Compiled Hernando Cases PDF

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Compiled by : Lao L. (FB: Feng Ja)
POLITICAL LAW
RE: INCIDENT REPORT OF SECURITY DIVISION +
This Court has held in a number of cases that a man having an illicit relationship
with a woman not his wife is within the purview of "disgraceful and immoral
conduct" under Civil Service Laws.
RE: EXPENSES OF RETIREMENT OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICES.
The retirement program budgets of Justices of collegiate courts are subject to the
discretion and approval of this Court, as part of its constitutional power of
administrative supervision over all courts and personnel thereof. In the exercise of
such discretion, the Court takes into consideration several factors, such as, but
not limited to, the established or actual costs of the items and activities which are
part of the retirement program, the number of employees of the collegiate court,
the period of time since the last increase in the retirement program budget, and
the availability of funds.
PHILIPPINE SINTER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL TRANSMISSION

CORPORATION AND CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, INC.,
RESPONDENTS.
Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies, such as the
ERC in the instant case, if based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the
reviewing authority. Administrative decisions on matters within their jurisdiction are
entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of
discretion, fraud or error of law, none of which obtains in this case.
RE: INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE ALLEGED EXTORTION ACTIVITIES OF PRESIDING

JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR., BRANCH 4, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BUTUAN
CITY, AGUSAN DEL NORTE
It is well to point out at this juncture that in criminal cases, the rule is that the death
of an accused after conviction but during the pendency of his/her appeal shall
result in the dismissal of the criminal case. This dismissal is triggered by the
presumption of innocence accorded every accused as well as by his/her right to
due process under the Constitution. As the said principles are instrumental to
criminal as well as to civil cases, these should likewise be applied to administrative
proceedings such as the one at bench. "[Since death of an accused extinguishes
personal criminal liability as well as pecuniary penalties arising from the felony
when the death occurs before final judgment in criminal cases, the standard for
an administrative case should be similar 01 less punitivef.]" "If this is the standard
for criminal cases wherein the quantum [of proof] is beyond reasonable doubt,
then a lower standard for administrative proceedings such as the case at bar
should be followed, even if the quantum of proof therein is substantial evidence."
Based on the foregoing, Judge Abul's heirs should be given death benefits
granted under Section 2 of RA No. 9946. If Judge Abul served for at least 15 years,
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his heirs should receive a lump sum equivalent to ten (10) years. Alternatively, if
he served for less than 15 years, the lump sum should be equivalent to five (5)
years. Subsequently, after the gratuity period of ten (10) years has passed, his heirs
are entitled to survivorship benefits, specifically, full monthly pension (if Judge
Abul rendered at least 15 years of service) or pro-rated monthly pension (if he
served for less than 15 years).
To recapitulate, these are the salient points for the dismissal of the case at bench:
1) because of Judge Abul's death, the administrative complaint against him
should be dismissed in accordance with the Constitutional principles of due
process and presumption of innocence; and 2) taking into account the instant
Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Abul's heirs should be granted the death
benefits and survivorship pension benefits due to his death while in actual service.
This is considering that prior to his demise, no definite ruling was rendered and no
corresponding penalty was imposed upon him. Equally important is the Court's
belief in equitable and humanitarian considerations, especially when the case
involves an inevitable occurrence like death.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PETITIONER, VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINES (NOW BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS) AND CITIBANK, N.A.,
RESPONDENTS.
CBP (now BSP) is a corporate body performing governmental functions. Operating

a clearing house facility for regional checks is within CBP's governmental
functions and duties as the central monetary authority.
One of the generally accepted principles of international law, which we have

adopted in our Constitution under Article XVI, Section 3 is the principle that a state
may not be sued without its consent, which principle is also embodied in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions. However, state immunity may be waived expressly or
impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general or special law. On the
other hand, consent is implied when the state enters into a contract or it itself
commences litigation.
In the case of government agencies, the question of its suability depends on
whether it is incorporated or unincorporated. An incorporated agency has a
Charter of its own with a separate juridical personality while an unincorporated
agency has none. In addition, the Charter of an incorporated agency shall
explicitly provide that it has waived its immunity from suit by granting it with the
authority to sue and be sued. This applies regardless of whether its functions are
governmental or proprietary in nature.
Indubitably, the CBP, which was created under RA 265 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 72 (PD 72), is a government corporation with separate
juridical personality and not a mere agency of the government. Specifically,
Sections 1 and 4 of RA 265, as amended, provided for the creation of the CBP, a
corporate body with certain corporate powers which include the authority to sue
and be sued. Its main function is to administer the monetary, banking and credit
system of the Philippines which is primarily governmental in nature. It has the
following duties: (a) to primarily maintain internal and external monetary stability
in the Philippines, and to preserve the international value of the peso and the
convertibility of the peso into other freely convertible currencies; and (b) to foster
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monetary, credit and exchange conditions conducive to a balanced and
sustainable growth of the economy.
Undoubtedly, the function of the CBP as the central monetary authority is a purely
governmental function.
Nonetheless, while the CBP performed a governmental function in providing
clearing house facilities, it is not immune from suit as its Charter, by express
provision, waived its immunity from suit. However, although the CBP allowed itself
to be sued, it did not necessarily mean that it conceded its liability. Petitioner BPI
had been given the right to bring suit against CBP, such as in this case, to obtain
compensation in damages arising from torts, subject, however, to the right of CBP
to interpose any lawful defense.
PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. URDANETA SACRED

HEART HOSPITAL, RESPONDENT.
Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies was justified. USHH's filing of the

complaint with the RTC without first exhausting available administrative remedies
is justifiable in light of the denial of its claims by the PHIC's Board itself, the body
superior to the RO or the PARD where USHH was supposed to file an MR or appeal.
To put it into perspective, "[PHIC's] President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is
directly appointed by the President of the Republic while its Board of Directors
(the Board) is composed of several cabinet secretaries (or their permanent
representatives) and representatives of different stakeholders." Thus, it is
reasonable to conclude that the PHIC Board exercises a higher authority than the
ROs or the PARD, and that to file an MR or appeal to it would be futile since the
PHIC Board already directed its denial. The trial court and the appellate court also
correctly considered USHH's Complaint as an exception to the application of the
doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies on the basis of strong public
interest. Alternatively, the instant case may also fall under the following
exceptions: (a) "when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable" and (b) "when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention."
Re: LETTER OF MRS. MA. CRISTINA ROCO CORONA REQUESTING GRANT OF

RETIREMENT +
Issue:
W/N Mrs. Corona should be accorded retirement benefits, other gratuities and
survivorship pension as the spouse of the late CJ Corona despite the latter’s ouster
by impeachment
Held: Petition is granted
The sole effect of impeachment is the removal from office and disqualification
from holding any public office. Citing cases from the American Jurisprudence
(where the law on impeachment in the country is heavily based on) there is
mutual exclusivity of impeachment proceedings and court trial.
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Impeachment is not crafted to mete out punishment. It is made to secure
the state against gross political misdemeanors. As such, it does not touch the
person or property, but only divests him of his political capacity.
No legally actionable liability attaches to the public officer by a mere

judgment of impeachment against him or her, and thus lies the necessity for a
separate conviction for charges that must be properly filed with courts of law.
In terms of hierarchy, judges of the lower courts stand on unequal footing with the
Justices of the Supreme Court. It may certainly be contended that their
circumstances do not level with those of a Supreme Court Justice, much more
the Chief Magistrate. However, whether a judge or a justice, all are members of
the Philippine Judiciary who swear foremost fealty to the same Constitution and
oath of public office, both of which demand the highest degree of awareness,
loyalty, and submission regardless of professional ascendancy. It needs
emphasizing that the peculiarities of the present case find no directly-analogous
precedent, both in law or in fact, that the Court may rely on. Thus being the case,
the liberalities granted to a judge can be allowed to the Chief Justice.
Whether this would be finally addressed by a compelling authority in the proper

forum, the late Chief Justice Corona has already been removed by
impeachment. What was done is fait accompli and now a final, unalterable
reality. For the future's worth, it is herein stressed that the SALN is a tool for public
transparency, never a weapon for political vendetta.
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona is hereby DECLARED entitled to retirement

benefits and other allowances under Republic Act No. 9946 equivalent to a five-
year lump sum of the salary and other allowances he was receiving at the time
of his removal by impeachment on May 29, 2012. The claim of survivorship benefits
of Ma. Cristina Roco Corona is hereby GRANTED reckoned from the lapse of the
five-year period on the lump sum. All benefits granted herein are ordered
immediately RELEASED to his widow and beneficiary, Ma. Cristina Roco Corona,
subject to usual clearances.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. CITY OF MUNTINLUPA
While ordinances, just like other laws and statutes, enjoy the presumption of
validity, they may be struck down and set aside when their invalidity or
unreasonableness is evident on the face or has been established in evidence.
A void ordinance cannot legally exist, it cannot have binding force and effect.
Ordinance which is incompatible with any existing law or statute is ultra vires,
hence, null and void.
The foregoing provisions clearly set out that municipalities may only levy taxes not
otherwise levied by the provinces. Section 137 particularly provides that provinces
may impose a franchise tax on businesses granted with a franchise to operate.
Since provinces have been vested with the power to levy a franchise tax, it follows
that municipalities, pursuant to Section 142 of RA 7160, could no longer levy it.
Therefore, Section 25 of MO 93-35 which was enacted when Muntinlupa was still
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a municipality and which imposed a franchise tax on public utility corporations
within its territorial jurisdiction, is ultra vires for being violative of Section 142 of RA
7160.
The City cannot seek refuge under Article 236(b) of Administrative Order No.
270[36] (AO 270) in its bid to declare Section 25 of MO 93-35 as valid. As mere rules
and regulations implementing RA 7160, they cannot go beyond the intent of the
law that it seeks to implement. The spring cannot rise above its source.
Hence, even if Article 236(b) of AO 270 appears to vest municipalities with such
taxing power, Section 142 of RA 7160 which disenfranchised municipalities from
levying a franchise tax, should prevail. The power to levy a franchise tax is
bestowed only to provinces and cities.
In sum, the then Municipality of Muntinlupa acted without authority in passing

Section 25 of MO 93-35, hence it is null and void for being ultra vires.
HERMINIO T. DISINI v. REPUBLIC
Republic is entitled to temperate and exemplary damages:
With the grant of temperate damages, this allows the imposition of exemplary
damages by way of example or correction for the public good. Exemplary
damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right and are only considered
when moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages are
granted."Exemplary damages are designed by our civil law to permit the courts
to reshape behavior that is socially deleterious in its consequence by creating
negative incentives or deterrents against such behavior." Its purpose is to serve as
a deterrent to serious wrong doings and as a vindication of undue sufferings and
wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of
outrageous conduct.
There is no doubt that Disini's receipt of the substantial commissions from
Westinghouse and B&R is illegal and despicable which is no less than abhorred by
our Freedom Constitution as its mandate includes eradication of graft and
corruption, punishment of those guilty thereof and recovery of ill-gotten wealth.
Verily, Disini's conduct should be corrected and deterred as his use of influence
or power for his own personal benefit to the detriment of the Republic caused
substantial injury not only to public funds but to the morale, trust and confidence
of Filipinos in the government and its projects. Hence, this Court finds it reasonable
under the circumstances to award One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as exemplary
damages.
Nevertheless, the Republic is not entitled to nominal damages as it is incompatible
with the award of temperate damages. Nominal damages are recoverable
where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an
invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has
been a breach of contract but no substantial injury or actual damages
whatsoever have been or can be shown. Clearly, Disini's illegal acquisition of
substantial commissions from Westinghouse and B&R produces injury or damage
to the Republic which has been deprived the use of these public funds in the
interest of the Filipinos.
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In the same manner, moral damages cannot be awarded in favor of the Republic
as it failed to convince this Court that it suffered any form of physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social-humiliation, or any other similar circumstance because of
Disini's acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
In sum, in order to be considered as ill-gotten wealth, they must have: (a)
originated from the government; and (b) been taken by former President Marcos,
his immediate family, relatives, and close associates by illegal means. Evidently,
the BNPP is· a government project the construction of which was awarded to
Westinghouse as the main contractor and B&R as the architect-engineer,
allegedly through undue advantage of Disini's influence and close association
with President Marcos. In exchange, Disini allegedly received substantial comm
ssions based on 3% and 10% of the total contract price from Westinghouse and
B&R, respectively. Obviously, the payment of the alleged commissions would be
coming from Westinghouse and B&R, which are private corporatibns, and not
directly from the government.
However, contrary to the contention of Disini, ill-gotten wealth also encompasses
those that are derived indirectly from government funds or properties through the
use of power, influence, or relationship resulting in unjust enrichment and causing
grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic. The
alleged subject commissions may not have been sourced directly from the public
funds but it is beyond cavil that Disini would not have amassed these commissions
had he not exerted undue influence on President Marcos.
Disini indirectly and unjustly enriched himself through his influence and close
association with President Marcos by ensuring that the BNPP project would be
awarded to Westinghouse and B&R. Besides, his alleged receipt of commissions
from Westinghouse and B&R is clearly within the definition of ill-gotten wealth
under the PCGG Rules and Regulations, that is, the receipt, directly or indirectly,
of any commission from an entity in connection with any government contract or
project.
Disini's argument that he may not be held liable since he was not a public officer,
or that there was no finding of conspiracy between him and President Marcos,
deserves scant consideration. Suffice it to say that EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A (1986)
clearly provide that ill-gotten wealth may be recovered from President Marcos'
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, notwithstanding
their private status. Undoubtedly, the Republic may recover ill-gotten wealth not
only from President Marcos, Imelda and his immediate family but also from his
dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates whether or
not President Marcos is also found liable together with them.
In light of the above issuances authorizing the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, there
is no doubt that the Republic has a valid cause of action founded in EO Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A (1986).
While it is true that the Republic failed to prove the amount of commissions
received, this does not mean, however, that Disini is free from any liability under
this civil action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages. Thus, under the principle of unjust enrichment, We uphold the
Republic's right to recover these commissions in favor of the Filipino people. No
one should unjustly enrich himself by receiving commissions in connection with a
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government project when clearly he has no right for it nor entitled to retain the
same.
Nonetheless, since recovery thereof cannot be effected due to the absence of
a definite amount, We deem it proper to award the Republic temperate
damages for the pecuniary loss and the Filipino people suffered on account of
Disini's illegal acquisitions of substantial commissions from Westinghouse and B&R,
albeit the amount thereof not being proven with certainty.
SHEILA MARIE G. UY-BELLEZA, PETITIONER, VS. THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF TACLOBAN

CITY, RESPONDENT.
A passport is “a document Issued by the Philippine government to its citizens

requesting other governments to allow its citizens to pass safely and freely, and in
case of need, to give him/her all lawful aid and protection.” It is an official
document of identity of Philippine citizenship of the holder issued for travel
purposes. A passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person
named therein as its national.
LABOR LAW
LUFTHANSA TECHNIK PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO CUIZON +
As a general rule, the Supreme Court may only entertain questions of law. As an
exception, the Court may review factual issues when the factual findings are in
conflict.
The Court may review factual issues in a labor case when the factual findings are
in conflict.
Article 297 (formerly 282) of the Labor Code provides that an employer may
terminate its employee for "[f]raud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative."
"The requisites for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence are: (1)
the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence; (2)
there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence; [and (3)]
such loss of trust relates to the employee's performance of duties."
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JOSE DEL PILAR v. BATANGAS II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE +
Article 223 provides that decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final
and executory unless appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by labor arbiters as provided in Article 217(b)
of the Labor Code. From the finding of illegal dismissal up to the execution of the
monetary award, the jurisdiction of the NLRC is appellate in nature. "Article 218(e)
of the Labor Code does not provide blanket authority to the NLRC or any of its
divisions to issue writs of injunction, considering that Section 1 of Rule XI of the New
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC makes injunction only an ancillary remedy in
ordinary labor disputes."
PEDRITO R. PARAYDAY v. SHOGUN SHIPPING CO. +
There is a conflict between the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC,
on one hand, and those of the CA, on the other hand, it becomes proper for this
Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, to review the facts and re-examine
the records of the case. Thus, this Court shall take cognizance of and resolve the
factual issues involved in this case.
"In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that
its dismissal of an employee was for a valid cause. However [as mentioned
above], before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer employee
relationship must first be established."
ENGINEERING v. SEGUNDINO PALLE +
Generally, length of service is a measure to determine whether or not an

employee who was initially hired on a temporary basis has attained the status of
a regular employee who is entitled to security of tenure. However, such measure
may not necessarily be applicable in a construction industry since construction
firms cannot guarantee continuous employment of their workers after the
completion stage of a project. [32] In addition, a project employee's work may or
may not be usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer. Thus, the fact that a project employee's work is usually necessary and
desirable in the business operation of his/her employer does not necessarily impair
the validity of the project employment contract which specifically stipulates a
fixed duration of employment.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. ROSARIO A. GOMEZ, RESPONDENT.
In termination cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the
employee's dismissal was for a valid and authorized cause. Consequently, the
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failure of the employer to prove that the dismissal was valid, would mean that
dismissal was unjustified, and thus illegal.
ITALKARAT 18 v. JURALDINE N. GERASMIO +
It must be noted that under Article 229 [223] of the Labor Code, as amended, a
decision of the NLRC already becomes final after ten (10) calendar days from
receipt thereof by the parties; on the other hand, the reglementary period with
respect to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is sixty (60)
days.
There is now no dispute that the CA can make a determination whether the
factual findings by the NLRC or the Labor Arbiter were based on the evidence
and in accord with pertinent laws and jurisprudence.
The significance of this clarification is that whenever the decision of the CA in a

labor case is appealed by petition for review on certiorari, the Court can
competently delve into the propriety of the factual review not only by the CA but
also by the NLRC.
It is a well-settled rule, however, that before the employer must bear the burden
of proving that the dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by
substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. Bare allegations of
constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot
be given credence.
To summarize, if the fact of dismissal is disputed, it is the complainant who should
substantiate his claim for dismissal and the one burdened with the responsibility of
proving that he was dismissed from employment, whether actually or
constructively. Unless the fact of dismissal is proven, the validity or legality thereof
cannot even be an issue. In the present case, the fact of the matter is that it was
Juraldine himself who resigned from his work, as shown by the resignation letter
he submitted and the quitclaim that he acknowledged, and thus, he was never
dismissed by the Company.
In conclusion, considering that there was no dismissal involved in this case as
Juraldine voluntarily resigned from work, his claims arising from his complaint for
illegal dismissal must be denied. This includes his claim for separation pay as he
failed to prove his entitlement thereto, either via contract or company practice.
JR HAULING SERVICES v. GAVINO L. SOLAMO +
it is a well-established rule that the party-litigant who alleges the existence of a

fact or thing necessary to establish his/her claim has the burden of proving the
same by the amount of evidence required by law, which, in labor proceedings,
is substantial evidence, or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." To be clear, in the hierarchy of
evidentiary values, "proof beyond reasonable doubt is placed at the highest
level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence,
and substantial evidence, in that order." Thus, in the hierarchy of evidence, it is
the least demanding. "Corollarily, the ground for the dismissal of an employee
does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt." The quantum of proof required
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is merely substantial evidence - which only entails evidence to support a
conclusion, "even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine
otherwise." Accordingly, requiring a quantum of proof that is over and above
substantial evidence is contrary to law.
In determining an employee's entitlement to his monetary claims, the burden of
proof is shifted from the employer to the employee depending on the nature of
the money claim prayed for. In claims involving payment of salary differentials,
this Court has held that the burden rests on the employer to prove payment
following the basic rule that "in all illegal dismissal cases, the burden rests on the
defendant to prove payment rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-
payment." This rationale is supported by the fact that all pertinent personnel files,
payrolls, records, remittances and other similar documents which show that the
salary differentials have in fact been paid are not in the possession of the worker
but are in the custody and control of the employer
This Court has held that in labor cases, "[a]ffidavits may be sufficient to establish
substantial evidence." Respondents argued, however, that affidavits taken ex-
parte should not be given due weight for being self-serving, hearsay and
inadmissible in evidence. By citing pertinent provisions on the rules on evidence,
respondents insisted that any admissions made therein cannot be used to
establish their culpability, but only of the confessants themselves.
The argument that the affidavits are hearsay for having been taken ex parte i.e.,
that the affiants were not presented for cross-examination, does not persuade us.
The rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control proceedings
before the labor tribunals where decisions may be reached on the basis of
position papers, accompanied by supporting documents, including affidavits of
witnesses, and other allied pleadings.
Loss of trust and confidence as a ground for dismissal of employees covers
employees occupying a position of trust who are proven to have breached the
trust and confidence reposed on them. Moreover, in order to constitute a just
cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be work-related and shows that
the employee concerned is unfit to continue working for the employer. In
addition, loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is
premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of
responsibility, trust and confidence or that the employee concerned is entrusted
with confidence with respect to delicate matters, such as the handling or care
and protection of the property and assets of the employer. The betrayal of this
trust is the essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized. In this
regard, it is not the job title but the nature of the work that the employee is duty-
bound to perform which is material in determining whether he holds a position
where greater trust is placed by the employer and from whom greater fidelity to
duty is concomitantly expected.
PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS v. ALMARIO C. SAN JUAN +
We have held that the 120-day period should be reckoned from the time the
seafarer reported to the company-designated physician. If the company-
designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with
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sufficient justification, then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be
extended to 240 days.
Settled is the rule that when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while
on board the vessel, his fitness or unfitness for work shall be determined by the
company-designated physician, and that "in case of conflicting medical
assessments [between the company-designated physician and the seafarer's
own physician], referral to a third doctor is mandatory; and that in the absence
of a third doctor's opinion, it is the medical assessment of the company-
designated physician that should prevail." Relevant to this rule is Section 20(B)(3)
of the 2000 POEA-SEC, which similarly states that "[i]f a doctor appointed by the
seafarer disagrees with the assessment [of the company-designated physician],
a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The
third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties."
PEOPLE v. OLIVER IMPERIO Y ANTONIO +
Under RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority is liable for Illegal

Recruitment when the following elements concur: (1) the offender has no valid
license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) the offender undertakes any of
the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article
13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of the Labor Code (now Section 6 of RA 8042). In the case of Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale, a third element is added: that the offender commits
any of the acts of recruitment and placement against three or more persons,
individually or as a group.
Moreover, "[t]o prove [I]llegal [R]ecruitment, it must be shown that the accused
gave the complainants the distinct impression that [he or she] had the power or
ability to deploy the complainants abroad in [such] a manner that they were
convinced to part with their money for that end."
ALLAN REGALA, PETITIONER, VS. MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
Consistent therewith is the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this is
strictly adhered to in labor cases. However, where, like in the instant case, there is
a conflict between the factual findings of the LA and the CA, on one hand, and
those of the NLRC, on the other, it becomes proper for this Court, in the exercise
of its equity jurisdiction, to review the facts and re-examine the records of the
case.
A fixed-term employment contract which otherwise fails to specify the date of
effectivity and the date of expiration of an employee's engagement cannot, by
virtue of jurisprudential pronouncement, be regarded as such despite its
nomenclature or classification given by the parties. The employment contract
may provide for or describe some other classification or type of employment
depending on the circumstances, but it is not, properly speaking, a fixed-term
employment contract.
There is constructive dismissal where "there is cessation of work because
'continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an
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offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay' and other benefits. Aptly
called a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear
as if it were not, constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act of clear
discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on
the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to
forego his continued employment."
Patently, the reduction of Regala's regular work days from five (5) days to two (2)
days resulted to a diminution in pay. Regala's change in his work schedule
resulting to the diminution of his take home salary is, therefore, tantamount to
constructive dismissal.
The fact that Rega1a may have continued reporting for work does not rule out
constructive dismissal, nor does it operate as a waiver.
MARIA LEA JANE I. GESOLGON v. CYBERONE PH. +
The four-fold test used in determining the existence of employer employee

relationship involves an inquiry into: (a) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the
employer's power to control the employee with respect to the means and
method by which the work is to be accomplished.
Based on record, petitioners were requested by respondent Mikrut to become

stockholders and directors of CyberOne PH with each one of them subscribing to
one share of stock. However, petitioners contend that they were hired as
employees of CyberOne PH as shown by the pay slips indicating that CyberOne
PH paid them P10,000.00 monthly net of mandatory deductions. Other than the
pay slips presented by petitioners, no other evidence was submitted to prove their
employment by CyberOne PH. Petitioners failed to present any evidence that
they rendered services to CyberOne PH as employees thereof.
As it is established that petitioners are not employees of CyberOne PH, there is no
need for this Court to delve into the issues of petitioners' illegal dismissal, their
monetary claims and the probative value of the pay slips presented by
petitioners. Based on the foregoing, this Court is convinced that petitioners are
not employees of CyberOne PH, but stockholders thereof.
To summarize, the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over CyberOne AU.
CyberOne PH is neither the resident agent nor the conduit of CyberOne AU upon
which summons may be served. Also, there existed no employer employee
relationship between petitioners and CyberOne PH. Hence, there is no dismissal
to speak of, much more illegal dismissal.
OMANFIL INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION & MODH AL-

ZOABI TECHNICAL PROJECTS CORP., PETITIONERS, V. ROLANDO B. MESINA,
RESPONDENT.
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If the repatriation was indeed voluntary on his part, he would not have pursued a
case of illegal termination against petitioners which would cost him time and
money. As it is, Mesina's immediate filing of a case of illegal dismissal negates
petitioners' claim that he voluntarily agreed to his repatriation to seek medical
treatment in his home country. Likewise, petitioners failed to establish the fact that
they provided Mesina a re-entiy visa to support their argument that they did not
dismiss him. In any case, even the existence of a re-entry visa does not necessarily
defeat an illegal dismissal complaint.
EFREN SANTOS v. KING CHEF +
"In cases where there is both an absence of illegal dismissal on the part of the
employer and an absence of abandonment on the part of the employees, the
remedy is reinstatement but without backwages." However, considering that
petitioners do not pray for such relief, "each party must bear [their] own loss,"
placing them on equal footing.
FERNANDO C. GOSOSO v. LEYTE LUMBER YARD
Abandonment requires the concurrence of the following: (1) the employee must
have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable
reason; and (2) there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-
employee relationship manifested by some overt acts.
Mere absence or simple failure to report for work is not abandonment, more so if
the employee was able to lodge his complaint before the labor tribunals with
haste. An immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, more so when it
includes a prayer for reinstatement, is inconsistent with a charge of
abandonment.
RONNIE L. SINGSON v. ARKTIS MARITIME CORP.
The mere lapse of the 120-day period under Article 198(c)(l) of the Labor
Code does not automatically give rise to a cause of action for a claim of
permanent total disability benefits.
To be clear, when a certain sickness or injury causes a temporary and total
disability which lasts continuously for more than 120 days, then such total disability
is considered to be permanent. However, as an exception to this rule, if the said
sickness or injury that caused the temporary total disability requires medical
treatment beyond the 120-day period but not to exceed 240 days, then the
employee is only entitled to temporary total disability benefits until he is declared
as either: 1) "fit to work," which stops his entitlement to disability benefits; or 2)
"permanently and totally disabled," which then entitles him to permanent total
disability benefits. In any event, if the 240 days had lapsed without any
certification issued by the company designated doctor, then the employee may
pursue an action for permanent total disability benefits. Mere presence of a
disease is not a disability.
PEOPLE v. AVELINA MANALANG

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Jurisprudence is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted
separately for Illegal Recruitment under RA 8042 (or the Labor Code), and Estafa
under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC.
In estafa, damage is essential, but not in the crime of illegal recruitment. As to the
latter, it is the lack of the necessary license or authority, but not the fact of
payment that renders the recruitment activity as unlawful.
C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT v. JIMMY G. JAICTEN
Settled is the rule that the company-designated physician is tasked with assessing
the seafarer's disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness,
during the term of the latter's employment. However, his or her assessment is not
automatically final, binding or conclusive on the claimant, the labor tribunal or
the courts as its inherent merits would still be weighed and duly considered.
Moreover, the seafarer has the right to dispute such assessment by consulting his
own doctor. In addition, in case of disagreement between the findings of the
company-designated physician and the seafarer's doctor of choice, both parties
may agree to jointly refer the matter to a third doctor whose decision shall be final
and binding on them.
GERARDO U. VILLE, PETITIONER, VS. MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING, INC. AND/OR

A.P. MOLLER A/S, RESPONDENTS.
It is settled rule that non-compliance with the post-employment medical

examination requirement (within 3 days after disembarkation) is tantamount to a
waiver or forfeiture of any right to claim disability benefits.
SUSAN M. BANCE v. UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANTHONY
For resignation from employment to be valid, there must be an intent to relinquish

the position together with the overt act of relinquishment. Resignation must be
voluntary. In illegal dismissal cases, the employer, if defense of resignation is
presented, must show that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned.
"It is settled that there is nothing reprehensible or illegal when the employer grants
the employee a chance to resign and save face rather than smear the latter's
employment record."
To constitute willful breach of trust, the employee concerned must be holding a

position of trust and confidence, and there must be an act, that is willful, that
would justify the loss of trust and confidence. Additionally, cashiers, auditors,
property custodians, and those positions who, in the normal and routine exercise
of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property
are considered positions of trust.
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Fraud and dishonesty can only be used to justify termination from employment
when the employee concerned commits a dishonest act that reflects a
disposition to deceive, defraud and betray the employer.
To comply with the requirement of procedural due process, two written notices
must be issued. The first written notice should contain the specific causes or
grounds for termination against the employee. The second written notice
contains the decision terminating the employment after considering all
circumstances involving the charge. Conferences and verbal announcements
do not suffice as substitute for the requisite first written notice.
DEL MONTE LAND TRANSPORT BUS v. RENANTE A. ARMENTA
The rules governing jurisdiction on labor standards claims, may be summed up as

follows:
If the claim involves labor standards benefits mandated by the Labor Code
or other labor legislation regardless of the amount prayed for and provided
1. that there is an existing employer employee relationship, jurisdiction is with
the DOLE regardless of whether the action was brought about by the filing
of a complaint or not.
If the claim involves labor standards benefits mandated by the Labor Code
or other labor legislation regardless of the amount prayed for and there is no
2. existing employer-employee relationship or the claim is coupled with a
prayer for reinstatement, jurisdiction is with the LA/NLRC.
FLORENCIO B. DESTRIZA, PETITIONER, VS. FAIR SHIPPING CORPORATION, ANGEL C.

