverified and anonymous letters may suffice to start an investigation. In permitting the filing of
complaints “in any form or manner,” the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known
reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. The Office of the
Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government
because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence,
can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them.
Digest:
FACTS
Alvin Garcia, as then Mayor of Cebu City, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig. The contract essentially
provided that F.E. Zuellig shall be the exclusive supplier of asphalt for the city’s asphalt batching plant for
the period of 3 yrs. Subsequently, Garcia was elected to a new term as mayor. The respondent Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas thereafter sought to hold him administratively liable on the aforesaid
contract and ordered him preventively suspended for six months.
Newspaper accounts of the alleged anomalies started to surface. Respondent, in a letter, required the
Director of COA-Region VII to conduct a special audit. On the same day, it likewise requested the City
Administrator of the Office of the Mayor to submit documents pertaining to the asphalt supply of the city
and a copy of the subject contract. Special Prosecution Office Tagaan of the Office of the Ombudsman
was assigned to conduct the inquiry. In his report, he recommended that a criminal and an administrative
complaint be filed against the petitioner Garcia and several others. On June 21, 1999, Tagaan filed an
affidavit with the Graft Investigation Office against the petitioner Garcia.
On August 16, 1999, the Office of the City Auditor filed with the Deputy Ombudsman its report which was
prepared by State Auditors Cabreros and Quejada, Jr. The COA Special Audit Report concluded that the
propriety of the foregoing is highly questionable in view of the fact that the payment(s) were made even
if the terms were not yet delivered which is clear case of ADVANCE PAYMENT in violation of existing law,
rules and regulations.
ISSUE(S)
Whether a mere COA fact-finding report constitute a valid complaint
RULING
YES, the complaint being referred to by petitioner is the complaint filed in court in a criminal case. For
purposes of initiating a preliminary investigation before the Office of the Ombudsman, a complaint “in
any form or manner” is sufficient.
Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution states that the Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of
the people, shall act promptly on “complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of Government.”
In Almonte v. Vasquez, we held that even unverified and anonymous letters may suffice to start an
investigation. In permitting the filing of complaints “in any form or manner,” the framers of the
Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining
against official wrongdoings. The Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and
prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who,
through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them.
In any case, the joint affidavits submitted by State Auditors Cabreros and Quejada contain allegations
specific enough for petitioner to prepare his evidence and counter-arguments.
201 Ledesma v. CA
ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANIANO A.
DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, HON. ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, in his capacity
as Assistant Ombudsman, and Ombudsman’s Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau,
represented by Director AGAPITO ROSALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 161629. July 29, 2005.
Synopsis:
The Ombudsman’s “recommendation” is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within
the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of
the head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but
a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged.
Digest:
FACTS
Atty. Ledesma is the Chairman of the First Division of the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of
Immigration, and Deportation (BID). In a letter-complaint filed by Somalio with the Fact Finding and
Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, an investigation was requested on alleged
anomalies surrounding the extension of the Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs) of 2 foreign nationals. The
FIIB investigation revealed 7 other cases of TRV extensions tainted with similar irregularities. As a result,
the FIIB, as nominal complainant, filed before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the Office
of the Ombudsman a formal complaint against herein petitioner and Caronongan and Ang. With respect
to petitioner, the complaint was treated as both a criminal and an administrative of violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for falsification of public documents, 9 counts of Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Falsification of Public Documents and Gross Neglect of Duty.
In a Joint Resolution, the Graft Investigation Officer Reyes, resolved the administrative cases filed against
petitioner, Caronongan and Ang, as follows:
“WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, it is respectfully recommended that:
1. Respondent Atty. Ledesma be SUSPENDED from the service for 1 year for Conduct Prejudicial
to the interest of service;
2. The instant case against Atty. Caronongan be DISMISSED, the same having been rendered
moot and academic; and
3. The instant case against respondent Ang be DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence.
SO RESOLVED.”
In the meantime, respondent Ombudsman approved a Resolution of the Graft Investigation Officer
Ancheta-Mejica, dismissing the criminal charges against petitioner for insufficiency of evidence. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration in the administrative case alleging that the BOC which reviews all
applications for TRVs extension, approved the TRVs in question, hence petitioner argued that it
effectively declared the applications for extension regular and in order and waived any infirmity thereon.
In an order dated February 8, 2000, Graft Officer Reyes recommended the denial of the motion for
reconsideration which was approved by respondent Ombudsman but reduced the period of suspension
from 1 yr. to 9 months without pay.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the finding of the Ombudsman is not merely advisory on the Bureau of Immigration is contrary
to the pertinent provision of the 1987 Constitution and applicable decisions of the honorable court
RULING
Yes, The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987 Constitution.The
Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated to act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations.Foremost
among its powers is the authority to investigate and prosecute cases involving public officers and
employees, thus:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, was passed into law on
November 17, 1989 and provided for the structural and functional organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman. RA 6770 mandated the Ombudsman and his deputies not only to act promptly on
complaints but also to enforce the administrative, civil and criminal liability of government officers and
employees in every case where the evidence warrants to promote efficient service by the Government to
the people. The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations as in the present
case is settled. Section 19 of RA 6770 provides:
SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints.—The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited
to acts or omissions which:
(1)Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2)Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3)Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency’s functions, though in accordance with law;
(4)Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5)Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6)Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
The point of contention is the binding power of any decision or order that emanates from the Office of
the Ombudsman after it has conducted its investigation. Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, it is provided:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
...
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.
The Ombudsman’s “recommendation” is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within
the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of
the head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but
a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged.
202 Ombudsman v. Galicia
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. RAMON C. GALICIA, respondent.

G.R. No. 167711. October 10, 2008.

Synopsis:
The intention of the law, which is to impose a separate standard and procedural requirement for
administrative cases involving public school teachers, must be given consideration. Hence, the
Ombudsman must yield to this committee of the Division School Superintendent. Even in the earlier case
of Alcala v. Villar, 416 SCRA 147 (2003), the Court held that: Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act
of 1989, provides that the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries except
over officials who may be removed by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
However, in Fabella v. Court of Appeals, it was held that R.A. No. 4670, the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers, specifically covers and governs administrative proceedings involving public school
teachers.
Digest:
FACTS
Galicia was a former public school teacher at M.B. Asistio, Sr. High School (MBASHS) in Caloocan City.
Based on academic records, he submitted forming part of his 201 file, Galicia graduated from FEU with a
degree in Civil Engineering but failed to pass the board exams. He also represented himself to have
earned 18 units in education in SY 1985-1986, evidenced by a copy of a TOR from the Caloocan City
Polytechnic College (CCPC). Likewise, he passed the Teachers’ Professional Board Examination (TPBE)
given on November 22, 1987.
Subsequently, Yamsuan, then principal of the MBASHS, reviewed the 201 files of the teaching staff. He
took note that the TOR submitted by Galicia was not an original copy, but only stamped with “verified
correct from the original” signed by Administrative Officer Mallari. Pursuant to a Division Memorandum,
Yansuan required Galicia and other teachers with similar records, to secure authenticated copies of the
TOR that they submitted. All of the teachers who were given the said instruction complied, with the
exception of Galicia.
Yamsuan proceeded to verify the authenticity of the said TOR by requesting for confirmation from the
school. Yamsuan was surprised to receive a reply from Torres-De Jesus, College Registrar of CCPC,
stating that they had no record of the said TOR, and more importantly, that they had no records that
Galicia indeed took 18 units of education in SY 1985-1986. Acting on his findings, Yamsuan lodged an
affidavit-complaint for falsification, dishonesty and grave misconduct against Galicia before the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman gave judgement, finding Galicia, guilty of dishonesty.
Galicia filed a motion for reconsideration, raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time. He argued that
it is not the Ombudsman, but the Department of Education, through the School Superintendent, which
has jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers, as mandated by RA 4670 or the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. He further challenged the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman by
invoking Sec. 20 of RA 6770 or Ombudsman Act which enumerates the instances when the Ombudsman
may not conduct an administrative investigation. The Ombudsman denied Galicia’s motion. Galicia
elevated the case to CA.
The CA held that jurisdiction over Public school teachers belonged to the School Superintendent as
mandated by RA 4670. The CA however, did not hinge its decision solely on the question of jurisdiction.
It upheld the arguments of Galicia and, consequently, overturned the findings of fact during the
investigation proceedings. Contrary to the ruling of the Ombudsman, the CA ruled that the school’s lack
of certification did not establish that the TOR was fabricated or spurious. It was possible that the records
were only missing. The “verified correct from the original” notations in the photocopied TOR and COG
prove that the documents were indeed, authentic.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case
RULING
No, This Court has recently ruled in Office of the Ombudsman v. Estandarte, 521 SCRA 155
(2007), that by virtue of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, original jurisdiction
belongs to the school superintendent. The intention of the law, which is to impose a separate
standard and procedural requirement for administrative cases involving public school teachers, must be
given consideration. Hence, the Ombudsman must yield to this committee of the Division School
Superintendent. Even in the earlier case of Alcala v. Villar, 416 SCRA 147 (2003), the Court held that:
Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned
or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries except over officials who may be removed by
impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. However, in Fabella v. Court of Appeals, it
was held that R.A. No. 4670, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, specifically covers and
governs administrative proceedings involving public school teachers.
203 Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio
LEONILA GARCIA-RUEDA, petitioner, vs. WILFRED L. PASCASIO, RAUL R. ARNAU, ABELARDO

L. APORTADERA, JR., Honorable CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, all of the Office of the Ombudsman;
JESUS F. GUERRERO, PORFIRIO MACARAEG, and GREGORIO A. ARIZALA, all of the Office of
the City Prosecutor, Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. 118141. September 5, 1997.
Ponente: J. Romero
Synopsis:
Only resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor
dismissing a criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal to the Secretary of Justice except as
otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof.”
What action may the Secretary of Justice take on the appeal? Section 9 of Order No. 223 states: “The
Secretary of Justice may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution.” On the other hand, “He may
motu proprio or on motion of the appellee, dismiss outright the appeal on specified grounds.”
In exercising his discretion under the circumstances, the Ombudsman acted within his power and
authority in dismissing the complaint against the Prosecutors and this Court will not interfere with the
same.
Digest:
FACTS
Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda, underwent surgical operation at the UST
hospital for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter. He was attended by Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. who
was the surgeon, while Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes was the anaesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery,
however, Florencio died of complications of “unknown cause,” according to officials of the UST Hospital.
Not satisfied with the findings of the hospital, petitioner requested the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to conduct an autopsy on her husband’s body. Consequently, the NBI ruled that Florencio’s death
was due to lack of care by the attending physician in administering anaesthesia. Pursuant to its findings,
the NBI recommended that Dr. Domingo Antonio and Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes be charged for Homicide
through Reckless Imprudence before the Office of the City Prosecutor.
During the preliminary investigation, what transpired was a confounding series of events which we shall
try to disentangle. The case was initially assigned to Prosecutor Antonio M. Israel, who had to inhibit
himself because he was related to the counsel of one of the doctors. As a result, the case was reraffled to
Prosecutor Norberto G. Leono who was, however, disqualified on motion of the petitioner since he
disregarded prevailing laws and jurisprudence regarding preliminary investigation. The case was then
referred to Prosecutor Ramon O. Carisma, who issued a resolution recommending that only Dr. Reyes be
held criminally liable and that the complaint against Dr. Antonio be dismissed.
The case took another perplexing turn when Assistant City Prosecutor Josefina Santos Sioson, in the
“interest of justice and peace of mind of the parties,” recommended that the case be re-raffled on the
ground that Prosecutor Carisma was partial to the petitioner. Thus, the case was transferred to
Prosecutor Leoncia R. Dimagiba, where a volte face occurred again with the endorsement that the
complaint against Dr. Reyes be dismissed and instead, a corresponding information be filed against Dr.
Antonio. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning the findings of Prosecutor Dimagiba.
Pending the resolution of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration regarding Prosecutor Dimagiba’s
resolution, the investigative “pingpong” continued when the case was again assigned to another
prosecutor, Eudoxia T. Gualberto, who recommended that Dr. Reyes be included in the criminal
information of Homicide through Reckless Imprudence. While the recommendation of Prosecutor
Gualberto was pending, the case was transferred to Senior State Prosecutor Gregorio A. Arizala, who
resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes from any wrongdoing, a resolution which was approved by both City
Prosecutor Porfirio G. Macaraeg and City Prosecutor Jesus F. Guerrero.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed graft charges specifically for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
against Prosecutors Guerrero, Macaraeg, and Arizala for manifest partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes before
the Office of the Ombudsman. However, on July 11, 1994, the Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution
dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the case
RULING
No, while a party who feels himself aggrieved is at liberty to choose the appropriate “weapon from the
armory,” it is with no little surprise that this Court views the choice made by the complainant widow.
To our mind, the better and more logical remedy under the circumstances would have been to appeal the
resolution of the City Prosecutors dismissing the criminal complaint to the Secretary of Justice under the
Department of Justice’s Order No. 223, otherwise known as the “1993 Revised Rules on Appeals From
Resolutions In Preliminary Investigations/Reinvestigations,” as amended by Department Order No. 359,
Section 1 of which provides:
“Section 1. What May Be Appealed.—Only resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State
Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal
to the Secretary of Justice except as otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof.”
What action may the Secretary of Justice take on the appeal? Section 9 of Order No. 223 states: “The
Secretary of Justice may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution.” On the other hand, “He may
motu proprio or on motion of the appellee, dismiss outright the appeal on specified grounds.”
In exercising his discretion under the circumstances, the Ombudsman acted within his power and
authority in dismissing the complaint against the Prosecutors and this Court will not interfere with the
same.
204 Presidential ad hoc Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, represented by

MAGDANGAL B. ELMA, PCGG CHAIRMAN AND ORLANDO C. SALVADOR AS CONSULTANT OF
THE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP OF THE AD-HOC COMMITTEE, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE ANIANO A. DESIERTO AS OMBUDSMAN, PANFILO O. DOMINGO, CONRADO S.
REYES, ENRIQUE M. HERBOZA, MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, ABDULLAH DIMAPORO AND
AMER DIANALAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 135715. April 13, 2011.
Ponente: J. Perez
Topic: Public Officers – Powers of the Ombudsman; Prescription of Actions; Judicial Review
Synopsis:
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is committed. An exception
to this rule is the “blameless ignorance” doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this
doctrine, “the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which
will support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations
where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of
action.” The prescriptive period for the crime which is the subject herein, commenced from the date of its
discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation. When the complaint was filed
in 1997, only five years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for this
was succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, that
“it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known these crimes committed
prior to the 1986 EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged connivance and conspiracy among involved
public officials and the beneficiaries of the loans.”
The Ombudsman is a constitutionally created body with constitutionally mandated independence. Despite
this, however, the Ombudsman comes within the purview of the Court’s power of judicial review —a
peculiar concept of Philippine Ombudsman, embodied in Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution —
which serves as a safety net against its capricious and arbitrary acts. Thus, in Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio,
the Court held that “while the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal
case is to be filed, the Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when there is
grave abuse of discretion.”
Digest:
FACTS
Mohammad Ali Dimaporo, Abdullah Dimaporo, and Amer Dianalan, were stockholders and officers of the
Mindanao Coconut Oil Mills (MINCOCO), while respondents Panfilo Domingo, Conrado Reyes, Enrique
Herboza and Ricardo Sunga, were then officers of the National Investment and Development Corporation
(NIDC).
On May 10, 1976, MINCOCO applied for a Guarantee Loan Accommodation with NIDC which the NIDC’s
Board of Directors approved. The guarantee loan was, however both undercapitalized and under
collateralized because MINCOCO’s paid capital was only P7 million and its assets worth is P7 million. This
notwithstanding, MINCOCO further obtained additional guarantee loan accommodations from NIDC in the
amount of P 13, 647, 600.00 and P7,000,000.00 respectively.
When MINCOCO’s mortgage liens were about to be foreclosed by the government banks due to its
outstanding obligations, Cojuangco issued a memorandum, bearing the late President Marcos’ marginal
note, disallowing the foreclosure of MINCOCO’s properties. The government banks were not able to
recover any amount from MINCOCO and President Marcos’ marginal note was construed by the NIDC to
have effectively released MINCOCO, including its owners, from all of its financial liabilities.
The above mentioned transactions, were however, discovered only in 1992 after then President Ramos,
in an effort to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos issued AO No. 13 creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, with the Chairman of the PCGG as
Committee Head.
The Committee found 21 corporations including MINCOCO, obtained behest loans. It claimed that the fact
that MINCOCO was under-collateralized and undercapitalized; that its officers were identified as cronies;
that the late President Marcos had a marginal note, effectively waiving the government’s right to
foreclose; and that the guarantee loan accommodation were approved in an extraordinary speed of 1
month, bore badges of behest loans.
Subsequently, the Committee files with the Ombudsman a sworn complaint against MINCOCO’s Officers
and NIDC’s Board of Directors for violation of Sec. 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019, as amended. The
Ombudsman motu proprio dismissed the complaint on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence
and the alleged offenses had prescribed.
The petitioner argued that the right of the State to recover behest loans as ill-gotten wealth is
imprescriptible under Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution; and, assuming that the period to file
criminal charges herefore is subject to prescription, the prescriptive period should be counted from the
time of discovery of behest loans or sometime in 1992 when the Committee was constituted.
The Ombudsman, in his Comment, countered that his office has the discretionary power during
preliminary investigation to determine the sufficiency of evidence for indictment; that it is beyond the
ambit of the Court to review this exercise of discretion; that Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution applies only to civil suits and not to criminal proceedings; and, that the crime under which
the respondents herein were charged had already prescribed.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the right to recover has already prescribed.
2. Whether the ombudsman comes within the purview of judicial review.
RULING
1. NO, while we sustain the Ombudsman’s contention that the prescriptive period for the crime charged
herein is 10 years and not 15 years, we are not persuaded that in this specific case, the prescriptive
period began to run in 1976, when the loans were transacted.
The time as to when the prescriptive period starts to run for crimes committed under Republic Act No.
3019, a special law, is covered by Act No. 3326, Section 2 of which provides that:
“Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.”
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is committed. That an
aggrieved person “entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which
his right arises,” does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. An exception to this rule is the
“blameless ignorance” doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, “the
statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a
cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the
plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action.” It
was in this accord that the Court confronted the question on the running of the prescriptive period in
People v. Duque which became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), and the subsequent cases33 which
Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of prescription too. Thus, we held in a
catena of cases, that if the violation of the special law was not known at the time of its commission, the
prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the
constitutive act or acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime which is the subject herein,
commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation.
When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet
set in. The rationale for this was succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans, that “it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have
known these crimes committed prior to the 1986 EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged connivance
and conspiracy among involved public officials and the beneficiaries of the loans.”37 In yet another
pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto
(G.R. No. 130817), the Court held that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to
question the legality of these transactions.
2. YES, true, the Ombudsman is a constitutionally created body with constitutionally mandated
independence. Despite this, however, the Ombudsman comes within the purview of the Court’s power of
judicial review —a peculiar concept of Philippine Ombudsman, embodied in Article VIII, Section 1 of the
1987 Constitution —which serves as a safety net against its capricious and arbitrary acts. Thus, in
Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio, the Court held that “while the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case is to be filed, the Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s
action when there is grave abuse of discretion.” This is because, “while the Ombudsman enjoys, as it
must, complete independence, it cannot and must not lose track of the law, which it is bound to uphold
and obey.”
After reviewing the case’s records, the Court finds that the present petition calls for the exercise of its
power of judicial review.
205 Villasenor v. Sandiganbayan
GERARDO R. VILLASEÑOR and RODEL A. MESA, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (5th

Division) and LOUELLA MAE OCO-PESQUERRA (Office of the Special Prosecutor,
Ombudsman), respondents.
G.R. No. 180700. March 4, 2008.

Topic: Public Officers – Preventive Suspension
Synopsis:
Imposed during the pendency of proceedings, preventive suspension is not a penalty in itself. It is merely
a measure of precaution so that the employee who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons,
from office. Thus, preventive suspension is distinct from the penalty. While the former may be imposed
on a respondent during the investigation of the charges against him, the latter may be meted out to him
at the final disposition of the case. That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly
provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.
Digest:
FACTS
In the wee hours of the morning, the Quezon City Manor Hotel went ablaze resulting in the death of
seventy-four (74) people and injuries to scores of others. Investigation into the tragedy revealed that the
hotel was a veritable fire trap.
Petitioners, together with other officials of the City Engineering Office of Quezon City, are presently
facing criminal charges before the 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan for the crime of multiple homicide
through reckless imprudence and for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. They were also charged
administratively with gross negligence, gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the
service in connection with the Manor Hotel inferno.
In two separate orders the administrative case, petitioners Villaseñor and Mesa were preventively
suspended for a period of 6 months, effective upon receipt of the suspension order. During the pendency
of the criminal case, respondent special prosecutor Oco-Pesquera filed a motion for suspension pendente
lite of petitioners.
Petitioners opposed the motion, contending that they had already been suspended for 6 months relative
to the administrative case, based on the same fcts and circumstances. They posited that any preventive
suspension that may be warranted in the criminal case was already absorbed by the preventive
suspension in the administrative cases were anchored on the same set of facts.
In the assailed resolution, respondent court granted the prosecution’s motion for suspension of
petitioners for a period of 90 days.
ISSUE(S)
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND/OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE
SUSPENSION PENDENTE LITE OF HEREIN PETITIONERS DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAD ALREADY
BEEN PREVIOUSLY SUSPENDED ADMINISTRATIVELY BASED ON THE SAME FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES
RULING
Criminal and administrative cases are distinct from each other. The settled rule is that criminal and civil
cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the first two will not inevitably
govern or affect the third and vice versa. Verily, administrative cases may proceed independently of
criminal proceedings.
Imposed during the pendency of proceedings, preventive suspension is not a penalty in itself. It is merely
a measure of precaution so that the employee who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons,
from office. Thus, preventive suspension is distinct from the penalty. While the former may be imposed
on a respondent during the investigation of the charges against him, the latter may be meted out to him
at the final disposition of the case.
The Court’s discussion in Quimbo v. Gervacio is enlightening:
“Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure and
suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily
cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved.
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative

investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and
the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which
may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is
established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then
he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.
That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and
other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.
Sec. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered
to be a preventive measure.”
The accused public officers whose culpability remains to be proven are entitled to the constitutional
presumption of innocence. The law itself provides for the reinstatement of the public officer concerned
and payment to him of the salaries and benefits for the duration of the suspension in the event of an
acquittal:
“Suspension and loss of benefits.—Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any
offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property, whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of the execution and mode of participation, is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement and
gratuity benefits under the law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.
206 Navaro v. Executive Secretary
RODOLFO G. NAVARO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA, Petitioners vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, Representing the President of the Philippines, Senate of the
Philippines, Represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT, et al., Respondents
G.R. No. 180050. February 10, 2010
Ponente: J. Nachura
Topic: Local Government – Creation of Provinces
Synopsis:
In Tan vs. COMELEC, the Court held that the plebiscite should have included the people living in the area
of the proposed new province and those living in the parent province. However, the Court did not direct
the conduct of a new plebiscite, because the factual and legal basis for the creation of the new province
did not exist as it failed to satisfy the land area requirement; hence, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, creating
the new Province of Negros del Norte, was declared unconstitutional. The Court found that the land area
of the new province was only about 2,856 square kilometers, which was below the statutory requirement
then of 3,500 square kilometers.
Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census of population in
Dinagat Islands in 2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000, the result was not certified by the
NSO as required by the Local Government Code. Moreover, respondents failed to prove that with the
population count of 371,000, the population of the original unit (mother Province of Surigao del Norte)
would not be reduced to less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of the
creation of the new province.
Digest:
FACTS
The mother province of Surigao del Norte was created and established under R.A. No. 2786 on June 19,
1960. The province is composed of three main groups of islands: (1) the Mainland and Surigao City; (2)
Siargao Island and Bucas Grande; and (3) Dinagat Island, which is composed of seven municipalities,
namely, Basilisa, Cagdianao, Dinagat, Libjo, Loreto, San Jose, and Tubajon.
Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as The Local Government Code, a province may be
created if it has an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as
certified by the Department of Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified
by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income of the province.
The Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census, with the assistance of an
NSO District Census Coordinator, in the Dinagat Islands to determine its actual population in support of
the house bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. The special census yielded a population count of
371,576 inhabitants in the proposed province. The NSO, however, did not certify the result of the special
census. On August 14, 2006 and August 28, 2006, the Senate and the House of Representatives,
respectively, passed the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. It was approved and enacted into
law as R.A. No. 9355 on October 2, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9355, otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being unconstitutional.
Petitioners contended that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands under R.A. No. 9355 is not
valid because it failed to comply with either the population or land area requirement prescribed by the
Local Government Code.
ISSUE(S)
(1) Whether or not R.A. No. 9355 violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; (2) Whether R.A. No.
9355 complied with the requirements of Section 461 of the Local Government Code in creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands; and (3) Whether the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands is an act of
gerrymandering
RULING
(1) YES. The constitutional provision on the creation of a province in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution states:
SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.”
Pursuant to the Constitution, the Local Government Code of 1991 prescribed the criteria for the creation
of a province, thus:
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation.—(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income,
as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based
on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original
unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
In Tan vs. COMELEC, the Court held that the plebiscite should have included the people living in the area
of the proposed new province and those living in the parent province. However, the Court did not direct
the conduct of a new plebiscite, because the factual and legal basis for the creation of the new province
did not exist as it failed to satisfy the land area requirement; hence, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, creating
the new Province of Negros del Norte, was declared unconstitutional. The Court found that the land area
of the new province was only about 2,856 square kilometers, which was below the statutory requirement
then of 3,500 square kilometers.
(2) NO. It is undisputed that R.A. No. 9355 complied with the income requirement specified by the Local
Government Code. What is disputed is its compliance with the land area or population requirement. R.A.
No. 9355 expressly states that the Province of Dinagat Islands “contains an approximate land area of
eighty thousand two hundred twelve hectares (80,212 has.) or 802.12 sq. km., more or less, including
Hibuson Island and approximately forty-seven (47) islets x x x.” R.A. No. 9355, therefore, failed to
comply with the land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers.
The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed to comply with the population requirement of not less than
250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO. Based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the
NSO, the population of the Province of Dinagat Islands as of May 1, 2000 was only 106,951.
Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census of population in
Dinagat Islands in 2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000, the result was not certified by the
NSO as required by the Local Government Code. Moreover, respondents failed to prove that with the
population count of 371,000, the population of the original unit (mother Province of Surigao del Norte)
would not be reduced to less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of the
creation of the new province.
(3) NO. “Gerrymandering” is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so

contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, defined “gerrymandering” as the formation of one legislative district out
of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party. The Constitution proscribes
gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to comprise, as far as practicable, a contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory.
As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Province of Dinagat Islands consists of one island and
about 47 islets closely situated together, without the inclusion of separate territories. It is an
unsubstantiated allegation that the province was created to favor a candidate or party.
207 Umali v. COMELEC
AURELIO M. UMALI, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V.

VERGARA, and THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CABANATUAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 203974. April 22, 2014.

Topic: Local Government – Plebiscite for Conversion of HUC
Synopsis:
The Supreme Court ruled that the qualified voters in the entirety of Nueva Ecija should participate in the
plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City, and not just the qualified voters in the city itself. The
power to create, divide, merge, abolish, or substantially alter boundaries of provinces, cities,
municipalities, or barangays, is essentially legislative in nature, but it has since been delegated by the
Constitution to the local governments, as long as the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code is
met and such power is exercised through a plebiscite. With these twin requirements, the power to create,
divide, etc. has become a recognized exception to the doctrine of non-delegability. The Supreme Court
determined that the source of this delegation is none other than Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
therefore, Section 453 of the LGC cannot be enforced unless the plebiscite is made with the participation
of all the qualified voters of the LGU(s) directly affected by the conversion.
Digest:
FACTS
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cabanatuan City requested the President by resolution
to convert the city from component city into a highly urbanized city. Pursuant to the approval of the
President, COMELEC issued a resolution calling for a plebiscite to vote on the conversion of Cabanatuan
into a HUC, stating that only those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate, citing
Section 453 of the Local Government Code, as well as several cases in Palawan, Leyte, and Cebu, where
only the residents of the city proposed to be converted were allowed to vote. However, petitioner Nueva
Ecija governor Aurelio Umali filed a motion for reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed conversion
should be interpreted in conjunction with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. He argues that while
conversion does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an existing city, the spirit of the
Constitutional provision calls for the people of the local government unit directly affected to vote in a
plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities. Thus, the phrase
qualified voters therein should be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the LGUs directly affected
by the conversion and not just those in the component city proposed to be upgraded. Umali bolstered his
claim by enumerating several adverse effects of the conversion of Cabanatuan City into HUC to the
entirety of the province of Nueva Ecija.
ISSUE(S)
Who should vote in the plebiscite?
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the qualified voters in the entirety of Nueva Ecija should participate in the
plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City, and not just the qualified voters in the city itself. The
power to create, divide, merge, abolish, or substantially alter boundaries of provinces, cities,
municipalities, or barangays, is essentially legislative in nature, but it has since been delegated by the
Constitution to the local governments, as long as the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code is
met and such power is exercised through a plebiscite. With these twin requirements, the power to create,
divide, etc. has become a recognized exception to the doctrine of non-delegability. The Supreme Court
determined that the source of this delegation is none other than Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
therefore, Section 453 of the LGC cannot be enforced unless the plebiscite is made with the participation
of all the qualified voters of the LGU(s) directly affected by the conversion.
Respondents further posit that this cannot be so, as the conversion of a component city under Section
453 is not within the ambit of creation, division, merging, abolition, or substantial alteration as provided
for under Section 10, Article X. The Supreme Court, in striking down this proposition, declared that a
close reading of the latter provision will reveal that the enumerated matters all involve a common
denominator: material changes in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly
affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the
approval of the people in the political units directly affected.
Notes:
Section 10, Article X – No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. – It shall be the duty of the President to declare a
city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements
prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a
plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.
208 Dela Rama v. CA
CONRADO L. DE RAMA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION, THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION), ELADIO MARTINEZ, DIVINO DE JESUS, MORELL AYALA, ARISTEO
CATALLA, DAISY PORTA, FLORDELIZA ORIASEL, GRACIELA GLORY, FELECIDAD ORINDAY,
MA. PETRA MUFFET LUCE, ELSA MARINO, BERNARDITA MENDOZA, JANE MACATANGAY,
ADELFO GLODOVIZA and FLORINO RAMOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 131136. February 28, 2001.
Topic: Local Government – Appointments to Office
Synopsis:
The CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition (on midnight appointments) applies only to
presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from
making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. Petitioner certainly did not raise the issue
of fraud on the part of the outgoing mayor who made the appointments. Neither did he allege that the
said appointments were tainted by irregularities or anomalies that breached laws and regulations
governing appointments. His solitary reason for recalling these appointments was that they were, to his
personal belief, “midnight appointments” which the outgoing mayor had no authority to make.
It has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointee’s assumption of the
position in the civil service, “he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by revocation of
the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and hearing.” Moreover, it is
well-settled that the person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed appointment
acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the position.
Digest:
FACTS
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado de Rama wrote a
letter to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal
employees. He justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of said employees were
“midnight” appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Sec. 15
of the Constitution.
While the matter was pending before the CSC, 3 of the employees filed with the CSC a claim for payment
of their salaries, alleging that although their appointments were declared permanent by Conrado Gulim,
Director II of CSC Field Office, petitioner withheld the payment of their salaries and benefits pursuant to
Office Order No. 95-01, wherein the appointments were recalled.
The legal and Quasi-judicial Division of the CSC issued an Order finding that since the claimants-
employees had assumed their respective positions and performed their duties pursuant to their
appointments, they are therefore entitled to receive the salaries and benefits appurtenant to their
positions. On April 30, 1996, the CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall, for lack of merit.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the CSC is correct is denying petitioner’s request
2. Whether the appointments can be recalled
RULING
1. Yes. The CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to presidential
appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making
appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. Petitioner certainly did not raise the issue of fraud
on the part of the outgoing mayor who made the appointments. Neither did he allege that the said
appointments were tainted by irregularities or anomalies that breached laws and regulations governing
appointments. His solitary reason for recalling these appointments was that they were, to his personal
belief, “midnight appointments” which the outgoing mayor had no authority to make.
2. No. It has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointee’s assumption of the
position in the civil service, “he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by revocation of
the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and hearing.” Moreover, it is
well-settled that the person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed appointment
acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the position. This right is protected not only by statute,
but by the Constitution as well, which right cannot be taken away by either revocation of the
appointment, or by removal, unless there is valid cause to do so, provided that there is previous notice
and hearing.
Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code
specifically provides that “an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by
the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission.”
Thus, it is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when such
appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law
and regulations.
Moreover, Section 10 of the same rule provides:
Sec. 10. An appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and rules shall take effect immediately
upon its issuance by the appointing authority, and if the appointee has assumed the duties of the
position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting the approval of his
appointment by the Commission. The appointment shall remain effective until disapproved by the
Commission. In no case shall an appointment take effect earlier than the date of its issuance.
Section 20 of Rule VI also provides:

Sec. 20. Notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same may be recalled on any of the
following grounds:
(a)Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency’s Merit Promotion Plan;
(b)Failure to pass through the agency’s Selection/Promotion Board;
(c)Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees relative to
promotion; or
(d)Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.
Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the above-cited
grounds.
209 Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos v. PB Martinez

THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BARANGAY DON MARIANO MARCOS, MUNICIPALITY OF
BAYOMBONG PROVINCE OF NUEVA VISCAYA, Represented by BARANGAY KAGAWAD JOSE
CENEN SANTOS, MARIO BACUD, et. al., Petitioners, vs. PUNONG BARANGAY SEVERINO
MARTINEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 170626. March 3, 2008.
Topic: Local Government – Powers of the Sanggunian
Synopsis:
The Sanguniang Bayan has no power to remove Martinez. The Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang
Bayan cannot order the removal of an erring elective barangay official from office, as the courts are
exclusively vested with this power under Section 60 of the Local Government Code; The most extreme
penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective
barangay official is suspension.
Further, the Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since the power is
exclusively vested in the proper courts.
Digest:
FACTS
Respondent is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. He
was charged with Dishonesty and Graft Corruption by petitioner. On 28 July 2005, the Sanguniang Bayan
rendered its decision which imposed upon Martinez the penalty of removal from office.
On 3 August 2005 Mayor Severino Bagasao issued a Memorandum stating that the Sangguniang Bayan is
not empowered to order Martinez’s removal from service but ordered the indefinite suspension of
Martinez since the period of appeal had not yet lapsed.
20 October 2005, RTC of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya issued an order declaring the decision of
Sanguniang Bayan and the Mayor’s Memorandum void. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
was denied. Hence, the petition to the SC.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the Sanguniang Bayan has the power to remove Punong Barangay Martinez
RULING
No, the Sanguniang Bayan has not power to remove Martinez. The Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the removal of an erring elective barangay official from office, as the
courts are exclusively vested with this power under Section 60 of the Local Government Code; The most
extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring
elective barangay official is suspension.
Further, the Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since the power is
exclusively vested in the proper courts.
Special Note: Exemption to the Doctrine Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.

Where the case involves only legal questions, the litigant need not exhaust all administrative remedies
before such judicial relief can be sought; A legal question is properly addressed to a regular court of
justice rather than to an administrative body.
Other grounds:
Among these exceptions are: 1) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; 2)
where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; 3) where
there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; 4) where
the amount involved is relatively small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; 5) where the
question raised is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; 6) where
judicial intervention is urgent; 7) where its application may cause great and irreparable damage; 8)
where the controverted acts violate due process; 9) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot; 10) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 11)
when strong public interest is involved; and 13) in quo warranto proceedings.
210 League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), Represented by LCP National President

MAYOR JERRY TRENAS, CITY OF ILOILO, et al., Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, et. al., Respondents
G.R. No. 176951. April 12, 2011.
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Local Government – The Local Government Code
Synopsis:
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in
the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The
Digest:
FACTS
During the 11th Congress, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress, 33 of which
was later enacted into law, leaving pending the other 24 conversion bills. During the 12th Congress,
Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009) which amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code was
enacted into law increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city
from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale of which was to restrain municipalities from converting
into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite their lack of fiscal
independence. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29
which sought to exempt from the P100-million-income requirement 16 out of 24 municipalities whose
cityhood bills were pending in the 11th Congress. Both chambers of Congress approved the cityhood bills
which eventually lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) after the president failed to sign it.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the Cityhood Laws are constitutional or not
RULING
Yes, the 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. The Court stated that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood
Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the
requirements of the Local Government Code prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009, and that
since the Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play
demanded, the Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable
legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress. The Court also
stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be
exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million
for the creation of cities because while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well
aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the
Cityhood Laws. RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient.
The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local sources under RA
9009 was arbitrary. “While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must
comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must
have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects
contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside
development, and the concomitant national growth.”
211 Acaac v. Azcuna
RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETALFOUNDATION, INC., APOLINARIO M. ELORDE, HECTOR ACAAC,

and ROMEO BULAWIN, Petitioners, vs. MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, in his capacity as Mayor of
Lopez Jaena Muncipality, Misamis Occidental.
G.R. No. 187378. September 30, 2013.
Topic: Local Government – Formal Requisites for Validity of Ordinances
Synopsis:
Section 56 of the LGC (d) provides that, “if no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
within 30 days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed
consistent with law and therefore valid.” In this case, petitioners maintain the subject ordinance cannot
be deemed approved through the mere passage of time. It, however, bears to note that more than 30
days have already elapsed from the time the subject ordinance was submitted to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for review by the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, it should be deemed approved and valid
pursuant to Section 56 (d) of the Local Government Code. While Sec. 59 of Republic Act No. 7160 or
“The Local Government Code” required the main features of ordinances duly enacted or adopted be
published in a newspaper of general circulation, Petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that
no publication of the subject ordinance was made. In accordance with the presumption of validity in favor
of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of evidence showing
that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their enactment.
Digest:
FACTS
The petitioner, Ramonito O. Acaac, was the founder of the NGO called PETAL. PETAL built cottages on
Capayas Island, which it rented out to the public and became the source of livelihood of its beneficiaries.
On April 11 and May 20, 2002, respondents Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr. and Building Official
Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate Notices of Illegal Construction against PETAL, ordering it to stop all
illegal activities on the island due to the absence of a building permit. There was a third and final notice
sent on July 8, 2002 but the same remained unheeded.
On the same date, the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena adopted a subject ordinance, which prohibited
the entry of any entity and the construction of any structures in the area of Capayas Island which Mayor
Azcuna, Jr, adopted on July 12, 2002. On August 23, 2002, a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served
upon PETAL directing it to remove the structures it built since it was a violation of the subject ordinance.
On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action against the respondents before the RTC alleging that
they have prior vested rights to occupy and utilize Capayas Island, while also assailing the validity of the
subject ordinance on the grounds that it was adopted without public consultation, it was not published in
a newspaper of general circulation, and it was not approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
On November 26, 2004, the RTC declared the subject ordinance as invalid/void on the same grounds that
the petitioners laid down.
On the contrary, according to the CA, the subject ordinance was deemed approved upon failure of the
SP to declare the same invalid within 30 days. It also gave credence to the respondent that the subject
ordinance was posted and published and that public consultations were conducted before the subject
ordinance was passed.
The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on March 9, 2009. Thus, the instant petition.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against petitioners
RULING
Yes. Section 56 of the LGC (d) provides that, “if no action has been taken by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan within 30 days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be
presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.” In this case, petitioners maintain the subject
ordinance cannot be deemed approved through the mere passage of time. It, however, bears to note
that more than 30 days have already elapsed from the time the subject ordinance was submitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review by the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, it should be deemed approved
and valid pursuant to Section 56 (d) of the Local Government Code. While Sec. 59 of Republic Act No.
7160 or “The Local Government Code” required the main features of ordinances duly enacted or adopted
be published in a newspaper of general circulation, Petitioners failed to present any evidence to show
that no publication of the subject ordinance was made. In accordance with the presumption of validity in
favor of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of evidence
showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their enactment. Likewise, petitioners
had the burden of proving their own allegation, which they, however, failed to do. All told, the Court finds
on reversible error committed by the CA in upholding the validity of the subject ordinance.
NOTES
• SB forwards the approved ordinance to SP within 3 days after approval
• July 8, 2002 – SB adopted ordinance; July12, 2002 – Azcuna, Jr. adopted ordinance; August 23,
2002 – respondents sent Notice of Voluntary Demolition to petitioners (more than 30 days after the
adoption of ordinance, no action from SP).
• RTC added that the authority and control over Capayas Island belong to the DENR, but the
appellate Court ruled that the Municipality of Lopez Jaena was vested with sufficient power and authority
to pass and adopt the subject ordinance (Sec 447 in relation to Sec. 16 of the LGC).
• All the courts ruled that PETAL have no proprietary rights over the Capayas island due to absence
of building permit and title.
• Petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegations.
• We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the law requires them to do, in the
absence of positive proof to the contrary.
212 Damasen v. Tumamao
ATTY. LUCKY M. DAMASEN, petitioner, vs. OSCAR G. TUMAMAO, respondent.

G.R. No. 173165. February 17, 2010.*
Ponente: J. Peralta
Topic: Local Government – Substitution
Synopsis:
The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent
vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by the people in the
election. Since the permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian occurred because of the elevation of LDP
member Alonzo to vice-mayor, it follows that the person to succeed her should also belong to the LDP so
as to preserve party representation. Thus, this Court cannot countenance Damasen’s insistence in
clinging to an appointment when he is in fact not a bona fide member of the LDP. Lastly, the records of
the case reveal that Tumamao has the nomination of Senator Edgardo J. Angara, the Party Chairman
and, therefore, the highest official of the LDP. In addition, he is a member in good standing of the LDP.
Thus, given the foregoing, it is this Court’s view that Tumamao has complied with the requirements of
law.
Digest:
FACTS
Nelia Tumamao, the Vice-Mayor of San Isidro, Isabela, died. As a result, a permanent vacancy was
created in the Office of the Vice-Mayor. Pursuant to Sec. 44 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160, Ligaya C.
Alonzo was elevated to the position of Vice-Mayor, she being the highest-ranking member of the
Sangguniang Bayan, that is, the one who garnered the highest number of votes for that office. As a
result, a permanent vacancy was created in the Sangguniang Bayan.
To fill up the ensuing vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan, San Isidro Mayor Lim recommended to
Governor Padaca, the appointment of respondent Tumamao, a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP), the same political party to which Alonzo belonged.
Tumamao took his oath as a member of the Sangguninang Bayan before Mayor Lim. Tumamao then
attended the regular sessions of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Petitioner Damasen became a member of the LDP after taking his oath of affiliation before the LDP
Provincial Chairman, Ms. Ana Benita Balauag (Provincial Chairman Balauag). On even date, Damasen was
able to secure from LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag a letter of nomination addressed to Governor
Padaca for his appointment to the Sangguniang Bayan.
Damasen was appointed as Sangguniang Bayan member by Governor Padaca. Damasen took his oath as
member of the Sangguniang Bayan before Governor Padaca.1
Damasen attended the Sangguniang Bayan session, but with Tumamao present thereat, the former was
not duly recognized. Hence, in the afternoon of the same day, Damasen filed with the RTC)a Petition for
Quo Warranto seeking to be declared the rightful member of the Sangguniang Bayan, claiming that he
had been nominated by LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag and had been appointed thereto by Governor
Padaca.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Tumama was entitled to assume the vacant position in the Sangguniang Bayan
RULING
Yes. Like the CA, this Court has no reason to doubt the veracity of the letter coming from the LDP
leadership. Quite clearly, from the tenor of the letter, it appears that the membership of Damasen still
had to be approved by the LDP National Council. Thus, notwithstanding Damasen’s procurement of a
Certificate of Membership from LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag, to this Court’s mind, the same merely
started the process of his membership in the LDP, and it did not mean automatic membership thereto.
While it may be argued that Damasen was already a member upon receipt of a Certificate of Membership
from LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag, this Court cannot impose such view on the LDP. If the LDP
leadership says that the membership of Damasen still had to be endorsed to the National Council for
approval, then this Court cannot question such requirement in the absence of evidence to the contrary. It
is well settled that the discretion of accepting members to a political party is a right and a privilege, a
purely internal matter, which this Court cannot meddle in.
In resolving the petition at bar, this Court is guided by Navarro v. Court of Appeals44
(Navarro), where this Court explained the reason behind the rule of succession under Sec.
45 (b) of RA 7160, to wit:
“The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent
vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by the people in the
election.
With the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who belonged to REFORMA-LM, to the position of Vice-Mayor, a
vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian that should be filled up with someone belonging to the political party
of petitioner Tamayo. Otherwise, REFORMA-LM’s representation in the Sanggunian would be diminished.
xxx. As earlier pointed out, the reason behind Par. (b), Sec. 45 of the Local Government Code is the
maintenance of party representation in the Sanggunian in accordance with the will of the electorate.”45
Since the permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian occurred because of the elevation of LDP
member Alonzo to vice-mayor, it follows that the person to succeed her should also belong
to the LDP so as to preserve party representation. Thus, this Court cannot countenance
Damasen’s insistence in clinging to an appointment when he is in fact not a bona fide
member of the LDP. While the revocation of the nomination given to Damasen came after
the fact of his appointment, this Court cannot rule in his favor, because the very first
requirement of Sec. 45 (b) is that the appointee must come from the political party as that of
the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy. To stress, Damasen is not a bona fide
member of the LDP.
In addition, appointing Damasen would not serve the will of the electorate. He himself admits that he
was previously a member of the Lakas-CMD, and that he ran for the position of Mayor under the said
party on the May 2004 Elections. Likewise, he did not resign from the said party when he joined the LDP,
and even admitted that his joining the LDP was not because of party ideals, but because he just wanted
to.46 How can the will of the electorate be best served, given the foregoing admissions of Damasen? If
this Court were to grant herein petition, it would effectively diminish the party representation of the LDP
in the Sanggunian, as Damasen would still be considered a member of the Lakas-CMD, not having
resigned therefrom, a scenario that defeats the purpose of the law, and that ultimately runs contrary the
ratio of Navarro.
Lastly, the records of the case reveal that Tumamao has the nomination of Senator Edgardo
J. Angara, the Party Chairman and, therefore, the highest official of the LDP. In addition, he
is a member in good standing of the LDP. Thus, given the foregoing, it is this Court’s view
that Tumamao has complied with the requirements of law. ###
213 Tayaban v. People
ROBERT TAYABAN y CALIPLIP, FRANCISCO MADDAWAT y TAYOBAN, ARTEMIO BALANGUE*

y LANGA, FRANCISCO MAYUMIS y BAHEL and QUIRINO PANA y CUYAHEN, Petitioners vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 150194 March 6, 2007
Topic: Local Government – Police Power
Synopsis:
The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law
of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable,
oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of a common right. In the present case, the acts of
Tayaban have been established as a violation of law, particularly of the provisions of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019.
Digest:
FACTS
In 1988, Roberto Tayaban was the mayor of Tinoc, Ifugao. He made a project proposal with the
Governor for a public market to be erected. The same was approved and it was funded by the Cordillera
Executive Board. The project bidding was subsequently won by Lopez Pugong. Pugong began erecting
the market but in 1989, Tayaban and Tinoc’s councilors enforced a resolution to demolish the structure
being built on the ground that the structure is not being erected in the proper area as specified by
Tayaban and that the structure is a public nuisance and by virtue of police power to protect general
welfare.
Tayaban and some councilors then went to the site and demolished the structure. Pugong sued Tayaban
et al for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft Act). Pugong also averred that the
resolution reviewing the said local public development project (market) that the council passed in 1989
was not posted in a conspicuous place as required by Sections 56 and 59(a) of the 1991 LGC (R.A. No.
7160). Tayaban lost and he appealed contending that he demolished the structure by virtue of PD 1096
(National Building Code) and LOI 19 (removal of illegal structures).
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Tayaban’s demolition of the structure is a valid exercise of police power by a LGU officer
RULING
No. The SC is not impressed with Tayaban’s contention that the subject demolition is a valid exercise of
police power. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is
unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of a common right. In the present
case, the acts of Tayaban have been established as a violation of law, particularly of the provisions of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
On the other hand though, as held by the OSG, Sec 56 and 59 of the LGC of 1991 is not applicable as
said law was not yet passed in 1989 hence there was no need for Tayaban to post the ’89 resolution in a
conspicuous place. Also, Tayaban’s defense that he acted by virtue of LOI 19 and PD 1096 is a mere
afterthought, nowhere in the resolution was it said that they are going to demolish because of these two
laws but rather only on the ground that the market being built is in the wrong place. Further, Tayaban
actually never specified as to where he intended the market to be built.
214 AC Enterprises, Inc. v. Frabella Properties Corp.
AC ENTERPRISES, INC., vs. FRABELLE PROPERTIES CORPORATION

G.R. No. 166744. November 2, 2006
Ponente: J. Sereno
Topic: Local Government – Powers of LGUs
Synopsis:
Under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the
Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and
other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a
particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a
fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize
the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use
is not such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing be in
fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere
resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan.
A simple suit for abatement of a nuisance is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance, now the RTC. The LGUs may conduct inspections, at all reasonable times, without doing
damage, after due notice to the owners of buildings to ascertain compliance with the noise standards
under the law; and to order them to comply therewith if they fail to do so; or suspend or cancel any
building permits or clearance certificates issued by it for said units/buildings after due hearing as required
by P.D. No. 984. However, the LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless
such as thing is a nuisance per se; nor can they effect the extrajudicial abatement of that as a nuisance
which in its nature or use is not such. Those things must be resolved by the courts in the ordinary course
of law.
Digest:
FACTS
The herein respondent wrote petitioner demanding that the latter abate the daily continuous, intense and
“unbearable noise” and the hot air blast coming from the 36 blowers in the Feliza Building. Petitioner
rejected the demand. Respondent reiterated its demand for ACEI to abate the nuisance in a letter dated
June 6, 1995.
On June 29, 1995, respondent requested that the 36 blowers of Felisa Building be tested by the NCR
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). On August 11, 1995, it received a report from the EMB that the noise generated by the blowers
of Feliza Building is beyond the legal allowable level under Section 78(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
984, as amended. FPC had the blowers tested anew by the EMB on December 8, 1995 and July 1, 1996
with the same results. Despite repeated demands, petitioner refused to act on the matter.
The respondent filed a complaint against petitioner with the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) for the
abatement of noise and/or air pollution and damages with a plea for injunctive relief. Petitioner moved
for the dismissal of the complaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of
the complaint. Petitioner averred that it was the Makati City Government that had jurisdiction over the
complaint pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160. It also pointed out that DENR Administrative Order
(A.O.) No. 30 issued on June 30, 1992 devolved to the local government units the power to determine
matters pertaining to environmental management such as: (a) enforcement of pollution control and
environmental protection laws, rules and regulations; (b) abatement of noise and other forms of
nuisance; and (c) implementation of cease and desist orders issued by the PAB.
ISSUE(S)
(1) Whether or not the Sangguniang Panglungsod (or Bayan) has the power to declare a particular thing
as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation; and (2) Whether or not the Makati City Government
that had jurisdiction over the complaint pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160.
RULING
(1) NO. We agree with petitioner’s contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact
ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing,
however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its
condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when
such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction
of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined
and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its
operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan.
(2) NO. In Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, the Court ruled that a simple suit for abatement of a nuisance is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the RTC. Section 17 of R.A. No. 7160
provides that local government units shall discharge the functions and responsibilities of national
agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to the law; and such other powers, functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic
services and facilities in the Code. Devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers
powers and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities. What were devolved by the DENR to the LGUs under DENR Administrative Order No. 30
dated June 30, 1992, in relation to R.A. No. 7160, were the regulatory functions/duties of the National
Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) which were absorbed and integrated by the EMB, as provided in
Title No. XIV, Chapter 2, Section 17 of the 1987 Administrative Code. However, the DENR exercises
administrative supervision and control over the LGUs. Enumerated in Chapter IV, Article 1, Sections 74 to
79 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the NPCC implementing P.D. 984 are the regulations
relative to noise control, specifically, the noise quality standards.
The LGUs may conduct inspections, at all reasonable times, without doing damage, after due notice to
the owners of buildings to ascertain compliance with the noise standards under the law; and to order
them to comply therewith if they fail to do so; or suspend or cancel any building permits or clearance
certificates issued by it for said units/buildings after due hearing as required by P.D. No. 984.
However, the LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such as thing is a
nuisance per se; nor can they effect the extrajudicial abatement of that as a nuisance which in its nature
or use is not such. Those things must be resolved by the courts in the ordinary course of law.
215 Canet v. Decena
ROLANDO N. CANET, Petitioner, vs. MAYOR JULIETA A. DECENA, Respondent

