Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR STATE
PROSECUTOR
AURELIO
TRAMPE,
PROSECUTOR
FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR
EULOGIO
MANANQUIL,
NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM,
BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the
Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS
WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON
OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO,
petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C.
TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C.
MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, Branch 103, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal
jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once more takes center
stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would reexamine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its
applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number of
similar cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked
lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where season and
circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide
public attention and excite impassioned debate, even among
laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind and

range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same

question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27,
1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim
of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a
warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No.
9010941. The warrant had issued on an information signed and
earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of
Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor
Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio
Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco
and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly
committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from
November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken
to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue,
Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the
information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following
morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody
of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen.
Edgardo Dula Torres. 3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through
counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was
followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being,
or having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in
the statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which
no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was
conducted, hence was denied due process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued
without the judge who issued it first having personally
determined the existence of probable cause. 4

The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990
and set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990. 5 On March 5,
1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the
respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had
been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator
Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio,
and raised similar questions. Said return urged that the
petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling
because-and this is putting it very simply-the information in
Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes
committed as a necessary means for the commission of
rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al.
charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the
occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise,
the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex
crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a
necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in
the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the
subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime
("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or
more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause
of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not
concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on
March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of the
same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses
provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours
from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator
Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The
Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice to a more
extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the
petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal
issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court 9 voted
against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 against
granting bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are
raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.

The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the
following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed
in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that
rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be
complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was
suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it
is not offered in his written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in
furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of
rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion
which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave
character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all
other offenses committed in its course, whether or not
necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted
against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the
doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority,
the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases
have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are
presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete
reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long
ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the
1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others,
Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which
precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a
new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the
effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the
crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which
includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which
graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty
for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be
imposed upon the offender."' 11 In thus acting, the President in
effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding
doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less than
accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful

reason against so doing.

On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the
theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application
to offenses committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be
interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other
common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in
furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the Court felt that
the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the
consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome what
appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the
complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its
course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is
made clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in
that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why
Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at
bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two
crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be
done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the
movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not
exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding
period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present,
but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the
crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. in
other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the
extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However,
under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him,
even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus,
said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the
prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the
purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a
penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the
several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the
words of Rodriguez Navarro:

La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a

que hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta
basado francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal
del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71
(later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our
Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el
caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o
cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el
otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al
delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que
represents la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando
separadamente los delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se
sancionaran los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro,
Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted
in said amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for
the graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it
does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the
acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of said
limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect
substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act
constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to
inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of
said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the
graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period,
Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a
penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each
offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent
spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more
crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less
perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and
distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime
independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of
the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is

less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each
offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the
primary ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains
binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion
with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either
as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended
effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt
or innocence is not here inquired into, much less adjudged. That
is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling
merely provides a take-off point for the disposition of other
questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints about the denial
of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information
filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense.
Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that
indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus, in
Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the
amended information against defendant-appellant Amado V.
Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described
therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly
committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the
perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged
in the aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple
rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty
imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years
of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity
with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons
amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be
allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime

that does not exist in the statute books, while technically correct
so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be
complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion
thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric.
Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed
charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the
Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been
initially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The
record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for
simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau
of Investigation, and that on the strength of said complaint a
preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent
prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the questioned
information. 14 There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to
law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense
different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if
warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary
investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the
warrant for petitioner's arrest without first personally determining
the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or
affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art.
III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has already ruled,
however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make
such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he follows
established procedure by personally evaluating the report and
the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. 16
Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one
hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the
respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to
personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary
investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what
some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to
comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had
not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single
circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In

the light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable
to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary
that the information against him should be considered as
charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable
before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct
proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from
which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this
Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or
vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal
venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional
liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to
grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct
course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a
petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by
reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after
that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review
jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not
without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief
was also available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the
Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non-existent crime
or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more
than one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper
choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious
recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the
criminal action before the respondent Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon
which petitioner has founded the present petition, whether these
went into the substance of what is charged in the information or
imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or
of the respondent Judge in dealing with the charges against
him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said
Judge and should have been brought up there instead of directly
to this Court.

There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any

of these questions was beyond the ability or competence of the
respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be
demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever
to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental
importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from
deciding them; none, in short that would justify by passing
established judicial processes designed to orderly move
litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically,
this is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court
against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court
should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction
to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an
opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that the
respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail.
Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's
recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as
the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing
where a capital offense is charged. 19 It is, in any event,
incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been
recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and
thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence
against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a
rush to this Court of other parties in a similar situation, all
apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of
the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just
outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to
the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming
directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the
outcome of the present petition, but also because to wash the
Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only
compound the delay that it has already gone through, the Court
now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the Court
cannot express too strongly the view that said petition
interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of proceedings
that should have started with the trial court and reached this

Court only if the relief appealed for was denied by the former
and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer
countenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas like the present,
that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with
the resolution of issues properly within the original competence
of the lower courts. What has thus far been stated is equally
applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses
(G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner
Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore determinable on the
same principles already set forth. Said spouses have
uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against
them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 9010941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim
in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody
and detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in
violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of
rebellion has lost that quitessentiany quixotic quality that justifies
the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by
law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country
than by lust for power and have become no better than mere
terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is
allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so
underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless
killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much
in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent
civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable to,
or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing
rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no
exception-that not even the crowded streets of our capital City
seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the
public peace and stymies every effort at national economic
recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on
rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define
and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed

thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the

umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name.
The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only
interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is
needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will
perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this
matter, which is properly within its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine
enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information
filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple
rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before
final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of
bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the
proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the
respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the
petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the
petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court
shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Medialdea, J., concurs in G.R. No. 92164 but took no part in
G.R. No. 92163.
Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 135, HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG,
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior
State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE, State Prosecutor
FERDINAND ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor
EULOGIO MANANQUIL; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law Offices for
petitioner.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion complexed with
murder 1 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
government prosecutors filed another information charging him
for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati. The second information reads:
That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmarias
Village, Makati, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having reasonable
ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo"
Honasan has committed a crime, did then and there unlawfully,
feloniously, willfully and knowingly obstruct, impede, frustrate or
delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo"
Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house.
On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to
hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest pending
personal determination by the court of probable cause, and (b)
to dismiss the case and expunge the information from the
record.

On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as

pairing judge of respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator
Enrile's Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that "there
(was) probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile
liable for violation of PD No. 1829."
On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information on the
grounds that:
(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid
of factual and legal basis; and
(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and
frustrated murder against Senator Enrile as alleged coconspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their alleged
meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the
Senator for harboring or concealing the Colonel on the same
occasion under PD 1829.
On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying
the motion for reconsideration for alleged lack of merit and
setting Senator Enrile's arraignment to May 30, 1990.
The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss
the information on the following grounds, to wit:
I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col.
Honasan in a supposed meeting on 1 December 1989 is
absorbed in, or is a component element of, the "complexed"
rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged coconspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same meeting
on 1 December 1989;
III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be
only one prosecution for all the component acts of rebellion;

IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for
alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829;
V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829. The preliminary
investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred by patent
irregularities resulting in denial of due process.
On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the respondents from conducting further proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this
Court.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner
could be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829
notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.
Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD
No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the
petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special law
while the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general
law.
The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of
People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of which
were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan
Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164,
June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to
reiterate the long standing proscription against splitting the
component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to
separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the
Hernandez case. This Court recently declared:
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the
primary ruling of the Court, which that Hernandez remains
binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion
with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either
as a means to its commission or as an unintended effect of an
activity that commutes rebellion. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not
be charged with the complex crime of rebellion for the greater

penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for

two (2) different offenses where one is a constitutive or
component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.
The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No.
1829 particularly Section 1 (c) which states:
SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum
period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos or both, shall
be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully
obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of
suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases
by committing any of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any
person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or
suspect has committed any offense under existing penal laws in
order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.
xxx xxx xxx
The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner
entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him
food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing
that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile
allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or
apprehended. And because of such failure the petitioner
prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of
Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.
The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City
were based on the affidavits executed by three (3) employees of
the Silahis International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col.
Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers
attended the mass and birthday party held at the residence of
the petitioner in the evening of December 1, 1989. The
information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads that on "or about
6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan
conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers wearing

white armed patches". The prosecution thereby concluded that:

In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col.
Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his house in the presence of
about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully armed, can be
inferred that they were co-conspirators in the failed December
coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis supplied)
As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the
rebellion charge constitute or include the very incident which
gave rise to the charge of the violation under Presidential
Decree No. 1829. Under the Department of Justice resolution
(Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only one crime of rebellion
complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder but there
could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions for
harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebels
under PD No. 1829. The splitting of component elements is
readily apparent.
The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy
with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in
conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or
concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the
crime of rebellion thus constitute a component thereof. it was
motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime
of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the
political order, as well as such common crimes as may be
committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is
the intent or motive. (p. 536)
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a
vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots.
(People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that
acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in
themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of
rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v.
Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659
[1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the
act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere

component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in

furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the
basis of a separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto 2 (80
Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be
accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of
a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation.
(Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity may be,
and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal
statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an
element of treason it becomes Identified with the latter crime
and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in
combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be
punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the
Identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or
trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because
possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in
smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be
made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction
with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a
constitutive ingredient of treason.
The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring
or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law while
the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence,
prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the
other. This argument is specious in rebellion cases.
In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory
must fail. The rationale remains the same. All crimes, whether
punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere
components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof,
become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be
isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:
This does not detract, however, from the rule that the
ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence,
are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either
separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the

Revised Penal Code. ... (People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)

The Hernandez and other related cases mention common
crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These common
crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson,
robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code.
The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however,
constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion
cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to
offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in
furtherance of the political offense.

with which the accused is charged in the present case which is

that of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is already
absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the crime of
rebellion with which the same accused is charged with other
persons in a separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty and
was convicted. (at page 662)
xxx xxx xxx

The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator

Ponce Enrile with Colonel Honasan is too intimately tied up with
his allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for practically
the same act to form two separate crimes of rebellion and
violation of PD No. 1829.
Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing
which was based on his acts of conspiring with Honasan was
committed in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and
must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and Identified
with the crime of rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of
the RPC.

[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the

accused is charged in the present case is already absorbed in
the rebellion case and so to press it further now would be to
place him in double jeopardy. (at page 663)
Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No.
83341, January 30, 1990) where the Court had the occasion to
pass upon a nearly similar issue. In this case, the petitioner
Misolas, an alleged member of the New Peoples Army (NPA),
was charged with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions in furtherance of subversion under Section 1 of PD
1866. In his motion to quash the information, the petitioner
based his arguments on the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings
on the doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion. The Court,
however, clarified, to wit:

Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence

overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes,
perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of
their character as "common" offenses, and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which they are mere
ingredients, and consequently, cannot be punished separately
from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify
the imposition of a graver penalty. (People v. Hernandez, supra,
p. 541)

... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for

the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED
WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE
BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND
FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings
of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no
application in this case.

In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused,

after having pleaded guilty and convicted of the crime of
rebellion, faced an independent prosecution for illegal
possession of firearms. The Court ruled:

The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal
possession of firearms under PD 1866 because no separate
prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 The
prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator
Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case
and charge him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and

An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime

also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with

murder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute
him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in
Makati. It should be noted that there is in fact a separate
prosecution for rebellion already filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the independent
prosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.
As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive
factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and
he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the
latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is
completely different. But if the act is committed with political or
social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should
be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being
punished separately.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried
separately under PD 1829 in addition to his being prosecuted in
the rebellion case. With this ruling, there is no need for the Court
to pass upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in
Criminal Case No. 90-777 is QUASHED. The writ of preliminary
injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their successors in
Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, from
holding the arraignment of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from
conducting further proceedings therein is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Medialdea, J., took no part.
Fernan, C.J. and Paras, J., are on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO DASIG @ KA RUBIN DAKU @ ARMAND; EDWIN
NUEZ Y TABANAS @ MABI; ALVIN DOE @ AL @ KA ALVIN;
ROGER DOE @ KA JAMES @ KA PEPE; TUDING ANDRINO
@ KA ERMI @ KA ROEL @ KA GRINGO MONTAYRE;
RUBEN DOE @ KA RUBEN @ KA JOJI @ INO ECHAVEZ;
ANASTACIO BANGKAL @ KA JUNIOR; AND CARLITO
MAGASIN @ BOBBY, accused, RODRIGO DASIG, accusedappellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Kinaadman and Archival for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CONFESSION, AS A RULE,
ADMISSIBLE; EXCEPTION; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT
BAR. The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a
confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves
that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or
promise of reward or leniency. Appellant relies on the much
abused claim that his extra-judicial confession was legally
defective and hence, should not have been admitted and
considered by the trial judge. This accusation is whimsical and
obviously a mere refuge for appellant's turnabout. In an attempt
to avoid criminal liability, he now questions the integrity of the
police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who stood by
him during the investigation. Indubitably established and now a
matter of record is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty.
Parawan who even signed the former's sworn declarations. It is
likewise a matter of record that before appellant made his extrajudicial confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to the
services of Atty. Parawan to which query he answered
affirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of force and intimidation

has not been substantiated by evidence other than his selfserving testimony. as has been pointed out, such allegation is
another naive effort of appellant to back track from his prior
voluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extrajudicial confession was done with regularity and legality.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ABSORBS THE CRIME OF
DIRECT ASSAULT WHEN DONE IN FURTHERANCE
THEREOF. The crime of rebellion consists of may acts. It is a
vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots.
Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in
themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of
rebellion. The act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that
the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or
ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the
rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.
3. ID.; ID.; NOT COVERED BY INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
LAW (R.A. 4203). The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not
applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203),
contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of
the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor
and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who
promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion.
DECISION
NOCON, J p:
Appellant, Rodrigo Dasig is now before Us to plead the reversal
of his conviction by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28,
Mandaue City finding him guilty of Murder with Direct Assault.
He was charged together with Edwin Nuez and 6 others who
are still at large, in an information which reads:
"That on or about the 4th day of August, 1987, in the city of
Mandaue, of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused,
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another,
with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of
superior strength and use of motor vehicle, all armed with
unlicensed firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Redempto Manatad, a
police officer on traffic duty, at his vital portion which caused his
death soon thereafter, knowing beforehand that the victim was a
policeman who was then in the performance of his official

duties."
Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nues entered a plea of
"not guilty." However, after the prosecution had presented its
first witness, accused Nues changed his plea of "not guilty" to
"guilty." Hence, the lower court held in abeyance the
promulgation of a judgment against said accused until the
prosecution had finished presenting its evidence. While trial was
still ongoing, Nuez died on March 10, 1989, thereby
extinguishing his criminal liability.
The facts surrounding this case show that in the afternoon of
August 4, 1987, Pfc. Redempto Manatad, Pfc. Ninah Tizon and
Pfc. Rene Catamora were tasked by their commanding officer to
assist in canning the traffic at M.N. Briones and Bonifacio
Streets in Mandaue City. Pfc. Tizon controlled the traffic lighting
facility; Pfc. Manatad manned the traffic; while Pfc. Catamora
acted as back-up and posted himself at Norkis Trading building.
At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed
eight (8) persons, one of whom he identified as Edwin Nuez,
acting suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructions
to two of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. He followed the
two, but sensing that they were being followed, they immediately
proceeded to the middle of the road and engaged Pfc.
Catamora to a gun battle. At that instant, Pfc. Catamora heard a
series of shots from the other group and thereafter saw Pfc.
Manatad sprawled on the ground. Being out-numbered and to
save his own life, Pat. Catamora sought refuge at the nearby
BIR Office from where he saw two (2) persons take Pfc.
Manatad's gun and again fired at him to make sure that he is
dead while the rest of the group including Nues acted as back
up. Thereafter, the Nues group commandeered a vehicle and
fled from the scene of the shooting. Pfc. Rene Catamora
testified that he can identify accused-appellant Nues because
of a mole at the bridge of his nose near the left eye which he
noticed when the accused passed 2 or 3 meters in front of him
together with his companions.
On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to
conduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of
the sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon
reaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin

Nues trying to escape. The team of Capt. Antonio Gorre

captured Nues and confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3
magazines and ammunitions, while the group of Sgt. Ronald
Arnejo pursued Dasig, who threw a grenade at his pursuers, but
was shot on his left upper arm and subsequently apprehended.
A .38 caliber revolver with 17 live ammunitions were confiscated
from him.
Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for treatment,
while Nues was turned over to the Metrodiscom for
investigation. Meanwhile, Dasig was interrogated by M/Sgt.
Ariston Ira of the PC Criminal Investigation Service on August
19, 1987 at his hospital bed at the Lapulapu Army Hospital in
Cebu City. Assisting Dasig during the interrogation was Atty.
Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office, who was requested
by the military to represent appellant who did not have a lawyer.
Before the start of the interrogation, Atty. Parawan asked
appellant whether he was willing to avail of his services, to
which appellant agreed. M/Sgt. Ira then appraised Dasig of his
constitutional rights. The interrogation was conducted in
Cebuano upon appellant's request.
Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nues killed
Pfc. Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and Nues were
members of the sparrow unit and the their aliases were
"Armand" and "Mabi," respectively. The extra-judicial confession
of appellant marked as Exhibit "J" 2 was signed by him on every
page thereof with the first page containing a certification likewise
signed by him, which states: "I hereby certify that the herein
statement is free and voluntary, and that I am assisted by my
counsel in the course of this investigation" followed by the
signed conformity of Atty. Parawan. The extra-judicial
confession was subscribed and sworn to before Cebu City Asst.
Fiscal Salvador Solima.
In the present appeal, Dasig contends that the procedure by
which his extra-judicial confession was taken was legally
defective, and contrary to his Constitutional rights. He further
contends that assuming he conspired in the killing of Pfc.
Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple rebellion and
not murder with direct assault.
Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was done

while he was still very sick and consequently, he could not have
fully appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a serious
offense. That even with the presence of counsel, his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence as said counsel
did not actively assist him and advise him of his rights. In effect,
his presence was merely to give a semblance of legality to the
proceedings and not to protect appellant against possible
abuses of the investigator. Dasig, likewise questions the
sincerity of Atty. Parawan in protecting his rights considering
that the latter is a known anti-Communist advocate and that the
law firm to which he belongs has represented high ranking
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
We find the argument specious. Fiscal Salvador Solima in his
certification, Exhibit "J-7-B," stated that he had personally
examined the affiant and that he is convinced that the latter's
statement was free and voluntary and that the affiant signed the
same in his presence and swore under oath as to the veracity of
everything therein. Atty. Fortunato L. Parawan also testified that
he assisted the affiant from the start of the investigation up to its
termination. Atty. Parawan testified thus:
"Q Who introduced Rodrigo Dasig to you?
A I inquired from the personnel of the hospital the whereabout of
Rodrigo Dasig and I introduced myself as a lawyer. So they
informed me the room of Rodrigo Dasig. At that time I
introduced myself as a lawyer who came to assist the person of
Rodrigo Dasig. Once we had a confrontation with Rodrigo
Dasig, I asked him whether he was willing to get me as his
lawyer in that investigation. Then he told me yes.
Q Did he tell you whether he as a counsel of his own choice?
A No.
xxx xxx xxx
Q In other words he accepted your services as counsel in
connection with that investigation which was about to be made?
A Yes.
Q Who are the persons present at that time?
A There were guards outside and inside. There was a man from
the CIS in the person of Sgt. Ira, myself and Dasig.
Q What happened after that?
A The CIS started the investigation.