CACHAPERO, AND/OR BOSELINE S.A., RESPONDENTS.
It is settled that in case of disagreements between the findings of the company-

designated physician and the seafarer's doctor of choice, resort to a third-doctor
opinion is mandatory. The third-doctor opinion is final and binding between the
parties. The opinion of the company-designated physician prevails over that of
the seafarer's personal doctor in case there is no third-doctor opinion.
V PEOPLE MANPOWER PHILS., INC., AND/OR CAPE PNL LTD., PETITIONERS, VS.
DOMINADOR C. BUQUID, RESPONDENT.
In order to be considered a seaman or seafarer, one would have to be, at the

very least, employed in a vessel engaged in maritime navigation. Thus, it is clear
that those employed in non-mobile vessels or fixed structures, even if the said
vessels/structures are located offshore or in the middle of the sea, cannot be
considered as seafarers under the law.
These allegations bolster the fact that: 1) Dominador was not aboard any vessel
engaged in maritime navigation or mobile offshore or drilling unit, but a port,
which is a fixed structure by nature; and 2) the said port is located in the Gulf of
Papua New Guinea, which only means that it is not located in the high seas.
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The applicable law defines a "seafarer" based not only on the employee's kind of
work, but also on the kind of marine vessel or offshore unit the employee was
aboard during his employment. Stated otherwise, an overseas employee, in order
to be considered as a "seafarer," must not only perform tasks concerning manning
marine vessels or marine navigation, but they must also perform such functions
onboard a vessel engaged in maritime navigation or a mobile offshore rig or
drilling unit in the high seas.
ARLENE PALGAN v. HOLY NAME UNIVERSITY
The Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, and not the Labor Code,
determines whether or not a faculty member in an educational institution has
attained regular or permanent status.
The governing law for the employment status of teachers/professors/instructors

are the manuals of regulations for private schools.
The following requisites before a private school teacher acquires permanent

status, namely: 1) The teacher serves full-time; 2) he/she must have rendered
three consecutive years of service; and 3) such service must have been
satisfactory.
Being unqualified as a nursing faculty from the start, petitioner cannot possibly be
considered a full-time faculty and thus, could not, even after rendering
satisfactory service for three years, be entitled to permanency.
The Court thus laid down the criteria under which fixed-term employment could
not be said to be in circumvention of the law on security of tenure, thus:
1. The fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon
by the parties without any force, duress, or improper pressure being brought to
bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his
consent; or
2. It satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt with each
other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance exercised by the
former or the latter.
Considering petitioner's part-time status, even if no written fixed-term contract

was presented, judicial notice can be made upon the fact that teachers'
employment contracts are for a specific semester or term.
PHILAM HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION v. SYLVIA DE LUNA
In labor cases, the proper recourse from the adverse decision or final order of the
NLRC is via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
to the appellate court on the ground that the labor tribunal acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. This judicial review
presupposes that the NLRC's disposition of the case has already attained finality,
and the appellate court is to ascertain whether it should reverse or modify the
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NLRC decision on the aforesaid exclusive ground.
From the CA, the labor suit is elevated to this Court via a petition for review
on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on pure questions of law;
questions of fact may be entertained and reviewed only in exceptional
circumstances.
Factual findings of the NLRC are accorded great respect, but the appellate court
is not precluded from reviewing evidence alleged to be arbitrarily considered or
otherwise disregarded by the former.
When the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code,
such as loss of trust and confidence, but the termination was procedurally infirm,
the sanction against the employer for such a violation is tempered; hence, the
award of nominal damages. This is because the dismissal was initiated by an act
imputable to the employee compared to when the dismissal was initiated by the
employer through the enumerated authorized causes under the Labor Code,
where the sanction is stiffer and the amount of nominal damages is higher.
When the employer extended the period of preventive suspension beyond 30

days, he is obliged to pay the wages and other benefits due to the employee.
EMS CREW MANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES v. ERWIN C. BAUZON
The employment of seafarers, including claims for permanent and total disability
benefits, is governed by law, its rules and regulations, and the contracts that they
sign upon being hired or rehired.
Bauzon, as an Able Seaman on board the vessel, was exposed to harsh sea
weather, chemical irritants, dusts, heat, stress brought about by being away from
his family, long hours of work, and limited and unclean air/oxygen, all of which
invariably contributed to his illness. There was at least a reasonable connection
between his job and his contracting the throat ailment during his employment,
which eventually developed into papillary cancer.
Moreover, the duties and responsibilities of an Able Seaman generally require the
use of a variety of chemical substances (e.g., grease, solvents, cleaning agents,
de-greasers, paint, etc.
There was, by all accounts, a reasonable connection between the nature of his
work on board the vessel and the illness that he came down with. The
aggravation of his illness had been duly established by him.
Settled is the rule that a worker brings with him possible infirmities in the course of
his employment, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of the
employees, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability. In
order for an illness to be compensable, it is enough that the employment had
contributed, even to a small degree, to the development of the disease.
Neither is it necessary in order to recover compensation, that the employee must
have been in perfect condition or health at the time he contracted the
disease. Every workingman brings with him to his employment certain infirmities,
and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of the employees, he takes
them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability. If the disease is the
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proximate cause of the employee's death for which compensation is sought, the
previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant and recovery may be
had therefor independent of any pre- existing disease.
This Court finds that the nature of Bauzon's employment had contributed to the
aggravation of his illness. We reiterate that the nature of his job as an Able
Seaman exposed him to harsh sea weather, chemical irritants, dusts, heat, stress
brought about by being away from his family, and long hours of work, all of which
invariably contributed to his illness. Under these circumstances, there was at least
a reasonable connection between his job and his ailment.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, PETITIONER, VS. NELSON C. BOOL, RESPONDENT.
Length of service cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance when the

length of respondent's service itself helped facilitate the commission of the
offense, which is found to be grave or serious.
In this case, the Court agrees with the BSP that it was precisely because of Bool's
length of service and experience that he was chosen as BSP's representative to
France. It was in consideration of his extensive experience, special skills, and
relevant expertise that he acquired by reason of his long years of service with the
BSP that Bool was chosen for the highly technical work abroad. The CSC correctly
held that the fact that Bool had been in the service for 33 years should have
made him "more meticulous and prudent in discharging his responsibility."
Moreover, the offense committed is so gross, grave, and serious in character as
to endanger or threaten the public welfare. The CSC is correct in holding that the
repercussions and the impact resulting from Bool's negligence in not detecting
the error in former President Arroyo's surname are so great.
INTERISLAND INFORMATION SYSTEM VS. CA
As can be gleaned from the records, respondent Ibay did not abandon his work
in Inter-Island as in fact he immediately filed a complaint for illegal dismissal after
he was prevented from entering the company premises. This only proves that
respondent Ibay had no intention to sever his employer-employee relationship
with Inter-Island.
The contention that Ibay had applied to work abroad is not supported by
evidence on record. Even if the same is true, Ibay's intent to earn a living during
the pendency of the labor case should not be taken against him. Besides, even
if he indeed applied for a new job abroad in November 2003, petitioner's illegal
dismissal of respondent Ibay and the latter's subsequent filing of a complaint
were fait accompli, having already been accomplished in October 2003 or way
before respondent Ibay's alleged application for work abroad.This cannot erase
the fact that the company illegally dismissed its employee without just and
authorized cause and prevented the latter from entering the company premises.
Further, petitioner's contention that it issued several return-to-work orders is without
any factual basis. Petitioner's allegation that it ordered its worker to return to work
during the mandatory conference on January 12, 2004, as reiterated in its position
paper dated February 5, 2004 and in its Rejoinder dated May 12, 2004, were
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substantially refuted by Ibay who claimed non-receipt of petitioner's written
notice to return to work.
As a final note, the obstinate failure of respondent lbay and his counsel of record
before the LA and the NLRC, Atty. Erro, to comply with the appellate court and
this Court's numerous directives has not escaped Our notice. While it is true that
Ibay's cause was ultimately proven to be meritorious, this fact does not excuse
nor justify Ibay's or Atty. Erro's repeated failure to comply with the orders of the
Court. In fact, this case has dragged on for 11 years since the filing of the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 before this Court in 2009 due to the mere fact that Atty.
Erro could not be located to be served the notices of this Court. Even respondent
Ibay was not found in his address on record during the service of the warrant of
arrest for contempt.
Although we recognize Atty. Erro's appointment as undersecretary of DAR during
the pendency of this case and his inability to continue private law practice
because of conflict of interest, this does not excuse him from complying with his
responsibility to update the Court and the IBP of his current and complete address
and to his clients. Clearly, petitioner cannot be faulted when it relied on the
information of Atty. Erro's address as stated in his pleadings filed before the LA and
NLRC. His failure to withdraw as counsel of record of respondent lbay in this case
or even the proper tum-over of the same to his partner Atty. Pahilga undoubtedly
shows negligence on his part.
EDUARDO G. JOVERO v. ROGELIO CERIO
The presentation of service contracts between the employer and their client
(even if it shows the duration of the project), in lieu of the employees' individual
employment contracts, does not establish that the latter are project employees.
There was no other substantial evidence offered to prove that respondents were
informed at the time of their hiring, that they were project employees. Moreover,
petitioner's failure to file termination reports at the end of each project was an
indication that respondents were regular employees.
For purposes of appeal, the period shall be counted from receipt of such
decisions, resolutions, or orders by the counsel or representative of record.
c) The bailiff or officer serving the notice, order, or resolution shall submit his/her
return within two (2) days from date of service thereof, stating legibly in his/her
return his/her name, the names of the persons served and the date of receipt,
which return shall be immediately attached and shall form part of the records of
the case. In case of service by registered mail or by private courier, the name of
the addressee and the date of receipt of the notice, order or resolution shall be
written in the return card or in the proof of service issued by the private courier. If
no service was effected, the reason thereof shall be so stated.
Considering that the Bailiff Proof of Service and Notice of Judgment/Final Order
show that Jovero's counsel received Labor Arbiter Rivera's Decision on August 21,
2001, and that the reglementary period indubitably lapsed before he filed his
appeal, the CA correctly held that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when
it took cognizance of and even granted Jovero's appeal. Lest we forget,
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is
not a mere technicality, but jurisdictional. Hence, failure to perfect an appeal as
required by the Rules renders the judgment final and executory.
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JOSE R. DELA TORRE, PETITIONER, VS. TWINSTAR PROFESSIONAL PROTECTIVE
SERVICES, INC., RESPONDENT.
The LA and the NLRC are mandated to use every and all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. In this
connection, the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence on appeal as
technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. As applied in this case,
the NLRC, acting within its lawful authority, decided to admit evidence for the first
time during appeal, and the circumstances would show that the said decision
was not made arbitrarily or capriciously. The records would show that Twinstar, to
its prejudice, failed to submit any evidence before the LA and thus, the latter was
not able to make an informed decision on the issues presented before it.
While the alleged negligence of Twinstar and its previous counsels generally does
not excuse the non-submission of its position paper and evidence despite notice,
it is within the prudent discretion of the NLRC to decide on whether or not to admit
and consider the evidence presented before it. Considering the relevance and
veracity of the evidence presented by Twinstar, not to mention the primacy given
to substantive justice over procedural technicalities, this Court is constrained to
agree with the CA in affirming the NLRC Decision.
It must be emphasized that "not every inconvenience, disruption, difficulty, or
disadvantage that an employee must endure sustains a finding of constructive
dismissal." What is vital is the weighing of the evidence presented and a
consideration of whether, given the totality of circumstances, the employer
acted fairly in exercising a prerogative. Applying the foregoing standards to this
case, petitioner utterly failed to prove that he was constructively dismissed. He
never presented any evidence, aside from his self-serving allegations, that he was
forced to be on floating status for more than six (6) months without being given
new assignment by Twinstar.
While an employee may indeed accept his dismissal and agree to waive his
claims or right to initiate or continue any action against his employer, both parties
do not have the jurisdiction or authority to determine whether such termination is
legal or not; such question of law is still subject to the final determination of the
competent labor tribunals and courts, as the case may be. It follows then that the
award of nominal damages, which by its nature, arises from the determination of
whether the employee's rights were violated or not in an illegal dismissal case
cannot be deemed to be covered by the Quitclaim.
To stress, nominal damages are "adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,
which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him."
Moreover, any quitclaim or agreement executed by the parties, as with all

contracts, must not be contrary to law or public policy. It is apparent that the
public policy in the stiffer imposition of nominal damages is to discourage the
abhorrent practice of "dismiss now, pay later."
CHARLO P. IDUL v. ALSTER INT'L SHIPPING SERVICES

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The CA did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in annulling the Decision of the NLRC, and reinstating the Labor
Arbiter's Decision. The CA correctly concluded that a temporary total disability
only becomes permanent when 1) the company-designated physician declares
it to be so within the 240-day period; or 2) when after the lapse of the 240-day
period, the company-designated physician fails to make such declaration.
ARMANDO H. DE JESUS VS. INTER-ORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., ET AL.
Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. If the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to
promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules or except a
particular case from their operation. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the
prerogative to relax compliance with the procedural rules, even the most
mandatory in character, mindful of the duty to reconcile the need to put an end
to litigation speedily and the parties' right to an opportunity to be heard.
For a disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA SEC, it
must be the result of a work-related injury or a work-related or work-aggravated
illness. The POEA SEC defines a work-related injury as "injuries resulting in disability
or death arising out of and in the course of employment.' On the other hand, a
work-related illness has been defined as "any sickness resulting in disability or
death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this
contract with the conditions set therein satisfied."
The 2000 POEA SEC provides for the company-designated doctor to assess the
illness of the seafarer or his fitness to return to sea duties. In the event the seafarer
disagrees with the assessment of the company-designated physician, he ought
to consult his doctor of choice. Here, instead of consulting his own physician, De
Jesus executed a release and quitclaim in favor of respondents. In executing this
document, petitioner thus impliedly admitted the correctness of the assessment
of the company-designated physician, and acknowledged that he could no
longer claim for disability benefits.
In sum, in order for a deed of release, waiver or quitclaim pertaining to an existing

right to be valid, it must meet the following requirements: (1) that there was no
fraud or deceit or coercion on the part of any of the parties; (2) that the
consideration for the quitclaim is sufficient and reasonable; and (3) that the
contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
At this point, petitioner was already aware of his medical condition when he
signed the waiver as he was examined by the company-designated doctor.
Moreover, there was no proof that respondents employed fraud, malice, force or
duress to compel him to sign the quitclaim. "Lack of sleep and exhaustion", can
hardly be accepted as grounds to invalidate the waiver considering that it was
signed six days after his arrival. For sure, as a seasoned seafarer, petitioner properly
considered his decision of giving up his rights before signing the quitclaim.
SALVACION A. LAMADRID, PETITIONER, VS. CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS LIMITED

AND VIVIAN LO, RESPONDENTS.
SECTION 2. Section 3, paragraph (a) of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended, is

hereby amended to read as follows:
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(a) “Overseas Filipino worker” refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged

or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is
not a citizen or on board a vessel navigating the foreign seas other than a
government ship used for military or non-commercial purposes or on an
installation located offshore or on the high seas; to be used interchangeably with
migrant worker.
Under the foregoing definition, Lamadrid is considered an Overseas Filipino

Worker (OFW). She had been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state where
she is not a citizen. Cathay’s cabin crew are all based in Hong Kong, and in fact
Lamadrid resided and leased an apartment in Hong Kong during her stint with
Cathay. As an OFW faced with a termination dispute, Lamadrid’s case may be
heard and decided by the Arbiter under Article 224 [217] of the Labor Code in
relation to RA 8042 as amended by RA 10022.
Lamadrid's position as a Senior Purser is imbued with trust and confidence.
Jurisprudence classify positions of trust and confidence into two categories. The
first consists of those managerial employees or those "vested with powers or
prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees" as
defined under Article 219 [212] (m) of the Labor Code. By the nature of their
position, managerial employees are expected to exhibit utmost fidelity to the
employer as they are entrusted with confidential and sensitive matters. The
second category involves those who in the normal and routine exercise of their
functions regularly handle significant amounts of the employer's money or
property, such as but not limited to cashiers, auditors, and property custodians.
The company laid down the penalties for violation of its policies; however, the
evaluation of an employee's infraction should be dealt with fairness and reason.
Simply put, all surrounding circumstances must be considered and the penalty
must be commensurate to the violation committed by an employee. Termination
of the services of an employee should be the employer's last resort especially
when other disciplinary actions may be imposed, considering the employee's
long years of service in the company, devoting time, effort and invaluable service
in line with the employer's goals and mission.
RENATO C. TACIS v. SHIELDS SECURITY SERVICES
Constructive dismissal is an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued

employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; or when there is a
demotion in rank and/or a diminution in pay. It exists when there is a clear act of
discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer, which makes it unbearable
for the employee to continue his/her employment. In cases of constructive
dismissal, the impossibility, unreasonableness, or unlikelihood of continued
employment leaves an employee with no other viable recourse but to terminate
his or her employment.
Resignation is the formal pronouncement or relinquishment of a position or office.

It is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where he believes that
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personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and
he has then no other choice but to disassociate himself from employment. The
intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment; hence, the
acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be
considered in determining whether he in fact intended to terminate his
employment. In illegal dismissal cases, it is a fundamental rule that when an
employer interposes the defense of resignation, on him necessarily rests the
burden to prove that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned.
Guided by the foregoing legal precepts, a judicious review of the facts on record
will show that the Company was able to show petitioners' voluntary resignation.
The acts of petitioners before and after the resignation do not show that undue
force was exerted upon them.
EDGARDO I. MABALOT, PETITIONER, VS. MAERSK - FILIPINAS CREWING, INC.

AND/OR A.P. MOLLER A/S, RESPONDENTS.
A final, conclusive, and definite medical assessment must clearly state the
seafarer's fitness to work or his exact disability rating, or whether such illness is work-
related, and without any further condition or treatment. It should no longer require
any further action on the part of the company- designated physician and it is
issued by the company-designated physician after he or she has exhausted all
possible treatment options within the periods allowed by law.
To stress, the assessment to be conclusive must be complete and definite;

otherwise, the medical report shall be set aside and the disability grading
contained therein shall be ignored. As case law holds, a final and definite
disability assessment is necessary in order to truly reflect the true extent of the
sickness or injuries of the seafarer and his or her capacity to resume work as such.
EVELINA E. BELARSO v. QUALITY HOUSE
While the State can regulate the right of an employer to select and discharge his
or her employees. An employer cannot be compelled to continue the
employment of an employee in whom there has been a legitimate loss of trust
and confidence.
REPUBLIC VS. ABELLANOSA
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against

three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. In this case, private
complainants Pomar, Pastolero, Cathedral, Orias, Suobiron, Bueron, and Pelipog
testified that appellant went to Pavia, Iloilo and represented herself as a recruiter
who could send them to Brunei for work; that appellant impressed upon them
that she had the authority or ability to send them overseas for work by showing
them a job order from Brunei and a calling card; and appellant collected
processing or placement fees from the private complainants in various amounts
ranging from 5,000.00 to 20,000.00; and that she did not reimburse said amounts
despite demands. In addition, it was proved that appellant does not have any
license or authority to recruit workers for overseas employment as shown by the
certification issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. Finally,
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appellant recruited seven persons, or more than the minimum of three persons
required by law, for illegal recruitment to be considered in large scale.
Ratio Decidendi: Recruitment becomes illegal when undertaken by non-licensees

or non-holders of authority.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three

(3) or more persons individually or as a group.In this case, private complainants
Pomar, Pastolero, Cathedral, Orias, Suobiron, Bueron, and Pelipog testified that
appellant went to Pavia, Iloilo and represented herself as a recruiter who could
send them to Brunei for work; that appellant impressed upon them that she had
the authority or ability to send them overseas for work by showing them a job
order from Brunei and a calling card; and appellant collected processing or
placement fees from the private complainants in various amounts ranging from
5,000.00 to 20,000.00; and that she did not reimburse said amounts despite
demands. In addition, it was proved that appellant does not have any license or
authority to recruit workers for overseas employment as shown by the certification
issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. Finally, appellant
recruited seven persons, or more than the minimum of three persons required by
law, for illegal recruitment to be considered in large scale.
PACIFIC ROYAL FOODS VS. VIOLETA
Bare suspicion, like that harbored by PRBFI against respondents, is not a just cause
to fire any employee. The employer need not present proof beyond reasonable
doubt or clear and convincing evidence to justify the dismissal, but bare suspicion
that the employee is doing something detrimental to the interests of the employer
is just a hunch, a mere gut feeling that cannot amount to substantial evidence. A
reasonable mind requires reason. Mere allegations are not legally compelling
unless proved.
ESICO VS ALPHALAND CORPORATION AND ALPHALAND DEVELOPMENT INC.
The Supreme Court (SC) clarified where jurisdiction lies for money claim (even if
the same is) connected with an employment contract. Based on the case, Esico
was employed by PhilWeb Corporation (Phil Web), a part of respondents’ group
of companies. PhilWeb initially hired Esico as Risk & Security Management Officer.
Thereafter, respondent Alphaland concurrently engaged Esico as a rotary wing
pilot assigned to fly the chairperson of respondents’ group of companies to his
various engagements within and outside the country. The engagement letter
provides, among others, that the Company agrees to advance the expenses
necessary to send him on ground and flight course training. In turn, he agreed to
render service to the Company for a minimum period of five years beginning on
the start date indicated above. Should he fail to complete minimum years of
service, Esico shall reimburse the Company for the expenses spent on his training
subject to proportionate reduction equivalent to 5 percent per completed
quarter of actual service.
After more than two (2) years, Esico tendered his resignation, citing various
reasons therefor. As a consequence of his resignation, respondents demanded
from Esico reimbursement of the amount corresponding to a portion of his flight
training expenses. Esico refused to pay. Thus, the respondents filed a complaint
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against Esico for alleged wrongful resignation and damages with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), based on the employment contract.
We now face the issue, does the Labor Arbiter (LA) or NLRC have jurisdiction over
the case filed by Alphaland against Esico for the alleged wrong resignation and
damages based on the employment contract?
The SC answered in the negative. The bone of contention between the parties
lies in the interpretation of the employment contract, specifically the clause on
the minimum service requirement in consideration of expenses (advances) for
flight trainings. Unarguably, respondents claim payment of actual damages
equivalent to the amount they advanced for Esico’s flight training who reneged
on his contractual obligation by his premature resignation. Respondents cause of
action, the supposed violation of the right-duty correlative between the parties,
hinges on the enforceability of the contentious clause in the employment
contract. Clearly, respondents’ recourse against Esico is based on the law on
contracts. The labor tribunals do not have jurisdiction to settle various issues
necessitating application of civil laws on obligations and contracts. Moreover, in
determining which tribunal has jurisdiction over a case, the SC considers not only
the status or relationship of the parties, but more so the nature of the question that
is the subject of controversy.
Respondents further asserted that Esico’s failure to serve written notice of his
resignation at least a month prior violated Article 300(285)(a)54 of the Labor Code
which makes him liable to pay for damages.
This claim for damages, however, still arose from Esico’s supposed breach of
employment contract. The SC concluded that jurisdiction is conferred by law and
not by the parties. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC cannot exercise jurisdiction
over respondents’ complaint just by the mere expedient of citing the employer-
employee relationship between the parties and designating it as one for
“wrongful resignation with claims of damages.”
UNIVERSITY OF CORDILLERAS v. BENEDICTO F. LACANARIA
Totality of Infractions Rule. The totality of infractions or the number of violations

committed during the period of employment shall be considered in determining
the penalty to be imposed upon an erring employee. The offenses committed by
[employee] should not be taken singly and separately. Fitness for continued
employment cannot be compartmentalized into tight little cubicles of aspects of
character, conduct and ability separate and independent of each other. While
it may be true that [the employee] was penalized for his previous infractions, this
does not and should not mean that his employment record would be wiped
clean of his infractions. After all, the record of an employee is a relevant
consideration in determining the penalty that should be meted out since an
employee's past misconduct and present behavior must be taken together in
determining the proper imposable penalty. Despite the sanctions imposed upon
[the employee], he continued to commit misconduct and exhibit undesirable
behavior xxx. Indeed, the employer cannot be compelled to retain a
misbehaving employee, or one who is guilty of acts inimical to its interests. It has
the right to dismiss such an employee if only as a measure of self-protection.
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CIVIL LAW WITH LAND TITLES
SPS. BELINDA LIU AND HSI PIN LIU v. MARCELINA ESPINOSA +
Thus, an action for unlawful detainer will stand if the following requisites are
present:
a. Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;
b. Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
c. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived
the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
d. Within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property,
the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
The Court fully sustains both the MTCC and the RTC findings that the foregoing
requisites have been sufficiently established in the case at bar.
It is clear upon perusal of the records that petitioners are the registered owners of
the subject property, as evidenced by TCT No. 146-2010008891, and that the
respondents' occupation of the subject property was merely tolerated by the
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest and the petitioners themselves based on the
understanding that the said respondents will peacefully vacate the same once
the need to use the land by the petitioners arises.
Subsequently, this occupation became illegal when respondents refused to heed
petitioners' express and clear demands to vacate the subject property, the last
of which was dated February 12, 2013. It is evidently clear that the complaint for
unlawful detainer, filed on August 6, 2013, was made within one year from the
time the last formal demand to vacate was made.
It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in
favor of the person in whose name the title appears. It is conclusive evidence with
respect to the ownership of the land described therein. Hence, petitioners as the
titleholders are entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property including
possession.
SPOUSES DARITO P. NOCUENCA AND LUCILLE B. NOCUENCA, COMPLAINANTS, VS.