G.R. No. 155344. January 20, 2004
Topic: Local Government – Municipal Ordinances
Synopsis:
Ordinance No. 001 was withdrawn by the Sangguniang Bayan, therefore, the mayor cannot issue the said
permit inasmuch as there was no ordinance passed authorizing the operation and maintenance of
cockpits. While admitting this fact, petitioner nevertheless relies on Resolution No. 049 in his claim.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that such a resolution cannot be implemented precisely because of
such absence of municipal ordinance. To compel the mayor to issue the permit would be a violation of
the Local Government Code and a clear encroachment on her administrative prerogatives.
Digest:
FACTS
On July 27, 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 049, Series of
1998, authorizing herein petitioner to establish, operate, and maintain a cockpit in Sitio Cabaya, San
Roque, Bula, Camarines Sur. In 1999, the SB passed Ordinance No. 001, Series of 1999, which sought to
regulate the operation of cockpits and other related game-fowl activities in the municipality of Bula.
However, upon transmittal for approval, then Mayor Julieta M. Decena returned the proposed ordinance
to the SB, as it did not contain rules and regulations on cockfighting as well as a separability clause. This
led to the ordinance being shelved indefinitely. Meanwhile, petitioner sought to obtain a mayors permit
for the operation and maintenance of a cockpit pursuant to Resolution No. 049, but herein respondent
denied the request, contending that, among others, the Local Government Code grants the authority to
give licenses for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits to the SB, and therefore, she
cannot issue a permit inasmuch as there is no ordinance passed by the SB authorizing the same.
ISSUE(S)
Can petitioner compel the mayor to issue a permit on the basis of Resolution No. 049?
RULING’’
No. Ordinance No. 001 was withdrawn by the Sangguniang Bayan, therefore, the mayor cannot issue the
said permit inasmuch as there was no ordinance passed authorizing the operation and maintenance of
cockpits. While admitting this fact, petitioner nevertheless relies on Resolution No. 049 in his claim.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that such a resolution cannot be implemented precisely because of
such absence of municipal ordinance. To compel the mayor to issue the permit would be a violation of
the Local Government Code and a clear encroachment on her administrative prerogatives.
Furthermore, the Court also relied on principles of statutory construction, particularly in the maxim
expressium facit cessare tacitum, which provides that statutes, by their terms, are expressly limited
therein, and they may not be extended to other matters by interpretation of the courts. Even if there is a
clear legislative gap, as in this case, the courts cannot supply the details thereof, because a legislative
lacuna cannot be filled in by judicial fiat. Otherwise, what would occur is judicial legislation.
Notes:
Section 447. Powers, Functions and Compensation. (a) The Sangguniang Bayan as the legislative body of
the municipality shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare
of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of
the corporate powers of the municipality as provided for under Section 22, and shall:
xxx
(3) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant franchises, enact ordinances levying taxes,
fees and charges upon such conditions and for such purposes intended to promote the general welfare of
the inhabitants of the municipality, and pursuant to this legislative authority shall:
xxx
(v) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, authorize and license the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of cockpits and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks: Provided,
That existing rights should not be prejudiced
216 Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre

Pimentel, Jr., petitioner vs. Hon. Alexander Aguirre in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
Hon. Emilia Boncodin in her capacity as Secretary of the Deparment of Budget and
Management, respondents. Roberto Pagdanganan, intervenor.
G.R. No. 132988. July 19, 2000
Topic: Local Government – Local Autonomy
Synopsis:
While the wordings of Sec. 1 AO 372 have a rather commanding tone, and while we agree with petitioner
that the requirements of Sec. 284 of the LGC have not been satisfied, we are prepared to accept the
Solicitor General’s assurance that the directive to “identify and implement measures x x x that will reduce
total expenditures x x x by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation” is merely advisory in
character, and does not constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with the local autonomy.
The language used, while authoritative, does not amount to command that emanates from a boss to a
subaltern.
A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the National internal
revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The LGC specifies further that the release
shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within 5 days after every quarter of the year and “shall not
be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever
purpose.” Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is
equivalent to a holdback
Digest:
FACTS
The President of the Philippines, Fidel V. Ramos issued AO 372, which is the “Adoption of economy
measures in government for FY 1998.”
Subsequently, President Estrada issued AO 43 amending Sec. 4 of AO 372, by reducing to 5% the

amount of internal revenue allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs.
Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was effect in exercising the power of control
over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President, however, only the power of general supervision over
LGUs, consistent with the Principle of local autonomy. Petitioner further argues that the directibe to
withhold 10% of their IRA is in contravention of Sec. 286 of the Local Government Code (LGC) and Sec.
6, Article X of the Constitution providing for the automatic release to each of these units its share in the
national internal revenue.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether Sec. 1 of AO 372, insofar as it “directs” LGUs to reduce their expenditures to 25% is a valid
exercise of the President’s power over local governments
2. Whether Sec. 4 of AO 372, which withholds 10% of their internal revenue allotment, is a valid exercise
of the President’s power over local governments
RULING
1. Yes. While the wordings of Sec. 1 AO 372 have a rather commanding tone, and while we agree with
petitioner that the requirements of Sec. 284 of the LGC have not been satisfied, we are prepared to
accept the Solicitor General’s assurance that the directive to “identify and implement measures x x x that
will reduce total expenditures x x x by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation” is merely
advisory in character, and does not constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with the local
autonomy. The language used, while authoritative, does not amount to command that emanates from a
boss to a subaltern.
2. No. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the National
internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The LGC specifies further that the
release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within 5 days after every quarter of the year and
“shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for
whatever purpose.”
Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to
a holdback, which means “something held back or withheld, often temporarily.” Hence, “temporary”
nature of the retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.
217 City Government of Quezon, et al. v. Bayan Com.
THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY, and THE CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, DR.
VICTOR B. ENRIGA, Petitioners, vs. BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC., Respondents
G.R. No. 162015. March 6, 2006.
Ponente: J. Garcia
Topic: Local Government – Power of Taxation
Synopsis:
Bayantel’s real properties are exempted from real property taxes. With the LGC’s taking effect on January
1, 1992, Bayantel’s “exemption” from real estate taxes under Section 14 of RA 3259 for properties of
whatever kind located within the Metro Manila area was, by force of Section 234 of the Code, expressly
withdrawn. But, not long thereafter, however, or on July 20, 1992, Congress passed Rep. Act No. 7633
amending Bayantel’s original (RA 3259) franchise. Worthy of note is that Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633
is a virtual reenacment of the tax provision, i.e., Section 14, of Bayantel’s original franchise under Rep.
Act No. 3259. Stated otherwise, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 which was deemed impliedly repealed
by Section 234 of the LGC was expressly revived under Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633. In concrete
terms, the realty tax exemption heretofore enjoyed by Bayantel under its original franchise, but
subsequently withdrawn by force of Section 234 of the LGC, has been restored by Section 11 of Rep. Act
No. 7633.
Digest:
FACTS
City Assesor issued new tax declarations for Bayantel’s real properties in QC by virtue of the newly
enacted ordinance of QC called QC Revenue Code (QCRC) with Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93. This law
imposes real property taxes on all real properties in Quezon City and reiteration of withdrawal of
exemption from RPT under Section 234 of LGC.
Bayantel did not pay the real property taxes assessed against it by the QC government. On account
thereof, the QC Treasurer sent out notices of delinquency for the total amount of PhP43,878,208.18
followed by issuance of several warrants of levy against Bayantel’s properties preparatory to their sale at
public action set on July 30, 2002.
The RTC-QC issued a TRO on the eve of the scheduled foreclosure sale. Later, the RTC issued the
assailed order stating that Bayantel is exempted from real estate taxation. Their Motion for
Reconsideration being denied, they petitioned to the SC on pure questions of law.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Bayantel's real properties in Quezon City are exempt from real property taxes under its
legislative franchise
RULING
Yes, Bayantel’s real properties are exempted from real property taxes. With the LGC’s taking effect on
January 1, 1992, Bayantel’s “exemption” from real estate taxes under Section 14 of RA 3259 for
properties of whatever kind located within the Metro Manila area was, by force of Section 234 of the
Code, expressly withdrawn. But, not long thereafter, however, or on July 20, 1992, Congress passed Rep.
Act No. 7633 amending Bayantel’s original (RA 3259) franchise. Worthy of note is that Section 11 of Rep.
Act No. 7633 is a virtual reenacment of the tax provision, i.e., Section 14, of Bayantel’s original franchise
under Rep. Act No. 3259. Stated otherwise, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 which was deemed impliedly
repealed by Section 234 of the LGC was expressly revived under Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633. In
concrete terms, the realty tax exemption heretofore enjoyed by Bayantel under its original franchise, but
subsequently withdrawn by force of Section 234 of the LGC, has been restored by Section 11 of Rep. Act
No. 7633.
Ultimately, therefore, the inevitable result was that all realties which are actually, directly and exclusively
used in the operation of its franchise are “exempted” from any property tax.
218 Batangas CATV v. CA
BATANGAS CATV, INC., Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, and BATANGAS CITY MAYOR, Respondents.
G.R. No. 138810. September 29, 2004.
Ponente: J. Sandoval-Guttierez
Synopsis:
The NTC exercises exclusive regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies.
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause.
This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses
public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system – the
use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions – allow
an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators. But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power
under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No. 210. The court is convinced that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod strayed from the well recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No.
210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws, and (2) it violates the State’s deregulation policy
over the CATV industry.
Digest:
FACTS
Resolution No. 210 was enacted by herein respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod granting petitioner,
Batangas CATV Inc., a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8
of which provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified
therein, “provided, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod. Petitioner, however, increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a
result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the
approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging that respondent
Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators
because under EO 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to
regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines. The trial court decided in favor of the petitioner.
Unsatisfied, respondents elevated the case to the CA which ruled in their favor. Hence, the instant
petition.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code
authorizes respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod to exercise its regulatory functions solely lodged in the
NTC under EO 205
RULING
Yes. The NTC exercises exclusive regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies.
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause.
This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses
public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system – the
use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions – allow
an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators. But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power
under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No. 210.
The court is convinced that the Sangguniang Panlungsod strayed from the well recognized limits of its
power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws, and (2) it
violates the State’s deregulation policy over the CATV industry.
219 Asean Pacific Planners v. City of Urdaneta
ASEAN PACIFIC PLANNERS, APP CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and

CESAR GOCO
G.R. No. 162525. September 23, 2008.
Topic: Local Government – Legal Representation
Synopsis:
A local government unit cannot be represented by private counsel, as only public officers may act for and
in behalf of public entities and public funds should not be spent to hire private lawyers. Even pro bono
representation in collaboration with the municipal attorney and prosecutor has not been allowed. Neither
is the law firm’s appearance justified under the instances (Mancenido vs. CA*) listed wherein local
government officials can be represented by private counsel, such as when a claim for damages could
result in personal liability. No such claim against said officials was made in this case.
*Local governments may only hire private counsel when the provincial fiscal is disqualified, as:
1. When the original jurisdiction of the case involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court,
2. When the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in
the same province, and
3. When in the case involving the municipality, he or his wife, or child, is peculiarly involved as heir,
legatee, creditor, or otherwise.
(Enriquez, Sr. vs. Gimenez, quoted in Mancenido case)
Digest:
FACTS
This case stemmed from a Complaint for annulment of contracts with prayer for preliminary prohibitory
injunction and temporary restraining order filed by respondent Waldo C. Del Castillo, in his capacity as
taxpayer, against respondents City of Urdaneta and Ceferino J. Capalad doing business under the name
JJEFWA Builders, and petitioners Asean Pacific Planners (APP) represented by Ronilo G. Goco and Asean
Pacific Planners Construction and Development Corporation (APPCDC) represented by Cesar D. Goco.
Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor Rodolfo E. Parayno entered into five contracts for the
preliminary design, construction and management of a four-storey twin cinema commercial center and
hotel involving a massive expenditure of public funds amounting to P250 million, funded by a loan from
the Philippine National Bank (PNB). For minimal work, the contractor was allegedly paid P95 million.
In their Answer, APP and APPCDC claimed that the contracts are valid. Urdaneta City Mayor Amadeo R.
Perez, Jr., who filed the city’s Answer, joined in the defense and asserted that the contracts were
properly executed by then Mayor Parayno with prior authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod. For
respondent Ceferino J. Capalad, Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun filed an Answer with compulsory counterclaim
and motion to dismiss on the ground that Del Castillo has no legal standing to sue.
After pre-trial, the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel for Urdaneta City In its Order
dated September 11, 2002, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 45,
admitted the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm and granted the withdrawal of appearance of
the City Prosecutor. It also granted the prayer to drop the city as defendant and admitted its complaint
for consolidation with Del Castillo’s complaint, and directed the defendants to answer the city’s complaint.
It also granted Capalad’s motion to expunge all pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in his behalf. Capalad
was dropped as defendant, and his complaint filed by Atty. Jorito C. Peralta was admitted and
consolidated with the complaints of Del Castillo and Urdaneta City.
ISSUE(S)
(related sa Rule 11.04 di co na sinali ung mga unrelated issues - Miguel) WON Atty. Sahagun violated
rule 11.04 of the Code of Prof. Responsibility
RULING
Yes. At first, Atty. Sahagun represents petitioners who claim that the contracts are valid. On the other
hand, Capalad filed a complaint for annulment of the contracts. Certainly, Atty. Sahagun cannot represent
totally conflicting interests. Thus, we should expunge all pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in behalf of
Capalad.
Before we close, notice is taken of the offensive language used by Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio
B. Escalante in their pleadings before us and the Court of Appeals. They unfairly called the Court of
Appeals a “court of technicalities” for validly dismissing their defectively prepared petition. They also
accused the Court of Appeals of protecting, in their view, “an incompetent judge.” [46] In explaining the
“concededly strong language,” Atty. Sahagun further indicted himself. He said that the Court of Appeals’
dismissal of the case shows its “impatience and readiness to punish petitioners for a perceived slight on
its dignity” and such dismissal “smacks of retaliation and does not augur for the cold neutrality and
impartiality demanded of the appellate court.”
Accordingly, we impose upon Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante a fine of P2,000 [48]
each payable to this Court within ten days from notice and we remind them that they should observe and
maintain the respect due to the Court of Appeals and judicial officers; abstain from offensive language
before the courts; and not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record. Similar acts in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, we (1) GRANT the petition; (2) SET ASIDE the Resolutions dated April 15, 2003 and
February 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76170; (3) DENY the entry of appearance of
the Lazaro Law Firm in Civil Case No. U-7388 and EXPUNGE all pleadings it filed as counsel of Urdaneta
City; (4) ORDER the City Prosecutor to represent Urdaneta City in Civil Case No. U-7388; (5) AFFIRM the
RTC in admitting the complaint of Capalad; and (6) PROHIBIT Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun from representing
Capalad and EXPUNGE all pleadings that he filed in behalf of Capalad.
Finally, we IMPOSE a fine of P2,000 each on Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante for their
use of offensive language, payable to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision.
220 Provincial Government of Camarines Norte v. Beatriz Gonzales
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE, represented by GOVERNOR JESUS

O. TYPOCO, JR., petitioner, vs. BEATRIZ O. GONZALES, respondent.
G.R. No. 185740. July 23, 2013.
Ponente: J. Brion
Topic: Local Government – The Provincial Administrator
Synopsis:
When Congress, through R.A. 7160, made substantial changes to the provincial administrator position, it
effectively reclassified the position into a primarily confidential, non-career position. Thus, the position is
now among the mandatory provincial officials. Consequently, the Local Government Code also amended
the qualifications for the position. While the requirement of civil service eligibility was retained, as well as
the educational requirements, the six-year work experience requirement was shortened to five years.
Residence in the local government concerned, as well as possession of good moral character, were
likewise added as requirements. Another change is that the law made the provincial administrator
position coterminous with its appointing authority, thus classifying it as a non-career service. Section 480
of the LGC made the provincial administrator’s functions closely related to the prevailing provincial
administration by identifying the incumbent with the provincial governor to ensure the alignment of the
governor’s direction for the province with what the provincial administrator would implement. In short,
the law now mandates constant interaction between the provincial administrator and the provincial
governor.
Digest:
FACTS
Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte by then
Governor Roy A. Padilla, Jr. Her appointment was on a permanent capacity. Governor Jess B. Pimentel
sent Gonzales a memorandum directing her to explain in writing why no administrative charges should be
filed against her for gross insubordination/gross discourtesy in the course of official duties, and conduct
grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. After Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc
Investigation Committee found her guilty of the charges against her, and recommended to Governor
Pimentel that she be held administratively liable. Governor Pimentel adopted the Ad Hoc Investigation
Committee’s recommendation and dismissed Gonzales.
Gonzales appealed Governor Pimentel’s decision to CSC. The CSC modified Governor Pimentel’s decision,
finding Gonzales guilty of insubordination and suspending her for six months.
Upon service of the suspension thereof, Governor Pimentel reinstated Gonzales as provincial
administrator, but terminated her services the next day for lack of confidence. He then wrote a letter to
the CSC reporting his compliance with its order, and Gonzales’ subsequent dismissal as a confidential
employee. In his letter, Governor Pimentel cited Resolution No. 0001158, where the CSC ruled that the
provincial administrator position is highly confidential and is coterminous in nature. The CSC responded,
and which again directed Gonzales’ reinstatement as provincial administrator. It clarified that while the
Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. [RA] 7160) made the provincial administrator position
coterminous and highly confidential in nature, this conversion cannot operate to prejudice officials who
were already issued permanent appointments as administrators prior to the new law’s effectivity.
According to the CSC, Gonzales has acquired a vested right to her permanent appointment as provincial
administrator and is entitled to continue holding this office despite its subsequent classification as a
coterminous position. The conversion of the provincial administrator position from a career to a non-
career service should not jeopardize Gonzales’ security of tenure guaranteed to her by the Constitution.
As a permanent appointee, Gonzales may only be removed for cause, after due notice and hearing. Loss
of trust and confidence is not among the grounds for a permanent appointee’s dismissal or discipline
under existing laws.
ISSUE(S)
Did Congress effectively reclassify the provincial administrator position from a career service to
confidential?
RULING
Yes. When Congress, through R.A. 7160, made substantial changes to the provincial administrator
position, it effectively reclassified the position into a primarily confidential, non-career position. Thus, the
position is now among the mandatory provincial officials. Consequently, the Local Government Code also
amended the qualifications for the position. While the requirement of civil service eligibility was retained,
as well as the educational requirements, the six-year work experience requirement was shortened to five
years. Residence in the local government concerned, as well as possession of good moral character, were
likewise added as requirements. Another change is that the law made the provincial administrator
position coterminous with its appointing authority, thus classifying it as a non-career service. Section 480
of the LGC made the provincial administrator’s functions closely related to the prevailing provincial
administration by identifying the incumbent with the provincial governor to ensure the alignment of the
governor’s direction for the province with what the provincial administrator would implement. In short,
the law now mandates constant interaction between the provincial administrator and the provincial
governor.
221 OSG v. CA and Municipal Government of Saguiran, Lanao Del Sur
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG), Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF SAGUIRAN, LANAO DEL SUR, Respondents.
G.R. No. 199027 June 9, 2014
Ponente: J. Reyes
Synopsis:
Evidently, this provision of the LGC not only identifies the powers and functions of a local government
unit’s legal officer. It also restricts, as it names, the lawyer who may represent the local government unit
as its counsel in court proceedings. Being a special law on the issue of representation in court that is
exclusively made applicable to local government units, the LGC must prevail over the provisions of the
Administrative Code, which classifies only as a general law on the subject matter.
Digest:
FACTS
A petition for mandamus was filed with the RTC of Lanao del Sur by former members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Saguiran compelling the respondent Municipality of Saguiran to pay them an aggregate amount
of P726,000.00 representing their unpaid terminal leave benefits under Section 5 of the Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular Nos. 41, Series of 1988 and 14, series of 1999.
The RTC dismissed the petition on ground that the cat being sought by petitioners was not a ministerial
duty. It nonetheless, directed the Municipality of Saguiran to include general or special budget for the
year 2009 the subject claims for terminal leave benefits.
Dissatisfied, the Municipality of Saguitan partially appealed the order of the RTC to the CA. On December
14, 2009, the CA issued notice requiring the Office of the Solicitor General to file a memorandum for the
Municipality of Saguiran within a non-extendible period of 30 days. The OSG filed a Manifestation and
Motion requesting to be excused from filing the memorandum on the ground of lack of authority to
represent the Municipality of Saguiran arguing that the respondent had to be represented by its legal
officer, pursuant to Article XI(3)(i) of RA 7610 (Local Government Code of 1991). It furthers argued that
OSG’s mandate is limited to the representation of the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities ad its officials and its agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the service of a lawyer.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the OSG has no legal authority to represent Municipality of Saguiran
RULING
YES. A statute must be interpreted, not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other
laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. On the matter
of counsels’ representation for the government, the Administrative Code is not the only law that delves
on the issue.1âwphi1 Specifically for local government units, the LGC limits the lawyers who are
authorized to represent them in court actions, as the law defines the mandate of a local government
unit’s legal officer. Book III, Title V, Article XI, Section 481 of the LGC provides: Article Eleven-The Legal
Officer
Sec. 481. Qualifications, Term, Powers and Duties.
(a) No person shall be appointed legal officer unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, a resident of the
local government concerned, of good moral character, and a member of the Philippine Bar. x x x.
xxxx
The appointment of legal officer shall be mandatory for the provincial and city governments and optional
for the municipal government.
(b) The legal officer, the chief legal counsel of the local government unit, shall take charge of the office
of legal services and shall:
xxxx
(3) In addition to the foregoing duties and functions, the legal officer shall:
(i) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the local
government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party: Provided, That, in actions or
proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to
another component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be deployed to represent the adverse
party;
Evidently, this provision of the LGC not only identifies the powers and functions of a local government
unit’s legal officer. It also restricts, as it names, the lawyer who may represent the local government unit
as its counsel in court proceedings. Being a special law on the issue of representation in court that is
exclusively made applicable to local government units, the LGC must prevail over the provisions of the
Administrative Code, which classifies only as a general law on the subject matter.
222 Alinsug v. RTC br. 58
Alinsug vs. Hon. Rolindo D. Beldia, Jr., et. al.

G.R. No. 108232. August 23, 1993
Ponente: J. Vitug
Synopsis:
The key then to resolving the issue of whether a local government official may secure the services of
private counsel, in an action filed against him in his official capacity, lies on the nature of the action and
the relief that is sought. In one case, the SC held that where rigid adherence to the law on representation
of local officials in court actions could deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid grievance, the
hiring of a private counsel would be proper. And, in Albuera v. Torres, this Court also said that a
provincial governor sued in his official capacity may engage the services of private counsel when “the
complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if due from the defendants,
must be satisfied by them in their private capacity.”
Digest:
FACTS
The petitioner, Zonsayda L. Alinsug, had been a regular employee of the municipal government of
Escalante, Negros Occidental, when she received a permanent appointment as Clerk III in the Office of
the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of the same municipality. On 23 June 1992, Mayor
Ponsica issued Office Order No. 31, suspending Zonsayda for one month and one day commencing on 24
June 1992 for “a simple misconduct which can also be categorized as an act of insubordination.” The
order also stated that the suspension “carries with it forfeiture of benefits such as salary and PERA and
leave credits during the duration of its effectivity.”
Zonsayda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, in San Carlos City, a petition, dated 07
July 1992, for “injunction with damages and prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction” against Mayor Ponsica and the municipal treasurer. In its Answer filed by private practitioner
Samuel SM Lezama, Mayor Ponsica and the municipal treasurer made counter-claims and attorney’s fees
plus appearance fees. The petitioner then filed a Motion praying that the answer be disregarded and
expunged from the record, and that the respondents be all declared in default on the ground that since
the respondents were sued in their official capacities, “not including their private capacities,” they should
have been represented by either the municipal legal officer or the provincial legal officer or prosecutor as
provided for by Sec. 481 (b) [i] and [3] of the Local Government Code.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not a private counsel may represent municipal officials sued in their official capacities
RULING
IT DEPENDS. Indeed, it appears that the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a municipality only
when the municipality is an adverse party in a case involving the provincial government or another
municipality or city within the province. This provision has its apparent origin in the ruling in De Guia v.
The Auditor General where the Court held that the municipality’s authority to employ a private attorney is
expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal would be disqualified to serve and
represent it. With Sec. 1683 of the old Administrative Code as legal basis, the Court therein cited
Enriquez, Sr. v. Gimenez which enumerated instances when the provincial fiscal is disqualified to
represent in court a particular municipality; if and when original jurisdiction of case involving the
municipality is vested in the Supreme Court, when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial
government or to some other municipality in the same province, and when, in a case involving the
municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved, as heir legatee, creditor or otherwise.
The key then to resolving the issue of whether a local government official may secure the services of
private counsel, in an action filed against him in his official capacity, lies on the nature of the action and
the relief that is sought.
In one case, the SC held that where rigid adherence to the law on representation of local officials in court
actions could deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid grievance, the hiring of a private counsel
would be proper. And, in Albuera v. Torres, this Court also said that a provincial governor sued in his
official capacity may engage the services of private counsel when “the complaint contains other
allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by
them in their private capacity.”
223 Municipality of Hagonoy v. Dumdum
THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN, represented by the Hon. FELIX V. OPLE, in his
personal capacity, Petitioner, vs. HON. SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR., in his capacity as the
Presiding Judge of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, CEBU CITY, EMILY ROSE GO KO
LIM CHAO, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 168289. March 22, 2010.
Ponente: J. Peralta
Synopsis:
Believing that the trial court had abused its discretion, petitioner Ople filed in his personal capacity,
through law firm Chan Robles & Associates, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of
Appeals, which upheld the decision of the RTC. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. While
the municipal legal officer filed before the CA a Manifestation with Entry of Appearance (thereupon
adopting all the pleadings filed for and in behalf of Ople’s personal representation) for the original appeal,
only the personal representation of Ople signed on the motion for reconsideration. From this, the Court of
Appeals concluded that it was as if petitioner municipality and petitioner Ople never moved for
reconsideration. The manner in which the Manifestation with Entry of Appearance is worded, it is clear
that petitioner’s legal officer was intent on adopting, for both the municipality and mayor Ople, not only
the certiorari petition but also all other pleadings that may be filed thereafter by Ople’s personal
representation, including the motion for reconsideration.
Digest:
FACTS
Sometime in the mid-2000s, private respondent, doing business as KD Surplus, and engaged in buying
and selling surplus trucks and heavy equipment, was contracted by petitioner Ople, in his personal
capacity for the delivery of motor vehicles for several undertakings within the municipality. The vehicles
were delivered, however, despite repeated claims for payment, Ople failed to provide the sum agreed
upon, thus respondent filed a collection claim before the RTC, which granted a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment. Petitioners filed a motion to discharge the writ of attachment, invoking immunity of the state
from suit. On October 20, 2003, the RTC denied the motion, to which petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was also denied. Believing that the trial court had abused its discretion, petitioner
Ople filed in his personal capacity, through law firm Chan Robles & Associates, a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the RTC. A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. While the municipal legal officer filed before the CA a Manifestation
with Entry of Appearance (thereupon adopting all the pleadings filed for and in behalf of Ople’s personal
representation) for the original appeal, only the personal representation of Ople signed on the motion for
reconsideration. From this, the Court of Appeals concluded that it was as if petitioner municipality and
petitioner Ople never moved for reconsideration.
ISSUE(S)
1. Is Ople justified in invoking the local government’s immunity from suit?
2. Is the CA correct in its reason for denying the motion for reconsideration?
RULING
1. Yes. There is a difference between suability and liability. Where the suability of the state is conceded
and by which liability is ascertained judicially, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to
satisfy the judgment or not. Execution may not issue upon such judgment, because statutes waiving non-
suability do not authorize the seizure of property to satisfy judgment. With this in mind, the writ of
preliminary attachment should ever have been issued in the first place, as it amounts to nothing more
than a scrap of paper, as the property of the municipality may not be subject to writs of execution absent
a corresponding appropriation provided by law.
2. No. The manner in which the Manifestation with Entry of Appearance is worded, it is clear that
petitioner’s legal officer was intent on adopting, for both the municipality and mayor Ople, not only the
certiorari petition but also all other pleadings that may be filed thereafter by Ople’s personal
representation, including the motion for reconsideration.
Note:
The Supreme Court nevertheless affirmed the decision of the CA in denying the motion for
reconsideration, but reversed its ruling affirming the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment.
224 City of Caloocan v. Allarde
City of Caloocan vs. Hon. Allarde, Presiding Judge of Branch 123, RTC Caloocan City, Alberto
Castillo Deputy Sheriff of Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan City and Delfina Hernandez Santiago
and Philippine National Bank (PNB), respondents.
G.R. No. 107271. September 10, 2003
Ponente: J. Corona
Topic: Local Government – Garnishment of Public Funds
Synopsis:
The rule is and always been that all government funds deposited in the PNB or any other official
depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether general or
special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence
of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. In the instant case, the City Council of Caloocan
already approved and passed an Ordinance, allocating the amount for the respondent Santiago. Thus this
case fell squarely within the exception. For all intents and purposes the Ordinance was the
“corresponding appropriation as required by law.”
Digest:
FACTS
Sometime in 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson through Ordinance No. 1749, abolished the position of
Assistant City Administrator and 17 other positions from the plantilla of the local government of Caloocan.
Then Assistant City Administrator Delfina Hernandez Santiago and 17 affected employees of the City
Government assailed the legality of the abolition before the CFI of Caloocan City, Branch 33.
The CFI declared the abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all dismissed employees and the
payment of the back salaries and other emoluments. The City Government of Caloocan appealed to the
CA. Respondent Santiago and her co-parties moved for the dismissal of the appeal but the appellate
court denied their motion. Thus, they elevated the case on certiorari. The SC held that the appellate court
“erred in not dismissing the appeal.”
In 1986, the City Government of Caloocan made a partial payment of respondent Santiago’s back wages,
there by leaving a balance of P530, 761.91. Her co-parties were paid in full. In 1987, the City
appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries. Surprisingly, however, the City later refused to release
the money.
Again Santiago exerted effort for the execution of the remainder of the money judgement. Judge Allarde,
issued a writ of execution for the payment of the remainder of Santiago’s back salaries and other
emoluments. But for the second time the City went up to the CA, but the petition was dismissed. The City
again appealed to the SC but the petition was also dismissed.
On July 27, 1992, Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City,
for P 100,000. The proceeds of the sale were turned over to Santiago as partial payment. Then the City
questioned the auction as the properties of the municipality were exempt from execution.
On October 5, 1992, the City Council passed Ordinance No. 0134, which included the amount of
Santiago’s back salaries plus interest. But Mayor Asistio, Jr., refused to sign the check. Judge Allarde
issued another order directing the Acting Mayor Malonzo, to sign the check which was pending since
1992. However, Malonzo informed the trial court that “ he could not sign the check, because it was not
formally turned over to him by the City Mayor” and that “he doubted whether he had authority to sign
the same.”
Thus, Judge Allarde ordered Sheriff Castillo to immediately garnish the funds of the City corresponding
the claim of Santiago. On the same day the Sheriff served a copy of the Notice of Garnishment on the
PNB. When PNB immediately notified the City, the City Treasurer sent a letter informing PNB that the
order of garnishment was “illegal.” But PNB opted to comply with the order of Judge Allarde and released
the check. After 21 years the claim was satisfied.
ISSUE(S)
Whether PNB was correct in releasing the check
RULING
Yes. The rule is and always been that all government funds deposited in the PNB or any other official
depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether general or
special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence
of a corresponding appropriation as required by law.
In the instant case, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed an Ordinance, allocating
the amount for the respondent Santiago. Thus this case fell squarely within the exception. For all intents
and purposes the Ordinance was the “corresponding appropriation as required by law.”
225 Rimando v. Naguilian Emission Testing
ABRAHAM RIMANDO, Petitioner, vs. NAGUILIAN EMISSION TESTING CENTER, INC.,

Represented by its President, ROSEMARIE LLARENAS and HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 198860. July 23, 2002.
Ponente: J. Reyes
Topic: Local Government – Business Permits
Synopsis:
A Mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the exercise of the same is
a delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature. This was the pronouncement of this Court in
Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor, 499 SCRA 434 (2006), where a determination was made on the
nature of the power of a mayor to grant business permits under the Local Government Code.
Digest:
FACTS
Naguilan Emission Testing thru President filed a mandamus case against Mayor Rimando. Petitioner did
not issue business permit to respondent because the parties did not reach an agreement as to the
execution of the respondent of a contract of lease with the Municipality of Naguilan.
RTC denied petition. Respondent appealed to CA which reverses the decision of the RTC. Hence, petition
to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not issuance of Business Permit can be compelled by mandamus
RULING
No, a Mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the exercise of the
same is a delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature. This was the pronouncement of this
Court in Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor, 499 SCRA 434 (2006), where a determination was made on
the nature of the power of a mayor to grant business permits under the Local Government Code.
226 Vergara v. Ombudsman
SEVERINO B. VERGARA, Petitioner, vs. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, SEVERINO J. LAJARA, and
VIRGINIA G. BARORO, Respondents
G.R. No. 174567. March 12, 2009.
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Local Government – Requisites for Entering into Private Contracts
Synopsis:
Courts do not interfere in the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion in determining probable cause unless
there are compelling reasons, which were absent in this case. The Ombudsman, in issuing the assailed
Resolution, found no probable cause to hold any of the respondents liable for violation of RA 3019 since
(1) the purchase price for the site of the new City Hall was reasonable and was in fact lower than their
zonal valuation; (2) Calamba City took immediate possession of the properties despite a cut-rate initial
payment; (3) the total purchase price was paid under liberal terms as it was paid in installments for one
year from date of purchase, and; (4) the parties agreed that the last installment was subject to the
condition that titles to the properties were first transferred to Calamba City. All of these boils down to the
fact that that the findings of the Ombudsman are supported by substantial evidence.
As appropriately ruled by the Ombudsman, ratification by the City Council is not a condition sine qua non
for Mayor Lajara to enter into contracts. With the resolution issued by the Sangguniang Panlungsod, it
cannot be said that there was evident bad faith in purchasing the subject lots. The lack of ratification
alone does not characterize the purchase of the properties as one that gave unwarranted benefits to
Pamana or Prudential Bank or one that caused undue injury to Calamba City.
Digest:
FACTS
Resolution Nos. 115 and 280, Series of 2001, was issued by the City Council of Calamba authorizing
Mayor Severino J. Lajara: (1) to negotiate with landowners for a new city hall site; (2) to purchase
several lots owned by Pamana, and; (3) to execute, sign and deliver the required documents thereof.
Herein petitioner, Severino B. Vergara, alleged that all documents pertaining thereto were not ratified by
the City Council, maintaining further that since the pieces of evidence in support of the complaint were
documentary, respondents have admitted them impliedly. The Ombudsman, however, found no probable
cause to hold any of the respondents liable for violation of Section 3(e) of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA 3019), reasoning that when Mayor Lajara entered into and implemented the subject
contracts, he complied with the resolutions issued by the City Council. Therefore, he caused no undue
injury to Calamba City nor gave a private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference.
Petitioner, then, filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was later denied for lack of merit. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when he dismissed for lack of
probable cause the case against respondents for violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019
2. Whether or not all the documents pertaining to the purchase of the lots should bear the ratification by
the City Council of Calamba
RULING
1. No. The SC reiterated the rule that courts do not interfere in the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion
in determining probable cause unless there are compelling reasons, which were absent in this case. The
Ombudsman, in issuing the assailed Resolution, found no probable cause to hold any of the respondents
liable for violation of RA 3019 since (1) the purchase price for the site of the new City Hall was
reasonable and was in fact lower than their zonal valuation; (2) Calamba City took immediate possession
of the properties despite a cut-rate initial payment; (3) the total purchase price was paid under liberal
terms as it was paid in installments for one year from date of purchase, and; (4) the parties agreed that
the last installment was subject to the condition that titles to the properties were first transferred to
Calamba City. All of these boils down to the fact that that the findings of the Ombudsman are supported
by substantial evidence.
2. No. As appropriately ruled by the Ombudsman, ratification by the City Council is not a condition sine
qua non for Mayor Lajara to enter into contracts. With the resolution issued by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, it cannot be said that there was evident bad faith in purchasing the subject lots. The lack of
ratification alone does not characterize the purchase of the properties as one that gave unwarranted
benefits to Pamana or Prudential Bank or one that caused undue injury to Calamba City. The law requires
prior authorization from the City Council and in this case, Resolution Nos. 115 and 280 were the City
Council’s stamp of approval and authority for Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots.
227 Governor L-Ray Villafuerte, Jr., v. Sec. Robredo
GOV. LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR., and the PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR,
Petitioners, vs. HON. JESSE M. ROBREDO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
the Interior and Local Government, Respondent.
G.R. No. 195390. December 10, 2014.
Ponente: J. Reyes
Topic: Local Government – Fiscal Autonomy
Synopsis:
Villafuerte filed a petition assailing the three memorandum circulars issued by Robredo. The circulars
pertain to full disclosure of local budget and finances and other guidelines regarding budget. Villafuerte
argues that the circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy of the LGU. The Court ruled
that the circulars merely reiterated what was already provided in the law and that the order on public
disclosure is consistent with the policy of promoting good governance through transparency,
accountability and participation.
Digest:
FACTS
On February 21, 2011, Villafuerte, then Governor of Camarines Sur, joined by the Provincial Government
of Camarines Sur, filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify the three issuances of Robredo
for being unconstitutional and having been issued with grave abuse of discretion:
MC No. 2010-83 entitled “Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public Offerings,”
which aims to promote good governance through enhanced transparency and accountability of LGUs.
 Legal and Administrative Authority: Section 352 of LGC of 1991 requires the posting within 30
days from end of each fiscal year in at least 3 publicly accessible and conspicuous places in the LGU a
summary of all revenues collected and funds including the appropriations and disbursements of such
funds during the preceding fiscal year. RA No 984 (Government Procurement Reform Act) calles for the
posting of the Invitation to Bid, Notice of Award, Notice to Proceed and Approved Contract in the
procuring entity’s premises, in newspapers of general circulation, the Philippine Govt Electronic
Procurement System and the website of procuring entity.
 Responsibility of Local Chief Executive: All Provincial Governors, City Mayors, and Municipal
Myors, are directed to faithfully comply with the abovecited provisions of laws, and existing national
policy, by posting in conspicuous places within public buildings in the locality, or in print media of
community or general circulation, and in their websites
MC No 2010-138 reiterating that 20% component of the IRA shall be utilized for desirable social,
economic, and environmental outcomes essential to the attainment of the constitutional objective of life
for all.
MC No 2011-08 directing for the strict adherence to Section 90 of RA No 10147 of the General
Appropriations Act of 2011.
 Legal and Administrative Authority: Section 90 stipulates that “the amount appropriated for the
LGU’s share in the IRA shall be used in accordance with Sections 17(g) and 287 of RA No 7160. The
annual budgets of LGUs shall be prepared in accordance with the forms, procedures, and schedules
prescribed by the Department of Budget and Management and those jointly issued with the Commission
on Audit.
 Sanctions: Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions - An elective local official may be
disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on: (c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office,
gross negligence, or dereliction of duty
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy
enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC
RULING
No, Petition denied.
• Petitioners: assailed issuances interfere with the local and fiscal autonomy of LGUs embodied in
the Constitution and the LGC.
o MC 2010-138 transgressed these constitutionally-protected liberties when it restricted the
meaning of “development” and enumerated activities which the local government must finance from the
20% development fund component of the IRA and provided sanctions for local authorities who shall use
the said component of the fund for the excluded purposes stated therein.
o Robredo cannot substitute his own discretion with that of the local legislative council in enacting
its annual budget and specifying the development projects that the 20% component of its IRA should
fund.
• Court: Petitioners’ arguments are untenable.
o The Constitution has expressly adopted the policy of ensuring the autonomy of LGUs (Article X of
Constitution)
o It is also pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution that enhancing local autonomy that the
LGC was enacted.
o Local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization.
 Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local
governments “more responsive and accountable,” and “ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress.” (Limbona v Mangelin)
 To safeguard the state policy on local autonomy, the Constitution confines the power of the
President over LGUs to mere supervision. “The President exercises ‘general supervision’ over them, but
only to ‘ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.’ He has no control over their acts in
the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. (Section 4, Article X of Constitution)
o It is petitioners’ contention that Robredo went beyond the confined of his supervisory powers, as
alter ego of the President, when he issued MC No 2010-138. They argue that the mandatory nature of
the circular, with the threat of imposition of sanctions for non-compliance, evinces a clear desire to
exercise control over LGUs. However, the Court perceives otherwise.
o A reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an existing provision in the
LGC. It was plainly intended to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directive stated in Section 287 of
the LGC to utilize the 20% portion of the IRA for development projects. The assailed circular was issued
in response to the report of the COA that a substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some
LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to expenses more properly
categorized as MOOE, in violation of Section 287 of the LGC.
o The issuance of MC No. 2010-138 was brought about by the report of the COA that the
development fund was not being utilized accordingly. To curb the alleged misuse of the development
fund, the respondent deemed it proper to remind LGUs of the nature and purpose of the provision for the
IRA through MC No. 2010-138.
o The enumeration in the circular was not meant to restrict the discretion of the LGUs in the
utilization of their funds. It was incorporated in the assailed circular in order to guide them in the proper
disposition of the IRA and avert further misuse of the fund by citing current practices which seemed to be
incompatible with the purpose of the fund. LGUs remain at liberty to map out their development plans
based on their own discretion and utilize their IRAs accordingly, with the only restriction that 20% thereof
be expended for development projects.
• The local autonomy granted LGU does not completely severe them from the national government
or turn them into impenetrable states. Thus, notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy being enjoyed by
LGUs, they are still under the supervision of the President and maybe held accountable for malfeasance
or violations of existing laws.
• Answering petitioners’ claim that the requirement to post other documents in the issuances went
beyond the provisions in LGC and RA No 9184: It is well to remember that fiscal autonomy does not
leave LGUs with unbridled discretion in the disbursement of public funds. They remain accountable to
their constituency.
• The assailed issuances of the respondent, MC Nos. 2010-83 and 2011-08, are but implementation
of this avowed policy of the State to make public officials accountable to the people. They are
amalgamations of existing laws, rules and regulation designed to give teeth to the constitutional mandate
of transparency and accountability.
• Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain
but for the benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service
with responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and
employees have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to serve.
(ABAKADA GURO Party List v Purisima)
• The Constitution strongly summoned the State to adopt and implement a policy of full disclosure
of all transactions involving public interest and provide the people with the right to access public
information. Section 352 of the LGC and RA No 9184 are responses to this call for transparency and both
laws establish a system of transparency in procurement process in government agencies.
• The publication of budgets, expenditures, contracts and loans and procurement plans of LGUs
required in the assailed issuances could not have infringed on the local fiscal autonomy of LGUs.
o The issuances do not interfere with the discretion of the LGUs in the specification of their priority
projects and the allocation of their budgets. The posting requirements are mere transparency measures.
o Section 352 of the LGC that is being invoked by the petitioners does not exclude the requirement
for the posting of the additional documents stated in MC Nos. 2010-83 and 2011-08. The additional
requirement for the posting of budgets, expenditures, contracts and loans, and procurement plans are
well-within the contemplation of Section 352 of the LGC considering they are documents necessary for an
accurate presentation of a summary of appropriations and disbursements that an LGU is required to
publish.
o The supervisory powers of the President are broad enough to embrace the power to require the
publication of certain documents as a mechanism of transparency. The President, by constitutional fiat, is
the head of the economic and planning agency of the government, primarily responsible for formulating
and implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic policies, plans and
programs for the entire country. (Pimentel v Aguirre)
• The Constitution, which was drafted after long years of dictatorship and abuse of
power, is now replete with numerous provisions directing the adoption of measures to
uphold transparency and accountability in government, with a view of protecting the nation
from repeating its atrocious past. It commands the strict adherence to full disclosure of
information on all matters relating to official transactions and those involving public
interest. (Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III)
• The assailed issuances were issued pursuant to the policy of promoting good governance through
transparency, accountability and participation. The action of the respondent is certainly within the
constitutional bounds of his power as alter ego of the President.
• The power to govern is a delegated authority from the people who hailed the public official to
office through the democratic process of election. He must not frown upon accountability checks which
aim to show how well he is performing his delegated power. For, it is through these mechanisms of
transparency and accountability that he is able to prove to his constituency that he is worthy of the
continued privilege. <3
228 Republic v. City of Paranaque
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION

AUTHORITY (PRA), Petitioner, vs. CITY OF PARANAQUE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 191109. July, 18, 2012.
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Topic: Local Government – Taxation Power
Synopsis:
Section 133 of the Local Government Code prohibits local governments from imposing taxes on
government instrumentalities, pursuant to the principle of supremacy of the national government over all
local government units. Otherwise, mere creatures of the state can defeat national policies through
extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprises using the
power to tax as a tool for regulation.
Digest:
FACTS
Pursuant to its mandate under E.O. No. 380, which amended E.O. No. 525, issued by then president
Marcos, the PRA is the agency primarily responsible for integrating, directing and coordinating all
reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. By virtue of this mandate, it
reclaimed several portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay, including those in
Paranaque City. On February 19, 2003, then Paranaque City Treasurer Liberato M. Carabeo issued
Warrants of Levy on the properties reclaimed by PRA based on the assessment for delinquent real
property taxes made by the city assessor for the years 2001 and 2002. PRA contested, claiming that it
was exempt from paying real estate taxes. The RTC however, denied PRAs petition for writ of injunction,
stating that it was a GOCC under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1084, as it was organized as a stock corporation
with an authorized capital stock divided into no par value shares. As a GOCC, local tax exemption is
withdrawn by virtue of Section 193 of the Local Government Code, which was then the prevailing tax law
with respect to real property taxation.
ISSUE(S)
Is PRA a GOCC, and thus liable for real property tax?
RULING
No. The contention of the RTC is erroneous. While PRA has a capital stock divided into no par value
shares, it is not authorized to distribute dividends, surplus allotments, or profits to stockholders. Both
requisites must concur for an entity to be considered a corporation. The Supreme Court also declared
that PRA does not pass the twin-conditions that test whether an entity is a GOCC under Section 16,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, that is, establishment for the common good and economic viability.
In fact, PRA is a government instrumentality which, although granted autonomy by legislation, remains
attached to the National Government. Section 133 of the Local Government Code prohibits local
governments from imposing taxes on government instrumentalities, pursuant to the principle of
supremacy of the national government over all local government units. Otherwise, mere creatures of the
state can defeat national policies through extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be
undesirable activities or enterprises using the power to tax as a tool for regulation.
229 Hon. Paje v. Jon. Casino
HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Natural
Resources, Petitioner, vs. HON. TEODORO A. CASINO, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 207257. February 3, 2015.

Synopsis:
No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations
mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian
concerned is obtained: Provided, that occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented
shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution. The prior approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement is an
attribute and implementation of the local autonomy granted to, and enjoyed by LGUs under the
Constitution. The LGU has the duty to protect its constituents and interests in the implementation of the
project. Hence, the approval of the concerned sanggunian is required by law to ensure that local
communities partake in the fruits of their own backyard.
Digest:
FACTS
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority• (SBMA), a government agency organized and established under
Republic Act No. (RA) 7227, and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC) entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) expressing their intention to build a power plant in Subic Bay which would supply
reliable and affordable power to Subic Bay Industrial Park (SBIP). And another MOU whereby TCC
undertook to build and operate a coal-fired power plant. TCC identified 20 hectares of land at Sitio
Naglatore, Mt. Redondo, Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ) as the suitable area for the project and another
site of approximately 10 hectares tobe used as an ash pond. TCC intends to lease the property from
SBMA for a term of 50 years with rent fixed at$3.50 per square meter, payable in 10 equal 5-year
installments.
ECC was issued in favor of TCIC, a subsidiary of TCC. The DENR, through former Secretary Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., issued an ECC for the proposed 2x150-MW coal-fired power plant, this ECC was then
amended allowing inclusion of some additional components.
The Sangguniang Panglalawiganof Zambales opposed the establishment of a coal-fired thermal power
plant. Casiño Group filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan against RP Energy, SBMA, and
Hon. Ramon Jesus P. Paje, in his capacity as Secretary of the DENR. n the Petition, the Casiño Group
alleged, among others, that the power plant project would cause grave environmental damage; that it
would adversely affect the health of the residents of the municipalities of Subic, Zambales, Morong,
Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo; that the LDA was entered into without securing a prior certification
from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) as required under Section 59 of RA8371 or
the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA Law), and that the ECC was issued and the LDA
entered into without the prior approval of the concerned sanggunians as required under Sections 26 and
27 of the Local Government Code (LGC).
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the Certificate of Non-Overlap, under Section 59 of the IPRA Law, is a precondition to the
issuance of an ECC and the lack of its prior issuance rendered the ECC invalid.
2. Whether the Certificate of Non-Overlap, under Section 59 of the IPRA Law, is a precondition to the
consummation of the Lease and Development Agreement (LDA) between SBMA and RPEnergy and the
lack of its prior issuance rendered the LDA invalid.
3. Whether compliance with Section 27, in relation to Section 26, of the LGC (i.e., approval of the
concerned sanggunian requirement) is necessary prior to the implementation of the power plant project.
RULING
1. YES. Section 59, Chapter VIII of the IPRA Law provides:
SEC. 59. Certification Precondition. All departments and other governmental agencies shall henceforth be
strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing, or granting any concession, license or lease, or entering into any
production-sharing agreement, without prior certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not
overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued after a field-based investigation
is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That no certification shall
be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of ICCs/IPs concerned:
Provided, further, That no department, government agency or government-owned or -controlled
corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there is a
pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or
suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this
consultation process.
As may be deduced from its subtitle, Section 59 requires as a precondition, relative to the issuance of any
concession, license, lease or agreement over natural resources, a certification issued by the NCIP that the
area subject thereof does not lie within any ancestral domain. This is in keeping with the State policy to
protect the rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their ancestral
domains in order to ensure their economic, social and cultural well-being as well as to recognize the
applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and
extent of such ancestral domain.
2. CNO is required prior to the grant of a lease by all government agencies, including the SBMA. Again,
the evident intention is to prevent the impairment of the right of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains. A
lease, such as the LDA under consideration, would result in, among others, granting RP Energy the right
to the use and enjoyment of the project site to the exclusion of third parties. As such, the lease could
conceivably encroach on an ancestral domain if the CNO is not first obtained. However, implicit in the
operation of Section 59 is the practical reality that the concerned government agency must make a
preliminary determination on whether or not to obtain the required certification in the first place.
Even if the indigenous community does not actually reside on the proposed lease site, the government
agency would still be required to obtain the CNO precisely to rule out the possibility that the proposed
lease site encroaches upon an ancestral domain. The reason for this is that an ancestral domain does not
only cover the lands actually occupied by an indigenous community, but all areas where they have a
claim of ownership, through time immemorial use, such as hunting, burial or worship grounds and to
which they have traditional access for their subsistence and other traditional activities.
3. Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC contemplate two requirements: (1) prior consultations and (2) prior
approval of the concerned sanggunian.
SECTION 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. — It shall
be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation authorizing or
involved in the planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic
change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover, and
extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units, non-governmental
organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or
program, its impact upon the people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological balance,
and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.
SECTION 27. Prior Consultations Required. — No project or program shall be implemented by

government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied
with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, that occupants in areas
where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have
been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
The prior approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement is an attribute and implementation of the
local autonomy granted to, and enjoyed by LGUs under the Constitution. The LGU has the duty to protect
its constituents and interests in the implementation of the project. Hence, the approval of the concerned
sanggunian is required by law to ensure that local communities partake in the fruits of their own
backyard.
230 SK Board of Election Supervisors of Subic v. Rigonan
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
231 Crisostomo Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan
CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, Petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented by

HON. MAYOR JOHN P. YAP, SANGGUNIANG BA YAN OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented by HON.
EZEL FLORES, DANTE PASUGUIRON, ROWEN AGUIRRE, WILBEC GELITO, JUPITER
GALLENERO, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL ENGINEER, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL
TREASURER, BORACAY PNP CHIEF, BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC., represented by NENETTE
GRAF, MUNICIPAL AUXILIARY POLICE, and JOHN and JANE DOES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 211356. September 29, 2014.
.
Topic: Local Government – Police Power/Local Ordinances
Synopsis:
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a
nuisance per se. Under the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to
enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing,
condemnation. Notwithstanding this fact, Section 444 of the LGC grants the local chief executive the
power to require owners of illegally-constructed structures to secure the necessary permits, or to make
the necessary changes thereto in the interest of police power, even going so far as demolition.
Forestlands, although under the management of the DENR, are not exempt from the territorial
application of municipal laws, for local government units legitimately exercise their powers of government
over their defined territorial jurisdiction.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management
Philippines, Inc. On January 7, 2010, the company applied for a zoning compliance with the municipal
government of Malay, Aklan. While the company was already operating a resort in the area, the
application sought the issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over
a parcel of land located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan,which is covered
by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove. Through a Decision on Zoning dated
January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the ground that
the proposed construction site was within the "no build zone" demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-
131. In due time, petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor on February 1, 2010.
On May 13, 2010, petitioner followed up his appeal through a letter but no action was ever taken by the
respondent mayor. On April 5, 2011, however, a Notice of Assessment was sent to petitioner asking for
the settlement of Boracay West Cove’s unpaid taxes and other liabilities. Subsequently, on March 28,
2011, a Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the
resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering
the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel. Alleging that the order was issued and executed
with grave abuse of discretion, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with
the CA, arguing that Boracay West Cove was granted a FLAgT by the DENR, which bestowed the
company the right to construct permanent improvements on the area in question, and that it is the
mayor who should be blamed for not issuing the necessary clearances in the company’s favor.
ISSUE(S)
1. Was the Mayor justified in not issuing the necessary building permit?
2. Do the petitioner’s rights under the FLAgT prevail over a municipal ordinance?
RULING
1. Yes. Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a
nuisance per se. Under the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to
enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing,
condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when
such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction
of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined
and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing, be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its
operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan. However,
in this case, the Court resolved that, in the interest of police power, the government may enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to
promote the general welfare. In connection with this, Section 444 of the LGC grants the local chief
executive the power to require owners of illegally-constructed structures to secure the necessary permits,
or to make the necessary changes thereto in the interest of police power, even going so far as
demolition. In the immediate case, the petitioner not only failed to secure the necessary permits, but
even going so far as to defy the zoning administrator’s ruling.
2. No. The rights granted to petitioner under the FLAgT are not unbridled. Forestlands, although under
the management of the DENR, are not exempt from the territorial application of municipal laws, for local
government units legitimately exercise their powers of government over their defined territorial
jurisdiction. Thus, aside from complying with the provisions in the FLAgT granted by the DENR, it was
incumbent on petitioner to likewise comply with the no build zone restriction under Municipal Ordinance
2000-131, which was already in force even before the FLAgT was entered into. On this point, it is well to
stress that Sections 6 and 8 of the Ordinance do not exempt petitioner from complying with the
restrictions since these provisions adverted to grant exemptions from the ban on constructions on slopes
and swamps, not on the no build zone.
232 Municipality of San Juan v. CA
THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, LAURA BIGLANG-AWA, METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE
SYSTEM (MWSS), and KWOK CHEUNG, Respondents.
G.R. No. 121920. August 9, 2005.
Ponente: J. Garcia
Topic: Local Government – Liability for Torts
Synopsis:
Jurisprudence teaches that for liability to arise under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, ownership of the
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works, is not a controlling factor, it being
sufficient that a province, city or municipality has control or supervision thereof. However, even
petitioner’s claim of supervision of only municipal roads is untenable. Section 149 [1][bb] of the LGC
provides that the Sangguniang Bayan shall regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the
laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes; the building and repair of tunnels, sewers, drains and other
similar structures; erecting of poles and the use of crosswalks, curbs and gutters therein, and adopt
measures to ensure public safety against open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to
life and property, and provide just compensation or relief for persons suffering from them. Doubtless, the
term regulate found in the aforequoted provision of Section 149 can only mean that petitioner
municipality exercises the power of control, or, at the very least, supervision over all excavations for the
laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes within its territory. It must be further emphasised that the
phrases regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other
pipes, and adopt measures to ensure public safety against open canals, manholes, live wires and other
similar hazards to life and property, are not modified by the term municipal road. And neither can it be
fairly inferred from the same provision of Section 149 that petitioners power of regulation vis--vis the
activities therein mentioned applies only in cases where such activities are to be performed in municipal
roads.
Digest:
FACTS
Under a Contract For Water Service Connections entered into by and between the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and Kwok Cheung as sole proprietor of K.C. Waterworks
System Construction (KC, for short), the former engaged the services of the latter to install water service
connections. On 20 May 1988, KC was given a Job Order by the South Sector Office of MWSS to conduct
and effect excavations at the corner of M. Paterno and Santolan Road, San Juan, Metro Manila, a national
road, for the laying of water pipes and tapping of water to the respective houses of water
concessionaires. Meanwhile, between 10 oclock and 11 oclock in the evening of 31 May 1988, Priscilla
Chan was driving her Toyota Crown car with Plate No. PDK 991 at a speed of thirty (30) kilometers per
hour on the right side of Santolan Road towards the direction of Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro Manila.
With her on board the car and seated on the right front seat was Assistant City Prosecutor Laura Biglang-
awa. The road was flooded as it was then raining hard. Suddenly, the left front wheel of the car fell on a
manhole where the workers of KC had earlier made excavations. As a result, the humerus on the right
arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa was fractured. Consequent to the foregoing incident, Biglang-awa filed
before the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila a complaint for damages against MWSS, the
Municipality of San Juan and a number of San Juan municipal officials. Biglang-Awa amended her
complaint twice, and in the second time, she included KC as one of the defendants. In denying liability for
the incident, petitioner hinges on Section 149,[1][z] of the LGC, claiming that under the law, it is obliged
to provide for the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of only municipal streets, avenues,
alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places. Ergo, since Santolan Road is concededly a
national and not a municipal road, it cannot be held liable for the injuries suffered by Biglang-awa on
account of the accident that occurred on said road.
ISSUE(S)
Is the municipality of San Juan liable for the accident?
RULING
Yes. Jurisprudence teaches that for liability to arise under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, ownership of the
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works, is not a controlling factor, it being
sufficient that a province, city or municipality has control or supervision thereof. However, even
petitioner’s claim of supervision of only municipal roads is untenable. Section 149 [1][bb] of the LGC
provides that the Sangguniang Bayan shall regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the
laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes; the building and repair of tunnels, sewers, drains and other
similar structures; erecting of poles and the use of crosswalks, curbs and gutters therein, and adopt
measures to ensure public safety against open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to
life and property, and provide just compensation or relief for persons suffering from them. Doubtless, the
term regulate found in the aforequoted provision of Section 149 can only mean that petitioner
municipality exercises the power of control, or, at the very least, supervision over all excavations for the
laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes within its territory. It must be further emphasised that the
phrases regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other
pipes, and adopt measures to ensure public safety against open canals, manholes, live wires and other
similar hazards to life and property, are not modified by the term municipal road. And neither can it be
fairly inferred from the same provision of Section 149 that petitioners power of regulation vis--vis the
activities therein mentioned applies only in cases where such activities are to be performed in municipal
roads.
233 City of General Santos v. COA
CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, represented by its Mayor, HON. DARLENE MAGNOLIA R.