Q You mean this Ariston Ira?

A Yes.
Q Before Ariston Ira conducted the investigation was Dasig
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel
and if he chooses to testify or say something, that statement of
his will be used against or in his favor in the court of justice?
A Yes. He was willing to get me as counsel in that investigation.
Q After he was informed of his constitutional rights what
transpired next?
A The investigation started.
Q Were you present at the very start of that investigation?
A Yes. I was present from the start until it was finished.
Q Was that reduced to writing?
A Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said you were present during the entire investigation.
Were the answers of the accused, Rodrigo Dasig, to the
questions propounded by the investigator voluntary?
A Yes, they voluntary.
Q After the investigation was finished what transpired next?
A After the investigation, I think that was already past 3:00 or
4:00, we proceeded to the office of the City Fiscal at F. Ramos
St., Cebu City and then we proceeded to the Office of Fiscal
Solema (sic) and then it was subscribed there before Fiscal
Solema (sic).
Q Were you present during the proceeding?
A I was also present."
We do not find any reason to doubt the factual findings and
conclusions of the trial court that the extra-judicial confession of
the appellant was voluntarily made. Said the trial court:
"The prosecution's evidence clearly shows that herein accused
during his investigation was properly informed and appraised of
his constitutional right to remain silent and to have a competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice but since
at that time he did not signify his intention to retain a lawyer of
his own choice, so he was provided with a lawyer in the person
of Atty. Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office who was
available at that time, to assist him during the custodial
investigation conducted by T/Sgt. Ariston L. Ira at his hospital

bed at Camp Lapulapu Army Station Hospital, Cebu City where

he was confined after being hit on his upper left arm and in fact,
Atty. Parawan only consented to assist herein accused after the
latter has answered in the affirmative to his question as to
whether he would be amenable to be assisted by him as his
counsel of his own choice.
"The prosecution's evidence further show that Atty. Fortunato
Parawan after consenting to be his counsel was with him when
his extra-judicial confession or sworn statement was subscribed
and sworn to by him before Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O.
Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal's Office who, before accused has
actually affixed his signature on each and every pages of his
extra-judicial confession, has informed him (accused) of his
constitutional rights and has explained the contents of his extrajudicial confession.
"Moreover, per certification made by Assistant City Fiscal
Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, clearly
shows that accused in executing the same has done so
voluntarily and after having understood the contents thereof
which is in the visayan language, a language known to him,
found on the last page thereof now marked as Exhibit "J-7-B."
"Furthermore, this sworn statement of accused Dasig is
collaborated by the sworn statement of his co-accused Edwin
Nues dated August 18, 1987 which is sworn and subscribed to
before City Fiscal Jopelinito Pareja of the city Fiscal's Office of
Cebu City."
The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is
admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was
given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of
reward or leniency. 5 The case of People of the Philippines v.
Parojinog is four square to the case at bar. In Parojinog this
court had this to say:
"Anent his claim that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice, Section
12 (1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
'Sec. 12(1). Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel he must provided with one.

These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the

presence of counsel.'
"It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a person
under investigation for the commission of an offense may
choose his own counsel but if he cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. While the initial choice
of the lawyer in the latter case is naturally lodged in the police
investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may
reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. In
the instant case, the records show that no objection was voiced
by the accused throughout the entire proceedings of the
investigation and afterwards when he subscribed to its veracity
before City Prosecutor Luzminda V. Uy. Thus, he apparently
acquiesced to the choice of the investigators. He complained for
the first time that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice only during
trial. Thus it was too late."
Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicial
confession was legally defective and hence, should not have
been admitted and considered by the trial judge. This
accusation is whimsical and obviously a mere refuge for
appellant's turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal liability, he
now questions the integrity of the police authorities and the
reputation of the lawyer who stood by him during the
investigation. Indubitably established and now a matter of record
is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty. Parawan who
even signed the former's sworn declarations. It is likewise a
matter of record that before appellant made his extra-judicial
confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to the
services of Atty. Parawan to which query he answered
affirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of fore and intimidation has
not been substantiated by evidence other than his self-serving
testimony. As has been pointed out, such allegation is another
naive effort of appellant to back track from his prior voluntary
admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial
confession was done with regularity and legality.
Nevertheless, there is merit in appellant's argument that
granting he is guilty, what he committed was a political crime of
simple rebellion, and hence he should not be convicted of
murder with direct assault.

The Solicitor General agrees with the accused-appellant on this

point as manifested in the People's brief, which We quote:
"However, as correctly pointed by appellant, the lower court
erroneously convicted him of Murder with Assault Upon a
Person in Authority, instead of Rebellion.
"Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the
government, among other means. (Article 135, Revised Penal
Code). In this case, appellant not only confessed voluntarily his
membership with the sparrow unit but also his participation and
that of his group in the killing of Pfc. Manatad while manning the
traffic in Mandaue City in the afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is of
judicial notice that the sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of
the New People's Army with the objective of overthrowing the
duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to
comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a
means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA.
Consequently, appellant is liable for the crime of rebellion, not
murder with direct assault upon a person in authority."
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast
movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts
committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in
themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of
rebellion. 9 The act of killing a police officer, knowing too well
that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or
ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the
rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.
Moreover, in the case of People v. Mangallan 10 We held that
where the accused who was charged with murder admitted his
membership with the NPA and the killing of a suspected PC
informer, the crime committed is not murder but rebellion
punishable under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal
Code.
As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law is not applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2,
R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General.
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any
person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion.
However, in the case at bar, there is no evidence to prove that

appellant Dasig headed the crime committed. As a matter of fact

he was not specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as the
person giving instructions to the group which attacked Pfc.
Manatad.
Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just
executed the command of an unknown leader. Hence, he
should be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight
(8) years of prision mayor. For the resulting death, appellant is
likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Pfc. Manatad FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.
Premises considered, We uphold the findings of the trial court
that the extra-judicial confession was legally obtained. However,
appellant being a confessed member of the sparrow unit, the
liquidation squad of the New People's Army whose objective is
to overthrow the duly constituted government, the crime
committed is simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.
WHEREFORE, accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of
participating in an act of rebellion beyond reasonable doubt and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
eight (8) years of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc.
Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO DASIG @ KA RUBIN DAKU @ ARMAND; EDWIN
NUEZ Y TABANAS @ MABI; ALVIN DOE @ AL @ KA ALVIN;
ROGER DOE @ KA JAMES @ KA PEPE; TUDING ANDRINO
@ KA ERMI @ KA ROEL @ KA GRINGO MONTAYRE;
RUBEN DOE @ KA RUBEN @ KA JOJI @ INO ECHAVEZ;
ANASTACIO BANGKAL @ KA JUNIOR; AND CARLITO
MAGASIN @ BOBBY, accused, RODRIGO DASIG, accusedappellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Kinaadman and Archival for accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CONFESSION, AS A RULE,
ADMISSIBLE; EXCEPTION; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT
BAR. The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a
confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves
that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or
promise of reward or leniency. Appellant relies on the much
abused claim that his extra-judicial confession was legally
defective and hence, should not have been admitted and
considered by the trial judge. This accusation is whimsical and
obviously a mere refuge for appellant's turnabout. In an attempt
to avoid criminal liability, he now questions the integrity of the
police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who stood by
him during the investigation. Indubitably established and now a
matter of record is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty.
Parawan who even signed the former's sworn declarations. It is
likewise a matter of record that before appellant made his extrajudicial confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to the
services of Atty. Parawan to which query he answered
affirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of force and intimidation
has not been substantiated by evidence other than his selfserving testimony. as has been pointed out, such allegation is
another naive effort of appellant to back track from his prior
voluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extrajudicial confession was done with regularity and legality.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ABSORBS THE CRIME OF
DIRECT ASSAULT WHEN DONE IN FURTHERANCE
THEREOF. The crime of rebellion consists of may acts. It is a
vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots.
Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in
themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of
rebellion. The act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that
the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or
ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the
rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.
3. ID.; ID.; NOT COVERED BY INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
LAW (R.A. 4203). The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not
applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203),

contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of

the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor
and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who
promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion.
DECISION
NOCON, J p:
Appellant, Rodrigo Dasig is now before Us to plead the reversal
of his conviction by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28,
Mandaue City finding him guilty of Murder with Direct Assault.
He was charged together with Edwin Nuez and 6 others who
are still at large, in an information which reads:
"That on or about the 4th day of August, 1987, in the city of
Mandaue, of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused,
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another,
with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of
superior strength and use of motor vehicle, all armed with
unlicensed firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Redempto Manatad, a
police officer on traffic duty, at his vital portion which caused his
death soon thereafter, knowing beforehand that the victim was a
policeman who was then in the performance of his official
duties."
Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nues entered a plea of
"not guilty." However, after the prosecution had presented its
first witness, accused Nues changed his plea of "not guilty" to
"guilty." Hence, the lower court held in abeyance the
promulgation of a judgment against said accused until the
prosecution had finished presenting its evidence. While trial was
still ongoing, Nuez died on March 10, 1989, thereby
extinguishing his criminal liability.
The facts surrounding this case show that in the afternoon of
August 4, 1987, Pfc. Redempto Manatad, Pfc. Ninah Tizon and
Pfc. Rene Catamora were tasked by their commanding officer to
assist in canning the traffic at M.N. Briones and Bonifacio
Streets in Mandaue City. Pfc. Tizon controlled the traffic lighting
facility; Pfc. Manatad manned the traffic; while Pfc. Catamora
acted as back-up and posted himself at Norkis Trading building.
At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed
eight (8) persons, one of whom he identified as Edwin Nuez,

acting suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructions

to two of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. He followed the
two, but sensing that they were being followed, they immediately
proceeded to the middle of the road and engaged Pfc.
Catamora to a gun battle. At that instant, Pfc. Catamora heard a
series of shots from the other group and thereafter saw Pfc.
Manatad sprawled on the ground. Being out-numbered and to
save his own life, Pat. Catamora sought refuge at the nearby
BIR Office from where he saw two (2) persons take Pfc.
Manatad's gun and again fired at him to make sure that he is
dead while the rest of the group including Nues acted as back
up. Thereafter, the Nues group commandeered a vehicle and
fled from the scene of the shooting. Pfc. Rene Catamora
testified that he can identify accused-appellant Nues because
of a mole at the bridge of his nose near the left eye which he
noticed when the accused passed 2 or 3 meters in front of him
together with his companions.
On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to
conduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of
the sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon
reaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin
Nues trying to escape. The team of Capt. Antonio Gorre
captured Nues and confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3
magazines and ammunitions, while the group of Sgt. Ronald
Arnejo pursued Dasig, who threw a grenade at his pursuers, but
was shot on his left upper arm and subsequently apprehended.
A .38 caliber revolver with 17 live ammunitions were confiscated
from him.
Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for treatment,
while Nues was turned over to the Metrodiscom for
investigation. Meanwhile, Dasig was interrogated by M/Sgt.
Ariston Ira of the PC Criminal Investigation Service on August
19, 1987 at his hospital bed at the Lapulapu Army Hospital in
Cebu City. Assisting Dasig during the interrogation was Atty.
Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office, who was requested
by the military to represent appellant who did not have a lawyer.
Before the start of the interrogation, Atty. Parawan asked
appellant whether he was willing to avail of his services, to
which appellant agreed. M/Sgt. Ira then appraised Dasig of his

constitutional rights. The interrogation was conducted in

Cebuano upon appellant's request.
Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nues killed
Pfc. Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and Nues were
members of the sparrow unit and the their aliases were
"Armand" and "Mabi," respectively. The extra-judicial confession
of appellant marked as Exhibit "J" 2 was signed by him on every
page thereof with the first page containing a certification likewise
signed by him, which states: "I hereby certify that the herein
statement is free and voluntary, and that I am assisted by my
counsel in the course of this investigation" followed by the
signed conformity of Atty. Parawan. The extra-judicial
confession was subscribed and sworn to before Cebu City Asst.
Fiscal Salvador Solima.
In the present appeal, Dasig contends that the procedure by
which his extra-judicial confession was taken was legally
defective, and contrary to his Constitutional rights. He further
contends that assuming he conspired in the killing of Pfc.
Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple rebellion and
not murder with direct assault.
Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was done
while he was still very sick and consequently, he could not have
fully appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a serious
offense. That even with the presence of counsel, his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence as said counsel
did not actively assist him and advise him of his rights. In effect,
his presence was merely to give a semblance of legality to the
proceedings and not to protect appellant against possible
abuses of the investigator. Dasig, likewise questions the
sincerity of Atty. Parawan in protecting his rights considering
that the latter is a known anti-Communist advocate and that the
law firm to which he belongs has represented high ranking
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
We find the argument specious. Fiscal Salvador Solima in his
certification, Exhibit "J-7-B," stated that he had personally
examined the affiant and that he is convinced that the latter's
statement was free and voluntary and that the affiant signed the
same in his presence and swore under oath as to the veracity of
everything therein. Atty. Fortunato L. Parawan also testified that

he assisted the affiant from the start of the investigation up to its

termination. Atty. Parawan testified thus:
"Q Who introduced Rodrigo Dasig to you?
A I inquired from the personnel of the hospital the whereabout of
Rodrigo Dasig and I introduced myself as a lawyer. So they
informed me the room of Rodrigo Dasig. At that time I
introduced myself as a lawyer who came to assist the person of
Rodrigo Dasig. Once we had a confrontation with Rodrigo
Dasig, I asked him whether he was willing to get me as his
lawyer in that investigation. Then he told me yes.
Q Did he tell you whether he as a counsel of his own choice?
A No.
xxx xxx xxx
Q In other words he accepted your services as counsel in
connection with that investigation which was about to be made?
A Yes.
Q Who are the persons present at that time?
A There were guards outside and inside. There was a man from
the CIS in the person of Sgt. Ira, myself and Dasig.
Q What happened after that?
A The CIS started the investigation.
Q You mean this Ariston Ira?
A Yes.
Q Before Ariston Ira conducted the investigation was Dasig
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel
and if he chooses to testify or say something, that statement of
his will be used against or in his favor in the court of justice?
A Yes. He was willing to get me as counsel in that investigation.
Q After he was informed of his constitutional rights what
transpired next?
A The investigation started.
Q Were you present at the very start of that investigation?
A Yes. I was present from the start until it was finished.
Q Was that reduced to writing?
A Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said you were present during the entire investigation.
Were the answers of the accused, Rodrigo Dasig, to the
questions propounded by the investigator voluntary?

A Yes, they voluntary.