ATTY. ALFREDO T. BENSI, RESPONDENT.
Article 536 of the Civil Code provides:

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Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as
long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an
action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid
of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
While lawyers are mandated to act with dignity and in a manner that inspires
confidence to the legal profession, their rights must still be protected just like every
ordinary individual. The legal profession and the threat of disbarment should not
be used as a means to provoke lawyers who are acting well within their rights.
MRS. CONSOLACION V. TIÑA v. STA. CLARA ESTATE +
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that where the issue of ownership
is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of the issue on ownership
is not final and binding, but merely for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not
a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. [26] In
an ejectment case, questions as to the validity of the title cannot be resolved
definitively. A separate action to directly attack the validity of the title must be
filed, as was in fact filed by petitioner, to fully thresh out as to who possesses a
valid title over the subject property. Thus, any ruling on ownership that was passed
upon in the ejectment case is not and should not be binding on Civil Case No.
00-11133.
REPUBLIC v. JORGE CASTILLO +
As to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the complaint for expropriation,
we hold that, at the time of the institution of this case in 1980, Section 1(a) of P.D.
No. 478, otherwise known as "Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of
the Solicitor General" provides that the Solicitor General has the power to
represent the government and its officers before this Court and the CA, and all
other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. Moreover,
Section 1(k) of P.D. No. 478 likewise provides that the Solicitor General can act
and represent the RP and/or the people before any court, tribunal, body or
commission in any matter, action or proceedings which, in his opinion, affects the
welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require.
With the foregoing in mind, we rule that the Solicitor General has the authority to
initiate the present expropriation case against the respondents.
RODOLFO CARANTO v. ANITA AGRA CARANTO +
In civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, who is required to
establish his/her case by a preponderance of evidence. [31] Preponderance of
evidence is defined as the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence
on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater
weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." [32] It is a
phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence that
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is more convincing to the court as it is worthier of belief than that which is offered
in opposition thereto.
HEIRS OF AURIO T. CASIÑO v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES +
As a rule, in an action for quieting of title, the plaintiff or complainant must

demonstrate a legal or equitable title to, or an interest in the subject property. He
must likewise show that the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that
purportedly casts a cloud on his title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF CONSUELO
SANTIAGO GARCIA CATALINO TANCHANCO AND RONALDO TANCHANCO,
PETITIONERS, VS. NATIVIDAD GARCIA SANTOS, RESPONDENT.
It is settled that "the law favors testacy over intestacy" and hence, "the probate
of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that
no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of
a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory." In a similar way,
"testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose."
The main issue which the court must determine in a probate proceeding is the
due execution or the extrinsic validity of the will as provided by Section 1, Rule
75[124] of the Rules of Court. The probate court cannot inquire into the intrinsic
validity of the will or the disposition of the estate by the testator. Thus, due
execution is "whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will
in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law"
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP. v. NARCISO R. NOLASCO +
Section 4 of RA 6552 requires four (4) conditions before the seller may actually
cancel the contract thereunder: first, the defaulting buyer has paid less than two
(2) years of installments; second, the seller must give such defaulting buyer a sixty
(60)-day grace period, reckoned from the date the installment became
due; third, if the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the expiration of the said
grace period, the seller must give the buyer a notice of cancellation and/or a
demand for rescission by notarial act; and fourth, the seller may actually cancel
the contract only after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the buyer's receipt of the
said notice of cancellation and/or demand for rescission by notarial act.
In claiming that it had validly rescinded its contract to sell with Nolasco, Pryce
relies on two documents: a written Contract to Sell, which sets out an automatic
cancellation provision in case of default and which Pryce alleges that Nolasco
impliedly agreed to, and its denial of the refund as asserted in its Answer with
Counterclaims against Nolasco's Complaint before the RTC.
A notarial rescission contemplated under RA 6552 is a unilateral cancellation by
a seller of a perfected contract thereunder acknowledged by a notary public
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and accompanied by competent evidence of identity. [18] This notarial notice of
rescission has peculiar technical requirements.
Rescission unmakes a contract. Necessarily, the rights and obligations emanating
from a rescinded contract are extinguished. Being a mode of nullifying contracts
and their correlative rights and obligations, rescission thus must be conveyed in
an unequivocal manner and couched in unmistakable terms. This is so as not to
restrict the parties therein to mere guesswork in determining their contractual
status, in mapping out their causes of action, if any, against each other, in
deciding on their remedies should they be aggrieved by the rescission and find
the need for redress, and in estimating the prescriptive periods of such legal
remedies. Basic fairness empowers this rule.
APOLINARIO VALDEZ v. HEIRS OF ANTERO CATABAS +
We clarified that a possessor or occupant of property may be a possessor in the

concept of an owner prior to the determination that the property is alienable and
disposable agricultural land. Thus, the computation of the period of possession
may include the period of adverse possession prior to the declaration that the
land is alienable and disposable. Though at the time of his application, the subject
property was not yet classified as alienable and disposable, the subsequent
declaration thereof should be considered in Antero's favor whose free patent
application was still pending and subsisting at that time and is not canceled up
to this time.
ARTURO C. CALUBAD v. BILLY M. ACERON +
While it is true that petitioner Calubad is not a party to Civil Case No. Q-93-18011,
the foregoing provision states that the Resolution dated December 13, 2004 is
conclusive and binding upon him being the successor-in-interest of Oliver who
acquired title to the subject property after Civil Case No. Q-93-18011 has become
final and executory. As a general rule, a person not impleaded and given the
opportunity to present his or her case cannot be bound by the decision. However,
having acquired alleged interest over the subject property only after the finality
of Civil Case No. Q-93-18011, he is bound by the judgment and the determination
of rights of the original parties therein.
In other words, Calubad, being a privy to the judgment debtor, Oliver, can be
reached by an order of execution.] Evidently, petitioner Calubad's claim over the
subject property is not adverse to that of Oliver as he derived his alleged
ownership or interest thereof from Oliver by virtue of a contract of loan and deed
of real estate mortgage. Hence, petitioner Calubad cannot enforce his alleged
interest or claim over the subject property as against Aceron who is the adjudged
owner of the subject property in Civil Case No. Q-93-18011 against his
predecessor-in-interest Oliver; nor exempt himself from the execution of Civil Case
No. Q-93-18011 on the pretext that he is a purchaser in good faith and for value
relying on the indefeasibility of a Torrens title.
Furthermore, petitioner Calubad's resort to the remedy of annulment of judgment

under Rule 47 is unnecessary as the same extends only to a party in whose favor
the remedies of new trial, reconsideration, appeal, and petition for relief from
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judgment are no longer available through no fault of said party. As a non-party
in Civil Case No. Q-93-18011, petitioner Calubad could not bring the action for
annulment of judgment considering that the remedies of new trial,
reconsideration, appeal or setting the judgment aside through a petition for relief
are not available to him in the first instance.
Moreover, even assuming that petitioner Calubad can avail of the relief under
Rule 47, such an action would not finally determine his rights over the subject
property as against the competing rights of the original parties. Annulment of
judgment is an equitable relief not because a party-litigant thereby gains another
opportunity to reopen the already-final judgment but because a party-litigant is
enabled to be discharged from the burden of being bound by a judgment that
was an absolute nullity to begin with.
Finally, an action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
does not involve the merits of the final order of the trial court. The issues of whether
the subsequent mortgage of the subject property by Oliver to petitioner Calubad
and the indefeasibility of a Torrens title give petitioner a right of ownership over
the subject property superior to that of Aceron are outside the scope of the
present petition for review. To resolve such issues requires a review of evidence
which this Court obviously cannot do in this petition. An action for annulment of
judgment is an independent action where the judgment or resolution sought to
be annulled is rendered and is not an appeal of the judgment or resolution
therein. Thus, the issue of petitioner Calubad's alleged interest on or ownership of
the subject property cannot be addressed in this petition for review.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF JULIETA L. DANICO +
In fine, the NPC and the Spouses Danico entered into two deeds of sale and
stipulated that of the two Statements of Account, the Statement of Account as
of December 31, 1985 pertained to the first deed of sale while the Statement of
Account as of April 30, 1985 pertained to the second deed of sale. Contrary to
the ruling of the CA, the two deeds of sale are clear and unambiguous as to the
existence of the two statements of account. In fact, both the Spouses Danico and
the NPC adhered and agreed to the terms, conditions and stipulations embodied
in the two deeds of sale knowing fully well the existence of the two statements of
account.
Article 1370 of the Civil Code provides that if the terms of a contract are clear
and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal
meaning of its stipulation shall control. If, indeed, the stipulations in the said two
deeds of sale did not express the true intention of the parties, both the Spouses
Danico and the NPC could have filed the corresponding action for reformation
of the contract. But they did not do so. Besides, both deeds of sale had been
executed on the same day, that is, on September 9, 1985. Thus, the parties knew
at the time of their execution the existence of the two Statements of Account as
stipulated in the contracts. They cannot now impugn the existence of Statement
of Account as of April 30, 1985 when the words of both contracts are clear and
readily understandable. The contract is the law between the parties. Thus, it
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should be interpreted according to their literal meaning and should not be
interpreted beyond their obvious intendment.
As to respondent NPC's liability to pay interest, Article 1956 of the Civil Code states
that no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. As
can be gleaned from the foregoing provision, payment of monetary interest is
allowed only if: (1) there was an express stipulation for the payment of interest;
and (2) the agreement for the payment of interest was reduced in writing. The
concurrence of the two conditions is required for the payment of monetary
interest. Thus, We have held that collection of interest without any stipulation
therefor in writing is prohibited by law.
In the case at bar, it is clearly apparent that the two deeds of sale do not contain
any stipulation as to the payment of monetary interest. Contrary to the contention
of petitioner DBP, the stipulation as to interest in the original agricultural loan
dated April 22, 1977 and the Deed of Conditional Sale dated October 10, 1985
are not applicable to NPC as the latter is not privy to the said contracts.
REPUBLIC v. MANUEL M. CARAIG +
The OSG is not only raising a question of law, i.e. on whether the evidence
presented by Manuel was sufficient to prove that the subject land is alienable
and disposable. It is also raising a question of fact as it seeks the Court's
determination as to the veracity and truthfulness of the testimonies of the
witnesses presented by Manuel in support of his claim that he and his
predecessors-in-interest were in actual, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and ownership of the land even before June 12, 1945. Consequently,
the Court is constrained to exercise its jurisdiction in the case since the errors raised
by the OSG in its Petition, being mixed questions of fact and of law, are not proper
subjects of an appeal by certiorari.
In any case, the Petition is still dismissible for utter lack of merit.
No less than the Constitution prescribes under the Regalian Doctrine that all lands
which do not appear to be within private ownership are public domain and
hence presumed to belong to the State. As such, a person applying for
registration has the burden of proof that the land sought to be registered is
alienable or disposable. He must present incontrovertible evidence that the land
subject of the application has been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State and no longer
remains a part of the inalienable public domain. With the presentation of the
CENRO certificates as evidence, together with the documentary evidence,
Manuel substantially complied with the legal requirement that the land must be
proved to be an alienable and disposable part of the public domain.
in Republic v. TA.N Properties, Inc., and similar cases which impose a strict
requirement to prove that the public land is alienable and disposable, especially
in this case when the Decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals were
rendered prior to these rulings. To establish that the land subject of the application
is alienable and disposable public land, the general rule remains: all applications
for original registration under the Property Registration Decree must include both
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(1) a CENRO or PENRO certification and (2) a certified true copy of the original
classification made by the DENR Secretary.
As an exception, however, the courts — in their sound discretion and based solely
on the evidence presented on record — may approve the application, pro hac
vice, on the ground of substantial compliance showing that there has been a
positive act of government to show the nature and character of the land and an
absence of effective opposition from the government. This exception shall only
apply to applications for registration currently pending before the trial court prior
to this Decision and shall be inapplicable to all future applications.
Manuel filed his application for original registration on September 2, 2002. The MTC
granted the same on February 28, 2007 or 15 months before the promulgation of
T.A.N. Properties. Substantial compliance on the legal requirements should
therefore be applied in this case. Thus, Manuel duly proved that Lot No. 5525-B is
alienable and disposable.
BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK v. EDGARDO C. YPIL +
It highlights that the Promissory Note stipulated that in the event of default, CSTC's
remaining obligations with the Bank will immediately become due and payable
even without a demand notice. It points out that CSTC had already defaulted on
its obligations under the Promissory when the Notice of Garnishment was served
to the Bank. Hence, the Bank asserts that it acted correctly when it formally
debited CSTC's deposit to reflect the legal compensation which automatically
took place even prior to the service of the Notice of Garnishment on February 4,
2004. Moreover, the Bank contends that since legal compensation occurs by
operation of law, the deposits could not have been the proper subject of the
Notice of Garnishment and could not be placed in custodia legis.
It is settled that "[c]ompensation is a mode of extinguishing to the concurrent
amount the debts of persons who in their own right are creditors and debtors of
each other. The object of compensation is the prevention of unnecessary suits
and payments thru the mutual extinction by operation of law of concurring
debts."
jurisprudence states that "the diligence required of banks is more than that of a
good father of a family. Banks are required to exercise the highest degree of
diligence in its banking transactions." In view of this, BDO Unibank, Inc. should
recognize that it should be diligent and circumspect in its dealings with its clients,
especially with regard to transactions that involve loans and credits. If only it had
properly monitored the accounts of its clients, BDO Unibank, Inc. would not have
been remiss in assuring that CSTC fulfills its end of the loan or even in exercising its
option to offset the company's deposits with that of its outstanding obligations in
order to protect the Bank's interests. Unfortunately, it has to face the
consequences of its inattention to detail.
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BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PETITIONER, VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES (NOW BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS) AND CITIBANK, N.A.,
RESPONDENTS.
CBP's establishment of clearing house facilities for its member banks to which
Valentino and Estacio were assigned as Bookkeeper and Janitor-Messenger,
respectively, is a governmental function. As such, the State or CBP in this case, is
liable only for the torts committed by its employee when the latter acts as a
special agent but not when the said employee or official performs his or her
functions that naturally pertain to his or her office. A special agent is defined as
one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise
of the duties of his office. Evidently, both Valentino and Estacio are not considered
as special agents of CBP during their commission of the fraudulent acts against
petitioner BPI as they were regular employees performing tasks pertaining to their
offices, namely, bookkeeping and janitorial-messenger. Thus, CBP cannot be held
liable for any damage caused to petitioner BPI by reason of Valentino and
Estacio's unlawful acts.
Nonetheless, even assuming that CBP is an ordinary employer, it still cannot be
held liable. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that an employer shall be liable
for the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks. An act is deemed an assigned task if it is "done by an employee,
in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer
at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage." Obviously, Valentino and
Estacio's fraudulent acts of tampering with and pilfering of documents are not in
furtherance of CBP's interests nor done for its account as the said acts were
unauthorized and unlawful. Also, petitioner BPI has the burden to prove that
Valentino and Estacio's fraudulent acts were performed within the scope of their
assigned tasks, which it failed to do. It is only then that the presumption that CBP,
as employer, was negligent would arise which then compels CBP to show
evidence that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees.
Thus, where a public officer acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, any injury or
damage caused by such acts is his or her own personal liability and cannot be
imputed to the State.
The fraudulent acts of CBP's employees Valentino and Estacio, were evidently
not pursuant to their functions and were in excess of or without authority;
therefore, any injury or damage caused by such acts to petitioner BPI shall be
Valentino's and Estacio's own personal liabilities which should not be imputed to
CBP as their employer.
Finally, anent the issue of Citibank's liability as the collecting bank, we affirm the
trial court's dismissal of the third-party complaint against it. In this case, the subject
checks were not returned to Citibank before the lapse of the clearing period.
Thus, Citibank acted within its authority in allowing the withdrawal of said checks
after the lapse of the clearing period without any notice of dishonor from the
drawee bank, petitioner BPI. The remedy, therefore, of petitioner BPI lies against
the parties responsible for the tampering with and pilfering of the subject checks
and other bank documents which resulted in the total damage of P9 million.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HEREDEROS DE CIRIACO CHUNACO
DISTELERIA INCORPORADA, RESPONDENT.
An applicant for land registration must prove that the land sought to be registered
has been declared by the President or the DENR Secretary as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. Specifically, an applicant must present a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified
as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. A certificate of land
classification status issued by the CENRO or PENRO of the DENR and approved by
the DENR Secretary must also be presented to prove that the land subject of the
application for registration is alienable and disposable, and that it falls within the
approved area per verification survey by the PENRO or CENRO. A CENRO or
PENRO certification alone is insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable
nature of the land sought to be registered. It is the original classification by the
DENR Secretary or the President which is essential to prove that the land is indeed
alienable and disposable.
EULOGIO ALDE v. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA +
This Court agrees with Alde that the MLA remains valid even beyond the posting
and publication thereof because as an administrative proceeding before the
CENRO, it is in the nature of an action quasi in rem.
In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose

of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan
burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or
liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these
questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to
ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments
therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.
Thus, the City Government of Zamboanga is not without recourse. It can legally
step in and assert its interest after the expiration of the lease awarded to Alde.
In defending its case, it bears noting that the City Government did not present
any presidential proclamation, executive order, statute, investigative report by
the LMB or an administrative action, that clearly reserved the subject lots for
public use by the local government. Not even the Local Government Code
empowers local government units to reserve, on their own, particular public lands
for the private domain or patrimonial property of the Government. By statute, this
power to classify public lands as alienable and disposable and to relegate to the
private domain or patrimonial property, is reposed in the President and the DENR
Secretary, as delegated to them by Congress, through CA 141 and Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 705. Therefore, they cannot delegate the same to another
office or officer, such as the City Government of Zamboanga. What has once
been delegated by Congress can no longer be further delegated or redelegated
by the original delegate to another, as expressed in the Latin maxim - Delegata
potestas non potest delegari.
NINIA P. LUMAUAN v. COA +

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Petitioner can be held personally liable for the disallowed benefit to the extent
of the amount she actually and individually received pursuant to our ruling in
Madera v. Commission on Audit.
In Madera, We promulgated the following rules on return of disallowed

amounts, viz.:
1. If a Notice of Disallowance is set aside by the Court, no return shall be

required from any of the persons held liable therein;
2. If a Notice of Disallowance is upheld, the rules on return are as follows:
a. Approving and certifying officers who acted in good faith, regular

performance of official functions, and with the diligence of a good
father of the family are not civilly liable to return consistent with
Section 38 of the Administrative Code of 1987;
b. Approving and certifying officers who are clearly shown to have

acted in bad faith, malice, or gross negligence are, pursuant to
Section 43 of the Administrative Code of 1987, solidarily liable to
return only the net disallowed amount which, as discussed herein,
excludes amounts excused under the following sections 2c and 2d.
c. Recipients - whether approving or certifying officers or mere passive

recipients - are liable to return the disallowed amounts respectively
received by them, unless they are able to show that the amounts they
received were genuinely given in consideration of services
rendered.
d. The Court may likewise excuse the return of recipients based on

undue prejudicie, social justice considerations, and other bona
fide exceptions as it may determine on a case to case basis.
(Emphasis supplied).
A payee or recipient may be excused from returning the disallowed amount

when he/she has shown that he/she was "actually entitled to what he/[she]
received" or "when undue prejudice will result from requiring payees to return or
where social justice or humanitarian considerations are attendant."
We have reviewed the records and found none of the extenuating circumstances
to be present.
To recall, the benefit subject in this case is accrued COLA. As pointed out by the
COA, petitioner is not entitled to said allowance because it was already
incorporated in the standardized salary rates of government employees. Neither
was it established that ordering its return would unduly prejudice petitioner. It was
also not shown that social justice or humanitarian considerations were extant to
the instant case. Thus, there is no justifiable circumstance present that would
excuse petitioner from returning the disallowed benefit to the extent of the
amount she actually and individually received.
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Finally, pursuant to our pronouncement in Madera, petitioner should only be held

liable to return the disallowed amount corresponding to the amount actually and
individually received by her.
ARAKOR CONSTRUCTION v. GADDI
"[i]f any one party to a supposed contract was already dead at the time of Its
execution, such contract is undoubtedly simulated and false, and, therefore, null
and void by reason of its having been made after the death of the party who
appears as one of the contracting parties therein." Indeed, "no one can give what
one does not have; nemo dat quod non habet. One can sell only what one owns
or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more right than what the
seller can transfer legally."
HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. ELVIRA S. MANLAPAZ,

RESPONDENT.
Jurisprudence teaches that "the parties to a contract are the real parties-in-
interest in an action upon it." As such, "[t]he basic principle of relativity of contracts
is that contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and cannot favor
or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted
with knowledge thereof'.
Indeed, "'[w]here there is no privity of contract, there is likewise no obligation or
liability to speak about."
Section 25 of P.D. No. 957 states:
SEC. 25. Issuance of Title. – The owner or developer shall deliver the title of the lot
or unit to the buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit.
To recapitulate and for future guidance, the guidelines laid down in the case
of Eastern Shipping Lines are accordingly modified to embody BSP-MB Circular
No. 799, as follows:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi contracts,
delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravener can be held liable for
damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern
in determining the measure of recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of
money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that
which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself
earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of
stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
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2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is
breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at
the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall
be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the
demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the
demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run
from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code),
but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the
demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment
of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be
deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally
adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction,
this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance
of credit.
And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory
prior to July 1, 2013, shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented
applying the rate of interest fixed therein.
REPUBLIC v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
An applicant for land registration must prove that the land is an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
Certifications issued by the CENRO, or specialists of the DENR, as well as Survey

Plans prepared by the DENR containing annotations that the subject lots are
alienable, do not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the
presumption that the property sought to be registered belongs to the inalienable
public domain. Rather, this Court stressed the importance of proving alienability
by presenting a copy of the original classification of the land approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records.
In T.A.N. Properties, the Court ruled that it is not enough for the CENRO or the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) to certify that the
land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for original registration must
present a copy of the original land classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records to
establish that the land is alienable and disposable. In ruling in this wise, the Court
explained that the CENRO or the PENRO are not the official repository or legal
custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as
alienable and disposable. As such, the certifications they issue relating to the
character of the land cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein.
Thus, as things stand, the present rule is that an application for original registration
must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of
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the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records. (Emphasis supplied)
However, despite this pronouncement in T.A.N. Properties during the pendency

of the case in the appellate court, the PNP did not make any attempt to submit
the required twin certifications in order to prove that the subject lots have been
classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The PNP failed
to refute the CENRO Report by submitting the twin certifications as required
in T.A.N. Properties. An applicant for land registration bears the burden of proving
that the land applied for registration is alienable and disposable.
(important)
The Court further elaborated on the reason behind the rule on substantial
compliance in Republic v. San Mateo. In the said case, the Court explained that
the rule on substantial compliance was allowed in Vega due to the lack of
opportunity for the applicant to comply with the requirements provided in T.A.N.
Properties. The Court explained:
In Vega, the Court was mindful of the fact that the trial court rendered its decision
on November 13, 2003, way before the rule on strict compliance was laid down
in T.A.N. Properties on June 26, 2008. Thus, the trial court was merely applying the
rule prevailing at the time, which was substantial compliance. Thus, even if the
case reached the Supreme Court after the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties, the
Court allowed the application of substantial compliance, because there was no
opportunity for the registrant to comply with the Court's ruling in T.A.N. Properties,
the trial court and the CA already having decided the case prior to the
promulgation of T.A.N. Properties.
Conversely, if there is an opportunity for the applicant to comply with the ruling
in T.A.N. Properties (i.e., the case was still pending before the trial court after the
promulgation of T.A.N. Properties), the rule on strict compliance shall be applied.
From the foregoing, it is clear that substantial compliance may be applied, at the
discretion of the courts, only if the trial court rendered its decision on the
application prior to June 26, 2008, the date of the promulgation of T.A.N.
Properties. (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
In fine, We find that the respondent's evidence does not suffice to entitle it to
register the subject lots. The PNP failed to present any evidence showing that the
DENR Secretary had indeed released the subject lots as alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain.
DIOSCORO POLIÑO BACALA v. HEIRS OF SPS. JUAN POLIÑO AND CORAZON ROM
Gross inadequacy or simulation of price neither affects nor invalidates a sale, but
it can be shown that the parties may have really intended a donation or some
other act or contract.
Donation has three indispensable elements: (1) the reduction of the patrimony of
the donor; (2) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and (3) the intent to
do an act of liberality or animus donandi.
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A resolutory condition extinguishes a transaction that, for a time, existed and
discharges the obligations created thereunder. It was stipulated in the
Agreement that Anecito shall enjoy the usufruct of the subject property, and that
upon Anecito's death, Juan shall support and give financial assistance to Aquilino
and Ducepino. These stipulations in the Agreement are resolutory as Anecito and
Juan also agreed that breach of the terms and conditions of the Agreement shall
render the Deed of Sale non-effective and nugatory.
Substantial breaches of contract are fundamental violations as would defeat the

very object of the parties in making the agreement. The happening of a resolutory
condition is a substantial breach that may give either party thereto the option to
bring an action to rescind the contract and/or seek damages.
As a general rule, the power to rescind an obligation must be invoked judicially

and cannot be exercised solely on a party's own judgment that the other has
committed a breach of the obligation. As an exception, an injured party need
not resort to court action in order to rescind a contract when the contract itself
provides that it may be revoked or cancelled upon violation of its terms and
conditions.
CELEDENIO C. DEMEGILLO v. ARTURO S. LUMAMPAO
The issue in an accion publiciana is the "better right of possession" of real property
independently of title. It is therefore "an action for recovery of the right to possess
and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a regional trial court to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of the title."When
the parties, however, raise the issue of ownership, "the courts may pass upon the
issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property."
Simply put, DARAB adjudicators have primary and exclusive original jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate cases involving the correction, partition, cancellation,
secondary and subsequent issuances of CLOAs. Meanwhile, the DARAB is vested
with exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review, reverse, modify, alter or affirm
resolutions, orders, and decisions of its adjudicators.
Public land patent, when registered in the corresponding Register of Deeds, is a

veritable Torrens title, and becomes as indefeasible upon the expiration of one
(1) year from the date of issuance thereof."
The RTC was without jurisdiction or power to order the reconveyance of the land
in dispute as this can be done only through a definitive ruling thereof - something
which cannot be done by the court in an accion publiciana.
The age-old rule that a person who has a Torrens title over the land is entitled to
possession thereof.
SPS. EUGENIO DE VERA AND ROSALIA PADILLA v. FAUSTA CATUNGAL
It is important to note that "in determining whether consent is vitiated by any of

these circumstances, courts are given a wide latitude in weighing the facts or
circumstances in a given case and in deciding in favor of what they believe
actually occurred, considering the age, physical infirmity, intelligence,
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relationship, and conduct of the parties at the time of the execution of the
contract and subsequent thereto, irrespective of whether the contract is in a
public or private writing." A voidable contract is valid and binding until annulled
in a proper court action.
Although notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity and are

accorded evidentiary weight as regards their due execution, this presumption,
however, may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
When one of the contracting parties is unable to read or is otherwise illiterate, and
fraud is alleged, a presumption that there is fraud or mistake in obtaining consent
of that party arises. Article 1332 offers protection to contracting parties that are
unfortunate and disadvantaged to be illiterate and unable to read. It
contemplates a situation where "a contract is entered into but the consent of one
of the contracting parties is vitiated by mistake or fraud committed by the
other." This provision also modifies the principle that a party is presumed to know
the contents and import of a document to which he affixed his signature.
CRISTINA R. SEMING v. EMELITA P. ALAMAG
It is well settled that the object of every contract must be determinate. "The
requisite that a thing be determinate is satisfied if at the time the contract is
entered into, the thing is capable of being made determinate without the
necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties."
Petitioner relied on the October 22, 1990 and January 23, 1991 receipts to prove
that Natividad transferred and conveyed to petitioner the former's 771-square
meter portion of Lot 512-C. But as mentioned above, said receipts are null and
void, and thus, should not be given evidentiary weight and credence. Notably,
even if we consider the receipts presented by petitioner, the exact portion of Lot
512-C allegedly sold to petitioner was not specified. The phrase "[t]his amount is
payment only for two lots" renders the object of the sale ambiguous as it does not
even define the metes and bounds of the lots which are supposedly the subject
of the sale.
VILORIA VS. GAETOS
In an action for quieting of title, the plaintiff has the burden to show by
preponderance of evidence that they have a legal and equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action.
EDUARDO ATIENZA, PETITIONER, VS. GOLDEN RAM ENGINEERING SUPPLIES &

EQUIPMENT CORPORATION AND BARTOLOME TORRES, RESPONDENTS.
Solidary liability cannot be lightly inferred. "There is solidary liability when the
obligation expressly so states, when the law so provides, or when the nature of the
obligation so requires. Settled is the rule that a director or officer shall only be
personally liable for the obligations of the corporation, if the following conditions
concur: (1) the complainant alleged in the complaint that the director or officer
assented to patently unlawful acts of the corporation, or that the officer was guilty
of gross negligence or bad faith; and (2) the complainant clearly and
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convincingly proved such unlawful acts, negligence or bad faith."
The bad faith of respondents in refusing to repair and subsequently replace a

defective engine which already underperformed during sea trial and began
malfunctioning six (6) months after its commissioning has been clearly established.
Respondents' uncaring attitude towards fixing the engine which relates to MV
Ace I's seaworthiness amounts to bad faith. Thus, the RTC's grant of moral
damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit has sufficient basis.
SPOUSES EUGENIO PONCE AND EMILIANA NEROSA, PETITIONERS, VS. JESUS

ALDANESE, RESPONDENT.
Respondent Jesus inherited a property from his father in 1973. he has been paying
taxes on said property and the tax declaration was in his name. in 1996 or after
23 years he discovered that the ponce spouses were occupying the property. the
ponce spouses also produced a tax declaration which the court found to refer to
another property. the ponce spouses also argued that they possessed the
property for more than 20 years and therefore they are the owners by possession.
court ruled that the fact that Jesus was paying the taxes indicates that he
possesses it in the concept of an owner for nobody in his or her right mind would
be paying taxes for a property that is not in his or her actual or constructive
possession.
Indeed, while the tax declaration is not conclusive proof of ownership of Jesus
over the subject land, it is an indication however that he possesses the property
in the concept of an owner for nobody in his or her right mind would be paying
taxes for a property the1t is not in his or her actual or constructive possession.
PATRICIO G. GEMINA v. HEIRS OF GERARDO V. ESPEJO
When the party-defendant is present, the absence of his counsel during pre-trial
shall not ipso facto result in the plaintiffs ex parte presentation of evidence.
It is hornbook doctrine that the entitlement to the possession of real property

belongs to its registered owner. However, the registered owner must seek proper
judicial remedy and comply with the requisites of the chosen action in order to
recover possession of a real property from the occupant who has actual and
physical possession thereof. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the plaintiff
must not bank on the weakness of the defendant's title, hence, must establish his
title and the identity of the property because of the possibility that neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant is entitled or even more the true owner of the property
in dispute.
ARTURO A. DACQUEL, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES ERNESTO SOTELO AND FLORA