ANTONINO-CUSTODIO Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
G.R. No. 199439. April 22, 2014
Ponente: J. Leonen
Topic: Local Government – Removal of Public Officers for Reorganization
Synopsis:
A reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It could result in the loss of one's position through
removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make
the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, it must pass the test of good faith; otherwise, it is void ab
initio. Republic Act No. 6656 enumerates several indicators of bad faith in removing employees, to wit:
a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned;
b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions in created;
c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance
and merit;
d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified
offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; and
e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.
Digest:
FACTS
Then mayor of General Santos City, Pedro B. Acharon, Jr., issued Executive Order No. 40, series of 2008,
creating management teams pursuant to its organization development program. Mayor Pedro B. Acharon,
Jr. declared the city’s byword of "Total Quality Service" in his state of the city address in 2005. This was
followed by the conduct of a process and practice review for each department, section, and unit of the
local government. The product was an organization development masterplan adopted as Executive Order
No. 13, series of 2009. This was followed by Resolution No. 004, series of 2009, requesting for the
mayor’s support for GenSan SERVES, an early retirement program to be proposed to the Sangguniang
Panlungsod. Consequently, Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was passed together with its implementing
rules and regulations, designed "to entice those employees who were unproductive due to health reasons
to avail of the incentives being offered therein by way of early retirement package." The ordinance, as
amended, provides that qualified employees below sixty (60) years of age but not less than fifty (50)
years and sickly employees below fifty (50) years of age but not less than forty (40) years may avail of
the incentives under the program. In other words, the ordinance "provides for separation benefits for
sickly employees who have not yet reached retirement age." Moreover, an eligible employee shall receive
an early retirement incentive provided under this program at the rate of one and one-half (1 1/2) months
of the employee’s latest basic salary for every year of service in the City Government. The Commission on
Audit contested the legality of the ordinance, claiming that it is violative of the GISIS Act, as it partakes
of a supplementary retirement benefit plan. In its view, Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 186, as amended, prohibits government agencies from establishing supplementary retirement or
pension plans from the time the Government Service Insurance System charter took effect while those
plans already existing when the charter was enacted were declared abolished. In fine, since Ordinance
No. 08 is in the nature of an ERP [Early Retirement Program] of the City Government of General Santos,
a law authorizing the same is a requisite for its validity. In the absence, however, of such law, the nullity
of Ordinance No. 08 becomes a necessary consequence.
ISSUE(S)
Is Ordinance No. 08 a valid exercise of the power of local governments to reorganize?
RULING
No. The constitutional mandate for local autonomy supports petitioner city’s issuance of Executive Order
No. 40, series of 2008, creating change management teams as an initial step for its organization
development masterplan. Local autonomy also grants local governments the power to streamline and
reorganize. This power is inferred from Section 76 of the Local Government Code on organizational
structure and staffing pattern. Designing and implementing a local government unit’s own "organizational
structure and staffing pattern" also implies the power to revise and reorganize. Without such power, local
governments will lose the ability to adjust to the needs of its constituents. Effective and efficient
governmental services especially at the local government level require rational and deliberate changes
planned and executed in good faith from time to time. A reorganization involves the reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
It could result in the loss of one's position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a
reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, it must
pass the test of good faith; otherwise, it is void ab initio. Republic Act No. 6656 enumerates several
indicators of bad faith in removing employees. None of these however, are present in the immediate
case. Petitioner city followed the order of priority under Section 4 of its ordinance. It required applicants
to undergo medical examination with the local hospital and considered the hospital chief’s
recommendations. Unfortunately, these allegations showing good faith is not enough to declare the
program created by petitioner city as a reorganization that justifies the creation of a retirement benefit
plan. Petitioner city alleged that the positions occupied by those who qualified for GenSan SERVES
remained vacant, and it would neither hire replacements nor promote employees earlier than June 30,
2011. This means the positions left by those who availed of the program will eventually be filled up by
others. Their positions were not abolished or merged with other positions for streamlining in the service.
Notes:
SECTION 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and
after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide
reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge, divide,
or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by
the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as
evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for
reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:
a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned;
b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions in created;
c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance
and merit;
d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified
offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; and
e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.
In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the ordinance was valid only with respect to Section 6 thereof,
which provided for benefits that are not computed based on years of service. They are lump sum
amounts and healthcare benefits. The rest of the ordinance was invalidated.
234 Sebastian v. Lagmay-Ng
MICHAEL SEBASTIAN, Petitioner, vs. ANNABEL LAGMAY NG, represented by her Attorney-in-
fact, ANGELITA LAGMAY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 164594. April 22, 2015.
Ponente: J. Brion
Topic: Local Government – Effects of Amicable Settlement in the Barangay Lupon
Synopsis:
The kasunduan has the force and effect of a final judgment. A simple reading of Section 417 of the Local
Government Code readily discloses the two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement. It
provides that the amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the lupon
within six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such time, the settlement may
be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal court. Under this provision, an amicable
settlement or arbitration award that is not repudiated within a period of ten (10) days from the
settlement may be enforced by: first, execution by the Lupon within six (6) months from the date of the
settlement; or second, by an action in the appropriate city or municipal trial court if more than six (6)
months from the date of settlement has already elapsed. The second mode of enforcement, on the other
hand, is judicial in nature and could only be resorted to through the institution of an action in a regular
form before the proper City/Municipal Trial Court.
Digest:
FACTS
Sometime in 1997, Angelita Lagmay (Angelita), acting as representative and attorney-in-fact of her
daµghter Annabel Lagmay Ng (Annabel), filed a complaint before the Barangay Justice of Siclong, Laur,
Nueva Ecija. She sought to collect from Michael the sum of ₱350,000.00 that Annabel sent to Michael.
She claimed that Annabel and Michael were once sweethearts, and that they agreed to jointly invest their
financial resources to buy a truck. She alleged that while Annabel was working in Hongkong, Annabel
sent Michael the amount of ₱350,000.00 to purchase the truck. However, after Annabel and Michael’s
relationship has ended, Michael allegedly refused to return the money to Annabel, prompting the latter to
bring the matter before the Barangay Justice. On July 9, 1997, the parties entered into an amicable
settlement, evidenced by a document denominated as "kasunduan" wherein Michael agreed to pay
Annabel the amount of ₱250,000.00 on specific dates. Angelita alleged that the kasunduan was not
repudiated within a period of ten (10) days from the settlement, in accordance with the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law embodied in the Local Government Code of 1991 [Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160], and
Section 14 of its Implementing Rules. When Michael failed to honor the kasunduan, Angelita brought the
matter back to the Barangay, but the Barangay Captain failed to enforce the kasunduan, and instead,
issued a Certification to File Action. After about one and a half years from the date of the execution of
the kasunduan or on January 15, 1999, Angelita filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Laur and Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, a Motion for Execution of the kasunduan. Michael moved for the
dismissal of the Motion for Execution, citing as a ground Angelita’s alleged violation of Section 15, Rule
13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Michael claimed that Angelita’s recourse should have been to file
a civil action, not a mere motion for execution, in a regular court.
ISSUE(S)
Did Angelita err in filing a motion for execution instead of a new civil action based on the kasunduan?
RULING
No. A simple reading of Section 417 of the Local Government Code readily discloses the two-tiered mode
of enforcement of an amicable settlement. It provides that the amicable settlement or arbitration award
may be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After
the lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal
court. Under this provision, an amicable settlement or arbitration award that is not repudiated within a
period of ten (10) days from the settlement may be enforced by: first, execution by the Lupon within six
(6) months from the date of the settlement; or second, by an action in the appropriate city or municipal
trial court if more than six (6) months from the date of settlement has already elapsed. Under the first
mode of enforcement, the execution of an amicable settlement could be done on mere motion of the
party entitled thereto before the Punong Barangay. The proceedings in this case are summary in nature
and are governed by the Local Government Code and the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules
and Regulations. The second mode of enforcement, on the other hand, is judicial in nature and could
only be resorted to through the institution of an action in a regular form before the proper City/Municipal
Trial Court. The proceedings shall be governed by the provisions of the Rules of Court. Under Section 416
of the Local Government Code, the amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have the force and
effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days from the date of its execution,
unless the settlement or award has been repudiated or a petition to nullify the award has been filed
before the proper city or municipal court. Moreover, Section 14, Rule VI of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Implementing Rules states that the party’s failure to repudiate the settlement within the
period of ten (10) days shall be deemed a waiver of the right to challenge the settlement on the ground
that his/her consent was vitiated by fraud, violence or intimidation. In the present case, the records
reveal that Michael never repudiated the kasunduan within the period prescribed by the law.1âwphi1
Hence, the CA correctly ruled that the kasunduan has the force and effect of a final judgment that is ripe
for execution.
235 Miguel v. Montanez
CRISANTA ALCARAZ MIGUEL, Petitioner, vs. JERRY D. MONTANEZ, Respondent.

G.R. No. 191336. January 25, 2012.
Ponente: J. Reyes
Topic: Local Government – Effects of Amicable Settlement in the Barangay Lupon
Synopsis:
It is true that an amicable settlement reached at the barangay conciliation proceedings, like the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos in this case, is binding between the contracting parties and, upon its perfection, is
immediately executory insofar as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public order and
public policy. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall
be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise. Being a by-product of mutual
concessions and good faith of the parties, an amicable settlement transcends being a mere contract
binding only upon the parties thereto, and is akin to a judgment that is subject to execution in
accordance with the Rules. Thus under Section 417 of the Local Government Code, such amicable
settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the Barangay Lupon within six (6)
months from the date of settlement, or by filing an action to enforce such settlement in the appropriate
city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month period. It must be emphasized, however, that
enforcement by execution of the amicable settlement, either under the first or the second remedy, is only
applicable if the contracting parties have not repudiated such settlement within ten (10) days from the
date thereof in accordance with Section 416 of the Local Government Code. If the amicable settlement is
repudiated by one party, either expressly or impliedly, the other party has two options, namely, to
enforce the compromise in accordance with the Local Government Code or Rules of Court as the case
may be, or to consider it rescinded and insist upon his original demand. This is in accord with Article 2041
of the Civil Code, which qualifies the broad application of Article 2037.
Digest:
FACTS
On February 1, 2001, respondent Jerry Montanez secured a loan of One Hundred Forty-Three Thousand
Eight Hundred Sixty-Four Pesos (₱143,864.00), payable in one (1) year, or until February 1, 2002, from
the petitioner. The respondent gave as collateral therefor his house and lot in Palmera Spring,
Bagumbong, Caloocan City. Due to Due to the respondent’s failure to pay the loan, the petitioner filed a
complaint against the respondent before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay San Jose, Rodriguez,
Rizal. The parties entered into a Kasunduang Pag-aayos wherein the respondent agreed to pay his loan in
installments in the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (₱2,000.00) per month, and in the event the house
and lot given as collateral is sold, the respondent would settle the balance of the loan in full. However,
the respondent still failed to pay, and on December 13, 2004, the Lupong Tagapamayapa issued a
certification to file action in court in favor of the petitioner. On April 7, 2005, the petitioner filed before
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, a complaint for Collection of Sum of
Money. In his answer, the respondent raised the defense of improper venue, as he petitioner was a
resident of Bagumbong, Caloocan City while he lived in San Mateo, Rizal. The MeTC however, ruled in
favor of herein petitioner. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 146, the
respondent raised the same issues cited in his Answer, but the court only affirmed the initial ruling. The
same was later reversed by the CA, dismissing the complaint without prejudice. Petitioner raises the issue
of the propriety of the CA decision in ruling that a collection suit was improper, and remanding the case
for the enforcement of the kasunduan by the trial court.
ISSUE(S)
1. Was the CA justified in ruling that a complaint for sum of money is not the proper remedy?
2. Was the CA justified in not deciding the case on the merits and instead remanding it?
RULING
No. It is true that an amicable settlement reached at the barangay conciliation proceedings, like the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos in this case, is binding between the contracting parties and, upon its perfection, is
immediately executory insofar as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public order and
public policy. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall
be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise. Being a by-product of mutual
concessions and good faith of the parties, an amicable settlement transcends being a mere contract
binding only upon the parties thereto, and is akin to a judgment that is subject to execution in
accordance with the Rules. Thus under Section 417 of the Local Government Code, such amicable
settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the Barangay Lupon within six (6)
months from the date of settlement, or by filing an action to enforce such settlement in the appropriate
city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month period. It must be emphasized, however, that
enforcement by execution of the amicable settlement, either under the first or the second remedy, is only
applicable if the contracting parties have not repudiated such settlement within ten (10) days from the
date thereof in accordance with Section 416 of the Local Government Code. If the amicable settlement is
repudiated by one party, either expressly or impliedly, the other party has two options, namely, to
enforce the compromise in accordance with the Local Government Code or Rules of Court as the case
may be, or to consider it rescinded and insist upon his original demand. This is in accord with Article 2041
of the Civil Code, which qualifies the broad application of Article 2037. Thus, although the "Kasunduan"
executed by petitioner and respondent before the Office of the Barangay Captain had the force and effect
of a final judgment of a court, petitioner's non-compliance paved the way for the application of Art. 2041
under which respondent may either enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in the
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
Respondent chose the latter option when he instituted Civil Case No. 5139-V-97 for recovery of
unrealized profits and reimbursement of advance rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees.
Considering that the Kasunduang Pag-aayos is deemed rescinded by the non-compliance of the
respondent of the terms thereof, remanding the case to the trial court for the enforcement of said
agreement is clearly unwarranted. The CA took off on the wrong premise that enforcement of the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos is the proper remedy, and therefore erred in its conclusion that the case should
be remanded to the trial court. The fact that the petitioner opted to rescind the Kasunduang Pag-aayos
means that she is insisting upon the undertaking of the respondent under the original loan contract.
Thus, the CA should have decided the case on the merits, as an appeal before it, and not prolong the
determination of the issues by remanding it to the trial court.
236 Borja v. COMELEC
BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO,
JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 133495. September 3, 1998
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Topic: Local Government – Terms of Office
Synopsis:
Art. VII, Section 4 of the Constitution provides for succession of the Vice-President to the Presidency in
case of vacancy in that office. After stating that The President shall not be eligible for any reelection, this
provision says that No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than
four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time. Petitioner contends that, by
analogy, the vice-mayor should likewise be considered to have served a full term as mayor if he succeeds
to the latters office and serves for the remainder of the term. This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor.
Under the local Government Code, he is the presiding officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all
officials and employees of such local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions, succession to
mayorship in the event of vacancy therein being only one of them. It cannot be said of him, as much as
of the Vice-President in the event of a vacancy in the Presidency, that in running for vice-mayor, he also
seeks the mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a matter of
chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any
term limit. To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to
be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that
an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been
elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
Digest:
FACTS
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term
ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of
the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years
which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years
ending June 30, 1998. On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for
mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a
candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already
served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve
for another term after that. Petitioner contends that private respondent Capcos service as mayor from
September 2, 1989 to June 30, 992 should be considered as service for full one term, and since he
thereafter served from 1992 to 1998 two more terms as mayor, he should be considered to have served
three consecutive terms within the contemplation of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution and 43(b) of the Local
Government Code. Petitioner stresses the fact that, upon the death of Mayor Cesar Borja on September
2, 1989, private respondent became the mayor and thereafter served the remainder of the term.
Petitioner argues that it is irrelevant that private respondent became mayor by succession because the
purpose of the constitutional provision in limiting the number of terms elective local officials may serve is
to prevent a monopolization of political power.
ISSUE(S)
Should Capco be disqualified from running for office again?
RULING
No. In bolstering his case, petitioner cites as an example Art. VII, Section 4 of the Constitution which
provides for succession of the Vice-President to the Presidency in case of vacancy in that office. After
stating that The President shall not be eligible for any reelection, this provision says that No person who
has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for
election to the same office at any time. Petitioner contends that, by analogy, the vice-mayor should
likewise be considered to have served a full term as mayor if he succeeds to the latters office and serves
for the remainder of the term. This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the local Government
Code, he is the presiding officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials and employees of such
local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions, succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy
therein being only one of them. It cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in the event
of a vacancy in the Presidency, that in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks the mayorship. His
assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence,
his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit. To recapitulate, the
term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to
serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
Notes:
The Supreme Court emphasizes on its point by providing the following examples:
Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of the incumbent. Six
months before the next election, he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor
in the next election.
Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and subsequently resigned
from office before the full term expired, he has not actually served three full terms in all for the purpose
of applying the term limit. Under Art. X, 8, voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one for which he was
elected. Since A is only completing the service of the term for which the deceased and not he was
elected. A cannot be considered to have completed one term. His resignation constitutes an interruption
of the full term.
Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected Mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct
for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next election?
Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.
In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the application of
the disqualification provisions have not concurred, namely, that the local official concerned has been
elected three consecutive times and that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the first case,
even if the local official is considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation
before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has not been elected three times. In the second
case, the local official has been elected three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three
consecutive terms.
Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a total failure of the
two conditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. X 8. Suppose he is twice elected after that term,
is he qualified to run again in the next election?
Yes, because he was not elected to the office of the mayor in the first term but simply found himself
thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the
service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor.
To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third
time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to
choose whom they wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a bad mayor, the people can
remedy the situation by simply not reelecting him for another term. But if, on the other hand, he proves
to be a good mayor, there will be no way the people can return him to office (even if it is just the third
time he is standing for reelection) if his service of the first term is counted as one of the purpose of
applying the term limit.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional
Commission that while the people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power
may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.
237 Lonzanida v. COMELEC (Dizon v. COMELEC, GR 182088)
ROMEO LONZANIDA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and

EUFEMIO MULI, respondents.
G.R. No. 135150. July 28, 1999.
Ponente: J. Gonzaga-Reyes
Synopsis:
It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor
of San Antonio Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral elections. In the May 1995 elections he again ran
for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the
rights and duties of mayor until March 1998 when he was ordered to vacate the post by reason of the
COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 on the election protest against the petitioner which
declared his opponent Juan Alvez, the duly elected mayor of San Antonio. Alvez served the remaining
portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term. The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are
absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May
1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of
involuntary relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the
COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral
elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as
mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void
proclamation. Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term
because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The respondents'
contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998
because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the
second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive
terms.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged
the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez
who filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, which in a decision dated
January 9, 1997 declared a failure of elections. Both parties appealed to the COMELEC. On November 13,
1997 the COMELEC resolved the election protest filed by Alvez and after a revision and re-appreciation of
the contested ballots declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales by plurality of
votes cast in his favor. Alvez thus assumed office for the remainder of the term. In the May 11, 1998
elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio. On April 21, 1998
his opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San
Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same
post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner. On May 21, 1998 the First Division
of the COMELEC issued the questioned resolution granting the petition for disqualification upon a finding
that Lonzanida had served three consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and he is
therefore disqualified to run for the same post for the fourth time. The COMELEC found that Lonzanida's
assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before
the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term
limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. The finding of the COMELEC First Division
was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc in a resolution dated August 11, 1998. Petitioner Lonzanida
challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions finding him disqualified to run for mayor of San
Antonio Zambales in the 1998 elections. He maintains that he was duly elected mayor for only two
consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for
the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials, because he was not the duly
elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections.
ISSUE(S)
May petitioner Lonzanida's assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to
March 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term
limit for elective local government officials?
RULING
No. The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term limit which is now
embodied in section 8, Art. X of the Constitution was initially proposed to be an absolute bar to any
elective local government official from running for the same position after serving three consecutive
terms. The said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of massive political
power by an elective local government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in
office. he drafters however, recognized and took note of the fact that some local government officials run
for office before they reach forty years of age; thus to perpetually bar them from running for the same
office after serving nine consecutive years may deprive the people of qualified candidates to choose from.
As finally voted upon, it was agreed that an elective local government official should be barred from
running for the same post after three consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one term, he may
again run for the same office. It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two
consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral elections. In the
May 1995 elections he again ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He
assumed office and discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998 when he was ordered to
vacate the post by reason of the COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 on the election protest
against the petitioner which declared his opponent Juan Alvez, the duly elected mayor of San Antonio.
Alvez served the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term. The two requisites for the application
of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected
to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998
mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation and revision of the
contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May
1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His
assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by
reason of a void proclamation. Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to
1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The respondents'
contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998
because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the
second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive
terms.
238 Montebon, et al. v. COMELEC
FEDERICO T. MONTEBON and ELEANOR M. ONDOY, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTION and SESINANDO F. POTENCIOSO, JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 180444. April 8, 2008.
Synopsis:
While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal councilor for three consecutive terms, the
issue lies on whether he is deemed to have fully served his second term in view of his assumption of
office as vice-mayor of Tuburan on January 12, 2004. Succession in local government offices is by
operation of law. Section 44 of the LGC provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor. If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian
member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall
become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in
the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking
as defined therein. In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due to the
retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Respondent, being the highest ranking municipal councilor,
succeeded him in accordance with law. It is clear therefore that his assumption of office as vice-mayor
can in no way be considered a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor.Thus,
respondent’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his
office as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners Montebon and Ondy and respondent Potencioso, Jr. were candidates for municipal councilor
of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections. On
April 30, 2007, petitioners and other candidates for municipal councilor filed a petition for disqualification
against respondent with the COMELEC alleging that respondent had been elected and served three
consecutive terms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he is
proscribed from running for the same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his fourth consecutive
term. In his answer, respondent admitted that he had been elected for three consecutive terms as
municipal councilor. However, he claimed that the service of his second term in 2001-2004 was
interrupted on January 12, 2004 when he succeeded as vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of
Vice Mayor Petronilo L. Mendoza. Consequently, he is not disqualified from vying for the position of
municipal councilor in the 2007 elections. In petitioners’ memorandum, they maintained that respondent’s
assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 should not be considered an interruption in the
service of his second term since it was a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor. They
argued that, according to the law, voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the official concerned
was elected.
ISSUE(S)
Was there an interruption in respondent’s term of office in his second term?
RULING
Yes. While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal councilor for three consecutive terms,
the issue lies on whether he is deemed to have fully served his second term in view of his assumption of
office as vice-mayor of Tuburan on January 12, 2004. Succession in local government offices is by
operation of law. Section 44 of the LGC provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor. If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian
member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall
become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in
the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking
as defined therein. In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due to the
retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Respondent, being the highest ranking municipal councilor,
succeeded him in accordance with law. It is clear therefore that his assumption of office as vice-mayor
can in no way be considered a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor.Thus,
respondent’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his
office as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term.
239 Abundo v. COMELEC
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO

R. VEGA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 201716. January 8, 2013

Synopsis:
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted
constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government
post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
While appearing to be seemingly simple, the three-term limit rule has engendered a host of disputes
resulting from the varying interpretations applied on local officials who were elected and served for three
terms or more, but whose terms or service was punctuated by what they view as involuntary
interruptions, thus entitling them to a, but what their opponents perceive as a proscribed, fourth term.
Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from any of these events or causes: succession or
assumption of office by operation of law, preventive suspension, declaration of the defeated candidate as
the winner in an election contest, declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an
election contest, proclamation of a non-candidate as the winner in a recall election, removal of the official
by operation of law, and other analogous causes.
Digest:
FACTS
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local
elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and
2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served
the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of
canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the
functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation. Abundo was
eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his
assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a
period of a little over one year and one month. Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and
Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat
relative to this electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run, the
corresponding petition predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule. COMELEC found for Abundo,
who was accordingly proclaimed Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes in June of 2010. However, on May 21,
2010, before the COMELEC could resolve the adverted disqualification case Torres initiated against
Abundo, herein private respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto action before the
RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes, to unseat Abundo, essentially on the same grounds as Torres.
ISSUE(S)
Has Abundo fully-served the three-term limit?
RULING
No. The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s three successive, continuous
mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to,
and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was
eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate. To constitute a disqualification to
run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the
following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government
post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
While appearing to be seemingly simple, the three-term limit rule has engendered a host of disputes
resulting from the varying interpretations applied on local officials who were elected and served for three
terms or more, but whose terms or service was punctuated by what they view as involuntary
interruptions, thus entitling them to a, but what their opponents perceive as a proscribed, fourth term.
Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from any of these events or causes: succession or
assumption of office by operation of law, preventive suspension, declaration of the defeated candidate as
the winner in an election contest, declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an
election contest, proclamation of a non-candidate as the winner in a recall election, removal of the official
by operation of law, and other analogous causes. Unlike other election protest cases wherein the
individuals subject of disqualification were candidates who lost in the election protest and each declared
loser during the elections, Abundo was the winner during the election protest and was declared the
rightful holder of the mayoralty post. Unlike Mayor Lonzanida and Mayor Morales, who were both
unseated toward the end of their respective terms, Abundo was the protestant who ousted his opponent
and had assumed the remainder of the term. Nevertheless, the Court found Abundo’s case meritorious
and declared that the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should
be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of the three-
term limit rule.
In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until May 8,
2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a
matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor serve the functions of the said elective office.
The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right to assume
the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo
actually held the office and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following the
resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the May 2004 elections or for only a little over one
year and one month. Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local elected officials is
three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007.
240 Ong v. Alegre (Rivera v. COMELEC, GR 167591)
FRANCIS G. ONG, Petitioner, vs. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 163295 January 23, 2006
Ponente: J. Garcia
Synopsis:
While it was true that it was Alegre who won in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally
elected mayor of San Vicente, it must be stressed that such disposition was without practical and legal
use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner
Francis’ contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty
election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from
start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-
term rule. A contrary view would mean that Alegre would – under the three-term rule - be considered as
having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually
served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.
Digest:
FACTS
Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre and petitioner Francis Ong were candidates who filed
certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections.
Francis was then the incumbent mayor. On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial
Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Francis. The
petition to disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule, Francis having, according to
Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as
mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those
elections. The May 1998 elections saw both Alegre and Francis opposing each other for the office of
mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte, with the latter being subsequently proclaimed by COMELEC
winner in that contest. Alegre subsequently filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
at Daet, Camarines Norte. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998
mayoralty contest, albeit the decision came out only on July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully served the
1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect
of the municipality of San Vicente.
ISSUE(S)
Did the subsequent disqualification of Francis serve to interrupt his term notwithstanding the fact that he
had already served the same?
RULING
Yes. While it was true that it was Alegre who won in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the
legally elected mayor of San Vicente, it must be stressed that such disposition was without practical and
legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired.
Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty
election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from
start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-
term rule. A contrary view would mean that Alegre would – under the three-term rule - be considered as
having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually
served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election. The difference
between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the
mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated reason of "failure of election", and, as a
consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order
for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral
term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, there was
an effective interruption of the continuity of service.
241 Latasa v. COMELEC
ARSENIO A. LATASA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROMEO SUNGA,

respondents.
G.R. No. 154829. December 10, 2003
Ponente: J. Azcuna
Synopsis:
In the present case, petitioner Latasa was, without a doubt, duly elected as mayor in the May 1998
elections. Can he then be construed as having involuntarily relinquished his office by reason of the
conversion of Digos from municipality to city? The Supreme Court believes that he did involuntarily
relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished due to the
conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office
as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped
down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local government
unit. He never ceased from discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos. It is
evident in several decided cases that there exists a rest period or a break in the service of the local
elective official.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the
elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. During petitioners third term, the Municipality of Digos was declared a
component city, to be known as the City of Digos. A plebiscite conducted on September 8, 2000 ratified
Republic Act No. 8798 entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur Province into a
Component City to be known as the City of Digos or the Charter of the City of Digos. This event also
marked the end of petitioners tenure as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. However, under Section 53,
Article IX of the Charter, petitioner was mandated to serve in a hold-over capacity as mayor of the new
City of Digos. Hence, he took his oath as the city mayor. On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his
certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the May 14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible
therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the
Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor.
ISSUE(S)
Is Latasa still eligible to run as city mayor?
RULING
No. In the present case, petitioner Latasa was, without a doubt, duly elected as mayor in the May 1998
elections. Can he then be construed as having involuntarily relinquished his office by reason of the
conversion of Digos from municipality to city? The Supreme Court believes that he did involuntarily
relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished due to the
conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office
as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped
down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local government
unit. He never ceased from discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos. It is
evident in several decided cases that there exists a rest period or a break in the service of the local
elective official. In Lonzanida, petitioner therein was a private citizen a few months before the next
mayoral elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents therein lived as private
citizens for two years and fifteen months respectively. Indeed, the law contemplates a rest period during
which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the
inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit. The Court reiterates that
the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those
who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a
particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner
Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal
mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception.
Notes:
(important case cited by the SC, not in the syllabus, alongside the Lonzanida, Adorneo and Borja cases)
Furthermore, in Socrates vs. COMELEC, the principal issue was whether or not private respondent
Edward M. Hagedorn was qualified to run during the recall elections. Therein respondent Hagedorn had
already served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 until 2001 and did not run in the
immediately following regular elections. On July 2, 2002, the barangay officials of Puerto Princesa
convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall of the incumbent mayor,
Victorino Dennis M. Socrates. On August 23, 2002, respondent Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy
for mayor in the recall election. A petition for his disqualification was filed on the ground that he cannot
run for the said post during the recall elections for he was disqualified from running for a fourth
consecutive term. The Supreme Court, however, ruled in favor of respondent Hagedorn, holding that the
principle behind the three-term limit rule is to prevent consecutiveness of the service of terms, and that
there was in his case a break in such consecutiveness after the end of his third term and before the recall
election.
(orbiter dictum)
The SC stated in Labo vs. COMELEC that the disqualification of a winning candidate does not necessarily
entitle the candidate with the highest number of votes to proclamation as the winner of the elections. As
an obiter, the Court merely mentioned that the rule would have been different if the electorate, fully
aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the
electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying
their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next
higher number of votes may be deemed elected. The same, however, cannot be said of the present case.
This Court has consistently ruled that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an
ineligible candidate at a popular election, or that a candidate is later declared to be disqualified to hold
office, does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be declared
elected. The same merely results in making the winning candidates election a nullity.
242 Adormeo v. COMELEC
RAYMUNDO M. ADORMEO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RAMON Y.

TALAGA, JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 147927. February 4, 2002
Synopsis:
For nearly two years he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat
in the 1998 elections. To bolster his case, respondent adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a
Constitutional Commission member, stating that in interpreting said provision that if one is elected
representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be
considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed. However,
the Supreme Court ruled that the comment of Bernas is only pertinent to members of the House of
Representatives. Unlike local government officials, there is no recall election provided for members of
Congress. Neither can respondent’s victory in the recall election be deemed a violation of Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution as voluntary renunciation for clearly it is not. Voluntary renunciation of a
term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to
an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post for two years, not by voluntary
renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC
pursuant to a recall election. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of
service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 2000 term.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner and private respondent were the only candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy for
mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Private respondent was then the incumbent mayor.
Private respondent Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full term. Again, he was re-
elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. In the recall election of May
12, 2000, he again won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. On March 2,
2001, petitioner filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny
Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on the
ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3) consecutive terms as
follows: (1) in the election of May 1992, where he served the full term; (2) in the election of May 1995,
where he again served the full term; and, (3) in the recall election of May 12, 2000, where he served only
the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the 1998 election. Petitioner contended
that Talagas candidacy as Mayor constituted a violation of Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE(S)
Did private respondent Talaga fully serve three-terms, thereby disqualifying him from running again?
RULING
No. COMELECs ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms should be
upheld. For nearly two years he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by
his defeat in the 1998 elections. To bolster his case, respondent adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, a Constitutional Commission member, stating that in interpreting said provision that if one is
elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will
be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed. However,
the Supreme Court ruled that the comment of Bernas is only pertinent to members of the House of
Representatives. Unlike local government officials, there is no recall election provided for members of
Congress. Neither can respondent’s victory in the recall election be deemed a violation of Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution as voluntary renunciation for clearly it is not. Voluntary renunciation of a
term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to
an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post for two years, not by voluntary
renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC
pursuant to a recall election. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of
service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 2000 term.
243 Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC
SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N. TALABONG, Petitioners,

vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009
Ponente: J. Brion
Synopsis:
The phrase "voluntary renunciation," by itself, is not without significance in determining constitutional
intent. The word "renunciation" carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To renounce is to give
up, abandon, decline, or resign. It is an act that emanates from its author, as contrasted to an act that
operates from the outside. Read with the definition of a "term" in mind, renunciation, as mentioned
under the second branch of the constitutional provision, cannot but mean an act that results in cutting
short the term, i.e., the loss of title to office. The descriptive word "voluntary" linked together with
"renunciation" signifies an act of surrender based on the surenderee’s own freely exercised will; in other
words, a loss of title to office by conscious choice. In the context of the three-term limit rule, such loss of
title is not considered an interruption because it is presumed to be purposely sought to avoid the
application of the term limitation. An official under preventive suspension however, does not renounce his
office. Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension
should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond three
terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official
continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the
office within the suspension period.
Digest:
FACTS
The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms:
for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his
2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a
criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan’s suspension
order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term. In the 2007
election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino,
Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilo’s
certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three
terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule.
ISSUE(S)
Does preventive suspension constitute a bar on the application of the three-term limit rule?
RULING
No. A notable feature of the second branch (second sentence of Section 8, Article X) is that it does not
textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect
"continuity of service for a full term" for purposes of the three-term limit rule. It is a pure declaratory
statement of what does not serve as an interruption of service for a full term, but the phrase "voluntary
renunciation," by itself, is not without significance in determining constitutional intent. The word
"renunciation" carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To renounce is to give up, abandon,
decline, or resign. It is an act that emanates from its author, as contrasted to an act that operates from
the outside. Read with the definition of a "term" in mind, renunciation, as mentioned under the second
branch of the constitutional provision, cannot but mean an act that results in cutting short the term, i.e.,
the loss of title to office. The descriptive word "voluntary" linked together with "renunciation" signifies an
act of surrender based on the surenderee’s own freely exercised will; in other words, a loss of title to
office by conscious choice. In the context of the three-term limit rule, such loss of title is not considered
an interruption because it is presumed to be purposely sought to avoid the application of the term
limitation. An official under preventive suspension however, does not renounce his office. Strict
adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be
considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive
suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office
although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension
period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the absence of a permanent
replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists. To allow a preventively
suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is to close our eyes to this reality and
to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by equating the temporary inability to discharge the
functions of office with the interruption of term that the constitutional provision contemplates.
244 Naval v. COMELEC
ANGEL G. NAVAL, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NELSON B. JULIA,

Respondents.
G.R. No. 207851. July 8, 2014.
Ponente: J. Reyes
Synopsis:
Reapportionment is "the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation." The aim of
legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts. The basis for
districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province and not the number of registered
voters therein. The Court in this case noted that R.A. No. 9716 created a new Second District, but it
merely renamed the other four. Thus, after the reapportionment, the current Third District, which
brought Naval to office in 2010 and 2013, has a population of 35,856 less than that of the old Second
District, which elected him in 2004 and 2007. However, the wordings of R.A. No. 9716 indicate the intent
of the lawmakers to create a single new Second District from the merger of the towns from the old First
District with Gainza and Milaor. As to the current Third District, Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 9716 used the
word "rename." Although the qualifier "without a change in its composition" was not found in Section
3(c), unlike in Sections 3(d) and (e), still, what is pervasive is the clear intent to create a sole new district
in that of the Second, while merely renaming the rest. As the district for which Naval was seeking an
elective position was merely renamed, there is no conceivable interruption in Naval’s terms of office.
Digest:
FACTS
From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served as a member of the
Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur. On October 12, 2009, the President approved
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716, which reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines Sur. Notably, 8
out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present Third District. The present
Second District is composed of the two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with five towns from
the old First District. In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the
Sanggunian, Third District. He served until 2013. In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anewand was re-
elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third District. Private respondent Julia contested this, contending
that Naval had already served the three-term limit, regardless of the district he had been elected from.
ISSUE(S)
Did Naval already serve the three-term limit upon his filing of COC for the 2013 elections?
RULING
Yes. Reapportionment is "the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation." The aim of
legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts. The basis for
districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province and not the number of registered
voters therein. The Court in this case noted that R.A. No. 9716 created a new Second District, but it
merely renamed the other four. Thus, after the reapportionment, the current Third District, which
brought Naval to office in 2010 and 2013, has a population of 35,856 less than that of the old Second
District, which elected him in 2004 and 2007. However, the wordings of R.A. No. 9716 indicate the intent
of the lawmakers to create a single new Second District from the merger of the towns from the old First
District with Gainza and Milaor. As to the current Third District, Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 9716 used the
word "rename." Although the qualifier "without a change in its composition" was not found in Section
3(c), unlike in Sections 3(d) and (e), still, what is pervasive is the clear intent to create a sole new district
in that of the Second, while merely renaming the rest. As the district for which Naval was seeking an
elective position was merely renamed, there is no conceivable interruption in Naval’s terms of office.
Notes:
(case citation)
In Bandillo, a case decided by the COMELEC, Gainza and Milaor were added to five of the ten towns,
which used to comprise Camarines Sur’s old First District, to form the new Second District. The COMELEC
declined to apply the three-term limit rule against the elected Provincial Board member on the ground
that the addition of Gainza and Milaor distinctively created a new district, with an altered territory and
constituency.
245 Goh v. Bayron and COMELEC
ALROBEN J. GOH, Petitioner, vs. HON. LUCILO R. BAYRON and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 212584. November 25, 2014.
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Local Government – Recall Elections
Synopsis:
One of the specific constitutional functions of the COMELEC is to conduct recall elections. When the
COMELEC receives a budgetary appropriation for its "Current Operating Expenditures," such appropriation
includes expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions, including the conduct of recall elections.
Digest:
FACTS
On 17 March 2014, Goh filed before the COMELEC a recall petition, docketed as SPA EM No. 14-004
(RCL),7 against Mayor Bayron due to loss of trust and confidence brought about by "gross violation of
pertinent provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross violation of pertinent provisions of
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, Incompetence, and other related gross
inexcusable negligence/dereliction of duty, intellectual dishonesty and emotional immaturity as Mayor of
Puerto Princesa City." On 1 April 2014, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9864. Resolution No.
9864 found the recall petition sufficient in form and substance, but. suspended the funding of any and all
recall elections until the resolution of the funding issue. On 28 April 2014, Mayor Bayron filed with the
COMELEC an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for Clarification which prayed for the dismissal of
the recall petition for lack of merit.
It should be noted at this point that the LGC mandates that the COMELEC should shoulder all expenses
relative to the conduct of recall elections. Section 75 of the LGC likewise requires the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA) to include a contingency fund at the disposal of the Commission for the conduct
of recall elections. A careful review of the Commission's budget under the 2014 GAA reveals that it does
not have any appropriation or line item budget (line item) to serve as a contingency fund for the conduct
of recall elections. While the Commission has a line item for the "Conduct and supervision of elections,
referenda, recall votes and plebiscites" under the Program cate~ory of its 2014 budget in the amount of
Phpl.401.501.000.00, the said amount cannot be considered as "an appropriation made by law" as
required by the Constitution nor a contingent fund provided under the LGC considering that the said line
item is legally intended to finance the basic continuing staff support and administrative operations of the
Commission such as salaries of officials and employees as well as essential office maintenance and other
operating expenses. As such, it cannot be used for the actual conduct of recall elections. Under the
Revised Administrative Code, an appropriation may be used only for the specific purpose for which they
are appropriated.
ISSUE(S)
Did the COMELEC en banc commit grave abuse of discretion when it suspend recall proceedings?
RULING
Yes. The 2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to perform its
constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections. There is no need for supplemental legislation to
authorize the COMELEC to conduct recall elections for 2014. The 1987 Constitution expressly provides the
COMELEC with the power to "[e]nforce and administer alE laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall."26 The 1987 Constitution not only guaranteed
the COMELEC's fiscal autonomy, but also granted its head, as authorized by law, to augment items in its
appropriations from its savings. The 2014 GAA provides such authorization to the COMELEC Chairman.
Goh asserts that the 2014 GAA provided COMELEC with an appropriation for the conduct of recall
elections in the total amount of Ph₱2,735,321,000. Goh further pointed out that the COMELEC has
Ph₱1,483,087,000 appropriated under Operations, and that the PhP 1,401,501,000 for current operating
expenditure is allocated per region. Goh further states that COMELEC's personnel themselves admitted to
the existence of a contingency fund for the lawful conduct of recall elections. Despite Resolution No.
9882's statement about the alleged failure of the 2014 GAA to provide for a line item appropriation for
the conduct of recall elections, the Supreme Court held that the 2014 GAA actually expressly provides for
a line item appropriation for the conduct and supervision of recall elections. This is found in the Programs
category of its 2014 budget, which the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 is a "line item for the
'Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites.'" In addition, one of the
specific constitutional functions of the COMELEC is to conduct recall elections. When the COMELEC
receives a budgetary appropriation for its "Current Operating Expenditures," such appropriation includes
expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions, including the conduct of recall elections.
246 Espina v. Zamora

REPRESENTATIVES GERARDO S. ESPINA, ORLANDO FUA, JR., PROSPERO AMATONG,
ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, RAUL M. GONZALES, PROSPERO PICHAY, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI
and FRANKLIN BAUTISTA, Petitioners, vs. HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, JR. (Executive
Secretary), HON. MAR ROXAS (Secretary of Trade and Industry), HON. FELIPE MEDALLA
(Secretary of National Economic and Development Authority), GOV. RAFAEL BUENAVENTURA
(Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) and HON. LILIA BAUTISTA (Chairman, Securities and Exchange
Commission), Respondents.
G.R. No. 143855. September 21, 2010.
Ponente: J. Abad
Topic: Economy and National Patrimony
Synopsis:
Petitioners mainly argue that R.A. 8762 violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution for the State to
develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. They invoke
the provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies under Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioners also invoke the provisions of the National Economy and Patrimony under Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. But, as the Court explained in Tañada v. Angara, the provisions of Article II of the
1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative
failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts. The Court further
explained in Tañada that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the ideals of economic
nationalism: (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony and in the use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally-produced goods; (2) by mandating the State to adopt measures that help make
them competitive; and (3) by requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987
Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic
environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our
economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.
Digest:
FACTS
On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also known as
the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited
foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so under
certain categories. R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and
now reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business with the same rights as Filipino
citizens. Herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of the law, citing several alleged violations such as
the prohibition against alien control of the retail trade, promotion of monopolies, and the constitutional
provisions on national economy.
ISSUE(S)
Is R.A. 8762 unconstitutional?
RULING
No. Petitioners mainly argue that R.A. 8762 violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution for the State to
develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. They invoke
the provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies under Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioners also invoke the provisions of the National Economy and Patrimony under Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. But, as the Court explained in Tañada v. Angara, the provisions of Article II of the
1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative
failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts. The Court further
explained in Tañada that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the ideals of economic
nationalism: (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony and in the use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally-produced goods; (2) by mandating the State to adopt measures that help make
them competitive; and (3) by requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987
Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic
environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our
economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.
247 Republic v. Pagadian City Timber
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources (DENR), Petitioner, vs. PAGADIAN CITY TIMBER CO., INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 159308. September 16, 2008.
Ponente: J.
Topic: Natural Resources and Environmental Law – Service Agreements
Synopsis:
IFMA No. R-9-040 is a license agreement under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 (Revised Forestry
Code), the law which is the very basis for its existence. Under Section 3, paragraph (dd) thereof, a
license agreement is defined as "a privilege granted by the State to a person to utilize forest resources
within any forest land with the right of possession and occupation thereof to the exclusion of others,
except the government, but with the corresponding obligation to develop, protect and rehabilitate the
same in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in said agreement." An IFMA has for its
precursor the Timber License Agreement (TLA), one of the tenurial instruments issued by the State to its
grantees for the efficient management of the country’s dwindling forest resources. Jurisprudence has
been consistent in holding that license agreements are not contracts within the purview of the due
process and the non-impairment of contracts clauses enshrined in the Constitution. Such licenses
concerning the harvesting of timber in the country’s forests cannot be considered contracts that would
bind the Government regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare.
Digest:
FACTS
On October 14, 1994, petitioner, through the DENR, and respondent Pagadian City Timber Co., Inc.
executed Industrial Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) whereby petitioner, represented by then
Regional Executive Director (RED) for Region IX, Leonito C. Umali, authorized respondent, represented by
its President Filomena San Juan, to develop, utilize, and manage a specified forest area covering
1,999.14 hectares located in Barangays Langapod, Cogonan, and Datagan, Municipality of Labangan,
Zamboanga del Sur, for the production of timber and other forest products subject to a production-
sharing scheme. On October 8, 1998, in response to the numerous complaints filed by members of the
Subanen tribe regarding respondent’s alleged failure to implement the CDMP, disrespect of their rights as
an indigenous people, and the constant threats and harassment by armed men employed by respondent,
RED Antonio Mendoza, DENR Region IX, issued Regional Special Order No. 217 creating a regional team
to evaluate and assess the aforementioned IFMA. The evaluation team, after conducting the assessment,
submitted a report through a memorandum, recommending the determination of the capabilities of the
holders to develop their Lease areas in consonance with their submitted and approved Comprehensive
Development Management Plan. On 6 November 1998, Foresters Isabelo C. Mangaya-ay and Philidor
Lluisma, pursuant to Regional Special Order No. 217, Series of 1998, conducted the evaluation of the
performance of IFMA No. R9-040 of Pagadian City Timber Company, Inc. and found that Pagadian
Timber violated DENR rules, and recommended the cancellation of the IFMA. In its defense, Pagadian
Timber contends that the IFMA is a contract, and not a mere privilege, therefore it should not be
impaired.
ISSUE(S)
Was the cancellation of the IFMA justified?
RULING
Yes. IFMA No. R-9-040 is a license agreement under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 (Revised Forestry
Code), the law which is the very basis for its existence. Under Section 3, paragraph (dd) thereof, a
license agreement is defined as "a privilege granted by the State to a person to utilize forest resources
within any forest land with the right of possession and occupation thereof to the exclusion of others,
except the government, but with the corresponding obligation to develop, protect and rehabilitate the
same in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in said agreement." An IFMA has for its
precursor the Timber License Agreement (TLA), one of the tenurial instruments issued by the State to its
grantees for the efficient management of the country’s dwindling forest resources. Jurisprudence has
been consistent in holding that license agreements are not contracts within the purview of the due
process and the non-impairment of contracts clauses enshrined in the Constitution. Such licenses
concerning the harvesting of timber in the country’s forests cannot be considered contracts that would
bind the Government regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare.
248 Gamboa v. Secretary of Finance
WILSON P. GAMBOA, Petitioner, vs. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES, FINANCE