Q After the investigation was finished what transpired next?
A After the investigation, I think that was already past 3:00 or
4:00, we proceeded to the office of the City Fiscal at F. Ramos
St., Cebu City and then we proceeded to the Office of Fiscal
Solema (sic) and then it was subscribed there before Fiscal
Solema (sic).
Q Were you present during the proceeding?
A I was also present."
We do not find any reason to doubt the factual findings and
conclusions of the trial court that the extra-judicial confession of
the appellant was voluntarily made. Said the trial court:
"The prosecution's evidence clearly shows that herein accused
during his investigation was properly informed and appraised of
his constitutional right to remain silent and to have a competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice but since
at that time he did not signify his intention to retain a lawyer of
his own choice, so he was provided with a lawyer in the person
of Atty. Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office who was
available at that time, to assist him during the custodial
investigation conducted by T/Sgt. Ariston L. Ira at his hospital
bed at Camp Lapulapu Army Station Hospital, Cebu City where
he was confined after being hit on his upper left arm and in fact,
Atty. Parawan only consented to assist herein accused after the
latter has answered in the affirmative to his question as to
whether he would be amenable to be assisted by him as his
counsel of his own choice.
"The prosecution's evidence further show that Atty. Fortunato
Parawan after consenting to be his counsel was with him when
his extra-judicial confession or sworn statement was subscribed
and sworn to by him before Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O.
Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal's Office who, before accused has
actually affixed his signature on each and every pages of his
extra-judicial confession, has informed him (accused) of his
constitutional rights and has explained the contents of his extrajudicial confession.
"Moreover, per certification made by Assistant City Fiscal
Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, clearly
shows that accused in executing the same has done so

voluntarily and after having understood the contents thereof

which is in the visayan language, a language known to him,
found on the last page thereof now marked as Exhibit "J-7-B."
"Furthermore, this sworn statement of accused Dasig is
collaborated by the sworn statement of his co-accused Edwin
Nues dated August 18, 1987 which is sworn and subscribed to
before City Fiscal Jopelinito Pareja of the city Fiscal's Office of
Cebu City."
The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is
admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was
given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of
reward or leniency. 5 The case of People of the Philippines v.
Parojinog is four square to the case at bar. In Parojinog this
court had this to say:
"Anent his claim that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice, Section
12 (1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
'Sec. 12(1). Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel he must provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.'
"It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a person
under investigation for the commission of an offense may
choose his own counsel but if he cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. While the initial choice
of the lawyer in the latter case is naturally lodged in the police
investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may
reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. In
the instant case, the records show that no objection was voiced
by the accused throughout the entire proceedings of the
investigation and afterwards when he subscribed to its veracity
before City Prosecutor Luzminda V. Uy. Thus, he apparently
acquiesced to the choice of the investigators. He complained for
the first time that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice only during
trial. Thus it was too late."
Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicial
confession was legally defective and hence, should not have

been admitted and considered by the trial judge. This

accusation is whimsical and obviously a mere refuge for
appellant's turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal liability, he
now questions the integrity of the police authorities and the
reputation of the lawyer who stood by him during the
investigation. Indubitably established and now a matter of record
is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty. Parawan who
even signed the former's sworn declarations. It is likewise a
matter of record that before appellant made his extra-judicial
confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to the
services of Atty. Parawan to which query he answered
affirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of fore and intimidation has
not been substantiated by evidence other than his self-serving
testimony. As has been pointed out, such allegation is another
naive effort of appellant to back track from his prior voluntary
admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial
confession was done with regularity and legality.
Nevertheless, there is merit in appellant's argument that
granting he is guilty, what he committed was a political crime of
simple rebellion, and hence he should not be convicted of
murder with direct assault.
The Solicitor General agrees with the accused-appellant on this
point as manifested in the People's brief, which We quote:
"However, as correctly pointed by appellant, the lower court
erroneously convicted him of Murder with Assault Upon a
Person in Authority, instead of Rebellion.
"Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the
government, among other means. (Article 135, Revised Penal
Code). In this case, appellant not only confessed voluntarily his
membership with the sparrow unit but also his participation and
that of his group in the killing of Pfc. Manatad while manning the
traffic in Mandaue City in the afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is of
judicial notice that the sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of
the New People's Army with the objective of overthrowing the
duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to
comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a
means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA.
Consequently, appellant is liable for the crime of rebellion, not
murder with direct assault upon a person in authority."

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast

movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts
committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in
themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of
rebellion. 9 The act of killing a police officer, knowing too well
that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or
ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the
rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.
Moreover, in the case of People v. Mangallan 10 We held that
where the accused who was charged with murder admitted his
membership with the NPA and the killing of a suspected PC
informer, the crime committed is not murder but rebellion
punishable under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal
Code.
As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law is not applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2,
R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General.
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any
person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion.
However, in the case at bar, there is no evidence to prove that
appellant Dasig headed the crime committed. As a matter of fact
he was not specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as the
person giving instructions to the group which attacked Pfc.
Manatad.
Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just
executed the command of an unknown leader. Hence, he
should be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight
(8) years of prision mayor. For the resulting death, appellant is
likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Pfc. Manatad FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.
Premises considered, We uphold the findings of the trial court
that the extra-judicial confession was legally obtained. However,
appellant being a confessed member of the sparrow unit, the
liquidation squad of the New People's Army whose objective is
to overthrow the duly constituted government, the crime
committed is simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.
WHEREFORE, accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of
participating in an act of rebellion beyond reasonable doubt and

is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of

eight (8) years of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc.
Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 112235 November 29, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIAS LOVEDIORO y CASTRO, defendant-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along
Burgos St., away from the Daraga, Albay Public Market when a
man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from
his waist, aimed the gun at the policeman's right ear and fired.
The man who shot Lucilo had three other companions with him,
one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on
the ground. After taking the latter's gun, the man and his
companions boarded a tricycle and fled. 1
The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine
meters by Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old welder from Pilar,
Sorsogon, who claimed that he knew both the victim and the
man who fired the fatal shot. Armenta identified the man who
fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his nephew
(appellant's father was his first cousin) and alleged that he knew
the victim from the fact that the latter was a resident of
Bagumbayan.
Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple
gunshot wounds on the face, the chest, and other parts of the
body. 2 On autopsy, the municipal health officer established the
cause of death as hypovolemic shock. 3
As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor of
Albay, on November 6, 1992 filed an Information charging
accused-appellant Elias Lovedioro y Castro of the crime of
Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30
o'clock in the afternoon, at Burgos Street, Municipality of
Daraga, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,

together with Gilberto Longasa, who is already charged in Crim.
Case No. 5931 before RTC, Branch I, and three (3) others
whose true identities are at present unknown and remain at
large, conniving, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another for a common purpose, armed with firearms, with intent
to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire and shoot one
SPO3 JESUS LUCILO, a member of the Daraga Police Station,
inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds causing his
death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. The
dispositive portion of said decision, dated September 24, 1993
states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this
Court finds the accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal, acting in conspiracy with his coaccused who are still at large, of the crime of murder, defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua with all the accessories provided by law; to pay the
heirs of the deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow,
Mrs. Remeline Lucilo, the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos representing the civil indemnity for death; to
pay the said widow the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00)
Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and to pay the
said widow the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred EightyEight (P18,588.00) Pesos, representing actual damages,
without subsidiary imprisonment however, in case of insolvency
on the part of the said accused.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant appeal, in which the sole issue interposed is
that portion of trial court decision finding him guilty of the crime
of murder and not rebellion.
Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's principal
witness, Nestor Armenta, as supporting his claim that he should
have been charged with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his

Brief, he asseverates that Armenta, a police informer, identified

him as a member of the New People's Army. Additionally, he
contends that because the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in
furtherance of subversive ends," 4 (said killing) should have
been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts. 134
and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he did
not fire the fatal shot but merely acted as a look-out in the
liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he should have been charged
merely as a participant in the commission of the crime of
rebellion under paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code and should therefore have been meted only the penalty of
prison mayor by the lower court.
Asserting that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the
crime of murder, the Solicitor General avers that the crime
committed by appellant may be considered as rebellion only if
the defense itself had conclusively proven that the motive or
intent for the killing of the policeman was for "political and
subversive ends." 5 Moreover, the Solicitor General contends
that even if appellant were to be convicted of rebellion, and even
if the trial court had found appellant guilty merely of being a
participant in a rebellion, the proper imposable penalty is not
prision mayor as appellant contends, but reclusion temporal,
because Executive Order No. 187 as amended by Republic Act
No. 6968, the Coup D'etat Law, prescribes reclusion temporal
as the penalty imposable for individuals found guilty as
participants in a rebellion.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the crime committed
was murder and not rebellion.
Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 6968, rebellion is committed in the following
manner:
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for
the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government
or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any
part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature wholly or
partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. 6
The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public
uprising against the government. 7 By its very nature, rebellion is

essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd

action, which cannot be confined a priori within predetermined
bounds. 8 One aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion
is that other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law,
absorbed in the crime itself because they acquire a political
character. This peculiarity was underscored in the case of
People v. Hernandez, 9 thus:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the
political order, as well as such common crimes as may be
committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is
the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like
homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance "to the Government the territory of the Philippine
Islands or any part thereof," then it becomes stripped of its
"common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of
the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character
of the latter.
Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act,
however grave, assumes a different color by being absorbed in
the crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the
crime of murder. In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion,
not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain
whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end.
The political motive of the act should be conclusively
demonstrated.
In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls
on the defense, motive, being a state of mind which the
accused, better than any individual, knows. Thus, in People v.
Gempes, 10 this court stressed that:
Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accused's)
knowledge and since moreover this is an affirmative defense,
the burden is on them to prove, or at least to state, which they
could easily do personally or through witnesses, that they killed
the deceased in furtherance of the resistance movement.
From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that
the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and
overt acts are essential components of the crime. With either of
these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not
exist. In fact, even in cases where the act complained of were

committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion,

if the killing, robbing, or etc., were accomplished for private
purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it has been
held that the crime would be separately punishable as a
common crime and would not be absorbed by the crime
rebellion. 11
Clearly, political motive should be established before a person
charged with a common crime alleging rebellion in order to
lessen the possible imposable penalty could benefit from the
law's relatively benign attitude towards political crimes.
Instructive in this regard is the case of Enrile v.
Amin, 12 where the prosecution sought to charge Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile with violation of P.D. No. 1829, 13 for allegedly
harboring or concealing in his home Col. Gregorio Honasan in
spite of the senator's knowledge that Honasan might have
committed a crime. This Court held, against the prosecution's
contention, that rebellion and violation of P.D 1829 could be
tried separately 14 (on the principle that rebellion is based on the
Revised Penal Code while P.D. 1829 is a special law), that the
act for which the senator was being charged, though punishable
under a special law, was absorbed in the crime of rebellion
being motivated by, and related to the acts for which he was
charged in Enrile vs. Salazar (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164) a
case decided on June 5, 1990. Ruling in favor of Senator Enrile
and holding that the prosecution for violation of P.D. No. 1829
cannot prosper because a separate prosecution for rebellion
had already been filed and in fact decided, the Court said:
The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however
constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion
cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to
offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in
furtherance of the political offense. 15
Noting the importance of purpose in cases of rebellion the court
in Enrile vs. Amin further underscored that:
[I]ntent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is
not charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed
Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and
former associate, the motive for the act is completely different.
But if the act is committed with political or social motives, that is

in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part

of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.
It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and
proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime
and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the
act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the
furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.
The similarity of some of the factual circumstances of People v.
Ompad, Jr., 16 to the instant case is striking. Two witnesses,
both former NPA recruits identified the accused Ompad, alias
"Commander Brando," a known hitman of the NPA, as having
led three other members of the NPA in the liquidation of Dionilo
Barlaan, a military informer, also in a rebel infested area. In
spite of his notoriety as an NPA hitman, Ompad was merely
charged with and convicted of murder, not rebellion because
political motive was neither alleged nor proved.
As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act
committed was impelled by a political motive lies on the
accused. Political motive must be alleged in the information. 17 It
must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence. In
People v. Paz and Tica we held:
That the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter
of mitigation or defense that the accused has the burden of
proving clearly and satisfactorily. The lone uncorroborated
assertion of appellant that his superiors told him of Dayrit being
an informer, and his suspicion that he was one such, is neither
sufficient or adequate to establish that the motivation for the
killing was political, considering appellant's obvious interest in
testifying to that effect. 18
Similarly, in People v. Buco, 19 the Court stressed that accused
in that case failed to establish that the reason for the killing of
their victim was to further or carry out rebellion. The evidence
adduced by the defense therein simply showed that appellant
Francisco Buco was ordered by Tomas Calma, alias
"Commander Sol" to kill municipal mayor Conrado G. Dizon.
However, the evidence likewise showed that Calma was
induced by an acquaintance, a civilian, to order the killing on
account of private differences over a ninety (90) hectare piece of
land. The court attributed no political motive for the killing,

though committed by known members of the Hukbalahap

movement. 20
People v. Dasig 21 has a factual milieu almost similar to the
instant case. There, the Court held that "the act of killing a
police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in
authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an
act done in furtherance of a rebellion." In Dasig the Court
however noted that the accused, who was charged with murder,
not only admitted his membership with the NPA but also
executed an extrajudicial confession to the effect that he was a
member of an NPA "sparrow unit," a fact to which even the
Solicitor General, in his brief therein was in agreement. The
Solicitor General's brief in Dasig which this Court favorably
quoted, noted that:
[T]he sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's
Army with the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted
government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the
killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in
furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA. 22
By contrast, the Solicitor General vigorously argues for a
different result in the case at bench. He states that accusedappellant's belated claims to membership in the NPA were not
only insubstantial but also self serving 23 an averment to which,
given a thorough review of the circumstances of the case, we
fully agree. He states:
[In the case cited] the appellants, admittedly members of the
NPA, clearly overcame the burden of proving motive or intent. It
was shown that the political motivation for the killing of the victim
was the fact that Ragaul was suspected as an informer for the
PC. The perpetrators even left a letter card, a drawing on the
body of Ragaul as a warning to others not to follow his example.
It is entirely different in the case at bar where the evidence for
the appellant merely contains self-serving assertions and
denials not substantial enough as an indicia of political
motivation in the killing of victim SPO3 Jesus Lucilo. 24
In the case at bench, the appellant, assisted by counsel,
admitted in his extrajudicial confession to having participated in
the killing of Lucilo as follows:
Q What was that incident if any, please narrate?

A July 27, 1992 at more or less 12:00 noon. I am at home, three

male person a certain alias ALWIN, ALIAS SAMUEL and the
other one unknown to me, fetched me and told me to go with
them, so I asked them where, Alwin handed me a hand gun and
same he stopped/call a passenger jeepney and told me board
on said jeepney. (sic)
Q Please continue.
A Upon reaching Daraga, Albay fronting Petron Gasoline
Station, we alighted on said jeep, so we walk towards Daraga
Bakery we stopped walking due to it is raining, when the rain
stopped we continue walking by using the road near the bakery.
(sic)
Q When you reached Daraga bakery, as you have said in Q. 7
you used the road near the bakery where did you proceed?
A I am not familiar with that place, but I and my companion
continue walking, at more less 4:30 P.M. July 27, 1992 one of
my companion told us as to quote in Bicol dialect, to wit: "AMO
NA YADI AN TINAMPO PALUWAS" (This is the place towards
the poblacion), so, I placed myself just ahead of a small store,
my three (3) companions continue walking towards poblacion,
later on a policeman sporting white T-shirt and a khaki pant was
walking towards me, while the said policeman is nearly
approaching me, ALWIN shot the said policeman in front of the
small store, when the said policeman fell on the asphalted road,
ALWIN took the service firearm of the said policeman, then we
ran towards the subdivision, then my two (2) companions
commanded a tricycle then we fled until we reached a hill
wherein there is a small bridge, thereafter Ka Samuel took the
handgun that was handed to me by them at Pilar, Sorsogon.
(sic)
Q Do you know the policeman that was killed by your
companion?
A I just came to know his name when I reached home and heard
it radio, that he is JESUS LUCILO. (sic)
Q What is your participation in the group?
A Look-out sir.
Q I have nothing more to asked you what else, if there is any?
(sic)
A No more sir. 25

It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire extrajudicial

confession did appellant ever mention that he was a member of
the New People's Army. A thorough reading of the same reveals
nothing which would suggest that the killing in which he was a
participant was motivated by a political purpose. Moreover, the
information filed against appellant, based on sworn statements,
did not contain any mention or allusion as to the involvement of
the NPA in the death of SPO3 Lucilo. 26 Even prosecution
eyewitness Nestor Armenta did not mention the NPA in his
sworn statement of October 19, 1992. 27
As the record would show, allegations relating to appellant's
membership in the NPA surfaced almost merely as an
afterthought, something which the defense merely picked up
and followed through upon prosecution eyewitness Armenta's
testimony on cross-examination that he knew appellant to be a
member of the NPA. Interestingly, however, in the same
testimony, Armenta admitted that he was "forced" to pinpoint
appellant as an NPA member. 28 The logical result, of course,
was that the trial court did not give any weight and credence to
said testimony. The trial court, after all, had the prerogative of
rejecting only a part of a witness' testimony while upholding the
rest of it. 29 While disbelieving the portion of Armenta's testimony
on appellant's alleged membership in the NPA, the trial court
correctly gave credence to his unflawed narration about how the
crime was committed. 30 Such narration is even corroborated in
its pertinent portions, except as to the identity of the gun wielder,
by the testimony of the appellant himself.
In any case, appellant's claim regarding the political color
attending the commission of the crime being a matter of
defense, its viability depends on his sole and unsupported
testimony. He testified that, upon the prodding of alias Alwin and
alias Samuel, he joined the NPA because of the organization's
goals. 31 He claimed that his two companions shot Lucilo
because he "had offended our organization," 32 without,
however, specifying what the "offense" was. Appellant claimed
that he had been a member of the NPA for five months before
the shooting incident. 33
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant's
contentions are couched in terms so general and non-specific 34

that they offer no explanation as to what contribution the killing

would have made towards the achievement of the NPA's
subversive aims. SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a mere policeman, was
never alleged to be an informer. No acts of his were specifically
shown to have offended the NPA. Against appellant's attempts
to shade his participation in the killing with a political color, the
evidence on record leaves the impression that appellant's bare
allegations of membership in the NPA was conveniently infused
to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him. It is of judicial notice
that in many NPA infested areas, crimes have been all-tooquickly attributed to the furtherance of an ideology or under the
cloak of political color for the purpose of mitigating the
imposable penalty when in fact they are no more than ordinary
crimes perpetrated by common criminals. In Baylosis v. Chavez,
Jr., Chief Justice Narvasa aptly observed:
The existence of rebellious groups in our society today, and of
numerous bandits, or irresponsible or deranged individuals, is a
reality that cannot be ignored or belittled. Their activities, the
killings and acts of destruction and terrorism that they
perpetrate, unfortunately continue unabated despite the best
efforts that the Government authorities are exerting, although it
may be true that the insurrectionist groups of the right or the left
no longer pose a genuine threat to the security of the state. The
need for more stringent laws and more rigorous lawenforcement, cannot be gainsaid. 35
In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a
political motive for the killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, we are
satisfied that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the
crime of murder. 36 It is of no moment that a single eyewitness,
Nestor Armenta, sealed his fate, for it is settled that the
testimony of one witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to
convict. 37 Against appellant's claims that he acted merely as a
look-out, the testimony of one witness, his blood relative, free
from any signs of impropriety or falsehood, was sufficient to
convict the accused. 38 Moreover, neither may lack of motive be
availing to exculpate the appellant. Lack or absence of motive
for committing a crime does not preclude conviction, there being
a reliable eyewitness who fully and satisfactorily identified
appellant as the perpetrator of the felony. 39 In the case at

bench, the strength of the prosecution's case was furthermore

bolstered by accused-appellant's admission in open court that
he and the eyewitness, his own uncle, bore no grudges against
each other. 40
Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below.
The attack delivered by appellant was sudden, and without
warning of any kind. 41 The killing having been qualified by
treachery, the crime committed is murder under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, the trial court was correct in
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with all the
accessories provided by law.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's
decision dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of
Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17748
March 4, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiffappellee,
vs.
GRACIANO L. CABRERA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Vicente Sotto for appellants. Acting Attorney-General Tuason
for appellee
MALCOLM, J.:
As one outcome of the tumultous uprising of certain members of
the Philippine Constabulary to inflict revenge upon the police of
the city of Manila, charges of sedition were filed in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila against the participants in the
public disturbance. Convicted in the trial court of a violation of
Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, and sentenced either
to the maximum penalty or a near approach to the maximum
penalty provided by the punitive provisions of that law, all of the
defendants have perfected an appeal to this court. A statement
of the case and of the facts, an opinion on the pertinent issues,
and a judgement, if no reversible error be found, regarding the
appropriate penalty, will be taken up in the order named.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS
On December 13, 1920, policemen of the city of Manila arrested
a woman who was a member of the household of a
Constabulary soldier stationed at the Santa Lucia Barracks in
this city. The arrest of the woman was considered by some of
the Constabulary soldiers as an outrage committed by the
policemen, and it instantly gave rise to friction between
members of Manila police department and member of the
Philippine Constabulary.
The next day, December 14, at about sunset, a policemen
named Artemio Mojica, posted on Calle Real, in the District of
Intramuros, city of Manila, had an encounter with various
Constabulary soldiers which resulted in the shooting of private
Macasinag of the Constabulary. Private Macasinag was
seriously, and as afterwards appeared, mortally wounded.