DACQUELSOTELO, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, IMELDA SOTELO,
RESPONDENTS.
A deed of donation over a parcel of land appears to have been executed. But
one of the signatories was dead 36 years earlier. The deed of donation was
therefore void.
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Here, respondents successfully refuted said presumption of regularity. Rodriguez,
the notary public, testified that all the parties personally appeared before him
when the Deed of Donation was notarized. Interestingly, Eufrosina, the wife of
Valentin and one of the signatories in the Deed, died in 1958, or 36 years before
the Deed of Donation was executed. It is worthy to note that Isidro, one of the
petitioners, admitted his mother’s demise during the trial.
Thus, Eufrosina could not have personally appeared before the notary public
unless by some miracle she had risen from her grave to sign the Deed of Donation.
The only plausible conclusion is that another person stood in her place, and that
the notary public did not duly ascertain if the person who signed the Deed of
Donation was actually Eufrosina.
What happened now to the void deed of donation?
It is subject to attack at any time. An action to declare the existence of a void

contract does not prescribe.
The Deed of Donation is an absolute nullity hence it is subject to attack at any

time. Its defect, i. e., the absence of consent of respondents, is permanent and
incurable by ratification or prescription. In other words, the action is
imprescriptible. This is in accord with Article 1410 of the Civil Code which states
that an action to declare the inexistence of a void contract does not prescribe.
What happened now to the land, subject of the deed of donation.
The land is held by petitioners in trust for respondents who are the real owners.
Respondents can institute a case against petitioners for reconveyance of the
property anytime.
Since the Deed of Donation is void ab initio due to the illegality in its execution,
the disputed land is deemed to be simply held by petitioners in trust for
respondents who are the real owners. Respondents therefore have the right to
institute a case against petitioners for the reconveyance of the property at any
time. The well-settled rule is that “[a]s long as the land wrongfully registered under
the Torrens system is still in the name of the person who caused such registration,
an action in personam will lie to compel him to reconvey the property to the real
owner.
LAURO CARDINEZ v. SPS. PRUDENCIO AND CRESENCIA CARDINEZ
Deed of Donation is void ab initio in the absence of respondents' consent. The

notarized Deed of Donation does not enjoy the presumption of regularity.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK v. BASES CONVERSION
It is settled that the requirement of just compensation is not satisfied by the mere
deposit with any accessible bank of the provisional compensation determined by
the LBP or the DAR, and its subsequent release to the landowner after compliance
with the legal requirements set forth by law. What is material is the fact that the
landowner remains unpaid notwithstanding the taking of the property.
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It is settled that certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings, such as
EPs and CLOAs, are as indefeasible as those issued in judicial proceedings. In line
therewith, Section 24 of the CARL, as amended by RA 9700, now explicitly
provides that CLOAs enjoy the same indefeasibility and security afforded to all
titles under the Torrens System.
ATTY. ARISTOTLE T. DOMINGUEZ v. BANK OF COMMERCE
In petitions for cancellation of adverse claim, trial courts are not precluded from
adjudicating matters involving attorney's fees. While the trial court is directed to
speedily hear the case on the validity of the adverse claim, there is no prohibition
or any restriction on the trial court from hearing issues on money judgment
particularly on matters concerning attorney's fees and lien. A Compromise
Agreement between the counsels client and the adverse party is
one of the factors is determining the counsel's
lawful fees for the legal services he rendered.
In charging lien to secure attorney's fees, money judgment and execution

are necessary.
PNTC COLLEGES v. TIME REALTY
"it is well to remember that a contract is the law between the parties. Obligations
arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and
should be complied with in good faith. The parties are allowed by law to enter
into stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions they may deem convenient which
bind the parties as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy."
Essentially, the stipulations in the Contract of Lease "are clear and show no
contravention, of law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. As
such, they are valid, and the parties' rights shall be adjudicated according to
them, being the primary law between them. When the terms of the contract are
clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the rule is
settled that the literal meaning of its stipulations should control."
Relevantly, the lease contract provides that Time Really has the prerogative to
take control or possession of PNTC's properties in the event the latter violates a
provision of the contract, including non-payment of rent and other charges.
Through its judicial admissions which the CA already took note, there is no doubt
that PNTC should settle the said obligations in accordance with the Contract of
Lease and applicable laws.
To expound, PNTC incurred the obligations mainly because of Paragraph 23 of

the Contract of Lease which states that Time Realty can retain PNTC's properties
as security for unpaid rentals and other charges.
PULIDO VS. PEOPLE

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a void ab initio marriage is a valid defense in the prosecution for bigamy even
without a judicial declaration of absolute nullity. Consequently, a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of either the first and second marriages obtained
by the accused is considered a valid defense in bigamy.
CARLOS J. VALDES v. LA COLINA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
For a valid novation to take place, the following requisites must concur: "(1) a
previous valid obligation; (2) the agreement of all the parties to the new contract;
(3) the extinguishment of the old contract; and (4) validity of the new one. There
must be consent of all the parties to the substitution, resulting in the extinction of
the old obligation and the creation of a valid new one." [73]
There is no question that the new concept of the Montemar Project, as intimated
in the September 3, 1992 Memorandum of Agreement and the August 31, 1992
Consolidated Deed of Sale, was wholly incompatible with its original concept
earlier agreed upon by the Valdeses and LCDC. At that point, what was required
for the validity of the new concept was Valdeses' express conformity thereto, with
full knowledge that its implementation will denote that their rights to the 40% share
of the proceeds derived from the sale of the Montemar Villa lots will be novated
and converted into a 7.5% equity in MRDC.
In light of the foregoing facts, this Court finds that Gabriel, as the representative
of the Valdeses, had knowledge of the new concept of the Montemar Project,
and consented to the entry of Philcomsat as a new investor, this finding is based
on the following established facts: (1) the August 27, 1992 letter-conformity which
bore Gabriel's signature on the conforme portion thereof; (2) several minutes of
the board meetings of MBCI, where MBCI directors, including Gabriel, discussed
the entry of Philcomsat as a possible investor of the Montemar Project; and (3) the
notices sent to the LCRC stockholders and directors of scheduled meetings for
the purpose of discussing the proposed new concept of the said project. We
agree with the findings of the CA that the wordings in the notices sent to Gabriel
sufficiently apprised him of the changes in the Montemar Project.
Jurisprudence has shown that in order to constitute :fraud that provides basis to
annul contracts, it must fulfill two conditions: "First, the fraud must be dolo
causante or it must be fraud in obtaining the consent of the party," and "[s]econd,
the fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence and not merely by
a preponderance thereof."
MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE

COMPANY, INC.,
The purpose of CMVLI is to provide compensation for the death or bodily injuries
suffered by innocent third parties or passengers as a result of the negligent
operation and use of motor vehicles. The victims or their dependents are assured
of immediate financial assistance, regardless of the financial capacity of motor
vehicle owners.
The Court ruled that the schedule does not restrict the kinds of damages that
petitioner therein may be made to pay as long as liability is shown to have arisen
and the requisites for each kind of damages are present. The schedule is not an
enumeration of the specific kinds of damages that may be awarded. Its purpose
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was to set limits to the amounts the insurance company would be liable for in
cases of "claims for death, bodily injuries of, professional services and hospital
charges, for services rendered to traffic accident victims"; it does not limit or
exclude claims for other kinds of damages. The Court added that petitioner
therein should have used a more specific and precise language to reflect its
intentions as presented in its arguments.
CITY OF TANAUAN, PETITIONER, VS. GLORIA A. MILLONTE, RESPONDENT
"Time and again, we have ruled that 'while it is true that a notarized document
carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution,
and has in its favor the presumption of regularity, this presumption, however, is not
absolute."
Article 1410 of the Civil Code relevantly states that "[t]he action or defense for the
declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe." In other words,
"an action that is predicated on the fact that the conveyance complained of
was null and void ab initio is imprescriptible." Therefore, Millonte, as an heir, could
assail the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale even years after the execution of
the document, and even if the title of the property has already been transferred
in the name of the City of Tanauan. The passage of time in this case could not
defeat the legal principle that a null and void contract can be assailed anytime
due to the imprescriptibility of the action. In like manner, given that the action is
imprescriptible, the petitioner cannot invoke laches as a defense. Undeniably,
Millonte is not estopped from assailing the Deed of Absolute Sale specifically since
the signatures of the Gonzaga siblings were forged and without any binding or
legal effect.
Jurisprudence teaches that "the 'declaration of nullity of a contract which is

void ab initio operated to restore things to the state and condition in which they
were found before the execution thereof.'"
GODINES v. PLATON DEMAYMAY
Our jurisdiction has long recognized the validity of oral contracts, including oral
contracts of sale. Article 1305 of the Civil Code provides the following definition
of a contract:
Article 1305. A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons where by one
binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some
service.
Pertinently, Article 1356 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 1356. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have been
entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present.
However, when the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it
may be valid or enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a certain way, that
requirement is absolute and indispensable.
HEIRS OF JESUS P. MAGSAYSAY v. SPS. ZALDY AND ANNALIZA PEREZ

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Article 434 of the New Civil Code further provides what a complainant must prove
in order to recover the property:
Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's
claim.
In other words, the person who claims a better right of ownership to the property
sought to be recovered must prove two things: first, the identity of the land
claimed, and second, his title thereto.
The alleged failure of respondents to present evidence notwithstanding, it must
be emphasized that this is a case of reconveyance, with allegations of fraud and
misrepresentation. A complaint for reconveyance is an action which admits the
registration of title of another party but claims that such registration was erroneous
or wrongful. It seeks the transfer of the title to the rightful and legal owner, or to
the party who has a superior right over it, without prejudice to innocent purchasers
in good faith. The relief prayed for may be granted on the basis of intrinsic fraud -
fraud committed on the true owner instead of fraud committed on the procedure
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The party seeking to recover the property must prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that he or she is entitled to the property, and that the adverse party
has committed fraud in obtaining his or her title.
SPOUSES CALVIN LUTHER R. GENOTIVA AND VIOLET S. GENOTIVA, PETITIONERS, VS.

EQUITABLE-PCI BANK (NOW BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC.), RESPONDENT.
Duress or intimidation is present "when one of the contracting parties is compelled

by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon
[their] person or property, or upon the person or property of [their] spouse,
descendants or ascendants, to give [their] consent."
For intimidation to vitiate consent, the following requisites must be present:
(1) that the intimidation must be the determining cause of the contract, or must
have caused the consent to be given; (2) that the threatened act be unjust or
unlawful; (3) that the threat be real and serious, there being an evident
disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer,
leading to the choice of the contract as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces
reasonable and well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it
comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury. x x x
Applying the foregoing to this case, it is obvious that BDO's supposed "threat", i.e.,
its withholding of Violet's retirement benefits, is not the intimidation referred to by
law. The records show that the bank was unable to release Violet's clearance for
the release of her retirement benefits for the simple reason that she had an
existing liability to the bank arising from the Deed of Suretyship that she executed
with her husband and other stockholders of Goldland. Clearly, such act is neither
unjust nor unlawful.
FROILAN NAGAÑO v. LUIS TANJANGCO

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There is no incompatibility between PD 27 and EO 228 because EO 228 because
EO 228 "deals with payment of amortization and not on who qualify as legal
transferees of lands covered by PD 27." Thus, the prevailing rule is that lands
covered by PD 27 can only be validly transferred by hereditary succession or to
the government.
HEIRS OF LEONARDA LATOJA v. HEIRS OF GAVINO LATOJA
The principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title has been carved in case law edicts.
This means that a certificate of title registered under the Torrens System serves as
proof of an incontrovertible title over the property in favor of the individual whose
name appears on the title. With the emergence of the Torrens System, the
integrity and conclusiveness of a certificate of title may be guaranteed and
preserved. However, this system frowns upon those who fraudulently secure a
certificate of title to the prejudice of the real owner of the land. Hence, usurpers
who intend to enrich themselves cannot hide under the mantle of the Torrens
System which may only be cancelled, altered or modified through a direct attack
where the objective of the action is to annul or set aside the judgment or enjoin
its enforcement
An action for reconveyance based on fraud is a direct attack on a Torrens title. It
follows that despite the finality accorded to a Torrens title, reconveyance may
prosper as an equitable remedy given to the rightful owner of a land that was
erroneously registered in the name of another. This action recognizes the validity
of the registration and its incontrovertible nature; it does not question the
indefeasibility of the Torrens title.
Private individuals, aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, may seek direct
reconveyance of a land subject of a free patent where the latter was fraudulently
obtained.
PNB vs. LIMSIAMCO
The authority to encumber one's land title naturally includes the authority to
perform acts to disencumber such title.
It has been consistently held by this Court, that the relief afforded by Section 112
of the Land Registration Act may only be allowed if "there is a unanimity among
the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any
party in interest;" otherwise, the case becomes controversial and should be
threshed out in an ordinary case. In another case, this Court has held that "Section
112 authorizes, in our opinion, only alterations which do not impair rights recorded
in the decree, or alterations which, if they do prejudice such rights, are consented
to by all parties concerned or alterations to correct obvious mistakes."
Clearly, the situations above would not require a separate, ordinary action in
order for the RTC, while acting as a cadastral court, to have jurisdiction to rule on
the petition for the cancellation of the annotation of mortgages on the land titles
covering the mortgaged lots.
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COMMERCIAL LAW
While it is true that CyberOne AU owns majority of the shares of CyberOne PH, this,
nonetheless, does not warrant the conclusion that CyberOne PH is a mere
conduit of CyberOne AU. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only
in three basic instances, namely: (a) when the separate distinct corporate
personality defeats public convenience, as when the corporate fiction is used as
a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation; (b) in fraud cases, or when the
corporate entity is used to justify a wrong, protect a fraud, or defend a crime; or
(c) is used in alter ego cases, i.e., where a corporation is essentially a farce, since
it is a mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where the corporation is
so organized and controlled and its affairs conducted as to make it merely an
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instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation.
We find that the application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is
unwarranted in the present case. First, no evidence was presented to prove that
CyberOne PH was organized for the purpose of defeating public convenience or
evading an existing obligation. Second, petitioners failed to allege any fraudulent
acts committed by CyberOne PH in order to justify a wrong, protect a fraud, or
defend a crime. Lastly, the mere fact that CyberOne PH's major stockholders are
CyberOne AU and respondent Mikrut does not prove that CyberOne PH was
organized and controlled and its affairs conducted in a manner that made it
merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of CyberOne AU. In order
to disregard the separate corporate personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing
must be clearly and convincingly established.
Moreover, petitioners failed to prove that CyberOne AU and Mikrut, acting as the
Managing Director of both corporations, had absolute control over CyberOne
PH. Even granting that CyberOne AU and Mikrut exercised a certain degree of
control over the finances, policies and practices of CyberOne PH, such control
does not necessarily warrant piercing the veil of corporate fiction since there was
not a single proof that CyberOne PH was formed to defraud petitioners or that
CyberOne PH was guilty of bad faith or fraud.
Hence, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil cannot be applied in the
instant case. This means that CyberOne AU cannot be considered as doing
business in the Philippines through its local subsidiary CyberOne PH. This means as
well that CyberOne AU is to be classified as a non-resident corporation not doing
business in the Philippines.
Applying the foregoing, CyberOne AU, as a non-resident foreign corporation
which is not doing business in the Philippines, may be served with summons by
extraterritorial service, to wit: (1) when the action affects the personal status of
the plaintiffs; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property,
within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or an interest, actual
or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in
part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the
Philippines; and (4) when the defendant non residents property has been
attached within the Philippines. In these instances, service of summons may be
effected by (a) personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (b)
publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the court may deem
sufficient.
AGRO FOOD v. VITARICH CORPORATION
"When a corporation intentionally or negligently clothes its officer with apparent

authority to act in its behalf, it is estopped from denying its officer's apparent
authority as to innocent third parties who dealt with this officer in good faith."
MULTI-WARE MANUFACTURING v. CIBELES INSURANCE CORPORATION
The Court explained that the rationale behind the incorporation of "other
insurance" clause in fire policies is to prevent over-insurance and thus avert the
perpetration of fraud. When a property owner obtains insurance policies from two
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or more insurers in a total amount that exceeds the property's value, the insured
may have an inducement to destroy the property for the purpose of collecting
the insurance. The public as well as the insurer is interested in preventing a
situation in which a fire would be profitable to the insured.
Since the policy procured by petitioner from Cibeles Insurance covered the same
subject and interest as that covered by the policies issued by Western Guaranty
and Prudential Guarantee, the existence of other insurance policies referred to
under Policy Condition No. 3 is undeniable. The non-disclosure of these policies to
the insurers was fatal to petitioner's right to recover on the insurance policies.
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION* AND GUILLERMO DIMOG, PETITIONERS, VS.

SPOUSES MARIO ANTONIO MACAM
RA 8791 enshrines the fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of
integrity and performance. The statute now reflects jurisprudential holdings that
the banking industry is impressed with public interest requiring banks to assume a
degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family. Thus, all banks
are charged with extraordinary diligence in the handling and care of its deposits
as well as the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees.
Section 20 of the GBL allows universal or commercial banks, upon prior approval
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, to open branches or offices within or outside
the Philippines. It further provides that "a bank authorized to establish branches or
other offices shall be responsible for all business conducted in such branches and
offices to the same extent and in the same manner as though such business had
all been conducted in the head office. A bank and its branches and offices shall
be treated as one unit."
We cannot overemphasize that the highest degree of diligence required of banks

likewise contemplates such diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees. The very nature of their work which involves handling millions of pesos
in daily transactions requires a degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness
that is far greater than those expected from ordinary clerks and employees. The
bank must not only exercise "high standards of integrity and performance," it must
also insure that its employees do likewise because this is the only way to insure
that the bank will comply with its fiduciary duty.
ALPHA PLUS INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISES CORP. v. PHILIPPINE CHARTER

INSURANCE CORP.
Like any other contract, parties to a contract of insurance could stipulate on terms
and conditions that would govern them as long as these stipulations are not
contrary to law. An insurance contract is the law between the parties. Its terms
and conditions constitute the measure of the insurer's liability and compliance
therewith is a condition precedent to the insured's right to recovery from the
insurer.
Case law teaches that the prescriptive period for the insured's action for
indemnity should be reckoned from the "final rejection" of the claim. The "final
rejection" simply means denial by the insurer of the claims of the insured and not
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the rejection or denial by the insurer of the insured's motion or request for
reconsideration. The rejection referred to should be construed as the rejection in
the first instance.
To determine the prescription of the subject insurance claim, Article 63 of the

Insurance Code as well as Condition No. 27 of the two fire insurance policies
should be considered.
Section 63 of the Insurance Code states that:
Sec. 63. A condition, stipulation or agreement in any policy of insurance, limiting

the time for commencing an action thereunder to a period of less than one year
from the time when the cause of action accrues, is void.
On the other hand, Condition No. 27 of the parties' fire insurance policies
provides:
27. Action or suit clause - If a claim be made and rejected and an action or suit
be not commenced either in the Insurance Commission or any court of
competent jurisdiction within twelve (12) months from receipt of notice of such
rejection, or in case of arbitration taking place as provided herein, within twelve
(12) months after due notice of the award made by the arbitrator or arbitrators or
umpire, then the claim shall for all purposes be deemed to have been
abandoned and shall not thereafter be recoverable hereunder.
It is settled that respondents' rejection of petitioner's claim was embodied in a

Letter dated January 22, 2009, copy of which was received by petitioner on
January 24, 2009. Hence, in accordance with the parties' Condition No. 27 of their
fire insurance policies, the prescriptive period should be reckoned from
petitioner's receipt of the notice of rejection, specifically on January 24, 2009. One
(1) year or 365 days from January 24, 2009 would show that petitioner's
prescriptive period to file its insurance claim ends on January 24, 2010.
METROPLEX BERHAD v. SINOPHIL CORPORATION
Section 38 of the Corporation Code, the pertinent portions of which provide:
Sec. 38. Power to increase or decrease capital stock; incur, create or increase
bonded indebtedness. - No corporation shall increase or decrease its capital
stock or incur, create or increase any bonded indebtedness unless approved by
a majority vote of the board of directors, and at a stockholder's meeting duly
called for the purpose, two-thirds (2/3) of the outstanding capital stock shall favor
the increase or diminution of the capital stock, or the incurring, creating or
increasing of any bonded indebtedness. Written notice of the proposed increase
or diminution of the capital stock or of the incurring, creating, or increasing of any
bonded indebtedness and of the time and place of the stockholders' meeting at
which the proposed increase or diminution of the capital stock or the incurring or
increasing of any bonded indebtedness is to be considered, must be addressed
to each stockholder at his place of residence as shown on the books of the
corporation and deposited to the addressee in the post office with postage
prepaid, or served personally.
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SEC only has the ministerial duty to approve the decrease of a corporation's
authorized capital stock.
Disclosure of corporate actions to the stock exchange is intended to apprise the

investing public of the condition and planned corporate actions of the listed
corporation, thereby providing investors with sufficient, relevant and material
information as to the nature of the investment vehicle and the relationship of the
risks and returns associated with it. The corporation's simple act of disclosing the
decrease and delisting to the PSE was more than enough notice to the investing
public. There was nothing in the corporation's act that resulted in grave or
irreparable injury or prejudice to the investing public
KLM ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES, PETITIONER, VS. DR. JOSE M. TIONGCO, RESPONDENT
Considering that a contract of carriage is vested with public interest, a common

carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently in case of
lost or damaged goods unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence. Hence, in an action based on a breach of contract of carriage, the
aggrieved party does not need to prove that the common carrier was at fault or
was negligent. He or she is only required to prove the existence of the contract
and its non-performance by the carrier.
There is no dispute that KLM and Dr. Tiongco entered into a contract of carriage.
Dr. Tiongco purchased tickets from the airline for his trip to Almaty, Kazakhstan.
KLM, however, breached its contract with Dr. Tiongco when it failed to deliver his
checked-in suitcase at the designated place and time. The suitcase contained
his clothing for the conference where he was a guest speaker, a copy of his
speech, and his resource materials. Worse, Dr. Tiongco's suitcase was never
returned to him even after he arrived in Manila from Almaty. Thus, KLM's liability
for the lost suitcase was sufficiently established as it failed to overcome the
presumption of negligence.
ELIDAD KHO AND VIOLETA KHO, PETITIONERS, VS. SUMMERVILLE GENERAL

MERCHANDISING & CO., INC., RESPONDENT.
Petitioners' product which is a medicated facial cream sold to the public is

contained in the same pink oval-shaped container which had the mark "Chin
Chun Su," as that of respondent. While petitioners indicated in their product the
manufacturer's name, the same does not change the fact that it is confusingly
similar to respondent's product in the eyes of the public. As aptly found by the
appellate court, an ordinary purchaser would not normally inquire about the
manufacturer of the product. Petitioners' product and that solely distributed by
respondent are similar in the following respects "1. both are medicated facial
creams; 2. both are contained in pink, oval-shaped containers; and 3. both
contain the trademark "Chin Chun Su" x x x The similarities far outweigh the
differences. The general appearance of (petitioners') product is confusingly
similar to (respondent)." Verily, the acts complained of against petitioners
constituted the offense of Unfair Competition and probable cause exists to hold
them for trial.
The essential elements of an action for unfair competition are: (1) confusing
similarity in the general appearance of the goods, and (2) intent to deceive the
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public and defraud a competitor. The confusing similarity may or may not result
from similarity in the marks, but may result from other external factors in the
packaging or presentation of the goods. Likelihood of confusion of goods or
business is a relative concept, to be determined only according to peculiar
circumstances of each case. The element of intent to deceive and to defraud
may be inferred from the similarity of the appearance of the goods as offered for
sale to the public.
Unfair competition is always a question of fact. In line with this, We find that with
the existence of probable cause on hand, it would serve the ends of justice if the
parties would be able to present their respective claims and defenses in a full-
blown trial. For now, it is sufficient that probable cause exists to hold petitioners for
trial for the unfair competition case filed against them. Thus, the appellate court
did not err when it directed the trial court to reinstate the Information and
proceed with the criminal case before it. Hence, no double jeopardy.
EDUARDO ATIENZA, PETITIONER, VS. GOLDEN RAM ENGINEERING SUPPLIES &

EQUIPMENT CORPORATION AND BARTOLOME TORRES, RESPONDENTS.
Basic is the principle that a corporation is vested by law with a personality

separate and distinct from that of each person composing or representing it.
Equally fundamental is the general rule that corporate officers cannot be held
personally liable for the consequences of their acts, for as long as these are for
and in behalf of the corporation, within the scope of their authority and in good
faith. The separate corporate personality is a shield against the personal liability
of corporate officers, whose acts are properly attributed to the corporation.
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TAXATION LAW
I-REMIT VS. CIR
I-Remit argues that it has the right to rely on the favorable pronouncement of the
CTA Second Division in its May 23, 2011 Decision. To recall, the Second Division of
the Tax Court stated that "a joint computation, using the total number of shares
sold during the IPO (Initial Public Offering), should determine the IPO tax rate to
be used."
However, the pronouncement was an erroneous interpretation of Section 127(B)
from which no vested right may arise. Thus, it cannot be the source of any vested
right in favor of petitioner – more so in this case where the said pronouncement
was reversed and reconsidered by the same court in its August 18,2011 Resolution.
In fine, we rule that the tax on sale of shares of stock in closely held corporations
sold or exchanged through initial public offering under Sec. 127 (B) is separately
computed as to shares offered in primary and secondary offerings.
BASES CONVERSION v. CIR
Section 5, Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the CTA expressly requires a
notice to the parties of the hearings conducted by the CTA En Banc. Specifically
for motions for reconsideration, Section 3, Rule 15 of the same requires the notice
to be set for hearing. Suppletorily, notice of hearing is likewise required under
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the BCDA was required to
include a notice of hearing in its Motion for Reconsideration. That the filing of the
motion is optional did not excuse non-compliance since the BCDA opted to file
such motion.
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. CIR
[T]he only issue is whether BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule
applicable to all taxpayers or a specific ruling applicable only to a particular
taxpayer.
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule because it was a response
to a query made, not by a particular taxpayer, but by a government agency
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tasked with processing tax refunds and credits, that is, the One Stop Shop Inter-
Agency Tax Credit and Drawback Center of the Department of Finance. This
government agency is also the addressee, or the entity responded to, in BIR Ruling
No. DA-489-03.
Clearly, BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule. Thus, all taxpayers
can rely on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 from the time of its issuance on 10 December
2003 up to its reversal by this Court in Aichi on 6 October 2010, where this Court
held that the 120+30 day periods are mandatory and jurisdictional.
However, BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 cannot be given retroactive effect for four
reasons: first, it is admittedly an erroneous interpretation of the law; second, prior
to its issuance, the BIR held that the 120-day period was mandatory and
jurisdictional, which is the correct interpretation of the law; third, prior to its
issuance, no taxpayer can claim that it was misled by the BIR into filing a judicial
claim prematurely; and fourth, a claim for tax refund or credit, like a claim for tax
exemption, is strictly construed against the taxpayer.
Applying the exception molded in San Roque, i.e., that "all taxpayers can rely on
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 from the time of its issuance on 10 December 2003 up to
its reversal by this Court in Aichi on 6 October 2010," EDC's petition for review
before the CTA should be reinstated since the filing of its administrative and
judicial claims fell within the stated period.
On this score, we remove the cobwebs in the declaration of the CTA En Banc that
EDC's premature filing of its petition for review merely failed to exhaust
administrative remedies which "is not a jurisdictional defect."As has been
repeatedly emphasized herein and in the auspicious case of San Roque, the
120+30 day prescriptive periods in the law is mandatory and jurisdictional.
CIR VS. STANDARD INSURANCE CO.
Respondent's Petition for Declaratory Relief does not present a justiciable

controversy ripe for judicial determination. Respondent's petition failed to
demonstrate that respondent's legal rights are subject of an imminent or
threatened violation that should be prevented by the declaratory relief sought;
the apprehension that its business may be rendered technically insolvent in view
of the continued enforcement of the taxes under Sections 108 and 184 of the
NIRC appear to be merely conjectural and anticipatory.
Moreover, respondent's adequate remedy upon receipt of the FDDA for the DST
deficiency for taxable year 2011 was to file an appeal in due course with the CTA
instead of resorting to a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC. Similarly, the
respondent's adequate remedy in the event of the issuance of a FAN in
connection with its assessments for deficiency VAT for taxable year 2012 was to
protest the same with the BIR and if denied, appeal such denial to the CTA or
request for reconsideration with the CIR. Thus, the sixth requisite is likewise absent.
In view of the absence of the aforementioned requisites, the RTC should have
dismissed respondent's Petition for Declaratory Relief.
CIR v. UNIOIL CORPORATION

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May the BIR submit proof of its issuance of a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN)
and receipt thereof by the taxpayer – for the first time on a petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court?
No. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Unioil Corporation (G.R. No. 204405,