UNDERSECRETARY JOHN P. SEVILLA, AND COMMISSIONER RICARDO ABCEDE OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), et al., Respondents
G.R. No. 176579. June 28, 2011.
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Proscription against Foreign Ownership of Utilities
Synopsis:
The term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to
vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total
outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares. Considering that
common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares which
usually have no voting rights, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to
common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors,
then the term capital shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or
management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In
short, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can
vote in the election of directors.
Digest:
FACTS
On 28 November 1928, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 3436 which granted PLDT a franchise
and the right to engage in telecommunications business. In 1969, General Telephone and Electronics
Corporation (GTE), an American company and a major PLDT stockholder, sold 26 percent of the
outstanding common shares of PLDT to PTIC. In 1977, Prime Holdings, Inc. (PHI) was incorporated by
several persons, including Roland Gapud and Jose Campos, Jr. Subsequently, PHI became the owner of
111,415 shares of stock of PTIC by virtue of three Deeds of Assignment executed by PTIC stockholders
Ramon Cojuangco and Luis Tirso Rivilla. In 1986, the 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC held by PHI were
sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The 111,415 PTIC shares,
which represent about 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, were later declared by
this Court to be owned by the Republic of the Philippines. In 1999, First Pacific, a Bermuda-registered,
Hong Kong-based investment firm, acquired the remaining 54 percent of the outstanding capital stock of
PTIC. On 20 November 2006, the Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC) of the Philippine Government
announced that it would sell the 111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock
of PTIC, through a public bidding to be conducted on 4 December 2006. Subsequently, the public bidding
was reset to 8 December 2006, and only two bidders, Parallax Venture Fund XXVII (Parallax) and Pan-
Asia Presidio Capital, submitted their bids. Parallax won with a bid of P25.6 billion or US$510 million.
Thereafter, First Pacific announced that it would exercise its right of first refusal as a PTIC stockholder
and buy the 111,415 PTIC shares by matching the bid price of Parallax. However, First Pacific failed to do
so by the 1 February 2007 deadline set by IPC and instead, yielded its right to PTIC itself which was then
given by IPC until 2 March 2007 to buy the PTIC shares. On 14 February 2007, First Pacific, through its
subsidiary, MPAH, entered into a Conditional Sale and Purchase Agreement of the 111,415 PTIC shares,
or 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, with the Philippine Government for the price
of P25,217,556,000 or US$510,580,189. The sale was completed on 28 February 2007. Since PTIC is a
stockholder of PLDT, the sale by the Philippine Government of 46.125 percent of PTIC shares is actually
an indirect sale of 12 million shares or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT.
With the sale, First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent,
thereby increasing the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47 percent.
ISSUE(S)
Is the sale to First Pacific violative of the constitution? Specifically, is the term capital under Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution referring only to the total common shares, or to the total outstanding
capital stock of PLDT (common + non-voting preferred shares), which is a public utility?
RULING
Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, reminds us that
the Filipinization provision in the 1987 Constitution is one of the products of the spirit of nationalism
which gripped the 1935 Constitutional Convention. The 1987 Constitution provides for the Filipinization of
public utilities by requiring that any form of authorization for the operation of public utilities should be
granted only to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of
the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. The provision is [an
express] recognition of the sensitive and vital position of public utilities both in the national economy and
for national security. Any citizen or juridical entity desiring to operate a public utility must therefore meet
the minimum nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Hence, for a
corporation to be granted authority to operate a public utility, at least 60 percent of its capital must be
owned by Filipino citizens. The term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to
shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common
shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred
shares. Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to
preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in
the election of directors, then the term capital shall include such preferred shares because the right to
participate in the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the
election of directors. In short, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to
shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors. This interpretation is consistent with the intent
of the framers of the Constitution to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of
public utilities. Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned capital required in the
Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60
percent of the voting rights, is required.
The undisputed fact that the PLDT preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, are non-voting and earn
only 1/70 of the dividends that PLDT common shares earn, grossly violates the constitutional requirement
of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial ownership of a public utility. In short, Filipinos hold
less than 60 percent of the voting stock, and earn less than 60 percent of the dividends, of PLDT.
Notes:
The SC did not rule on the legality of the sale to First Pacific, but tasked the Chairperson of the SEC with
applying the decided definition in determining the extent of allowable foreign ownership in respondent
PLDT, and if there is a violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, to impose the appropriate
sanctions under the law.
249 Resident Marine Mammals v. Secretary Angelo Reyes
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT, e.g.,

TOOTHED WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE)
G.R. No. 180771/ G.R. No. 181527. April 21, 2015
Ponente: J. Leonen
Synopsis:
In our jurisprudence, there is neither reason nor any legal basis for the concept of implied petitioners,
most especially when the implied petitioner was a sitting President of the Republic. In the immediate
case, petitioners impleaded former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as an unwilling co-petitioner for
her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect Tanon Strait. Besides, the
President cannot be a party to the suit. Furthermore, the President cannot be presumed to need to resort
to a co-equal branch, the judiciary, merely to compel his alter-egos to enforce the law.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners are Resident Marine Mammals and Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC),
who questions the legality of SC-46 and the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX’s oil exploration activities.
The Government of the Philippines, through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration
Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX, which involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon
Strait. JAPEX assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas
sampling in Tañon Strait.
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration,
development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 sq. km.
offshore Tañon Strait. And from May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the
Strait.
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the 2nd sub-phase of the project. Since the well was
to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared
protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment
requirements pursuant to PD 1586.
On January 31, 2007, the PAMB- Tañon Strait issued a resolution wherein it adopted the Initial
Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and recommended the approval of JAPEX’s
application for an ECC.
On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted the ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for offshore oil
and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. Months later, JAPEX began to drill and exploratory well and it
lasted until February 8, 2008.
Petitioners alleged that after the seismic survey the fish catch was drastically reduced and the fisherfolk
were barred from entering and fishing within a 7km radius from where the oilrig was located, an area
greater that the 1.5 km radius stated in the IEE.
But the public respondents through the Sol. Gen., contend that petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and
Stewards have no legal standing to file present petition and the SC-46 does not violate the constitution.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether petitioner has locus standi
2. Whether SC-46 is constitutional
RULING
1. Yes. Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which allow
for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our
environmental laws:
SEC. 5. Citizen suit.—Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations
yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing
of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of
action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in
the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a
newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said
order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions.
Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, commented:
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants
enforcing environmental rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all
cases filed enforcing environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest,
on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine
first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn.
2. Yes. Paragraph 4, with the safeguards in place, is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article
XII. The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bugal:
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral
oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or
uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and
avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement
is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels
to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that
branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-¬46 is indeed null and void for
noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.
250 Yinlu Bicol Mining Corp. v. Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development Corp.
YINLU BICOL MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. TRANS-ASIA OIL AND ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
G.R. No. 207942. January 12, 2015.
Topic: Natural Resources and Environmental Law – Exemptions to the Regalian Doctrine
Synopsis:
For one, the lands and minerals covered by Yinlu’s mining patents are private properties. The
government, whether through the DENR or the Mines and Geosciences Bureau cannot alienate or dispose
of the lands or mineral through the MPSA granted to Trans-Asia or any other person or entity. Yinlu had
the exclusive right to explore, develop, and utilize the minerals therein, and it could legally transfer or
assign such exclusive right. The Supreme Court in this case excluded the disputed areas that had been
established to belong exclusively to Yinlu as registered owner to be taken out of the coverage of Trans-
Asia’s MPSA.
Digest:
FACTS
In 1996, Trans-Asia entered into a mining operating agreement with Philex Mining Corporation for the
exploration and possible reopening of the mines abandoned by Philippine Iron Mines, Inc. when it ceased
operations due to financial losses in 1975 (the PIMI Mines were sold in a foreclosure sale to the Manila
Banking Corporation and the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, which later became BDO).
Pursuant to this, it applied for a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) before the DENR of Albay.
The application was granted on July 28, 2007, by which Trans-Asia was given exclusive exploratory,
development, and utility rights over the portion of land applied for. On August 31 of the same year, Yinlu
Bicol Mining informed the DENR by letter that it had acquired the patents of PIMI from BDO by way of a
deed of absolute sale, stating that the sale covered included the areas of Trans-Asia’s MPSA. Trans-Asia
subsequently informed Yinlu of its intention to start exploration, but the latter denied access to the area
covered by the sale. Trans-Asia questioned the validity of the mining patents of Yinlu (contending that
the patents issued were homestead patents and not mining patents), to which the latter claims that such
patents, as evidenced by TCTs registered pursuant to the Land Registration Act in relation to the
Philippine Bill of 1902, were valid, existing, and indefeasible, and that it was the absolute owner of the
lands covered by the TCTs, as there was no mineral patent separate from the OCT issued pursuant to the
Philippine Bill. The DENR resolved the case in Yinlu’s favor, as to the mining patents’ validity and Yinlu’s
ownership over the land. The Office of the President, upon appeal by Trans-Asia, affirmed in toto the
DENR decision. The OP bolstered its resolution with the ruling that the right of the locator to the mining
patent is a vested right, and is thus an exemption to the constitutional prohibition against alienation of
natural resources.
ISSUE(S)
Is the OP correct in ruling against the applicability of the regalian doctrine in this case?
RULING
Yes. For one, the lands and minerals covered by Yinlu’s mining patents are private properties. The
government, whether through the DENR or the Mines and Geosciences Bureau cannot alienate or dispose
of the lands or mineral through the MPSA granted to Trans-Asia or any other person or entity. Yinlu had
the exclusive right to explore, develop, and utilize the minerals therein, and it could legally transfer or
assign such exclusive right. The Supreme Court in this case excluded the disputed areas that had been
established to belong exclusively to Yinlu as registered owner to be taken out of the coverage of Trans-
Asia’s MPSA.
Notes:
Issue #2: the OP also ruled that the TCT of Yinlu, being registered under the Torrens system, is
indefeasible even against the government.
251 Matthews v. Taylor
PHILIP MATTHEWS, Petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN A. TAYLOR and JOSELYN C. TAYLOR,

Respondents.
G.R. No. 164584. June 22, 2009.
Ponente: J. Nachura
Topic: National Patrimony – Bar on Alien Ownership of Land
Synopsis:
In the outset, Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 constitution states that save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or
corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the
aforecited provision, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary function of this is
to conserve our national patrimony. Furthermore, Section 1, Article XIII of the constitution states that
natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and with respect
to agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. This provision closes the only remaining
avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into an alien’s hands. For the purpose of applying
the provisions of the constitution, private agricultural lands are deemed to include those not strictly
agricultural, or those not actually in use as agricultural lands. It would be futile to prohibit the alienation
of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming
private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens.
Digest:
FACTS
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor, British, married Joselyn, a 17-year old Filipina. During
the subsistence of their marriage, Joselyn bought a parcel of land from Diosa Martin, situated at Manoc-
Manoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. The sale was financed by Benjamin, who, in addition, introduced
several improvements thereon. Eventually, the lot was converted into a tourist resort. However, the
couple had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with a Kim Philippsen. Joselyn executed an SPA in favor of
Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sublease their co-owned property. Joselyn
subsequently entered into a contract of lease over the property, with Matthews as lessee. Benjamin
argued that the contract of lease is null and void, having been executed without his consent. In his
defense, petitioner argues having contracted in good faith, claiming that it was apparent that Joselyn was
the owner of the property, and that Benjamin gave implied consent when he signed the contract as a
witness.
ISSUE(S)
Does Benjamin have legal standing to file the complaint?
RULING
No. In the outset, Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 constitution states that save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or
corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the
aforecited provision, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary function of this is
to conserve our national patrimony. Furthermore, Section 1, Article XIII of the constitution states that
natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and with respect
to agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. This provision closes the only remaining
avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into an alien’s hands. For the purpose of applying
the provisions of the constitution, private agricultural lands are deemed to include those not strictly
agricultural, or those not actually in use as agricultural lands. It would be futile to prohibit the alienation
of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming
private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens.
Note:
The constitutional law issue was never raised at any point, by any party, in any of the proceedings, but
the Supreme Court deemed it of utmost importance to decide the case thereon.
252 Republic v. Register of Deeds
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, vs.

REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY, ELIZABETH LEE, and PACITA YU-LEE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 158230. July 16, 2008.
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: National Patrimony – Bar on Alien Ownership of Land
Synopsis:
Petitioner here argues that since the sale is void, the lot never became part of Lee Liong’s estate.
However, the Supreme Court accentuated the fact that while the original vendee was an alien, the death
of Liong’s heirs transmitted the lot to herein respondents, who are naturalized Filipino citizens, therefore
the issue of the validity of the sale with respect to the constitutional bar against alien ownership of
private property has since become moot. As to the issue of reversion, the Supreme Court declared that
escheat proceedings are no longer an option, seeing as the property is now in the hands of Filipino
citizens. The flaw in the original transaction is cured, and the title of the private respondents are valid.
Digest:
FACTS
In March 1936, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, purchased a lot from the Dinglasans at the corner of Pavia
Street and Roxas Avenue, Roxas City. In February 1944, Lee Liong died intestate and was survived by his
widow, Ang Chia, and his sons Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting. On June 30, 1947, the surviving heirs of
Lee Liong extrajudicially settled the estate and partitioned the land. Herein private respondents are the
surviving spouses of Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting, respectively. On January 26, 1995, the OSG of
Roxas City filed a complaint before the RTC for the reversion of title against the respondents, praying
that the original sale by the Dinglasans be declared null and void, and to revert the lot back into the
public domain.
ISSUE(S)
1. Is the original sale in violation of the principle of national patrimony?
2. Should the property be reverted back to the public domain?
RULING
No. Petitioner here argues that since the sale is void, the lot never became part of Lee Liong’s estate.
However, the Supreme Court accentuated the fact that while the original vendee was an alien, the death
of Liong’s heirs transmitted the lot to herein respondents, who are naturalized Filipino citizens, therefore
the issue of the validity of the sale with respect to the constitutional bar against alien ownership of
private property has since become moot. As to the issue of reversion, the Supreme Court declared that
escheat proceedings are no longer an option, seeing as the property is now in the hands of Filipino
citizens. The flaw in the original transaction is cured, and the title of the private respondents are valid.
253 Acebedo Optical v. CA
ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. MAMINDIARA MANGOTARA, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Br. 1 of Iligan City,
SAMAHANG OPTOMETRISTS NG PILIPINAS, et al.
G.R. No. 100152. March 31, 2000.
Ponente: J. Purisima
Topic: Local Government – Police Power
Synopsis:
The government is inherently granted police power, which is used to prescribe regulations for the
promotion of national welfare, security, morals, peace, education, and similar goals. In connection with
this, the Local Government Code has empowered the local chief executives with police power in the form
of its licensing power (note that this is a delegation by Congress, not an inherent power of LGUs,
therefore it must be exercised with limitations), albeit subject to substantial limitations. Indeed, while a
business may be regulated, such regulation must however, be within the bounds of reason, in that the
ordinance must be reasonable, and not oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the
business or calling subject of regulation. In the immediate case, the conditions imposed by the mayor are
oppressive to the business model of Acebedo, and have no basis in law.
Digest:
FACTS
When Acebedo Optical applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan City for a business permit, the
respondent mayor issued the same, but with the condition that, since Acebedo is a corporation, it cannot
put up and optical clinic, but only a commercial store, and that petitioner cannot prescribe reading and
similar optical glasses, nor grind lenses without the prescription of an independent optometrist. Acebedo
opposed these conditions, claiming, among others, that the aforesaid conditions are ultra vires, being an
exercise beyond the scope and authority of the mayor to impose.
ISSUE(S)
May a city mayor impose such conditions on Acebedo’s business permit?
RULING
No. The government is inherently granted police power, which is used to prescribe regulations for the
promotion of national welfare, security, morals, peace, education, and similar goals. In connection with
this, the Local Government Code has empowered the local chief executives with police power in the form
of its licensing power (note that this is a delegation by Congress, not an inherent power of LGUs,
therefore it must be exercised with limitations), albeit subject to substantial limitations. Indeed, while a
business may be regulated, such regulation must however, be within the bounds of reason, in that the
ordinance must be reasonable, and not oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the
business or calling subject of regulation. In the immediate case, the conditions imposed by the mayor are
oppressive to the business model of Acebedo, and have no basis in law.
254 Avon Cosmetics v. Luna
AVON COSMETICS INCORPORATED AND JOSE MARIE FRANCO, Petitioners, vs. LETICIA H.
LUNA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 153674. December 20, 2006.
Topic: National Economy and Patrimony – Regulation of Monopolies
Synopsis:
An exclusivity clause, which prohibit the obligor from engaging in business in competition with the
obligee, is not always void under the constitution, as the test in determining whether a given agreement
constitutes an unlawful restraint of trade is whether, under the particular circumstances of the case and
the nature of the contract involved, the agreement is against public interest or public policy. The
Supreme Court used the definition of public policy by Manresa, which is that which represents in the law
of persons the public, social and legal interest, that which is permanent and essential of the institutions,
that which, even if favoring an individual in whom the right lies, cannot be left to his own will. It is an
idea which, in cases of the waiver of any right, is manifested with clearness and force. Plainly put, public
policy is that principle of law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a
tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.
Digest:
FACTS
On November 5, 1985, petitioner Avon and respondent Luna entered into an agreement (called a
supervisor’s agreement) whereby Luna became part of the independent sales force of Avon. One of the
conditions in the agreement states that the supervisor shall sell or offer to sell, display or promote only
and exclusively products sold by the company (paragraph 5). However, in the latter part of 1988, Luna
engaged in direct selling of vitamins and food supplements as a Group Franchise Director of Sandre,
Philippines, Inc., which she exercised concurrently with her Avon project. When Avon learned of this,
Luna was discharged, but she contested the same, contending that paragraph 5 of the agreement was
violative of public policy.
ISSUE(S)
Did paragraph 5 of the supervisor’s agreement constitute restraint of trade?
RULING
No. An exclusivity clause, which prohibit the obligor from engaging in business in competition with the
obligee, is not always void under the constitution, as the test in determining whether a given agreement
constitutes an unlawful restraint of trade is whether, under the particular circumstances of the case and
the nature of the contract involved, the agreement is against public interest or public policy. The
Supreme Court used the definition of public policy by Manresa, which is that which represents in the law
of persons the public, social and legal interest, that which is permanent and essential of the institutions,
that which, even if favoring an individual in whom the right lies, cannot be left to his own will. It is an
idea which, in cases of the waiver of any right, is manifested with clearness and force. Plainly put, public
policy is that principle of law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a
tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good. In the present case, there is nothing
invalid or contrary to public policy either in the objectives sought to be attained by paragraph 5 in
prohibiting Luna and all other Avon supervisors from selling products other than those manufactured by
Avon.
255 In re: Benjamin Dacanay
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN DACANAY, Petitioner.

B.M. No. 1678. December 17, 2007.
Ponente: J. Corona
Topic: Citizenship – Practice of Law
Synopsis:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected with public interest
that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it for the public welfare. A lawyer
who has lost his Filipino citizenship thus has also lost his privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
Citizenship indeed is a requirement for admission to the bar, so it only follows that the loss thereof ipso
jure terminates membership in the bar, as the practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. The
exemption to this is the subsequent reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. 9225. Nevertheless,
although he is deemed never to have lost his Filipino citizenship under the law, no automatic right to
resume the practice of law accrues.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December of 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His petition for citizenship was
approved in May 2004. He then reacquired his Filipino citizenship on July 14, 2006, pursuant to R.A.
9225, taking his oath before the Philippine Embassy in Toronto. He requested to be restored in the bar.
ISSUE(S)
Is petitioner entitled to be restored as a member of the bar? Otherwise stated, did he lose his
membership thereto when he gave up his Filipino citizenship in 2004?
RULING
Yes. The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected with public
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it for the public welfare. A
lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship thus has also lost his privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. Citizenship indeed is a requirement for admission to the bar, so it only follows that the loss
thereof ipso jure terminates membership in the bar, as the practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners. The exemption to this is the subsequent reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. 9225.
Nevertheless, although he is deemed never to have lost his Filipino citizenship under the law, no
automatic right to resume the practice of law accrues.
Note:
This case established the requirements for readmission into the bar pursuant to reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship thru R.A. 9225, to wit:
a) Updating and payment in full of the annual IBP membership dues,
b) Payment of professional tax,
c) Completion of at least 36 credit hours of MCLE to refresh and update the petitioner,
d) Retaking of the lawyers oath
Compliance therewith will restore his good standing in the bar.
256 In re: Petition to re-acquire the privilege to practice law
IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES,

EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner.
B.M. No. 2112. July 24, 2012
Ponente: J. Reyes
Topic: Citizenship – Practice of Law
Synopsis:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected with public interest
that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it for the public welfare. A lawyer
who has lost his Filipino citizenship thus has also lost his privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
Citizenship indeed is a requirement for admission to the bar, so it only follows that the loss thereof ipso
jure terminates membership in the bar, as the practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. The
exemption to this is the subsequent reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. 9225. Nevertheless,
although he is deemed never to have lost his Filipino citizenship under the law, no automatic right to
resume the practice of law accrues.
Digest:
FACTS
On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The petitioner
alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on March 21, 1966, but he lost
his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United States of America (USA) on August
28, 1981, and reacquired it pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 on September 15, 2006.
ISSUE(S)
Should petitioner be allowed to resume the practice of law?
RULING
Yes. The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected with public
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it for the public welfare. A
lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship thus has also lost his privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. Citizenship indeed is a requirement for admission to the bar, so it only follows that the loss
thereof ipso jure terminates membership in the bar, as the practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners. The exemption to this is the subsequent reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. 9225.
Nevertheless, although he is deemed never to have lost his Filipino citizenship under the law, no
automatic right to resume the practice of law accrues.
257 Victor Lingan v. Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy Baliga
VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant, vs. ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA,
Respondents.
A.C. No. 5377. June 30, 2014
Ponente: J. Leonen
Topic: Commission on Human Rights – Regional Directors
Synopsis:
The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director constitutes
practice of law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney - a member of the bar in good standing
and authorized to practice law. When the Regional Director loses this authority, such as when he or she
is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a necessary qualification
to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or suspended lawyer must desist from holding the
position of Regional Director.
Digest:
FACTS
In a Supreme Court decision dated June 15, 2006, Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga were
found guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as respondents
allowed their secretaries to notarize documents in their stead, in violation of Sections 245 and 246 of the
Notarial Law. The court suspended them from the practice of law for one year, revoked their notarial
commissions, and disqualified them from reappointment as notaries public for two years. Atty. Baliga,
who was also Director/Attorney VI of the. Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region II,
was also suspended therefrom, with the CHR contending that his suspension from the practice of law
"prevent[ed] [him] from assuming his post [as Regional Director] for want of eligibility in the meantime
that his authority to practice law is suspended." But Atty. Baliga argued that he cannot be suspended for
acts not connected with his functions as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director, as his
suspension from the practice does not involve his suspension from public office. The CHR reconsidered
and lifted the suspension, but then complainant Lingan notified the Supreme Court that Atty. Baliga
continued practicing law and discharging his functions as Commission on Human Rights Regional
Director, in violation of the order of suspension. Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the
functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director necessarily required the practice of law. A
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director must be a member of the bar and is designated as
Attorney VI. Since this court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in effect "a
non-lawyer . . . and [was] disqualified to hold the position of [Regional Director] [during the effectivity of
the order of suspension]."
With respect to Atty. Baliga's claim that he was in good faith in reassuming his position as Regional
Director, complainant Lingan countered that if Atty. Baliga were really in good faith, he should have
followed the initial resolution of the Commission on Human Rights suspending him from office. Atty.
Baliga did not even furnish this court a copy of his motion for reconsideration of the Commission on
Human Right's resolution suspending him from office. By "playing ignorant on what is 'practice of law',
twisting facts and philosophizing," complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga "[no longer has that]
moral vitality imperative to the title of an attorney."
ISSUE(S)
Was it proper for the CHR to lift its own suspension of Atty. Baliga despite his suspension from the
practice of law?
RULING
No. The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created under the Constitution with
power to investigate "all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights[.]" Under the
Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring of Human Rights Violations and Abuses,
and the Provision of CHR Assistance, it can be gleaned that the Regional Director has powers and
functions which are characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths and affirmations are usually performed
by members of the judiciary and notaries public - officers who are necessarily members of the bar.
Investigating human rights complaints are performed primarily by the Commission's legal officer.
Discussing immediate courses of action and protection remedies and reviewing and approving draft
resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer require the use of extensive legal
knowledge. The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional
Director constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney - a member of the
bar in good standing and authorized to practice law. When the Regional Director loses this authority,
such as when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a
necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or suspended lawyer must
desist from holding the position of Regional Director.
Notes:
Powers and functions of the Regional Director, CHR:

a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to "[Commission on Human Rights] matters;"
b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices;

c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human rights complaints in the absence of
the legal officer or investigator;
d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among parties and discuss "immediate courses of
action and protection remedies and/or possible submission of the matter to an alternative dispute
resolution";
e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including notices, letter-invitations, orders, or

subpoenas within the territorial jurisdiction of the regional office; and
f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer.
258 Airlift Asia v. CA
AIRLIFT ASIA CUSTOMS BROKERAGE, INC. and ALLAN G. BENEDICTO, Petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND THE SECRETARY
OF FINANCE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 183664. July 28, 2014.
Ponente: J. Brion
Topic: The Bureau of Customs – Licensing
Synopsis:
The BOC, like the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), performs a critical role in government revenue
collection. The integrity and efficiency of transactions before both these agencies is important, and all
persons dealing with them must strictly adhere to their respective rules and regulations. The similarity in
the functions and concerns of the BOC and the BIR, however, does not support a grant of power to
accredit customs brokers to the BOC Commissioner. Unlike the BOC Commissioner whose power over
customs brokers was – at the very least – implied and indirect, the BIR Commissioner was given express
and specific powers to accredit and register tax agents under Section 6(G)of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC).
Digest:
FACTS
CAO 3-2006 was issued by the then Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (BOC) Napoleon L. Morales,
with the approval of then Secretary of Finance Margarito B. Teves, on March 2, 2006. It covers the Rules
and Regulations Governing the Accreditation of the Customs Brokers Transacting with the BOC and
essentially requires the accreditation by the BOC of customs brokers who intend to practice before the
BOC. Part I of CAO 3-2006 defines accreditation as "the process for registration and/or listing of customs
brokers desiring to engage in customs brokers practice." Accordingly, the accreditation process is
included in the issuance’s definition of a "custom broker". The petitioners assailed the validityof CAO 3-
2006 through an action for declaratory relief before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. They
primarily claimed that CAO 3-2006 was issued without authority, contravenes Republic Act No. 9280 (RA
9280) or the Customs Brokers Act of 2004,and violates their right to practice the customs broker
profession. The RTC upheld the petitioners’ contentions and nullified CAO 3-2006. It found that the BOC
Commissioner had no authority to issue rules governing the practice of the customs brokerage
profession.10 This power, initially lodged with the Commissioner of the Civil Service under Section 3409
of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP), had been transferred upon the passage of RA
9280 to the Professional Regulatory Board for Customs Brokers (PRBCB). On appeal, the CA reversed the
RTC ruling, finding its construction of CAO 3-2006 rigid and crippling on the BOC’s efforts to ensure
efficient customs administration and collection of taxes and duties. Although the accreditation
requirement was an added burden to customs brokers, it nevertheless bore a reasonable connection to
the BOC’s aim to ensure accountability and integrity in the transactions involving customs duties and
tariff laws.
ISSUE(S)
Is CAO 3-2006 valid?
RULING
No. The assailed decision of the CA declared that the passage of RA 9280 did not divest the BOC
Commissioner of his authority over customs brokers. The BOC Commissioner retains the general power
"to regulate the activities of licensed customs brokers insofar as the enforcement of tariff laws and
prevention of smuggling and other illegal schemes to defraud the government of lawful revenues." It
adds that "[t]o strip the BOC [Commissioner] of any disciplinary and supervisory authority over license
customs brokers… would not only cripple the [BOC’s] intensified drive to combat smuggling and derail the
all-out program…to increase collection targets." While the BOC Commissioner indeed has the mandate to
enforce tariff laws and prevent smuggling, these powers do not necessarily include the power to regulate
and supervise the customs broker profession through the issuance of CAO 3-2006. The BOC
Commissioner’s power under Section 608 of the TCCP is a general grant of power to promulgate rules
and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of the TCCP. Under the rules of statutory
construction, this general rule-making power gives way to the specific grant of power to promulgate rules
and regulations on the practice of customs brokers profession to the CSC Commissioner under Section
3409 of the TCCP. Indeed, in the exercise of this specific power, the Board of Examiners (of which the
BOC Commissioner serves as ex-officio chairman) was to perform only a recommendatory role.
The BOC, like the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), performs a critical role in government revenue
collection. The integrity and efficiency of transactions before both these agencies is important, and all
persons dealing with them must strictly adhere to their respective rules and regulations. The similarity in
the functions and concerns of the BOC and the BIR, however, does not support a grant of power to
accredit customs brokers to the BOC Commissioner. Unlike the BOC Commissioner whose power over
customs brokers was – at the very least – implied and indirect, the BIR Commissioner was given express
and specific powers to accredit and register tax agents under Section 6(G)of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC).
259 Carpio-Morales v. CA and Jejomar Erwin Binay, Jr.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT

OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
Topic: The Ombudsman – Preventive Suspension
Synopsis:
The Supreme Court laid down the three aspects of the independence of the Ombudsman, to wit: (1)
creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally
specified functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself
allows, or an amendment thereto is made; (2) fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be
obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its] functions;
hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of government so
as to impair said functions; and (3) insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that
those within the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an internal authority.
Digest:
FACTS
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI
before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the
City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder in connection with the 5 phases of
the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).
Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint (OMB
Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with 6administrative cases and 6 criminal cases.
Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of
the 2nd Special Panel, issued on March 10, 2015, the subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay,
Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during the
pendency of the OMB Cases. The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension of a
public officer are present, finding that: (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that
(1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City had attested to the
irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project; (2) the documents on record negated the
publication of bids; and (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release
of funds; and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; (2) said charges, if proven to be
true, warrant removal from public service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them access to public records and
allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may prejudice the
investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against them. Binay filed a petition for certiorari, seeking to
nullify the preventive suspension, claiming that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to
show that the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong, maintaining that he did not participate in
any of the purported irregularities. In support of his prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he
has a clear and unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by landslide vote in the 2010 and
2013 elections, and that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to sustain
the charges against him, his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the
services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.
ISSUE(S)
Is the Ombudsman justified in ruling on Binay’s preventive suspension?
RULING
From the inception of these proceedings, the Ombudsman has been adamant that the CA has no
jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive writ against her office to enjoin its preventive suspension
orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's
independence under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea that "[i]n order to further ensure [her
office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from judicial intervention," particularly, "from
injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from the courts," claiming that said writs may work "just as
effectively as direct harassment or political pressure would." In deciding the case, the Supreme Court laid
down the three aspects of the independence of the Ombudsman, to wit: (1) creation by the Constitution,
which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and
privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an
amendment thereto is made; (2) fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed
from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its] functions; hence, its
budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of government so as to
impair said functions; and (3) insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those
within the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an internal authority .
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman from political
harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the "insidious tentacles of politics." That being the case,
the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from
judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to
act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be
exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive
suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from political
harassment or pressure.
260 Ugdoracion v. COMELEC
MAYOR JOSE UGDORACION, JR., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND EPHRAIM
M. TUNGOL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 179851. April 18, 2008.
Ponente: J. Nachura
Topic: Public Officers – Citizenship
Synopsis:
The dust had long settled over the implications of a green card holder status on an elective officials
qualification for public office. The SC has previously ruled that the acquisition by a Filipino citizen of
apermanent resident status abroad constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. In short, the green card status in the USA is a renunciation of ones status as a resident of the
Philippines. In the instant case, Ugdoracions acquisition of a lawful permanent resident status in the
United States amounted to an abandonment and renunciation of his status as a resident of the
Philippines; it constituted a change from his domicile of origin, which was Albuquerque, Bohol, to a new
domicile of choice, which is the USA. The contention that Ugdoracions USA resident status was acquired
involuntarily, as it was simply the result of his sisters beneficence, does not persuade. Although
immigration to the USA through a petition filed by a family member (sponsor) is allowed by USA
immigration laws,the petitioned party is very much free to accept or reject the grant of resident status.
Permanent residency in the USA is not conferred upon the unwilling; unlike citizenship, it is not bestowed
by operation of law.
Digest:
FACTS
Ugdoracion and private respondent, Ephraim Tungol, were rival mayoralty candidates in the Municipality
of Albuquerque, Province of Bohol in the May 14, 2007 elections. Both filed their respective Certificates of
Candidacy (COC). On April 11, 2007, Tungol filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel the Certificate
of Candidacy of Jose Ugdoracion, Jr., contending that Ugdoracions declaration of eligibility for Mayor
constituted material misrepresentation because Ugdoracion is actually a green card holder or a
permanent resident of the United States of America (USA). Specifically, Ugdoracion stated in his COC that
he had resided in Albuquerque, Bohol, Philippines for forty-one years before May 14, 2007 and he is not a
permanent resident or an immigrant to a foreign country. It appears that Ugdoracion became a
permanent resident of the USA on September 26, 2001. For his part, Ugdoracion argued that, in our
jurisdiction, domicile is equivalent to residence, and he retained his domicile of origin (Albuquerque,
Bohol) notwithstanding his ostensible acquisition of permanent residency in the USA.
ISSUE(S)
Should Ugdoracion be disqualified from running for office?
RULING
Yes. Ugdoracion claims that he did not lose his domicile of origin because his acquisition of a green card
was brought about merely by his sisters petition. He maintains that, except for this unfortunate detail, all
other facts demonstrate his retention of residence in Albuquerque, Bohol. Believing in the truth of these
circumstances, he simply echoed in his COC a truthful statement that he is a resident of Albuquerque,
Bohol, and, therefore, eligible and qualified to run for Mayor thereof. Ugdoracions assertions miss the
mark completely. The dust had long settled over the implications of a green card holder status on an
elective officials qualification for public office. The SC has previously ruled that the acquisition by a
Filipino citizen of apermanent resident status abroad constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and
residence in the Philippines. In short, the green card status in the USA is a renunciation of ones status as
a resident of the Philippines. In the instant case, Ugdoracions acquisition of a lawful permanent resident
status in the United States amounted to an abandonment and renunciation of his status as a resident of
the Philippines; it constituted a change from his domicile of origin, which was Albuquerque, Bohol, to a
new domicile of choice, which is the USA. The contention that Ugdoracions USA resident status was
acquired involuntarily, as it was simply the result of his sisters beneficence, does not persuade. Although
immigration to the USA through a petition filed by a family member (sponsor) is allowed by USA
immigration laws,the petitioned party is very much free to accept or reject the grant of resident status.
Permanent residency in the USA is not conferred upon the unwilling; unlike citizenship, it is not bestowed
by operation of law.
II. Administrative Law
1 MMDA v. Garin
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. DANTE O. GARIN,

respondent.
G.R. No. 130230. April 15, 2005.
Topic: Legislative Power
Synopsis:
MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power, and, unlike
its predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is
that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the
implementation of the MMDA’s functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and
regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis.
Digest:
FACTS
Dante Garin, a lawyer who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver’s license confiscated
for parking illegally along Gandara Street in Binondo, Manila.
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR’s validity, Garin addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Oreta
requesting the return of his driver’s license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed a complaint with application for preliminary injunction, with the
RTC of Parañaque, contending that, in the in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec.
5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their
licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due
process clause of the Constitution. The respondent further contended that the provision violates the
constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA
to fix and impose unspecified—and therefore unlimited - fines and other penalties on erring motorists.
For its part, the MMDA, represented by the Office of Solicitor General pointed out that the powers
granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection and imposition of fines
and penalties for traffic violations, which powers are legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary
retains the right to determine the validity of the penalty imposed. It further argued that the doctrine of
separation of powers does not preclude “admixture” of the three powers of government in administrative
agencies.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not MMDA is vested with legislative authority
RULING
NO. MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power, and,
unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare
of the community.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the passage of
Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a “special development and
administrative region” and the administration of “metro-wide” basic services affecting the region placed
under “a development authority” referred to as the MMDA. Thus:
. . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the
legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the
MMDA or its Council to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare” of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a “development
authority.” It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and the
private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All
its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz.:
“Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.—x x x.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise
regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila,
without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters.”
....
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given
to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of
the MMDA’s functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis.
2 GSIS v. COA
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(COA) , respondent.
G.R. No. 162372. October 11, 2011.

Topic: Powers of the GSIS – Retirement Benefits
Synopsis:
While the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) may have been clothed with authority to adopt
an early retirement or financial assistance plan, such authority was limited by the very law it was seeking
to implement.—The GSIS RFP was not created because of a valid company reorganization. Its purpose
did not include the granting of benefits for early retirement. Neither did it provide benefits for either
voluntary or involuntary separation from GSIS. It was intended for employees who were already eligible
to retire under existing retirement laws. While the GSIS may have been clothed with authority to adopt
to implement.
Digest:
FACTS
Republic Act No. 8291, otherwise known as “The Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997”
(the GSIS Act) was enacted and approved, amending Presidential Decree No. 1146, as amended,
expanding and increasing the coverage and benefits of the GSIS, and instituting reforms therein.
Pursuant to the powers granted to it under Section 41(n) of the said law, the GSIS Board of Trustees,
upon the recommendation of the Management-Employee Relations Committee (MERCOM), approved
Board Resolution No. 326 wherein they adopted the GSIS Employees Loyalty Incentive Plan (ELIP).
On November 21, 2000, Board Resolution No. 326 was amended by Board Resolution No. 360, which
provided for a single rate for all positions, regardless of salary grade. Dimagiba, the corporate auditor of
GSIS, communicated to the President and General Manager of GSIS that the GSIS RFP was contrary to
law. However, the GSIS Legal Services Group opined that the GSIS Board is authorized to adopt the plan
according to Sec. 28 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186 as amended by R.A. No. 4968 has been repealed
by Sec. 3 and 41(n) of R.A. No. 8291.
On January 16, 2001, Board Resolution No. 69 was approved, wherein ELIP was renamed GSIS
Retirement/Financial Plan (RFP) to conform strictly to the wordings of Section 41(n) of Republic Act No.
8291.
Upon Garcia’s assumption of office as President and General Manager, Dimagiba requested to again
review the GSIS RFP, but this was denied by Garcia. Dimagiba sought the assistance of COA in
determining the legality and/or morality of said plan. COA General Counsel Alquizalas, issued a
memorandum to Commissioner Flores and opined that the GSIS RFP is a supplementary retirement plan,
which is prohibited under R.A. 4968 or the Teves Retirement Law.
On August 14, 2001, Commissioner Flores forwarded this Memorandum to Dimagiba, who in turn
forwarded it to Garcia. But Garcia responded, taking exception to the notice of disallowance for being
“highly irregular and precipitate” as it was based on mere opinion of COA’s consel who had no authority
to declare GSIS Board of Trustees as null and void. Moreover, Garcia said that COA had neither power
nor authority to declare null and void certain resolutions approved by the Board of Government
Corporations, as the power to do so was exclusively lodged before the courts.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not GSIS is clothed with authority to adopt a Retirement/Financial Assistance to it’s
employees
RULING
NO. It is true that under Section 41(n) of Republic Act No. 8291, Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) is expressly granted the power to adopt a retirement plan and/or financial assistance for its
employees, but a closer look at the provision readily shows that this power is not absolute.—It is true
that under Section 41(n) of Republic Act No. 8291, GSIS is expressly granted the power to adopt a
retirement plan and/or financial assistance for its employees, but a closer look at the provision readily
shows that this power is not absolute. It is qualified by the words “early,” “incentive,” and “for the
purpose of retirement.” The retirement plan must be an early retirement incentive plan and such early
retirement incentive plan or financial assistance must be for the purpose of retirement.
While the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) may have been clothed with authority to adopt
to implement.—The GSIS RFP was not created because of a valid company reorganization. Its purpose
did not include the granting of benefits for early retirement. Neither did it provide benefits for either
voluntary or involuntary separation from GSIS. It was intended for employees who were already eligible
to retire under existing retirement laws. While the GSIS may have been clothed with authority to adopt
to implement.
3 Soriano v. MTRCB
ELISEO F. SORIANO, vs. MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD
G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009

Topic: Preventive Suspension
Synopsis:
A perusal of the MTRCB’s basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the
authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. And this authority
stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its power of regulation and supervision.
Digest:
FACTS
Soriano (petitioner) as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, made the following remarks:
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang bababe o di ba. Yung putang babae ang
gumagana lang doon yung ibaba. [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O,
masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra
ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito. x x x
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by
Jessie L. Galapon and 7 other private respondents, all members of the INC, against Soriano in connection
with the above broadcast.
The MTRCB, by order of August 16, 2004, prevently suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan for 20
days in accordance with Sec. 3 (d) of P.D. 1986, creating the MTRCB, inrelation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of
the 2004 IRR of P.D. 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure. The same order also
set the case for preliminary investigation.
The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, praying that
Chairperson Laguardia and 2 members of the adjudication board recues themselves from hearing the
case. Two days after, however petitioner sought to withdraw his motion for reconsideration, followed by
the filing with this court of a petition for certiorari and prohibition, to nullify the preventive suspension
order thus issued.
ISSUE(S)
Whether MTRCB has the power to issue a preventive suspension order against Soriano
RULING
YES. A perusal of the MTRCB’s basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the
authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. And this authority
stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its power of regulation and supervision. The
preventive suspension was actually done in furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant, to repeat, to the
MTRCB’s duty of regulating or supervising television programs, pending a determination of whether or
not there has actually been a violation. In the final analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely
formalized a power which PD 1986 bestowed, albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.
The scope of the MTRCB’s authority extends beyond motion pictures. What the acronym MTRCB stands
for would suggest as much. And while the law makes specific reference to the closure of a television
network, the suspension of a television program is a far less punitive measure that can be undertaken,
with the purpose of stopping further violations of PD 1986. Again, the MTRCB would regretfully be
rendered ineffective should it be subject to the restrictions petitioner envisages.
4 GMA v. MTRCB
GMA NETWORK, INC., vs. MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD
G.R. No. 148579 February 5, 2007
Ponente: J. Corona
Topic: Quasi-Legislative Power – Publication
Synopsis:
The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file
with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law
Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published
or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, has not
been registered with the ONAR as of January 27, 2000. Hence, the same is yet to be effective, thus
unenforceable. Consequently, petitioner was not bound by said circular and should not have been meted
the sanction provided thereunder.
Digest:
FACTS
GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF television station, EMC Channel 27. On January 7,
2000, MTRCB issued an order of suspension against petitioner for airing "Muro Ami: The Making" without
first securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD 1986. The penalty of suspension was based
on Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated December 15, 1998 which provided for the penalties for exhibiting
a program without a valid permit from the MTRCB.
The MTRCB denied both petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and letter-protest. Petitioner’s petition for
certiorari before the CA was also dismissed and the suspension order issued by MTRCB was affirmed in
toto. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE(S)
(1) Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the show "Muro Ami: The Making" prior to
its broadcast by television and
(2) Whether Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding on petitioner
RULING
(1) YES. Section 3 of PD 1986 empowers the MTRCB to screen, review and examine all motion pictures,
television programs including publicity materials. This power of prior review is highlighted in its Rules and
Regulations, Section 7 thereof.
SECTION 7. REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR REVIEW. - No motion picture, television program or related

publicity material shall be imported, exported, produced, copied, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited or
broadcasted by television without prior permit issued by the BOARD after review of the motion picture,
television program or publicity material.
The only exemptions from the MTRCB’s power of review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7, such
as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or departments and
agencies, and (2) newsreels.
"Muro Ami: The Making," did not fall under any of the exemptions and was therefore within the power of
review of MTRCB. The subject program was a publicity for the movie, "Muro Ami."
Even if, say, "Muro Ami: The Making" was a public affairs program, the resolution of this issue would not
change. The Court ruled that a public affairs program -- described as a variety of news treatment; a cross
between pure television news and news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions -- is
within the MTRCB’s power of review.
(2) However, while MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program, Memorandum Circular 98-17, which
was the basis of the suspension order, was not binding on petitioner.
The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file
with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law
Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published
or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, has not
been registered with the ONAR as of January 27, 2000. Hence, the same is yet to be effective, thus
unenforceable. Consequently, petitioner was not bound by said circular and should not have been meted
the sanction provided thereunder.
The instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The suspension order issued against petitioner GMA
Network, Inc. is hereby declared null and void.
5 Board of Trustees v. Velasco
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and

WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as GSIS President and General Manager, petitioners, vs.
ALBERT M. VELASCO and MARIO I. MOLINA, respondents.
G.R. No. 170463. February 2, 2011.
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Quasi-Legislative Power
Synopsis:
Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP Law
Center. Only those of general or of permanent character are to be filed. According to the UP Law Center’s
guidelines for receiving and publication of rules and regulations, “interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the Administrative agency and not the
public,” need not be filed with the UP Law Center.
Digest:
FACTS
On May 2002, Petitioners charged the respondents with administrative case for grave misconduct for
their alleged participation and in the demonstration held by some GSIS employees to denounce the
alleged corruption within the agency and to oust its president Winston Garcia. The Board placed the
respondents under preventive suspension for 90 days.
On April 2003, respondent Molina requested for a step increment but it was denied because he did not
pass the qualifications mentioned in the Board Resolution. The respondents filed a petition for prohibition
with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction claiming that they were denied of their benefits as
employees of GSIS due to their pending administrative case. Respondents also argued that the subject
resolutions were ineffective because they were not registered with the UP Law Center pursuant to the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
ISSUE(S)
1. WON GSIS Board Resolution needs to be filed with UP Law Center
2. WON a Special Civil action for Prohibition against GSIS Board – who is exercising quasi legislative and
administrative function – is within the jurisdiction of RTC
RULING
1. NO. Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP Law
Center. Only those of general or of permanent character are to be filed. According to the UP Law Center’s
guidelines for receiving and publication of rules and regulations, “interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the Administrative agency and not the
public,” need not be filed with the UP Law Center.
Resolution No. 372 was about the new GSIS salary structure, Resolution No. 306 was about the authority
to pay the 2002 Christmas Package, and Resolution No. 197 was about the GSIS merit selection and
promotion plan. Clearly, the assailed resolutions pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the
personnel of the GSIS. There was no need for the publication or filing of these resolutions with the UP
Law Center.
2. YES. The petition for prohibition filed by respondents is a special civil action which may be filed in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court, as the case may be.
It is also a personal action because it does not affect the title to, or possession of real property, or
interest therein. It may comment and be tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides,
or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Since
respondent Velasco is a resident of the City of Manila, the petition could properly be filed in the City of
Manila.
6 Garcia v. Molina
G.R. No. 157383. August 10, 2010.*

WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as President and General Manager of GSIS, petitioner,
vs. MARIO I. MOLINA and ALBERT M. VELASCO, respondents.
G.R. No. 174137. August 10, 2010.*
WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as President and General Manager of the Government
Service Insurance System, petitioner, vs. MARIO I. MOLINA and ALBERT M. VELASCO,
respondents.
Ponente: J. Nachura
Topic: Quasi-Judicial Power
Synopsis:
The CSC Rules does not specifically provide that a formal charge without the requisite preliminary
investigation is null and void. However, upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form and
substance, the disciplining authority shall require the person complained of to submit a Counter-
Affidavit/Comment under oath within three days from receipt. Which means that this should be done
prior to the issuance of a formal charge and the comment required is different from the Answer that the
respondents may file. The rule is the same in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings wherein if
there is violation of basic constitutional rights – which includes right to due process – courts are ousted
from their jurisdiction and any decision shall be rendered VOID.
Digest:
FACTS
Molina and Velasco are both Attorney V of the GSIS. They received two separate Memoranda from
Petitioner charging them with grave misconduct. Velasco, in addition was also accused of violating Rules
of Office Decorum and gross insubordination. Both were suspended for 90 days without pay.
In their answer, both respondents denied the charges and averred that Petitioner acted in bad faith in
charging them falsely. They also opposed to their suspension for lack of factual and legal basis.
Respondents filed an Urgent Petition for to Lift Preventive Suspension Order before Civil Service
Commission (CSC) as well as Petition to Transfer Investigation. CSC failed to resolve both motions.
Respondents filed with CA a Special Civil Action for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for TRO. CA
granted the Petition and agreed that the investigation should be done by CSC and not GSIS.
ISSUE(S)
WON the conduct of Preliminary Investigation in Administrative proceeding is an essential requisite to the
conduct of adjudication
RULING
Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied more liberally,
administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles such as the
right to due process in investigations and hearings.
The formal Memoranda separately issued to the respondents are the formal charges against them and
these formal charges are done without preliminary or fact finding investigation. Petitioners claimed that
preliminary investigations are not required in indictments in flagranti as in this case. This was opposed by
the Supreme Court.
Indeed, the CSC Rules does not specifically provide that a formal charge without the requisite preliminary
investigation is null and void. However, as clearly outlined above, upon receipt of a complaint which is
sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining authority shall require the person complained of to
submit a Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three days from receipt. Which means that this
should be done prior to the issuance of a formal charge and the comment required is different from the
Answer that the respondents may file.
The rule is the same in quasi-judicial and administrative proceeding wherein if there is violation of basic
constitutional rights – which includes right to due process – courts are ousted from their jurisdiction and
any decision shall be rendered VOID.
Due process in administrative proceedings has been recognized to include the following:
1. The right to actual or constructive notice to the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondent’s legal rights;
2. A real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights;
3. A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
4. A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration
during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
7 NASECORE v. ERC
National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms, Inc. (NASECORE), Federation of

Village Associations (FOVA), Federation of Las Pinas Village vs. Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC) and Manila Electric Company (MERALCO)
G.R. No. 163935. February 2, 2006.

Synopsis:
Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is granted, there is no
denial of due process. It must not be overlooked that prior to the issuance of the assailed decision,
petitioner were given several opportunities to attend the hearings and to present all their pleadings and
evidence in the MAP2010 case. Petitioners’ voluntary failed to appear in most of those hearings. Further,
any defect in the observance of due process requirements is cured by the filing a Motion for
Reconsideration (MR).
Digest:
FACTS
By referring to Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), Section 43 (f), Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC) was able to change the conventional pricing of electricity sale known as Return on
Rate Base (RORB) method to Performance –Based Regulation (PBR) method. Meralco, a distribution
utility (DU) applied for an increase of its distribution rate under the PBR scheme docketed as ERC case
no. 2009-057 RC (MAP2010 case) on 7 August 2009. All the petitioners including Engineer Robert F.
Mallillin all filed their petition for intervention to ERC against the application of Meralco.
Hearing ensued in ERC however, the petitioners do not attend any of the hearings conducted by ERC. On
14 December 2009, Meralco’s application in MAP2010 case was approved by ERC. Petitioner NASECORE
protests this claiming approval as premature, that there were still four (4) days before the expiration of
the period given to it to file its opposition to the formal offer of evidence of Meralco.
Engr. Malillin filed his Motion for Reconsideration in ERC while the petitioners appealed to the SC via Rule
65 with the urgent prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Status Quo Order.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not petitioners’ right to due process of law was violated when the ERC issued its order before
the expiration of the period granted to petitioners to file their comment
RULING
No. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is granted, there
is no denial of due process. It must not be overlooked that prior to the issuance of the assailed decision,
petitioner were given several opportunities to attend the hearings and to present all their pleadings and
evidence in the MAP2010 case. Petitioners’ voluntary failed to appear in most of those hearings.
Further, any defect in the observance of due process requirements is cured by the filing a Motion for
Reconsideration (MR). Although it is true that the ERC erred in prematurely issuing its Decision, its
subsequent act of ordering petitioners to file their comments on Mallillin’s MR cured this defect. We have
held that nay defect in the observance of due process requirements is cured by the filing of MR. Thus,
denial of due process cannot be invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his MR.
8 PNR v. Kanlaon Construction Ent. Co. Inc.
Philippine National Railways (Petitioner) vs. Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co. Inc.
(Respondent).
G.R. No. 182967. April 6, 2011.
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Power to Contract
Synopsis:
The Administrative Code of 1987 expressly prohibits the entering into contracts involving the expenditure
of public funds unless two (2) prior requirements are satisfied. First, there must be an appropriation law
authorizing the expenditure required in the contract. Second, there must be attached to the contract a
certification by the proper accounting official and auditor that funds have been appropriated by law and
such funds are available.
Digest:
FACTS
In July 1990, PNR and Kanlaon entered into a contract of construction of PNR stations i.e. College station,
Binan station, and Buendia station. On June 1994, Kanlaon send a demand letter to PNR requesting for
the release of the retention money in the amount of PhP333,894.07 plus PhP531,652.72 for unpaid
contract price. However, PNR was constraint to pay because of some Audit findings by the Commission
on Audit (COA). Hence, Kanlaon filed a case for collection of sum of money and damages in RTC which
sided respondent. Unsatisfied, PNR elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) wherein it affirmed the
decision of RTC. Hence, the petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the CA is correct in affirming the decision of RTC to pay Kanlaon for the unpaid contract
price plus damages
RULING
No, CA erred in affirming the RTC. The contract between PNR and Kanlaon violated a requirement of the
law, making their contract void. The Administrative Code of 1987 expressly prohibits the entering into
contracts involving the expenditure of public funds unless two (2) prior requirements are satisfied. First,
there must be an appropriation law authorizing the expenditure required in the contract. Second, there
must be attached to the contract a certification by the proper accounting official and auditor that funds
have been appropriated by law and such funds are available.
PS. What is the recourse now of Kanlaon? Having already completed the project for PNR.
• The officers entering into the contract shall be liable to the Government or other contracting
party for any consequent damage to the same extent as if the transaction had been wholly between
private parties as provided in Section 48 of the Administrative Code of the Philippines
9 Pharmaceuticals and Health Care Association Phils. v. Duque
PHARMACEUTICAL and HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION of the PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III; HEALTH UNDERSECRETARIES DR. ETHELYN
P. NIETO, DR. MARGARITA M. GALON, ATTY. ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, & DR. JADE F. DEL
MUNDO; and ASSISTANT SECRETARIES DR. MARIO C. VILLAVERDE, DR. DAVID J. LOZADA,
AND DR. NEMESIO T. GAKO, respondents.
G.R. No. 173034. October 9, 2007.
Topic: Quasi-Legislative Power
Synopsis:
An administrative agency like respondent possesses quasi-legislative or rule-making power or the power
to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the
granting statute and the Constitution, and subject to the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers. Such express grant of rule-making power necessarily includes the power to amend, revise, alter,
or repeal the same. This is to allow administrative agencies flexibility in formulating and adjusting the
details and manner by which they are to implement the provisions of a law, in order to make it more
responsive to the times. Hence, it is a standard provision in administrative rules that prior issuances of
administrative agencies that are inconsistent therewith are declared repealed or modified.
Digest:
FACTS
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino by virtue of the legislative
powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the
Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breast Milk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From
1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported,
promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted
for breast milk substitutes.
In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said
instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child
mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding.
On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 or the Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations (RIRR) which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
Petitioners raised that the DOH acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the provisions of the Constitution
in promulgating the RIRR.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the DOH may implement the provisions of the WHA Resolutions by virtue of its powers
and functions under the Revised Administrative Code even in the absence of a domestic law
2. Whether Section 57 of the RIRR repeals existing laws that are contrary to the RIRR is frivolous
RULING
1. NO. Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 provides that the DOH
shall define the national health policy and implement a national health plan within the framework of the
government’s general policies and plans, and issue orders and regulations concerning the implementation
of established health policies.
It is crucial to ascertain whether the absolute prohibition on advertising and other forms of promotion of
breast milk substitutes provided in some WHA Resolutions has been adopted as part of the national
health policy.
Respondents submit that the national policy on infant and young child feeding is embodied in A.O. No.
2005-0014, dated May 23, 2005. Basically, the Administrative Order declared the following policy
guidelines: (1) ideal breastfeeding practices, such as early initiation of breastfeeding, exclusive
breastfeeding for the first six months, extended breastfeeding up to two years and beyond; (2)
appropriate complementary feeding, which is to start at age six months; (3) micronutrient
supplementation; (4) universal salt iodization; (5) the exercise of other feeding options; and (6) feeding
in exceptionally difficult circumstances. Indeed, the primacy of breastfeeding for children is emphasized
as a national health policy. However, nowhere in A.O. No. 2005-0014 is it declared that as part of such
health policy, the advertisement or promotion of breast milk substitutes should be absolutely prohibited.
The national policy of protection, promotion and support of breastfeeding cannot automatically be
equated with a total ban on advertising for breast milk substitutes.
In view of the enactment of the Milk Code which does not contain a total ban on the advertising and
promotion of breast milk substitutes, but instead, specifically creates an IAC which will regulate said
advertising and promotion, it follows that a total ban policy could be implemented only pursuant to a law
amending the Milk Code passed by the constitutionally authorized branch of government, the legislature.
Thus, only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly
implemented by the DOH through the subject RIRR.
2. NO. Section 57 of the RIRR does not provide for the repeal of laws but only orders, issuances and
rules and regulations. Thus, said provision is valid as it is within the DOH’s rule-making power. An
administrative agency like respondent possesses quasi-legislative or rule-making power or the power to
make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the
granting statute and the Constitution, and subject to the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers. Such express grant of rule-making power necessarily includes the power to amend, revise, alter,
or repeal the same. This is to allow administrative agencies flexibility in formulating and adjusting the
details and manner by which they are to implement the provisions of a law, in order to make it more
responsive to the times. Hence, it is a standard provision in administrative rules that prior issuances of
administrative agencies that are inconsistent therewith are declared repealed or modified.
10 Public Hearing Committee of the LLDA v. SM Prime Holdings
PUBLIC HEARING COMMITTEE OF THE LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and HON.
GENERAL MANAGER CALIXTO CATAQUIZ, petitioners, vs. SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC. (in its
capacity as operator of SM CITY MANILA), respondent.
G.R. No. 170599. September 22, 2010.
Ponente: J. Peralta
Topic: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Synopsis:
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on
a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the
court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to
one’s cause of action. An exception to this rule is when the issues raised are purely legal.
Digest:
FACTS
An inspection was conducted by the Pollution Control Division of the LLDA of the wastewater collected
from SM City Manila. The results of the laboratory tests showed that the sample collected failed to
conform with the effluent standards for inland water imposed in accordance with law.
The LLDA informed SM City Manila of its violation, directing them to perform corrective measures and
ordering the latter to pay a penalty of Php 1,000.00 per day of discharging pollutive wastewater from
February 4, 2002 until cessation of discharging pollutive wastewater.
In a letter SM’s Pollution Control Officer requested the LLDA to conduct a re-sampling, claiming that they
already took measures to meet their standards. But still the LLDA required SM to pay a fine of Php
50,000.00 for the accumulated daily penalty. Two follow-up letters, which the LLDA treated as a Motion
for reconsideration, SM asked for a waiver of the fines assessed on the ground that they immediately
undertook corrective measures and this is the first time that the wastewater discharge failed to meet the
standards of law with respect to inland water. However, LLDA issued an Order denying respondents’
request.
On April 21, 2003, respondent issued another letter to the LLDA requesting for reconsideration but the
LLDA issued another Order to Pay. Aggrieved, SM filed a petition for certiorari with the CA praying for
nullification of the orders. CA rendered granted the petition of SM.
Petitioners contend that the petition for certiorari filed by the respondent with the CA is premature and
did not raise purely legal question in its petition.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether respondent has exhausted all administrative remedies before filing a petition for
certiorari with the CA
2. Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the respondent only involved purely legal
question
RULING
1. NO. The Court agrees with petitioners that respondent did not exhaust administrative remedies before
filing a petition for certiorari with the CA. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or
herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the
intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is based on practical and legal reasons.
2. NO. It is true that one of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
when the issues raised are purely legal. However, the Court is not persuaded by respondent’s contention
that the special civil action for certiorari it filed with the CA involved only purely legal questions and did
not raise factual issues. A perusal of the petition for certiorari filed by respondent readily shows that
factual matters were raised, to wit: (a) whether respondent has immediately implemented remedial
measures to correct the pH level of the effluent discharges of SM City Manila; and (b) whether the third
party monitoring report submitted by respondent proves that it has complied with the effluent standards
for inland water set by the LLDA.
11 Flores v. Montemayor
HON. WALDO Q. FLORES vs. ATTY. ANTONIO F. MONTEMAYOR

G.R. No. 170146. June 8, 2011.