The encounter between policemen Mojica and other

companions of the Manila force and private Macasinag and
other companions of the Constabulary, with its grave
consequences for a Constabulary soldier endangered a deep
feeling of resentment on the part of the soldiers at Santa Lucia
Barracks. This resentment was soon converted into a desire for
revenge against the police force of the city of Manila. The
officers of the Constabulary appear to have been aware of the
state of excitement among the soldiers the shooting of private
Macasinag, Captain Page, the commanding officer of the
Barracks, increased the number of guards, and confined all the
soldiers in the Barracks.
During the afternoon of the next day, December 15, 1920, a
rumor spread among the soldiers in Santa Lucia Barracks to the
effect that policeman Mojica was allowed to continue on duty on
the streets of Intramuros and that private Macasinag had died
as a consequence of the shot he received the night before. This
rumor contributed in no small degree in precipitating a
movement for reprisal by the Constabulary soldiers against the
policemen.
At about 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day, December
15, 1920, corporal Ingles of the Fourth Company approached
private Nicolas Torio who was then the man in charge of
quarters, and asked him to let the soldiers out through the
window of the quarters of the Fourth Company. Private Torio
was easily persuaded to permit private Francisco Garcia of the
Second Company to saw out the window bars of the quarters, in
his charge, and to allow soldiers to escape through the window
with rifles and ammunition under the command of their
sergeants and corporals. When outside of the quarters, these
soldiers divided into groups for attack upon the city police force.
One platoon of Constabulary soldiers apparently numbering
about ten or twelve, on Calle Real, Intramuros, fired in the
direction of the intersection of Calles Real and Cabildo where an
American policeman named Driskill was stationed, and was
taking with a friend named Jacumin, a field clerk in the United
States Army. These two men were shot and died soon
afterwards. To the credit of policeman Driskill be it said, that
although in a dying condition and in the face of overwhelming

odds, her valiantly returned the fire with his revolver. Jacumin
was killed notwithstanding that in response to the command of
Constabulary, "Hands up!," he elevated both arms.
A street car happened to stop at this time at the corner of Calles
Real and Cabildo. Without considering that the passengers in
the car were innocent passersby, the Constabulary squad fired
a volley into the car, killing instantly the passenger named Victor
de Torres and gravely wounding three other civilian passengers,
Gregorio Cailes, Vicente Antonio, and Mariano Cortes. Father
Jose Tahon, a priest of the Cathedral of Manila, proved himself
a hero on this occasion for, against the command of the
Constabulary, he persisted in persuading them to cease firing
and advanced in order that he might administer spiritual aid to
those who had been wounded.
The firing on Calle Real did not end at that time. Some minutes
later, Captain William E. Wichman, assistant chief of police of
the city of Manila, riding in a motorcycle driven by policeman
Saplala, arrived at the corner of Calles Real and Magallanes in
Intramuros, and a volley of shorts by Constabulary soldiers
resulted in the instantaneous death of Captain Wichman and the
death shortly afterwards of patrolman Saplala.
About the same time, a police patrol came from the Meisic
police station. When it was on Calle Real near Cabildo, in
Intramuros, it was fired upon by Constabulary soldiers who had
stationed themselves in the courtyard of the San Agustin
Church. This attack resulted in the death of patrolmen Trogue
and Sison.
Another platoon of the Constabulary, between thirty and forty in
number, had in the meantime, arranged themselves in a firing
line on the Sunken Gradens on the east side of Calle General
Luna opposite the Aquarium. From this advantageous position
the Constabulary fired upon the motorcycle occupied by
Sergeant Armada and driven by policeman Policarpio who with
companions were passing along Calle General Luna in front of
the Aquarium going in the direction, of Calle Real, Intramuros.
As a result of the shooting, the driver of the motorcycle,
policeman Policarpio, was mortally wounded. This same platoon
of Constabulary soldiers fired several volleys indiscriminately
into the Luneta police station, and the office of the secret service

of the city of Manila across Calles General Luna and Padre

Burgos, but fortunately no one was injured.
General Rafael Crame, Chief of the Constabulary, and Captain
Page, commanding officer of the Santa Lucia Barracks, and
other soldiers in the streets of Manila, and other soldiers one
after another returned to the Barracks where they were
disarmed. No list of the names of these soldiers was, however,
made.
In the morning of the next day, December 16, 1920, Colonel,
Lucien R. Sweet of the Constabulary officers, and later by the
fiscals of the city of Manila, commenced an investigation of the
events of the night before. He first ordered that all the soldiers in
Santa Lucia Barracks at that time, numbering some one
hundred and eighty, be assembled on the parade ground and
when this was done, the soldiers were separated into their
respective companies. Then Colonel Sweet, speaking in English
with the assistance of Captain Silvino Gallardo, who interpreted
his remarks into Tagalog, made to all of the soldiers two
statements.
What occurred on the occasion above described can best be
told in the exact language of Colonel Sweet: "I assembled all
four companies in Santa Lucia Barracks and asked them to tell
me which ones had been out the night before and which ones
had participated in the shooting, which they did, and to tell me
the names of those who were with them and who were not then
present, which they did. I think there were seventy-two (seventythree) present and they named five (four) others." Again the
witness said: "At first I asked all those who went out on the
previous night for any purpose whatever to signify the fact by
stepping forward and gave them five minutes to think it over
before doing so. To those who stepped forward that had gone
out for any purpose whatever I asked those who took part in the
shooting the night before that in justice to themselves and to the
other men who had not taken part in it, and for the good of all
concerned, that they step forward and they did." The names of
the four who took part (not five as stated by Colonel Sweet), but
ho were taken to present, were noted by Captain Gallardo.
The statements of the seventy-seven soldiers were taken in
writing during the afternoon of the same day, December 16. The

questionnaire prepared by the fiscal of the city of Manila was in

English or Spanish. The questions and answers were, however,
when requested by the soldiers, translated not their dialects.
Each statement was signed by the soldier making it in the
presence of either two or three witnesses.
Although the answers to the questions contained these
statements vary in phraseology, in substance they are the
same. One of them, the first in numerical order, that of Sergeant
Graciano L. Cabrera, taken in Spanish and interpreted into
Tagalog, may be selected into Tagalog, may be selected as
typical of the rest, and is here literally transcribed:
1. Give your name, age, status, occupation, and residence.
Graciano I. Cabrera, 254 years of age, single, sergeant of the
first company of the General Service of the Constabulary,
residing in Santa Lucia Barracks.
2. To what company of the Philippine Constabulary do you
belong? First Company, General Service of the
Constabulary.]
3. Where were you garrisoned yesterday afternoon December
15,
1920? In the Santa Lucia Barracks.
4. Did you leave the barracks at about 7 o'clock yesterday
evening? Yes, sir.
5. For what reason, and where did you go? We went in
search of the policemen and secret service men of Manila. It
has been sometime now since we have been having standing
grudge against now since we have been having a standing
grudge against the police of Manila. The wife of one of our
comrades was first arrested by the policemen and then abused
by the same; and not content with having abused her, they gave
this woman to an American; after this incident, they arrested two
soldiers of the Constabulary, falsely accusing them of keeping
women of bad reputation; after this incident, came the shooting
of Macasinag, a shooting not justified, because we have come
to know that Macasinag did nothing and the policemen could
have arrested him if they desired. Moreover, the rumor spread
among us that the police department of Manila had given orders
to the policemen to fire upon any Constabulary soldier they
found in the streets, and we believe that the rumor was not

without foundation since we noticed that after the Macasinag

affair, the policemen of Manila, Contrary to the usual practice,
were armed with carbines or shotguns. For this reason we
believe that if we did not put an end to these abuses of the
policemen and secret service men, they would continue abusing
the constabulary. And as an act of vengeance we did what we
had done last night.
6. How did you come to join your companions who rioted last
night? I saw that almost all the soldiers were jumping through
the window and I was to be left alone in the barracks and so I
followed.
7. Who asked you to join it? Nobody.
8. Do you know private Crispin Macasinag, the one who was
shot by the Manila police the night before last on Calle Real?
Yes, Sir, I know him because he was our comrade.
9. Were you offended at the aggression made on the person of
said soldier? Indeed, yes, not only was I offended, but my
companions also were.
10. State how many shots you fired, if nay, during the riot last
night. I cannot tell precisely the number of shots I fired
because I was somewhat obfuscated; all I can assure you is that
I fired more than once.
11. Do you know if you hit any policeman or any other person?If so state whether the victim was a policeman or a civilian. I
cannot tell whether I hit any policeman or any civilian.
12. State the streets of the city where you fired shots. I
cannot given an exact account of the streets where I fired my
gun. I had full possession of my faculties until I reached Calle
Victoria; afterwards, I became aware that I was bathed with
perspiration only upon reaching the barracks.
13. What arms were you carrying and how much ammunition or
how many cartidge did you use? I Carried a carbine; I cannot
tell precisely the number of cartridges I used; however, I placed
in my pocket the twenty cartridges belonging to me and I must
have lost.
14. How did you manage to leave the barracks? By the
window of the quarter of the Fourth Company, through the
grating which I found cut off.
15. Are the above statements made by you, voluntarily, freely,

and spontaneously given? Yes, sir.

16. Do you swear to said statements although no promise of
immunity is made to you? Yes, sir; I confirm them, being true.
(Sgd.) G. L. CABRERA.
Witnesses:
S. GALLARDO.
LAURO C. MARQUEZ.
The defendants were charged in one information filed in the
Court of First Instance of the City of Manila with the crime of
sedition, and in another information filed in the same, court, with
the crimes of murder and serious physical injuries. The two
cases were tried separately before different judges of first
instance.
All of the accused, with the exception of eight, namely,
Francisco Ingles, Juan Noromor, P. E. Vallado., Dionisio
Verdadero, and Paciano Caa, first pleased guilty to the charge
of sedition, but later, after the first witness for the prosecution
had testified, the accused who had pleaded guilty were
permitted, with the consent of the court, to substitute therefor
the plea of not guilty. the prosecution, in making out it case,
presented the seventy-seven confession of the defendants,
introduced in evidence as Exhibits C to C-76, conclusive, and
with the exception of those made by Daniel Coralde, Nemesio
Gamus, and Venancio Mira, all were identified by the respective
Constabulary officers, interpreters, and typists who intervened in
taking them. The prosecution further relied on oral testimony,
including eyewitness to the uprising.
The attorneys for the accused presented two defenses. The first
defense was in favor of all the defendants and was based on the
contention that the written statements Exhibits C to C-76 were
not freely and voluntarily made by them. The second defense
was in favor of the defendants Vicente Casimiro, Salvador
Gregorio, Roberto Palabay, Cipriano Lizardo, Ildefonso de la
Cruz, Roque Ebol, Francisco Garcia, Benigno Tagavilla,
Paciano Caa, Juan Abarques, Genaro Elayda, Hilario Hibabar,
P. E. Vallado, Patricio Bello, Felix Liron, Bonifacio Eugenio,
Nemesio Decea, Venancio Mira, Baldomero Rodriguez, Juan
Noromor, Maximo Perlas, and Victor Atuel, and was to the effect
these men did not take part in the riot.

The court overruled the special defenses and found that the guilt
of the accused had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. All
of the defendants were sentenced to serve the maximum
imprisonment of ten years provided by section 6 of Act No. 292.
The court, however, distinguished fines from that of a
defendants Francisco Garcia, a private and the eight corporals
E. E. Agbulos, Francisco Ingles, Clemente Manigdeg, Juan
Abarques, Pedro V. Matero, Juan Regalado, Hilario Hibalar and
Genaro Elayda, upon each of whom a fine of P5,000 was
imposed, and of the three sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera,
Pascual Magno, and Bonifacio Eugenio, upon each of whom a
fine of P10,000 was imposed. The costs were divided
proportionately among the defendants.
For the statement of the cases and the facts which has just
been made, we are indebted in large measure to the
conspicuously fair and thoughtful decisions of the Honorable
George R. Harvey who presided in the sedition case and of the
Honorable Carlos Imperial who presided in the murder case. As
stipulated by the Attorney-General and counsel for the
defendants, the proof is substantially the same in both cases.
In all material respects we agree with the findings of fact as
made by the trial court in this case. The rule is again applied
that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgement of
the trial court in passing upon the credibility of the opposing
witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstances of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.
(U. S. vs. Ambrosio and Falsario [1910], 17 Phil., 295; U. S. vs.
Remegio [1918], 37 Phil., 599.) In the record of the case at bar,
no such fact or circumstance appears.
OPINION
An assignment of five errors is made by counsel for the
defendants and appellants. Two the assignment of error merit
little or no consideration. Assignment of error No. 2 (finding its
counterpart in assignments of error 5 and 6 in the murder case),
in which it is attempted to establish that Vicente Casimiro,
Salvador Gregorio, Paciano Caa, Juan Abarquez, Mariano
Garcia, Felix Liron, Bonifacio Eugenio, Patricio Bello, Baldomero
Rodriguez, Roberto Palabay, Juan Noromor, Roque Ebol,

Ildefonso de la Cruz, Cipriano Lizardo, Francisco Garcia,

Genaro Elayda, Hilario Hibalar, P. M. Vallado, Maximo Perlas,
and Benigno Tagavilla, did not leave the Santa Lucia Barracks
in the night of the tragedy, is predicated on the special defense
raised in the lower court for these defendants and three other
and which was found untenable by the trial court. Any further
discussion of this question falls more appropriately under
consideration of assignment of error No. 4, relating to the
conspiracy between the accused.
Assignment of error No. 3, relating to the finding of the trial court
that it had not been shown that the policemen were not aware of
the armed attack of the Constabulary, However, we find that the
evidence supports this conclusion of the trial court.
The three pertinent issues in this case relate to: (1) the
Admission of Exhibits C to C-76 of the prosecution (assignment
of error No. 2, murder case); (2) the conspiracy between the
accused (assignment of error No. 4, sedition case; assignment
of error No. 3, murder case); and (3) the conviction of the
accused of a violation of the Treason and Sedition Law
(assignment of error No. 5, sedition case).
1. The admission of exhibits C to C-76
Appellants claim that fraud and deceit marked the preparation of
the seventy seven confessions. It is alleged that some of the
defendants signed the confessions under the impression that
those who had taken part in the affray would be transferred to
Mindanao, and that although they did not in fact so participate,
affirmed that they because of a desire to leave Manila; that other
stepped forward "for the good of the service" in response to
appeals from Colonel Sweet and other officers; while still others
simply didn't understand what they were doing, for the remarks
of Colonel Sweet were made in English and only translated into
Tagalog, and their declarations were sometime taken in al
language which was unintelligible to them. Counsel for the
accused entered timely objection to the admission in evidence
of Exhibits C to C-76, and the Attorney-General is worn in
stating otherwise.
Section 4 of Act No. 619, entitle "An Act to promote good order
and discipline in the Philippines Constabulary," and reading: "No
confession of any person charged with crime shall be received

as evidence against him by any court of justice unless be first

shown to the satisfaction of the court that it was freely and
voluntarily made and not the result of violence, intimidation,
threat, menace or of promises or offers of reward or leniency,"
was repealed by the first Administrative Code. But the same rule
of jurisprudence continues without the law. As he been
repeatedly announced by this and other courts, "the true test of
admissibility is that the confession is made freely, voluntarily,
and without compulsion or inducement of any sort". If the
confession is freely and voluntarily made, it constitutes one of
the most effectual proofs in the law against the party making it.
(Wilson vs. U. S.[1896], 162 U. S. 613.)The burden of proof that
he confession was not voluntarily made or was obtained by
undue pressure is on the accused. (U. S. vs Zara [1912, 42
Phil., 308.)
What actually occurred when the confessions were prepared is
clearly explained in the records. The source of the rumor that
the defendant would be transferred to Mindanao if they signed
the confession is not established. One the contrary it is
established that before the declaration were taken, Lieutenant
Gatuslao in response to a query had shown the improbability of
such a transfer. With military orders given in English and living
in the city of Manila where the dialect is tagalog, all of the
defendants must have understood the substantial part of
Colonel Sweet's remarks. What is more important, there could
be no misunderstanding as to the contents of the confessions as
written down. In open court, sixty-nine of the defendants
reiterated their guilt. The officers who assisted in the
investigation were of the same service as the defendants in their
own men.
It must also be remembered that each and everyone of the
defendants was a member of the Insular Police force. Because
of the very nature of their duties and because of their practical
experience, these Constabulary soldiers must have been aware
of the penalties meted out for criminal offenses. Every man on
such a momentous occasion would be more careful of his
actions than ordinarily and whatever of credulity there is in him,
would for the moment be laid aside. Over and above all desire
for a more exciting life, over and above the so called esprit de