August 4, 2021), the Supreme Court emphasized that it is not a trier of facts, and
such evidence should have been submitted to the CTA. The CTA was especially
created by law for the purpose of reviewing tax cases. The CTA undertakes trial
on the issues brought before it and accordingly exercises the power to receive
evidence. It is not the Supreme Court’s duty to look and sift through the evidence
of the parties. The BIR’s failure to offer proof of the taxpayer’s receipt of the PAN
as evidence before the CTA means that it failed to establish the fact of issuance
of the PAN to the taxpayer, which means that it failed to comply with the notice
requirements under the Tax Code. This effectively denied the taxpayer its right to
due process and renders BIR’s assessment void.
HEDCOR SIBULAN v. CIR
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure
on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application within the period
prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from the
receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one
hundred twenty-day period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the
Court of Tax Appeals.
Under the foregoing provision, the CIR has 120 days from the date of submission
of complete documents to rule on an administrative claim of a taxpayer. In case
of denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, either in whole or in part, or if the
CIR failed to act on an application within the prescribed period, the taxpayer
shall file a judicial claim by filing an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from
the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration the 120-day
period. The 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional. It should therefore be
strictly observed in order for a claim for tax credit refund to prosper. Otherwise,
non-observance of the period would warrant the dismissal of a petition filed
before the CTA as it would not acquire jurisdiction over the claim.
LA FLOR ISABELA VS. CIR
Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax

Appeals:
Section 7 of RA 9282 provides for the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA
on matters arising under the NIRC or other law administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR), to wit:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. — The CTA shall exercise:
a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
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2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in
relation thereto, or other matter arising under the National Internal Revenue Code
or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National
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Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the
inaction shall be deemed a denial;
Considering the foregoing defects in the waivers executed by the parties, the
periods for the CIR to assess or collect the alleged Withholding Tax on
Compensation (WTC) and Expanded Withholding Tax (EWT) deficiencies were not
extended. The period within which the CIR could assess the internal revenue taxes
of La Flor had already prescribed. In fine, the assessments issued by the BIR are
therefore considered void and of no legal effect. Without a valid waiver, the
statute of limitations on assessment and consequently on collection of the
deficiency taxes could not have been suspended.
La Flor validly applied for a compromise agreement even after filing its
application for tax amnesty under RA 9480.
Considering petitioner La Flor's compliance with the requirements under RA 9480
as implemented by DOF DO No. 20-97, it is now deemed absolved of its
obligations and is already immune from the payment of the said taxes as well as
additions, civil, criminal and administrative penalties.
The doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied as an exception to the statute of
limitations on assessment of taxes considering that the BIR provides a detailed
procedure for the proper execution of waiver which must be strictly followed. The
BIR cannot simply invoke the doctrine of estoppel to conceal its failure to comply
with its own issuances, namely, RMO No. 20-90 and RDAO No. 05-01. It cannot just
collect taxes based on an already prescribed assessment, even when taxes are
considered the lifeblood of government. A waiver of the statute of limitations is a
derogation of a taxpayer's right to security against prolonged and unscrupulous
investigations. Thus, it must be carefully and strictly construed. Hence, both the
assessment and collection "should be made in accordance with law as any
arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government itself."
CIR v. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION
The CTA En Banc correctly affirmed the CTA Second Division's ruling that Philex is
entitled to a refund of P18,610,568.32 representing its unutilized and excess input
VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales for the fourth quarter of 2009.
Notably, the CTA En Banc enumerated four grounds in support of its ruling, to wit:
(1) Philex's appeal before the CTA Second Division was seasonably filed;
(2) Philex is entitled to a refund as correctly ruled by the CTA Second Division;
The CTA Second Division did not err in considering the amount of zero-rated
sales of Philex which were likewise supported by financial invoices dated
(3)
outside the period of claim as the provisional invoices and bills of lading
proved that sales were actually generated during the period of claim; and
Presentation before the CTA Second Division of the subsidiary sales journal
(4) and subsidiary purchase journal is not required for refund of input tax
attributable to zero-rated sales.
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Section 112(c) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) provides:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. -
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(C) Period within which refund or tax credit of input taxes shall be made. - In
proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit
certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days from
the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application
filed in accordance with Subsection (A) hereof.
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In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the
failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application within the
period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30)
days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of
the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim
with the Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)
The term "complete documents" is further clarified in Revenue Memorandum
Circular (RMC) No. 49-2003. Pilipinas Total Gas, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (Pilipinas Total Gas, Inc.)[21] explained the term "complete documents"
in accordance with RMC No. 49-2003, viz.:
[F]or purposes of determining when the supporting documents have been

completed - it is the taxpayer who ultimately determines when complete
documents have been submitted for the purpose of commencing and
continuing the running of the 120-day period.
There is nothing in the afore quoted provision of the NIRC of 1997 which require[s]
the presentation of the subsidiary sales journal and subsidiary purchase journal in
order [for] a taxpayer [to] be entitled to refund, or issuance of a tax credit
certificate, of its claimed input tax attributable to zero-rated sales." The subsidiary
journals are not required, but they may be utilized by the CIR as vital sources of
information for other purposes such as making assessments.
REMEDIAL LAW
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM v. MANUEL F. SENO +
In Crespo v. Mogul, the Supreme Court held that once a complaint or information
is already filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its
continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court. It is the best and sole judge
on what to do with the case before it. Thus, when a motion to dismiss the case is
filed by the public prosecutor, it should be addressed to the court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. The court should be mindful not to infringe on
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the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of
law.
Moreover, in Santos. v. Orda, Jr., this Court emphasized that the above rule
likewise applies to a motion to withdraw Information or to dismiss the case filed
before the court, like in the case at bar, even before or after arraignment of the
accused. The grant or denial of the same is left to the trial court's exclusive judicial
discretion. Hence, it should not merely rely on the findings of the public prosecutor
or the Secretary of Justice that no crime was committed or that the evidence in
the possession of the public prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment of
conviction of the accused. Instead, the trial court has to make its own
independent assessment of the merits of the case as well as the evidence of the
prosecution. Its independent assessment must be based on the affidavits and
counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the Information, the
records of the public prosecutor which the court may order the latter to produce
before the court, or any evidence already adduced before the court by the
accused at the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor.
MILAGROS MANOTOK DORMIDO v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN +
In dismissing the Complaint and denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the
Ombudsman relied on the Ombudsman Act of 1989, cited relevant jurisprudence,
and squarely applied the foregoing to the facts of the case at hand. This negates
Dormido's allegation that grave abuse of discretion might have attended the
Ombudsman's conclusions. Whether these determinations by the Ombudsman
were correct or wrong is not remediable by certiorari. Whimsicality in the issuance
of a decision, not accuracy, is the core of certiorari proceedings. An unfavorable
evaluation of the evidence presented by a party will not be inquired into via
certiorari unless it is shown that it was done in an arbitrary manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal enmity.
CLARA R. ICK v. ATTY. ALLAN S. AMAZONA +
Every person is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. Settled is the rule
that in disbarment proceedings, the complainant must satisfactorily establish the
allegations of his or her complaint through substantial evidence. Mere allegations
without proof are disregarded considering the gravity of the penalty prayed for.
Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence.
LOYDA L. REYES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN, RESPONDENT.
There is no prejudicial question not proscription that will prevent it from

proceeding. Double jeopardy or In Pari Delicto are also not available as defenses
as to bar the disciplinary proceedings against an erring lawyer. It should be noted
that it can be initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or the IBP and even
without a complaint and can proceed regardless of lack of interest of the
complainants, if the facts proven so warrant.
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HEIRS OF AURIO T. CASIÑO v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES +
It bears stressing that the doctrine of res judicata actually embraces two different
concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.
The second concept which is conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or

question which was in issue in a former suit and was judicially passed upon and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with
them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between
such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent
jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment
remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a
judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another
action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be
identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a
former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and
conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit. In this case, identity of cause of action is not required,
but merely identity of issues.
Applying the foregoing to the instant case, the validity of the real estate
mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure sale can no longer be attacked in a
new complaint for quieting of title, more so because the Decision in Civil Case
No. 1465 has become final and an entry of judgment has already been entered
in our books. To put it simply, we have already ruled, in effect, that DBP is the
owner of the subject property as it was acquired by it through a valid foreclosure
sale. Granting the reliefs sought by Aurio and his heirs would be inconsistent with
the ruling in Civil Case No. 1465 and will disturb the final and executory Decision
in the said case.
Moreover, the writ of possession that was issued as a result of the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 1465 cannot be regarded as a cloud upon the alleged title of Aurio,
as the said writ and/or the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1465 were not shown to
be "in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable." It is the claimant or
plaintiff who has the burden of proof as a general principle of due process, and
in this case, Aurio has fell short in discharging his burden when he failed to prove
neither his alleged title to the subject property nor anything that could constitute
a cloud upon that title.
EDISON PRIETO v. ERLINDA CAJIMAT +
For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the

probative value of the evidence presented by any of the litigants. The resolution
of the issue must solely depend on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is obvious that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact.
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However, the rule admits of exceptions, which includes, but not limited to: (1)
where the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, and
conjectures; (2) where the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) where there
is grave abuse of discretion; (4) where the judgment is based on misapprehension
of facts; and (5) the findings of fact are premised on the absence of evidence
and are contradicted by evidence on record.
COA v. SILVINO T. PAMPILO +
A petition for declaratory relief is an action instituted by a person interested in a

deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to
determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument,
executive order or regulation, or statute and for a declaration of his rights and
duties thereunder. It must be filed before the breach or violation of the statute,
deed or contract to which it refers; otherwise, the court can no longer assume
jurisdiction over the action. Thus, "[t]he only issue that may be raised in such [an
action] is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or
statute. Based on the foregoing, the core issue involved in the Amended Petition
is whether the business practice of the Big 3 violates the RPC and RA 8479. This,
however, cannot be made the subject matter of a declaratory relief.
As regards the issue of intervention, Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court requires
that: (1) the movant must have a legal interest in the matter being litigated; (2)
the intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the parties; and (3) the claim of the intervenor must not be capable of being
properly decided in a separate proceeding. The right to intervene, however, is
not an absolute right as the granting of a motion to intervene is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court and may only be allowed if the movant is able to
satisfy all the requirements.
In this case, Pasang Masda's allegation that its members consume petroleum
products is not sufficient to show that they have legal interest in the matter being
litigated considering that there are other oil players in the market aside from the
Big 3. Jurisprudence mandates that legal interest must be actual, substantial,
material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant. Such is
not the situation in this case. In fact, there is no showing that Pasang Masda has
something to gain or lose in the outcome of the case. Thus, it was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of public respondent RTC in allowing Pasang Masda to
intervene despite its failure to comply with the first requirement.
EDDA V. HENSON v. COA +
It bears stressing that "in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the
court of a change of address, the service of the order or resolution of a court
upon the parties must be made at the last address of their counsel of record."
Hence, in case there is a change in address, it is the duty of the lawyer to promptly
inform the court and the parties of such change to ensure that all official and
judicial communications sent by mail will reach him.
Here, based on the letters attached to her Compliance, it appears that

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petitioner's counsel belatedly informed respondent COA-CP of her change of
address. Thus, the service made by respondent COA-CP on January 17 and 26,
2017 at the old address of petitioner's counsel are deemed valid and effectual.
Besides, even if the Court disregards this procedural defect or lapse in the interest
of substantial justice, the Petition would still be dismissed for lack of merit.
The essence of due process, as the Court has consistently ruled, is simply the
opportunity to be heard, or to explain one's side, or to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of; thus, for as long as the party was afforded the
opportunity to defend himself/herself, there is due process.
ANTONIO G. NGO v. VISITACION GABELO +
A party's failure to comply with the requirement of prior barangay conciliation

before filing a case in court would render his complaint dismissible on the ground
of failure to comply with a condition precedent.
PANACAN LUMBER CO. v. SOLIDBANK CORP. +
Well-settled is the rule that personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial

foreclosure proceedings is not necessary. Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended
by Act No. 4118, requires only the posting of the notice of sale in three public
places and the publication of that notice in a newspaper of general circulation.
An exception to this rule is when the parties stipulate that personal notice is
additionally required to be given to the mortgagor. Failure to abide by the
general rule or its exception renders the foreclosure proceedings null and void.
REPUBLIC v. MANUEL M. CARAIG +
The arguments raised in the instant petition involve a mixed question of facts and
of law.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court prescribes that only questions of law should be raised
in petitions filed under the said rule since factual questions are not the proper
subject of an appeal by certiorari. The Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, We will not
entertain questions of fact as factual findings of the appellate court are
considered final, binding, or conclusive on the parties and upon this Court
especially when supported by substantial evidence.
Extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the action is in rem or quasi
in rem but not if an action is in personam as in this case; hence, jurisdiction over
CyberOne AU cannot be acquired unless it voluntarily appears in court.
Consequently, without a valid service of summons and without CyberOne AU
voluntarily appearing in court, jurisdiction over CyberOne AU was not validly
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acquired. Consequently, no judgment can be issued against it, if any. Any such
judgment will only bind respondents CyberOne PH, Mikrut, and Juson.
In any event, the determination of whether there exists an employer-employee

relationship between petitioners and CyberOne PH is ultimately a question of fact.
Generally, only errors of law are reviewed by this Court. Factual findings of
administrative and quasi-judicial agencies specializing in their respective fields,
especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded high respect, if
not finality. However, in this case, the findings of the NLRC are in conflict with that
of the LA and CA. Thus, as an exception to the rule, We now look into the factual
issues involved in this case.
ATTY. JOSEPH VINCENT T. GO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. VIRGILIO T. TERUEL,

RESPONDENT.
It is well-settled that "[t]he essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as
a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in
another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on
the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An
important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts
and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same
reliefs. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present
or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another."
Evidently, Atty. Teruel willfully committed forum shopping when he instituted two
actions grounded on the same cause, even if strictly speaking, he was not
included as a "complainant" in Fr. Reyes' Complaint. This is because he prepared
and filed both administrative actions with full knowledge that they have the same
cause of action and contained nearly exactly the same allegations. Simply put,
the outcome in one case would necessarily have an effect in the other since both
cases share the same cause of action and involve the same parties.
ARTURO O. RADAZA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
An accused who travels abroad with the provisional conformity of the

Sandiganbayan is considered to have positively invoked and already validated
the same judicial power that permitted his travel outside the Philippines during the
pendency of the criminal proceedings. By the principle of estoppel, the
accused's own actuations countered and nullified any dispute on the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan over the person of such accused.
the accusations against Radaza, whether in the original Information or in the

Amended Information, both yield a prima facie case of violation of RA 3019,
effectively placing the subject offenses under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and rendering Radaza indictable under Section 3(e) or 3(g).
Sections 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019 state:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
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(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions;
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(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are:
(a) That the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial,
or official functions, or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public
officers;
(b) That he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable
negligence; and
(c) That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or
preference in the discharge of his functions.
On the other hand, Section 3(g) of RA 3019 requires the concurrence of the
following requisites:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he or she entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to
the government.
Jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. Correlatively, the law vests upon the
Sandiganbayan the power to hear and decide violations of RA 3019, among
other offenses, committed by a city mayor, among other public officials
specifically enumerated therein.
By the wordings of the assailed Informations, the Court finds all elements for both
offenses properly alleged by the prosecution against Radaza.
HARBOUR CENTRE PORT TERMINAL v. LA FILIPINA UYGONGCO CORP.
Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their
nature; that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and
essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required. As otherwise
expressed, a proceeding for civil contempt is one instituted to preserve and
enforce the rights of a private party to an action and to compel obedience to a
judgment or decree intended to benefit such a party litigant. So a proceeding is
one for civil contempt, regardless of its form, if the act charged is wholly the
disobedience, by one party to a suit, of a special order made in behalf of the
other party and the disobeyed order may still be obeyed, and the purpose of the
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punishment is to aid in an enforcement of obedience. The rules of procedure
governing criminal contempt proceedings, or criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are
inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings.
In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved

party, or has successor, or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to
be protected. In criminal contempt proceedings, it is generally held that the State
is the real prosecutor.
ILDEFONSO TV PATDU v. CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
The remedy to assail the OMB's findings of probable cause in criminal or non-
administrative cases Is still by filing a petition for certiorari with the SC, and not with
the CA.
EVANGELINE ENGAO ASIS v. HEIRS OF ROSELLO CALIGNAWAN
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements as to the elements of forum-

shopping.
First, there must be identity of parties. Both petitioners and respondents or their
predecessors were the contending parties in the Complaints for Declaration of
Nullity and Recovery of Ownership.
Second, there must be similarity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, where
the relief is anchored on the same facts. While the caption of both complaints
are evidently distinct, the allegations contained in their respective bodies seek a
similar relief, that is, the entitlement to the properties and reconveyance thereof
in favor of Rosello and eventually to the respondents who are the latter's heirs. It
is a hornbook doctrine that the cause of action is determined by the allegations
of the complaint and not the caption or designation by the parties, considering
that the latter is not even indispensable to the complaint.
Third, the judgment rendered in any of the actions would amount to res
judicata as to the other. The finality of the Decision rendered by the RTC of
Burauen, as affirmed by the appellate court and which subsequently reached
this Court in G.R. No. 188676 entitled Heirs of Felipe Engao, Namely: Erma E.
Trocino. Felicitacion E. Bausita, Cesar Engao and Evangeline E. Asis vs. Rosello
Calignawan, operated as res judicata on the matter of the Deed of Donation's
validity.
ORLANDO D. GARCIA v. SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION
The findings of the DAR Secretary are accorded great weight and respect.
Considering his technical expertise on the matter, courts cannot simply brush
aside his pronouncements regarding status of a land, a subject well within his field,
absent palpable and overriding error or grave abuse of discretion that would
result in manifest injustice and grave misapplication of the law.
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. HIGH DESERT STOP OVERS

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In the case before us, the Government is bound by the MOA due to estoppel. The
OSG is assumed to have known about the existence of the MOA as petitioner's
principal counsel. At the very least, even if the OSG had no prior knowledge of
the MOA, it was duly notified on November 10, 2010 when it received a copy of
the assailed Judgment dated July 2, 2010 together with other Orders issued by
the trial court which approved the MOA. Notwithstanding such knowledge, the
OSG failed to file an appeal or resort to other remedies to contest the validity of
the MOA.
This Court also agrees with the appellate court's ruling that the action for
annulment of judgment is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. An action
to annul a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy, which is not to be granted
indiscriminately by the court. It shall be availed of when the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner.
THE LINDEN SUITES, INC. VS. MERIDEN FAR EAST PROPERTIES, INC.
Examination of Judgment Obligor Not Limited by Place of Residence
The trial court should have proceeded to conduct a permissible examination

of respondent, through its officers, so as to disclose the properties which can be
subjected to execution. The trial court, in denying petitioner’s motion, exclusively
confined itself with the one and only limitation stated in the provision, thereby
ultimately defeating the purpose of the rule, i.e. to ascertain the properties or
earnings of a judgment obligor that are to be applied to the satisfaction of the
judgment. The RTC should have employed other allowable means such as, but
not limited to, the submission of documents consisting of a list of properties and
income of respondent and the affidavits of concerned officers in relation thereto.
The well-settled doctrine is inapplicable in the case at bench. Petitioner wanted

the officers to be examined not for the purpose of passing unto them the liability
of respondent as its judgment obligor. In fact, it never averred in the motion any
intention to make the officers liable for respondent’s obligation due to the latter’s
purported attempts to evade the execution of the final judgment. What is clear
therein is that the sole objective of the examination of the officers was to
ascertain the properties and income of respondent which can be subjected for
execution in order to satisfy the final judgment and nothing else.
SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC., PETITIONER, VS. MABALACAT

INSTITUTE, INC., RESPONDENT
The Court likewise reminds us that the elements of forum shopping are: (i) identity
of parties, or at least such parties representing the same interest; (ii) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the latter founded on the same facts; and
(iii) any judgment rendered in one action will amount to res judicata in the other
action.
Considering that the second and third elements of forum shopping and litis
pendentia are lacking, there is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for
between a suit for collection of sum of money and an unlawful detainer case,
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and that any judgment rendered in one of these actions would not amount to res
judicata in the other action.
METRO RAIL TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. TRACKWORKS

RAIL TRANSIT ADVERTISING, VENDING AND PROMOTIONS, INC. RESPONDENT.
litis pendentia ripened to res judicata when the PDRCI's arbitral award, as
confirmed by the RTC of Pasig City in its March 14, 2013 Resolution, became final
and executory and a writ of execution was issued against Trackworks on June 13,
2013.
Settled is the rule that a judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null
and void and may be attacked anytime. It creates no rights and produces no
effect. It remains a basic fact in law that the choice of the proper forum is crucial,
as the decision of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity. A void
judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. All acts performed pursuant
to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
DORIS MARIE S. LOPEZ, PETITIONER, VS. ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., RESPONDENT.
Parameters of a judicial review under a Rule 45 petition
a. Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of law
Before proceeding to the merits of the case, this Court deems it necessary to
emphasize that a petition for review under Rule 45 is limited only to questions of
law. Factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. This
Court will not review facts, as it is not our function to analyze or weigh all over
again evidence already considered in the proceedings below. As held in Diokno
v. Hon. Cacdac, a reexamination of factual findings is outside the province of a
petition for review on certiorari, to wit:
It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done through

a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because as
earlier stated, this Court is not a trier of fa.cts[.] x x x. The Supreme Court is not
duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the
proceedings below. This is already outside the province of the instant Petition
for Certiorari.
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain set of facts; a question of fact, on the other hand, exists when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Unless
the case falls under any of the recognized exceptions, we are limited solely to the
review of legal questions.
b. Rule 45 petition is limited to errors of the appellate court
Furthermore, the "errors" which we may review in a petition for review

on certiorari are those of the C A, and not directly those of the trial court or the
quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, or officer which rendered the decision in the first
instance. It is imperative that we refrain from conducting further scrutiny of the
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findings of fact made by trial courts, lest we convert this Court into a trier of facts.
As held in Reman Recio v. Heirs of the Spouses Agueda and Maria Altamirano,
etc., et al., our review is limited only to the errors of law committed by the
appellate court, to wit:
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, jurisdiction is generally limited to the review of
errors of law committed by the appellate court. The Supreme Court is not obliged
to review all over again the evidence which the parties adduced in the court a
quo. Of course, the general rule admits of exceptions, such as where die factual
findings of the CA and the trial court are conflicting or contradictory.
EDILBERTO 'EDDIE' PINEDA v. ABELARDO C. MIRANDA
this is a case for unlawful detainer filed against the petitioners at mtc which ruled
in favor of respondents. appealed to rtc which affirmed mtc decision. petitioners
did not appeal the rtc decision. 7 years passed. respondents filed at rtc for
complaint to revive judment. petitioners filed several motions and appeals.
supreme court said petitioners’ remedy was appeal when rtc promulgated its
decision. their subsequent motions and appeals are without legal basis.
In this case, the RTC Branch 42 Decision dated May 17, 1999 became final and
executory when no further legal action was undertaken by herein petitioners
concerning the RTC Branch 42 Decision. Thus, on January 6, 2000 or less than a
year after the RTC Branch 42 Decision became final, respondents filed a motion
for the lssuance of a Writ of Execution. The Motion was granted on February 14,
2000. However, seven years later, the RTC Branch 42 Decision h~1d not yet been
executed. Thus, on May 9, 2006, the respondents filed a Complaint for Revival of
Judgment in accordance with the above legal provisions. On the premise that
the RTC Branch 42 Decision was already final and executory, respondents filed a
revival suit as a procedural means of securing the execution of the RTC Branch 42
Decision which had become dormant after the passage of several years. The
revival suit filed by respondents did not intend to re-open any issue affecting the
merits of the case or the propriety or correctness of the first judgment. The ordinary
remedy of appeal was still readily available as a proper remedy.
As for petitioner’s legal remedy RTC Branch 42 promulgated its Decision on May
17, 1999. However, instead of filing an ordinary appeal, petitioners filed the
following motion and petitions throughout the course of the proceedings: (1)
Motion to Quash Writ of Execution; (2) Petition for Annulment of Judgment; and
(3) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition.
First, the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution was filed on the ground that the
Writ of Execution cannot be enforced anymore because more than five years
had elapsed since its issuance. 39 However, the Court notes that respondents’
Complaint for Revival of judgment was filed on May 9, 2006, two months before
petitioners filed their ~motion to Quash the Writ of Execution on July 20, 2006.
Neither did petitioners show that there had been a change in the situation of the
parties which makes the execution inequitable; or that the writ of execution was
improperly issued, defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party; or
that the judgment debt had been paid or otherwise satisfied; or that the writ was
issued without authority: Petitioners’ Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution was
therefore groundless.
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Secondly, petitioners’ Petition for Annulment of Judgment of both the MTC and
RTC Decisions was correctly dismissed by the CA not only because it did not have
jurisdiction over the Petition but also because it was not the proper legal remedy.
Rule 47, Sections 1 and 241 of the Rules of Court are clear. The remedy of
annulment of judgment can only be availed of when the ordinary remedy of
appeal, among others, is no longer available through no fault of the petitioners.
Furthermore, the annulment may be based only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction which were clearly not present in this case.
Lastly, petitioners’ Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed with the CA was to
compel the RTC to give due course to petitioners’ Notice of Appeal filed after the
RTC granted respondents’ Complaint for Revival of Judgment. A Petition for
Mandamus and Prohibition is only available when there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Again, the
Court reiterates that the ordinary remedy of appeal was easily available to
petitioners when the RTC Branch 42 promulgated its May 1 7, 1999 Decision.
In the end, the Court finds that the CA correctly ruled that the RTC Branch 42
Decision can still be revived as the respondents properly filed a Complaint for
Revival of Judgment in accordance with existing law and jurisprudence. The
Court therefore instructs the RTC to execute Civil Case No. 11757 with deliberate
dispatch.
HEIRS OF ELISEO BAGAYGAY v. HEIRS OF ANASTACIO PACIENTE
A land covered by free patent title was sold within the prohibitory period.
Supreme court said that the sale was void. Petitioners claim that the case is barred
by laches. That they should be reimbursed for the purchase and for
improvements. Supreme court said laches does not apply in case of contracts
void ab initio. But respondents are entitled to reimbursement for price of the land.
But no reimbursement for improvements because such are compensated from
fruits arising from possession.
In actions for reconveyance of property predicated on the fact that the

conveyance complained of was null and void ah initio, a claim of prescription of
action would be unavailing. “The action or defense for the declaration of the
inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.” Neither could laches be invoked in
the case at bar. Laches is a doctrine in equity and our courts are basically courts
of law and not courts of equity. Equity, which has been aptly described as “justice
outside legality,” should be applied only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law. Aequetas [nunquam] contravenit legis. The positive mandate of
Art. 1410 of the New Civil Code conferring imprescriptibility to actions for
declaration of the inexistence of a contract should pre-empt and prevail over all
abstract arguments based only on equity. Certainly, laches cannot set up to resist
the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right, and petitioners can validly
vindicate their inheritance despite the lapse of time.
As above-mentioned, a sale of a parcel of land is in violation of the five[1]year

prohibition on the alienation of land acquired via free patent application is void
and produces no legal effect. As successors-in-interest of Alido, petitioners’ right
to challenge the sale between Alido and respondent cannot be barred by I
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aches as it was in violation of the restriction on the sale of land acquired through
free patent.
IGNACIO S. DUMARAN v. TERESA LLAMEDO
Failed to prove that fraud existed, thus, the writ of preliminary attachment issued
by the RTC was a "too harsh" provisional remedy that must be denied.
Under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, there are two remedies a party can avail of
to discharge their attached property:
(1) Under Section 12, make a cash deposit equal to the claim or give a counter-
bond which will take the place of the attached property; or
(2) Under Section 13, file a motion to discharge the attachment on the following
grounds:
(a) that it was improperly or irregularly issued; or
(b) that it was improperly or irregularly enforced; or
(c) that the bond of the plaintiff is insufficient.
For the second remedy to apply, a writ of attachment may be discharged without
filing a cash bond or counter-bond only if the writ of preliminary attachment itself
has already been proven to be improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or the
bond is insufficient.
EAST WEST BANKING CORPORATION v. IAN Y. CRUZ
It is important to mention as well that "'the right to appeal is not a natural right or
a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only
in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. A party who seeks
to avail of the right must, therefore, comply with the requirements of the rules,
failing which the right to appeal is invariably lost.' Compliance with procedural
rules is mandatory, 'since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases
to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in
the administration of justice.'
A final note. It is known that "the business of banking is one imbued with public
interest As such, banking institutions are obliged to exercise the highest degree of
diligence as well as high standards of integrity and performance in all its
transactions. The law expressly imposes upon the banks a fiduciary duty towards
its clients and to treat in this regard the accounts of its depositors with meticulous
care."
If the Bank deemed that it received damage in any way, it has no one to blame
but itself, or rather, its employees who allowed the transfer of funds without proper
verification, including the issuance of the alleged spurious FEFCs. Paul could not
have successfully completed the transactions without the approval of his
superiors. However, a further discussion of these matters is not proper as this
already involves a consideration of factual incidents not within the ambit of the
present suit.
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PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER, VS. ROMEO B. DARADAR, RESPONDENT.
All elements of res judicata are present in the instant case. Anent the first and
second elements, the Second Order is a final judgment which has already
attained finality and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. It is
likewise undisputed that there is an identity of parties, subject matter, and causes
of action between Civil Case Nos. 21375 and 25981.
Finally, the third element of res judicata is present as the Second Order dismissing
Civil Case No. 21375 operated as a judgment on the merits. Here, the Second
Order did not state that the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice. A
dismissal based on any of the grounds in Section 3, Rule 17 operates as an
adjudication on the merits.
SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.— If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff
fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the
complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed
upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion without prejudice
to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a
separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the
merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. (Emphasis supplied)
Unless otherwise qualified by the court, a dismissal under said rule is considered
with prejudice, which bars the refiling of the case.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES MILU AND ROSALINA DE
JESUS, RESPONDENTS.
The trial court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
spouses De Jesus' motion for issuance of a status quo order and when it no longer
conducted the hearing on their application for preliminary injunction.
Grave abuse of discretion exists when "an act is (1) done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias."
A status quo order is "in the nature of a cease and desist order," and is "intended
to maintain the last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things which
preceded the controversy." If the RTC granted the spouses De Jesus' prayer for
such order, Land Bank will be prevented from consolidating its ownership over the
properties for the duration of such order.
However, We find no legal impediment to prevent Land Bank from consolidating

its ownership. The RTC is correct that upon the expiration of the period for
redemption, without the mortgagor or his or her successor-in-interest redeeming
the property, consolidation becomes a matter of right.
If the redemption period expires without the mortgagor or his successor-in-interest

redeeming the foreclosed property within one year from the registration of the
sale with the Register of Deeds, the title over the property consolidates in the
purchaser. The consolidation confirms the purchaser as the owner entitled to the
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possession of the property without any need for him to file the bond required
under Section 7 of Act No. 3135. The issuance of a writ of possession to the
purchaser becomes a matter of right upon the consolidation of title in his name
while the mortgagor, by failing to redeem, loses all interest in the property.
Thus, when the one-year redemption period lapsed without the spouses De Jesus
redeeming the properties, and without any TRO or writ of preliminary injunction to
prevent consolidation, nothing barred Land Bank from exercising its right.
Given that the trial court already ordered the spouses De Jesus to present their
evidence in support of their application for preliminary injunction, considerably in
view of the limited duration of Land Bank's commitment not to consolidate, then
they should have complied with the same. Instead, they moved to set the main
case for pre-trial. Such an act constitutes a clear case of abandonment of their
application for preliminary injunction. It goes against the very nature of
preliminary injunction – a remedy resorted to "when there is a pressing necessity to
avoid injurious consequences that cannot be redressed under any standard of
compensation."
A status quo order, if issued by the RTC, would be tantamount to an injunction

order issued without the benefit of a hearing, contrary to the express requirement
of Section 5, Rule 53 of the Rules of Court that "[n]o preliminary injunction shall be
granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be
enjoined." Clearly, the RTC may not grant the spouses De Jesus' motion for status
quo order without running afoul of such express proscription.
FLORANTE VILLAROMAN v. ARCIAGA
The complaint for specific performance is barred by res judicata.

Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; or a thing or matter settled by judgment." Under this rule, final judgment
or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction "is conclusive as to
the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits, and on all points and matters
determined in the former suit.
All the elements of res judicata are present.
There is no question as to the presence of the first three elements in the present
case. The decision in Civil Case No. 11993 is a final judgment on the merits
rendered by a court that had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
parties.
Anent the fourth element, a careful examination of the allegations raised by the
parties in Civil Case No. 11993 and Civil Case No. 00-113 shows that the cases
involve the same parties and relate to the same subject matter. Specifically, in
Civil Case No. 11993, the plaintiffs therein are the heirs of the late Jose, while
Agrifina, the mother of herein petitioners, is one of the defendants in the said case
insofar as her claim over the 300-square meter portion of Lot 965 is concerned.
Notably, Agrifina was eventually substituted by petitioners upon her demise on
January 17, 1997.
In the instant case, the plaintiffs are herein petitioners as heirs of Agrifina, while
defendants are the heirs of Jose. While we are aware that the subject matter in
Civil Case No. 11993 comprised the whole area of Lot 965, Agrifina's property
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interest therein encompassed the 300-square meter portion of Lot 965, which is
the very same subject matter involved in this case.
Finally, there is identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. 11993 and Civil
Case No. 00-113. "A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act
or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the
plaintiff."
Verily, when respondents filed their Complaint for Annulment of the Kasulatan ng
Bilihang Ganap dated April 2, 1980 with the RTC in Civil Case No. 11993, Agrifina
and her co-defendants responded thereto by filing an Answer with Counterclaim
for Damages with prayer that they be declared as the lawful owners of their
respective portions of Lot 965. Jurisprudence on the matter is that a counterclaim
raised by a defendant partakes of a nature of a complaint or a cause of action
against a plaintiff. "It is in itself a distinct and independent cause of action, so that
when properly stated as such, the defendant becomes, in respect to the matter
stated by him, an actor, and there are two simultaneous actions pending
between the same parties, where each is at the same time both a plaintiff and
defendant."
In the Answer with Counterclaim for Damages in Civil Case No. 11993, Agrifina's
cause of action rested on respondents' failure to respect her ownership over the
300-square meter portion of Lot 965 by virtue of the Kasunduan ng Bilihan dated
September 4, 1968 between Jose and Florentino, and the Kasulatang Tapos at
Lubos Na Bilihan Ng Lupa dated January 12, 1971 between herself and Florentino.
In Civil Case No. 00-113, petitioners' cause of action hinges on respondents' refusal
to execute a deed of absolute sale despite the existence of the two foregoing
documents supposedly evidencing the sale of the property from Jose to
Florentino, and from the latter to Agrifina.
Clearly, in both Civil Case No. 11993 and Civil Case No. 00-113, herein petitioners
impute the same wrongful act on respondents – their failure to recognize
petitioners' title over the 300-square meter portion of Lot 965 despite the existence
of perfected contracts of sale in their favor. Although differing in form, these two
cases are ultimately anchored on conflicting claims of ownership over the
property in dispute. Thus, we conclude that they have identical causes of action.
Settled is the rule that "the application of the doctrine of res judicata to identical
causes of action does not depend on the similarity or differences in the forms of
the two actions."
Under the same test evidence, if the same evidence ultimately support and
establish the causes of action in the first and second cases, then there is likely an
identity of causes of action.
Applying Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, petitioners cannot split their cause
of action by filing a case in court to recognize them as lawful owners of a
property, and thereafter file another separate complaint for specific
performance that ultimately seeks to determine with finality their title or ownership
over the same property.
GUILLERMA S. SILVA, PETITIONER, VS. CONCHITA S. LO, RESPONDENT.

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In our jurisdiction, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court have laid down two phases of an
action for partition: first, the trial court, after determining that a co-ownership in
fact exists and that partition is proper, issues an order for partition; and, second,
the trial court promulgates a decision confirming the sketch and subdivision of the
properties submitted by the parties (if the parties reach an agreement) or by the
appointed commissioners (if the parties fail to agree), as the case may be.
The tenants are not heirs and are thus strangers to the estate of the decedent,
the subject matter of the action for partition. However, in relation to the subject
property, as tenants who are qualified beneficiaries thereof under the CARL and
to whom new titles had been issued, they are palpably real parties-in-
interest. While the validity of the partition of the subject property and consequent
distribution thereof can still be finally determined in CA-G.R. SP No. 116979, a
complete relief for those already parties or the complete determination of the
claim could not be had since the tenants were not impleaded. In short, the
tenants are not indispensable parties but, at the least, are necessary parties in the
determination of the partition of the subject property.
By operation of law, the tenancy relationship between the tenants on one hand,
and the co-owners of the subject property, the heirs of the decedent, on the
other hand, subsisted even after the death of one of the landholders. Under the
CARL, the tenants are deemed qualified beneficiaries to ownership of a portion
of their tilled land. Ultimately, the tenants cannot be cursorily excluded from a
court determination of the validity of the partition, and consequent change in
ownership, of the subject property.
CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. CHARLIE CHUA UY, JR.,
RESPONDENT.
In contrast to Cathay, which presented the foregoing testimonial and

documentary evidence, all that Uy could offer to negate his liability is the dismissal
of the criminal case filed by Cathay against him. He did not even deny the
authenticity and due execution of his signature in the delivery receipts. He likewise
did not rebut Cathay's claim that the release of the retazos was conditioned
upon his authorization. He never imputed any motive or ill will on the part of
Cathay in filing the complaint. All he did was bank on the criminal case which, as
already discussed, not only covered a separate and independent action, but
also pertained to a different subject matter.
For these reasons, We are constrained to rule that the greater weight of evidence
is on the side of Cathay. Uy should be held liable for the unremitted payments
from the sale of the retazos.
GOLDWELL PROPERTIES TAGAYTAY v. METROPOLITAN BANK
The "debtor cannot ask for the release of any portion of the mortgaged property
or of one or some of the several lots mortgaged unless and until the loan thus
secured has. been fully paid, notwithstanding the fact that there has been a
partial fulfillment of the obligation. Hence, it is provided that the debtor who has
paid a part of the debt cannot ask for the proportionate extinguishment of the
mortgage as long as the debt is not completely satisfied." Thus, the fact that
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petitioners paid for the loan value of the Pasay properties is immaterial; the
mortgage would still be in effect since the loans have not been fully settled.
The Court has previously held that "[w]hen the law does not provide for the
determination of the property's valuation, neither should the courts so require, for
our duty limits us to the interpretation of the law, not to its augmentation."Although
this pronouncement pertains to the basis of the bid price of a mortgaged
property that became the subject of foreclosure, by analogy, We can infer that
courts, cannot likewise dictate how banks should set the values of mortgaged
properties for purposes of loan acquisition. In this case, the Court cannot compel
Metrobank to accept the values pegged by the independent appraisers as
insisted by the petitioners, lest We be suspected of meddling with management
prerogative. Besides, the petitioners only raised this valuation issue after they have
already obtained the loans.
In granting loans, banks always attempt to impose as many interests that they
can, sometimes worded differently to confuse debtors. Unfortunately, borrowers
are, in most cases, forced to accept unfair interest rates and > conditions due to
dire need. Ergo, the Court has the duty to ensure that banks do not unduly take
advantage of their position of wealth and opportunity. Certainly, while the
business of banks is geared toward profit-earning, it should always be subject to
standards of reasonableness and fairness.
VILORIA VS. GAETOS
It should be noted that the rules on verification and certification against forum
shopping are designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of
justice. Hence, they should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert their own ultimate and legitimate objectives. The requirement of strict
compliance merely underscores their mandatory nature to the effect that the
verification and certification against forum shopping cannot altogether be
dispensed with or their requirements completely disregarded. They do not prohibit
substantial compliance with the rules under justifiable circumstances.
The petition's Verification/Certification on Non-Forum Shopping was not signed by
all the parties therein. This defect was duly admitted by the petitioners' in their
Reply. However, they argue that such was not fatal nor was it jurisdictional as to
affect their present appeal.
We agree. Altres v. Empleo laid down the following guidelines with respect to
noncompliance with the requirements on or submission of a defective verification
and certification against forum shopping:
A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement

on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the
1)
requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum
shopping.
As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not

2) necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending
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circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
3)
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been
made in good faith or are true and correct.
As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a

defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
4) submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on
the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances
or compelling reasons."
The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as
parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however,
5)
as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the

party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable
6) reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power
of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
Applying the above guidelines to the present case, We find that the subject
Verification/Certification of Non-forum Shopping substantially complied with the
rules.
JAY V. SABADO v. TINA MARIE L. SABADO
Jurisdiction over the person of the respondent in a petition for TPO/PPO under RA
9262 can be acquired through any of the means of serving summons under the
Rules of Court. In an action in personam such as a petition for TPO/PPO under RA
9262, the purpose of summons is two-fold: (1) to notify the defendant that an
action has been brought against him; and (2) to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the
court's jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of
the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and
void.
The trial court acquired jurisdiction through his voluntary appearance when he
sought the lifting of the TPO and the denial of the issuance of PPO in his opposition,
without raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person. By such conduct, he
can no longer subsequently object to the court's jurisdiction.
DAISY JOY ROJALLO CERVANTES v. H.E. BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III
"[a] case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of
the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In
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such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be
entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts
generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of
mootness. This is because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have
any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be
enforced."
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the action for certiorari and prohibition
filed by petitioners has been mooted by the termination of the BOT Agreement of
private respondents. The staleness of the claims becomes more manifest
considering the reliefs sought by petitioners, i.e., to annul and set aside the BOT
Agreement for the modernization of the POC; and to permanently enjoin
respondents from implementing the MPOC Project, are hinged on the existence
of the BOT Agreement.
Corollarily, the eventual termination of the BOT Agreement rendered the
resolution of the issues relating to the prayers for certiorari and prohibition of no
practical or legal effect. Simply stated, petitioners in this case would no longer be
entitled to any actual substantial relief regardless of this Court's disposition on the
merits of the present petition.
JORGENETICS SWINE IMPROVEMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. THICK & THIN

AGRI-PRODUCTS, INC., RESPONDENT.
The chairperson and president of a corporation may sign the verification and
certification without need of board resolution. Moreover, lack of authority of a
corporate officer to undertake an action on behalf of the corporation may be
cured by ratification through the subsequent issuance of a board resolution.
A variance in the date of the verification with the date of the petition is not
necessarily fatal to Jorgenetics' case since the variance does not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that no verification was made, or that the verification was false.
It does not necessarily contradict the categorical declaration made by
Jorgenetics in its affidavit that its representatives read and understood the
contents of the pleading.
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired by service
of summons. However, "even without valid service of summons, a court may still
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant if the latter voluntarily
appears before it." "If the defendant knowingly does an act inconsistent with the
right to object to the lack of personal jurisdiction as to [them], like voluntarily
appearing in the action, [they are] deemed to have submitted [themselves] to
the jurisdiction of the court."
Thus, a defendant is deemed to have voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court if they seek affirmative relief from the court. This includes
the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration.
AROMIN VS. SOSIS

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A lawyer's neglect in keeping track of the case and his failure to apprise his client
of the developments of the case do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Fraud is not
extrinsic if the alleged fraudulent act was committed by petitioner's own counsel.
The fraud must emanate from the act of the adverse party and must be of such
nature as to deprive petitioner of its day in court. Thus, in many cases, we have
held that a lawyer's mistake or gross negligence does not amount to extrinsic
fraud that would grant a petition for annulment of judgment.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, PETITIONER, VS. BANGKO

SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE MONETARY BOARD, RESPONDENTS.
Cases involving the propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs, as mere adjuncts
to the main suit, become moot and academic upon disposal of the main action.
TROs and WPIs "constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency
of the action" and are "preservative remedies for the protection of substantive
rights" of the parties. They are ancillary because "they are mere incidents in and
are dependent upon the result of the main action." Ancillary writs are not causes
of action in themselves; they are mere adjuncts to the main suit with the sole
object of preserving the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard.
Being ancillary in nature, the existence of a main action or proceeding is a
condition sine qua non before a WPI or TRO may lie.
A bank under receivership can only sue or be sued through its receiver, the PDIC.
Thus, a petition filed on behalf of a bank under receivership that is neither filed
through nor authorized by the PDIC must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
A TRO and WPI issued by a court without jurisdiction over the main case are void
for want of jurisdiction.
CIR VS. STANDARD INSURANCE CO.
Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that the sworn certification
against forum shopping must be attached to the petition for review
on certiorari. In contrast, there is no requirement that motions for extension of time
be accompanied by a certification against forum shopping.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS v. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS
TROs and WPIs "constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency
of the action" and are "preservative remedies for the protection of substantive
rights" of the parties. They are ancillary because "they are mere incidents in and
are dependent upon the result of the main action."
Ancillary writs are not causes of action in themselves; they are mere adjuncts to
the main suit with the sole object of preserving the status quo until the merits of
the case can be heard. Being ancillary in nature, the existence of a main action
or proceeding is a condition sine qua non before a WPI or TRO may lie:
In our jurisdiction, writs of preliminary injunction and TROs are considered as
provisional injunctive reliefs that are only permitted to be issued in connection
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with — or as an ancillary to — a main action or proceeding pending in court. It is
settled that the office of a writ of preliminary injunction is limited only to the
preservation of the status quo until an action or proceeding could be fully
decided; whereas a TRO is merely the maintenance of such status until an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction can be heard. Evidently, the
existence of a main action or proceeding is a condition sine qua non before a
writ of preliminary injunction or TRO may lie.
The ancillary character of the writs of preliminary injunction and TROs also finds
black letter support in our rules of procedure. Sections 1, 2 and 5, Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court — which define and describe the precise circumstances under
which a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO may be granted — all assume the
prior existence of a main action or proceeding before such writ and order may
be granted.
Thus, any preliminary writ cannot survive the resolution of the main case of which
it is an incident because an ancillary writ "loses its force and effect after the
decision in the main petition." When a main action is dismissed, any provisional
remedy in this case is dissolved. It then follows that once a decision disposing of
the main case becomes final and executory, any disposition by a court on the
propriety of a TRO and WPI issued in the case serves no practical purpose and
renders such a disposition moot and academic.
A bank under receivership can only sue or be sued through its receiver, the PDIC.
Thus, a petition filed on behalf of a bank under receivership that is neither filed
through nor authorized by the PDIC must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
A TRO and WPI issued by a court without jurisdiction over the main case are void
for want of jurisdiction.
ASSET POOL A v. SPS. BUENAFRIDO AND FELISA BERRIS
The true rule which determines whether a party has only a single and entire cause
of action for all that is due him, and which must be sued for in one action, or has
a severable demand for which he may maintain separate suits, is whether the
entire amount arises from one and the same act or contract or the several parts
arise from distinct and different acts or contracts.
Where there are entirely distinct and separate contracts, they give rise to
separate causes of action for which separate actions may be instituted and
presented. When money is payable by installments, a distinct cause of action
assails upon the following due by each installment and they may be recovered
in successive action. On the other hand, where several claims payable at
different times arise out of the same transactions, separate actions may be
brought as each liability accounts. But where no action is brought until more than
one is due, all that are due must be included in one action; and that if an action
is brought to recover upon one or more that are due but not upon all that are
due, a recovery in such action will be a bar to a several or other actions brought
to recover one or more claims of the other claims that were due at the time the
first action was brought.
In sum, petitioner may institute two alternative remedies against the spouses Berris:
either a personal action for the collection of the promissory notes issued under the
Discounting Line or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but not both,
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simultaneously or successively. Although we recognize the right of the mortgage
creditor to recover the deficiency when the mortgaged properties are not
enough to satisfy the entire obligation, the action is only instituted after the
termination of the foreclosure proceedings and not during its pendency, so as not
to violate the prohibition against splitting of cause of action.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS v. CA-CAGAYAN DE ORO STATION
Before the courts may issue a writ of preliminary injunction, it is essential that the
party seeking its issuance be able to establish the existence of a right to be
protected. It must be a right that is actual, clear, and existing; not a mere
contingent, abstract, or future right. Further, the invasion of that clear and
unmistakable right must be material and substantial.
There must also be a showing of urgency to prevent irreparable injury on the part
of the party seeking injunction. Injury is irreparable where there is no standard by
which its amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy discussed the
unquantifiable nature of damages or injury for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Any damage which is easily subject to mathematical computation and, if proven,
is fully compensable by damages. Thus, a preliminary injunction is not warranted.
It is well settled that the aggrieved party may challenge the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction only on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the issuing court. Grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies "a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of [a] positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in
contemplation of law."
CRISTINA R. SEMING v. EMELITA P. ALAMAG
A private document must be authenticated in the manner allowed by law or the

Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The October 22, 1990
and January 23, 1991 receipts are private documents executed by petitioner
herself. Before they can be admitted in evidence, they must be authenticated in
accordance with Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 20. Proof of private documrents. - Before any private document offered
as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to
be.
Accordingly, "before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be
authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its
execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed,
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or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to
whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed execution thereof."
"Settled is the rule that forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear,
positive and convincing evidence, thus, the burden of proof lies on the party
alleging forgery. One who alleges forgery has the burden to establish his/her case
by a preponderance of evidence."
The best evidence of a forged signature in the instrument is the instrument itself
reflecting the alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be
established by comparison between the alleged forged signature and the
authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon
to have been forged."
Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. - The handwriting of a person

may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such
person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to
be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the
handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the
court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom
the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
Payment of real property taxes does not prove that the whole area of Lot 512-C
was sold to her. In any case, this Court cannot give probative or evidentiary value
to the tax receipts and tax certification presented by petitioner. Firstly, the tax
receipts presented date back to 2002 to 2007 only. Notably, these receipts all the
more cast doubt on petitioner's and Jesusa's assertion that the sale of Lot 512-C
took place in 1977. Secondly, the tax certification presented by petitioner showing
that she had paid real property taxes on Lot 512-C since 1977 up to 2006 is a mere
photocopy and not even a certified true copy of the original. A mere photocopy
otherwise controverted by the opposing party cannot be admitted into evidence
and the same cannot stand in the place of the original.
LETICIA A. RAMIREZ v. FELOMINO ELOMINA
The instant Petition challenges the appellate court's May 25, 2012 Resolution
which ordered the issuance of an Entry of Judgment. However, said Resolution
was a necessary consequence of the appellate court's December 21, 2011
Resolution which denied the November 3, 2011 Motion for Reconsideration due
to late filing.
Thus, the appropriate recourse would have been for Ramirez to timely file an
appeal of the December 21, 2011 Resolution, which she received on January 5,
2012. She had until January 20, 2012 to file an appeal, reckoned from the date of
her receipt. However, the instant Petition was only filed on August 10, 2012, and
thus likewise filed beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal.
In view of the foregoing, We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
appellate court. A special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors in judgment. Thus,
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We have repeatedly held that when "the court has jurisdiction over the case and
person of the defendant, any mistake in the application of the law and the
appreciation of evidence committed by a court may be corrected only by
appeal."
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the CA had jurisdiction over the case.
What Ramirez actually seeks is the reversal of the appellate courts' ruling
declaring Felomino as the lawful owner of the subject land. Therefore, assuming
there was any error in the appellate court's interpretation of the law and
appreciation of evidence, it may only be corrected through an appeal and not
through certiorari, since it is considered as an error of judgment and not of
jurisdiction.
TECHNICAL EDUCATION v. ERNESTO ABRAGAR
The joinder of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the exercise
of judicial power. While the failure to implead an indispensable party is not per
se a ground for the dismissal of an action, considering that said party may still be
added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any
stage of the action and/or such times as are just, it remains essential — as it is
jurisdictional — that any indispensable party be impleaded in the proceedings
before the court renders judgment. The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
A void judgment is in effect no judgment at all, and all acts performed under it
and all claims flowing out of it are void. The judgment is vulnerable to attack even
when no appeal has been taken, and does not become final in the sense of
depriving a party of his right to question its validity.
Thus, the failure to implead petitioner and the other parties to the MOA renders
the July 30, 2004 Decision of the LA, writ of execution, and break- open order null
and void for want of authority, which may be attacked in any way at any time,
even when no appeal is taken. It is immaterial that petitioner filed the Appeal
Memorandum in Intervention after the LA judgment became allegedly final and
executory, since a judgment void ab initio is non-existent and thus cannot
acquire finality.
ZAHARA PENDATUN MAULANA v. JUDGE OSCAR P. NOEL
The complaint should not be dismissed solely on the basis of complainant's

affidavit of desistance. Thus, the fact that herein complainant manifested before
the Investigating Justice that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case does
not, as a matter of course, warrant the automatic dismissal of an administrative
case against respondent, more so in the instant case where respondent appears
to have admitted certain material allegations in the complaint filed against him.
Certifications issued by the FEO Records Section are sufficient proof of the fact of
possession or non-possession of a valid license to own or possess firearms or
explosives in the offense of Illegal Possession of Firearms. OCA Circular No. 11-2011
further states that personal appearances of FEO records personnel is not required
in order to establish the authenticity of FEO-issued certifications.
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This only means that FEO-issued certifications are sufficient evidence, and thus,
should be accepted by the courts in determining the presence or absence of a
valid license or permit to own or possess firearms.
PEOPLE v. MAE AL-SAAD Y BAGKAT
Jurisprudence holds that direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing
guilt. The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the
accused-appellant's guilt cannot be proved. Circumstantial evidence, if
sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct evidence and therefore, also prove
guilt beyond reasonable doubt
ALPHA PLUS INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISES CORP. v. PHILIPPINE CHARTER

INSURANCE CORP.
An amended complaint supersedes an original one. As a consequence, the

original complaint is deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the
record.
When the amended complaint does not introduce new issues, cause of action,
or demands, the suit is deemed to have commenced on the date the original
complaint was filed.
With petitioner's filing of the Amended Complaint which raised new demands, the
original complaint of petitioner must be deemed to have been abandoned and
to have been rendered functus officio.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MAGDALENA QUILIT AND

MAURICIO LAOYAN, RESPONDENTS.
The power to issue writs of certiorari is an incident of judicial review. DARAB, not
being a court of law exercising judicial power, is, therefore, inherently powerless
and incapable by constitutional fiat of acquiring jurisdiction over special civil
actions for certiorari, and issuing writs of certiorari to annul acts of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) or RARAD even when it exercises
supervisory powers over them.
DARAB's exercise of the innately judicial certiorari power is an executive

encroachment into the judiciary. It violates the separation of powers; it is
unconstitutional.
Well-settled is the rule that "this Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not its function
to examine, review, or evaluate the evidence all over again. "Along the same
lines, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers
only questions of law. Thus, in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the
Court is generally limited to reviewing only errors of law and not of facts.
Nevertheless, the Court has enumerated several exceptions to this rule, such as
when: "(1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5)
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the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on
which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are
contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court
of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of
Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to
the admissions of both parties."
LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. ESPEDITO* Q. ESCARO
It is well-settled that the "valuation of property or determination of just

compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function
which is vested with the courts and not with administrative
agencies." Accordingly, RA 6657 vests the RTCs, acting as SACs (Special Agrarian
Courts), original and exclusive jurisdiction in the determination of just
compensation,
The correct period to file a petition for judicial determination of just compensation
under RA 6657 (CARP) before the RTC-SAC is 10 years pursuant to Article 1144 (2)
of the Civil Code.
As established from the records, respondent filed the complaint for determination
of just compensation with the RTC-SAC on January 5, 2009, more than 10 years
after he received or acquired knowledge of the notice of coverage from the DAR
sometime between 1994 and 1996. As such, it appears that there was sufficient
ground for the dismissal of respondent's complaint for having been filed out of
time.
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[p]rivate property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation." At this juncture, it must be
emphasized that determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is
essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies.
There is no statutory basis for the DARAB to promulgate rules that would derogate
the jurisdiction of the RTC-SAC or impose procedural limitations which would
effectively bar it from taking exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction.
Any attempt to do so should be struck down for being contrary to law and the
Constitution.
V PEOPLE MANPOWER PHILS., INC., AND/OR CAPE PNL LTD., PETITIONERS, VS.
DOMINADOR C. BUQUID, RESPONDENT.
If the factual findings by the LA, NLRC, and the CA are contradictory, the same
may be subject of review by the Supreme Court.
PNB-REPUBLIC BANK v. REMEDIOS SIAN-LIMSIACO
Jurisprudence has already held that the action to cancel the mortgage is a
personal action, as compared to an action to foreclose such mortgage, which
is a real action that involves real property.
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since neither the subject mortgage contracts nor the instant case involved the
mortgagors-principals' real property rights, there was no need to join them and
hence, respondent validly instituted the action in her own name but still in her
capacity as an agent of the mortgagors-principals.
In any event, we agree with the appellate court in its ruling that the joining of the
mortgagors-principals would be unneccessary and moot as the evidence on
record patently reveals that the main loan contracts have already been
rendered unenforceable by virtue of prescription. Given that the subject
mortgage contracts are mere accessory contracts to the said loan contracts,
then it follows that the action to foreclose on these mortgage contracts had also
already prescribed. Therefore, there is no necessity in including the mortgagors-
principals in the petition as the cancellation of the mortgages annotated on the
titles was a result of the unenforceability of the principal loan.
The parties' right to due process had been substantially complied with, given that
both parties were given the opportunity to present their side and adduce their
own evidence to bolster their positions. To emphasize, it has always been a basic
principle in our jurisdiction that on balance, substantial justice trumps procedural
rules, especially given that there is no prejudice to the parties' right to due process.
This axiom is especially true if the strict and rigid application of such procedural
rules would result in technicalities which tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK v. LAGUNA NAVIGATION
The general rule is that this Court has no jurisdiction to resolve questions of fact in
a petition for review on certiorari, subject to exceptions laid down in case law.
There is a question of fact when the issue at hand invites a review of the evidence
presented. The test, therefore, of whether a question is one of law or of fact is
"whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a
question of fact."
We find that the issues raised by PCIB are clearly questions of fact. The bank
contends that the CA erred in ruling that its complaint could not be fairly and
justly disposed without the direct examination of the witness contained in the
destroyed TSNs notwithstanding the admitted and established facts of the case.
It also claims that the RTC could have decided the case based on other evidence
such as the Partial Stipulation of Facts, the other available TSNs containing the
cross-examination of a witness, and the documentary exhibits duly admitted. The
bank claims that the records would show that the remaining issue to be resolved
as determined by the trial court is the manner of payment of the principal
obligation after the parties executed a Partial Stipulation of Facts; yet, this
document was not considered by both the CA and the RTC. It alleges that it had
already made a formal offer of evidence, which the RTC admitted; while the
respondents merely offered the Contract of Continuing Guaranty and waived its
right to present testimonial and documentary evidence.
Indeed, the bank seeks mainly for the examination by this Court of the evidence
in the records. This entails appreciation of evidence that the trial court has passed
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upon. Doing so would be disturbing the findings of fact made by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA. It is well settled that the RTC is in a better position to determine
which party was able to present evidence with greater weight. Significantly, there
is no reason to disturb the findings of fact in the instant case. Notably, the
dispositive portion of the September 25, 2001 RTC Order states that PCIB failed to
prove its case by preponderance of evidence despite several opportunities
afforded to it. Preponderance of evidence is the required quantum of evidence
in civil cases; it is defined as the evidence more convincing to the court as
worthier of belief than that offered as opposition thereto.
MAGNA READY MIX CONCRETE CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. ANDERSEN