Synopsis:
Dismissal of a criminal action does not foreclose institution of an administrative proceeding against the
same respondent, nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability. Res judicata did not set in
because there is no identity of causes of action.
Digest:
FACTS
This resolves the motion for reconsideration for the August 25, 2010 decision, setting aside the October
19, 2005 Decision of the CA and restating the decision date March 23, 2004 of the Office of the
President, which found the Atty. Montemayor (respondent) administratively liable for failure to declare in
his 2001 and 2002 Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities 2 expensive cars registered in his name, in
violation of Sec. 7, R.A. No. 3019 in relation to Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6713.
The motion is anchored on the following grounds:

1. Respondent was subjected to 2 administrative/criminal investigations equivalently resulting in violation
of his constitutional right against “double jeopardy.”
2. Who to follow between conflicting decisions of 2 government agencies involving the same facts and
issues affecting the rights of the Respondent. (Ombudsman and PAGC)
3. Respondent’s constitutional right to due process was violated.
4. Penalties prescribed by the Honorable Court is too harsh and severe on the alleged offense
committed/omitted.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether there is res judicata
2. Whether Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) still has jurisdiction
3. Whether the respondent was given due process
RULING
1. NO. The same wrongful act committed by the public officer can subject him to civil, administrative and
criminal liabilities. We held in Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, 318 SCRA 80 (1999): [I]t is a basic principle of
the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation
of duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly,
criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful act results
in damages to an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If
the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be punished criminally. Finally, such
violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or other administrative sanctions. This
administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities. (Italics in the original.)
Dismissal of a criminal action does not foreclose institution of an administrative proceeding against the
same respondent, nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability. Res judicata did not set in
because there is no identity of causes of action. Moreover, the decision of the Ombudsman dismissing the
criminal complaint cannot be considered a valid and final judgment. On the criminal complaint, the
Ombudsman only had the power to investigate and file the appropriate case before the Sandiganbayan.
2. YES. A presidential appointee is under the disciplinary authority of the Office of the President (OP);
Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is
terminated—having already taken cognizance of the complaint against the respondent involving non-
declaration in his 2001 and 2002 Sworn Statements of Assets and Liabilities (SSALs), the Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) thus retained jurisdiction over respondent’s administrative case
notwithstanding the subsequent filing of a supplemental complaint before the Ombudsman charging him
with the same violation.
3. YES. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side
or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.
What is offensive to due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard. This Court has repeatedly
stressed that parties who choose not to avail themselves of the opportunity to answer charges against
them cannot complain of a denial of due process. Having persisted in his refusal to file his pleadings and
evidence before the PAGC, respondent cannot validly claim that his right to due process was violated.
12 Carpio-Morales v. CA and Jejomar Erwin Binay, Jr.
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) and JEJOMAR

ERWIN S. BINAY, JR.
G.R. Nos. 217126-27. November 10, 2015.*
Topic: Condonation Doctrine
Synopsis:
The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people
at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an
elective local official’s administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be
wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post.
Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or
statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully
absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term.
Digest:
FACTS
This case is about alleged involvement of Binay Jr. in anomalous activities attending procurement and
construction phases of Makati Parking Building Project, committed during his previous and present terms
as City Mayor of Makati.
Binay, Jr.’s First Term (2010 to 2013)

Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award for Phase III, Phase IV and Phase V of the Makati Parking Building
project to Hilmarc’s and consequently, executed the corresponding contract. Then, without the required
publication and lack of architectural design, he approved the release of the funds thereof for the project.
Binay, Jr.’s Second Term (2013 to 2016)

On July 3 and 4, 2013, he approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the September 13,
2012 contract with Hilmarc’s for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project.
On July 24, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the contract with
MANA for the design and architectural services covering the project.
On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a
preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication on the OMB Cases. Thereafter, the 2nd Special
Panel issued a separate orders for each OMB cases, requiring Binay, Jr. et al. to file their respective
counter-affidavits. Before Binay, Jr., et al.’s filing of the counter-affidavits the Ombudsman upon
recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel issued the subject preventive suspension order placing Binay,
Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than 6 months without pay, during the pendency of
the OMB Cases.
Consequently, the Ombudsman directed the DILG through Sec. Roxas to immediately implement the
preventive suspension, upon receipt of the same.
On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the Office of the City Mayor
and was received by Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr’s staff.
Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking nullification of the preventive suspension
order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and or/WPI to enjoin its implementation.
On March 16, 2015 Sec. Roxas implemented the preventive suspension order through Director Brion of
DILG NCR, who posted a copy thereof on the wall of Makati City Hall after failing to serve it personally, as
the points of entry to the Makati City Hall were closed. The same day Vice Mayor Peña, Jr. was sworn in
to assume his positon as Acting Mayor. At Noon of the same day, the CA granted Binay, Jr.’s TRO, were
they applied the Condonation doctrine. That if it were established that the acts subject of the
administrative cases against Binay. Jr. were all committed during his prior term, then Binay, Jr.’s
reelection meant that he can no longer be administratively charged.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the CA erred in applying the condonation doctrine
RULING
YES. The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the
people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an
elective local official’s administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be
wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post.
Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or
statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully
absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this
jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned by the President in light of
Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844
(1991), to apply to administrative offenses.
13 Salumbides v. Ombudsman
SALUMBIDES, JR. vs. OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No. 180917. April 23, 2010

Topic: Neglect of Duty
Synopsis:
Simple Neglect of Duty is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a task expected from an
their advice to their superior. Public servants must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and
dedication to duty.
Digest:
FACTS
Salumbides and Araña were appointed in July 2001 as Municipal Legal Officer/ Administrator and
Municipal Budget Officer, respectively, of Tagkawayan, Quezon. Towards the end of 2001 Mayor
Salumbides III saw the urgent need to a construct 2-classroom building with a fence for the Tagkawayan
Municipal High School. On how to solve the classroom shortage, the mayor consulted Salumbides who
suggested that the construction of the 2-classroom building be charged to the account of the
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses/Repair and Maintenance of Facilities (MOOE/RMF) and
implemented “by administration,” as had been done in a previous classroom building project.
Upon, consultation, Araña advised Salumbides, that there were no more available funds that could be
taken from the MOOE/RMF, but the savings of the municipal government were adequate to fund the
projects. She added, however, that the approval by the Sangguniang Bayan of a proposed supplemental
budget must be secured. But the members of the Sangguniang Bayan has already gone into recess for
the Christmas holidays. So, Araña and Salumbides advised the mayor to source the funds from the Php
1,000,000 MOOE/RMF allocation in the approved Municipal Annual Budget for 2002.
Thus, the mayor ordered the Municipal Engineer to proceed with the construction of the projects based
on the program of work and bill of materials. And Upon advice of Municipal Planning and Development
Officer, the mayor included the project in the list of government projects scheduled for bidding.
The construction of the projects commenced without any approved appropriation and ahead of the public
bidding. Hence, a complaint has been filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman found
Salumbides and Araña guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the petitioners are guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty
RULING
YES. Simple Neglect of Duty is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a task expected from an
their advice to their superior. Public servants must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and
dedication to duty.
14 PAGCOR v. De Guzman
G.R. No. 208261. December 8, 2014.

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LORENIA P. DE
GUZMAN, respondent.
Synopsis:
As a general rule, an appeal is not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege, and as such, may only
be availed in the manner provided by the law and the rules. Therefore, it must be perfected within the
reglementary period. However, exception is when the appeal is meritorious. In the case at bar, it is clear
that PAGCOR was the one who hired the respondent and as such, only PAGCOR has the power to
discipline or remove de Guzman from any transgressions she may have committed.
Digest:
FACTS
In 2001, PAGCOR hired De Guzman as an Evaluation Specialist and assigned her to the Property and
Procurement Department. In her Personal History Statement (PHS), she did not declare that she has a
sister working for PAGCOR as well. However, in 2008, she listed her sister when she updated her PHS. It
was also found out that de Guzman had a nephew who worked at PAGCOR for the period of 2001 to
2005. Upon discovery of these information, de Guzman was sent a Notice of Charges charging her with
“Deception or Fraud in Securing Employee’s Appointment or Promotion”. She was directed to show cause
why she should not be subjected to disciplinary action. De Guzman was found administratively liable for
the charges filed and was dismissed. De Guzman appealed before the CSC. CSC ruled in favor of De
Guzman on the ground that PAGCOR violated the respondent’s right to due process. PAGCOR appealed
before CA who affirmed the CSC ruling.
ISSUE(S)
WON the CA correctly affirmed the CSC’s dismissal of the administrative disciplinary case against De
Guzman on the ground that she was deprived of her right to due process
RULING
Yes. As a general rule, an appeal is not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege, and as such, may
only be availed in the manner provided by the law and the rules. Therefore, it must be perfected within
the reglementary period. However, exception is when the appeal is meritorious. In the case at bar, it is
clear that PAGCOR was the one who hired the respondent and as such, only PAGCOR has the power to
discipline or remove de Guzman from any transgressions she may have committed. As a corporate entity,
PAGCOR may act through its Board of Directors as well. However, in this case, the formal charge as well
as the memorandum were NULL and VOID since it did not come from PAGCOR or its Board of Directors.
Rather, it was from someone who was not authorized by PAGCOR or any of its Board of Directors.
Consequently, De Guzman’s removal from PAGCOR without a valid formal charge was done in violation of
her right to due process.
15 Republic v. Transunion Corp.
Republic of the Philippines (Petitioner) vs. Transunion Corporation (Respondent).

G.R. No. 191590. April 21, 2014.
Topic: Administrative Due Process
Synopsis:
It is well established that the touch stone of due process is the opportunity to be heard. This, Transunion
was unquestionably afforded in this case, despite having been denied the remedies of reconsideration
and appeal which, however, remain unavailable, either by statute or regulation, against the investigation
report and recommendation assailed herein. At any rate, lack of administrative due process, on the
assumption of its truth, is not a ground for a motion to dismiss, hence, the RTC’s ruling was altogether
proper.
Digest:
FACTS
Leticia Salamat filed an application to purchase Friar Land specifically Lot no. 5741 of the Imus Estate
with the CENRO of the DENR. However, she was informed that the land has already been owned by the
respondent corporation, Transunion Corporation. This prompted Salamat to file a protest on 27 June
2000 against Transunion with Land Management Bureau (LMB) docketed as case no. 114, alleging that
TCT no. T-616740 was obtained through fraud considering that no deed of conveyance was issued by the
LMB for lot no. 5741 in the name of any person.
LMB issued special order no. 2000-175 designating Atty. Rogelio C. Mandar to conduct a formal
investigation in order to determine the veracity of the allegations contained in Salamat’s protest. Despite
the protest of Transunion to stop the conduct of special investigation, Atty. Mandar issued the result of
the investigation report stating that the TCT no. 616740 should be reverted to the government thru a
case filed with the RTC.
DENR transmitted the records to Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for the complaint of reversion of
the land to the Republic docketed as LMB Case no. 114. Transunion filed a motion to dismiss stating that
the reversion was premature stating that the LMB failed to notify Transunion of its recommendation in
the investigation report- thereby depriving it the opportunity to seek reconsideration or an appeal of the
same, and ultimately resulting in a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. Unsatisfied, Transunion elevated to CA which reversed the RTC’s
denial of the motion to dismiss. Hence, the petition by the petitioner to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the Transunion’s constitutional right to administrative due process has been violated by
way of the failure of LMB to notify Transunion of the result of the special investigation report
RULING
No, the SC finds that there was no violation of Transunion right to administrative due process. It is well
established that the touch stone of due process is the opportunity to be heard. This, Transunion was
unquestionably afforded in this case, despite having been denied the remedies of reconsideration and
appeal which, however, remain unavailable, either by statute or regulation, against the investigation
report and recommendation assailed herein. At any rate, lack of administrative due process, on the
assumption of its truth, is not a ground for a motion to dismiss, hence, the RTC’s ruling was altogether
proper.
16 Department of Finance v. Hon. Mariano Dela Cruz

Department of Finance represented by Hon. Cesar V. Purisima and Bureau of Customs,
represented by Hon. Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon (Petitioners) vs. Hon. Marino M. Dela Cruz, Jr.
(RTC) and other 15 employees of BOCs namely Ronnie C. Silvestre and so on.
G.R. No. 209331. August 24, 2015.
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Synopsis:
Exceptions: (1) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (2) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (3) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (4) where the
amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (5) where the
question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (6) where
judicial intervention is urgent; (7) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable
damage; (8) where the controverted acts violate due process; (9) where the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies had been rendered moot; (10) where there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (11) where strong public interest is involved; and (12) in quo warranto proceedings.
Digest:
FACTS
The case stemmed from the issuance of Executive Order 140 (EO 140) on 2 September 2013 which
created the Customs Policy Research Office (CPRO) in the Department of Finance (DOF). EO 140 states
that the CPRO shall be responsible for reviewing the customs administration policies, rules and
procedures, and thereafter proving sound recommendations for the improvement of the same.
On the same day, Commissioner Biazon issued Customs Personal Order (CPO) 189-2013 detailing 27 BOC
personnel holding positions of Collector of Customs V and Vi including respondents in the case, to CPRO
“effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked.”
This was contested by the respondents in a Declaratory Relief with Application for TRO and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injuction before the RTC of Manila on 30 Sep 2013. On 1 Oct 2013, Executive judge Dela
Cruz issued a TRO for 72 hours enjoining petitioners or any person acting for and in their behalf from
implementing CPO 189-2013. Thereafter, the case was raffled to the sala of Judge Laron-Cacanindin.
Judge Laron –Cacanaindin extended Judge Dela Cruz’s 72-hour TRO for 20 days.
On 21 Oct 2013, petitioners filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before this Court with prayer for
issuance of TRO or a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with an allegation that the case should be
under the Civil Service Commission. Likewise, that respondents failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies available to them before filing the petition before the RTC.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies in filing the action before the RTC
RULING
No, this case clearly falls within the exceptions where exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be
resorted to by the respondents. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies allows
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. The doctrine entails lesser expenses and provides for
the speedier resolution of controversies. Therefore, direct recourse to the trial court, when administrative
remedies are available, is a ground for dismissal of the action. The doctrine, however, is not without
exceptions.
Among the exceptions are: (1) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (2)
where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (3) where
there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (4) where
the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (5) where the
question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (6) where
judicial intervention is urgent; (7) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable
damage; (8) where the controverted acts violate due process; (9) where the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies had been rendered moot; (10) where there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (11) where strong public interest is involved; and (12) in quo warranto proceedings.
III. Law on Public Officers
1 Eijansantos v. Special Presidential Task Force 156
JESSE PHILIP B. EIJANSANTOS, Petitioner, vs. SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE 156,
represented by ATTY. ALLAN U. VENTURA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 203696. June 2, 2014.
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Topic: Grave Misconduct
Synopsis:
The petitioner apparently failed in one of his duties and responsibilities as an evaluator which was to
conduct a physical verification/inspection of manufacturing and plant facilities. While he followed the
instructions and training given to him by his superiors at the Center, he neither conducted a physical
verification/inspection on the actual office premises and the manufacturing and plant facilities of
Evergreen, nor did he conduct such verification or inspection on Evergreen’s suppliers and exporters.
Definitely, as a Senior Tax Specialist, the petitioner ought to know that there was a necessity to
thoroughly verify the authenticity of tax credit applications before processing the same.
Digest:
FACTS
SPTF 156 was created by former President Joseph Estrada in October 1999 to review, investigate and
gather evidence necessary to prosecute the commission of irregularities in the various offices and
agencies of the DOF. The life of SPTF 156 was extended by former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in
October 2001. SPTF 156 was further mandated to investigate the irregularities committed at the One
Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the Department of Finance. and to
recover and collect lost revenues. Pursuant to this mandate, Atty. Gerville Abanilla Reyes (Atty.
Reyes),SPTF 156 lawyer-consultant, conducted an independent investigation on the alleged anomalous
issuances of TCCs to Evergreen Weaving Mills, Inc (Evergreen). Based on the Investigation Report, dated
March 16, 2004, submitted by Atty. Reyes, it appeared that Evergreen’s existence was questionable. The
suppliers and buyers were inexistent or could no longer be found. The sales invoices and delivery receipts
which were used as bases of the tax credit claims of Evergreen were fake and the TCC transfers were
fictitious. For said reason, SPTF 156 Executive Director Atty. Alan A. Ventura, through a complaint-
affidavit, filed criminal charges for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019, as amended,
and Estafa Thru Falsification of Public Documents, against those involved in the aforesaid anomalous
transactions. On July 10, 2006, the Prosecution and Monitoring Bureau (PAMB)of the Ombudsman
rendered a decision, finding several of the accused guilty of grave misconduct with the penalty of
dismissal from the service including all its accessory penalties and without prejudice to criminal
prosecution. Subsequently, Eijansantos filed a petition for review before the CA assailing the decision and
order of the Ombudsman. He argued, among others, that he could not be held guilty of grave misconduct
as he dutifully performed his responsibilities as evaluator; that his duties and responsibilities basically
involved the preparation of an evaluation report submitted to his immediate superior, Aranas; that he
was not privy to the process by which the TCC was issued because its approval and release were an
altogether different duty which he did not exercise; that he performed his duties based on the directives
and manner taught to him in the Center; and that the documents submitted by Evergreen appeared to be
authentic without any hint of falsity which he had no reason to doubt. The CA affirmed the decision of
the Ombudsman, with the reasoning that the duties of Eijansantos as evaluator included the physical
verification/inspection of manufacturing and plant facilities. To perform this task, petitioner must go
beyond the documents that reached his desk. He must not content himself with what appeared to be
regular or authentic on the face of these documents. Surely, his specific duty to physically verify and
inspect manufacturing and plant facilities requires him to go out of his office and personally proceed to
these facilities.
ISSUE(S)
Should Eijansantos be held guilty of misconduct?
RULING
Yes. The record shows that there is enough evidence on record warranting the finding of guilt for grave
misconduct against the petitioner. Misconduct has a legal and uniform definition. It is defined as an
intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a
government official. A misconduct is grave where the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law or flagrant disregard of established rule are present. In the case at bench, the petitioner does not
dispute that his duties and responsibilities as an evaluator for the wearable/textile division include:
checking listing of tax credit claims; preparation of evaluation reports and the computation of tax credit
claims; preparation of correspondence and other communication letters to exporters/claimants; attending
to inquiries and assistance on specific cases; and physical verification/inspection of manufacturing
facilities and plant inspections. The petitioner did not deny that he evaluated and processed Evergreen’s
tax credit application which was filed and accepted by the Center on November 26, 1993 and
subsequently approved on January 5, 1994, and that TCC No. 020829 was subsequently issued to
Evergreen. The petitioner apparently failed in one of his duties and responsibilities as an evaluator which
was to conduct a physical verification/inspection of manufacturing and plant facilities. While he followed
the instructions and training given to him by his superiors at the Center, he neither conducted a physical
verification/inspection on the actual office premises and the manufacturing and plant facilities of
Evergreen, nor did he conduct such verification or inspection on Evergreen’s suppliers and exporters.
Definitely, as a Senior Tax Specialist, the petitioner ought to know that there was a necessity to
thoroughly verify the authenticity of tax credit applications before processing the same.
2 Anonymous Letter Complaint Against Reynaldo C. Alcantara…
ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST REY-NALDO C. ALCANTARA, UTILITY WORKER

I, BR. 70, AND JOSEPH C. JACINTO, ELECTRICIAN, HALL OF JUSTICE, BOTH OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BURGOS, PANGASINAN.
A.M. No. P-15-3296. February 17, 2015.*
Ponente: PER CURIAM

Synopsis:
Dishonesty is defined as the “[d]isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness;
disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.” Grave misconduct is committed when there has been “‘a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by a public officer.’ The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements
of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, all of which must be
established by substantial evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.”
Digest:
FACTS
An anonymous Letter-Complaint was addressed to Executive Executive Judge Abella, charging
respondents Alcantara, Utility, and Jacinto, Electrician, both of the Hall of Justice of the Regional Trial
Court, Burgos, with the commission of several illegal activities in violation of Civil Service Rules
Pangasinan.
Upon endorsement to the Office of the Court Administrator, it directed Judge Abella to conduct a discreet
investigation and submit a report. Executive Judge Abella recommended that Alcantara and Jacinto be
immediately dismissed from service. He found that as early as 2009, Alcantara and Jacinto received and
encashed checks of their coworkers without consent. He found that Alcantara’s and Jacinto’s actions
constituted grave misconduct and recommended their dismissal from service.
In his Alcantara admitted to the taking and encashing checks without permission. He claimed, however,
that he was not a thief. He was only tempted to take and encash the checks because of his financial
circumstances then to support his family. Jacinto, in his Comment denied taking the checks. He admitted
that he accompanied Alcantara in encashing a check. However, he did not know that the check did not
belong to Alcantara. He received a portion of the proceeds from the check but when he found out that
the check belonged to Tugade, he returned the amount and asked for her forgiveness.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not respondents, in taking and encashing checks without permission, are guilty of grave
misconduct and dishonesty
RULING
Yes. In the case at bar, the acts of respondents Alcantara and Jacinto clearly amounted to dishonesty
and grave misconduct. Respondent Alcantara admitted to stealing and encashing the checks and put up
the lame excuse that he was forced to do it because of his dire financial situation at the time. The
explanation of respondent Jacinto is even more absurd. He claimed that he had no idea that the checks
were stolen but he admitted receiving proceeds from the scheme and allotting them to his personal
needs.
Dishonesty is defined as the “[d]isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness;
disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.” Grave misconduct is committed when there has been “‘a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by a public officer.’ The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements
of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, all of which must be
established by substantial evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.”
In this case, Alcantara and Jacinto admitted to taking and encashing checks of their coworkers without
permission. There is no doubt that their acts of repeatedly stealing the checks and forging the signatures
of their coworkers constitute grave misconduct and dishonesty. Their alleged remorse for what they have
done does not erase the transgression they committed. “This Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of
undesirables who undermine its efforts toward an effective and efficient administration of justice, thus
tainting its image in the eyes of the public.”
Under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule 10, Section 46, serious
dishonesty and grave misconduct are punishable by dismissal from service even if for the first offense.
###
3 CSC and DOST v. ARANDIA
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Regional

Office No. V, Petitioners, vs. MARILYN G. ARANDIA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 199549. April 7, 2014.
Ponente: J. Brion
Topic: Insubordination
Synopsis:
Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order, which a superior officer is entitled to give and
have obeyed. The term imports a willful or intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable instructions
of the employer. In this case, the respondent committed insubordination when she failed to promptly act
on the memorandum issued by her superior, Regional Director Nepomuceno, reminding her of her duties
to immediately turn-over documents to and exchange room assignments with the new Administrative
Officer-Designate, Engr. Lucena. The records show that it was only on June 28, 2000 that the respondent
complied with the turn-over order, where the same was issued as early as June 16, 2000.
Digest:
FACTS
In March of 2000, Eriberta Nepomuceno, Regional Director of DOST-V, filed an administrative complaint
against herein respondent for gross insubordination, gross neglect of duty, and several other similar
charges. She alleged that respondent refused to sign, without justifiable cause, documents for the
payment of certain miscellaneous and travelling expenses, phone bills, and the release of salaries and
allowances of Nepomuceno and other employees of DOST-V. In her answer, respondent claimed that her
refusal to sign the same was attributed to the failure of Nepomuceno and other employees to submit
sufficient supporting documents for their claims for reimbursement and the release of their salaries and
allowances. The CSC found Arandia guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
ISSUE(S)
Is respondent guilty of insubordination?
RULING
Yes. Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order, which a superior officer is entitled to
give and have obeyed. The term imports a willful or intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable
instructions of the employer. In this case, the respondent committed insubordination when she failed to
promptly act on the memorandum issued by her superior, Regional Director Nepomuceno, reminding her
of her duties to immediately turn-over documents to and exchange room assignments with the new
Administrative Officer-Designate, Engr. Lucena. The records show that it was only on June 28, 2000 that
the respondent complied with the turn-over order, where the same was issued as early as June 16, 2000.
Notes:
In this case, the penalty of suspension of one month could no longer be meted, as Arandia was no longer
a part of DOST-V by the time the judgment was rendered, so she was instead fined in the amount of one
month salary, to be deducted from her retirement benefits.
4 Velasco v. Obispo
LOLITA RAYALA VELASCO, Complainant, vs. GERALDO C. OBISPO, Utility Worker I, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 113, Pasay City, Respondent.
A.M. No. P-13-3160. November 10, 2014.
Ponente: J. Reyes
Synopsis:
Time and Time again, the Supreme Court has stressed that the behavior of all employees and officials
involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a
heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times in order to
merit and maintain the public trust and respect for the judiciary. Needless to say, all court personnel
must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty, and uprightness. In the present
case, the records of the case reveal that the conduct of Obispo fell short of this standard. By soliciting
money from the complainant, even for the purpose of securing the services of a counsel and the filing of
a petition for annulment, he committed an act of serious impropriety which tarnished the honor and
dignity of the judiciary and deeply affected the confidence of the people in it.
Digest:
FACTS
Lolita Rayala Velasco charged respondent Geraldo Obispo with Grave Misconduct and violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, alleging that sometime in 2010, some court employees in San Pedro,
Laguna introduced her to Obispo, who can allegedly help her in the filing of a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage in behalf of her son and daughter-in-law. According to her, respondent claims that he
can work out the petition without the couple’s appearance in court. Obispo demanded money, which
Velasco readily gave. Despite the assurances of respondent however, the annulment did not materialize.
Complainant then asked for a refund, which respondent refused. In his defense, Obispo claimed that he
never gave an assurance to the complainant that he could work out the petition, only that he will
recommend to the complainant a lawyer who could handle the case and a psychologist who can conduct
the required psychological evaluation.
ISSUE(S)
Is Obispo guilty of grave misconduct?
RULING
Yes. Time and Time again, the Supreme Court has stressed that the behavior of all employees and
officials involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed
with a heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times in
order to merit and maintain the public trust and respect for the judiciary. Needless to say, all court
personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty, and uprightness. In the
present case, the records of the case reveal that the conduct of Obispo fell short of this standard. By
soliciting money from the complainant, even for the purpose of securing the services of a counsel and the
filing of a petition for annulment, he committed an act of serious impropriety which tarnished the honor
and dignity of the judiciary and deeply affected the confidence of the people in it.
5 Pagaduan v. CSC
CECILIA PAGADUAN, Petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and REMA MARTIN
SALVADOR, Respondents.
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Topic: Moral Turpitude
Synopsis:
Res judicata is applicable either by way off (1) bar by prior judgment, or (2) conclusiveness of judgment.
Conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue,
judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. The fact or
question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that action, and continues to bind them
while the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed. Contrary to Salvador’s contention
however, there is no identity of issues and facts in the two administrative cases. The first case involved
the issue of whether Salvador falsified her PDS, while the second one involved the issue of whether she
was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Falsification is no longer in issue in the second case.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals; and act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Not every
criminal act however, involves moral turpitude. It is a matter for the courts to determine. In the instant
case, considering that the principal act punished in the crime of falsification of public documents is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth, the elements of the administrative offense of
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude clearly exists in this case.
Digest:
FACTS
On May 14, 1992, petitioner Cecilia Pagaduan filed a notarized complaint with the Civil Service
Commission-Regional Office 2 in Tuguegarao City against respondent Salvador, newly appointed
Municipal Budget Officer at the time, charging her with the administrative offenses of falsification and
misrepresentation. Pagaduan claimed that Salvador did not really posses the necessary budgeting
experience required by her position, and that she misrepresented herself in her Personal Data Sheet as
having been employed as bookkeeper in Veterans Woodworks, Inc. Subsequently, on October 19, 1994,
Pagaduan filed with the MTC of Tuguegarao City a criminal charge against Salvador for falsification of
public documents. On May of 2000, a decision on the administrative case was rendered by the CSC-RO
II, holding Salvador liable only for simple misconduct, and meting the penalty of one month suspension,
ruling that her act was a mere error of judgment. On October of 2008, the MTCC found Salvador guilty of
falsification of public documents, and sentenced her to probation for one year. At this point, Pagaduan
filed another administrative case against her, this time for the offense of conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude. Salvador raises the issue of res judicata, forum shopping, and double jeopardy, based on
the previous administrative ruling, which penalty she fully served.
ISSUE(S)
1. Does res judicata bar the filing of the second administrative complaint?
2. Was Salvador convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude?
RULING
1. No. Salvador’s contention in raising res judicata is that the cases involve the same parties, facts, and
issues, albeit conceding that they are for different causes of action. Indeed, res judicata is applicable
either by way off (1) bar by prior judgment, or (2) conclusiveness of judgment. Conclusiveness of
judgment finds application when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon,
and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. The fact or question settled by final
judgment or order binds the parties to that action, and continues to bind them while the judgment or
order remains standing and unreversed. Contrary to Salvador’s contention however, there is no identity
of issues and facts in the two administrative cases. The first case involved the issue of whether Salvador
falsified her PDS, while the second one involved the issue of whether she was convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Falsification is no longer in issue in the second case.
2. Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals; and act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Not every
criminal act however, involves moral turpitude. It is a matter for the courts to determine. In the instant
case, considering that the principal act punished in the crime of falsification of public documents is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth, the elements of the administrative offense of
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude clearly exists in this case.
6 CSC v. Andal
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, complainant, vs. HERMINIGILDO L. ANDAL, Security Guard II,
Sandiganbayan, Quezon City, respondent.
A.M. No. SB-12-19-P. November 18, 2014.*
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 10-26¬-SB-P)
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Dishonesty
Synopsis:
Substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in this administrative case, is that amount
of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. This
standard is satisfied in the present case so long as there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent
is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if the evidence may not be overwhelming or even
preponderant. Justice Jurado’s Investigation Report and Recommendation is supported by the evidence
on record showing that respondent did not take the CSPE-CAT of 24 January 2000. Firstly, by claiming
that he was nursing a hangover on the day of examination, respondent was effectively admitting that he
did not take the test; and logically, he did not earn for himself the 81.08% passing rate. Secondly, the
pictures in his Civil Service Application Form and PSP are entirely different. In other words, it cannot be
doubted that another person took the test under his name.
However, the recommendations of Justice Jurado are conflicting. By ruling that respondent falsely
obtained his civil service eligibility, and by barring respondent from taking any civil service examination, it
logically follows that respondent no longer holds a basic qualification to hold his permanent position in
the judiciary. Therefore, the recommended penalty cannot simply be a one-year suspension, but removal
from government service.
Digest:
FACTS
Andal is employed as Security Guard II at the Sandiganbayan. On December 20, 2006, the CSC issued
Resolution Nos. 062255 and 071493 affirming the decision of the CSC-NCR. The CSC-NCR dismissed
respondent from government service after finding him guilty of dishonesty by allowing another person to
take his CSPE-CAT.
The CA issued a decision setting aside the judgement of the CSC for want of jurisdiction. The CA held
that the case was cognizable by the SC, which had administrative supervision over all courts and
personnel thereof. The SC affirmed the judgement of the CA.
Thereafter, the SC En Banc issued a resolution re-docketing the case as an administrative matter, and
resolved to refer the case to then Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Justice Villaruz, Jr. for
investigation, report and recommendation. Justice Villaruz, Jr. requested the court to assign the case to a
senior Justice. As reason, he adduced that an administrative investigation would take a toll on his
functions at a time when some programs in the Sandiganbayan needed his immediate attention.
Appreciating the merit of the request, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the matter
be referred to Justice Ong. Bur due to an administrative case against Justice Ong, the case was referred
to Justice Jurado.
CSC claimed that Andal had applied for the CSPE-CAT and that it appeared that he passed the test. But
based on the differing photographs in the Picture Seat Plan and his Civil Service Application Form, the
CSC averred that he had not taken the test himself.
Andal admitted that he could not have taken the test, since he was in the province nursing a hangover.
As his defense, he maintained that he had not authorized another person to take the test for him. He
alleged that the impersonation was perpetrated by a group of employees who disliked him for revealing
their drinking sprees and doping sessions to their superiors. He further narrated that in 2007, he learned
from his co-employee, Larry Lincallo, that the impersonator was Emmerson Nucom.
Justice Jurado disbelieved the claims of respondent and found him guilty of dishonesty. But the
investigating office did not dismiss but only suspended him.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the respondent is guilty of dishonesty
2. Whether Justice Jurado erred in giving a penalty of suspension
RULING
1. Yes. Justice Jurado’s Investigation Report and Recommendation is supported by the evidence on
record showing that respondent did not take the CSPE-CAT of 24 January 2000. Firstly, by claiming that
he was nursing a hangover on the day of examination, respondent was effectively admitting that he did
not take the test; and logically, he did not earn for himself the 81.08% passing rate. Secondly, the
pictures in his Civil Service Application Form and PSP are entirely different. In other words, it cannot be
doubted that another person took the test under his name.
Despite this established fact, respondent still tries to refute the charge of dishonesty by claiming that the
actual examinee impersonated him and took the test without his knowledge. Indeed, to be found guilty of
dishonesty, there must be substantial evidence that respondent intentionally made false statements or
practiced deception in securing his permanent employment with the Sandiganbayan.
Substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in this administrative case, is
that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify
a conclusion. This standard is satisfied in the present case so long as there is reasonable ground to
believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if the evidence may not be
overwhelming or even preponderant.
Here, we agree with Justice Jurado that the impersonation theory of respondent, claimed to be
perpetrated by his officemates, is incredible.
First, the claim of respondent is self-serving and uncorroborated by any witness. Second, it is more
reasonable to believe that the employees who had an axe to grind against him would rather have him fail
than pass the test. Third, as Justice Jurado aptly pointed out, it defies reason that the actual examinee
would take the test for the benefit of another without any recompense. Fourth, even assuming arguendo
that respondent had an unauthorized impersonator, he should have alerted the CSC or the
Sandiganbayan as soon as he received the passing grade.
Respondent’s scheme of passing the blame to the actual examinee is old hat. In Donato, Jr. v. Civil
Service Commission Regional Office No. 1, we have already dealt with the same issue and explained that
persons being impersonated actually consent to the impersonation:
The picture of Donato pasted over the name of Gil Arce in the PSP during the Career Service Sub-
professional Examination on August 5, 1990 is indicative of the fact that respondent Arce did not
personally take the said examination but Donato in his behalf. This is so because as a matter of
procedure, the room examiners assigned to supervise the conduct of examination closely examine the
pictures submitted by the examinees. An examinee is not allowed by the examiners to take the
examination if he does not look like the person in the picture he submitted and affixed in the PSP.
Obviously, the person whose picture is pasted on the PSP was the one who took the examination for and
in behalf of Arce. In the offense of impersonation, there are always two persons involved. The offense
cannot prosper without the active participation of both persons. Further, by engaging or colluding with
another person to take the test in his behalf and thereafter by claiming the resultant passing rate as his,
clinches the case against him. In cases of impersonation, the Commission has consistently rejected claims
of good faith, for “it is contrary to human nature that a person will do (impersonation) without the
consent of the person being impersonated.”
2. Yes. The recommendations of Justice Jurado are conflicting. By ruling that respondent falsely obtained
his civil service eligibility, and by barring respondent from taking any civil service examination, it logically
follows that respondent no longer holds a basic qualification to hold his permanent position in the
judiciary. Therefore, the recommended penalty cannot simply be a one-year suspension, but removal
from government service.
Contrary to the recommendation of Justice Jurado, the reduced penalty of suspension cannot be justified
by the alleged mitigating circumstances of satisfactory performance, length of service and non-utilization
of the acquired eligibility.
Dishonesty cannot be tolerated from government officials or employees, even when official duties are
performed well. First-time offenders found guilty of grave dishonesty involving falsification of their civil
service examination results already merit the penalty of dismissal from service. Thus, as in the case of
the respondent in Civil Service Commission v. Ramoneda-Pita, the mitigating circumstance of length of
service was not considered, since the act of falsifying eligibility does not satisfy the high standards
demanded of a court employee. It is likewise erroneous to appreciate that “respondent never took
advantage of the ‘acquired eligibility’ as a tool for promotion and never benefited from it,” given that
respondent enjoyed his permanent position without the requisite eligibility.
7 Ombudsman v. Cabreroy
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, vs. CYNTHIA E. CABEROY, Respondent.

G.R. No. 188066. October 22, 2014.
Ponente: J. Reyes
Topic: Oppression
Synopsis:
Oppression, also known as grave abuse of authority, is a misdemeanor committed by a public officer
who, under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or
other injury. It is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority. To be held administratively
liable for oppression, there must be substantial evidence presented proving the complainant’s allegations.
In this case, the CA overturned the OMB’s findings of substantial evidence, stating that not paying the
private respondent did not constitute oppression, because she was eventually paid, albeit delayed (July
2002). The Supreme Court found for the CA, ruling that the delay does not constitute oppression, as it
hardly qualifies as an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority, especially when she
contributed to the delay of her own payment (she submitted her Daily Time Record only on July 11,
2002.)
Digest:
FACTS
Caberoy is the principal of Ramon Acancena High School in Arevalo, Iloilo City. She was charged with
oppression and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by Angeles O. Tuares for allegedly
withholding her salary for the month of June 2002. Caberoy denied the charges against her, alleging,
among others, that the payrolls of June 1 to 15, 2002, show that Tuares received her salary as shown by
her signature on the payroll. The Ombudsman found Caberoy guilty and dismissed her from service. The
CA however, cleared the charges against her, claiming that Caberoy’s refusal to release Tuares’ salary
was justified and the element of failure to act for the purpose of obtaining pecuniary benefit or
advantage or discrimination against another is absent. The CA in effect, did not find the acts of Caberoy
oppressive. The case was thus forwarded to the Supreme Court under Rule 45, who took to ruling on
matters of fact, as there was clear discrepancy in the findings of the CA and the OMB.
ISSUE(S)
Is Caberoy guilty of oppression?
RULING
No. Oppression, also known as grave abuse of authority, is a misdemeanor committed by a public officer
2002.)
8 Abad v. Dela Cruz
ANGEL ABAD, Petitioner, vs. HERMINO DELA CRUZ, Respondent.

G.R. No. 207422. March 18, 2015.
Ponente: J. Leonen
Topic: Appointments to Office
Synopsis:
Under the Section 21(2)(3) of the Civil Service Law, the appointing authority for promotion must
automatically consider the employees next-in-rank as candidates for appointment. The rationale of the
next-in-line rule is for the maintenance of the merit policy and rewards in the civil service. Since
appointments in the civil service are based on merit and fitness, it is assumed that the appointments of
employees next in rank are equally meritorious. As long as the appointee possesses the qualifications
required by law, the appointment is valid.
Digest:
FACTS
Mayor Jaime R. Fresnedi of Muntilupa City, upon the concurrence of the majority of members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City Government of Muntinlupa, appointed the respondent HerminioDela
Cruz as City Assessor in a permanent capacity as City Government Department Head III. Petitioner Angel
Abad, Local Assessment Operations Officer V in the Office of the City Assessor, requested the disapproval
of Dela Cruz’s appointment, alleging that the position of City Government Department Head III
corresponded to Salary Grade 27, 9 salary grades higher than Dela Cruz’s former position as Local
Assessment Operations Officer III with Salary Grade 18. According to Abad, Dela Cruz’s appointment
violated Item 15 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 3, Series of 2001, which prohibits the promotion of an
employee to a position more than 3 salary grades above his or her former position. Abad alleged further
that he and 3 other qualified applicants were excluded from the selection process, in violation of Item 10
of the same Memorandum Circular, which is the automatic consideration of all the next-in-rank
employees for promotions to the next higher position.
CSC-NCR invalidated the appointment of Dela Cruz which the latter appealed to CSC reversing the CSC-
NCR’s decision, stating that applicants for City Government Department Head III are chosen based on the
following criteria: performance, work history, awards, education, training, potential, and physical
characteristics and personality traits. The Commission ruled that Dela Cruz’s appointment was an
exception to the three-salary-grade rule.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court dismissed Abad’s petition ruling that the three-salary-grade
rule only gives preference to the person occupying the position next in rank to a vacancy, but does not
by any means give the employee next in rank the exclusive right to be appointed to the said vacancy. As
long as the employee appointed to the position possesses the minimum qualifications for the position, the
appointment is valid.
ISSUE(S)
1) Whether or not Dela Cruz’s appointment is void for the violation of the next-in-rank rule;
2) Whether or not Dela Cruz’s appointment is an exception to the three-salary grade limitation.
RULING
1. No, Dela Cruz’s appointment is valid in accordance with the next-in-rank rule.
Under the Section 21(2)(3) of the Civil Service Law, the appointing authority for promotion must
automatically consider the employees next-in-rank as candidates for appointment. The rationale of the
next-in-line rule is for the maintenance of the merit policy and rewards in the civil service. Since
appointments in the civil service are based on merit and fitness, it is assumed that the appointments of
employees next in rank are equally meritorious. As long as the appointee possesses the qualifications
required by law, the appointment is valid.
2. Yes, Dela Cruz’s appointment is an exception to the three-salary grade limitation.
Item 15 of CSC Memorandum Circular, Series of 2001 on the three-salary-grade rule states that “an
employee may be promoted or transferred to a position which is not more than 3 salary, pay or job
grades higher than the employee’s present position.” However, this rule is subject to the exception of
“very meritorious cases.” These “very meritorious cases” are provided in CSC Resolution No. 03-0106
dated January 24, 2003:
Any or all of the following would constitute a meritorious case exempted from the 3-salary grade
limitation on promotion:
1. The position occupied by the person is next-in- rank to the vacant position, as identified in the
Merit Promotion Plan and the System of Ranking Positions (SRP) of the agency;
2. The position is a lone, or entrance position, as indicated in the agency’s staffing pattern;
3. The position belongs to the dearth category, such as Medical Officer/Specialist positions and
Attorney positions;
4. The position is unique and/or highly specialized such as Actuarial positions and Airways
Communicator;
5. The candidates passed through a deep selection process, taking into consideration the
candidates’ superior qualifications in regard to:
6. -Educational achievements Highly specialized trainings Relevant work experience
7. -Consistent high-performance rating/ranking; and
8. The vacant position belongs to the closed career system.
In the case at bar, Dela Cruz’s appointment falls under the 5th exception. Contrary to petitioner’s claim,
the Personnel Selection Board conducted a deep selection process, ranking the candidates for the
position of City Government Department Head III based on approved criteria. Respondent’s case,
therefore, is a “very meritorious case” and is valid.
WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed.
G.R. No. 208261. December 8, 2014.