corps, is the instinct of self preservation which could not but be

fully aroused by such stirring incidents too recent to be forgotten
as had occurred in this case, and which would counsel
prudence rather than rashness; secretiveness rather than
garrulity.
These confessions contain the statements that they were made
freely and voluntarily without any promise of immunity. That
such was the case was corroborated by the attesting witnesses
whose credibility has not been successfully impeached.
We rule that the trial court did not err in admitting Exhibits C to
C-76 of the prosecution.
2. The conspiracy between the accused
The contention of the appellants is that evidence is lacking of
any supposed connivance between the accused. Counsel
emphasizes that in answer to the question in the confession,
"who asked you to join the riot," each of the accused answered,
"Nobody." The argument is then advanced that the appellants
cannot be held criminally responsible because of the so called
psychology of crowds theory. In other words, it is claimed that at
the time of the commission of the crime the accused were mere
automatons obeying the insistent call of their companions and of
their uniform. From both the negative failure of evidence and the
positive evidence, counsel could deduce the absence of
conspiracy between the accused.
The attorney-General answers the argument of counsel by
saying that conspiracy under section 5 of Act No. 292 is not an
essential element of the crime of sedition. In this law officer for
the people may be on solid ground. However, this may be, there
is a broader conception of the case which reaches the same
result.
It is a primary rule that if two or more persons combine to
perform a criminal act, each is responsible for all the acts of the
other done in furtherance of the common design; and " the
result is the same if the act is divided into parts and each person
proceed with his part unaided." (U. S. vs Maza [1905], 5 Phils.,
346; U. S. vs. Remegio [1918] 37 Phil., 599; decision of
supreme court of Spain of September 29, 1883; People vs.
Mather [1830], 4 Wendell, 229.)
Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite

acts, conditions, and circumstances which vary according to the

purposes to be accomplished. It be proved that the defendants
pursued by their acts the same object, one performing one part
and another part of the same, so as to complete it, with a view
to the attainment of that same object, one will be justified in the
conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect that
object. (5 R. C. L., 1088.) Applied to the facts before us, it is
incontestable that all of the defendants were imbued with the
same purpose, which was to avenge themselves on the police
force of the city of Manila. A common feeling of resentment
animated all. A common plan evolved from their military training
was followed.
The effort to lead the court into the realm of psychology and
metaphysics is unavailing in the face of actualities. The
existence of a joint assent may be reasonably inferred from the
facts proved. Not along are the men who fired the fatal shots
responsible, not along are the men who admit firing their
carbines responsible, but all, having united to further a common
design of hate and vengeance, are responsible for the legal
consequences therefor.
We rule that the trail court did not err in declaring that there a c
conspiracy between the accused.
3. The conviction of the accused of a violation of the Treason
and Sediton Law
Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions
or disturbances in the State. The Philippine law on the subject
(Act No. 292) makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise
publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside
of legal methods any one of vie objects, including that of
inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property
of any official or agent of the Insular Government or of Provincial
or Municipal Government. The trial court found that the crime of
sedition, as defined and punished by the law, had been
committed, and we believe that such finding is correct.
Counsel's contention that in order for there to be a violation of
subdivision 3 of section 5 of Act No. 292 it is and necessary that
the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a
public functionary, and that what really happened in this
instance was a fight between two armed bodies of the Philippine

Government, is absolutely without foundation. Subdivison 3 of

section 5 of the Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction
between the persons to which it applies. In one scene there was
a fights between two armed bodies of the Philippine
Government, but it was an unequal fight brought on by the
actions of the accused.
We rule that the trial court did not err in convicting the accused
of the violation of section 5, paragraph 3, of Act No. 292 of the
Philippine Commission.
JUDGEMENT
The Treason and Sedition Law provides as a penalty for any
person guilty of sedition as defined in section 5 of the law,
punishment by fine of not exceeding P10,000 or by
imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or both. In this
connection, it will be recalled that the court sentenced each of
the private soldiers Salvador Gregorio, Juan Noromor, Patricio
Bello, Nemesio Decea, Baldomero Rodriguez, P. E. Vallado,
Pedro Layola, Felix Liron (Cenon), Dionisio Verdadero, Lorenzo
Tumboc, Casiano Guinto, Victor Atuel, Venancio Mira, Benigno
Tagavilla, Masaway, Quintin Desierto, Teofilo Llana, Timoteo
Opermaria, Maximo Perlas, Cornelio Elizaga, Roberto Palabay,
Roque Ebol, Benito Garcia, Honorio Bautista, Crisanto Salgo,
Francisco Lusano, Marcelino Silos, Nicanor Perlas, Patricio
Rubio, Mariano Aragon, Silvino Ayngco, Guillermo Inis, Julian
Andaya, Crispin Mesalucha, Prudencio Tasis, Silvino Bacani,
Petronilo Antonio, Domingo Peroche, Florentino Jacob, Paciano
Caa, Domingo Canapi, Arcadio San Pedro, Daniel Coralde,
Nemesio Camas, Luis Borja, Severino Elefane, Vicente Tabien,
Marcos Marquez, Victorino Merto, Bernabe Sison, Eusebio
Cerrudo, Julian Acantilado, Ignacio Lechoncito, Pascual Dionio,
Marcial Pelicia, Rafael Nafrada, Zacarias Bayle, Cipriano
Lizardo, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Juan Miranda, Graciano Zapata,
Felisardo Favinal, Gaspar Andrade, Felix Lamsing, and Vicente
Casimiro, to suffer imprisonment for ten years, and to pay one
seventy-seventh part of the costs; the private Francisco Garcia,
who sawed the bars of the window through which the
defendants passed from Santa Lucia Barracks and each of the
corporals E. E. Agbulos, Francisco Ingles, Clemente Manigdeg,
Juan Abarquez, Pedro V. Mateo, Juan Regalado, Hilario Hibalar

and Genaro Elayda, to suffer imprisonment for ten years and to

pay a fine of P5,000 and one seventy-seventy of the costs; and
each of the sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera, Pascual Magno,
and Bonifacio Eugenio, to suffer imprisonment for ten years and
to pay a fine of P10,000 and one seventy-seventy of the costs.
The trial judge appears to have made a reasonable exercise of
the discretion which the law reposes in him.
We cannot bring to a close this disagreeable duty without
making our own the pertinent observations found in the decision
of the trial court in this case. Therein, along toward the closed of
his learned opinion, Judge Harvey said:
Rarely in the history of criminality in this country has there been
registered a crime so villainous as that committed by these
defendants. The court is only concerned in this case with crime
of sedition. The maximum penalty prescribed by Act No. 292,
imprisonment for ten year and a fine P10,000, is not really
commensurate with the enormity of the offense. Impelled by
hatred, employing their knowledge of military sciences which is
worthy of a better cause, and in disregard of the consequences
to themselves and their innocent loved ones, and using the
means furnished to them by the Government for the protection
of life and property, they sought by force and violence and
outside of legal methods to avenge a fancied wrong by an
armed and tumultuous attack upon officials and agents of the
government of the city of Manila.
Although in view of the sentence which is being handed down in
the murder case, affecting these same defendants and
appellants, it would seem to be a useless formality to impose
penalties in this case, yet it is obviously our duty to render
judgement appealed from, with one seventy-seventh of the
costs of this instance against each appellant. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J. Johnson, Street, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand,
Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1451 March 6, 1906
THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. AURELIO
TOLENTINO,Defendant-Appellant.
Rafael Palma and Gibbs and Kincaid for appellant. Office of
the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
Aurelio Tolentino, the appellant in this case, was convicted upon
an information charging him with the crime of "uttering seditious
words and writings, publishing and circulating scurrilous libels
against the Government of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, committed as follows:
That said Aurelio Tolentino, on or about the 14th day of May,
1903, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, did unlawfully utter
seditious words and speeches and did write, publish, and
circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United
States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands,
which tend to obstruct the lawful officers of the United States
and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands in the
execution of their offices, and which tend to instigate others to
cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and which
suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and riots, and which
tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to
disturb the peace of the community and the safety and order of
the Government of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, which said seditious
words and speeches are false and inflammatory, and tend to
incite and move the people to hatred and dislike of the
government established by law within the Philippine Islands, and
tend to incite, move, and persuade great numbers of the people
of said Philippine Islands to insurrection, riots, tumults, and
breaches of the public peace; which said false, seditious, and
inflammatory words and scurrilous libels are in Tagalog
language in a theatrical work written by said Aurelio Tolentino,
and which was presented by him and others on the said 14th
day of May, 1903, at the "Teatro Libertad," in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, entitled 'Kahapon gayon at Bukas'
(Yesterday, To-day, and To-morrow). An exact translation of the
said drama is included in the information, and various parts

thereof are specially assigned, which, in the opinion of the

prosecution, were more especially in violation of the statute in
such cases made and provided.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
It was proven at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused did in fact write the drama and the announcement
thereof, substantially as set out in the information, and did, with
other members of a theatrical company, of which he was
director, utter and publish the same substantially in manner and
form as charged, and as we understand it, the only question for
decision is whether, in writing, publishing, and uttering the
drama, the accused was in fact guilty of a violation of section 8
of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, upon which the
information was based.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
This section is as follows:
Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write,
publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of
the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in
executing his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal or
meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite
rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of
the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who
shall knowingly conceal such evil practices, shall be punished
by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment
not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.
Counsel discussed at some length the question whether the
drama or any part of it was of a "scurrilous" nature in the legal
acceptation of the word, but for the purposes of this decision we
do not deem it necessary to make a finding on this point. In the
case of the United States vs. Fred L. Dorr and Edward F.
O'Brien, 1 decided May 19, 1903, this court said:
The complaint appears to be framed upon the theory that a
writing, in order to be punishable as a libel under this section,
must be of a scurrilous nature and directed against the
Government of the United States or the Insular Government of
the Philippine Islands, and must, in addition, tend to some one

of the results enumerated in the section, the article in question

being described in the complaint as "a scurrilous libel against
the Government of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, which tends to obstruct
the lawful officers of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands in the execution of their
offices, and which tends to instigate others to cabal and meet
together for unlawful purposes, and which suggests and incites
rebellious conspiracies, and which tends to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities, and which disturbs the safety and
order of the Government of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands." But it is a "a well-settled
rule in considering indictments that where an offense may be
committed in any of several different modes, and the offense, in
any particular instance, is alleged to have been committed in
two or more modes specified, it is sufficient to prove the offense
committed in any one of them, provide that it be such as to
constitute the substantive offense." (Com. vs. Kneeland, 20
Pick. Mass. 206, 215), and the defendants may, therefore, be
convicted if any one of the substantive charges into which the
complaint
may
be
separated
has
been
made
out.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Several allied offenses or modes of committing the same
offense are define in that section, viz: (1) The uttering of
seditious words or speeches; (2) the writing, publishing, or
circulating of scurrilous libels against the Government of the
United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands; (3) the writing, publishing, or circulating of libels which
tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his
office; (4) or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet
together for unlawful purposes; (5) or which suggest or incite
rebellious conspiracies or riots; (6) or which tend to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of
the community, the safety and order of the Government; (7)
knowingly concealing such evil practices.
In accordance with the principles laid down in the preceding
paragraph the judgment of conviction in this case must be
sustained, if it appears from the evidence in the record that the
accused was guilty as charged of any one of those offenses. We

are all agreed that the publication and presentation of the drama
directly and necessarily tend to instigate others to cabal and
meet together for unlawful purposes, and to suggest and incite
rebellious conspiracies and riots and to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the
community
and
the
safety
and
order
of
the
Government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of the
time, place, and manner of its presentation, was to inculcate a
spirit of hatred and enmity against the American people and the
Government of the United States in the Philippines, and we are
satisfied that the principal object and intent of its author was to
incite the people of the Philippine Islands to open and armed
resistance to the constituted authorities, and to induce them to
conspire together for the secret organization of armed forces, to
be used when the opportunity presented itself, for the purpose
of overthrowing the present Government and setting up another
in its stead.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Counsel for the appellant insists that the intent of the accused to
commit the crime with which he is charged does not appear
from the evidence of record, and that the drama is, in itself, a
purely literary and artistic production wherein the legendary
history of these Islands and their future, as imagined by the
author, are presented merely for the instruction and
entertainment
of
the
public.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
This contention can not be maintained. The public presentation
of the drama took place in the month of May, 1903, less than
two years after the establishment of the Civil Government. The
smouldering embers of a wide-spread and dangerous
insurrection were not yet entirely extinguished, and here and
there throughout the Islands occasional outbreaks still required
the use of the armed forces of the Government for their
suppression. A junta in the city of Hongkong, composed of
persons whose announced purpose and object in organizing
was the overthrow of the present Government, was actively
engaged in the endeavor to keep the people of these Islands

from peaceably accepting the authority of that Government, and

this junta, acting with confederates in the Philippines, was still
able to keep alive a certain spirit of unrest and uncertainty which
it hoped to fan into open revolt and rebellion at the first favorable
opportunity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The manner and form in which the drama was presented at
such a time and under such conditions, renders absurd the
pretense that it was merely or even principally a literary or
artistic production, and the clumsy devices, the allegorical
figures, the apparent remoteness, past and future, of the events
portrayed, could not and in fact were not intended to leave the
audience in doubt as to its present and immediate application,
nor should they blind this court to the true purpose and intent of
the author and director of the play.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
It is further contended that even though the accused were in fact
guilty as charged, the court erred in imposing an excessive and
unjust penalty, and in fixing the amount of the fine in dollars
instead of Philippine currency. As to the latter objection it is
sufficient to say that the use of the word "dollars" was in strict
conformance with the words of the statute, and that the
equivalent of that word in Philippine currency is fixed by law.
The penalty was within the limits prescribed by law, and we are
not prepared to hold that the trial court erred in the exercise of
its
discretion
in
imposing
it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The judgment and sentence appealed from is affirmed, with the
costs
against
the
appellant.
So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2990
December 17, 1951
OSCAR ESPUELAS Y MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Carlos P. Garcia, Cosme P. Garcia and B.E. Enerio for

petitioner. Office of the Solicitor Jesus A. Avancea for

respondent.
BENGZON, J.:
Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code punishes those who shall
write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the
Government of the Philippines or any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof or which suggest or incite rebellious
conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir up the people againts
the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community.
The appellant Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was, after trial,
convicted in the Court of First Instance of Bohol of a violation of
the above article. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, because according to said court.
"About the time compromised between June 9 and June 24,
1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol,
Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to
appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of
rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth and in
fact, he was merely standing on a barrel (Exhibit A, C-I). After
securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of
same to several newspapers and weeklies of general circulation
(Exhibit C, F, G, H, I), not only in the Province of Bohol but also
throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with
a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was
written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed
to the latter's supposed wife translation of which letter or note in
hereunder reproduced:
Dearest wife and children, bury me five meters deep. Over my
grave don't plant a cross or put floral wreaths, for I don't need
them.
Please don't bury me in the lonely place. Bury me in the
Catholic cemetery. Although I have committed suicide, I still
have the right to burried among Christians.
But don't pray for me. Don't remember me, and don't feel sorry.
Wipe me out of your lives.
My dear wife, if someone asks to you why I committed suicide,
tell them I did it because I was not pleased with the
administration of Roxas. Tell the whole world about this.

And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas,
point out to them the situation in Central Luzon, the Leyte.
Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them
that here in the Philippines our government is infested with
many Hitlers and Mussolinis.lawphil.net
Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they
come across one.
I committed suicide because I am ashamed of our government
under Roxas. I cannot hold high my brows to the world with this
dirty government.
I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez
de Cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power. So, I sacrificed
my own self.
The accused admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter
above quoted and caused its publication in the Free Press, the
Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang and other local
periodicals and that he had impersonated one Alberto
Reveniera by signing said pseudonymous name in said note or
letter and posed himself as Alberto Reveniera in a picture taken
wherein he was shown hanging by the end of a rope tied to a
limb of a tree."
The latter is a scurrilous libel against the Government. 1 It calls
our government one of crooks and dishonest persons (dirty)
infested with Nazis and a Fascistis i.e. dictators.
And the communication reveals a tendency to produce
dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to
remain loyal to the government. 2
Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of
the government or to weaken the confidence of the people in the
government are against the public peace, and are criminal not
only because they tend to incite to a breach of the peace but
because they are conducive to the destruction of the very
government itself (See 19 Am. Law Rep. 1511). Regarded as
seditious libels they were the subject of criminal proceedings
since early times in England. (V op. cit.).
As explained by Paterson, 3 ". . . the great factors of
government, consisting of the Sovereign, the Parliament, the
ministers of state, the courts of justice, must be recognized as
holding functions founded on sound principles and to be

defended and treated with an established and well-nigh

unalterable respect. Each of these great institutions has peculiar
virtues and peculiar weaknesses, but whether at any one time
the virtue or the weakness predominates, there must be a
certain standard of decorum reserved for all. Each guarded
remonstrance, each fiery invective, each burst of indignation
must rest on some basis of respect and deference towards the
depository, for the time being, of every great constitutional
function. Hence another limit of free speech and writing is
sedition. And yet within there is ample room and verge enough
for the freest use of the tongue and pen in passing strictures in
the judgment and conduct of every constituted authority."
Naturally, when the people's share in the government was
restricted, there was a disposition to punish even mild criticism
of the ruler or the departments of government. But as
governments grew to be more representative, the laws of
sedition became less drastic and freedom of expression strife
continue to be prohibited.
The United States punished seditious utterances in the act of
July 14, 1798 containing provisions parallel to our own article
142. Analogous prohibitions are found in the Espionage Act of
June 1917 and the seditious libel amendment thereto in May,
1918.
Of course such legislation despite its general merit is liable to
become a weapon of intolerance constraining the free
expression of opinion, or mere agitation for reform. But so long
as there is a sufficient safeguard by requiring intent on the part
of the defendant to produce illegal action-such legislation aimed
at anarchy and radicalism presents largely a question of policy.
Our Legislature has spoken in article 142 and the law must be
applied.
In disposing of this appeal, careful thought had to be given to
the fundamental right to freedom of speech. Yet the freedom of
speech secured by the Constitution "does not confer an
absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility whatever
one may choose." It is not "unbridled license that gives immunity
for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment
of those who abuse this freedom. 4" So statutes against sedition
have guaranty, although they should not be interpreted so as to

agitate for institutional changes. 5

Not to be restrained is the privilege of any citizen to criticize his
government officials and to submit his criticism to the "free trade
of ideas" and to plead for its acceptance in "the competition of
the market." However, let such criticism be specific and
therefore constructive, reasoned or tempered, and not a
contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up.
Such wholesale attack is nothing less than an invitation to
disloyalty to the government. In the article now under
examination one will find no particular objectionable actuation of
the government. It is called dirty, it is called a dictatorship, it is
called shameful, but no particular omissions or commissions are
set forth. Instead the article drip with male-violence and hate
towards the constituted authorities. It tries to arouse animosity
towards all public servants headed by President Roxas whose
pictures this appellant would burn and would teach the younger
generation to destroy.
Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences the
article cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to
sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is
not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer's simulated
suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with is failure to
particularize. When the use irritating language centers not on
persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the
rationable of free speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer
is removed from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.
If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire
governmental structure but only President Roxas and his men,
the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against
the Government but also "libels against any of the duly
constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the
Government obviously refer of least to the President, his
Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives
dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this
score alone the conviction could be upheld. 6
As heretofore stated publication suggest or incites rebellious
conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up people against the
constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition
who may seek to silence the writer. 7 Which is the sum and

substance of the offense under consideration.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate
tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal
courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal
methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order
to repress the evils which press upon their minds. 8
"The idea of violence prevades the whole letter" says Justice
Paredes of the Court of Appeals. "The mere fact that a person
was so disgusted with his "dirty government" to the point of
taking his own life, is not merely a sign of disillusionment; it is a
clear act to arouse its readers a sense of dissatisfaction against
its duly constituted authorities. The mention made in said letter
of the situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps, Julio Guillen
and the banditry in Leyte, which are instances of flagrant and
armed attacks against the law and the duly constituted
authorities cannot but be interpreted by the reading public as an
indirect justification of the open defiance by the Hukbalahaps
against the constituted government, the attempt against the life
of President Roxas and the ruthless depredations committed by
the bandits of Leyte, thus insinuating that a state on
lawlessness, rebellion and anarchy would be very much better
than the maladministration of said President and his men.
To top it all, the appellant proclaimed to his readers that he
committed suicide because he had "no power to put under juez
de cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power." Knowing, that
the expression Juez de Cuchillo means to the ordinary layman
as the Law of the Knife, a "summary and arbitrary execution by
the knife", the idea intended by the appellant to be conveyed
was no other than bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods to
free the government from the administration of Roxas and his
men.
The meaning, intent and effect of the article involves maybe a
question of fact, making the findings of the court of appeals
conclusive upon us. 9
Anyway, it is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation or
assassination of all Roxas officials (at least members of the
Cabinet and a majority of Legislators including the Chief
Executive himself). And such suggestion clinches the case
against appellant.