BJORNSTAD KANE JACOBS, INC., RESPONDENT.
A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in Philippine Courts
although not authorized to do business here against a Philippine citizen or entity
who had contracted with and benefited by said corporation. To put it in another
way, a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation after
having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. And the
doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to a foreign as well as
to domestic corporations. One who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin
as a corporate entity is estopped to deny its corporate existence and capacity.
The principle will be applied to prevent a person contracting with a foreign
corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes
chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract.
The rule is deeply rooted in the time-honored axiom of commodum ex injuria sua
non habere debet -no person ought to derive any advantage of his own wrong.
This is as it should be for as mandated by law, "every person must in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
xxxx
By virtue of the doctrine of estoppel, a party cannot take undue advantage by

challenging the foreign corporation's personality or legal capacity to sue when
the former already acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with the
latter and derived benefits therefrom.
RAMON JACINTO v. ATTY. BENEDICT LITONJUA
In settlement of estate proceedings, the ultimate objective is the distribution and

partition of the decedent's estate under Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
The general rule is that an administrator has all the powers necessary for
administration of the estate and which powers he can exercise without leave of
court. However, as regards the sale, mortgage or other encumbrances on the
estate, the provisions of Rule 89 apply.
MARYLOU R. ANCHETA v. MARY CAMBAY

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Lack of jurisdiction being a valid ground for annulment of a judgment, and one
which may negate the court's acquisition of jurisdiction, including defective
service of summons, it is a well-founded cause for an action for annulment of a
judgment.
BASES CONVERSION v. CIR
At the crux of the present petition is the issue of whether or not BCDA is a
government instrumentality or a government-owned and - controlled corporation
(GOCC). If it is an instrumentality, it is exempt from the payment of docket fees. If
it is a GOCC, it is not exempt and as such non-payment thereof would mean that
the tax court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and properly dismissed it
for BCDA's failure to settle the fees on time.
BCDA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers. As such, it is
exempt from the payment of docket fees required under Section 21, Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court
EMILY ESTORES Y PECARDAL, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES

RESPONDENT.
It is well established that the defense of alibi or denial, in the absence of

convincing evidence, is invariably viewed with disfavor by the courts for it can
easily be concocted, especially in cases involving the Dangerous Drugs Act.
When a prohibited drug is found in a house or other building belonging to and
occupied by a particular person, the presumption arises that such person is in
possession of such drugs in violation of law. The fact of finding the said illegal drug
is sufficient to convict. In other words, the finding of illegal drugs in a house owned
by the accused, or in this case, the room occupied and shared by petitioner and
accused Miguel, raises the presumption of knowledge and, standing alone, was
sufficient to convict. Petitioner failed to present any evidence to rebut the
existence of animus possidendi over the illegal drugs found in the cabinet inside
her room. Her claim that she was unaware that illegal drugs were in her room fails
to convince. Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness.
It is a self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater
evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.
REPUBLIC v. HEIRS OF SPS. MAURO BORJA AND DEMETRIA BAJAO
It has been settled that the 60-day period within which a petition
for certiorari should be filed is non-extendible, except in meritorious cases.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial
court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC states that in cases where a motion for reconsideration was
timely filed, the filing of a petition for certiorari questioning the resolution denying
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the motion for reconsideration must be made not later than sixty (60) days from
the notice of the denial of the motion.
It must be further stressed that this case has dragged on for 17 years to date. This
case has in fact reached the execution stage, where the trial court had directed
the LRA to issue the OCT in numerous occasions for several years. The LRA
stubbornly refused to abide by the court order. On March 5, 2010, the LRA had
succeeded in persuading respondents to enter into a settlement, where it was
agreed that the LRA would issue the OCT on the condition that respondent
produce a certification that "no OCT has ever been issued" on the subject
property. When respondents produced the certification, the LRA found another
reason not to issue the OCT. This very judgment is the subject of appeal by
petitioners before the appellate court. Instead of timely filing its appeal to a then
10-year old case, petitioners filed a Motion for Extension, which is prohibited under
the rule. If, indeed, petitioner considered the importance of this case, it should
have diligently and timely pursued its appeal.
It bears stressing that "the right to appeal is not a natural right but a statutory
privilege, and it may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
the provisions of law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with
the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost."
LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. DEL MORAL +
All the elements of res judicata are present in the case at bar. First, there is a final
judgment or order, that is, the RTC Decision dated October 16, 2006 as affirmed
by the CA in its Decision dated October 30, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 98373 had
already become final and executory by virtue of this Court's Resolution dated
June 4, 2008 in G.R. No. 181183 which denied the DAR's Petition for Review
on Certiorari before this Court. Thereafter, on October 28, 2008, the
corresponding Entry of Judgment was issued.
Second, both the CA and the RTC have jurisdiction over (1) the subject matter,
that is, the computation of just compensation of the subject properties and the
awards for temperate and nominal damages as well as legal interest; and (2) the
parties, namely, LBP, DAR and Del Moral. Third, the RTC Decision dated October
16, 2006 and CA Decision dated October 30, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 98373 are
judgments on the merits, the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to
the causes of action and the subject matter of the case having been
unequivocally determined and resolved.
Lastly, CA-G.R. SP No. 98033 and CA-G.R. SP No. 98373 refer to the same subject
matter, raise the same issues and involve the same parties. Although CA-G.R. SP
No. 98373 was an appeal filed only by the DAR, for purposes of res judicata, we
have held that only a substantial identity of parties is required and not absolute
identity. The LBP may not be impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 98373 which had
already attained finality, however, the LBP has community of interest with the DAR
as both parties represented the government's interest in the expropriation of Del
Moral's 102 hectares of landholdings.
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Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present case
becomes dismissible. Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court enunciates the rule
of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, thus:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating
for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity[.]
By the principle of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their
privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same
claim, demand or cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the
party to be affected, or some other with whom he/she is in privity, has litigated
the same matter in the former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and
should not be permitted to litigate it again.
The records reveal that the two appeals before the CA stemmed from the same
factual circumstances between the same parties as both the DAR and the LBP
were parties in Agrarian Case No. U-1505 before the RTC for the proper
determination and payment of just compensation. To reiterate, the DAR's appeal
of the RTC's Agrarian Case No. U-1505 before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
98373 was already terminated in our Resolution dated June 4, 2008.
during the pendency of this case, R.A. No. 9700 was enacted on August 7, 2009
which amended Section 7 of R.A. No. 6657, viz.:
Section 5. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
SEC. 7. Priorities. — The DAR, in coordination with the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC) shall plan and program the final acquisition and distribution of all
remaining unacquired and undistributed agricultural lands from the effectivity of
this Act until June 30, 2014. Lands shall be acquired and distributed as follows:
Phase One: During the five (5)-year extension period hereafter all remaining lands
above fifty (50) hectares shall be covered for purposes of agrarian reform upon
the effectivity of this Act. All private agricultural lands of landowners with
aggregate landholdings in excess of fifty (50) hectares which have already been
subjected to a notice of coverage issued on or before December 10, 2008; rice
and corn lands under Presidential Decree No. 27; all idle or abandoned lands; all
private lands voluntarily offered by the owners for agrarian reform: Provided, That
with respect to voluntary land transfer, only those submitted by June 30, 2009 shall
be allowed: Provided, further, That after June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition
shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory acquisition: Provided,
furthermore, That all previously acquired lands wherein valuation is subject to
challenge by landowners shall be completed and finally resolved pursuant to
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended: x x x. (Emphases supplied.)
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However, despite the foregoing, we have held in Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Spouses Chu that R.A. No. 9700 applies to landholdings that are yet to be
acquired and distributed by the DAR. This is further strengthened by Paragraph VI
(Transitory Provision) of DARA.O. No. 02-09, the implementing rules of R.A. No.
9700, which specifically provides that:
VI. Transitory Provision
With respect to cases where the Master List of ARBs has been finalized on or before
July 1, 2009 pursuant to Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 2003, the acquisition
and distribution of landholdings shall continue to be processed under the
provisions of R.A. No. 6657 prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9700.
However, with respect to land valuation, all Claim Folders received by LBP prior to
July 1, 2009 shall be valued in accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 prior
to its amendment by R.A. No. 9700. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, based on the foregoing, the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 9700 and
its implementing rules with respect to the factors to be considered in computing
just compensation shall not be applicable in the case at bar as Del Moral's claim
was approved by the LBP as early as 1992, or 17 years before July 1, 2009. Hence,
the proper determination of just compensation of Del Moral's landholdings shall
be based on Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9700.
The RTC and the CA are therefore duty bound to utilize the basic formula
prescribed and laid down in pertinent DAR regulations existing prior to the
passage of R.A. No. 9700 to determine just compensation.
The determination of just compensation is a judicial function which cannot be
curtailed or limited by legislation, much less by an administrative rule.[31] Section
57 of R.A. No. 6657 vests the Special Agrarian Courts the "original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners." While Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 requires the due consideration of
the formula prescribed by the DAR, the determination of just compensation is still
subject to the final decision of the proper court.
Regarding the award of temperate and nominal damages, we hold that
temperate or moderate damages may be recovered if pecuniary loss has been
suffered but the amount cannot be proved with certainty from the nature of the
case. The trial and appellate courts found that Del Moral was unable to use
productively the 102 hectares of its landholdings after it was deprived of its
possession in 1972. With the passage of time, it is, however, impossible to
determine Del Moral's losses with any certainty. Thus, considering the particular
circumstances of this case, the award of P10 million as temperate damages is
reasonable.
Although res judicata applies in this case, for the greater interest of justice,
nominal damages of P1 million should be deleted as temperate and nominal
damages are incompatible and thus, cannot be granted concurrently.
PATRICK U. GABUTINA, PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, RESPONDENT.
Delay in filing a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the
CA spanned more than six years, when, in the first place, he only had 15 days
under the law to do so. The Court has consistently held that the right to appeal is
a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed
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by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law. Under Administrative Order No.
07, as amended, Gabutina only had 15 days from the time he received the
February 18, 2005 Order on March 17, 2005 within which to file a Petition for Review
with the CA. In the second place, his six-year delay was not justified by any
compelling reason; thus, his Petition for Review must fail. Ironically, as respondent,
Gabutina should have pursued the procedural remedies available to him. It was
his own undoing that rendered his cause a failure.
GUILLERMO VILLANUEVA REPRESENTING UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS LIFE

ASSURANCE CORPORATION (COCOLIFE), COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. BONIFACIO
ALENTAJAN, RESPONDENT.
Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in

anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through
means other than appeal or certiorari.
There is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendencia are present or
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. They
are as follows: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties that represent the
same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights or causes of action, and (c)
identity of reliefs sought.
Under this test, we find that Atty. Alentajan committed forum shopping when he
filed Civil Case No. R-QZN-13-02119-CV despite the finality of the judgment in Civil
Case No. Q-05-5629.
First, an identity of parties exists in Civil Case No. Q-05-5629 and Civil Case No. R-
QZN-13-02119-CV. In both cases, the initiating parties were the same, the heirs of
Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr., namely, Erlinda, Paz, Anna, and Bienvenido IV. They
represented the same interest in both cases wherein they claimed to be the
legitimate heirs of Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr. and co-owners of the real property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 79724 registered in the name of
Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr. and Erlinda O. Marquez.
Meanwhile, COCOLIFE is the sole private respondent in both Civil Case No. Q-05-
5629 and Civil Case No. R-QZN-13-02119-CV. It espoused the same interest, as the
transferee-owner of the real property allegedly still owned by the heirs of
Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr.
Second, the test of identity of causes of action does not depend on the form of
an action taken, but on whether the same evidence would support and establish
the former and the present causes of action. The heirs of Bienvenido O. Marquez,
Jr. cannot avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the form of their
action or by adopting a different method of presenting it. [24]
In Civil Case No. Q-05-5629, the trial court already ruled upon the issue of the
validity of the foreclosure of real estate mortgage as well as the validity of the
issuance of TCT in favor of COCOLIFE. The issue as to the ownership of the subject
real property covered by TCT No. 79724 was already substantially passed upon
and decided by the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-05-5629. The evidence
necessary to prove their claim in Civil Case No. R-QZN-13-02119-CV had already
been presented in the previous case, that is, Civil Case No. Q-05-5629. Therefore,
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the subsequent filing of Civil Case No. R-QZN-13-02119-CV of the same party
against COCOLIFE in the form of a complaint for reconveyance of title cannot
prosper. In fact, as per Order dated November 12, 2013 issued by the RTC, Branch
90 of Quezon City, Civil Case No. R-QZN-13-02119-CV was dismissed on the ground
that the cause of action was barred by a prior judgment issued by the RTC,
Branch 92 of Quezon City which became final and executory on September 22,
2010.
Third, in Civil Case No. Q-05-5629, the heirs of Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr. prayed
for the annulment of foreclosure proceedings, certificate of sale, and transfer
certificate of title issued in the name of COCOLIFE.
On the other hand, in Civil Case No. R-QZN-13-02119-CV, the heirs of Bienvenido
O. Marquez, Jr. asked for the reconveyance of the real property and annulment
of title. They also prayed that the TCT issued in the name of COCOLIFE be
declared null and void and that TCT No. 79724 be reconstituted.
It is obvious that the reliefs sought by the heirs of Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr. in
both Civil Case No. Q-05-5629 and Civil Case No. R-QZN-13-02119-CV were the
same such that a ruling in one case would have resulted in the resolution of the
other, and vice versa. To illustrate, had the validity of the foreclosure of real estate
mortgage and the sale of the subject real property be declared, there would be
no need for another decision as to the ownership and title of the subject property.
Conversely, had the ownership and title of the subject property be decided upon,
a declaration of the validity of the sale and foreclosure proceedings in another
case would have been unnecessary. The reliefs prayed for, the facts upon which
both are based, and the parties are substantially similar in the two cases. Since
the elements of res judicata are present, Atty. Alentajan committed forum
shopping when he filed Civil Case No. R-QZN-13-02119-CV without indicating that
Civil Case No. Q-05-5629 had already become final and executory.
Furthermore, Atty. Alentajan argued that Villanueva had no authority to represent

COCOLIFE in the disbarment case filed against him as Villanueva had no special
power of attorney executed in his favor by COCOLIFE. The Resolution dated April
26, 2011 issued by COCOLIFE in favor of Villanueva referred to a different legal
action and not to a disbarment case which was filed three years thereafter or on
September 15, 2014.
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LEGAL ETHICS
RUBEN A. ANDAYA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EMMANUEL ALADIN A.

TUMANDA,RESPONDENT.
His deliberate failure to settle his obligation despite repeated demands is in itself
a gross misconduct for which he may be sanctioned with one-year suspension
from the practice of law. As pointed out by complainant in his Complaint-Affidavit
and as aptly found by the IBP, respondent has been using several addresses to
avoid being traced and to evade his obligation to complainant. In fact, because
of this, the IBP had to send copies of the Notice of Hearing to the different
addresses of respondent as he could not be located. Such aberrant behavior of
respondent lays bare his lack of integrity and moral soundness.
In addition, respondent even refused to answer the accusations against him and
to appear in the mandatory conferences despite due notice, thereby causing
undue delay in the resolution of the instant case.
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All these circumstances taken together justify the imposition upon respondent of
a three-year suspension from the practice of law. It bears stressing that the
determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed on an erring lawyer is
within the sound judicial discretion of the court taking into consideration the
factual circumstances of the case.
FRANCISCO PAGDANGANAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ROMEO C. PLATA,

RESPONDENT.
Gross misconduct has been defined as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrantly

unlawful conduct on the part of the person involved in the administration of
justice, conduct that is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of the cause. Such conduct is generally motivated by a
premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose, but does not necessarily imply
corruption or criminal intent.
AA TOTAL LEARNING CENTER FOR YOUNG ACHIEVERS, INC. REPRESENTED BY

SANTIAGO B. BURGOS, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. JOVENCIO JAMES G. BEREBER,
RESPONDENT.
Simply put, in determining whether a lawyer is guilty of violating the rules on

conflict of interest under the CPR, it is essential to determine whether: (1) "a lawyer
is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same
time, to oppose that claim for the other client;" (2) "the acceptance of a new
relation would prevent the full discharge of a lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in
the performance of that duty;" and (3) "a lawyer would be called upon in the new
relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired
through their connection or previous employment."
Considering the foregoing, the proper resolution of the issue herein involved
necessarily hinges upon the existence of an attorney-client relationship. Notably,
the absence of an attorney-client relationship between Bereber and Burgos is an
essential element of Bereber's defense to the charge of conflict of interest.
JONATHAN C. PARUNGAO, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. DEXTER B. LACUANAN,

RESPONDENT.
For there to be conflicting interests when a former client is involved, the following
circumstances must concur: (a) the lawyer is called upon in his present
engagement to make use against a former client confidential information which
was acquired through their connection or previous employment, and (b) the
present engagement involves transactions that occurred during the lawyer's
employment with the former client and matters that the lawyer previously
handled for the said client.
GUILLERMO VILLANUEVA REPRESENTING UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS LIFE

ASSURANCE CORPORATION (COCOLIFE), COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. BONIFACIO
ALENTAJAN, RESPONDENT.
"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
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administration of justice. Any conduct [that] tends to delay, impede or obstruct
the administration of justice contravenes [this obligation]." In fact, willful and
deliberate forum shopping has been made punishable either as direct or indirect
contempt of court in SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated April 1, 1994.
In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Alentajan violated Canon 1 of the CPR

which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the
law and legal processes. He also disregarded his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice, and the prohibition against unduly delaying a
case by misusing court processes.
Regardless of the fact that Atty. Alentajan did not act as counsel in Civil Case No.
Q-05-5629, it would not exempt him from culpability. He knowingly filed another
civil case despite the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-05-5629 which
already resolved the issue of ownership and validity of foreclosure of mortgage
of the subject property. In fact, aside from filing Civil Case No. R-QZN-13-02119-
CV, Atty. Alentajan assisted his clients in filing various cases such as, criminal
complaint for violation of Sections 1 and 36 of R.A. No. 7653 in relation to Sections
4 and 6 of R.A. No. 3765, criminal complaint for violation of Article 302 of the RPC
or robbery in an uninhabited place or a private building and contempt against
the officers of COCOLIFE which were all dismissed for lack of merit.
Rule 10.3, Capon 10 of the CPR mandates lawyers to observe the rules of
procedures and to not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. A lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his/her client, but not at the expense of the truth and the
administration of justice. The filing of multiple cases constitutes abuse of the court's
processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade
the administration of justice. The filing of another action concerning the same
subject matter likewise runs contrary to Canon 1 and Rules 12.02 and 12.04 of
Canon 12 of the CPR. Canon 1 of the CPR requires a lawyer to exert every effort
and consider it his/her duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. Rule 12.02 prohibits a lawyer from filing multiple cases arising from the
same cause, and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 prohibits the undue delay of a case by
misusing court processes.
PASTORA GANANCIAL v. BETTY CABUGAO +
Mere formal infirmities in the notarization of the instrument will not invalidate the
mortgage. Basis for the award of damages must be clearly and distinctly set out
in the judgment.
LOURDES E. ELANGA v. ATTY. RUTILLO B. PASOK +
"[T]he quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in a disbarment case is

substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The complainant has
the burden of proving his allegations against respondents." In the case at bench,
the Elangas proved with substantial evidence that Atty. Pasok committed several
infractions pertaining to his participation in relevant documents concerning the
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opposing parties not only as a retained counsel but also as a notary public, and
which involved monetary considerations which he improperly received.
TEODORO L. CANSINO and EMILIO L. CANSINO, JR., Complainants, VS. ATTY.

VICTOR D. SEDERIOSA, Respondent.
SECTION 1. Qualifications. - A notarial commission may be issued by an Executive

Judge to any qualified person who submits a petition in accordance with these
Rules.
To be eligible for commissioning as notary public, the petitioner:
(1) must be a citizen of the Philippines;

(2) must be over twenty-one (21) years of age;
(3) must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and maintains a
regular place of work or business in the city or province where the commission is
to be issued;
(4) must be a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing with clearances from
the Office of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and
(5) must not have been convicted in the first instance of any crime involving moral
turpitude. (Emphasis Supplied.)
In other words, a lawyer, during the period of his/her suspension, is barred from
engaging in notarial practice as he/she is deemed not a member of the
Philippine Bar in good standing, which is one of the essential requisites to be
eligible as a notary public.
There is more than enough evidence that shows that Atty. Sederiosa has
continuously been practicing his legal profession despite the suspension order
against him. He remained to be a duly commissioned notary public from January
8, 2016 to December 31, 2017 as attested by the Certification from the RTC -
Davao City, the Commission for Notary Public dated January 8, 2016, and the
Affidavit of Loss dated August 8, 2016 which he duly notarized. In short, he had
never served his suspension.
It must be stressed that at the time he notarized the Affidavit of Loss on August 8,
2016, Atty. Sederiosa was already cognizant of the Court's December 7, 2015
Resolution as early as January 29, 2016. As such, he was already aware that the
Court had imposed the following penalties upon him: (a) immediate revocation
of his notarial commission; (b) disqualification from being commissioned as a
notary public for a period of two years; and (c) suspension for one year from the
practice of law. Consequently, Atty. Sederiosa should have refrained from
performing the duties of a notary public and engaging in law practice. Yet, he
continued to notarize documents in clear defiance of the Court's orders. By doing
so, he continued to practice law.
All told, Atty. Sederiosa is administratively liable for engaging in law practice
during his suspension and for performing his duties as a notary public despite
revocation of his commission. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
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Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
RISIE G. BAYGAR, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CLARO MANUEL M. RIVERA,

RESPONDENT.
Atty. Rivera was merely performing his official duties as Municipal Administrator of
the Municipality of Binangonan, particularly the implementation of the Closure
Order against the businesses operated by the Baygar family and matters related
thereto. As Municipal Administrator, one of his duties is to "assist in the coordination
of the work of all the officials of the local government unit, under the supervision,
direction, and control of the governor or mayor, and for this purpose, he may
convene the chiefs of offices and other officials of the local government unit." The
implementation of a closure order and the issuance of business permits may be
considered well within this function of a Municipal Administrator. Significantly, Risie
failed to prove by substantial evidence that in the performance of his functions,
Atty. Rivera committed acts in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the CPR.
Finally, it has not escaped our attention that the Baygars already filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Rivera before the CSC as well as two
criminal complaints before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
MANUEL B. TABLIZO v. ATTYS. JOYRICH M. GOLANGCO +
It is settled that in disbarment and suspension proceedings against lawyers in this

jurisdiction, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. Thus, this Court has
held that "in consideration of the gravity of the consequences of the disbarment
or suspension of a member of the bar, we have consistently held that a lawyer
enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to satisfactorily prove the allegations in his complaint through
substantial evidence." A complainant's failure to dispense the same standard of
proof requires no other conclusion than that which stays the hand of the Court
from meting out a disbarment or suspension order.
In the case at bar, there is an absolute dearth of evidence of the respondents'

alleged Gross Misconduct. Other than his bare allegations, complainant was
unable to present proof to substantiate his grave charges against respondents.
That the Consolidated Resolution and Consolidated Resolution - MR issued by the
respondents in the OMB Cases were adverse to complainant does not, by itself,
establish malice or prejudice against him.
In contrast, respondents enjoy, absent any evidence to the contrary, the
presumption that they had regularly performed their official duties as GIPOs and
Directors of the EIO, Office of the Ombudsman, when they resolved the OMB
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Cases. All parties were accorded the opportunity to be heard following the rules
of procedure before the Office of the Ombudsman. In fact, Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon Mosquera effectively granted complainant's prayer for the inhibition of
respondents Atty. Bunagan and Atty. Salazar of EIO - Bureau A by re-assigning
complainant's Motion for Reconsideration of the Consolidated Resolution to
respondents Atty. Golangco and Atty. Agbada of EIO - Bureau B for resolution. It
is also noteworthy that both the Consolidated Resolution and Consolidated
Resolution – MR were reviewed and ultimately approved by Ombudsman Carpio
Morales.
Furthermore, a perusal of the Consolidated Resolution and Consolidated
Resolution - MR issued by respondents readily shows that they sufficiently
presented the factual and legal bases for the dismissal of complainant's charges
against Zafe and Alberto. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the subject
Resolutions were completely arbitrary, capricious, or groundless.
More importantly, if complainant really believed that respondents committed
reversible errors in judgment or grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
Consolidated Resolution and Consolidated Resolution - MR, then his remedy
would have been to seek judicial review of the same, and not through a
disciplinary case against the respondents. The following declaration of the Court
in administrative matters involving judges may be applied by analogy herein: "An
administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is
still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition
for certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is tainted with bad faith, fraud,
malice or dishonesty."
ATTY. ANTONIO B. MANZANO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CARLOS P. RIVERA,

RESPONDENT,
Only a person who is commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in
any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period
of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the
commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary public has resigned
under these Rules and the Rules of Court. Hence, a violation thereof should
therefore not be dealt with lightly to preserve the integrity of notarization.
In the case at bench, it was sufficiently proven that Atty. Rivera was not
commissioned as a notary public at the time he notarized the Answer that was
filed by the defendants in Civil Case No. 33-467-2014. The Certification issued by
the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan duly
showed that Atty. Rivera was not commissioned as a notary public for and in the
Province of Cagayan in 2014. Thus, Atty. Rivera is indubitably liable for gross
violation of the notarial rules which should not be dealt with lightly by the Court.
Atty. Rivera's act of making it appear that he was a duly commissioned notary
public is in blatant disregard of the Lawyer's Oath to obey the laws, i.e. the
Notarial Law, and to do no falsehood. It likewise constitutes a transgression of Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which states that:
"A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
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PRUDENCIO B. PORTUGUESE,* JR., COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JERRY R. CENTRO,
RESPONDENT.
It is settled that "[a] member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or
suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation of the Lawyer's Oath and/or
breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the [CPR]. For the
practice of law is 'a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is
entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character.' The
appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts."
TONY PETER PARTSCH v. ATTY. REYNALDO A. VITORILLO
The prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine private lands is too basic a
rule for even non-attorneys to be unaware of. As a lawyer, Atty. Vitorilllo is
presumed to know this. Despite being equipped with such knowledge, Atty.
Vitorillo still marketed the subject property for sale to Partsch, a Swiss national.
More telling of Atty. Vitorillo's ethical obliquity is his questionable instruction to
Partsch to just proceed with the fencing of the subject property without any
acceptable guarantee of Atty. Vitorillo's title thereto. Again, Atty. Vitorillo had not
refuted this serious allegation. He is deemed to have acted in contravention of
Canon 1, Rule 1.02 - CPR's proscription against counseling activities aimed at
defiance of the law.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a member of the Bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Court for any deceit,
gross misconduct in such office, or violation of the Lawyer's Oath.
ATTY. ROGELIO S. CONSTANTINO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. NEMESIO A.