GUZMAN, respondent.
Synopsis:
As a general rule, an appeal is not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege, and as such, may only
be availed in the manner provided by the law and the rules. Therefore, it must be perfected within the
reglementary period. However, exception is when the appeal is meritorious. In the case at bar, it is clear
that PAGCOR was the one who hired the respondent and as such, only PAGCOR has the power to
discipline or remove de Guzman from any transgressions she may have committed.
Digest:
FACTS
Guzman on the ground that PAGCOR violated the respondent’s right to due process. PAGCOR appealed
before CA who affirmed the CSC ruling.
ISSUE(S)
WON the CA correctly affirmed the CSC’s dismissal of the administrative disciplinary case against De
Guzman on the ground that she was deprived of her right to due process
RULING
Yes. As a general rule, an appeal is not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege, and as such, may
only be availed in the manner provided by the law and the rules. Therefore, it must be perfected within
the reglementary period. However, exception is when the appeal is meritorious. In the case at bar, it is
clear that PAGCOR was the one who hired the respondent and as such, only PAGCOR has the power to
discipline or remove de Guzman from any transgressions she may have committed. As a corporate entity,
PAGCOR may act through its Board of Directors as well. However, in this case, the formal charge as well
as the memorandum were NULL and VOID since it did not come from PAGCOR or its Board of Directors.
Rather, it was from someone who was not authorized by PAGCOR or any of its Board of Directors.
Consequently, De Guzman’s removal from PAGCOR without a valid formal charge was done in violation of
her right to due process.
10 Argel v. Singson
NATANYA JOANA D. ARGEL vs. GOV. LUIS C. SINGSON

G.R. No. 202970. March 25, 2015.*
Ponente: J. Perez
Synopsis:
Even assuming in arguendo that Argel failed to strictly meet the relevant experience required for the
position, we are still inclined to uphold the CSCRO1’s approval of her appointment. We are aware that
this is not the first time that the Commission has allowed the appointment of employees who were
initially lacking in experience but eventually obtained the same. In CSC Resolution No. 97-0191 dated 9
January 1997, the applicant for the position of Chief Inspector was considered to have substantially
satisfied the four (4) years experience required for the position since he has in his favor three (3) years
and eight (8) months experience as Senior Inspector.
The rulings that are clearly in all fours with the case before us is CSC Resolution No. 011747. In this case
the Commission found “the experience gained by Abarca sufficient to enable him to successfully perform
the duties and responsibilities of Municipal Engineer, especially since he continued to perform the same
from the time of the disapproval of his appointment by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No.
XIII on August 24, 2000, or for a period of more than one (1) year. Hence, adding this period to his
previous experience of two (2) years will more than satisfy the required experience. Being similarly
situated Argel should be deemed to have satisfactorily met the relevant experience required for the
position.
Digest:
FACTS
Argel was appointed as Nurse II under permanent status at the Gabriela Silang General Hospital, in Ilocos
Sur. In accordance with procedure, her appointment was submitted to the CSC Field Office for evaluation.
The CSCFO disapproved the appointment of Argel on the ground that she failed to meet the one (1) year
experience required for the position. It was pointed out that she still lacks four (4) months of relevant
experience. Dr. Singson, Provincial Health Officer II, moved for reconsideration of the disapproval of
Argel’s appointment. She claimed that Argel rendered services at the Gabriela Silang General Hospital
from 15 July 2008 to 15 January 2009 (six months) as a volunteer and from 8 July 2010 to 8 January
2010 (six months) as contractual nurse or for a total of twelve months. She concluded that Argel has
completed the experience requirement as of 8 January 2010.
MR was denied. On appeal to CSCRO1, her appointment as Nurse II under permanent status was
affirmed. It held that although at the time the appointment was issued to Argel on 15 September 2009
she lacked four (4) months of relevant experience, she, nonetheless, performed the functions of the
position from that time up to the date of disapproval of her appointment on 3 December 2009 and even
thereafter. Hence, she was considered to have met the minimum qualification required for the position.
CSCFO forwarded the decision to Governor Singson. A Notice of Appeal was filed. The petition was
anchored on the main argument that Argel is not qualified to the Nurse II position as she lacks four (4)
months of relevant experience at the time she was appointed on 15 September 2009.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the permanent status appointment of Argel as Nurse II at the Gabriela Silang General
Hospital should be approved
RULING
Even assuming in arguendo that Argel failed to strictly meet the relevant experience required for the
position, we are still inclined to uphold the CSCRO1’s approval of her appointment. We are aware that
this is not the first time that the Commission has allowed the appointment of employees who were
initially lacking in experience but eventually obtained the same. In CSC Resolution No. 97-0191 dated 9
January 1997, the applicant for the position of Chief Inspector was considered to have substantially
satisfied the four (4) years experience required for the position since he has in his favor three (3) years
and eight (8) months experience as Senior Inspector.
The rulings that are clearly in all fours with the case before us is CSC Resolution No. 011747. In this case
the Commission found “the experience gained by Abarca sufficient to enable him to successfully perform
the duties and responsibilities of Municipal Engineer, especially since he continued to perform the same
from the time of the disapproval of his appointment by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No.
XIII on August 24, 2000, or for a period of more than one (1) year. Hence, adding this period to his
previous experience of two (2) years will more than satisfy the required experience. Being similarly
situated Argel should be deemed to have satisfactorily met the relevant experience required for the
position.
Moreover, as a nursing graduate, Argel is presumed to have previously acquired substantial knowledge
and trainings necessary for the effective performance of her duties and responsibilities as Nurse II. In
CSC Resolution No. 992296 dated 16 October 1999, the Commission approved the promotional
appointment of a Data Encoder as Planning Specialist after considering the relevant experience he gained
while actually designated/ordered to perform the duties and responsibilities of a Planning Specialist for
more than one (1) year.
In conclusion, we note the observation of the CA that perhaps office politics was moving behind the
scenes in this case. Such cannot be allowed by this Court. We hereby emphasize that politics should
never play a role in the appointment of public servants. ###
Other Principle: Remedial Law: Finality of judgment/Immutability of Judgment . ###
11 DBP v. COA
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
12 Ombudsman v. De Zosa
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. AVELINO DE ZOSA and BARTOLOME DELA
CRUZ, respondents
G.R. No. 205433. January 21, 2015
Synopsis:
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct
must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply
wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to
differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate
the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former.
Digest:
FACTS
The Sangguniang Bayan of Kawit, Cavite issued Resolution authorizing the mayor to sell the municipal
properties and to perform such other acts necessary and related to such sales. Pursuant thereto, the
Municipal Appraisal Board (MAB) of Kawit, Cavite issued MAB-Resolution, whereby it decreased the
assessed fair market value of the subject lands from P700.00 per square meter (sq. m.) to P500.00 per
sq. m. Thereafter, the Municipality of Kawit, Cavite auctioned a parcel of land at a minimum bid price set
at P121,781,000.00, pegged at P500.00 per sq. m. Consequently, the said property was awarded to FJI
Property Developers, Inc. (FJI), which gave the highest bid of P123,123,123.00, or approximately
P505.51 per sq. m.
However, in the Appraisal Review/Evaluation Report dated June 23, 2000 of the Commission on Audit, it
was found that the proper fair market value for the property should have been P878.26 per sq. m.
Hence, the COA Report concluded that the Municipality of Kawit, Cavite suffered undue injury when it
was deprived of income in the amount of P378.26 per sq. m., or a total of P92,129,762.12, from the sale
of Lot No. 4431, resulting in unwarranted benefits in favor of FJI.
Resultantly, the Field Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) filed a Complaint dated
January 16, 2007 against the members of the MAB of Kawit, Cavite, including respondents, criminally
charging them of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 and administratively charging them
of Grave Misconduct, for passing and approving MAB-Resolution No. 3-97.
In its Decision, the OMB-Luzon found respondents guilty of Grave Misconduct. On appeal to CA, the latter
reversed and set aside the OMB-Luzon Ruling, and thereby exonerated respondents from administrative
liability for Grave Misconduct and restored their entitlement to their earned benefits. The CA held that
there is no substantial evidence to support the finding that corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or
disregard of established procedures may be ascribed to respondents.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the CA correctly absolved respondents from administrative liability for Grave Misconduct
RULING
YES. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the
misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct
must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to
and be connected with the performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to
differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate
the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former.
In this case, records are bereft of any showing that respondents wrongfully intended to transgress some
established and definite rule of action which is attended by corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of the rules when they, along with the other members of the MAB of the Municipality of
Kawit, Cavite, approved MAB-Resolution causing the reappraisal and revaluation of the subject lands. the
passage of MAB-Resolution was merely done so that lands within the municipality which have the same
attributes — those which are around “30 meters away from the national road, and classified as
agricultural being fishpond or marsh land with similar desirability, neighborhood and important need for
the acquisition of a real property” — will be assessed uniformly, pursuant to Resolution No. 10-96 of the
Cavite Provincial Assessment Board.
13 Republic v. Arias
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT
COMMISSION, Petitioners, vs. FLORENDO B. ARIAS, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
EQUIPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, Respondent
G.R. No. 188909. September 17, 2014.
Ponente: J. Perez
Topic: Presumption of Regularity
Synopsis:
The quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual administratively liable in administrative cases is
substantial evidence, which the Rules of Court defines as that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Substantial evidence does not mean
preponderant proof, but only such as is sufficient to support a conclusion or evidence commonly accepted
by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. In the immediate case, the Supreme Court
noted that the fact that the subject vehicles were turned over to the Central Equipments Spare Parts
Division for repair without certification by the end-users only meant that the repairs were not urgently
needed. Complete reliance on signatures is a ministerial function but respondent, as Assistant Director,
does not exercise purely ministerial duties. His duties entail review and evaluation of documents
presented before him before recommending approval. What respondent did, in fact, was a form of gross
neglect of duty and grave misconduct, which is characterized by want of care, acting or omitting to act in
a situation where there is a duty to act. There is thus substantial evidence to support a conclusion that
respondent should be administratively liable.
Digest:
FACTS
Respondent Arias was the Assistant Bureau Director of the BOE-DPWH. Along with other DPWH officials,
Arias was charged with corruption and similar charges (violations of the anti-graft law and other special
laws). One of the issues involves the disbursement in 2000 of a total of Php 139 million for emergency
repairs of a total of 578 vehicles, which was paid out of the capital outlay and MOOE funds, which was a
violation of the 2000 General Appropriations Act (for some vehicles, no actual repair was done).
Respondent recommended the approval of such emergency repairs. In specifically denying each charge
against him, respondent essentially relies on good faith and the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duties. As to the issue of the emergency repairs, respondent denies that
capital outlay funds were used, because according to the DBM, emergency repairs may be charged
against the 3.5% Engineering and Overhead of the projects of DPWH.
In December 2002, the PAGC found the respondent and the others charged guilty and recommended
their dismissal. On January 2003, the Office of the President concurred with the recommendation of the
PAGC, but only respondent appealed the order to the CA by petition for review. The appellate court found
no sufficient basis to hold the appellant administratively liable, observing that the documents presented
as evidence of the charges appear to be regular on their faces as the requisite signatures of the proper
officials appeared thereon, and it was only after inspection of these documents did respondent
recommend the approval of the emergency repair of the vehicles and the payment thereof. The appellate
court noted that respondent had to rely to a reasonable extent on his subordinates and on good faith to
those who prepared and submitted the questionable documents. The CA ruled that the unlawful acts of
his subordinates cannot be ascribed to the respondent in the absence of his foreknowledge of the falsities
in issue.
ISSUE(S)
Should the presumption of regularity be applied in respondent’s favor?
RULING
No. The quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual administratively liable in administrative
cases is substantial evidence, which the Rules of Court defines as that amount of relevant evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Substantial evidence does not mean
preponderant proof, but only such as is sufficient to support a conclusion or evidence commonly accepted
by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. In the immediate case, the Supreme Court
noted that the fact that the subject vehicles were turned over to the Central Equipments Spare Parts
Division for repair without certification by the end-users only meant that the repairs were not urgently
needed. Complete reliance on signatures is a ministerial function but respondent, as Assistant Director,
does not exercise purely ministerial duties. His duties entail review and evaluation of documents
presented before him before recommending approval. What respondent did, in fact, was a form of gross
neglect of duty and grave misconduct, which is characterized by want of care, acting or omitting to act in
a situation where there is a duty to act. There is thus substantial evidence to support a conclusion that
respondent should be administratively liable.
14 CSC v. Vergel De Rios
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. MARIA RIZA G. VERGEL DE DIOS, respondent.
G.R. No. 203536. February 4, 2015.*

Topic: Dishonesty
Synopsis:
The submitted documents show that the picture of Vergel de Dios as affixed in the [personal data sheet]
is obviously not the Maria Riza G. Vergel de Dios whose picture appears on the [picture seat plan]. This
may be seen in the discrepancies in her facial features specifically the size of her head, the prominence of
the forehead, shape of her eyebrows, the difference of the full-face view, the projection of the nose, the
round shape of the face and the forehead, among others. Moreover, the signatures of the respondent as
affixed in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) reflects a glaring difference to the signature affixed in her Personal
Data Sheet (PDS) accomplished on February 27, 2001. Such difference in the manner by which the
respective signatures were done clearly shows that they were made by two different persons.
There is also no need to present the room examiners to establish the authenticity and due execution of
the picture seat plan. The picture seat plan is a public document which is admissible in evidence without
need of proof of its authenticity and due execution. Pertinently, Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court provides that “[d]ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.” As a public document, the
picture seat plan need not be identified or presented by the custodian thereof in order to be admissible in
evidence.
Digest:
FACTS
The CSC conducted an investigation after receiving an anonymous complaint that several employees of
San Rafael Water District employed a fixer to pass the CSC’s Career Service Professional Examination. In
the course of the investigation, CSC Director De Leon received a phone call implicating De Dios in the
alleged irregularity. Upon verification with the Integrated Records Management Office of the Central
Office of the CSC revealed that there were discrepancies in the signatures and picture of the respondent
in her personal data sheet and on the picture seat plan used for said examination. Thus, respondent was
charged fir dishonesty, falsification of official documents and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service.
De Dios’ contented that she was the one who took the examination. A Loline Padilla testified that she
accompanied respondent when she took the examination. But admitted however that she never saw
respondent take the examination.
The CSC Regional Office No. III found respondent guilty. The CSC dismissed the respondent’s appeal and
affirmed the CSC Regional Office decision. However, the CA reversed said decisions stating, that there is
no showing that procedures were followed when the purported impersonation subject of the case
happened. The CA noted that the room examiners were not presented to prove that the examination
procedures were strictly implemented. Thus, the CA held that the discrepancy in the respondent’s
signatures and pictures on the personal data sheets and seat plan can be the result of a simple mix up.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the CA erred in reversing the CSC’s ruling
RULING
Yes. This ruling is pure speculation and is belied by the evidence on record.
Written on the picture seat plan is the name of respondent in bold letters. On top of it is her purported
signature. Notably, respondent said that she was the one who took the examination. If we believe her,
then she was the one who wrote her name in bold letters and put the signature on top of it. Thus, there
was no mix up in her signature on the picture seat plan.
The submitted documents show that the picture of Vergel de Dios as affixed in the [personal data sheet]
is obviously not the Maria Riza G. Vergel de Dios whose picture appears on the [picture seat plan]. This
may be seen in the discrepancies in her facial features specifically the size of her head, the prominence of
the forehead, shape of her eyebrows, the difference of the full-face view, the projection of the nose, the
round shape of the face and the forehead, among others. Moreover, the signatures of the respondent as
affixed in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) reflects a glaring difference to the signature affixed in her Personal
Data Sheet (PDS) accomplished on February 27, 2001. Such difference in the manner by which the
respective signatures were done clearly shows that they were made by two different persons.
There is also no need to present the room examiners to establish the authenticity and due execution of
the picture seat plan. The picture seat plan is a public document which is admissible in evidence without
need of proof of its authenticity and due execution. Pertinently, Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court provides that “[d]ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.” As a public document, the
picture seat plan need not be identified or presented by the custodian thereof in order to be admissible in
evidence.
15 SPO4 Laud v. People
RETIRED SPO4 BIENVENIDO LAUD, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 199032. November 19, 2014.
Ponente: J. PER CURIAM

Topic: De Facto Doctrine
Synopsis:
A de facto officer, as defined in Funa vs. Agra, is one who derives his appointment from one having
colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on his
face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging his duties under color of
authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so
that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid
for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested
therein are concerned. In order for the de facto doctrine to apply, the following requisites must apply: (a)
there must be a de jure office, (b) there must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public, and
(c) there must be actual possession of the office in good faith.
Digest:
FACTS
On July 10, 2009, the PNP, through Police Senior Superintendent Roberto B. Fajardo, applied with the
RTC of Manila for a warrant to search three caves located inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3,
Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged remains of the victims summarily executed by the
infamous Davao Death Squad may be found. In support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola was
presented to the RTC, and he testified to having personally witnessed the killing of six people therein.
Judge William Simon Peralta found probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, which was later
enforced by elements of the PNP-CIDG. The search yielded positive results for the presence of human
remains. On July 20, 2009, herein petitioner filed an urgent motion to quash and to suppress illegally
seized evidence, premised on, among other grounds, that Judge Peralta had no authority to act on the
application for a search warrant, as he had been automatically divested of his position as Vice Executive
Judge when he was meted with several administrative penalties by the court.
ISSUE(S)
Are the administrative penalties meted to Judge Peralta controlling in divesting him of authority to issue
warrants?
RULING
No. While the Supreme Court did agree that the imposition of said administrative penalties did operate to
divest Judge Peralta of his authority to act as Vice Executive Judge, the abstraction of such authority did
not divest him of the power to issue a search warrant, as he may be considered to have made such
issuance as a de facto officer whose acts remain valid. A de facto officer, as defined in Funa vs. Agra, is
one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an
appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on his face. He may also be one who is in possession of
an office, and is discharging his duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from
an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.
Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure
officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. In order for the
de facto doctrine to apply, the following requisites must apply: (a) there must be a de jure office, (b)
there must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public, and (c) there must be actual
possession of the office in good faith.
Applied in the immediate case, the existence of the foregoing elements are clear. Undoubtedly, there is a
de jure office of a 2nd Vice Executive Judge. Judge Peralta also had a colorable right to the said office as
he was duly appointed to such position and was only divested of the same by virtue of a supervening
legal technicality. Also, there may be said to be public acquiescence since the search warrant application
was regularly endorsed to the sala of Judge Peralta by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Manila RTC
under his apparent authority as 2nd Vice Executive Judge. Finally, Judge Peralta’s actual physical
possession of the office is presumed to be in good faith, as the contrary was not proved. Accordingly, the
Judge can then be considered to have acted as a de facto officer when he issued the search warrant,
therefore it is treated it as valid as if it was issued by a de jure officer suffering no administrative
impediment.
16 Sabijon v. De Juan
FELISCIMO R. SABIJON and ZENAIDA A. SABIJON, Complainants, vs. BENEDICT M. DE JUAN,

SHERIFF IV, RTC, BRANCH 22, KABACAN, NORTH COTABATO
A.M. No. P-14-3281. January 28, 2015.
Topic: Neglect of Duty
Synopsis:
The Court concurs with the OCA’s findings and recommendation, except as to the recommended penalty
to be imposed upon respondent, and held that Sheriffs, like respondent, being ranking officers of the
court and agents of the law, must discharge their duties with great care and diligence. In serving and
implementing writs, as well as processes and orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without
affecting adversely the proper dispensation of justice. Sheriffs play an important role in the administration
of justice and as agents of the law, high standards are expected of them. They should always hold
inviolate and invigorate the tenet that a public office is a public trust. Any act deviating from the
procedure laid down by the Rules of Court is misconduct that warrants disciplinary action, which may be
deemed as Simple Neglect of Duty or even Grave Abuse of Authority.
Digest:
FACTS
As alleged by the complainants, FelisicimoSabijon and Zenaida Sabijon, a vehicular accident transpired
between the former's Isuzu Elf Truck that of PO2 Recto Aquino’s van. Due to their failure to settle, PO2
Aquino filed a civil case for damages and attorney’s fees against the former before the 2nd Municipal
Circuit Trial Court ofCotabato. Thereafter, herein respondent, Benedict M. De Juan, Sheriff IV of the
Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, North Cotabato and PO2 Aquino went to complainants’ residence and,
on the strength of the Writ of Execution, allegedly forcibly took away the subject truck.
In this regard, complainants surmised that respondent committed irregularities in executing the judgment
in their case and in the disposition of the subject truck. Respondent vehemently denied all the
accusations invoking good faith thereto, and that when issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Personal
Property, nobody participated in the auction, hence, the vehicle was awarded to PO2 Aquino. Respondent
also asserted that he already submitted his Sheriff’s Return but later admitted his failure to submit one.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found that by his own admission, respondent digressed from
the procedure laid down by the Rules of Court for the enforcement of judgments when he: (a)
immediately levied upon the subject truck, rendering nugatory the option given to complainants, as
judgment debtors, to choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon; (b) failed to keep the
levied property securely in his custody; and (c) did not prepare a Sheriff’s Return within the prescribed
period and furnish the parties copies of the same. In this light, the OCA doubted the existence of the
auction sale, opining that without the foregoing, all that respondent has to prove that an actual auction
sale occurred is his bareallegation, which is at most self-serving, and thus, cannot be given any
credence.Finally, the OCA did not give credence to respondent’s assertion that the subject truck was only
valued at more or less ₱80,000.00, considering that the same was mortgagedin order to secure a loan
amounting to ₱149,272.00.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for Grave Abuse of Authority (otherwise
referred to as Oppression) and Simple Neglect of Duty
RULING
Yes. The Court concurs with the OCA’s findings and recommendation, except as to the recommended
penalty to be imposed upon respondent, and held that Sheriffs, like respondent, being ranking officers of
the court and agents of the law, must discharge their duties with great care and diligence. In serving and
implementing writs, as well as processes and orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without
affecting adversely the proper dispensation of justice. Sheriffs play an important role in the administration
of justice and as agents of the law, high standards are expected of them. They should always hold
inviolate and invigorate the tenet that a public office is a public trust. Any act deviating from the
procedure laid down by the Rules of Court is misconduct that warrants disciplinary action, which may be
deemed as Simple Neglect of Duty or even Grave Abuse of Authority. No position demands greater moral
righteousness and uprightness from its holder than an office in the judiciary. Court employees should be
models of uprightness, fairness and honesty to maintain the people's respect and faith in the judiciary.
The conduct of court personnel, therefore, must not only be, but must also be perceived to be, free from
any whiff of impropriety, both with respect to their duties in the judiciary and to their behavior outside
the court. Any act or omission of any court employee diminishing or tending to diminish public trust and
confidence in the courts will not be tolerated. The Court will not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty
on those who fall short of their accountabilities.
WHEREFORE, respondent Benedict M. De Juan, Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, North
Cotabato, Branch 22 is found GUILTY of Grave Abuse of Authority (or Oppression) and Simple Neglect of
Duty, mitigated by the fact that it is his first offense in his more than nineteen (19) years of service.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day effective from the
finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
17 Casimiro, et al. v. Rigor

HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, in his capacity as Acting Ombudsman, Office of the
Ombudsman; HON. ROGELIO L. SINGSON, in his capacity as Department of Public Works and
Highways Secretary, petitioners, vs. JOSEFINO N. RIGOR, respondent.
G.R. No. 206661. December 10, 2014.*
Ponente: J. Peralta
Topic: Dishonesty/Falsification
Synopsis:
Dishonesty, as juridically understood, implies the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty or probity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. It is a malevolent act that puts serious
doubt on one’s ability to perform duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or
employee. The requirement of filing a SALN is enshrined in the Constitution to promote transparency in
the civil service and serves as a deterrent against government officials bent on enriching themselves
through unlawful means. Falsification of an official document such as the SALN is considered a grave
offense. It amounts to dishonesty. Both falsification and dishonesty are grave offenses punishable by
dismissal from the service, even for the first offense, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except
accrued leave benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service.
Digest:
FACTS
The General Investigation Bureau-A of the OMB (GIB-A-OMB) conducted a lifestyle check on respondent
Josefino N. Rigor, then the Regional Director of DPWH-NCR. Thereafter, the GIB-A-OMB filed a complaint
against Rigor charging him criminally and administratively before the OMB for alleged unexplained wealth
and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 30195 and R.A. 1379.6 Said complaint was mainly based on
certain irregularities on Rigor’s Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALNs), allegedly failing to
declare therein several properties, business interests, and financial connections. Its administrative aspect
asserted that Rigor committed Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Falsification of Official Documents.
Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713 also requires him to declare under oath even the assets, liabilities, and
financial interests of his spouse, thus:
Section 8. Statements and Disclosure.—Public officials and employees have an obligation to accomplish

and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net
worth and financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children
under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.
ISSUE(S)
WON Rigor is guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Falsification of Official Documents
RULING
Yes. Dishonesty, as juridically understood, implies the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty or probity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. It is a malevolent act that puts serious
doubt on one’s ability to perform duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or
employee. The requirement of filing a SALN is enshrined in the Constitution to promote transparency in
the civil service and serves as a deterrent against government officials bent on enriching themselves
through unlawful means. By mandate of law, every government official or employee must make a
complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities and net worth in order to avoid any issue regarding
questionable accumulation of wealth. The importance of requiring the submission of a complete, truthful,
and sworn SALN as a measure to defeat corruption in the bureaucracy cannot be gainsaid. Full disclosure
of wealth in the SALN is necessary to particularly minimize, if not altogether eradicate, the opportunities
for official corruption, and maintain a standard of honesty in the public service. Through the SALN, the
public can monitor movement in the fortune of a public official; it serves as a valid check and balance
mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth. The failure to file a truthful SALN reasonably puts
in doubts the integrity of the officer and normally amounts to dishonesty.
In the case at bar, Rigor deliberately and wilfully omitted his wife’s business interests in the Jetri
Corporation, the two-storey building in Sampaloc, the Toyota RAV 4, and the Dodge Ram Road Trek in
his SALNs for 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002, despite being required by law to do so. Anent his wife’s
alleged business interests in Disneyland Bus Line, Inc., and Kontrata Construction & Development
Corporation, his belief that he was no longer under obligation to declare the same as they had already
become dead corporations, deserves scant merit. While said corporations may be considered as dead
corporations, dissolution and liquidation are still necessary.
Also, Rigor’s SALN for 1999 has two (2) versions the irregularities of which were not clarified. True, no
liability can be attributed to him for submitting two (2) different SALNs for a calendar year, as his real
purpose behind it cannot be ascertained with accuracy, but such act still manifests Rigor’s predilection to
misrepresent a fact. Since there are two (2) versions of a SALN which appear to have been subscribed on
the same date before the same administering officer, it cannot, therefore, be determined which of these
two versions represents his real net worth.
Falsification of an official document such as the SALN is considered a grave offense. It amounts to
dishonesty. Both falsification and dishonesty are grave offenses punishable by dismissal from the service,
even for the first offense, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service. The act of falsifying an official
document is in itself grave because of its possible deleterious effects on government service. At the same
time, it is also an act of dishonesty, which violates fundamental principles of public accountability and
integrity. Under Civil Service regulations, falsification of an official document and dishonesty are distinct
offenses, but both may be committed in one act, as in this case. ###
18 Airlift Asia Customs Brokerage, Inc. v. CA
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
19 Buena v. Benito
ATTY. ANACLETO B. BUENA, JR. vs. DR. SANGCAD D. BENITO
G.R. No. 181760. October 14, 2014
Ponente: J. Leonen
Synopsis:
The position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent is a position in the Career Executive Service.
Under the civil service law, positions in the Career Executive Service are: “Undersecretary, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director,
Chief of Department Service, and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career
Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President.” In the exercise of its legal
mandate, the Career Executive Service Board issued Resolution No. 945 dated June 14, 2011, where it
set the following criteria to determine whether a position belongs to the Career Executive Service: 1. The
position is career; 2. The position is above division chief; and 3. The position entails performance of
executive and managerial functions. Aside from satisfying the criteria set by the Career Executive Service
Board, the holder of the position must also be a presidential appointee.
Digest:
FACTS
On August 27, 2004, Dr. Parouk S. Hussin (Regional Governor Hussin), then Regional Governor of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, appointed Dr. Sangcad D. Benito (Dr. Benito) as Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent of the Department of Education, Division of Lanao del Sur-I, in a
temporary capacity. On June 20, 2005, Regional Governor Hussin reappointed Dr. Benito as Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent, this time in a permanent capacity.
To change the status of Dr. Benito’s appointment from temporary to permanent, Regional Governor
Hussin requested the Civil Service Commission Regional Office for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao to attest to Dr. Benito’s permanent appointment. However, the Regional Office, through
Regional Director Anacleto B. Buena, Jr. (Regional Director Buena), returned the appointment to the
Regional Governor. According to the Regional Office, Dr. Benito did not possess the career executive
service eligibility required for the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent.
On August 24, 2005, Dr. Benito filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9,
Lanao del Sur, to compel the Regional Office to attest to his permanent appointment as Assistant Schools
Division Superintendent. He argued that the position does not belong to the Career Executive Service
under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Consequently, the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent does not require career executive
service eligibility.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent requires career executive service
eligibility
RULING
YES. The position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent is a position in the Career Executive
Service. Under the civil service law, positions in the Career Executive Service are: “Undersecretary,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional
Director, Chief of Department Service, and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the
Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President.” In the exercise of its legal
mandate, the Career Executive Service Board issued Resolution No. 945 dated June 14, 2011, where it
set the following criteria to determine whether a position belongs to the Career Executive Service: 1. The
position is career; 2. The position is above division chief; and 3. The position entails performance of
executive and managerial functions. Aside from satisfying the criteria set by the Career Executive Service
Board, the holder of the position must also be a presidential appointee.
It is settled, therefore, that the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent belongs to the
Career Executive Service. The appointee to the position must be career executive service eligible.
Permanent appointment to positions in the Career Executive Service presupposes that the appointee has
passed the Career Executive Service examinations. In this case, respondent Dr. Benito does not possess
the required career executive service eligibility. He, therefore, cannot be appointed to the position of
Assistant Schools Division Superintendent in a permanent capacity. The Civil Service Commission cannot
be compelled to attest to the permanent appointment of respondent Dr. Benito.
The Regional Governor has the power to appoint civil servants in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao under Article VII, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 9054. In Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No.
279 or the ARMM Basic Education Act of 2010, the Regional Assembly set the qualification standards of
Assistant Schools Division Superintendents of Divisions of the Department of Education in the
Autonomous Region: Sec. 45. Qualification Standards of Schools Division Superintendent and Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent. Nevertheless, when respondent Dr. Benito was appointed Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent in 2005, there was yet no regional law providing for the qualifications for
the Assistant Schools Division Superintendents of Divisions of the Department of Education in the
Autonomous Region. Consequently, the civil service eligibilities required for positions in the national
government shall likewise be required for appointments to positions in the Autonomous Region.
20 Lagoc v. Malaga, et al.
RUBY P. LAGOC, Petitioner, vs. MARIA ELENA MALAGA, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, and
the OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), Respondents.
G.R. No. 184785. July 9, 2014.

Topic: Presumption of Regularity/Collusion
Synopsis:
Collusion implies a secret understanding whereby one party plays into another’s hands for fraudulent
purposes. It may take place between and every contractor resulting in no competition, in which case, the
government may declare a failure of budding. Collusion may also ensure between contractors and the
chairman and members of the PBAC to simulate or rig the bidding process, thus insuring the award to a
favorable bidder, to the prejudice of the government agency and public service. The complainants are
burdened to prove the existence of such collusion by clear and convincing evidence.
Digest:
FACTS
This case arose out of the implementation of two projects undertaken by the DPWH through the Iloilo
City District Engineering Office. On July 20, 2001, private respondent Malaga filed a complaint-affidavit
before the OMB-Visayas against several officers of the DPWH, accusing them of violating established
rules and regulations, making it appear that there was open, public, and competitive bidding for the
materials and equipment needed for the skywalk construction projects to favor a single contractor, one
Helen Edith Tan of IBC Builders Corp. Petitioner Lagoc, one of the accused, contended that the invitation
to bid was duly published in the Visayan Tribune, submitting photocopies of the newspaper, and that
when the bidding was opened, IBC was the lowest bidder. The OMB-Visayas found substantial evidence
to hold the accused guilty of Misconduct and recommended the penalty of one year suspension without
pay. Then Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo approved the recommendation but modified it to dismissal. The
Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the ruling of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE(S)
1. Was there substantial evidence justifying the Ombudsman’s ruling?
2. Was there collusion/conspiracy?
RULING
Yes. For one, the OMB-Visayas noted that while the petitioner submitted copies of an issue of the Visayan
Tribune in support of their claim of publication, there was never actually any mention of the invitation to
bid in the submitted photocopies. This betrayed efforts at manipulation to make it appear as if said
invitations were therein published when in fact there was none. The petitioners have also submitted a
notarized affidavit of publication, but the Ombudsman, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, likewise struck
down the same, because no statement therein was given about the existence of the supposed circulated
copies of the Tribune on which the accused claim they published the invitation to bid. While the affidavit,
being notarized, enjoys presumption of regularity, the same can be overturned by clear and convincing
evidence, such as the plain fact that the submitted issue of the Tribune did not carry the supposedly
published invitation to bid.
The Supreme Court likewise upheld the Ombudsman’s finding of collusion. Collusion implies a secret
understanding whereby one party plays into another’s hands for fraudulent purposes. It may take place
between and every contractor resulting in no competition, in which case, the government may declare a
failure of budding. Collusion may also ensure between contractors and the chairman and members of the
PBAC to simulate or rig the bidding process, thus insuring the award to a favorable bidder, to the
prejudice of the government agency and public service. The complainants are burdened to prove the
existence of such collusion by clear and convincing evidence. In the immediate case, the Court noted that
it is the duty of Lagoc (and Sales, as chairman) as member of the bidding committee to ensure that the
rules and regulations for the conduct of bidding for government projects are faithfully observed. They
may thus be held liable for collective acts and omissions as when they affixed their signatures in official
documents as BAC Chairman/Members, and recommended approval of the bids, and in effect certifying
compliance with the aforesaid rules.
21 Ombudsman v. Caberoy
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, vs. CYNTHIA E. CABEROY, Respondent.

G.R. No. 188066. October 22, 2014.
Ponente: J. Reyes
Topic: Oppression
Synopsis:
Oppression, also known as grave abuse of authority, is a misdemeanor committed by a public officer
2002.)
Digest:
FACTS
Caberoy is the principal of Ramon Acancena High School in Arevalo, Iloilo City. She was charged with
oppression and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by Angeles O. Tuares for allegedly
withholding her salary for the month of June 2002. Caberoy denied the charges against her, alleging,
among others, that the payrolls of June 1 to 15, 2002, show that Tuares received her salary as shown by
her signature on the payroll. The Ombudsman found Caberoy guilty and dismissed her from service. The
CA however, cleared the charges against her, claiming that Caberoy’s refusal to release Tuares’ salary
was justified and the element of failure to act for the purpose of obtaining pecuniary benefit or
advantage or discrimination against another is absent. The CA in effect, did not find the acts of Caberoy
oppressive. The case was thus forwarded to the Supreme Court under Rule 45, who took to ruling on
matters of fact, as there was clear discrepancy in the findings of the CA and the OMB.
ISSUE(S)
Is Caberoy guilty of oppression?
RULING
No. Oppression, also known as grave abuse of authority, is a misdemeanor committed by a public officer
2002.)
22 CSC v. Cortes
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, vs. MARICELLE M. CORTES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 200103. April 23, 2014.
Ponente: J. Abad
Topic: Appointments to Office – Nepotism
Synopsis:
Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority, (2) recommending authority,
(3) chief of the bureau or office, and (4) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. By
way of exception, the following shall not be covered by the prohibition: (1) persons employed in a
confidential capacity, (2) teachers, (3) physicians, and (4) members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. In the immediate case, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of the
Commissioner in the first degree of consanguinity. Unfortunately, her appointment does not fall into any
of the exemptions provided by law.
Digest:
FACTS
On February 19, 2008, the Commission en banc of the CHR issued Resolution A 2008-19, approving the
appointment to the position of Information Officer V of respondent Maricelle M. Cortes. Commissioner
Eligio P. Mallari, father of respondent Cortes, abstained from voting and requested the CHR to render an
opinion on the legality of the appointment of the respondent. CHR Legal Division Chief Atty. Efren
Ephraim G. Lamorena rendered an opinion that respondent Cortes’ appointment is not covered by the
rule on nepotism because the appointing authority, the Commission en banc, has a personality distinct
and separate from its members. CHR Chairperson Purificacion C. Valera Quisumbing however, sent
respondent a letter, instructing her not to assume her position because the appointment is not yet
complete, as the CSC has yet to investigate the same. The CSC however, ruled that the appointment was
indeed covered by the proscription against nepotism under Section 9 of the Revised Omnibus Rules on
Appointments and Other Personnel Actions.
ISSUE(S)
Does the appointment of Cortes fall under the definition of nepotism?
RULING
Yes. Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority, (2) recommending authority,
(3) chief of the bureau or office, and (4) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. By
way of exception, the following shall not be covered by the prohibition: (1) persons employed in a
confidential capacity, (2) teachers, (3) physicians, and (4) members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. In the immediate case, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of the
Commissioner in the first degree of consanguinity. Unfortunately, her appointment does not fall into any
of the exemptions provided by law.
To bolster its ruling, the Supreme Court said that it is absurd to declare that the prohibitive veil on
nepotism does not include appointments made by a group of individuals acting as a body. What cannot
be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
23 Causing v. COMELEC
ELSIE S. CAUSING, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERNAN D. BIRON, SR.,
respondents.
G.R. No. 199139. September 9, 2014.
Topic: Election Law/The Commission on Elections – Ban on Details and Transfers
Synopsis:
The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 were transfer and detail.
appointment. Physical transfer of location over a short distance is not what the law contemplates.
Digest:
FACTS
Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. On May 28, 2010, Mayor
Biron issued Memorandum No. 12, Series of 2010 which states that Causing is being detailed at the
Office of the Municipal Mayor. On the same date Mayor Biron also issued Office Order No. 13 detailing
Belonio, to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar to assume the functions and duties as Local Civil
Registrar-designate effective upon receipt of order.
On June 1, 2010, Mayor Biron issued to Causing Memorandum No. 17, Series on 2010, and Memorandum
No. 17-A, Series of 2010, which directed her to report to the Office of the Mayor effective immediately.
In view of the foregoing issuances by Mayor Biron, Causing filed the complaint-affidavit dated June 8,
2010 in the Office of the Regional Election Director, Region VI, in Iloilo City, claiming that Office Order
No. 12 dated May 28, 2010 issued by Mayor Biron ordering her detail to the Office of the Municipal
Mayor, being made within the election period and without prior authority from the COMELEC, was illegal
and violative of Section 1, Paragraph A, No. 1, in connection with Section 6(B) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8737, Series of 2009.
ISSUE(S)
Are the acts of Mayor Biron made in violation of the OEC and the COMELEC resolution?
RULING
No, the only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 were transfer and detail.
appointment. Having acquired technical and legal meanings, transfer and detail must be construed as
such. Obviously, the movement involving Causing did not equate to either a transfer or a detail within the
contemplation of the law if Mayor Biron only thereby physically transferred her office area from its old
location to the Office of the Mayor “some little steps” away. Petitioner’s argument, therefore, that the
phrase “any transfer or detail whatsoever” encompassed “any and all kinds and manner of personnel
movement,” including the mere change in office location.
24 NTC v. COA
NATIONAL TRANSMISSIONS CORPORATION vs. COA, TILAN and PADILLA

G.R. NO. 204800, 14 OCTOBER 2014
Ponente: J. Peralta
Topic: Benefits of Office
Synopsis:
Separation pay at the time of the reorganization of the NPC and retirement benefits at the appropriate
future time are two separate and distinct entitlements. Stated otherwise, the retirement plan is a
different program from a separation package. The entitlement to separation pay does not disqualify the
separated employee who is likewise qualified to receive loyalty award pursuant to the CSC Memorandum
Circular. Verily, when an employee has complied with the statutory requirements for the grant of loyalty
award under the CSC Memorandum Circular, his right to receive what is due him by virtue thereof
becomes vested and may not thereafter be revoked or impaired.
Digest:
FACTS
By R.A. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law), a reorganization was
effected dividing the National Power Corporation (NPC) into two: 1) the NPC which became in-charge of
the generation of electricity, and 2) the National Transmissions Corporation (Transco) with the
transmission of electricity power to the customers. This resulted to Transco’s acquisition of all the
transmission assets of NPC including the rehiring of all of NPC’s employees who were terminated
effectively on 3 February 2003, receiving separation benefits and terminal leave pay therefor. The HR
Department of Transco thereafter sent a query to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on the entitlement
of the rehired employees to loyalty awards under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06 of 2002.
In response to this, the CSC Assistant Commissioner clarified that the policy specifies that “only the entire
service in the particular agency where a government personnel is employed as of 1 January 2002 shall be
considered part of the 10th year Loyalty Award. Services rendered in other government agencies before
said date shall not be considered for purposes of completing the required 10-year loyalty award.” Hence,
the granting of loyalty award to qualified Transco employees in the aggregate amount of P670, 000,
taking into account the services of said employees in the NPC prior to their re-employment by Transco.
The Commission on Audit through State Auditor Roberto Padilla, however, questioned the legality of the
aforementioned awarding.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the NPC employees who were separated from their services because of the reorganization
of the electric power industry and who received their separation pay under the EPIRA Law are still
entitled to receive loyalty awards under the CSC Memorandum Circular
RULING
Yes, because separation pay at the time of the reorganization of the NPC and retirement benefits at the
appropriate future time are two separate and distinct entitlements. Stated otherwise, the retirement plan
is a different program from a separation package. The entitlement to separation pay does not disqualify
the separated employee who is likewise qualified to receive loyalty award pursuant to the CSC
Memorandum Circular. Verily, when an employee has complied with the statutory requirements for the
grant of loyalty award under the CSC Memorandum Circular, his right to receive what is due him by virtue
thereof becomes vested and may not thereafter be revoked or impaired.
Furthermore, the Court held that they cannot countenance the refund of subject incentive benefits for the
year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have already received because no indicia of bad faith can be
detected under the attendant facts and circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned
disbursed such incentive benefits in honest belief that the amounts given where due to the recipients and
the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such benefits.
25 CAAP-EU v. CAAP
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
26 Moncayo Integrated Small-Scale Miners Association v. Southeast Mindanao Mining

G.R. No. 149638. December 10, 2014.*
MONCAYO INTEGRATED SMALL-SCALE MINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [MISSMA], petitioner,
vs. SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP., JB. MGT. MINING CORP., PICOP
RESOURCES, INC., MT. DIWATA UPPER ULIP MANDAYA TRIBAL COUNCIL, INC. and BALITE
INTEGRATED SMALL-SCALE MINING CORP., (BISSMICO), respondents.
G.R. No. 149916. December 10, 2014.*
HON. ANTONIO H. CERILLES, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, petitioner, vs. SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD
MINING CORPORATION (SMGMC) and BALITE INTEGRATED SMALL-SCALE MINING CORP.,
(BISSMICO), respondents.
Ponente: J. Leonen
Topic:
Synopsis: Power of Control vs. Power of Supervision
Even though Developments after these petitions had been filed in 2001 mooted this case, the Court
explained that DENR Secretary as provided for in Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7076, has power of
control over “the program and the activities of the small-scale miners within the people’s small-scale
mining area”.
League of Provinces v. DENR discussed that “the Local Government Code did not fully devolve the
enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to
the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in-charge, subject to law and higher authority,
of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization of the country’s natural resources.”
Since the DENR Secretary has power of control as opposed to power of supervision, he had the power to
affirm with modification the PMRB’s decision.
Digest:
FACTS
These two consolidated cases involve the “Diwalwal Gold Rush Area” in Mt. Diwata, Mindanao that has
been embroiled in controversies since the mid-1980’s. The instant controversy focuses on the 729-
hectare portion excluded from respondent Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation’s Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement application, and declared as People’s Small Scale Mining Area. Due to
supervening events, the petitions were declared moot and academic.
Facts showed that the Bureau of Forest Development issued to Marcopper a prospecting permit covering
4,941 hectares within the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. Marcopper was also issued a permit to
explore (EP 133) covering the same area. Marcopper assigned EP 133 to Southeast Mindanao Gold
Mining Corporation (SMGMC).
Adverse claims were filed against MPSA No. 128. The adverse claims were anchored on DENR
Administrative Order No. 669 (DAO No. 66) issued on December 27, 1991, declaring 729 hectares of the
Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve as forest land open for small-scale mining purposes, subject to
existing and valid private rights.
The panel of arbitrators, reiterated the validity of EP 133 and dismissed all adverse claims against MPSA
No. 128. The adverse claimants appealed to the Mines Adjudication Board.
The Mines Adjudication Board (MAB), vacated the decision of the panel of arbitrators. It held that the
area covered by DAO 66, Series of 1991, actually occupied and actively mined by the small-scale miners
on or before August 1, 1987 as determined by the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (“PMRB”), is
excluded from the area applied for by SEM.
Both SMGMC and the adverse claimants questioned MAB’s decision before the Court.
Meanwhile, independent of the MAB decision and the appeals to the Court of Appeals and SC, the
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Davao proposed to declare a People’s Small Scale Mining Area in
accordance with the MAB decision.
In dismissing all oppositions, The Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) segregated and declared
the 729-hectare gold rush area in Mt. Diwalwal actually occupied and actively mined on or before August
1, 1987 as People’s Small-Scale Mining Area. Thereafter, the concerned local government unit through
the recommendation of this Board shall issue/execute the necessary small-scale mining contract to
qualified applicants upon compliance of the requisites for small scale mining under R.A. 7076 and its
implementing rules and regulations.
Then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles, affirmed with modification the Provincial Mining and Regulatory
Board decision.
ISSUE(S)
Whether the DENR Secretary can modify the PMRB’s decision
RULING
Yes. Even though Developments after these petitions had been filed in 2001 mooted this case, the Court,
in explained that DENR Secretary as provided for in Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7076, has power of
control over “the program and the activities of the small-scale miners within the people’s small-scale
mining area”.
League of Provinces v. DENR discussed that “the Local Government Code did not fully
devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial government, as its
enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in-
charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State’s constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the country’s
natural resources.”
Since the DENR Secretary has power of control as opposed to power of supervision, he had
the power to affirm with modification the PMRB’s decision. ###
Further Reading:
Case Mooted (Discussion)
Petitioner DENR Secretary raised that the petitions were mooted by (a) then President Macapagal-
Arroyo’s issuance of Proclamation No. 297, excluding an area from Proclamation No. 369 and declaring
this area as a mineral reservation and as an environmentally critical area, and (b) this court’s decision
dated June 23, 2006 in G.R. Nos. 152613, 152628, 152619¬-20, and 152870-71 declaring DAO No. 66 as
void, declaring EP 133 as expired, and underscoring the Executive’s power of supervision and control over
the exploration, development, and utilization of the country’s mineral resources.
Proclamation No. 297 dated November 25, 2002 excluded an area of 8,100 hectares in Moncayo,
Compostela Valley as a mineral reservation and as an environmentally critical area.
Since this court declared that EP 133 expired and its transfer to SMGMC is void, respondent SMGMC has
no more basis to claim any right over the disputed 729 hectares in the Diwalwal gold rush area excluded
from its MPSA.
Furthermore, since this court has declared that the DENR Secretary had no authority to issue DAO No. 66
declaring 729 hectares of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve as forest land open for small-scale
mining purposes subject to existing and valid private rights, both the PMRB decision, and the DENR
Secretary’s decision affirming it with modification, are consequently overturned for lack of basis in
delineating the 729 hectares from the MPSA.
The 2009 resolution in Apex Mining v. SMGMC also ruled that “the State, through the Executive
Department, should it so desire, may now award mining operations in the disputed area to any qualified
entities it may determine [and] [t]he Mines and Geosciences Bureau may process exploration permits
pending before it, taking into consideration the applicable mining laws, rules and regulations relative
thereto.”
Indeed, then President Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 297 excluding an area in Moncayo,
Compostela Valley, declaring this as a mineral reservation and as an environmentally critical area. DENR
Administrative Order No. 2002-18 followed, declaring an emergency situation in this gold rush area and
ordering the stoppage of all mining operations. Executive Order No. 217 thereafter created the National
Task Force Diwalwal.
Authority and functions

in mining activities
In any case, we discuss the powers of the different agencies in relation to mining activities as laid down
by the relevant laws.
Mines Adjudication Board
Chapter XIII (Settlement of Conflicts) of Republic Act No. 7942 known as the Mining Act of 1995 provides
for the powers of the panel of arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB). Section 77 states
that “the panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide on the following:
a. Disputes involving rights to mining areas;
b. Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits;
c. Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires; and
d. Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of the effectivity of this Act.”
Section 78 provides for the MAB’s appellate jurisdiction over the decision or order of the panel of
arbitrators. Section 79 enumerates the MAB’s powers and functions, including the power “to conduct
hearings on all matters within its jurisdiction.”
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board
While the MAB’s jurisdiction covers the settlement of conflicts over mining claims, the Provincial Mining
Regulatory Board (PMRB) — created under Republic Act No. 7076 known as the People’s Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991 — granted powers that include functions more executive in nature such as declaring
and segregating areas for small-scale mining.94
Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7076 provides for the PMRB’s power to “declare and segregate existing
gold-rich areas for small-scale mining” but “under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary”:
Section 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board.—There is hereby created under the direct

supervision and control of the Secretary a provincial/city mining regulatory board, herein called the
Board, which shall be the implementing agency of the Department, and shall exercise the following
powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:
(a) Declare and segregate existing gold-rich areas for small-scale mining;
(b) Reserve future gold and other mining areas for small-scale mining;
(c) Award contracts to small-scale miners;
(d) Formulate and implement rules and regulations related to small-scale mining;
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a people’s small-scale mining area,
an area that is declared a small mining area; and
(f) Perform such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the goals and objectives of this Act.
Section 22 of DAO No. 34-92, the implementing rules and regulations of Republic Act No. 7076, similarly
states that the “Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board created under RA7076 shall exercise the
following powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary[.]”
Section 6 of DAO No. 34-92 also provides that “[t]he Board created under RA 7076 shall have the
authority to declare and set aside People’s Small-Scale Mining Areas in sites onshore suitable for small-
scale mining operations subject to review by the DENR Secretary thru the Director[.]”
DENR Secretary
Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7076 reiterates the DENR Secretary’s power of control over “the program
and the activities of the small-scale miners within the people’s small-scale mining area”:
Section 26. Administrative Supervision over the People’s Small-scale Mining Program.—The Secretary

through his representative shall exercise direct supervision and control over the program and activities of
the small-scale miners within the people’s small-scale mining area.
The Secretary shall within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act promulgate rules and
regulations to effectively implement the provisions of the same. Priority shall be given to such rules and
regulations that will ensure the least disruption in the operations of the small-scale miners.
Section 21.1 of DAO No. 34-92, the implementing rules and regulations of Republic Act No. 7076, states
that the DENR Secretary has “direct supervision and control over the program and the activities of the
small-scale miners within the people’s small-scale mining area.”
This court has distinguished the power of control and the power of supervision as follows:
. . . In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may
take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other
hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.
League of Provinces v. DENR discussed that “the Local Government Code did not fully
devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial government, as its
enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in-
charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State’s constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the country’s
natural resources.”
Since the DENR Secretary has power of control as opposed to power of supervision, he had
the power to affirm with modification the PMRB’s decision.
Executive Department
The Constitution provides that “[t]he State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into
coproduction, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens[.]”103
Moreover, “[t]he President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based
on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country[.]”
Chapter II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7942 known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 also provides
as follows:
SEC. 4. Ownership of Mineral Resources.—Mineral resources are owned by the State and the
exploration, development, utilization, and processing thereof shall be under its full control and
supervision. The state may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into mineral agreements with
contractors.
The State shall recognize and protect the rights of the indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral
lands as provided for by the Constitution.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942 on mineral reservations provides that “[m]ining operations in existing
mineral reservations and such other reservations as may thereafter be established, shall be undertaken
by the Department or through a contractor[.]”106
Apex Mining v. SMGMC discussed that “Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942 is a special provision, as it
specifically treats of the establishment of mineral reservations only. Said provision grants the President
the power to proclaim a mineral land as a mineral reservation, regardless of whether such land is also an
existing forest reservation.” ###
27 Zambales II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Zameco II) v. Castillejos Consumers Assoc.
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
28 TESDA v. COA
TESDA vs. COA

G.R. No. 196418. February 10, 2015
Topic: Benefits of Office
Synopsis:
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1597 (Further Rationalizing the System of Compensation and
Position Classification in the National Government) states that the authority to approve the grant of
allowances, honoraria, and other fringe benefits to government employees, regardless of whether such
endowment is payable by their respective offices or by other agencies of the Government, is vested in the
President. As such, the precipitous release and payment of the healthcare maintenance allowance
benefits without any authorization from the Office of the President is without basis and should be
rightfully disallowed.
Digest:
FACTS
In view of the inadequate policy on basic health and safety conditions of work experienced by
government personnel, then DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas issued Administrative Order (AO) No.
430, Series of 2003, authorizing the payment of healthcare maintenance allowance of P5,000.00 to all
officials and employees of the DOLE, including its bureaus and attached agencies. AO No. 430 was
purportedly based on Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 33, Series of 1997,
and Section 34 of the General Provisions of the 2003 General Appropriations Act.
Upon post-audit, COA State Auditor IV Rosemarie A. Valenzuela issued AOM No. 04-005 on January 26,
2004, and later endorsed the matter to the COA Director of the LAO-National for appropriate legal action.
Atty. Rebecca Mislang, Officer-In-Charge of the COA LAO-National, subsequently issued Notice of
Disallowance (ND) No. 2006-015 dated May 26, 2006, addressed to then TESDA Director General
Augusto Syjuco, indicating that the payment of the allowance had no legal basis, it being contrary to
Republic Act No. 6758 (Salary Standardization Law of 1989). ND No. 2006-015 identified the following
persons as liable for the disallowance.
The TESDA filed an appeal before the COA Commission Proper, assailing the disallowance by the LAO-
National. However, the COA Commission Proper promulgated the now assailed decision dated March 23,
2010, denying the appeal for lack of merit.
ISSUE(S)
Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing ND No. 2006-015 pursuant to AOM No. 04-005?
RULING
NO. The COA is endowed with latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It has the power to
ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purpose for which they had been intended by law.
The Constitution has made the COA “the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all
accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property,
including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the
techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations.”
Thus, the COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty and
responsibility to examine and audit expenditures of public funds, particularly those which are perceptibly
beyond what is sanctioned by law.
It bears reminding that pursuant to Article VI, Section 29(1) of the 1987 Constitution, no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Hence, the GAA should be
purposeful, deliberate, and precise in its contents and stipulations. Also, the COA was correct when it
held that the provisions of the GAA were not self-executory. This meant that the execution of the GAA
was still subject to a program of expenditure to be approved by the President, and such approved
program of expenditure was the basis for the release of funds. For that matter, Section 34, Chapter 5,
Book VI of the Administrative Code (Executive Order No. 292) states that Section 34. Program of
Expenditure. The Secretary of Budget shall recommend to the President the year’s program of
expenditure for each agency of the government on the basis of authorized appropriations. The approved
expenditure program shall constitute the basis for fund release during the fiscal period, subject to such
policies, rules and regulations as may be approved by the President.
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1597 (Further Rationalizing the System of Compensation and
Position Classification in the National Government) states that the authority to approve the grant of
allowances, honoraria, and other fringe benefits to government employees, regardless of whether such
endowment is payable by their respective offices or by other agencies of the Government, is vested in the
President. As such, the precipitous release and payment of the healthcare maintenance allowance
benefits without any authorization from the Office of the President is without basis and should be
rightfully disallowed.
29 Provincial Government of Camarines Norte v. Beatriz Gonzales
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE, represented by GOVERNOR JESUS

O. TYPOCO, JR., Petitioner, vs. BEATRIZ O. GONZALES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 185740. July 23, 2013.
Ponente: J. Brion
Topic: Local Government – Security of Tenure
Synopsis:
All permanent officers and employees in the civil service, regardless of whether they belong to the career
or non-career service category, are entitled to this guaranty; they cannot be removed from office except
for cause provided by law and after procedural due process. The concept of security of tenure, however,
labors under a variation for primarily confidential employees due to the basic concept of a “primarily
confidential” position. Serving at the confidence of the appointing authority, the primarily confidential
employee’s term of office expires when the appointing authority loses trust in the employee. When this
happens, the confidential employee is not “removed” or “dismissed” from office; his term merely
“expires”46 and the loss of trust and confidence is the “just cause” provided by law that results in the
termination of employment. In the present case where the trust and confidence has been irretrievably
eroded, we cannot fault Governor Pimentel’s exercise of discretion when he decided that he could no
longer entrust his confidence in Gonzales. Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public
officer or employee shall not be suspended or dismissed except for cause, as provided by law and after
due process. It cannot be expanded to grant a right to public office despite a change in the nature of the
office held.
Digest:
FACTS
Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte by then
Governor Roy A. Padilla, Jr. Her appointment was on a permanent capacity. Governor Jess B. Pimentel
sent Gonzales a memorandum directing her to explain in writing why no administrative charges should be
filed against her for gross insubordination/gross discourtesy in the course of official duties, and conduct
grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. After Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc
Investigation Committee found her guilty of the charges against her, and recommended to Governor
Pimentel that she be held administratively liable. Governor Pimentel adopted the Ad Hoc Investigation
Committee’s recommendation and dismissed Gonzales.
Gonzales appealed Governor Pimentel’s decision to CSC. The CSC modified Governor Pimentel’s decision,
finding Gonzales guilty of insubordination and suspending her for six months.
Upon service of the suspension thereof, Governor Pimentel reinstated Gonzales as provincial
administrator, but terminated her services the next day for lack of confidence. He then wrote a letter to
the CSC reporting his compliance with its order, and Gonzales’ subsequent dismissal as a confidential
employee. In his letter, Governor Pimentel cited Resolution No. 0001158,10 where the CSC ruled that the
provincial administrator position is highly confidential and is coterminous in nature. The CSC responded,
and which again directed Gonzales’ reinstatement as provincial administrator. It clarified that while the
Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. [RA] 7160) made the provincial administrator position
coterminous and highly confidential in nature, this conversion cannot operate to prejudice officials who
were already issued permanent appointments as administrators prior to the new law’s effectivity.
According to the CSC, Gonzales has acquired a vested right to her permanent appointment as provincial
administrator and is entitled to continue holding this office despite its subsequent classification as a
coterminous position. The conversion of the provincial administrator position from a career to a non-
career service should not jeopardize Gonzales’ security of tenure guaranteed to her by the Constitution.
As a permanent appointee, Gonzales may only be removed for cause, after due notice and hearing. Loss
of trust and confidence is not among the grounds for a permanent appointee’s dismissal or discipline
under existing laws.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Gonzalez’s position as provincial city administrator enjoys security of tenure
RULING
Yes. But, Gonzales has security of tenure, only as a primarily confidential employee.
The provincial administrator position has been classified into a primarily confidential, non-career position
when Congress, through RA 7160, made substantial changes to it. Gonzales has security of tenure, but
only as a primarily confidential employee
To be sure, both career and non-career service employees have a right to security of tenure. All
permanent officers and employees in the civil service, regardless of whether they belong to the career or
non-career service category, are entitled to this guaranty; they cannot be removed from office except for
cause provided by law and after procedural due process. The concept of security of tenure, however,
labors under a variation for primarily confidential employees due to the basic concept of a “primarily
confidential” position. Serving at the confidence of the appointing authority, the primarily confidential
employee’s term of office expires when the appointing authority loses trust in the employee. When this
happens, the confidential employee is not “removed” or “dismissed” from office; his term merely
“expires”46 and the loss of trust and confidence is the “just cause” provided by law that results in the
termination of employment. In the present case where the trust and confidence has been irretrievably
eroded, we cannot fault Governor Pimentel’s exercise of discretion when he decided that he could no
longer entrust his confidence in Gonzales.
Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee shall not be
suspended or dismissed except for cause, as provided by law and after due process. It
cannot be expanded to grant a right to public office despite a change in the nature of the
office held. In other words, the CSC might have been legally correct when it ruled that the
petitioner violated Gonzales’ right to security of tenure when she was removed without
sufficient just cause from her position, but the situation had since then been changed. In
fact, Gonzales was reinstated as ordered, but her services were subsequently terminated
under the law prevailing at the time of the termination of her service; i.e., she was then
already occupying a position that was primarily confidential and had to be dismissed
because she no longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of the appointing authority. Thus,
Gonzales’ termination for lack of confidence was lawful. She could no longer be reinstated as
provincial administrator of Camarines Norte or to any other comparable position. This
conclusion, however, is without prejudice to Gonzales’ entitlement to retirement benefits,
leave credits, and future employment in government service. ###
30 Re: Anonymous Letter Complaint on the alleged…of Ms. Dolores Lopez,...
Re: ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT ON THE ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT AND FOR ENGAGING