In 1922 Isaac Perez of Sorsogon while discussing political

matter with several persons in a public place uttered theses
words: "Filipinos must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head"
referring to the them Governor-General, Leonard Wood. Perez
was found guilty of inciting to sedition in a judgment of this court
published in Volume 45 of the Philippine Reports. That
precedent is undeniably opposite. Note that the opinion was
penned by Mr. Justice Malcolm probably of speech. Adopting
his own words we could say, "Here the person maligned by the
accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His
official position, like the President of the United States and other
high office, under form of government, instead of affording
immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite
abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the President
passes the furthest bounds of free speech and common
decency. More than a figure of speech was intended. There is a
seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily
produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling
incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the
Government and obedient to the laws."
The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And
there being no question as to the legality of the penalty imposed
on him, the decision will be affirmed with costs.
Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur. Jugo, J.,
concurs in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34022 March 24, 1972
MANUEL MARTINEZ Y FESTIN petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JESUS P. MORFE OF THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, and THE CITY WARDEN OF
MANILA, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-34046-7 March 24, 1972
FERNANDO BAUTISTA, SR., petitioner,
vs.

HON. FRANCISCO MA. CHANCO, Presiding Judge, Court of

First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Second Judicial
District, Branch III, et al., respondents.
Estanislao A. Fernandez, Amelito Mutuc, Reynaldo Villar,
Alberto K. Jamir Anacleto Badoy, Jr., Emmanuel Santos,
Sedfrey Ordoez, Antonio Tupaz, Arturo Pacificador, Dominador
F. Carillo, Antonio Borromeo, Augusto Cesar Espiritu, Dandy K.
Tupaz and Eugene A. Tan for petitioner Manuel Martinez Y
Festin.
Remulla, Perez and Estrella, Fernando P. Cabato and
Gaudencio N. Floresca for petitioner Fernando Bautista Sr.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant
Solicitor General Bernardo P. Pardo, Assistant Solicitor General
Rosalio A. de Leon and Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza for
respondents Judges.
Kaulayao V. Faylona, Manuel Imbong, Jacobo Gonzales,
Fernando P. Camaya, Jose Tablizo, Romeo Kahayon and
Tomas P. Matic, Jr. for respondents Pulido and Tamayo.
FERNANDO, J.:p
The question raised in these certiorari proceedings, one to
which no authoritative answer has been yielded by past
decisions, is the scope to be accorded the constitutional
immunity of senators and representatives from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of Congress and in going to
and returning from the same except in cases of treason, felony
and breach of the peace. 1 Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin
2 and Fernando Bautista, Sr., 3 as delegate of the present
Constitutional Convention would invoke what they consider to
be the protection of the above constitutional provision, if
considered in connection with Article 145 of the Revised Penal
Code penalizing a public officer or employee who shall, during
the sessions of Congress, "arrest or search any member
thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime
punishable under [such] Code by a penalty higher than prision
mayor." 4 For under the Constitutional Convention Act, 5
delegates are entitled to the parliamentary immunities of a
senator or a representative. 6 Both petitioners are facing criminal
prosecutions, the information filed against petitioner Manuel

Martinez y Festin for falsification of a public document and two

informations against petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr. for
violation of the Revised Election Code. The Solicitor General, on
behalf of the respondent Judges in the above proceedings, 7
would dispute such a contention on the ground that the
constitutional provision does not cover any criminal prosecution
being merely an exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical
inference being that insofar as a provision of the Revised Penal
Code would expand such an immunity, it would be
unconstitutional or at the very least inoperative. A careful study
of the above constitutional provision, in the light of the
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, adopting the then
well-settled principle under American law and of the purposes to
be served by such an immunity, persuade us that the stand
taken by the Solicitor General is correct. These certiorari
proceedings cannot prosper.
The facts in both petitions for certiorari are not in dispute.
Petitioner Martinez y Festin 8 alleged that on June 10, 1971, an
information against him for falsification a public document was
filed. Its basis was his stating under oath in his certificate of
candidacy for delegate to that Constitutional Convention that he
was born on June 20, 1945, when in truth and in fact he knew
that he was born on June 20, 1946. There was on July 9, 1971,
a special appearance on his part questioning the power of
respondent Judge to issue a warrant of arrest and seeking that
the information be quashed. On the same day, there was an
order from the lower court suspending the release of the warrant
of arrest until it could act on such motion to quash. Then came
on July 22, 1971 an omnibus motion from him, with previous
leave of court, to quash the information, to quash the warrant of
arrest, or to hold in abeyance further proceeding in the case. It
was not favorably acted on. On August 21, 1971, respondent
Judge rendered an order denying the petitioner omnibus motion
to quash. In his belief that the information and the warrant of
arrest in this case are null and void, the petitioner did not post
the required bond. He was arrested by the City Sheriff in the
afternoon of September 6, 1971. At the time of the filing of the
petition he was confined at the City Jail in the custody of
respondent City Warden of Manila. He was on his way to attend

the plenary session of the Constitutional Convention. Such

arrest was against his will and over his protest. He was
arraigned on September 9, 1971. There was at such a time a
motion by petitioner to reconsider the court's order of August 21,
1971. It was denied in open court. On the very same day, he
filed the petition for certiorari and habeas corpus, but having
been released thereafter on bail on September 11, 1971, the
petition is now in the nature solely of a certiorari proceeding. 9
As for petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr., 10 it was alleged that he
is a duly elected and proclaimed delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention. He took his oath of office and
assumed the functions of such office on June 1, 1971. He has
continued since then to perform the duties and discharge the
responsibilities of a delegate. Two criminal complaints, docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 146(57) and 148(58), were directly filed
with the Court of First lnstance of Baguio and Benguet by a
certain Moises Maspil, a defeated delegate-aspirant who placed
15th in the order of votes garnered against the petitioner, and
his co-accused for alleged violation of Section 51 of the Revised
Penal Code in that they gave and distributed free of charge
food, drinks and cigarettes at two public meetings, one held in
Sablan and the other in Tuba, both towns being in Province of
Benguet. Respondent Presiding Judge conducted the
preliminary investigation of said criminal complaints. Thereafter
on August 7, 1971, he issued an order for the filing of the
corresponding informations. Before a warrant of arrest in said
criminal cases could be issued, petitioner in a motion of August
14, 1971 invoked the privilege of immunity from arrest and
search, pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6132,
otherwise known as the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, in
relation to Sec. 15, Article VI of the Constitution and Article 145
of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent Judge, on the very
same day, issued an order, holding in abeyance the issuance of
a warrant of arrest and setting the hearing of said Motion on
August 23, 1971. As scheduled on August 23, 1971, there was a
hearing on such motion. Petitioner however did not prevail
notwithstanding his vigorous insistence on his claim for
immunity, a warrant of arrest being ordered on the same day.
On September 11, 1971, there was a motion to quash such

order of arrest filed by petitioner. He was unsuccessful,

respondent Judge, in an order of said date, ordering his
immediate arrest. His petition for certiorari and prohibition was
filed with this Court on September 15, 1971. 11
What is thus sought by petitioners Martinez y Festin and
Bautista, Sr. is that the respective warrants of arrest issued
against them be quashed on the claim that by virtue of the
parliamentary immunity they enjoy as delegates, ultimately
traceable to Section 15 of Article VI of the Constitution as
construed together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code,
they are immune from arrest. In the case of petitioner Martinez y
Festin, he is proceeded against for falsification of a public
document punishable by prision mayor. 12 As for petitioner
Bautista, Sr., the penalty that could be imposed for each of the
Revised Election Code offense, of which he is charged, is not
higher than prision mayor. 13
The respondents in the above petitions were required to answer
by resolutions of this Court issued on September 10 and
September 20, 1971, respectively. An answer on behalf of
respondent Judge Jesus P. Morfe in the case of petitioner
Martinez y Festin was filed on September 20, 1971 with an
answer in intervention filed by respondent Executive Sheriff of
Manila and the Chief of Warrant Division likewise filed on the
same date. His petition was duly heard on September 14, 1971,
Delegate Estanislao A. Fernandez vehemently pressing his
claim to immunity. Thereafter on October 29, 1971, a
memorandum, comprehensive in scope and persuasive in its
analysis of the constitutional question presented, was filed on
behalf of respondent Judge Morfe by Solicitor General Felix Q.
Antonio, two Assistants Solicitors General Bernardo P. Pardo
and Rosalio A. de Leon as well as Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza.
A memorandum on behalf of President Diosdado Macapagal of
the Constitutional Convention, who was given permission to
submit such a pleading, was submitted on March 8, 1972 by the
Committee on Legal Affairs of the Constitutional Convention. 14
As for the petitions of Bautista, Sr., the answer on behalf of
respondent Judge was filed on September 29, 1971. When the
matter was heard on October 14, 1971, he appeared through
counsel, Delegate Juanito R. Remulla, while respondent Judge

was represented by Assistant Solicitor General Rosalio A. de

Leon and Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza. With the submission, on
October 30, 1971, of an able memorandum on behalf of
respondent judge, again, by the same counsel from the Office of
the Solicitor General as well as a carefully-prepared
memorandum of petitioner Bautista, Sr., on December 1, 1971,
the matter was deemed submitted for adjudication.
As noted at the outset, certiorari does not lie to quash the
warrants of arrest issued against petitioner Martinez y Festin as
well as petitioner Bautista, Sr. Their reliance on the
constitutional provision which for them should be supplemented
by what was provided for in the Revised Penal Code is futile.
There is no justification then for granting their respective pleas.
No other conclusion is allowable consistently with the plain and
explicit command of the Constitution. As is made clear in
Section 15 of Article VI, the immunity from arrest does not cover
any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the peace.
Treason exists when the accused levies war against the
Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and comfort.
15 A felony is act or omission punishable by law. 16 Breach of the
peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal
Code or any special statute. It is a well-settled principle in public
law that the public peace must be maintained and any breach
thereof renders one susceptible to prosecution. Certainly then
from the explicit language of the Constitution, even without its
controlling interpretation as shown by the debates of the
Constitutional Convention to be hereinafter discussed,
petitioners cannot justify their claim to immunity. Nor does
Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code come to their rescue.
Such a provision that took effect in 1932 could not survive after
the Constitution became operative on November 15, 1935. As
will be shown, the repugnancy between such an expansion of
the congressional immunity and the plain command of the
Constitution is too great to be overcome, even on the
assumption that the penalty to which a public officer will be
subjected in the event that he did arrest one entitled thereto for
an offense punishable by less than reclusion temporal suffices
to widen its scope. This is so considering not only the history of
such a Constitutional grant of immunity but also its basic

purpose and objective.

1. Even if the provision granting the legislative immunity of
freedom from arrest were clothed in language less clear, its
history precludes any other interpretation. As submitted to the
Constitutional Convention of 1934, the draft proposal was
worded as follows: "The Members of the National Assembly
shall in all cases except treason, open disturbance of public
order, or other offense punishable by death or imprisonment of
not less than six years, be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of the National Assembly, and in
going to and returning from the same." On December 4, 1934,
upon its being considered by the Convention, an amendment
was proposed by Delegate Aldeguer so that it would read: "The
Members of the National Assembly shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the National
Assembly, and in going and returning from the same." What was
sought by him was to retain the provision of the Philippine
Autonomy Act of 1916, with phraseology identical to that found
in the American Constitution.
He defended his proposal thus: "My amendment is not new. It is
the same phrase granting parliamentary immunity to the
members of the Parliament of England. It is the same phrase
granting parliamentary immunity to members of Congress. It is
the same phrase granting parliamentary immunity to members
of the various state legislators of the Union. Now, in reading the
draft proposed by the Sub-Committee of Seven, I found out that
it is a broad rule. Mr. President, the question is not whether we
should grant privilege of immunity to the members of the
National Assembly ... " 17 He was interrupted by a point of order
raised, but he was allowed to continue. He went on: "As I was
saying, Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Convention, the
draft gives to the member of the National Assembly more
privileges than what the nature of the office demands. My
question is that if the members of the Congress of the United
States, if the members of the Parliament, if the members of the
various State Legislatures were able to perform their functions
as members of law-making bodies with the privileges and
immunities granted by the phrase "breach of peace." I wonder

why the members of the future National Assembly cannot

perform their duties with the same limitations and with the same
privileges. Mr. President and members the Convention, the
history of parliamentary immunity shows that it was never
intended to exempt members of the National Assembly from
criminal arrest. When American sovereignty was implanted into
these Islands, a new theory of government was implanted too.
This theory of government places every man equal before the
eyes of the law. The grant of certain privileges to any set of
persons means the abrogation of this principle of equality before
the eyes of the law. Another reason, Mr. President and
Members of the Convention, is this: The State Legislature is the
agent of the State. The power or the right of the Legislature to
claim privileges is based on the right of self-preservation. The
right of the State to claim privileges is due to the fact that it has
the right to carry its function without obstacle. But we must also
remember that any Legislature is but the agent of the State. The
State is the principal. Any crime committed, whether such crime
is committed by a colorum or by a gangster, endangers the
State. Giving more privileges to an agent, which is the
Legislature, at the expense of the principal, which is the State, is
not a sound policy. So that, Mr. President, and Members of the
Convention, believing that under the phrase "breach of peace",
our future members of the Assembly can very well perform the
duties incumbent upon them. I submit my amendment for the
consideration of this Convention." 18
Delegate Manuel Roxas on behalf of the sub-committee of
seven did not object. As a matter of fact, he was for such
amendment. He considered it "well-founded" and was for such
immunity complying "with the wording of the [Philippine
Autonomy Act] in this particular." 19 The Convention readily
approved the amendment by acclamation.
It does not admit of doubt therefore that the immunity from
arrest is granted by the Constitution was understood in the
same sense it has in American law, there being a similar
provision in the American Constitution. 20 Its authoritative
interpretation in the United States was supplied by the
Williamson case, a 1908 decision. 21
According to the then Justice, later Chief Justice, White who

penned the opinion, "the term "treason, felony and breach of the
peace," as used in the constitutional provision relied upon,
excepts from the operation of the privilege all criminal offenses,
... " 22 He traced its historical background thus: "A brief
consideration of the subject of parliamentary privilege in
England will, we think, show the source whence the expression
"treason felony, and breach of the peace" was drawn, and leave
no doubt that the words were used in England for the very
purpose of excluding all crimes from the operation of the
parliamentary privilege, and therefore to leave that privilege to
apply only to prosecutions of a civil nature." 23 Story's treatise on
the Constitution was likewise cited, his view on the matter being
quite emphatic: "Now, as all crimes are offenses against the
peace, the phrase "breach of the peace" would seem to extend
to all indictable offenses, as well those which are in fact
attended with force and violence, as those which are only
constructive breaches of the peace of the government,
inasmuch as they violate its good order." 24
As far as American constitutional law is concerned, both Burdick
25 and Willoughby 26 could use practically identical appraising
such immunity, the former stating that it "is not now of great
importance" and the latter affirming that it "is of little importance
as arrest of the person is now almost never authorized except
for crimes which fall within the classes exempt from the
priviledge." The state of the American law on this point is aptly
summarizedby Cooley: "By common parliamentary law, the
members of the legislature are privileged from arrest on civil
process during the session of that body, and for a reasonable
time before and after, to enable them to go to and return from
the same." 27 A prosecution for a criminal offense, is thus
excluded from this grant of immunity. So it should be Philippine
law, if deference were to be paid to what was explicitly agreed
upon in the Constitutional Convention.
2. Would it make a difference however in the availability of the
writs of certiorari sought by petitioners considering that Article
145 of the Revised Penal Code would impose upon any public
officer or employee who shall, while the Congress is in regular
or special session, arrest or charge any member thereof except
in case such member has committed a crime punishable by