ARANSAZO, JR.,
It is settled that a "lawyer-client relationship begins from the moment a client seeks
the lawyer's advice upon a legal concern. The seeking may be for consultation
on transactions or other legal concerns, or for representation of the client in an
actual case in the courts or other fora. From that moment on, the lawyer is bound
to respect the relationship and to maintain the trust and confidence of his client."
Thus, if an individual consults a lawyer in respect to his business affairs or legal

troubles of any kind with a view towards obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the lawyer, by virtue thereof, permits or acquiesces with the
consultation, then a lawyer-client relationship is established.
The information regarding the real estate mortgage, private documents such as
the Deed of Assignment, and other pertinent facts and figures revealed in
confidence to Atty. Aransazo used as basis or support in the execution of his sworn
statement and the filing of the amended complaint of Aldaba against Atty.
Constantino, were all acquired through an attorney-client relationship. Such act
is in direct violation of the CPR and constitutes a breach of trust sufficient to
warrant imposition of disciplinary sanction against Atty. Aransazo.
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his
office as an attorney, for violating the lawyer's oath and/or for breaching the
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ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR, for the practice of law is a
profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those
who are qualified and who possess good moral character. The appropriate
penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts.
ADELITA S. VILLAMOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ELY GALLAND A. JUMAO-AS,

RESPONDENT.
There can be no denying that a lawyer-client relationship existed between

Villamor and respondent despite the absence of any express or written
agreement or arrangement as to attorney's fees. Atty. Jumao-as' argument that
it was Retubado who engaged his legal services and that his participation was
limited only to the incorporation of the lending company, is misplaced. It must be
stressed that in the course of the incorporation, respondent directly dealt with
Villamor as owner of the company; conversely, Villamor definitely made
consultations with respondent on legal matters pertaining to the incorporation
and operation of the lending business. In turn, respondent learned of confidential
information from Villamor. In fine, a lawyer-client relationship existed between
Villamor and respondent. On the other hand, respondent expressly admitted that
Yu was also his client.
Thus, when respondent sent a demand letter to Villamor on behalf of Yu, he was
clearly representing conflicting interests. Suffice it to state that Villamor and Yu
have inconsistent interests. If respondent would argue for the rights of Yu, he
would in effect directly oppose the interests of Villamor. In short, he would be
representing inconsistent and opposing interests which is not allowed.
Canon 15 of the CPR requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in
all his/her dealings and transactions with his/her clients. Corollary to this, Rule 15.03
provides that lawyers shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
JOHN PAUL KIENER, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. RICARDO R. AMORES, RESPONDENT.
Atty. Amores should be held administratively liable for violating the Rules on
Notarial Practice when he notarized a document without the presence of the
signatory and failed to indicate his commission number in the notarial certificate.
It is settled that "notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one
invested with substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private
document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his
notarial duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized
document would be undermined." Atty. Amores is, therefore, bound to strictly
comply with these notarial rules.
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A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, one of which
is a jurat. Atty. Amores performed a jurat when he notarized the Secretary's
Certificate with Irene signing as the Corporate Secretary. Rule II, Section 6 of the
Rules on Notarial Practice defines a jurat as:
Section 6. Jurat. — "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single

occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or
document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or
document.
This provision requires that the signatory, or the affiant in some cases, physically
appears before the notary public and signs the document in his presence. Rule
IV, Section 2 of the same rules further provides:
xxxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to
the instrument or document —
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
This provision bolsters the requirement of physical appearance as it prohibits the

notary public from performing a notarial act if the signatory is not in his/her
presence at the time of the notarization.
In Prospero v. Delos Santos, the Court emphasized that "a notary public should
not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same
person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and the truth of what are stated therein. Without the appearance of the
person who actually executed the document in question, the notary public would
be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party
and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act or deed."
To repeat, Atty. Amores failed to observe the requirement of physical presence

when he notarized the Secretary's Certificate. Upon examination of the
document, and as admitted by Atty. Amores himself, Irene's signature in the
Secretary's Certificate attached to the complaint-affidavit in the criminal case
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was merely printed. In short, it was not an actual handwritten signature of Irene.
Atty. Amores's defense that Irene physically signed one copy that was
subsequently reproduced then notarized, does not convince this Court. Atty.
Amores did not present any proof that Irene was indeed physically in his presence
upon the signing and notarization of the document. It goes without saying that
Irene had signed the document elsewhere, scanned it, and then sent it
electronically to Atty. Amores for the latter to print, reproduce, notarize, and use
for the designated purpose. If indeed Irene had personally appeared before him,
he should have asked her right then and there to affix her signature to each and
every copy of the document, not just to one copy.
It is also worth mentioning that Atty. Amores failed to indicate the serial number
of his notarial commission in the concluding part of the notarial certificate of the
Secretary's Certificate as required by the rules.
Based on the foregoing, Atty. Amores violated the Rules on Notarial Practice. For
having committed such violations, he also failed to adhere to Canon 1 of the
CPR, which requires every lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land, and promote respect for the law and legal processes, and Rule 1.01, Canon
1 of the CPR, which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, and deceitful conduct.
On a final note, the Court deems it necessary to remind lawyers who are currently
commissioned as notaries public that a community tax certificate (CTC) is no
longer considered as competent evidence of identity. Atty. Amores used a CTC
as competent evidence of identity of Irene in notarizing the Secretary's
Certificate. However, it was not a violation at the time of the performance of the
notarial act in 2007 as the use of CTCs was prohibited only in 2008 by virtue of an
amendment to the Rules on Notarial Practice as clarified in the case of Baylon v.
Almo.
ROGER B. DAP-OG, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. LUEL C. MENDEZ, RESPONDENT.
"The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any misconduct showing any fault
or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, whether
in his profession or private life because good character is an essential qualification
for the admission to the practice of law and for the continuance of such privilege."
As applied in this case, Atty. Mendez clearly did not meet the lofty standards
reposed on lawyers. There is no excuse for respondent's unlawful and
dishonorable behavior. Even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent's
allegations against Roger were true, that the latter swindled the former's clients,
no person should take the law into his own hands. In this regard, this Court must
remind respondent that while he can represent his clients with zeal, he must do so
within the bounds of the law.
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CRIMINAL LAW
PEOPLE v. HECTOR CORNISTA Y REOTUTAR +
The rule is that "a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses referring to minor details [and collateral matters,] which do not touch
the essence of the crime do not impair their credibility." In addition, Carmelita
testified that at the time Arturo was kidnapped, there was a light on the fence, a
daylight in front of the restaurant, and the restaurant's signboard illuminated the
area. Thus, she was able to recognize appellants. Furthermore, as the CA aptly
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held, appellants failed to give any reason why Carmelita would falsely accuse
them of kidnapping her husband. In the absence of any ill motive on the part of
Carmelita to point to the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, her
testimony must be given full faith and credit.
The elements of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended,
are as follows: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his/her
liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his/her liberty; and (c) motive of the
accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim. [46] In the special
complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, the person kidnapped
is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was
purposely sought or was merely an afterthought.
PEOPLE v. FLORENTINO LABUGUEN Y FRANCISCO +
To avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1) the
existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent;
and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed. A
threat of future injury is insufficient. The compulsion must be of such a character
as to leave no opportunity for the accused to escape.
LUIS T. ARRIOLA v. PEOPLE +
The courts below held Arriola criminally liable for Estafa by false deceits under
Article 315, Paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, which provides:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). -Any person who shall defraud another by any of
the means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or transactions, or by means of
other similar deceits.
Ordinarily, this Court desists from trifling with the findings of facts by the courts
below. Findings by trial courts are generally accorded with great respect by the
appellate courts, more so that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts but of
questions of law.
For this case, however, We defer to one of the prevailing exceptions listed by
jurisprudence, that is, when the findings of fact by the trial court were conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. [22] The courts
below correctly convicted Arriola, but not much substantial discussion was made
on the falsity of his representations and the documentary evidence thereof,
which We now address.
Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part,
on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by
whom it is sought to produce it. A person who introduces a hearsay statement is
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not obliged to enter into any particular stipulation, to answer any question, to
solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities,
to remove any ambiguities; and that he/she entrenches himself/herself in the
simple assertion that he/she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the
dead or absent author. For this reason, the rule against hearsay testimony rests
mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. The return by the accused of money belonging to the private
complainant will not reverse a consummated act of Estafa. Quite the contrary,
such action may even uphold a conviction. Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court states that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or
criminal negligence or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt. In this case, Arriola's initial attempts to reimburse Del Rosario
through checks, coupled with the actual return of the latter's money after the RTC
issued its judgment of conviction, may all be considered as unequivocal gestures
to compromise and which can be measured against Arriola as his implied
admission of guilt.
PEOPLE v. FLOR PUEYO +
Successful prosecutions for statutory rape charges falling under Article 266-A(2)
rely on only two requisites: (1) the victim is a child, male or female, under 12 years
of age, and (2) that the accused inserted any instrument or object into the genital
or anal orifice of the victim. In relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610, the apparent
circumstances fit squarely as sexual assault: AAA, 6 years young at the time of the
incident, received a penetrating blow onto her vagina that almost extended to
her anus by a welding rod wielded by Pueyo. The severity of the genital injury
inflicted upon AAA cannot be more telling of Pueyo's abusive intent. AAA's
consent to Pueyo's vile act holds no relevance here - it is settled that a child's
consent is immaterial because of his or her presumed incapacity of discerning evil
from good
PEOPLE v. VALENTINO CATIG Y GENTERONI +
The elements of the crime of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC are as follows:
(1) the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) the said act was
accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim
is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12
years of age or is demented.
It is not required for a rape victim to undergo a comprehensive medical
examination so as to prove that he/she is a mental retardate. We have
repeatedly pronounced that mental retardation can be proven by evidence
other than medical/clinical evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses and
even the observation by the trial court. However, the conviction of an accused
of rape based on the mental retardation of the victim must be anchored on proof
beyond reason able doubt of the same.
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MERLINA R. DIAZ v. PEOPLE +
It has been held that the requirement of particularity as to the things to be seized
does not require technical accuracy in the description of the property to be
seized, and that a search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things
to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will
ordinarily allow it to be described.
PEOPLE v. JOHNNY ARELLAGA Y SABADO +
In illegal drugs cases, the drugs seized from the accused constitute the corpus
delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of utmost importance that the integrity and identity
of the seized drugs must be clearly shown to have been duly preserved with moral
certainty. "This means that on top of the elements of possession or illegal sale, the
fact that the substance illegally sold or possessed is, in the first instance, the very
substance adduced in court must likewise be established with the same exacting
degree of certitude as that required in sustaining a conviction." [15] "The chain of
custody rule performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed."
Without the three witnesses, there is reasonable doubt on the identity of the seized
drugs itself. Without the three witnesses, the Court is unsure whether there had
been planting of evidence and/or contamination of the seized drugs. Because
of this, the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised. Consequently, appellant must be acquitted.
PEOPLE v. ALEX BALUYOT Y BIRANDA +
It is a well-settled rule that in criminal cases, the accused's guilt must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. This burden lies with the prosecution. In this case, the
prosecution was not able to prove Alex's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
failure of the drug enforcement officers to observe the three-witness rule seriously
compromised the integrity of the seized items and ultimately casted reasonable
doubt on Alex's guilt.
PEOPLE v. ZZZ +
Sexual intercourse with a victim who is under 12 years old, as defined under Article
266-A, Paragraph 1(d) of the RPC, is Statutory Rape. Where the victim is below 12
years old, the only subject of inquiry is whether carnal knowledge took
place. Under the law, carnal knowledge is the act of a man having sexual
intercourse or sexual bodily connections with a woman. The victim's consent to
the vile act holds no relevance here - it is settled that a child's consent is
immaterial because of his or her presumed incapacity of discerning evil from
good.
PEOPLE v. ROGELIO NATINDIM +

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Since treachery qualified the crime to murder, the generic aggravating
circumstances of abuse of superior strength, in aid of armed men and nighttime
are absorbed by and necessarily included in the former. Unless the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime was purposely sought and founded on different
factual bases, then nighttime can be considered as a separate generic
aggravating circumstance, which is however not present in the case at bar. The
prosecution failed to prove by sufficient evidence that nighttime was purposely
and deliberately sought by the appellants. Thus, this Court holds that since
treachery was alleged in the Information and duly established by the prosecution
during trial, the appellants' conviction for the crime of Murder is proper.
However, evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance cannot be

appreciated in this case for failure of the prosecution to specifically allege in the
Information the acts constituting it. Mere reference to evident premeditation is
not sufficient because it is in the nature of a conclusion of law, not factual
averments.
PEOPLE VS. XXX
The elements of Qualified Rape are: "(1) sexual congress; (2) with a woman; (3)
done by force and without consent; (4) the victim is under [eighteen] years of
age at the time of the rape; and (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted) of the victim." In this case, AAA was below eighteen years
old when the crime was committed against her, which was verified by her birth
certificate. Accused-appellant, who admitted that he is AAA's father, sexually
took advantage of her without her consent, likely relying on the authority he holds
over her. Relevantly, "when the offender is the victim's father, as in this case, there
need not be actual force, threat or intimidation because when a father commits
the odious crime of rape against his own daughter, who was also a minor at the
time of the commission of the offenses, his moral ascendancy or influence over
the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation." Undoubtedly, accused-
appellant's relationship with the victim should be considered in assessing his
criminal liability.
PEOPLE v. ARMANDO BUEZA Y RANAY
The absence of hymenal laceration is inconsequential since it is not an element

of the crime of Rape. The Court has consistently held that mere touching of the
external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient
to constitute carnal knowledge. Thus, when a penis comes in contact with the lips
of the victim's vagina, the crime of Rape is considered consummated.
As regards the charge of Grave Threats, the Court agrees with the appellate court
that the crime was consummated as soon as the victim heard Bueza utter his
threatening remarks. Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats, "any
person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor, or
property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime[.]" The
crime is consummated as soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the
person threatened.
In this case, it is clear that the accused-appellant's threat to kill the private
complainant is wrong on the person amounting to, at the very least, homicide
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under the RPC. The felony of Grave Threats was consummated the moment she
heard Bueza utter his threatening remarks. The appellate court correctly ruled
that it was inconsequential that the threat was made in the presence of a number
of people since the offense does not require that it be committed in private.
However, we note that Bueza was charged with and prosecuted for Robbery with
Rape and Grave Threats "in relation to Republic Act No. 7610." Pursuant to our
ruling in People v. Tulagan (Tulagan), we find the need to fix the proper
nomenclature of the crimes committed. Tulagan teaches that:
'[F]orce, threat or intimidation' is the element of rape under the RPC, while 'due to
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group' is the operative phrase for
a child to be deemed 'exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse,' which is the
element of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610.
xxxx
Therefore, there could be no instance that an Information may charge the same
accused with the crime of rape where 'force, threat or intimidation' is the element
of the crime under the RPC, and at the same time violation of Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610.
xxxx
Assuming that the elements of both violations of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 and
of Article 266-A, paragraph l(a) of the RPC are mistakenly alleged in the same
Information x x x the accused should still be prosecuted pursuant to the RPC, as
amended by R.A. No. 8353, which is the more recent and special penal legislation
that is not only consistent, but also strengthens the policies of R.A. No. 7610.
Thus, the Court fixes the error in the nomenclature of appellant's crimes. As it
should now stand, accused-appellant is to be held criminally liable for Robbery
with Rape defined under Article 294, Paragraph 1 of the RPC and of Grave Threats
under Article 282 of the RPC. The correlation to RA 7610 is deleted.
PEOPLE v. EDDIE MANANSALA Y ALFARO +
Settled is the rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws the entire case wide
open for review. Thus, it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct any
error that may be found in the appealed judgment, whether assigned as an error
or not. In the crime of murder, the elements of murder and the aggravating
circumstances qualifying the killing must be proven beyond reasonable doubt by
the prosecution.
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act
must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry
out the criminal intent, during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment. When it is not shown as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched
or what time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation
cannot be considered. "Evident premeditation must be based on external acts
and must be evident, not merely suspected, indicating deliberate planning."
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Nevertheless, despite the absence of evident premeditation, the killing remains
to be murder in view of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
PANTE VS. PEOPLE
A "finder" under Article 308, par. 2(1) of the RPC is not only limited to the actual
finder of the lost property since the gist of the offense is the furtive taking and
misappropriation of the property found. Though not the actual finder, there is no
dispute that Pante knew for a fact that his two co-accused minor did not own the
subject money. He knew for a fact that his co-accused minor merely found the
money along the road while the latter was delivering bread. Instead of returning
the money, Pante convinced his co-accused minors not to return the money and
to divide it among themselves. At that moment, Pante placed himself precisely in
the situation as if he was the actual finder. Otherwise stated, petitioner was a
"finder in law," if not in fact; and his act in appropriating the money was of
precisely of the same character as if it had been originally found by him. His
criminal intent to commandeer the money found was altogether clear at that
point.
PEOPLE VS. MONTALVO
Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability for

crimes only if satisfactorily proved. It requires (a) unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused
to repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on his part. By invoking self-
defense, the burden is placed on the accused to prove its elements clearly and
convincingly. While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and
foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful
aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded.
In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present:

(1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself;
and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means,
methods, or forms of attack employed by him.
In the same tenor, we affirm the lower courts' finding that Perreira is not entitled
to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The requisites for voluntary
surrender that: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the
surrender was voluntary, were not met. The facts established herein parlay that
the barangay authorities had to search for Perreira and go to the place where
he fled to. Only then was he arrested.
PEOPLE VS. MARIO PANIS
Anent the imposable penalty, Article 248 of the RPC, as amended, specifically
provides that the crime of Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
The qualifying circumstance of treachery having qualified the killing to the crime
of Murder, and there being no other aggravating circumstance, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua imposed upon Santiago was proper.
With respect to the award of damages, We further modify the awards of civil
indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to P75,000.00 each; and
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temperate damages to P50,000.00 pursuant to People v. Jugueta.[55] Finally, all
the monetary awards shall earn interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the
date of finality of the judgment until fully paid.
To be convicted of the crime of Murder, the following elements must be
established, to wit: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing
was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) as amended; and (4) the killing constitutes neither
parricide nor infanticide.
In the case at bar, the abovementioned elements were duly established by the
prosecution. Artemio, Sr. was killed. Santiago was positively identified as one of
the assailants in the killing of Artemio, Sr. Moreover, the killing was not parricide or
infanticide.
PEOPLE VS. ZZZ
The date of commission of the crime is not an essential element thereof. In fact,
the specific Rule cited by accused-appellant states that "it is not necessary to
state in the Information the precise date the offense was committed except when
it is a material ingredient of the offense." The date of commission is not even an
element of the crime of rape which elements are: (1) sexual congress; (2) with a
woman; (3) done by force and without consent; (4) the victim is under [18] years
of age at the time of the rape; (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted) of the victim.
[A]n Information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense
and the acts or omission constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission
of a crime is not an essential element of the crime charged. In a prosecution for
rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of
the rape, not the time of its commission. The precise time of the crime has no
substantial bearing on its commission. Therefore, it is not essential that it be alleged
in the information with ultimate precision.
Further, it cannot be considered that appellant was deprived of his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
DEBUQUE VS. NILSON
PD 1689 imposes the penalty of life imprisonment to death if the estafa is

committed by a syndicate, defined as a group of "five or more persons formed
with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise
or scheme..." Section 1 of PD 1689 reads:
Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of
swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa)
is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the
intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or
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scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of money
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang
nayon(s)", or farmers' association, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
xxxx
Thus, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are as follows: (a) Estafa or Other Forms
of Swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the
Estafa or Swindling is committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and, (c)
defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon[s]," or
farmers' association, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the
general public.
Applying the foregoing, the Court finds no existing syndicate in which Ramon and
the other accused had any participation. As found by the DOJ Secretary, Atty.
Debuque acted on his own, without the participation or involvement of Ramon
or the other accused. Atty. Debuque was never authorized by the ILC
shareholders, i.e., Ramon and the other accused, to transact with Nilson. The third
standard provided in Remo, therefore, is not satisfied. There is simply no proof that
all of the accused, including Ramon, acted through ILC in defrauding Nilson.
There was also no showing that Ramon acted on his own and defrauded Nilson.
On the contrary, the evidence shows that Nilson parted with his money solely
because of Atty. Debuque's misrepresentations and false pretenses.
PEOPLE v. BELINA BAWALAN Y MOLINA
While the prosecution failed to prove the victim's minority due to the absence of
her birth certificate, it however established that the crime was committed by a
group of three persons, and by an ascendant and a person exercising authority
over the victim. Consequently, the crime still falls under Qualified Trafficking in
Persons under Sections 6(c) and (d) of RA 9208.
The issue on whether the entrapment operation was recorded in the police blotter
prior to the conduct of the actual operation, and whether the marked money
was already prepared during the pre-operation meeting, are likewise immaterial
in the prosecution of the crime charged. Thus, this Court deems it unnecessary to
delve into this matter.
As to the inconsistencies in AAA's testimony, We find them unsubstantiated. AAA's

allegedly conflicting answers as to what happened after she boarded the tricycle
pertained to two different instances, Her first narration referred to a previous
incident where she was taken to the cemetery by a male customer while the
second narration pertained to the entrapment operation.
ROSELA BARLIN VS. PEOPLE
The Information clearly and categorically charged her with Estafa under Article
315 paragraph (1)(b) for violating the trust receipt agreements she had entered
into with Gacayan. It must be stressed that a violation of trust receipt agreements
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would make the accused criminally liable for estafa under paragraph (1)(b) of
Article 315 of the RPC as expressly provided in Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law.
The prosecution had proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of estafa. The element of damage was sufficiently established when
Gacayan parted with her goods and failed to recover the proceeds of the sale
thereof or the unsold items despite repeated demands. Petitioner herself
admitted that she tried to turn over the proceeds of the sale under the TRAs
through the issuance of post-dated checks which were however dishonored.
Petitioner even admitted before the trial court that the post-dated checks were
issued with respect to the same transactions in this case. She also presented a
Compromise Agreement with respect to the dishonored post-dated checks
executed by the parties before the MeTC of San Juan.
As regards the proper penalty, Article 315 of the RPC, as amended by Republic
Act No. 10951 (RA 10951) provides that the imposable penalty is arresto mayor in
its medium and maximum periods, which ranges from two (2) months and one (1)
day to six (6) months when the amount of fraud does not exceed P40,000.00.
Considering that there is no mitigating and aggravating circumstance present in
this case, the proper penalty should be within the range of three (3) months and
eleven (11) days to four (4) months and twenty (20) days. The Indeterminate
Sentence Law is not applicable in this case since the maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one year.
Thus, in view of RA 10951 and considering the amount involved, it is proper to

impose upon the petitioner the penalty of three (3) months and eleven (11) days
of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods.
XXX v. PEOPLE
Crimes mala in se are those "so serious in their effects to society as to call for
almost unanimous condemnation of its members." On the other hand,
crimes mala prohibita are "violations of mere rules of convenience designed to
secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society."Generally, the
term mala in se pertains to felonies defined and penalized by the RPC while mala
prohibita refers generally to acts made criminal by special laws. In acts which are
declared to be mala prohibita, malice or intent is immaterial. Since RA 9262 or the
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 is a special law, the
act of deprivation of financial support is considered malum prohibitum.
Petitioner's argument of absence of malice or intent is immaterial and the only
inquiry to be made is whether or not XXX committed the act.
SPOUSES ISIDRO DULAY III* AND ELENA DULAY, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
Private complainants' failure to conduct due diligence does not negate

petitioners' fraud in pretending to own the subject property and gain by selling it
to gullible buyers. In short, the estafa by deceit was consummated when
petitioners received payments for the subject property knowing that they were
not the registered owners who could validly transfer title thereto. Time and again
we have ruled that the one induced, who must be ignorant of the falsity of the
HERNANDO DOCTRINES
for 2023 Bar
NOT FOR SALE
representations, must have relied on the truth thereof and, as a consequence,
sustained injury
PEOPLE VS. EVANGELISTA
The rule on chain of custody establishes the identity of the object of the sale or
the item possessed by the accused without authority. The purpose of this rule is to
preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized dangerous drugs in
order to fully remove doubts as to its identity. It must be shown that the items
presented and identified in court during trial are the very same items that were
sold and seized from the accused during the buy-bust operation. Section 21, as
amended, provides that the marking, taking of photographs, and inventory of the
seized items must be done immediately after seizure and confiscation of the items
in the presence of two witnesses (as compared with the previous requirement of
three witnesses): an elected public official, and a representative from the
National Prosecution Service or the media. The provision allows for the marking,
taking of photographs, and inventory be conducted in the nearest police station
or office if practicable in case of warrantless seizures. It further provides that the
seized items must be immediately brought to the forensic laboratory for
examination.
HORCA VS. PEOPLE
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment

against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b)
the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil
liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which
the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist
or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
MARZAN VS. PEOPLE
the crime of violation of Section 3(a) of RA 3019 may be committed in either of

the following modes: (1) when the offender persuades, induces or influences
another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duties of the public officer; or (2) when the public
officer allowed himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced to perform said
act which constitutes a violation of rules and regulations promulgated by
competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the
public officer.
HERNANDO DOCTRINES
for 2023 Bar
NOT FOR SALE
GIL MIGUEL, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS,
RESPONDENT
In sum, Murder is considered a heinous crime in so far as the GCTA Law is

concerned, and persons charged with and/or convicted of such are disqualified
from availing of the benefits of the law.
it is clear that the trial court, the appellate court, and this Court exercise
concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
However, this does not mean that parties are absolutely free to choose before
which court to file their petitions, thus:
[M]ere concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford parties absolute freedom to

choose the court with which the petition shall be filed. Petitioners should be
directed by the hierarchy of courts. After all, the hierarchy of courts 'serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitioners for the extraordinary
writs.'

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HERNANDO DOCTRINES

for 2023 Bar

RE: INCIDENT REPORT OF SECURITY DIVISION +

RE: EXPENSES OF RETIREMENT OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICES.

PHILIPPINE SINTER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL TRANSMISSION

RE: INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE ALLEGED EXTORTION ACTIVITIES OF PRESIDING

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PETITIONER, VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE

CBP (now BSP) is a corporate body performing governmental functions. Operating

One of the generally accepted principles of international law, which we have

PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. URDANETA SACRED

Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies was justified. USHH's filing of the

Re: LETTER OF MRS. MA. CRISTINA ROCO CORONA REQUESTING GRANT OF

Held: Petition is granted

No legally actionable liability attaches to the public officer by a mere

Whether this would be finally addressed by a compelling authority in the proper

Chief Justice Renato C. Corona is hereby DECLARED entitled to retirement

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. CITY OF MUNTINLUPA

In sum, the then Municipality of Muntinlupa acted without authority in passing

HERMINIO T. DISINI v. REPUBLIC

Republic is entitled to temperate and exemplary damages:

SHEILA MARIE G. UY-BELLEZA, PETITIONER, VS. THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF TACLOBAN

A passport is “a document Issued by the Philippine government to its citizens

LUFTHANSA TECHNIK PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO CUIZON +

PEDRITO R. PARAYDAY v. SHOGUN SHIPPING CO. +

ENGINEERING v. SEGUNDINO PALLE +

Generally, length of service is a measure to determine whether or not an

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. ROSARIO A. GOMEZ, RESPONDENT.

ITALKARAT 18 v. JURALDINE N. GERASMIO +

The significance of this clarification is that whenever the decision of the CA in a

JR HAULING SERVICES v. GAVINO L. SOLAMO +

it is a well-established rule that the party-litigant who alleges the existence of a

PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS v. ALMARIO C. SAN JUAN +

PEOPLE v. OLIVER IMPERIO Y ANTONIO +

Under RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority is liable for Illegal

ALLAN REGALA, PETITIONER, VS. MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

MARIA LEA JANE I. GESOLGON v. CYBERONE PH. +

The four-fold test used in determining the existence of employer employee

Based on record, petitioners were requested by respondent Mikrut to become

OMANFIL INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION & MODH AL-

EFREN SANTOS v. KING CHEF +

FERNANDO C. GOSOSO v. LEYTE LUMBER YARD

RONNIE L. SINGSON v. ARKTIS MARITIME CORP.

PEOPLE v. AVELINA MANALANG

C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT v. JIMMY G. JAICTEN

GERARDO U. VILLE, PETITIONER, VS. MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING, INC. AND/OR

It is settled rule that non-compliance with the post-employment medical

SUSAN M. BANCE v. UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANTHONY

For resignation from employment to be valid, there must be an intent to relinquish

To constitute willful breach of trust, the employee concerned must be holding a

DEL MONTE LAND TRANSPORT BUS v. RENANTE A. ARMENTA

The rules governing jurisdiction on labor standards claims, may be summed up as

FLORENCIO B. DESTRIZA, PETITIONER, VS. FAIR SHIPPING CORPORATION, ANGEL C.

It is settled that in case of disagreements between the findings of the company-

In order to be considered a seaman or seafarer, one would have to be, at the

ARLENE PALGAN v. HOLY NAME UNIVERSITY

The governing law for the employment status of teachers/professors/instructors

The following requisites before a private school teacher acquires permanent

Considering petitioner's part-time status, even if no written fixed-term contract

PHILAM HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION v. SYLVIA DE LUNA

When the employer extended the period of preventive suspension beyond 30

EMS CREW MANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES v. ERWIN C. BAUZON

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, PETITIONER, VS. NELSON C. BOOL, RESPONDENT.

Length of service cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance when the