IN THE BUSINESS OF LENDING MONEY AT USURIOUS RATES OF INTEREST OF MS. DOLORES
T. LOPEZ, SC CHIEF JUDICIAL STAFF OFFICER, and MR. FERNANDO M. MONTALVO, SC
SUPERVISING JUDICIAL STAFF OFFICER, CHECKS DISBURSEMENT DIVISION, FISCAL
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET OFFICE.
A.M. No. 2010-21-SC. September 30, 2014.*
Topic: Public Trust
Synopsis:
Considering that the official and personal conduct and deportment of all the people who work for the
Judiciary mirrored the image of the Court itself, they should strive to comport themselves with propriety
and decorum at all times, and to be above suspicion of any misdeed and misconduct. Only thereby would
they earn and keep the public’s respect for and confidence in the Judiciary. As a public servant, therefore,
Lopez knew only too well that she was expected at all times to exhibit the highest sense of honesty and
integrity. No less that the Constitution itself impresses this expectation in Section 1 of its Article XI, to
wit:
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times, be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.
Digest:
FACTS
An undated letter-complaint addressed to the Complaints and Investigation Division (CID) of the Office of
Administrative Services (OAS) of the Supreme Court triggered this administrative matter. The letter was
sent by a concerned employee who chose to remain anonymous, assailed the profitable money-lending
with usurious interest scheme engaged in by respondents Dolores T. Lopez, an SC Chief Judicial Staff
Officer, and Fernando M. Montalvo, an SC Supervising Judicial Staff Officer, both of the Checks
Disbursement Division of the Court’s Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO). It stated that the
respondents had been involved in the money-lending activities targeting the low-salaried employees of
the Court like the drivers and employees of the janitorial services; that such money-lending had been
going on with the help of the personnel of the Checks Disbursement Division of FMBO by enticing
employees of the Court to pledge forthcoming benefits at a discounted rate; and that around 300
Automated Teller Machine (ATM) cards were surrendered by the borrowers to the respondents as
collateral for the individual borrowings.
Lopez neither denied nor admitted the allegations against her. But Montalvo dismissed the letter-
complaint as maliciously sent for the purpose of tarnishing his reputation and the reputation of his office.
He denied being engaged in the lending business in the Court.
The OAS recommended the dismissal of the letter-complaint against Montalvo for lack of merit; but
endorsed Lopez’s suspension.
ISSUE(S)
Whether Lopez is administratively liable
RULING
Yes. Administrative Circular No. 5 (Re: Prohibition for All Officials and Employees of the Judiciary to Work
as Insurance Agents), dated October 4, 1988, has prohibited all officials and employees of the Judiciary
from engaging directly in any private business, vocation or profession, even outside their office hours.
The prohibition has been at ensuring that full-time officers and employees of the courts render full-time
service, for only thereby could any undue delays in the administration of justice and in the disposition of
court cases be avoided. The nature of the work of court employees and officials demanded their highest
degree of efficiency and responsibility, but they would not ably meet the demand except by devoting
their undivided time to the government service.47 This explains why court employees have been enjoined
to strictly observe official time and to devote every second or moment of such time to serving the public.
Although many “moonlighting” activities were themselves legal acts that would be permitted or tolerated
had the actors not been employed in the public sector, moonlighting, albeit not usually treated as a
serious misconduct, can amount to a malfeasance in office by the very nature of the position held.
In the case of Lopez, her being the Chief of the Checks Disbursement Division of the FMBO, a major
office of the Court itself, surely put the integrity of the Checks Disbursement Division and the entire
FMBO under so much undeserved suspicion. She ought to have refrained from engaging in money
lending, particularly to the employees of the Court. We do not need to stress that she was expected to be
circumspect about her acts and actuations, knowing that the impression of her having taken advantage of
her position and her having abused the confidence reposed in her office and functions as such would
thereby become unavoidable. There is no doubt about her onerous lending activities greatly diminishing
the reputation of her office and of the Court itself in the esteem of the public.
Considering that the official and personal conduct and deportment of all the people who work for the
Judiciary mirrored the image of the Court itself, they should strive to comport themselves with propriety
and decorum at all times, and to be above suspicion of any misdeed and misconduct. Only thereby would
they earn and keep the public’s respect for and confidence in the Judiciary. As a public servant, therefore,
Lopez knew only too well that she was expected at all times to exhibit the highest sense of honesty and
integrity. No less that the Constitution itself impresses this expectation in Section 1 of its Article XI, to
wit:
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times, be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.
Lopez was quite aware that the foregoing declarative language of the Constitution on the nature of her
public office and her responsibilities as a public officer was not mere rhetoric expressing idealistic
sentiments, but a definite working standard and a statement of attainable goals that the actual deeds of
the public officers and employees should match. She plainly disregarded the Constitution.
IV. Public International Law
1 Pimentel v. Executive Secretary
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
2 Kuroda v. Jalandoni
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
3 Mijares v. Ranada
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
4 Razon v. Tagitis
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
5 Wright v. CA
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
6 Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
7 US v. Purganan
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
8 Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Judge Olalia, Jr.
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
9 Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Munoz
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
10 Republic v. Sandiganbayan
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
11 Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
12 China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. v. Santamaria
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
13 Vinuya v. Executive Secretary Romulo
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
14 Bayan Muna v. Romulo
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
15 Saguisag v. Executive Secretary

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
16 Mirpuri v. CA
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
17 LBP v. Atlanta Industries, Inc.
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
18 Arigo v. Swift
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
V. Constitutional Law II
1 Ynot v. IAC
RESTITUTO YNOT, Petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION

COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATINOAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO, and THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION VI, ILOILO CITY,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 74457. March 20, 1987.
Ponente: J. Cruz
Topic: Police Power/Due Process
Synopsis:
The test for the valid exercise of police power requires that there be a (a)lawful subject and (b)lawful
means. Indeed, there is a need to protect carabaos from slaughter, as they are the primary workhorses
of our country’s struggling farming industry—as such, there is lawful subject. However, EO 626-A
punishes the movement, and not the slaughter of carabaos, a prohibition whose object escapes even the
Supreme Court.
To give substance to a concept that is otherwise intentionally left vague by the courts, due process has
been given two minimum requirements for its validity: hearing and trial. In this case, there is no such
pressure of time or action calling for the immediate confiscation of carabaos, as doing otherwise would
not immediately endanger the general public.
Digest:
FACTS
Ynot transported six carabaos on a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, and was
immediately apprehended by the station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of Executive
Order 626-A. Executive Order 626-A prohibited the inter-provincial movement of carabaos and carabeef
in the interest of protecting and conserving these beasts of burden for small farmers who need them to
do work. Thus, the law called for the immediate confiscation and forfeiture of transported carabaos and
carabeef for distribution to charitable institutions.
ISSUE(S)
1. Is the law a valid exercise of police power?
2. Does the act of apprehending Ynot violate the due process clause?
RULING
1. No. The test for the valid exercise of police power requires that there be a (a)lawful subject and
(b)lawful means. Indeed, there is a need to protect carabaos from slaughter, as they are the primary
workhorses of our country’s struggling farming industry—as such, there is lawful subject. However, EO
626-A punishes the movement, and not the slaughter of carabaos, a prohibition whose object escapes
even the Supreme Court. “We do not see how the prohibition of inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty
in one province than in another.” Therefore, EO 626-A violates the requirement for lawful means, and as
such is NOT a valid exercise of police power.
2. Yes. To give substance to a concept that is otherwise intentionally left vague by the courts, due
process has been given two minimum requirements for its validity: hearing and trial. In this case, there is
no such pressure of time or action calling for the immediate confiscation of carabaos, as doing otherwise
would not immediately endanger the general public. There was no reason why the violation of EO 626-A
could not be resolved first in a court of justice, where the accused will be accorded all the rights
safeguarded to him by the Constitution.
2 Beltran v. Secretary of Health
RODOLFO BELTRAN, doing business under the name and style, OUR LADY OF FATIMA BLOOD
BANK, et al., Petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, Respondent.
G.R. No. 133640. November 25, 2005.
Ponente: J. Azcuna
Topic: Police Power/Equal Protection
Synopsis:
In testing whether RA 7719 is a valid form of police power, it is important to note that there is little
question as to its lawful subject. Regulating the quality of donated blood affects every citizen who might
need transfusions for whatever purpose. It is the interest of the general welfare, and not just of a
particular class, that it at stake, therefore the interference of the State is required. Moreover, the means
employed are reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In the visors of police
power, deprivation of property is valid when done for the good of the totality of the populace.
For an act to be in conformity with the equal protection clause, it must be:
(a) Based on substantial distinctions
(b) Germane to the purposes of the law
(c) Applicable to future conditions (not just to existing conditions)
(d) Must apply equally to all members of the class
On one hand, government blood donation programs, like that of the Philippine Red Cross are operating
purely for humanitarian reasons, whereas commercial blood banks are aimed towards profit, a clear and
substantial distinction. Thus the phase-out of commercial blood banks is not an assault on equal
protection of the law, but rather for the enhancement and strict adherence of professional and scientific
standards of blood collection, as well as to regulate the implementation of voluntary blood donation
programs by the government; as such it is germane to the purpose of RA 7719.
Digest:
FACTS
Republic Act 7719, or the National Blood Services Act of 1994, in attempting to regulate blood donations
and ensuring an adequate supply of safe and quality blood in hospitals, sought to phase out commercial
blood banks, as research has found that paid blood donors are more likely to lie about their age and
medical condition than voluntary donors, thus tainting the quality of blood donations offered by
commercial establishments. Owners of such blood banks (herein petitioners) contended that the phase-
out plan is against the constitutional guarantee of equal protection, because it unduly discriminated
against them in a manner not germane to the purpose of the law.
ISSUE(S)
1. Is the act of phasing out commercial blood banks a valid exercise of police power?
2. Does the law violate the equal protection clause?
RULING
1. Yes. In testing whether RA 7719 is a valid form of police power, it is important to note that there is
little question as to its lawful subject. Regulating the quality of donated blood affects every citizen who
might need transfusions for whatever purpose. It is the interest of the general welfare, and not just of a
particular class, that it at stake, therefore the interference of the State is required. Moreover, the means
employed are reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In the visors of police
power, deprivation of property is valid when done for the good of the totality of the populace.
2. No. For an act to be in conformity with the equal protection clause, it must be:
On one hand, government blood donation programs, like that of the Philippine Red Cross are operating
purely for humanitarian reasons, whereas commercial blood banks are aimed towards profit, a clear and
substantial distinction. Thus the phase-out of commercial blood banks is not an assault on equal
protection of the law, but rather for the enhancement and strict adherence of professional and scientific
standards of blood collection, as well as to regulate the implementation of voluntary blood donation
programs by the government; as such it is germane to the purpose of RA 7719.
3 Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., Petitioner, vs. HON. FRANKLIN M.

DRILON, as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator
of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, Respondents.
G.R. No. 81958. June 30, 1988.
Ponente: J. Sarmiento
Synopsis:
In this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the necessity of imposing a temporary ban on deployment of
female domestic workers, as the unhappy plight of Filipino women working abroad is not a matter for
debate. The sordid tales of exploitation and maltreatment suffered by OFWs are compelling motives for
urgent government action.
The Supreme Court was satisfied that the classification made—the preference for female workers, is
based on substantial distinctions, as the reports of abuse, rape, maltreatment, etc. of male workers are
not as prevalent as those of female OFWs. Furthermore, such a classification is germane to the purpose
behind the measure, which is to enhance the protection for Filipino female OFWs. The ban likewise
applies to all members of the class of female domestic and household workers.
Digest:
FACTS
Herein petitioner PASEI, a recruitment firm, assails the constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1,
series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, which imposes a temporary ban on the
deployment of female domestic and household workers due to multiple reports of harassment, abuse,
and other crimes against them. According to petitioner, the law discriminates against male domestic
helpers, and that it violates the equal protection clause for being applicable only to domestic helpers and
females with similar skills. Petitioner likewise raises that this is in violation of the right to travel, as well as
the non-impairment of contracts clause. Crucially, petitioner claims that D.O. No. 1 is unconstitutional, as
it is an exercise of police power by the executive, a power vested primarily in the legislature.
ISSUE(S)
1. Is D.O. No. 1 a valid exercise of police power?
2. Was the order violative of the equal protection clause?
RULING
1. Yes. In this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the necessity of imposing a temporary ban on
deployment of female domestic workers, as the unhappy plight of Filipino women working abroad is not a
matter for debate. The sordid tales of exploitation and maltreatment suffered by OFWs are compelling
motives for urgent government action. Furthermore, there is no abuse of police power in this case,
because while the same is originally vested in the legislature, it can be delegated. The Labor Code in fact,
constitutes the limited and valid delegation by Congress to the DOLE of its rule-making power. Being a
valid exercise of police power, the issue of violation of the right to travel and impairment of contracts is
moot.
2. No. For an act to be in conformity with the equal protection clause, it must be:
The Supreme Court was satisfied that the classification made—the preference for female workers, is
based on substantial distinctions, as the reports of abuse, rape, maltreatment, etc. of male workers are
not as prevalent as those of female OFWs. Furthermore, such a classification is germane to the purpose
behind the measure, which is to enhance the protection for Filipino female OFWs. The ban likewise
applies to all members of the class of female domestic and household workers.
4 PRC v. De Guzman
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, CHAIRMAN HERMOGENES P. POBRE, et. al.,

Petitioners, vs. ALENE V. DE GUZMAN, VIOLETA V. MENESES, CELERINA S. NAVARRO, et. al.
G.R. No. 144681. June 21, 2004.
Ponente: J. Tinga
Topic: Police Power
Synopsis:
While it may be true that the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select
a profession or course of study, this right is nevertheless subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirements. Like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the charter, exercising
the right to a profession may be regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health,
morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare. The present case clearly falls squarely
within the grounds for denying a license to practice medicine as provided under RA No. 2382, otherwise
known as the Medical Act of 1959. Moreover, the act also passes the tests of lawful subject and lawful
means, prohibition being the most logical and least pervasive solution to the injustice of admitting
unqualified persons to the medical board.
Digest:
FACTS
The PRC withheld the registration and induction of some graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine
after its investigative body, in cooperation with the National Bureau of Investigation, determined that the
students have gained early access to test questions for two of the most difficult subjects in the Physician
Licensure Examination. The students revolted and asked in a petition for mandamus to have their names
registered as physicians, as is their supposed right.
ISSUE(S)
Is the act of denying the students’ licenses a valid exercise of police power?
RULING
Yes. While it may be true that the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to
select a profession or course of study, this right is nevertheless subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirements. Like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the charter, exercising
the right to a profession may be regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health,
morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare. The present case clearly falls squarely
within the grounds for denying a license to practice medicine as provided under RA No. 2382, otherwise
known as the Medical Act of 1959. Moreover, the act also passes the tests of lawful subject and lawful
means, prohibition being the most logical and least pervasive solution to the injustice of admitting
unqualified persons to the medical board.
5 MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE

ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 135962. March 27, 2000.
Ponente: J. Puno
Topic: Police Power
Synopsis:
The Supreme Court held that the MMDA does not have the authority to exercise police power on behalf
of the State. Police power is delegated from the National Legislature to some of its agents, including
Local Government Units. Republic Act 7924 declared Metro Manila as a special development and
administrative region and created the MMDA as a special development authority to administer metro-wide
basic services affecting the region, including formulating, regulating, and coordinating the implementation
of medium and long term developmental plans for the metro. However, no syllable in this law expressly
confers police power, let alone legislative power, to the MMDA. In the immediate case, it is the City of
Makati that possesses the police power capable of compelling the opening of a private street for public
use, as long as there is a lawful subject, and that it be enacted by lawful means.
Digest:
FACTS
On December 30, 1995, the Bel-Air Village Association received a notice from the MMDA compelling the
former to open Neptune Street, a private road within a private subdivision in the heart of the commercial
district of Makati, to public traffic, pursuant to the MMDA’s exercise of police power. Petitioners claim that
being an agent of the state, the police power is extended to their prerogative.
ISSUE(S)
Does the MMDA possess police power?
RULING
No. The Supreme Court held that the MMDA does not have the authority to exercise police power on
behalf of the State. Police power is delegated from the National Legislature to some of its agents,
including Local Government Units. Republic Act 7924 declared Metro Manila as a special development and
administrative region and created the MMDA as a special development authority to administer metro-wide
basic services affecting the region, including formulating, regulating, and coordinating the implementation
of medium and long term developmental plans for the metro. However, no syllable in this law expressly
confers police power, let alone legislative power, to the MMDA. In the immediate case, it is the City of
Makati that possesses the police power capable of compelling the opening of a private street for public
use, as long as there is a lawful subject, and that it be enacted by lawful means.
6 Binay v. Domingo
HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, Petitioners, vs. HON. EUFEMIO
DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 92389. September 11, 1991.
Ponente: J. Paras
Topic: Police Power
Synopsis:
While COA correctly noted the delegation of police power to local governments through the general
welfare clause, it erred in confining the definition of such power to “public safety and general welfare”.
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it benefits a limited number of persons. The care
for the poor is a public duty, and the government, by virtue of the principle of parens patriae, has the
duty of making sure the poor are attended to. Thus financial support for the less fortunate has long been
expected as a valid exercise of police power aimed at the promotion of the common good.
Digest:
FACTS
The Municipality of Makati enacted Resolution No. 60, which gave financial assistance of five hundred
pesos to a bereaved family within the locality whose gross income does not exceed two thousand pesos a
month. The law further states that the funds therein will be taken from unappropriated funds from the
municipal treasury. The Commission on Audit assailed the resolution, claiming that an ordinance must
have a real, substantial, or rational relation to public health, morals, or general welfare for it to be a valid
exercise of police power.
ISSUE(S)
Is the law a valid exercise of police power?
RULING
Yes. According to the Supreme Court, while COA correctly noted the delegation of police power to local
governments through the general welfare clause, it erred in confining the definition of such power to
“public safety and general welfare”. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it benefits a
limited number of persons. The care for the poor is a public duty, and the government, by virtue of the
principle of parens patriae, has the duty of making sure the poor are attended to. Thus financial support
for the less fortunate has long been expected as a valid exercise of police power aimed at the promotion
of the common good.
7 City of Manila v. Judge Laguio
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, as the Mayor of the City of Manila, et al., vs. HON.
PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., AS Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, and MALATE TOURIST
G.R. No. 118127. April 12, 2005.
Ponente: J. Tinga
Synopsis:
In the case above, it is clear that the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, as it substantially divests
the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. Moreover, it does not specify the rules and
regulations to be observed, rather, it exercises an assumed power to prohibit trade. For violating these
two essential requirements, the ordinance is deemed an invalid exercise of police power.
The guarantee of equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The guarantee means that no person or
class of persons shall be denied the equal protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in like circumstances. In the immediate case, the MTDC’s businesses were, without basis,
classified as grounds for illicit activities.
Digest:
FACTS
The City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7783, which prohibits the establishment or operation of certain
forms of businesses like sauna parlors, karaoke bars, inns and hotels in the Malate area for the purpose
of protecting the general welfare and morals, as these places are often the fonts of illicit activities within
the locality. Malate Tourist Development Corporation contends that this is an invalid exercise of police
power, as it unnecessarily includes inns, hotels, lodging houses, and motels in the classification.
ISSUE(S)
2. Does it violate the equal protection clause?
RULING
1. No. An ordinance, to be a valid exercise of police power, needs to conform to the following substantive
requirements:
1) Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
2) Must not be unfair or oppressive
3) Must not be partial or discriminatory
4) Must not prohibit but may regulate trade
5) Must be general and consistent with public policy
6) Must not be unreasonable
2. Yes. The guarantee of equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The guarantee means that no
person or class of persons shall be denied the equal protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons
or other classes in like circumstances. In the immediate case, the MTDC’s businesses were, without basis,
8 White Light Corporation v. City of Manila
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. CITY OF MANILA, Respondent.
G.R No. 122846. January 20, 2009.
Ponente: J. Tinga
Topic: Police Power
Synopsis:
The fact that the ordinance deprives patrons of a product and the petitioners with a lucrative business
places the validity of the exercise of police power in question. According to the Supreme Court, aside
from the requirements of lawful subject and lawful means, there should also appear a reasonable relation
between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, otherwise, what
would ensue is arbitrary invasion of private rights and deprivation of property in the guise of police
power.
Digest:
FACTS
Through Ordinance No. 7774, the City of Manila prohibited short-time admission and wash-up rates for
the same in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, and similar establishments, in order to minimize the use
of these establishments for illicit activities. Malate Tourist Development Corporation contends that this is
an invalid exercise of police power, as it unreasonably interferes with their business.
ISSUE(S)
RULING
No. The fact that the ordinance deprives patrons of a product and the petitioners with a lucrative
business places the validity of the exercise of police power in question. According to the Supreme Court,
aside from the requirements of lawful subject and lawful means, there should also appear a reasonable
relation between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment,
otherwise, what would ensue is arbitrary invasion of private rights and deprivation of property in the
guise of police power.
9 City of Manila v. Judge Laguio
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, as the Mayor of the City of Manila, et al., vs. HON.
PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., AS Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, and MALATE TOURIST
G.R. No. 118127. April 12, 2005.
Ponente: J. Tinga
Synopsis:
The guarantee of equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The guarantee means that no person or
class of persons shall be denied the equal protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in like circumstances. In the immediate case, the MTDC’s businesses were, without basis,
Digest:
FACTS
The City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7783, which prohibits the establishment or operation of certain
forms of businesses like sauna parlors, karaoke bars, inns and hotels in the Malate area for the purpose
of protecting the general welfare and morals, as these places are often the fonts of illicit activities within
the locality. Malate Tourist Development Corporation contends that this is an invalid exercise of police
power, as it unnecessarily includes inns, hotels, lodging houses, and motels in the classification.
ISSUE(S)
2. Does it violate the equal protection clause?
RULING
1. No. An ordinance, to be a valid exercise of police power, needs to conform to the following substantive
requirements:
1) Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
2) Must not be unfair or oppressive
3) Must not be partial or discriminatory
4) Must not prohibit but may regulate trade
5) Must be general and consistent with public policy
6) Must not be unreasonable
2. Yes. The guarantee of equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The guarantee means that no
person or class of persons shall be denied the equal protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons
or other classes in like circumstances. In the immediate case, the MTDC’s businesses were, without basis,
10 Acebedo Optical v. CA
ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. MAMINDIARA MANGOTARA, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Br. 1 of Iligan City,
SAMAHANG OPTOMETRISTS NG PILIPINAS, et al.
G.R. No. 100152. March 31, 2000.
Ponente: J. Purisima
Topic: Police Power
Synopsis:
In general, the issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory
in nature. The authority of local government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits is in the
exercise of the police power of the State. However, a business permit is issued to regulate the mere
conduct of business within the city, therefore the mayor cannot regulate the practice of a profession—a
power vested exclusively within the Professional Regulation Commission and the Board of Examiners in
Optometry in this case. This act is oppressive and discriminatory, not to mention unreasonable. The
mayor could instead have required the optometrists in petitioner’s business to produce a valid certificate
of registration or license.
Digest:
FACTS
A city mayor, at the behest of local optometrists, imposed special conditions on the release of a business
permit for Acebedo Optical within the locality. In setting such conditions, he sought to prevent the latter
from opening up an optical clinic and from prescribing and selling reading or optical eyewear.
ISSUE(S)
RULING
No. In general, the issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially
regulatory in nature. The authority of local government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits is
in the exercise of the police power of the State. However, a business permit is issued to regulate the
mere conduct of business within the city, therefore the mayor cannot regulate the practice of a
profession—a power vested exclusively within the Professional Regulation Commission and the Board of
Examiners in Optometry in this case. This act is oppressive and discriminatory, not to mention
unreasonable. The mayor could instead have required the optometrists in petitioner’s business to produce
a valid certificate of registration or license.
11 ABS-CBN v. PMSI
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE MULTI-MEDIA
SYSTEM, INC., CESAR G. REYES, FRANCIS CHUA (ANG BIAO), MANUEL F. ABELLADA, RAUL B.
DE MESA, and ALOYSIUS M. COLAYCO, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 175769-70. January 19, 2009.
Topic: Police Power/Eminent Domain
Synopsis:
The contention of ABS-CBN is erroneous at best. The carriage of ABS-CBN’s signals by virtue of the must-
carry rule in Memorandum Circular No. 04-08-88 is under the direction and control of the government
though the NTC which is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to supervise, regulate and control
telecommunications and broadcast services/facilities in the Philippines. Therefore, ABS-CBN cannot claim
to enjoy private ownership of a television signal. Moreover, the imposition of the must-carry rule is within
the NTC’s power to promulgate rules and regulations, as public safety and interest may require, to
encourage a larger and more effective use of communications, radio and television broadcasting facilities,
and to maintain effective competition among private entities.
Digest:
FACTS
PMSI was granted a legislative franchise under RA 8630 to install, operate, and maintain a nationwide
DTH satellite service. Under the NTC Memorandum Circular No. 4-08-88, it is required to carry the
television signals of authorized television broadcast stations. ABS-CBN sued PMSI alleging, among others,
that the aforementioned NTC Circular is violative of Section 9 of the Bill of Rights, for it allows the taking
of private property without just compensation.
ISSUE(S)
Is the law a valid exercise of eminent domain?
RULING
No. However, the contention of ABS-CBN is erroneous at best. The carriage of ABS-CBN’s signals by
virtue of the must-carry rule in Memorandum Circular No. 04-08-88 is under the direction and control of
the government though the NTC which is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to supervise, regulate and
control telecommunications and broadcast services/facilities in the Philippines. Therefore, ABS-CBN
cannot claim to enjoy private ownership of a television signal. Moreover, the imposition of the must-carry
rule is within the NTC’s power to promulgate rules and regulations, as public safety and interest may
require, to encourage a larger and more effective use of communications, radio and television
broadcasting facilities, and to maintain effective competition among private entities.
12 City Government of Quezon v. Judge Ericta
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, Petitioners,vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch XVIII, HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. L-34915. June 24, 1983.
Ponente: J. Guttierez, Jr.

Topic: Police Power/Eminent Domain
Synopsis:
If an owner is deprived of his property by virtue of police power, the property is generally summarily
destroyed in order to promote the general welfare, as in the case of a nuisance per se. In this case, the
lots are instead converted to public use, which is not an exercise of police power but rather, of eminent
domain, as there is a taking of property, without just compensation to boot.
Digest:
FACTS
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 requires that at least 6% of the total area of the Memorial Park
Cemetery be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been citizens of
Quezon City for at least five years prior to their death.
ISSUE(S)
RULING
No. If an owner is deprived of his property by virtue of police power, the property is generally summarily
destroyed in order to promote the general welfare, as in the case of a nuisance per se. In this case, the
lots are instead converted to public use, which is not an exercise of police power but rather, of eminent
domain, as there is a taking of property, without just compensation to boot.
13 DOH and FDA v. Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing, Inc.
THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Represented by SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, and THE FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, Represented by ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF HEALTH NICOLAS
B. LUTERO III, Petitioners, vs. PHILIP MORRIS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING, INC.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 202943. March 25, 2015.
Topic: Police Power/Due Process
Synopsis:
In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that promotion refers to the general marketing process of raising
customer awareness of a product or brand, and that it necessarily includes personal selling, advertising,
direct marketing, and sales promotion. Therefore, as the common and fundamental purpose of these
marketing strategies is to raise customer awareness, to consider promotions and sales promotion as two
distinct activities would only serve to sow confusion.
Digest:
FACTS
On November 19, 2008, Philip Morris applied for a sales promotion permit before the FDA for its Gear Up
Promo, but the same was not acted upon, reportedly pursuant to a DOH Memorandum prohibiting
tobacco companies from conducting any tobacco promotional activities in the country. Nine days later,
Philip Morris once again filed an application for a sales permit, this time for its Golden Stick Promotional
Activity, which the FDA (then BFAD) refused outright, pursuant to a directive to refuse all permit
applications for promotional activities of tobacco companies. All these actions of the DOH and FDA are
pursuant to R.A. 9211, or the Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003. Philip Morris assailed the decision of the
FDA, contending that promotion is not included in the class of banned tobacco advertising and
sponsorships. Furthermore, it contends that the denial of its promotional permit applications was
tantamount to a violation of its right to due process as well as its right to property.
Note:
In essence, PMPMI contends that promos in the conventional sense are not the same as a sales
promotion, which uses media and non-media marketing communication to increase consumer demand
through prizes, raffles, product samples, coupons, etc.
ISSUE(S)
Is there a substantial distinction between promotion and sales promotion for purposes of enforcing the
regulation against tobacco ads?
RULING
No. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that promotion refers to the general marketing process of
raising customer awareness of a product or brand, and that it necessarily includes personal selling,
advertising, direct marketing, and sales promotion. Therefore, as the common and fundamental purpose
of these marketing strategies is to raise customer awareness, to consider promotions and sales
promotion as two distinct activities would only serve to sow confusion.
Note:
R.A. 9211 created the Inter-Agency Committee-Tobacco (IAC-Tobacco), which was given the power to
regulate tobacco ads and promotional applications. Thus the DOH and the FDA are now divested of the
power to act on such applications. Pursuant to this, the SC remanded the case for determination by the
IAC-Tobacco.
14 OSG v. Ayala Land, Inc.
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Petitioner, vs. AYALA LAND INCORPORATED,
ROBINSONS LAND CORPORATION, SHANGRI-LA PLAZA CORPORATION, and SM PRIME
HOLDINGS, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 177056. September 18, 2009.
Topic: Police Power
Synopsis:
Firstly, preventing the collection of fees by mall parking lots is not a regulation of trade, but rather a
prohibition, and an encroachment of the right of private entities over their property. Secondly, police
power cannot degrade to arbitrary or whimsical prohibition, as it should first pass the test of lawful
means and lawful subject. Police power does not involve taking of property, unless there is a need to
destroy the same for the protection of peace and order, and the protection of public welfare.
Digest:
FACTS
The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce found that the collection of parking fees by shopping
malls is contrary to the National Building Code. Thus the committee recommended that the OSG should
enjoin the collection of parking fees and enforce the sanctions for violation of the National Building Code.
Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons Land Corporation, Shangri-La Plaza, and SM Prime Holdings, Inc.
contended that they could not be obliged to provide free parking spaces in their malls to patrons and the
general public.
ISSUE(S)
May the OSG prohibit the malls from collecting parking fees as an exercise of police power?
RULING
No. Firstly, preventing the collection of fees by mall parking lots is not a regulation of trade, but rather a
prohibition, and an encroachment of the right of private entities over their property. Secondly, police
power cannot degrade to arbitrary or whimsical prohibition, as it should first pass the test of lawful
means and lawful subject. Police power does not involve taking of property, unless there is a need to
destroy the same for the protection of peace and order, and the protection of public welfare.
15 City of Manila v. Melba Tan
CITY OF MANILA, Petitioner, vs. MELBA TAN TE, Respondent.

G.R. No. 169263. September 21, 2011.
Ponente: J. Peralta
Topic: Eminent Domain
Synopsis:
Expropriation is a two-pronged proceeding: first, the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the lawful right to take the property for public use or purpose described in the complaint, and
second, the determination of just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated. Expropriation
proceedings under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court are covered by the rule on omnibus motions under
Section 8 of Rule 15, in that if a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the
complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within the
time stated in the summons. The answer shall designate or identify the property in which he claims to
have an interest, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his property.
Digest:
FACTS
For the purpose of establishing an urban housing project in the City of Manila, Mayor Joselito L. Atienza
approved Ordinance No. 7951, expropriating several pieces of real estate along Maria Clara and Governor
Forbes Street, including the lot owned by respondent Melba Tan Te. Pursuant thereto, petitioner filed a
petition for expropriation against petitioner, but instead of filing an answer, she submitted a motion to
dismiss, raising as grounds, among others, that Ordinance No. 7951 was an invalid expropriation because
it violated the rule against taking without just compensation, and that respondent qualified as a small
property owner and, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279, was exempt from
expropriation, the subject lot being the only piece of realty that she owned.
ISSUE(S)
Did the respondent file the proper responsive pleading?
RULING
No. The Supeme Court noted that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, in denying the petitions
before them, failed to appreciate the respondents’ error in filing a motion to dismiss instead of an
answer. Expropriation is a two-pronged proceeding: first, the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the lawful right to take the property for public use or purpose described in the
complaint, and second, the determination of just compensation for the property sought to be
expropriated. Expropriation proceedings under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court are covered by the rule on
omnibus motions under Section 8 of Rule 15, in that if a defendant has any objection to the filing of or
the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve
his answer within the time stated in the summons. The answer shall designate or identify the property in
which he claims to have an interest, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his
property. In this case, the trial court should have denied the motion to dismiss and required the
respondent to instead file an answer within the reglementary period, because she propounded affirmative
defenses which required the presentation of evidence aliunde.
Note:
The Supreme Court did not rule on the substantive issues, but instead remanded the case to the RTC.
16 Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District
TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, petitioner, vs. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT,

respondent.
G.R. No. 166471. March 22, 2011
Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Police Power
Synopsis:
Furthermore, the Local Water Utilities Administration cannot create an exclusive franchise in the guise of
the exercise of police power to regulate utilities. Police power does not include the power to violate the
constitution. Its exercise should be based on reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, and not
repugnant to the constitution.
Digest:
FACTS
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an
application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in
Barangay Tawang. La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) opposed TMPC’s application. LTWD claimed that,
under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive. Section 47 states that “no
franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for domestic, industrial or commercial water
service within the district or any portion thereof unless and except to the extent that the board of
directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such resolution, however, shall be
subject to review by the Administration.”
The NWRB approved TMPC’s application for a CPC. In its 15 August 2002 Decision, the NWRB held that
LTWD’s franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional. LTWD appealed to
the RTC and the latter set aside the NWRB’s Resolution and 15 August 2002 Decision and cancelled
TMPC’s CPC. The RTC held that Section 47 is valid.
ISSUE(S)
Is the exclusive franchise granted valid?
RULING
No, it is invalid. The Supreme Court ruled that the President, Congress and the Court cannot create
directly franchises for the operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and
1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character.
Furthermore, the Local Water Utilities Administration cannot create an exclusive franchise in the guise of
the exercise of police power to regulate utilities. Police power does not include the power to violate the
constitution. Its exercise should be based on reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, and not
repugnant to the constitution.
17 DAR v. Berina
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Petitioner, vs. SALUD GRACIAS BERINA, CESAR
GRACIAS, NORMA GRACIAS TANDOC, et al., Respondents
G.R. No. 183901. July 9, 2014.
Topic: Eminent Domain – Just Compensation
Synopsis:
The determination of just compensation is a judicial function; hence, courts cannot be unduly restricted
in their determination thereof. To do so would deprive the courts of their judicial prerogatives and reduce
them to the bureaucratic function of inputting data and arriving at the valuation. While the courts should
be mindful ofthe different formulae created by the DAR in arriving at just compensation, they are not
strictly bound to adhere thereto if the situations before them do not warrant it.
Digest:
FACTS
The spouses Gracias (parents of respondents) owns several parcels of ricelands and other agricultural
lands located in Irosin, Sorsogon. These land parcels were placed under the government’s Operation
Land Transfer (OLT) Program, also known as Tenants Emancipation Decree. The Department of Agrarian
Reform, in computing the land value for just compensation, used the formula under Executive Order No.
(EO) 228, which is to say, Land Value = Average Gross Product (AGP) x 2.5 x ₱35.00 x area.
Respondents thus filed a complaint for the determination of just compensation before the RTC, averring
that the DAR valuation was unconscionably low. The RTC rendered a decision rejecting the DAR
valuation, instead using the formula Land Value = (AGP x 2) x 2.5 x 35.00 x Has. The CA affirmed the
valuation of the RTC. The DAR now comes to the Supreme Court, questioning the RTC's decision in
doubling the value of the AGP in its valuation.
ISSUE(S)
Did the RTC err in changing the formula in arriving at the valuation for just compensation?
RULING
No. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function; hence, courts cannot be unduly
restricted in their determination thereof. To do so would deprive the courts of their judicial prerogatives
and reduce them to the bureaucratic function of inputting data and arriving at the valuation. While the
courts should be mindful ofthe different formulae created by the DAR in arriving at just compensation,
they are not strictly bound to adhere thereto if the situations before them do not warrant it. To insist that
the formula must be applied with utmost rigidity whereby the valuation is drawn following a strict
mathematical computation goes beyond the intent and spirit of the law. The suggested interpretation is
strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the law.
As we have established in earlier jurisprudence, the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially
a judicial function which is vested in the regional trial court acting as a SAC, and not in administrative
agencies.
Notes:
Notwithstanding this ruling, the SC ruled that the RTC, in arriving at its valuation, did not consider the
additional factors (in addition to the land’s fair market value) enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657,
i.e.: (a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of like properties, (c) the nature and actual
use of the property and the income therefrom, (d) the owner’s sworn valuation, (e) the tax declarations,
(f) the assessment made by government assessors, (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by
the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and (h) the non-payment of
taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, if any. The case was
remanded to the RTC for determination of just compensation.
18 DAR v. Spouses Sta. Romana
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by SECRETARY NASSER C.

PANGANDAMAN, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES DIOSDADO STA. ROMANA and RESURRECCION O.
RAMOS, represented by AURORA STA. ROMANA, PURIFICACION C. DAEZ, represented by
EFREN D. VILLALUZ and ROSAURO D. VILLALUZ, and SPOUSES LEANDRO C. SEVILLA and
MILAGROS C. DAEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 183290* July 9, 2014
Synopsis:
For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is
determined by its character and its price at the time of taking. In addition, the factors enumerated under
Section 17 of RA 6657,47 i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of like properties,
(c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom, (d) the owner's sworn
valuation, (e) the tax declarations, (f) the assessment made by government assessors, (g) the social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the
property, and (h) the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution
on the said land, if any , must be equally considered.
Digest:
FACTS
Respondents are owners of a parcel of agricultural land situated in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija. Petitioner
compulsorily acquired a 21-hectare portion of such land pursuant to the government's Operation Land
Transfer Program. The DAR, in arriving at its valuation for just compensation, used the formula laid down
by EO No. 228, i.e., LV = (2.5 x AGP x ₱35.00) x (1.06)n. Dissatisfied with the valuation, respondents
brought a case before the RTC, who determined the valuation for just compensation at at ₱2,576,829.94
or ₱121,438.60/ha. It explained that while respondents’ land was acquired pursuant to PD 27, the same
is covered by Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, or the CARP Law. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC,
stating that the expropriation of a landholding covered by PD 27, such as that of the subject land, is not
considered to have taken place on the effectivity of the said decree, or on October 21, 1972, but at the
time payment of just compensation is made, as judicially determined. Thus, it would be inequitable to
base the amount of just compensation on the guidelines provided by PD 27 and EO 228 when the seizure
of the subject land took place after the enactment of RA 6657. Acquisition of the subject land having
been initiated only in 1995, the LBP valuation using the formula under EO 228 was confiscatory, as just
compensation should constitute the full and fair equivalent of the property when it is taken.
ISSUE(S)
Was the land in question properly valued?
RULING
No. Settled is the rule that when the agrarian reform process is still incomplete, as in this case where the
just compensation for the subject land acquired under PD 27 has yet to be paid, just compensation
should be determined, and the process concluded under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 having mere
suppletory effects. For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking. In addition, the
factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657,47 i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b) the
current value of like properties, (c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom,
(d) the owner's sworn valuation, (e) the tax declarations, (f) the assessment made by government
assessors, (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by
the government to the property, and (h) the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land, if any , must be equally considered. The Court has
gone over the records and observed that the only factors considered by the RTC in determining the just
compensation for the subject land were (a) the acquisition price of a 5.5825-ha. landholding situated in
the same locality paid to the owner on November 17, 1997, and (b) the market value of the subject land
declared by the respondents, without a showing that the other factors under Section 17 of RA 6657, as
amended, were even taken into account or, otherwise, found to be inapplicable, contrary to what the law
requires. Consequently, the CA erred in upholding the RTC’s valuation as having been made in
accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended.
19 Mactan Cebu International Airport v. Lozada
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY and AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE,

Petitioner, vs. BERNARDO L. LOZADA, SR., and the HEIRS OF ROSARIO MERCADO, namely,
VICENTE LOZADA, MARIO M. LOZADA, MARCIA L. GODINEZ, VIRGINIA L. FLORES,
BERNARDO LOZADA, JR., DOLORES GACASAN, SOCORRO CAFARO and ROSARIO LOZADA,
represented by MARCIA LOZADA GODINEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 176625. February 25, 2010.
Ponente: J. Nachura
Topic: Eminent Domain – Public Use
Synopsis:
The taking of private property, consequent to the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain,
is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it
was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is
peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the
property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise
of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification.
Digest:
FACTS
Lot No. 88-SWO-25042, located in Lahug, Cebu City, was owned by Anastacio Deiparine when it was
subjected to expropriation by the national government (through the Civil Aeronautics Administration) for
the for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. During the pendency of the expropriation
proceedings, Lozada, Sr. acquired the lot from Deiparine. The expropriation was granted by the RTC,
whereby Lozada and other affected lot owners were paid their respective compensation. The landowners
appealed, but they soon withdrew in consideration of a commitment (presented to them during a
meeting, but not put in writing) that the expropriated lots would be resold at the price they were
expropriated in the event that the ATO would abandon the Lahug Airport, pursuant to an established
policy involving similar cases. True enough, the proposed expansion did not materialize. CAA however,
contended that the land should not be reverted back to the the Decision in the pertinent expropriation
proceedings did not provide for the condition that should the intended use of Lot No. 88 for the
expansion of the Lahug Airport be aborted or abandoned, the property would revert to respondents,
being its former owners.
ISSUE(S)
Is Lozada and the other homeowners entitled to repurchase their respective lots?
RULING
Yes. With respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property
pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another
petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said
property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of
expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise
of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be
devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment
would violate the property owners right to justice, fairness, and equity. Therefore, the taking of private
property, consequent to the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to
the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken.
Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to
the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of
eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification.
20 Ouano v. Republic/Mactan Cebu v. Inocian/Heirs of Moreno v. Mactan Cebu
ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANO, MARIO P. OUANO, LETICIA OUANO ARNAIZ, and CIELO
OUANO MARTINEZ, Petitioners, vs. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE MACTAN-CEBU
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF
CEBU, Respondents.
G.R. No. 168770. February 9, 2011.

Topic: Eminent Domain – Reacquisition of Expropriated Land
Synopsis:
The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its continued devotion
to its public purpose. As a necessary corollary, once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its reversion, subject of course to the
return, at the very least, of the just compensation received. Given the foregoing disquisitions, equity and
justice demand the reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated lands in question to the Ouanos and Inocians.
In the same token, justice and fair play also dictate that the Ouanos and Inocian return to MCIAA what
they received as just compensation for the expropriation of their respective properties plus legal interest
to be computed from default, which in this case should run from the time MCIAA complies with the
reconveyance obligation.
Digest:
FACTS
See: #19: Mactan Cebu vs. Lozada (Ouano, Inocian, and Moreno are some of the landowners in the
same boat as Lozada)
ISSUE(S)
Given that abandonment of the public purpose extinguished the validity of the expropriation, are
respondents entitled to reconveyance of the subject properties simply on the basis of a verbal assurance
of some NAC officials that the properties would be returned to the original owners should the airport be
abandoned?
RULING
Yes. Despite the lack of a formal written agreement, it has been preponderantly established by evidence
that the NAC, through its team of negotiators, had given assurance to the affected landowners that they
would be entitled to repurchase their respective lots in the event they are no longer used for airport
purposes. MCIAA invokes the Statute of Frauds, under which, as expressed in Article 1403 of the Civil
Code, a contract for the sale or acquisition of real property shall be unenforceable unless the same or
some note of the contract be in writing and subscribed by the party charged. Subject to defined
exceptions, evidence of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or secondary evidence of
its contents. However, this reliance is misplaced primarily because the statute applies only to executory
and not to completed, executed, or partially consummated contracts.
A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves
the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so desires. The notion,
therefore, that the government, via expropriation proceedings, acquires unrestricted ownership over or a
fee simple title to the covered land, is untenable. Expropriated lands should be differentiated from a piece
of land, ownership of which was absolutely transferred by way of an unconditional purchase and sale
contract freely entered by two parties, one without obligation to buy and the other without the duty to
sell. In that case, the fee simple concept really comes into play. There is really no occasion to apply the
fee simple concept if the transfer is conditional. The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings
is always conditioned on its continued devotion to its public purpose. As a necessary corollary, once the
purpose is terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its
reversion, subject of course to the return, at the very least, of the just compensation received. Given the
foregoing disquisitions, equity and justice demand the reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated lands in
question to the Ouanos and Inocians. In the same token, justice and fair play also dictate that the
Ouanos and Inocian return to MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the expropriation of
their respective properties plus legal interest to be computed from default, which in this case should run
from the time MCIAA complies with the reconveyance obligation.
21 Air Transportation Office v. Spouses Ramos
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES DAVID* and ELISEA RAMOS,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 159402. February 23, 2011.
Topic: Eminent Domain – Immunity from Suit
Synopsis:
government but was essentially a business. In this case, the CA correctly appreciated the juridical
character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or
sovereign function but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport,
an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO
had no claim to the States immunity from suit.
Digest:
FACTS
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos (respondents) discovered that a portion of their land in Baguio City was
being used by the Air Transportation Office (ATO). On August 11, 1995, the respondents agreed after
negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount of
P778,150.00, but the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands. When the
petitioners filed an action for collection against the ATO, the latter interposed as affirmative defense the
issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that
included the respondents affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had
no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the States consent considering that the deed of sale had
been entered into in the performance of governmental functions.
ISSUE(S)
May the ATO be sued without the State’s consent?
RULING
Yes. An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys
government but was essentially a business. In this case, the CA correctly appreciated the juridical
character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or
sovereign function but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport,
an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO
had no claim to the States immunity from suit.
22 Secretary of the DPWH v. Spouses Tecson
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT

ENGINEER CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES HERACLEO and RAMONA
TECSON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 179334. July 1, 2013.
Ponente: J. Peralta
Synopsis:
The Supreme Court has uniformly ruled that just compensation is the value of the property at the time of
taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation. The value of the property should be fixed as of
the date when it was taken and not the date of the filing of the proceedings." For where property is
taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the
public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its
value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time it is
taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private
property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation
shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the
time it is taken.
Digest:
FACTS
Respondents co-own a parcel of land located in San Pablo, Malolos, Bulacan. Said parcel of land was
among the properties taken by the government sometime in 1940 without the owners’ consent and
without the necessary expropriation proceedings and used for the construction of the MacArthur
Highway. In December of 1994, respondents sent a letter to the District Engineer of the DPWH,
demanding payment of the fair market value of their parcel of land. Subsequently, the demands being
unheeded, the respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages before the RTC.
The petitioner invoked the state's immunity from suit, which the RTC granted, but the CA reversed the
decision, remanding the case to the former for determination of just compensation. The commissioners
assigned by the RTC valuated the property at the current market value.
ISSUE(S)
1. Was the original complaint barred by laches or prescription?
2. Did the CA err in awarding just compensation?
3. Did the RTC err in ordering the payment of just compensation based on the current market value of
the respondents’ property?
RULING
1. No. It is undisputed that the subject property was taken by petitioners without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings for the construction of the MacArthur Highway. After the lapse of more than
fifty years, the property owners sought recovery of the possession of their property. Is the action barred
by prescription or laches? If not, are the property owners entitled to recover possession or just
compensation? Laches is principally a doctrine of equity which is applied to avoid recognizing a right
when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation or in an injustice. This doctrine finds no
application in this case, since there is nothing inequitable in giving due course to respondents’ claim. Both
equity and the law direct that a property owner should be compensated if his property is taken for public
use. Neither shall prescription bar respondents’ claim following the long-standing rule "that where private
property is taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto either through
expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof does not
prescribe."
2. No. Given that the action is not barred by laches or prescription, the award of just compensation is
proper.
3. Yes. The Supreme Court has uniformly ruled that just compensation is the value of the property at the
time of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation. The value of the property should be fixed
as of the date when it was taken and not the date of the filing of the proceedings." For where property is
time it is taken.
23 Secretary of the DPWH v. Spouses Tecson
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT

ENGINEER CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES HERACLEO and RAMONA
TECSON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 179334. July 1, 2013.
Ponente: J. Peralta
Synopsis:
The Supreme Court has uniformly ruled that just compensation is the value of the property at the time of
taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation. The value of the property should be fixed as of
the date when it was taken and not the date of the filing of the proceedings." For where property is
time it is taken.
Digest:
FACTS
Respondents co-own a parcel of land located in San Pablo, Malolos, Bulacan. Said parcel of land was
among the properties taken by the government sometime in 1940 without the owners’ consent and
without the necessary expropriation proceedings and used for the construction of the MacArthur
Highway. In December of 1994, respondents sent a letter to the District Engineer of the DPWH,
demanding payment of the fair market value of their parcel of land. Subsequently, the demands being
unheeded, the respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages before the RTC.
The petitioner invoked the state's immunity from suit, which the RTC granted, but the CA reversed the
decision, remanding the case to the former for determination of just compensation. The commissioners
assigned by the RTC valuated the property at the current market value.
ISSUE(S)
1. Was the original complaint barred by laches or prescription?
2. Did the CA err in awarding just compensation?
3. Did the RTC err in ordering the payment of just compensation based on the current market value of
the respondents’ property?
RULING
1. No. It is undisputed that the subject property was taken by petitioners without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings for the construction of the MacArthur Highway. After the lapse of more than
fifty years, the property owners sought recovery of the possession of their property. Is the action barred
by prescription or laches? If not, are the property owners entitled to recover possession or just
compensation? Laches is principally a doctrine of equity which is applied to avoid recognizing a right
when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation or in an injustice. This doctrine finds no
application in this case, since there is nothing inequitable in giving due course to respondents’ claim. Both
equity and the law direct that a property owner should be compensated if his property is taken for public
use. Neither shall prescription bar respondents’ claim following the long-standing rule "that where private
property is taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto either through
expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof does not
prescribe."
2. No. Given that the action is not barred by laches or prescription, the award of just compensation is
proper.
3. Yes. The Supreme Court has uniformly ruled that just compensation is the value of the property at the
time of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation. The value of the property should be fixed
as of the date when it was taken and not the date of the filing of the proceedings." For where property is
time it is taken.
24 City of Manila v. Te
CITY OF MANILA, Petitioner, vs. MELBA TAN TE, Respondent.