penalty higher than prision mayor? 28 The assumption here

indulged is that the effect of the above in the Revised Penal
Code was to expand the grant of parliamentary immunity under
the Philippine Autonomy Act, although its literal language does
not go that far. It is to be remembered, however, that it took
effect on January 1, 1932 before the enforcement of the present
Constitution in 1935. Considering that both under the then
organic law, the Philippine Autonomy Act and equally so under
the present Constitution, such a more generous treatment
accorded legislators exempting them from arrest even if
warranted under a penal law, the question as to whether it did
survive becomes unavoidable. It is our opinion that the answer
must be in the negative.
The Constitution is equally explicit on the following point: "All
laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the
inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter,
such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this
Constitution until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the
Congress of the Philippines, and all references in such laws to
the government or officials of the Philippines shall be construed,
in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and
corresponding officials under this Constitution." 29 In People v.
Linsangan 30 decided in December, 1935, barely a month after
the Constitution took effect, the continued applicability of
Section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code that would
allow the prosecution of a person who remains delinquent in the
payment of cedula tax, 31 this Court, in its opinion thru the pen of
the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Abad Santos, after setting
forth that the Constitution prohibits the imprisonment for debt on
non-payment of poll tax, 32 held: "It seems too clear to require
demonstration that section 2718 of the Revised Administrative
Code is inconsistent with section 1, clause 12, of Article III of the
Constitution in that, while the former authorizes imprisonment
for non-payment of the poll or cedula tax, the latter forbids it. It
follows that upon the inauguration of the Government of the
Commonwealth, said section 2718 of the Revised Administrative
Code became inoperative, and no judgment of conviction can be
based thereon." 33
So it was in De los Santos v. Mallare. 34 Again under the

provision of the Revised Administrative Code the President

could remove at pleasure any of the appointive officials under
the Charter of the City of Baguio. 35 Relying on such a provision,
the then President Quirino removed petitioner De los Santos
who was appointed City Engineer Baguio of on July 16, 1946,
and chose in his place respondent Gil R. Mallare. The Revised
Administrative Code was a legislation that dates back to 1917,
36 eighteen years before the Constitution prohibited any officer
or employee in the civil service being removed or suspended
except for cause as provided by law. 37 Again this Court, in the
light of aforecited provision in an opinion of Justice Tuason,
held: "So, unlike legislation that is passed in defiance of the
Constitution, assertive and menacing, the questioned part of
section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code does not need
a positive declaration of nullity by the court to put it out of the
way. To all intents and purposes, it is non-existent, outlawed
and eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution itself by
express mandate before the petitioner was appointed." 38 In the
language of the constitutional provision then that portion of
Article 145 penalizing a public official or employee who shall
while the Congress is in regular or special session arrest or
search any member thereof except in case he has committed a
crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code by a penalty
higher than prision mayor is declared inoperative.
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and
fortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full
recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and
likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to
the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital
responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of
their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech
should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from
arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged
class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their
liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune
during their attendance in Congress and in going to and
returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from
the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his
functions efficiently and well, without the need for any

transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate

event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen
considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it
that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be
expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might
unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices
to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an
accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an
individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at
abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary
would main independent. It is trite to say that in each and every
manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the
essence.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and habeas corpus by
Delegate Manuel Martinez by Festin in L-34022 and the
petitions for certiorari and prohibition by Delegate Fernando
Bautista, Sr. in L-34046 and L-34047 are hereby dismissed.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT Manila
EN BANC

DECISION
September 13, 1985
G.R. No. L-37168-69 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DELFINO BELTRAN, alias Minong, DOMINGO HERNANDEZ,
alias Doming; CEFERINO BELTRAN, alias Ebing; MANUEL
PUZON alias Noling; CRESENCIO SIAZON, alias Ising; and
ROGELIO BUGARIN, alias Boy, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Ernesto P.
Pagayatan for accused-appellants.
Relova, J.:
Accused-appellants Delfino Beltran, alias Minong; Rogelio
Bugarin, alias Boy; Cresencio Siazon, alias Ising; Manuel
Puzon, alias Noling; Domingo Hernandez, alias Doming; and,
Ceferino Beltran, alias Ebing, were indicted for murder and
double attempted murder with direct assault in the then Court of
First Instance of Cagayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 158S. Likewise, Delfino Beltran was charged with attempted murder
in Criminal Case No. 160-S.
After trial they were convicted and sentenced as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds all the accused DELFINO
BELTRAN alias Minong, ROGELIO BUGARIN alias Boy,
CRESENCIO SIAZON alias Ising, MANUEL PUZON alias
Noling, DOMINGO HERNANDEZ alias Doming and CEFERINO
BELTRAN alias Ebing, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder for the death of VICENTE QUIROLGICO. There
being no mitigating circumstance, the Court has no other
alternative than to impose the maximum penalty provided for by
law. Accused Delfino Beltran, Rogelio Bugarin, Cresencio
Siazon, Manuel Puzon, Domingo Hernandez and Ceferino
Beltran are hereby sentenced to the maximum penalty of

DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of Vicente Quirolgico the sum of

P 12,000.00 for the loss of his life; P 75,000.00 as
reimbursement for expenses covering medical funeral
embalming mausoleum and burial lot, and the further sum of P
50,000.00 for moral damages, jointly and severally and to pay
the costs, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, taking into consideration the nature of the principal
penalty imposed.
The Court likewise finds all the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of DOUBLE ATTEMPTED
MURDER WITH DIRECT ASSAULT and hereby imposes upon
an of them the penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL in its
medium period and orders them to undergo a prison term
ranging from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day as minimum to 17
years and 4 months as maximum and to pay the costs.
Under Crim. Case No, 160-S, accused DELFINO BELTRAN is
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and hereby sentence him to undergo
a prison term ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 3
years, 6 months and 20 days of prision correccional and to pay
the costs. (pp. 402-403, Record)
The People's evidence shows that in the evening of January 11,
1972, between 9:00 and 10:00, in Ballesteros, Cagayan,
Ernesto Alvarado was bringing Calixto Urbi home in a jeep.
Passing by the Puzon Compound, Delfino Beltran alias Minong,
shouted at them, "Oki ni inayo" (Vulva of your mother). They
proceeded on their way and ignored Delfino. After Alvarado had
brought Urbi to his house he went to the house of Mayor
Bienvenido Quirolgico and reported the matter. The newly
elected Mayor told the Chief of Police that something should be
done about it.
They decided to go to the Puzon Compound with the intention to
talk to Delfino Beltran and his companions to surrender
considering that he knew them personally as all of them were
once working for Congressman David Puzon When they came
near the compound, they saw appellants Delfino Beltran,
Rogelio Bugarin and Domingo Hernandez and suddenly there
was a simultaneous discharge of gunfire, The mayor's son,
Vicente, who was with them, cried: " I am already hit, Daddy."

As he fell, Vicente pushed his father and both fell down. Mayor
Quirolgico and Patrolman Rolando Tolentino also suffered
injuries. When the firing had stopped, they decided to bring
Vicente to the hospital. As the jeep left the compound three (3)
men came out of the Puzon Compound and fired at the fleeing
vehicle. They were Cresencio Siazon, Ceferino Beltran and
Noling Puzon. Likewise, Domingo Hernandez and Minong
Beltran and Boy Bugarin tried to give chase. After a while, all the
six men returned inside the compound.
An hour after admission to the hospital Vicente Quirolgico died.
Autopsy examination on the deceased Vicente Quirolgico
showed the following findings:
1. Gunshot wound. inlet wound at the posterior portion of right
Mid-axillary line, at the level of the 5th costal ribs at the back,
traversing the right side of the chest, harrowing the right lung,
and fracturing the four (4) postal ribs on the right side front
causing an outlet wound almost six (6) inches long over the right
side of the chest diagonally from above the right nipple
downward near the right mid-axillary line. The inlet has almost
one (1) cm. diameter.
2. Gunshot, wound left knee inlet wound at the exterior and
posterior side of the left knee. almost (1) cm. diameter, directed
towards the medial side of the left knee, fracturing the left knee
and inlet wound two (2) inches long.
3. Gunshot wound of the right thigh, inlet wound, anterior on
front side of the right thigh at the middle thirds, measuring
almost one (1) cm. diameter.
4. Gunshot wound at the internal angle of the left eye inlet
wound almost one (1) cm. diameter, directed downwards and
medially traversing the right side of the face.
CAUSE OF DEATH: INTERNAL HEMORRHAGE secondary to
Gunshot wound of the chest and left eye. (Exh. "B", p. 10,
Records).
and the examination on Mayor Quirolgico shows the following
injuries:
(1) Wound, gunshot, face right;
(2) Wound, gunshot, upper lips right;
(3) Wound, gunshot, leg, right;
(4) Wound, gunshot, big toe, right;

(5) Wound, gunshot, 2nd toe, right (Exh. "A-1", P. 22, Record)
and on Patrolman Rolando Tolentino, the following injuries:
(1) Wound, gunshot, amper fated index, middle and ring fingers,
right;
(2) Wound, lacerated, 1 cm. long, 1/3 cm. deep lumbar region,
right;
(3) Wound, lacerated 1/4 cm. long, 1/3 cm. deep forearm, left.
(Exh. "A", p. 20, Record.)
On November 23, 1982, this Court, upon receipt of the
information of the death of appellant Cresencio Siazon alias
Ising on February 17, 1982 due to "Cardio Respiratory Arrest
Secondary to Carcinoma Liver, Pulmonary Tuberculosis," from
Mr. Ramon J. Liwag, Officer-in-Charge, New Bilibid Prisons,
Muntinlupa, as well as the Comment filed by the Solicitor
General on the aforesaid information, Resolved to dismiss the
case insofar as the criminal liability of the deceased Cresencio
Siazon alias Ising is concerned.
Appellant Rogelio Bugarin claims that between 5:00 and 5:30 in
the afternoon of January 11, 1972,, the armed men inside the
passing jeep of Mayor Quirolgico fired at Rogelio Bugarin, who
was then standing at the main gate of Puzon Compound. After
the armed men had passed by, Rogelio Bugarin proceeded to
the office of Congressman Puzon where he met Ebing Beltran
and Delfino Beltran who both asked him about the gun reports.
They just dismissed the incident as no one was hurt. Rogelio
Bugarin played guitar while waiting for supper.
Around 10:30 in the evening of the same date, or after
appellants had taken their supper at Puzon Compound, they
heard an unusual sound which appeared to be a six by six truck
that was bumped. Thereafter, at about 12:00 midnight of the
same day, Delfino Beltran, posted himself as guard and
positioned himself in front of the gate of the Rural Bank. While at
the place he saw a group of persons, numbering more than ten,
along the road in front of the Rural Bank. Among the group of
armed men, he was able to recognize the Chief of Police of
Ballesteros, Gavino Collado, holding a swinging flashlight,
Gerry, Bundok Usita and Bunti Pinzon. When the group reached
the gate of Puzon Compound, he peeped and took hold of the
gate with an iron chain. Accidentally, he dropped the chain and

it created a sound which caused the group of armed men to fire

upon his direction for about half an hour. In retaliation, he
loaded his gun following which he saw a man falling down from
the fence. As the firing continued, he stealthily mounted his gun
on top of the fence and fired the same.
When the firing ceased, he proceeded to the residence of
Congressman Puzon. In the sala, he saw Boy Bugarin, Doming
Hernandez, Ising Siazon, Noling Puzon, Ebing Beltran and
Floresida Amayon, conversing. Upon seeing him, his
companions asked him what was that firing all about. He told
them that he traded shots with a group of armed men.
Thereafter, they hid in the basement of the residence of the
Congressman, staying there for one whole day. The following
day, Delfino Beltran surrendered to Captain Retuta, while the
rest escaped but thereafter surrendered.
The defense of appellant Delfino Beltran, alias Minong, is selfdefense; whereas appellants Rogelio Bugarin, alias Boy,
Ceferino Beltran, alias Ebing, and Manuel Puzon, alias Noling
denied having anything to do with the incident.
In this appeal, appellants contend that the trial court erred in: (1)
giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution; (2) holding
that conspiracy existed among them in the commission of the
offense charged in Criminal Case No. 158-S; (3) finding that
treachery and evident premeditation attended the commission of
the crimes; (4) not finding that appellant Delfino Beltran acted in
self-defense; (5) finding appellants guilty of attempted murder
with direct assault on Mayor Quirolgico and Pat. Rolando
Tolentino; and (6) not appreciating in favor of the appellants the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
On the first assigned error, We reiterate the established doctrine
that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate
courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court,
considering that it is in a better position to decide the question,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the hearing, unless
it had overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result of the case.
The judgment of conviction is not bereft of evidence to support
the same. Hereunder are the testimonies of the prosecution's

eyewitnesses, namely:
Carmelita Collado who declared the following:
Q Will you inform the Honorable Court who was that one
shouting?
A Minong Beltran, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Will you inform the Court what was that?
A I heard the voice of Mr. Minong Beltran saying, 'Cida, Cida,
you bring out the guns now I have already shot at the BRQ jeep
and they are sure to come back.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Can you tell us what you saw at that time?
A I saw these three persons, Minong Beltran, Boy Bugarin and
Domingo Hernandez, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What else did you see if any?
A When these three persons came out, they were already
xxx xxx xxx
Q Will you inform this Court what was that?
A Upon coming out, Delfino Beltran ordered Doming Hernandez
to go to the right side of the old office of Congressman Puzon
and he also instructed Boy Bugarin to seek cover to the Rural
Bank.
xxx xxx xxx
Q During all these time that these were happening, the going
out of Doming Hernandez, of Bugarin; the ordering of Minong
Beltran to the two, did you see any other persons inside the
compound of Congressman Puzon aside from the three?
A After the three had placed themselves in their respective
positions, I saw persons coming out but I was not able to
recognize them. (tsn., pp. 5-7, 42-45, Nov. 18, 1972 hearing.)
Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico testified as follows:
Q And do you know what happened after you walked a few
steps to the south?
A When I was looking very well around the vicinity, at the
southern part of the Rural Bank about the corner of their fence,
and as I tried to look intently, I recognized the face of Minong
Beltran.
xxx xxx xxx

Q At the precise moment, when you saw Minong Beltran at the

corner of the Rural Bank, what else happened if any?
A As I tried to look near them, that was the time when there was
a burst of gun fire, the direction of which was coming from the
place where they were staying.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Will you inform this Honorable Court who the other men were
at that time?
A Boy Bugarin and Domingo Hernandez.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And after the shooting, there was the shout?
A At the lulling of the shooting, I heard the shout.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And what were the words?
A 'Nala na si Mayor' (The mayor is already hit). (tsn., pp. 20, 21,
31-32, 58-59, Nov. 17, 1972 hearing)
Patrolman Rolando Usita stated that:
Q You said that as the mayor was leaving the scene of the
incident, you saw three of the accused coming out of the
guardhouse, do you confirm that?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And the persons who came out from this point according to
you are the accused Ising Siazon, Ebing Beltran and Noling
Puzon, do you confirm that?
A Yes, sir.
Q And after that the three other accused named as Doming
Hernandez, Boy Bugarin and Minong Beltran came out of the
same compound?
A No, sir. They came out from here. (tsn., pp. 84, 87, February
19, 1973 hearing)
Chief of Police Gavino Collado also pointed out the following:
Q May I see the sketch, your Honor?
A The mayor took this road in going to the hospital (witness
pointing to the Bonifacio Cortez Street), and as the jeep was
going westward, and reached this point, three men came out
from this part of the compound and they fired at the vehicle in
which the mayor and his son rode on.
xxx xxx xxx

Q So that the Court would now understand from your statement

that it was only after the jeep of the mayor has left already the
scene when three persons came out from the gate of the Puzon
compound, that you saw for the first time these persons?
A Yes, sir.
Q And these persons were Identified as Ebing Beltran,
Cresencio Siazon and Noling Puzon?
A Yes, sir. (tsn., pp. 59, 80, January 9, 1973 hearing)
The denial of appellants Rogelio Bugarin, Ceferino Beltran and
Manuel Puzon cannot, therefore, prevail over their positive
Identification, as the perpetrators of the crime by the
aforenamed eyewitnesses who have not been shown to have
any evil motive to testify falsely against them.
Moreover, the physical evidence, as testified to by Dr. Gregorio
R. Farin, Municipal Health Officer of Ballesteros, Cagayan, who
conducted the post mortem examination on the body of the
deceased Vicente Quirolgico, shows that several firearms could
have caused his wounds:
Q Considering the nature of the injuries that were found on the
body of the deceased, could it be possible that several firearms
could have caused these injuries?
A It is possible.
xxx xxx xxx
Q It is also possible that wounds Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were caused
by three different bullets, 3 different guns, different calibers?
A Yes, sir. It is possible. (tsn., pp. 65-66, Nov. 17, 1972 hearing)
The foregoing testimony of Dr. Farin finds support from the
findings of witnesses Vicente de Vera, a Ballistician, and Lt. Col.
Crispin Garcia, Chief Chemistry Branch, both of the Philippine
Constabulary Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City,
who conducted examinations on the empty shells and on the
firearms, respectively, recovered from the premises of the Rural
Bank and the Puzon Compound. Vicente de Vera testified on
direct examination, the following:
Q Under your findings No. 1, will you inform us your conclusion?
A My conclusion was that the 27 fired cartridges marked as CIS1 to 27 were fired from the firearm marked as Exhibit 'R' (SIG
Natu Rifle).
Q Your other findings, please tell the Court.