G.R. No. 169263. September 21, 2011.
Ponente: J. Peralta
Topic: Eminent Domain
Synopsis:
Expropriation is a two-pronged proceeding: first, the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the lawful right to take the property for public use or purpose described in the complaint, and
second, the determination of just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated. Expropriation
proceedings under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court are covered by the rule on omnibus motions under
Section 8 of Rule 15, in that if a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the
complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within the
time stated in the summons. The answer shall designate or identify the property in which he claims to
have an interest, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his property.
Digest:
FACTS
For the purpose of establishing an urban housing project in the City of Manila, Mayor Joselito L. Atienza
approved Ordinance No. 7951, expropriating several pieces of real estate along Maria Clara and Governor
Forbes Street, including the lot owned by respondent Melba Tan Te. Pursuant thereto, petitioner filed a
petition for expropriation against petitioner, but instead of filing an answer, she submitted a motion to
dismiss, raising as grounds, among others, that Ordinance No. 7951 was an invalid expropriation because
it violated the rule against taking without just compensation, and that respondent qualified as a small
property owner and, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279, was exempt from
expropriation, the subject lot being the only piece of realty that she owned.
ISSUE(S)
Did the respondent file the proper responsive pleading?
RULING
No. The Supeme Court noted that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, in denying the petitions
before them, failed to appreciate the respondents’ error in filing a motion to dismiss instead of an
answer. Expropriation is a two-pronged proceeding: first, the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the lawful right to take the property for public use or purpose described in the
complaint, and second, the determination of just compensation for the property sought to be
expropriated. Expropriation proceedings under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court are covered by the rule on
omnibus motions under Section 8 of Rule 15, in that if a defendant has any objection to the filing of or
the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve
his answer within the time stated in the summons. The answer shall designate or identify the property in
which he claims to have an interest and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his
property. In this case, the trial court should have denied the motion to dismiss and required the
respondent to instead file an answer within the reglementary period, because she propounded affirmative
defenses which required the presentation of evidence aliunde.
Note:
The Supreme Court did not rule on the substantive issues, but instead remanded the case to the RTC.
25 NPC v. Maria Mendoza San Pedro
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
MARIA MENDOZA SAN PEDRO, represented by VICENTE, HERMINIA and FRANCISCO, all
surnamed SAN PEDRO, respondents.
G.R. No. 170945. September 26, 2006.
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
26 Reyes v. NHA
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
27 NPC v. Manalastas
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
28 Manapat v. CA
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
29 Republic v. Judge Gingoyon
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
30 NPC v. Lucman Ibrahim
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
31 Republic v. Sarabia
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
32 Francia, Jr. v. Municipality of Meycauayan
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
33 Manila Electric Co. v. Pineda
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
34 Estate of JBL Reyes v. City of Manila
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
35 Lagcao v. Judge
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
36 Metropolitan Cebu Water v. J. King & Sons
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
37 Republic v. Lim
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
38 Manila International Airport Authority v. City of Pasay, et al.
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
39 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
40 Gerochi v. Department of Energy
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
41 Batangas City, et al. v. Pilipinas Shell
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
42 City Government of Quezon , et al. v. Bayan Com.
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
43 Republic v. City of Paranaque
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
44 Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage Council of Cebu
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
45 Nursery Care Corp. v. Acevedo
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
46 Chevron Philippines, Inc. v. BCDA
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
47 Angeles University Foundation v. City of Angeles
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
48 People v. Marti
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
49 Armando Yrasegui v. PAL
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
50 Zulueta v. CA
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
51 Philippine Blooming Mills Employees, et al. v. Philippine Blooming Mills
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO,

FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE,
BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-31195. June 5, 1973.
Ponente: J. Makasiar
Topic: Right to Free Speech/Right to Peaceful Assembly
Synopsis:
The Supreme Court noted that the respondent company is the one who is guilty of unfair labor practice,
as its refusal to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for
redress of grievances.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner union staged a mass demonstration and protest on March 1, 1969, in front of the Malacañang
palace, protesting the alleged abuses of the Pasig police. Respondent company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,
Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the
union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Because the petitioners violated this
request, in that they, numbering about 400, proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the
respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the
demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the
demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company filed charges against the
petitioners. Respondent Judge Joaquin M. Salvador found the petitioners guilty of bargaining in bad faith.
ISSUE(S)
Was the protest a valid exercise of the freedom of expression, assembly, and petition for the redress of
grievances?
RULING
Yes. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court noted that the respondent company is the one who is guilty
of unfair labor practice, as its refusal to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass
demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners
from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of
assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances. The insistence on the part of the respondent
firm that the workers for the morning and regular shift should not participate in the mass demonstration,
under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech."
52 Ang Tibay v. CIR
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and NATIONAL
WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and
NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. L-46496. February 27, 1940.
Ponente: J. Laurel
Synopsis:
Administrative due process, in fact, requires that:
1. The accused be given the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s cause and
submit evidence in support thereof.
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
3. The decision must have something to support itself
4. The evidence must be substantial
5. The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected
6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate
7. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
Digest:
FACTS
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company. Due to alleged shortage of leather,
Toribio caused the layoff of members of National Labor Union (NLU). NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not
valid. The CIR decided the case and it was elevated to the SC, but a motion for new trial was raised by
the NLU. Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion for new trial.
ISSUE(S)
Can the CIR, as a special court vested with more administrative than judicial functions, dispense with due
process?
RULING
No. The CIR is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
Its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. As such, it is free from rigidity of certain
procedural requirements, but this does not mean that it can disregard a person’s right to due process.
Administrative due process, in fact, requires that:
1. The accused be given the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s cause and
submit evidence in support thereof.
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
3. The decision must have something to support itself
4. The evidence must be substantial
5. The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected
6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate
7. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
53 Quisumbing v. Rosales
CECILIA RACHEL V. QUISUMBING, Petitioner, v. LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MA. VICTORIA

V. CARDONA AND NORBERTO DELA CRUZ, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIRPERSON AND
MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 209283, March 11, 2015
Ponente: J. Brion
Synopsis:
Firstly, the CHR in this case did not act in a judicial or even quasi-judicial capacity. It merely conducted
an inquiry proceeding in the manner of a fact-finding investigation, which is not an adjudication which
warrants a formal hearing and trial. Moreover, the petitioner was not denied due process, because she
was properly apprised of the allegations against her, and she was even given ample opportunity to hear
her side. This is clearly in line with the spirit of administrative due process, which states that every
person must be given a chance to explain his side, or to seek a reconsideration of the accusations
complained of.
Digest:
FACTS
On September 18, 2013, a meeting was held at the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) to discuss the
complaints of several CHR employees against Commissioner Cecilia Rachel Quisumbing, among which
includes maltreatment of her employees, and the crimes of malfeasance or misfeasance. Present during
the meeting were Commissioners Etta Rosales, Ma. Victoria Cardona, and Norberto dela Cruz.
Commissioner Quisumbing was on sick leave while Commissioner Mamauag was on official business.
Based on these complaints and affidavits, the Commissioners present issued a Resolution and a Show
Cause order requesting Comm. Quisumbing to submit within 5 days a written explanation why she should
not be held administratively liable for any administrative liability, and to transmit her explanation to the
Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE(S)
Was the petitioner denied due process when the CHR forwarded her case to the Ombudsman without
giving her the benefit of a hearing?
RULING
No. Firstly, the CHR in this case did not act in a judicial or even quasi-judicial capacity. It merely
conducted an inquiry proceeding in the manner of a fact-finding investigation, which is not an
adjudication which warrants a formal hearing and trial. Moreover, the petitioner was not denied due
process, because she was properly apprised of the allegations against her, and she was even given ample
opportunity to hear her side. This is clearly in line with the spirit of administrative due process, which
states that every person must be given a chance to explain his side, or to seek a reconsideration of the
accusations complained of.
54 Shu v. Magpantay
RAY SHU, Petitioner, vs. JAIME DEE, ENRIQUETO MAGPANTAY, RAMON MIRANDA, LARRY
MACILLAN, AND EDWIN SO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 182573. April 23, 2014.
Ponente: J. Brion
Topic: Due Process
Synopsis:
On the respondents’ allegation that they were denied due process during the NBI investigation, the
Supreme Court stressed that the functions of the NBI are merely investigatory and informational in
nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to any party. It
cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI is an investigative agency whose findings are merely
recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative or as public welfare may
require in accordance with its mandate. Since the NBI’s findings were merely recommendatory, there can
be no denial of due process.
Digest:
FACTS
The petitioner is the President of the 3A Apparel Corporation. He filed a complaint before the National
Bureau of Investigation charging the respondents of falsification of two deeds of real estate mortgage
submitted to the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. Both deeds of real estate mortgage were
allegedly signed by the petitioner, one in his own name while the other was on behalf of 3A Apparel
Corporation. The NBI filed a complaint before the City Prosecutor of Makati, who found no probable
cause against the respondents. The petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Justice, who thus reversed
the prosecutor's findings. The Secretary of Justice denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration
prompting them to file a petition for certiorari with the CA, the main contention of which was that they
were denied the right to due process as, in the proceedings before the NBI, the respondents were not
furnished a copy of the complaint and were not likewise required to file their answer or to present
countervailing evidence. All the evidence at the NBI level were solely provided by the petitioner.
Furthermore, in the proceedings before the Secretary of Justice, the respondents were not furnished with
the petition for review that the petitioner filed. They were not even required to file their answer nor to
comment.
ISSUE(S)
Was there a violation of petitioners’ due process?
RULING
No. The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is not the
absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be heard. Sufficient
compliance with the requirements of due process exists when a party is given a chance to be heard
through his motion for reconsideration. In the outset, respondents filed with the Secretary of Justice a
motion for reconsideration of her resolution. Therefore, any initial defect in due process, if any, was
cured by the remedy the respondents availed of.
On the respondents’ allegation that they were denied due process during the NBI investigation, the
Supreme Court stressed that the functions of the NBI are merely investigatory and informational in
nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to any party. It
cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI is an investigative agency whose findings are merely
recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative or as public welfare may
require in accordance with its mandate. Since the NBI’s findings were merely recommendatory, there can
be no denial of due process. The NBI’s findings were still subject to the prosecutor’s and the Secretary of
Justice’s actions for purposes of finding the existence of probable cause.
55 Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Sereno
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA Petitioner, vs. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 213181. August 19, 2014.
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Topic: Due Process
Synopsis:
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Indeed, they are
distinct from criminal proceedings where the finding of guilt or innocence of the accused is sine qua non.
The JBC’s constitutional duty to recommend qualified nominees to the President cannot be compared to
the duty of the courts of law to determine the commission of an offense and ascribe the same to an
accused, consistent with established rules on evidence. Even the quantum of evidence required in
criminal cases is far from the discretion accorded to the JBC. The Court, however, could not accept, lock,
stock and barrel, the argument that an applicant’s access to the rights afforded under the due process
clause is discretionary on the part of the JBC. The fact that a JBC proceeding is sui generis and is
impressed with discretion, however, does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due
process.
Digest:
FACTS
On March 14, 2014, the JBC received a letter from Dean Danilo Concepcion of the University of the
Philippines nominating petitioner Francis H. Jardeleza for the position vacated by the retirement of
Associate Justice Roberto Abad. On May 29, 2014, Jardeleza was interviewed by the JBC. However, on
June 16 and 17, 2014, Jardeleza received telephone calls from former Court of Appeals Associate Justice
and incumbent JBC member, Aurora Santiago Lagman who informed him that during the meetings held
on June 5 and 16, 2014, Chief Justice and JBC ex-officio Chairperson Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno manifested that she would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him. Jardeleza was
then directed to "make himself available" before the JBC on June 30, 2014, during which he would be
informed of the objections to his integrity. During the June 30 meeting, sans Jardeleza, Justice Carpio
presented evidence clarifying the objection to the former's integrity. Later, Jardeleza was directed to one
of the Court’s ante-rooms where Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima informed him of
Justice Carpio's objection. Jardeleza asked that he be allowed to defend himself, and that the
proceedings be deferred. However, later that afternoon, the JBC continued its deliberations and
proceeded to vote for the nominees to be included in the shortlist. Jardeleza was not among the
nominees.
ISSUE(S)
Was Jardeleza denied his right to due process?
RULING
Yes. The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Indeed, they are
distinct from criminal proceedings where the finding of guilt or innocence of the accused is sine qua non.
The JBC’s constitutional duty to recommend qualified nominees to the President cannot be compared to
the duty of the courts of law to determine the commission of an offense and ascribe the same to an
accused, consistent with established rules on evidence. Even the quantum of evidence required in
criminal cases is far from the discretion accorded to the JBC. The Court, however, could not accept, lock,
stock and barrel, the argument that an applicant’s access to the rights afforded under the due process
clause is discretionary on the part of the JBC. The fact that a JBC proceeding is sui generis and is
impressed with discretion, however, does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due
process. In this case, what precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was the circumstance of
requiring Jardeleza to appear before the Council and to instantaneously provide those who are willing to
listen to an intelligent defense. Was he given the opportunity to do so? The answer is yes, in the context
of his physical presence during the meeting. Was he given a reasonable chance to muster a defense? No,
because he was merely asked to appear in a meeting where he would be, right then and there, subjected
to an inquiry. Needless to state, Jardeleza’s grievance is not an imagined slight but a real rebuff of his
right to be informed of the charges against him and his right to answer the same with vigorous
contention and active participation in the proceedings which would ultimately decide his aspiration to
become a magistrate of the high court.
56 Nacion v. COA, et al.
ATTY. JANET D. NACION, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, MA. GRACIA PULIDO-TAN,

JUANITO ESPINO AND HEIDI MENDOZA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 204757, March 17, 2015
Ponente: J. Reyes
Topic: Due Process
Synopsis:
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is the opportunity to explain one's side or seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, and to submit any evidence he may have in
support of his defense. The demands of due process are sufficiently met when the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. Given this and the circumstances under which the
rulings of the COA were issued, the Court finds no violation of Nacion's right to due process.
Digest:
FACTS
Nacion was assigned by the Commission on Audit to the Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System as
State Auditor V. On June 27, 2011, when Nacion was already holding the position of Director IV of COA,
National Government Sector, a formal charge against her was issued by COA Chairperson Ma. Gracia M.
Pulido Tan for acts found to be committed when she was still with the MWSS. In her answer, Nacion
admitted that she availed of the MWSS Housing Project and thus, was awarded a 300-square-meter lot at
the MWSS Employees Corporate Office Housing Project in Novaliches, Quezon City. Nacion invoked an
honest belief that she could avail of the benefit given the absence of any prohibition thereon upon COA
personnel. The COA found her guilty of grave misconduct, and while the offense usually carries with it
the penalty of dismissal, she was merely suspended for a year, and to refund the amount she acquired
under the MWSS housing program. Nacion appealed before the Supreme Court, invoking due process as
she argues that the records during her tenure with the MWSS should not have been included by the audit
team in its investigations, as no office order covering it was issued by the COA Chairman.
ISSUE(S)
Was Nacion denied due process?
RULING
No. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is the opportunity to explain one's side or
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, and to submit any evidence he may have in
support of his defense. The demands of due process are sufficiently met when the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. Given this and the circumstances under which the
rulings of the COA were issued, the Court finds no violation of Nacion's right to due process. As the Office
of the Solicitor General correctly argued, the constitution of a separate fact-finding team specifically for
Nacion's case was not necessary for the satisfaction of such right. It bears stressing that Nacion was
formally charged by Chairperson Tan, following evidence that pointed to irregularities committed while
she was with the MWSS. Being the COA Chairperson who, under the law, could initiate administrative
proceedings motu proprio, no written complaint against Nacion from another person was necessary. It
should be emphasized that prior to the issuance of the formal charge, the investigations conducted by
the audit team were merely fact-finding. The crucial point was the COA's observance of the demands of
due process prior to its finding or decision that Nacion was administratively liable. The formation of a
separate fact-finding team that should look specifically into Nacion's acts was not necessary to satisfy the
requirement.
G.R. No. 208261. December 8, 2014.

GUZMAN, respondent.
Topic: Due Process
Synopsis:
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that PAGCOR was the one that appointed De Guzman to her position.
Adhering to the well-settled principle that the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in the same
authority on which the power to appoint is vested, PAGCOR may only act through its Board of Directors
as a collective body, which is vested with the power and responsibility to exercise all corporate powers
under the law. However, in this instance, the Formal Charge, as well as the Assailed Memorandum, did
not come from PAGCOR through its Board of Directors, but merely from Atty. Sordan and HRDD-OIC
Bailey, respectively. Records are bereft of any showing that the latter were authorized by the PAGCOR
Board of Directors to issue the aforesaid documents. As such, the Formal Charge and the Assailed
Memorandum are null and void. Consequently, De Guzman’s removal from PAGCOR without a valid
formal charge was done in violation of her right to due process.
Digest:
FACTS
Guzman claiming PAGCOR violated the respondent’s right to due process. PAGCOR appealed before CA
who affirmed the CSC ruling.
ISSUE(S)
Was De Guzman deprived of due process?
RULING
Yes. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that PAGCOR was the one that appointed De Guzman to her
position. Adhering to the well-settled principle that the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in the
same authority on which the power to appoint is vested, PAGCOR may only act through its Board of
Directors as a collective body, which is vested with the power and responsibility to exercise all corporate
powers under the law. However, in this instance, the Formal Charge, as well as the Assailed
Memorandum, did not come from PAGCOR through its Board of Directors, but merely from Atty. Sordan
and HRDD-OIC Bailey, respectively. Records are bereft of any showing that the latter were authorized by
the PAGCOR Board of Directors to issue the aforesaid documents. As such, the Formal Charge and the
Assailed Memorandum are null and void. Consequently, De Guzman’s removal from PAGCOR without a
valid formal charge was done in violation of her right to due process.
58 Atty. Erece v. Macalingay
ATTY. ROMEO L. ERECE, Petitioner, vs. LYN B. MACALINGAY, JOCELYN BASTIAN, et al.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 166809. April 22, 2008.
Ponente: J. Azcuna
Topic: Due Process
Synopsis:
Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with judicial process for a trial in court is not
always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is
otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due process clause
guarantees no form of procedure and its requirements are not technical.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner is the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) Region I, located at San
Fernando City, La Union. Respondent employees of the CHR Region I filed an Affidavit-Complaint dated
October 2, 1998 against petitioner alleging that he denied them the use of the office vehicle assigned to
petitioner, that petitioner still claimed transportation allowance even if he was using the said vehicle, and
that he certified that he did not use any government vehicle, when in fact he did, in order to collect
transportation allowance. After a fact-finding investigation, the CSC Proper charged petitioner with
Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct for using a government vehicle in spite of his receipt of the monthly
transportation allowance. Petitioner contends that he was denied due process as he was not afforded the
right to cross-examine his accusers and their witnesses. He stated that at his instance, in order to
prevent delay in the disposition of the case, he was allowed to present evidence first to support the
allegations in his Counter-Affidavit. After he rested his case, respondents did not present their evidence,
but moved to submit their position paper and formal offer of evidence, which motion was granted by the
CSC over his (petitioners) objection.
ISSUE(S)
Was petitioner denied due process?
RULING
No. Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with judicial process for a trial in court is
not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is
otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due process clause
guarantees no form of procedure and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of
administrative character, the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The
right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. Nor is an actual hearing always
essential.
59 Dela Salle University v. CA
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD HOLMES, et al., Petitioners, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, Presiding Judge, Branch 36, Regional
Trial Court, Manila, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 127980. December 19, 2007.

Topic: Due Process
Synopsis:
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school discipline, [t]here are
withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process
and these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the
assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall
have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Digest:
FACTS
Private respondents are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle
University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB) Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement
in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of
Domino Lux Fraternity. The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The next day, petitioner
Yap lodged a complaint with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging private respondents with direct
assault. Similar complaints were filed by the other petitioners against the private respondents. On May 3,
1995, after affording the respondents opportunity to answer the complaints, the DLSU-CSB Joint
Discipline Board issued a Resolution finding private respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme
penalty of automatic expulsion. Respondent Aguilar filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for TRO
before the RTC, which was granted by herein respondent judge. Despite the said order, private
respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU when he attempted to enroll on
September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996.On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its
questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private
respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to be reinstated, while other private respondents were to be
excluded. Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent Aguilar
from enrolling and/or attending his classes.
ISSUE(S)
Were the private respondents afforded due process of law?
RULING
Yes. The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights
based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be
deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history. In administrative cases,
such as investigations of students found violating school discipline, [t]here are withal minimum standards
which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these are: that (1) the
students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they
shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3)
they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in
their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. A formal trial-type hearing is not,
always and in all instances, essential to due process it is enough that the parties are given a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting
evidence on which a fair decision can be based. Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the
charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given
the opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers.
They were also informed of the evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before
the Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and
they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the
parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121. Private respondents cannot
claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses
against them.
60 Atienza, et al., v. COMELEC, Roxas, and Drilon
JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MATIAS V. DEFENSOR, JR., et al., Petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, MANUEL A. ROXAS III, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, and J.R. NEREUS O. ACOSTA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 188920. February 16, 2010.
Ponente: J. Abad
Topic: Due Process
Synopsis:
The requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of political parties.
The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies created by the state and
through which certain governmental acts or functions are performed. An administrative agency or
instrumentality contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the
performance of a state function.
Digest:
FACTS
On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of the Liberal Party (LP),
announced his partys withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
But petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of party members denounced
Drilon's move, claiming that he made the announcement without consulting his party. On March 2, 2006
petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local autonomy and party matters but,
when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LPs ruling body vacant and
elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president. Respondent Drilon immediately filed a petition with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to nullify the elections. The COMELEC partially granted the petition,
annulling the election already conducted and instead directed the holding of another election under its
supervision. Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent
Drilons term expired. Eventually, that meeting installed respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the
new LP president. Petitioners Atienza et al. also complained that Atienza, the incumbent party chairman,
was not invited to the NECO meeting and that some members, like petitioner Defensor, were given the
status of guests during the meeting.
ISSUE(S)
Was Atienza denied due process?
RULING
No. The requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of political parties.
performance of a state function. Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up
as an intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state
instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or
property within the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the
state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that party
members may have, in relation to other party members, correspond to those that may have been freely
agreed upon among themselves through their charter, which is a contract among the party members. But
even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere in membership and
disciplinary matters within a political party. A political party is free to conduct its internal affairs, pursuant
to its constitutionally-protected right to free association.
61 Department of Education v. Cuanan
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, represented by its Officer-in-Charge and Undersecretary,

RAMON C. BACANI, Petitioner, vs. GODOFREDO G. CUANAN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 169013. December 16, 2008.
Topic: Due Process
Synopsis:
While it is true that administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements, they are bound by law and practice to observe the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them. The relative freedom of
the CSC from the rigidities of procedure cannot be invoked to evade what was clearly emphasized in the
landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations: that all administrative bodies cannot ignore
or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process.
Digest:
FACTS
On March 11, 1996, Luzviminda Borja and Juliana Castro, on behalf of their respective minor daughters,
Lily Borja and Charo Castro, filed before the Department of Education, Culture and Sports - Regional
Office No. III (DECS-RO No. III), Cabanatuan City, two separate administrative complaints for Sexual
Harassment and Conduct Unbecoming a Public Officer against Cuanan, then Principal of Lawang Kupang
Elementary School in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. The DECS formed a committee and conducted a fact
finding/investigative operation, which found Cuanan guilty of sexual harassment and recommending his
forced resignation without prejudice to benefits. Regional Director Labrador concurred with the
committee's recommendation, and meted out the penalty of forced resignation to Cuanan without
prejudice to benefits. The CSC however, exonerated him from the offense in a resolution from which the
DepEd is seeking reconsideration. Cuanan now contends that his right to due process was violated when
he was not given a copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd or given the opportunity to comment
thereon.
ISSUE(S)
Was Cuanan’s right to due process violated?
RULING
Yes. While it is true that administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements, they are bound by law and practice to observe the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them. The
relative freedom of the CSC from the rigidities of procedure cannot be invoked to evade what was clearly
emphasized in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations: that all administrative
bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. Cuanan
undoubtedly was denied procedural due process. He had no opportunity to participate in the proceedings
for the petition for review/ reconsideration filed by the DepEd, since no copy of the pleadings filed by the
DepEd were served upon him or his counsel; nor was he even required by the CSC to file his comments
thereon.
62 Dela Salle University v. CA
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD HOLMES, et al., Petitioners, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, Presiding Judge, Branch 36, Regional
Trial Court, Manila, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 127980. December 19, 2007.

Topic: Due Process
Synopsis:
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school discipline, [t]here are
withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process
and these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the
assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall
have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Digest:
FACTS
Private respondents are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle
University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB) Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement
in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of
Domino Lux Fraternity. The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The next day, petitioner
Yap lodged a complaint with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging private respondents with direct
assault. Similar complaints were filed by the other petitioners against the private respondents. On May 3,
1995, after affording the respondents opportunity to answer the complaints, the DLSU-CSB Joint
Discipline Board issued a Resolution finding private respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme
penalty of automatic expulsion. Respondent Aguilar filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for TRO
before the RTC, which was granted by herein respondent judge. Despite the said order, private
respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU when he attempted to enroll on
September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996.On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its
questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private
respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to be reinstated, while other private respondents were to be
excluded. Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent Aguilar
from enrolling and/or attending his classes.
ISSUE(S)
Were the private respondents afforded due process of law?
RULING
Yes. The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights
based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be
deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history. In administrative cases,
such as investigations of students found violating school discipline, [t]here are withal minimum standards
which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these are: that (1) the
students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they
shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3)
they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in
their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. A formal trial-type hearing is not,
always and in all instances, essential to due process it is enough that the parties are given a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting
evidence on which a fair decision can be based. Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the
charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given
the opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers.
They were also informed of the evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before
the Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and
they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the
parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121. Private respondents cannot
claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses
against them.
63 Datufac Magudadatu v. HRET
ANICETO SABBUN MAGUDDATU and LAUREANA SABBUN MAGUDDATU, Petitioners, v.

Honorable COURT OF APPEALS (FOURTH DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 139599. February 23, 2000
Ponente: J. Kapunan
Topic: Right to Bail
Synopsis:
Bail is a matter of right: (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court: and (b) before conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be
admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
prescribed by law or [the Rules of Court]. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court on application, may admit the
accused to bail.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners Aniceto Sabbun Maguddatu and Laureana Sabbun Maguddatu, Atty. Teodoro Rubino, Antonio
Sabbun Maguddatu and several other "John Does" were charged with murder before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 64, for the killing of Jose S. Pascual. On October 23, 1985, petitioners filed a
motion to be admitted to bail on the ground that the prosecution’s evidence is not strong. The petition
was granted on December 20, 1985, and on the same day, the petitioners posted bail. On January 6,
1987, the AFISCO Insurance Corporation filed a motion before the trial court praying for the cancellation
of petitioner’s bail bond because of the latter’s failure to renew the same upon its expiration on
December 20, 1986. This was not acted upon by the court, until eventually the resolution finding
petitioners guilty was promulgated in absentia. While remaining at large, Petitioners, on February 27,
1998, filed a Notice of Appeal from the order of conviction for homicide with a motion to be granted
provisional liberty under the same bail bond pending appeal. Pursuant thereto, the RTC issued an order
for their arrest. The Court of Appeals however, denied petitioners' petition for bail and its prayer to lift
the order of arrest.
ISSUE(S)
Are petitioners entitled to bail? Otherwise stated, did the CA err in denying petitioners’ bail?
RULING
No. Bail is a matter of right: (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court: and (b) before conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be
admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
prescribed by law or [the Rules of Court]. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court on application, may admit the
accused to bail. Despite an order of arrest from the trial court and two warnings from the Court of
Appeals, petitioners had remained at large. It is axiomatic that for one to be entitled to bail, he should be
in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one’s release
and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. From the records of the case, petitioners
are not entitled to bail. Firstly, petitioners violated the conditions of their bail. Bail is defined as a security
for the release of a person conditioned upon his appearance before any court. The accused shall also
appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules. Petitioners’ non-
appearance during the promulgation of the trial court’s decision despite due notice and without justifiable
reason, and their continued non-submission to the proper authorities as ordered by the Court of Appeals,
constitutes violations of the conditions of their bail.
Notes:
The bail bond that the accused previously posted can only be used during the 15-day period to appeal
(Rule 122) and not during the entire period of appeal. This is consistent with Section 2(a) of Rule 114
which provides that the bail" shall be effective upon approval and remain in force at all stages of the
case, unless sooner canceled, until the promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it."
64 Atienza, et al., v. COMELEC, Roxas, and Drilon

JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MATIAS V. DEFENSOR, JR., et al., Petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, MANUEL A. ROXAS III, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, and J.R. NEREUS O. ACOSTA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 188920. February 16, 2010.
Ponente: J. Abad
Topic: Due Process
Synopsis:
The requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of political parties.
performance of a state function.
Digest:
FACTS
On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of the Liberal Party (LP),
announced his partys withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
But petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of party members denounced
Drilon's move, claiming that he made the announcement without consulting his party. On March 2, 2006
petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local autonomy and party matters but,
when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LPs ruling body vacant and
elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president. Respondent Drilon immediately filed a petition with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to nullify the elections. The COMELEC partially granted the petition,
annulling the election already conducted and instead directed the holding of another election under its
supervision. Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent
Drilons term expired. Eventually, that meeting installed respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the
new LP president. Petitioners Atienza et al. also complained that Atienza, the incumbent party chairman,
was not invited to the NECO meeting and that some members, like petitioner Defensor, were given the
status of guests during the meeting.
ISSUE(S)
Was Atienza denied due process?
RULING
No. The requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of political parties.
performance of a state function. Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up
as an intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state
instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or
property within the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the
state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that party
members may have, in relation to other party members, correspond to those that may have been freely
agreed upon among themselves through their charter, which is a contract among the party members. But
even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere in membership and
disciplinary matters within a political party. A political party is free to conduct its internal affairs, pursuant
to its constitutionally-protected right to free association.
65 Republic v. Pilipinas Shell

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Petitioner,
vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 173918. April 8, 2008.
Topic: Due Process
Synopsis:
As early as 1986, the Supreme Court in Tañada v. Tuvera enunciated that publication is indispensable in
order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing
laws, attain binding force and effect. In the immediate case, the petitioner was unable to convince the
Court that there has been publication in accordance with the Civil Code and the Administrative Code. The
due process requirements of publication and filing cannot be set aside, even when the assailed law is an
administrative circular or an implementing rules and regulations.
Digest:
FACTS
On 10 October 1984, the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) was created under Presidential Decree No.
1956 for the purpose of minimizing frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustments
and/or increase in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products. On December
1991, the Office of Energy Affairs, now the DOE, informed the respondent corporation that its
contributions to the OPSF were insufficient. Thus, in compliance with MOF Circular No. 1-85, the DOE
imposed a surcharge of ₱14,414,860.75. Respondent averred that the law is in violation of the right to
due process because it was not published in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
ISSUE(S)
Is the surcharge in violation of due process?
RULING
Yes. As early as 1986, the Supreme Court in Tañada v. Tuvera enunciated that publication is
indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or
implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect. In the immediate case, the petitioner was unable
to convince the Court that there has been publication in accordance with the Civil Code and the
Administrative Code. The due process requirements of publication and filing cannot be set aside, even
when the assailed law is an administrative circular or an implementing rules and regulations.
66 Timbol v. COMELEC
JOSEPH B. TIMBOL, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 206004. February 24, 2015.
Ponente: J. Leonen
Topic: Due Process
Synopsis:
The opportunity to be heard is a chance "to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of." In election cases, due process requirements are satisfied "when
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand."
Respondent declared petitioner a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to explain his bona fide
intention to run for office. Respondent had already issued Resolution No. 9610 on January 11, 2013 when
petitioner appeared before Election Officer Valencia in a clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2013. This
was an ineffective opportunity to be heard.
Digest:
FACTS
On October 5, 2012, Timbol filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City. On January 15, 2013, he received a
Subpoena from COMELEC Election Officer Dinah A. Valencia (Election Officer Valencia), ordering him to
appear before her office on January 17, 2013 for a clarificatory hearing in connection with his Certificate
of Candidacy. During the clarificatory hearing, Timbol argued that he was not a nuisance candidate. He
contended that in the 2010 elections, he ranked eighth among all the candidates who ran for Member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City. Election Officer Valencia thus
recommended that Timbol's Certificate of Candidacy be given due course. Despite Election Officer
Valencia's favorable recommendation, Timbol's name was not removed from the list of nuisance
candidates posted in the COMELEC's website. With the printing of ballots for the automated elections set
on February 4, 2013, Timbol filed on February 2, 2013 a Petition praying that his name be included in the
certified list of candidates for the May 13, 2013 elections. In the Minute Resolution dated February 5,
2013, the COMELEC denied the Petition for being moot, considering that the printing of ballots had
already begun.
ISSUE(S)
Was Timbol’s right to due process denied when he was declared a nuisance candidate?
RULING
Yes. The opportunity to be heard is a chance "to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of." In election cases, due process requirements are
satisfied "when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand." Respondent declared petitioner a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance
to explain his bona fide intention to run for office. Respondent had already issued Resolution No. 9610 on
January 11, 2013 when petitioner appeared before Election Officer Valencia in a clarificatory hearing on
January 17, 2013. This was an ineffective opportunity to be heard. That petitioner was able to file a
Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates did not cure the defect in the issuance of Resolution
No. 9610. First, he would not have to file the Petition had been given an opportunity to be heard in the
first place. Second, in the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013, respondent denied petitioner's
Petition on the sole ground that the printing of ballots had already begun on February 4, 2013.
67 Kuwait Airline Corporation v. PAL
KUWAIT AIRWAYS CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., Respondent.

G.R. No. 156087. May 8, 2009.
Ponente: J. Tinga
Topic: Non-Impairment Clause
Synopsis:
One of the most essential characteristics of contracts is its obligatory force, which means that it binds
contracting parties as the source of vested rights which may not be impaired. In the immediate case, PAL
was already a private corporation when the CMU was signed, therefore it was no longer controlled by the
government. In order to validly circumvent the non-impairment clause, the government should first
observe due process and seek non-invasive remedies provided for under civil law. For one, the
government could have called for the judicial annulment or reformation of the contract to effect the
termination of the original commercial agreement instead.
Digest:
FACTS
In 1981, Kuwait Airways and Philippine Airlines (acting then as a government-owned and controlled
corporation) entered into a Commercial Agreement wherein some of the operations and exercise of
certain freedom traffic rights between the two nations were subject to royalty payments. The contract
persisted even as PAL was privatized in 1992. On May 1995, delegates of the governments of Kuwait and
the Philippines, including officials of PAL, signed a Confidential Memorandum of Understanding (CMU).
The new contract stipulated that the exercise of third or fourth freedom traffic rights shall no longer be
subject to royalty payment or commercial arrangements. In relation to this, Kuwait Airways sent a letter
to PAL stating that it will terminate the original agreement on April 12, 1995. PAL however, replied that
pursuant to the original agreement, termination may only be made on the last day of any traffic period,
which means it could only cease to take effect on October 31, 1995. It filed a petition for the fulfillment
of Kuwait Airways’ obligation of payment during the period of April to October 1995.
ISSUE(S)
May a private corporation (PAL) be subjected to a contract signed by the executive department (CMU)
which impairs its obligation?
RULING
No. One of the most essential characteristics of contracts is its obligatory force, which means that it binds
contracting parties as the source of vested rights which may not be impaired. In the immediate case, PAL
was already a private corporation when the CMU was signed, therefore it was no longer controlled by the
government. In order to validly circumvent the non-impairment clause, the government should first
observe due process and seek non-invasive remedies provided for under civil law. For one, the
government could have called for the judicial annulment or reformation of the contract to effect the
termination of the original commercial agreement instead.
68 Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000
Ponente: J. Melo
Topic: Rights of the Accused/Due Process in Criminal Proceedings
Synopsis:
It is a known principle of statutory construction that when a municipal law and an international law is in
conflict, the local law must prevail. This rule is no less applicable given that it is the Constitution itself
that provides that the accused in a criminal proceeding shall be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does
not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over municipal law in the municipal sphere.
Digest:
FACTS
On June 1999, the government, through the Department of Justice, received a request from the United
States of America, through the Department of Foreign Affairs, calling for the extradition of Mark Jimenez.
This is pursuant to PD No. 1609 prescribing the procedure for the extradition of persons who have
committed a crime in a foreign country. Jimenez sought copies of the extradition requests and asked that
he be given ample time to comment on said requests. Herein petitioner denied the same.
ISSUE(S)
Should treaty stipulations prevail over an individual’s right to due process?
RULING
No. It is a known principle of statutory construction that when a municipal law and an international law is
in conflict, the local law must prevail. This rule is no less applicable given that it is the Constitution itself
that provides that the accused in a criminal proceeding shall be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does
not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over municipal law in the municipal sphere. In
states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated
if they are in conflict with the constitution.
69 Farinas v. Executive Secretary
RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A.

AQUINO, AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN
THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003.

Topic: Equal Protection
Synopsis:
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy
their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term
and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials
hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive
officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve
at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners assail that Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act, is
unconstitutional, because it violates the equal protection clause, as it discriminates against appointive
officials. In the Omnibus Election Code, both elective and appointive officials are considered ipso facto
resigned from their office once they file a certificate of candidacy. The assailed section of RA 9006
expressly repeals this provision in favor of elective officials, but it is implied that the election law provision
still applies to appointive officials.
ISSUE(S)
Does this law violate the equal protection clause?
RULING
No. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive
officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while
others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S.

ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R.
SANDOVAL, petitioners, vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his capacity as Commissioner of Bureau
of Customs, respondents
G.R. No. 166715. August 14, 2008
Ponente: J. Corona
Synopsis:
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same conditions and among
persons similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are
classified based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. When things or
persons are different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in law differently. The equal protection
clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and not arbitrary. With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the
revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions
provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies.
Digest:
FACTS
This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act
(RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005). They assailed among others that limiting the scope of the system of
rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a
system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.
ISSUE(S)
Is the law in violation of the equal protection clause?
RULING
No. Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same conditions and
among persons similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who
are classified based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. When things
or persons are different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in law differently. The equal
protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation
or rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization
of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law
is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or
sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns
only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of generating
revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of
being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions –
taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the
law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy
the demands of equal protection.
71 Garcia v. Judge Drilon
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in
behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed
GARCIA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 179267. June 25, 2013.
Synopsis:
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make
for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions
only; and apply equally to each member of the class. There is no question as to the validity of the
classification of women and children as victims more often than violators of acts of abuse. Moreover, the
legislative intent in passing the law is just as clear, the increased judicial protection of women and
children in cases of abuse being the most logical and least destructive method of attaining the
legislature’s goal.
Digest:
FACTS
Jesus Garcia, after his wife filed a case against him (claiming physical, psychological, emotional, and
economic violence), assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262, or the Violence Against Women
and their Children (VAWC) Law.
ISSUE(S)
the VAWC law violative of the equal protection clause?
RULING
No. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. All that is required of a valid classification is that
it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing
conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class. There is no question as to the validity of
the classification of women and children as victims more often than violators of acts of abuse. Moreover,
the legislative intent in passing the law is just as clear, the increased judicial protection of women and
children in cases of abuse being the most logical and least destructive method of attaining the
legislature’s goal.

G.R. No. 209287. July 1, 2014.
Synopsis:
The challenge based on the contravention of the Equal Protection Clause, which focuses on the release of
funds under the DAP to legislators, lacks factual and legal basis. The allegations about Senators and
Congressmen being unaware of the existence and implementation of the DAP, and about some of them
having refused to accept such funds were unsupported with relevant data. Also, the claim that the
Executive discriminated against some legislators on the ground alone of their receiving less than the
others could not of itself warrant a finding of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The denial of
equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only by parties who supposedly suffer it, and,
in these cases, such parties would be the few legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in
the releases of funds under the DAP. The reason for the requirement is that only such affected legislators
could properly and fully bring to the fore when and how the denial of equal protection occurred, and
explain why there was a denial in their situation. The requirement was not met here. Consequently, the
Court was not put in the position to determine if there was a denial of equal protection.
Digest:
FACTS
contentions was that DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule on equal
protection. With respect to the challenge against the DAP under the Equal Protection Clause, Luna argues
that the implementation of the DAP was "unfair as it [was] selective" because the funds released under
the DAP was not made available to all the legislators, with some of them refusing to avail themselves of
the DAP funds, and others being unaware of the availability of such funds. Thus, the DAP practised
"undue favoritism" in favor of select legislators in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause.
ISSUE(S)
Did the DAP violate the equal protection clause?
RULING
The challenge based on the contravention of the Equal Protection Clause, which focuses on the release of
funds under the DAP to legislators, lacks factual and legal basis. The allegations about Senators and
Congressmen being unaware of the existence and implementation of the DAP, and about some of them
having refused to accept such funds were unsupported with relevant data. Also, the claim that the
Executive discriminated against some legislators on the ground alone of their receiving less than the
others could not of itself warrant a finding of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The denial of
equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only by parties who supposedly suffer it, and,
in these cases, such parties would be the few legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in
the releases of funds under the DAP. The reason for the requirement is that only such affected legislators
could properly and fully bring to the fore when and how the denial of equal protection occurred, and
explain why there was a denial in their situation. The requirement was not met here. Consequently, the
Court was not put in the position to determine if there was a denial of equal protection.
73 Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC.,

petitioner, vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
respondents.
G.R. No. 148208. December 15, 2004.
Ponente: J. Puno
Synopsis:
The proviso is unconstitutional as it operates on the salary grade or the officer employee status, it
distinguishes between economic class and status with the higher salary grade recipients are of greater
benefit above the law than those of mandated by the Salary Standardization Act. Officers of the BSP
receive higher wages than those of rank-and-file employees because the former are not covered by the
salary standardization act as provided by the proviso.
Digest:
FACTS
Section 15 (i), Article II of RA 7653 establishes a Human Resource Management System and a
compensation structure as part of the authority of the Monetary Board. Employees whose positions fall
under SG 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates in the salary standardization act. Petitioner
contends that the classifications is not reasonable, arbitrary and violates the equal protection clause. The
Solicitor General, as counsel of the Executive Secretary defends the provision, that the classification of
employees is based on real and actual differentiation and it adheres to the policy of RA 7653 to “establish
professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the government.”
ISSUE(S)
Does this provision violate the equal protection clause?
RULING
Yes. The proviso is unconstitutional as it operates on the salary grade or the officer employee status, it
distinguishes between economic class and status with the higher salary grade recipients are of greater
benefit above the law than those of mandated by the Salary Standardization Act. Officers of the BSP
receive higher wages than those of rank-and-file employees because the former are not covered by the
salary standardization act as provided by the proviso.
74 Guttierez v. DBM
VICTORIA C. GUTTIEREZ, JOEL R. PEREZ, ARACELI L. YAMBOT, et al., Petitioners, vs.

G.R. No. 153266. March 18, 2010.
Ponente: J. Abad
Synopsis:
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane
to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. To be valid and
reasonable, the classification must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Digest:
FACTS
Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 to rationalize the compensation of government employees. Its Section 12 directed the
consolidation of allowances and additional compensation already being enjoyed by employees into their
standardized salary rates. But it exempted certain additional compensations that the employees may be
receiving from such consolidation. Pursuant to this, the Department of Budget and Management issued
NCC 59, enumerating the specific allowances and additional compensations which were deemed
integrated in the basic salaries and these included the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and Inflation
Connected Allowance (ICA). On May 16, 2002 employees of the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. 153266, questioning the propriety of integrating their COLA
into their standardized salary rates. Employees of other offices of the national government followed suit.
In addition, petitioners in G.R. 159007 questioned the disallowance of the allowances and fringe benefits
that the COA auditing personnel assigned to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) used to
get. Some of the petitioners likewise contend that the continued grant of COLA to military and police
personnel under CCC 10 and NCC 59 to the exclusion of other government employees violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
ISSUE(S)
Is there a violation of the equal protection clause in this case?
RULING
No. The Court ruled out the opinion that the continued grant of COLA to the uniformed personnel to the
exclusion of other national government officials run afoul the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane
to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. To be valid and
reasonable, the classification must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
75 Himagan v. People
ISHMAEL HIMAGAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE HILARIO
MAPAYO, RTC, Br. 11, Davao City, respondents.
G.R. No. 113811. October 7, 1994.
Ponente: J. Kapunan
Synopsis:
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among
men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as
the one which exists in the instant case.
Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical company of the Philippine National Police Regional
Headquarters at Camp Catitigan, Davao City, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and
the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the informations for murder nd attempted murder were
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City, on September 16, 1992, the trial court issued
an Order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case. On October 11, 1993, petitioner filed a
motion to lift the order for his suspension, relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree,
that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. Petitioner posits that as a member of the
Philippine National Police, he is covered by the Civil Service Law.
ISSUE(S)
Will the imposition of suspension of more than 90 days constitute a violation of Himagan’s constitutional
right to equal protection?
RULING
No. The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among
men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as
the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and substantial differences;
is germane to the purpose of the law; applies to all members of the same class; and applies to current as
well as future conditions, the classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal
protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper
legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.
Notes:
The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives
no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave
offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case.
The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same
Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not
qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the
period of suspension. The second deals with the time frame within which the trial should be finished.
Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to
the lifting of preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal cases, as here.
What is more, Section 42 expressly limits the period of preventive suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91
of R.A. 6975 which states that "The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules shall apply to all
personnel of the Department" simply means that the provisions of the Civil Service Law and its
implementing rules and regulations are applicable to members of the Philippine National Police insofar as
the provisions, rules and regulations are not inconsistent with R.A. 6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil
Service Decree which limits the preventive suspension to ninety (90) days cannot apply to members of
the PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides differently, that is, the suspension where the penalty
imposed by law exceeds six (6) years shall continue until the case is terminated.
76 Quinto v. COMELEC
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
77 Duncan Association v. Glaxo
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
78 PT&T v. NLRC
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
79 International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
80 Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
81 Garcia v. Executive Secretary
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
82 Prudente v. Dayrit
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
83 20th Century Fox v. CA
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
84 Sony Music v. Judge Espanol
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
85 Pilipinas Shell v. Romars International Gases Corp.
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
86 Leviste v. Alameda
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
87 Pestilos v. Generoso
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
88 Anlud Metal Recycling Corp. v. Ang
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
89 Malacat v. CA
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
90 People v. Mengote
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
91 People v. Claudio
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
92 People v. Aminudin
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
93 People v. Tangliben
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
94 People v. Malmstedt
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
95 People v. De Gracia
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
96 People v. Chi Chan Liu
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
97 People v. Mariacos
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
98 People v. Escano
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
99 People v. Valdez
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
100 Villanueva v. People
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
101 People v. Damaso
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
102 Caballes v. CA
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
103 George Antiquera v. People
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
104 People v. Cogaed
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
105 Sanchez v. People
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
106 Valeroso v. CA
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
107 People v. Bolasa
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
108 Disini v. Secretary of Justice
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
109 Chavez v. Gonzalez
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
110 KMU v. Ermita
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
111 Spouses Romualdez v. COMELEC
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
112 Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, et al.
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
113 Vivares v. St. Theresa's College
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
114 Belo-Henares v. Atty. Argee Guevarra
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
115 Gamboa v. P/SSupt. Chan
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
116 BSB Group, Inc. v. Sally Go
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
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117 Borjal v. CA
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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118 Tulfo v. CA
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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119 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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120 Newsounds Broadcasting v. Dy
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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121 Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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122 SWS v. COMELEC
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
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123 GMA Network, Inc., et al. v. COMELEC
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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124 1-Utak v. COMELEC
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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125 IBP v. Atienza
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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126 KMU v. Ermita/Bayan Muna v. Ermita
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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127 Soriano v. MTRCB
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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128 Iglesia ni Cristo v. CA
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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129 Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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130 Islamic Da'wah Council v. Executive Secretary
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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131 Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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132 Manosca v. CA
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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133 Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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134 Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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135 Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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136 Nollora, Jr. v. People
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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137 Estrada v. Escritur
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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138 Perfecto v. Esidera
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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139 Leus v. St. Scholastica's College, et al.
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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140 Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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141 Antolin v. Domondon
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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142 Bantay Republic Act 7941 v. COMELEC
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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143 Request for RadioTV Coverage-Estrada Trial
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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144 Bayan Muna v. Ermita
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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145 Chavez v. PEA and Amari
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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146 PSBank, et al. v/ Senate Impeachment Court
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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147 Hilado, et al. v. Judge Amor Reyes
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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148 In re: Production of Court Records
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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149 Request for a copy of 2006 SALN, PDS, and CV OF SC Justices, Officers…
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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150 Sta. Clara Homeowners Association v. Spouses Gaston
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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151 GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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152 United BF Homeowners Association, Inc. v. City Mayor, et al.
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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153 Yinlu Bicol Mining Corp. v. Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development Corp.
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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154 Philreca v. Secretary of DILG
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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155 Frias, Jr., et al. v. Judge Sorongon
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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156 Re: Query of Mr. Roger Prioreschi…
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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157 People v. Mahinay
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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158 BPI v. CASA
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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159 People v. Mollejo
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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ISSUE(S)
RULING
160 De Castro v. People
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
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FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
161 People v. Cristobal
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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ISSUE(S)
RULING
162 People v. Tuniaco
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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163 People v. Lauga
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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164 People v. Obrero
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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165 People v. Patungan
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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ISSUE(S)
RULING
166 People v. Reyes
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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ISSUE(S)
RULING
167 People v. Wahiman
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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168 People v. Rapeza
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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ISSUE(S)
RULING
169 People v. Endino
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
170 People v. Baloloy
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
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ISSUE(S)
RULING
171 Navallo v. Sandiganbayan
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
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ISSUE(S)
RULING
172 People v. Ting Lan Uy
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
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FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
173 People v. Taliman
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
174 People v. Culala
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
175 People v. Tomaquin
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
176 People v. Velarde
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
177 People v. Zuela
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
178 People v. Andan
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
179 People v. Maqueda
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
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ISSUE(S)
RULING
180 Ho Wai Pang v. People
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
181 People v. Bucalon
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
182 Qui v. People
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
183 Leviste v. Court of A ppeals
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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RULING
184 Enrile v. Sandiganbayan
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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RULING
185 US v. Purganan
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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ISSUE(S)
RULING
186 Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr.
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
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FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
187 Rodriguez v. Judge
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
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FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
188 Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
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ISSUE(S)
RULING
189 Taglay v. Daray
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
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FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
190 People v. CA
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
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FACTS
ISSUE(S)
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191 Sevilla v. People
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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192 Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion Angeles
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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RULING
193 Callangan v. People
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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194 People v. Bermas
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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195 Uyboco v. People
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
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FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
196 Delgado v. CA
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
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ISSUE(S)
RULING
197 People v. Santocildes
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
198 People v. Tulin
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
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ISSUE(S)
RULING
199 Re: Request for TV/Radio Coverage of the Trial v. Joseph Estrada
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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200 Go, et al. v. People
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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ISSUE(S)
RULING
201 People v. Chua
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
202 De Villa v. Director of Prisons
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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RULING
203 De Lima v. Gatdula
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
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FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING
204 So v. Tacla
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
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ISSUE(S)
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205 Teves v. Sandiganbayan
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
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206 Estrada v. People
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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207 People v. Angus, Jr.
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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ISSUE(S)
RULING
208 People v. Mortera
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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209 Adonis, et al. v. Supt. Tesoro (Director of Davao Prisons)
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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210 Martinez v. Mendoza
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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211 Ilagan v. Enrile
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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212 Secretary of National Defense and AFP Chief of Staff v. Manalo
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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213 Razon v. Tagitis
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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214 De Lima v. Gatdula
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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215 Navia, et al. v. Pardico
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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216 Spouses Pador v. Brgy. Captain Arcayan, et al.
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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217 Spouses Santiago v. Tulfo
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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218 Reyes v. CA
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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219 So v. Tacla
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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220 Barcelona v. Lim, et al.
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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221 People v. Olvis
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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222 SJS v. DDB
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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223 Dela Cruz v. People
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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224 Echegaray v. Executive Secretary
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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225 Villareal v. People
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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226 Lejano v. People/People v. Webb, et al.
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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227 People v. Judge Lagos
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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228 Bautista v. Cuneta-Pangilinan
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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229 Dayap v. Sendiong
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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230 People v. Domingo
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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231 Herrera v. Sandiganbayan
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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232 People v. Dumlao
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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233 People and AAA v. CA
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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234 Ivler v. San Pedro
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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235 SPO2 JAMACA v. People
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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236 Republic v. Eugenio
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
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***nothing follows***

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE DIGESTS

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE DIGESTS

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

1. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO

4. Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad

TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, petitioner, vs. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT,

Ponente: J. Davide, Jr.

Concurring opinion of J. Feliciano:

6. Gamboa v. Secretary of Finance

WILSON P. GAMBOA, petitioner, vs. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES, FINANCE

7. Tobias vs. Abalos

ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and

Petitioners come before the Supreme Court, contending RA 7675 as unconstitutional.

1. Was there gerrymandering (a manipulation of electoral constituency to achieve one’s purposes)?

Ponente: J. Davide, Jr.

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED

10. Province of North Cotabato v. GRP

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN

Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4

11. Magallona v. Ermita

13. Heirs of Mendoza v. DPWH

HEIRS OF DIOSDADO M. MENDOZA, namely: LICINIA V. MENDOZA, PETER VAL V. MENDOZA,

14. Secretary of Health v. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, and MA. MARGARITA M. GALON,

Ponente: J. Del Castillo

The DOH can validly invoke state immunity.

a) DOH is an unincorporated agency which performs sovereign or governmental functions.

The ruling in Air Transportation Office v. Ramos is relevant, viz.:

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN, RUBEN P.

Hence, the appeal.

16. ATO v. Spouses Ramos

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN, RUBEN P.

The petition for review has no merit.

17. Hermano Oil vs. Toll Regulatory Board

HERMANO OIL MANUFACTURING & SUGAR CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. TOLL

18. Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon

THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR SOERATMIN, and MINISTER

19. China National Machinery and Equipment Corp. v. Santamaria

Ponente: J. Villarama, Jr.

21. Basco v. PAGCOR

ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO

KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA,

The policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by petitioner read:

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the Philippine

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, complainant, vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. NESTOR GALANG, respondent

26 Garcia v. Executive Secretary

27 ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S.

ii. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

iii. Principle of Checks and Balances

iv. Local Autonomy

II. YES. The presidential pork barrel is valid.

AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC

REPRESENTATIVE DANILO RAMON S. FERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF

Ponente: J. Leonardo-De Castro

G.R. No. 177597. July 16, 2008.*

G.R No. 188078. January 25, 2010.*

G.R. No. 189793. April 7, 2010.*

35. G.R. No. 176970 December 8, 2008

(Article X). Section 10 of this Article provides:

The principle of equality of representation.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.