A Under findings Nos. 2: Microscopic examination and

comparison of the 223 Cal. fired cartridge cases marked as CIS
28 to CIS 154 revealed the non-congruency of striations with the
test cartridge cases fired from the abovementioned 223 caliber
M16 Armalite rifle with Serial No. 527226. They further revealed
the following:
1. CIS 28 to CIS 62 were fired from one (1) firearm;
2. CIS 63 to CIS 95 were fired from one (l) firearm;
3. CIS 96 to CIS 102 were fired from one (1) firearm;
4. CIS 103 to CIS 154 were fired from one (1) firearm
Q May we know your conclusion of this findings of yours?
A My conclusion is that, the 223 Caliber fired cartridges marked
as CIS 28 to CIS 154 were fired from four different firearms but
not from the above-entioned 223 Cal. M16 Armalite with SN527226. (tsn., pp. 29-30, January 8, 1973 hearing)
and on cross-examination declared that:
Q Supposing that there are three SIG rifles of the same Serial
number and the fired cartridges from this three guns have the
same number of similar characteristics or congruency of
striations? A They can have no similar characteristics. Q Do you
mean to say that for every SIG rifle there is its own
characteristics; that congruency of striations? A That is correct.
(tsn., p. 36, January 8, 1973 hearing)
whereas, Lt. Col. Crispin B. Garcia on the witness stand
declared:
Q With this request for examination of certain articles, what
articles were actually submitted to you for examinations? A Well
one (1) rifle SIG, Switzerland made with SN-5721, the barrel
group bearing Serial Number 15721; the receiver group with
SN-5720 and the barrel link bearing SN-9641, and another
firearm (Exh. 'R'). Q Colonel aside from this article, Exhibit 'R',
what other articles or guns did you receive for examination? A
One Armalite with Serial No. 527226. (Exhibit 'S') xxx xxx xxx Q
With reference to the first rifle which you have mentioned, which
is marked as Exhibit 'R', with different serial numbers, in the
barrel group, receiver group, and the barrel link, will you inform
this Honorable Court your findings? A I found that the barrel of
the Armalite is positive for the presence of gunpowder, sir. xxx
xxx xxx Q With reference to this Armalite, M15, marked as

Exhibit 'S', in this particular case, will you tell us your findings
about the presence of gunpowder? A Exhibit 'S', the barrel is
positive of gunpowder. (tsn., pp. 52, 55, 57, & 58, January 8,
1973 hearing)
The above findings further confirm the truth of the statements of
eyewitnesses Gavino Collado, Patrolman Usita, Mayor
Quirolgico and Carmelita Collado that appellants traded shots
with the Mayor's group, using long or high powered guns. Anent
the second assigned error, We agree with the trial court's finding
on the existence of conspiracy. In the case at bar, the sequence
of events that transpired in the evening of January 11, 1972,
from the time Delfino Beltran first fired upon the passing jeep of
Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico, driven by witness Ernesto
Alvarado at around 9:00, the subsequent preparations for the
arrival of the Mayor as testified to by eyewitness Carmelita
Collado, the shooting on the other passing jeepney to further
provoke the Mayor, and the simultaneous and sudden firing at
the Mayor's group which had just arrived at about 12:00
midnight in the scene of the crime; the final shooting of the
fleeing Mayor; and, the simultaneous common retreat and
escape of all the accused, established the presence of
conspiracy. For conspiracy to exist, it is enough that at the time
the offense was committed, the participants had the same
purpose and were united in its execution, as may be inferred
from the attendant circumstances (People vs. Manalo, 133
SCRA 626). Further, conspiracy does not require an agreement
for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence, as conspiracy
legally exists if, at the time of the offense, the accused had the
same criminal purpose and were united in its execution.
Appellants' conduct and/or actuations before, during and after
the commission of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 158S are circumstances proving conspiracy. Conspiracy having
established, the act of one is the act of all. It is no longer
necessary to specifically lay out the particular participation of
each participant. Relative to the third assigned error, the trial
court properly appreciated the existence of the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery. From
9:00 in the evening to 12:00 midnight of the same day,
appellants had three (3) long hours to meditate and reflect on

their evil design and they clung in their determination to kill the
Mayor, which fortunately failed.
Premeditation is present where there was a lapse of two hours
from the inception to execution.
The existence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery was
shown in the simultaneous and sudden firing by the accused on
the newly arrived Mayor's group, without warning. We are
convinced that they employed means, methods or forms which
could have tended directly or insured the accomplishment of
their evil design against the Mayor, with whom they have no
personal grudge, without risk to themselves arising from the
defense which the offended party had made. No one from
herein appellants sustained a scratch as they were really
prepared for the coming Mayor. With respect to the fourth
assigned error, the claim of Delfino Beltran that he had just
acted in self-defense, suffice it to say, that the one invoking this
justifying circumstance must prove beyond reasonable doubt
that all the necessary requisites of self-defense are present,
namely: (1) Unlawful aggression on the part of the offended
party; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and, (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself. Delfino Beltran had not
proved any one of these. Thus, his claim of self-defense was
properly dismissed by the trial court. Regarding the fifth
assigned error, considering that Mayor Quirolgico is a person in
authority and Pat. Rolando Tolentino is a policeman who at the
time was in his uniform, and both were performing their official
duties to maintain peace and order in the community, the finding
of the trial court that appellants are guilty of attempted murder
with direct assault on the persons of Mayor Quirolgico and Pat.
Tolentino is correct. Relative to the last assigned error, following
Our latest ruling in People vs. Nicolas Canamo, et al., G.R. No.
62043, promulgated on August 13, 1985, We agree with
appellants that they should be credited with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, as they in fact presented
themselves voluntarily to the authorities. However, this
mitigating circumstance is offset by the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation. WHEREFORE, in
Criminal Case No. 158-S, with the modifications that for lack of

necessary votes, the penalty imposed upon appellants Delfino

Beltran alias Minong, Rogelio Bugarin alias Boy, Manuel Puzon
alias Noling, Domingo Hernandez alias Doming and Ceferino
Beltran alias Ebing, for the death of Vicente Quirolgico, is
reduced to Reclusion Perpetua, and that the indemnity to the
heirs of the deceased Vicente Quirolgico is increased to
P30,000.00, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in an other
respects. For the double attempted murder with direct assault,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposed
on the aforesaid appellants is reduced to four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as maximum. In Criminal Case No. 160S, applying also the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty
imposed to the accused Delfino Beltran is reduced to Six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. With costs. SO
ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 70639 June 30, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO DOLLANTES, HAMLET DOLLANTES, ALFREDO
DOLLANTES, LAURO DOLLANTES, MONICO DOLLANTES,
SIDRITO LOKESIO, MERLANDO DOLLANTES, HUGO
GRENGIA, DANNY ESTEBAN AND LEONILO VILLAESTER,
accused-appellants.
PARAS, J:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City, 7th Judicial Region, Branch XL, in Criminal
Case No. 5832, convicting the nine (9) accused, Pedro
Dollantes, Hamlet Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Monico Dollantes,
Sidrito Lokesio, Merlando Dollantes, Hugo Grengia, Danny
Esteban and Leonilo Villaester, all equally guilty of the complex
crime of "Assault upon a Person in Authority Resulting in
Murder" and sentencing the abovementioned accused to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased, jointly and severally, the sum of P30,000.00 to
pay attomey's fees in the amount of P3,000.00 and to pay the
costs.
All of the accused were charged as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of April 1983 at nighttime, in the
Municipality of Tayasan, Province of Negros Oriental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and helping one another with evident premeditation
and treachery, and with intent to kill did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Marcos
Gabutero, Barangay Captain of Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros
Oriental, an agent of a person in authority and which fact
accused had full knowledge, while the latter was in the lawful
performance of his official duty or function as Barangay Captain
or on the occasion of such function, with a bolo and hunting

knives with which the accused were then armed and provided,
thereby inflicting the following wounds in the victim, viz:
1. Stab wound measuring three and a half (3 1/2) cm. in length
and half (1/2) cm. in width, ten (10) cm. depthness located at the
left anterior aspect of the trunk at the level of the 3rd intercostal
space, 5 cm. away from the anterior mid-line. The wound was
oriented horizontally and directed vertically and slightly to the
back. Ventricle and lung tissue penetrated.
2. Stab wound measuring four (4) cm. in length, 1 cm. in width,
eleven and a half (11 1/2) cm. depthness, located at the right
anterior aspect of the trunk, at the level of the 2nd intercostal
space about five (5) cm. away from the anterior and midline, the
wound was oriented horizontally and directed downward and
slightly to the back.
3. Incised wound five (5) cm. in length, 1 cm. in width located at
the left anterior aspect of the trunk about 26 cm. below the left
clavicle and four (4) cm. away from the anterior mid-line. The
wound was oriented obliquely.
4. Incised wound measuring two (2) cm. in length and one (1)
cm. in width, located at the right anterior aspect of the trunk
about twenty-one (21) cm. below the right clavicle and eight (8)
cm. away from the anterior line. The wound was oriented
obliquely.
5. Incised wound measuring one and a half (1 1/2) cm. in length,
half (1/2) cm. in width located at the anterior aspect of the upper
extremity about nine (9) cm. above the wrist joint one and a half
(1 1/2) cm. away from the anterior mid-line and medially. The
wound was oriented vertically.
6. Incised wound measuring four (4) cm. in length, 1 cm. in
width located at the lateral aspect of the right upper extreme
about five (5) cm. above the elbow joint and five (5) cm. away
from the posterior midline laterally. The wound was oriented
horizontally.
7. Through and through stab wound located at the left upper
extremity the wound of entrance measuring about three and a
half (3 1/2) cm. in length and one (1) cm. in width located at the
posterior aspect of the forearm above five (5) em. below the
elbow joint, three (3) cm. away from the anterior mid-line
medially. The wound was oriented vertically.

8. Incised wound measuring 3 cm. in length half (1/2) cm. in

width located at the lateral aspect of the left upper extremity
about five (5) cm. below the elbow joint and (5) cm. away from
the posterior mid-line. The wound was oriented horizontally.
9. Stab wound measuring one and one-half (1 1/2) cm. in width
and four (4) cm. depthness located at the left anterior aspect of
the trunk, about seven and a half (7 1/2) cm. above the ihac
crest and twelve (12) cm. away from the anterior mid-line. The
wound was oriented obliquely and directed downward, slightly to
the right and posteriority, perforating part of the intestine.
10. Stab wound measuring three (3) cm. in length, one (1) cm.
in width and seven and a half (7) cm. in depthness, located at
the left posterior of the trunk about three (3) cm. above the lower
angle of the scapula, and seven (7) cm. away from the posterior
mid-line. The wound was oriented obliquely and directed
downward and slightly to the left.
11. Stab wound measuring three(3) cm. in length, one (l) cm. in
width and twelve (12) cm. in depthness, located at the left
posterior aspect of the trunk about thirteen (13) cm. below the
lower angle of the scapula and six (6) cm. away from the
posterior mid-line. The wound was oriented obliquely and
directed anteriority to the left.
12. Hemothorax on the left pleural cavity, which wounds caused
the latter's untimely death.
Contrary to Art. 248, 148 and 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
(Information, Original Record, pp. 3-4)
The findings of facts of the trial court are as follows:
That deceased Marcos Gabutero at the time of his death was
the Barangay Captain of Barangay Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros
Oriental; that due to the approaching fiesta of barangay Maglihe,
a dance was held in said barangay in the evening of April 21,
1983; that while the Barangay Captain was delivering a speech
to start the dance, the accused Pedro Dollantes went to the
middle of the dancing floor, making a dance movement known in
the visayan as "nagkorantsa", brandishing his knife and
challenging everyone as to who was brave among the people
present; the Barangay Captain approached Pedro Dollantes and
admonished him to keep quiet and not to disturb the dance.
However, the accused, instead of heeding to the advice of the

Barangay Captain, stabbed the latter on the left arm; that

accused Hugo Grengia held the left hand of accused Pedro
Dollantes and Dionilo Garol was able to get from the hand of
Pedro Dollantes the hunting knife. Immediately thereafter,
accused Hamlet Dollantes, who rushed towards the Barangay
Captain, stabbed the Barangay Captain at the back and the
other co-accused also took turns in stabbing the Barangay
Captain; the Barangay Captain at that time was not armed.
Except for the accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and
Leonilo Villaester who were merely holding stones, the other coaccused participated in the stabbing incident. When the
Barangay Captain fell to the ground and died, the accused in
this case took turns in kicking the dead body of the Barangay
Captain and were dancing around said dead body; that the
Barangay Captain suffered eleven (11) wounds in the different
parts of his body, two of which happened to be at the back of his
dead body. According to the attending physician, Dr. Rogelio
Kho who examined the body of the deceased, the victim died of
"Severe hemorrhage and cardiac tamponade due to stab
wounds." (Decision, Crim. Case No. 5832, Rollo, p. 75).
The evidence for the prosecution consisted principally of the
testimonies of Dionilo Garol, Bonifacio Cero, Marciana
Gabutero, the wife of the deceased, Pat. Ricardo Barrera, Dr.
Rogelio Kho who conducted the post mortem examination of the
deceased, Ponsimillo Balasabas, the Municipal Treasurer of
Tayasan, Negros Oriental and Pat. Jose Amis of the Integrated
National Police.
On the other hand, the defense presented the following
witnesses: Accused: Hugo Grengia, Leonilo Villaester, Danny
Esteban, Alfredo Dollantes, Hamlet Dollantes, and other
witnesses: Machim Dollantes and Tacio Fausto.After a careful
evaluation of the evidence, the trial court was convinced that all
the accused in this case conspired in the commission of the
crime.
Thus on February 20, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision
finding all the accused guilty of the complex crime of assault
upon a person in authority resulting in murder. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of all the

accused beyond reasonable doubt, this Court hereby finds the

accused Pedro Dollantes, Hamlet Dollantes, Alfredo Dollantes,
Lauro Dollantes, Monico Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesia, Merlando
Dollantes, Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester,
guilty of the complex crime of assault upon a person in authority
resulting in murder, and hereby sentences the above-mentioned
accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of Marcos Gabutero, jointly and severally,
the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) PESOS, to pay
attorney's fees in the amount of Three Thousand (P3,000.00)
Pesos, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED. (RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 79)
From the aforementioned decision, all the accused appealed.
Accused Hugo Grengia submitted a separate brief.
The appellant raised the following assignment of errors:
FIRST ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND
CREDIT
TO
THE
BIASED,
INCREDIBLE
AND
CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES DIONILO GAROL, BONIFACIO CERO AND
MARCIANA GABUTERO AND IN NOT CONSIDERING AT
LEAST
THE
UNCONTRADICTED
TESTIMONY
OF
INDEPENDENT WITNESSES DOLLANTES AND TACIO
FAUSTO.
SECOND AND THIRD ERRORS
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE
EXPERT PROSECUTION WITNESS DR. ROGELIO R. KHO
WHICH IN EFFECT CONTRADICTS THE THEORY OF THE
PROSECUTION AND THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DECIDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTS.
FOURTH ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FROM NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO
THE TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED HUGO GRENGIA, LEONILO
VILLAESTER alias "Laon," DANILO ESTEBAN, HAMLET
DOLLANTES, ALFREDO DOLLANTES AND THE TESTIMONY
OF INDEPENDENT WITNESSES TACIO FAUSTO AND
MCLEAN DOLLANTES.
FIFTH ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED

GUILTY OF THE COMPLEX CRIME OF ASSAULT UPON A

PERSON IN AUTHORITY RESULTING TO MURDER AND
SENTENCING THEM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF
RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS
OF MARCOS GABUTERO, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, THE
SUM OF THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS, and TO
PAY THE COSTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS. (Brief for AccusedAppellant, Rollo, p. 62)
In his separate brief, accused Hugo Grengia assigns the
following errors:
1. The lower court erred in not giving weight and credence to the
admission of accused-appellant Hamlet Dollantes that he was
the lone perpetrator of the alleged stabbing of victim Marcos
Gabutero.
2. The lower court erred in not considering the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses, namely: Patrolman Ricardo Barrera, Dr.
Rogeho Kho which in effect buttressed the theory of the
defense.
3. The lower court erred in not considering the entry in the police
logbook of the Tayasan Integrated National Police, dated April
21, 1983, as testified to by Patrolman Jose Amis.
4. The lower court erred in holding that conspiracy exist in
perpetration of the felony.
5. The lower court erred in holding that the case of People vs.
Agag (L-64951, June 29, 1984) is applicable to the case at bar
to justify the conviction of the accused-appellants.
6. The lower court erred in not giving weight and credence to the
testimony of the defense witnesses.
7. Finally, the trial court erred in holding that the accusedappellant herein is guilty of the crime charged. (Brief for
accusedappellant Hugo Grengia, pp. 1-2)
The appeal is without merit.
The issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses.
The accused were positively identified by three (3) prosecution
eye witnesses. They were: Dionilo Garol, Bonifacio Cero and
Marciana Gabutero, the wife of the victim. Except for the latter,
the two other witnesses Garol and Cero are not related to the
victim or the accused. The testimonies of these three (3)
witnesses were subjected to a lengthy cross-examination and

were found credible and free from material contradictions by the

trial court (Rollo, p. 75).
Dionilo Garol who was six (6) meters away, saw clearly what
happened. He testified that when the Barangay Captain started
to deliver his speech, the accused Pedro Dollantes brandishing
a knife shouted "Who is brave here?" (TSN, page 6, Oct. 7,
1983). The victim then approached to admonish him t the latter
stabbed the victim on the arm. Garol immediately approached
the accused Pedro Dollantes and tried to wrest the knife away
from the hand of the accused. The accused Hugo Grengia also
tried to grab the knife but it was Garol who succeeded. The
accused Grengia then told him "Do not try to intervene because
you might be included in the plan." (TSN, page 8, Oct. 17,
1983). Then Grengia made some signs by nodding his head and
the accused Hamlet Dollantes and Alfredo Dollantes rushed to
and attacked the victim followed by the other co-accused in this
case who also rushed at and stabbed the victim. He specified
that accused Alfredo Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Monico
Dollantes and Sidrito Lokesio were carrying knives while the
accused Merlando Dollantes was carrying a bolo; and that they
stabbed the victim one after another. He said that the accused
Danny Esteban, Hugo Grengia andLeonilo Villaester were all
carrying stones which they threw at the store of the victim's wife
(TSN, pp. 7-10; Oct. 17, 1983).
This testimony was fully corroborated by another prosecution
eyewitness Bonifacio Cero who was about three (3) meters
away and whose narration tallied on all material ints with that of
Dionilo Garol as to what transpired that night. He stated further
that when he saw the Barangay Captain being stabbed he tried
to approach the group but he was held by Danny Esteban who
said "do not try to interfere, you are not a party to this. We have
already gotten what we have been aiming for." (TSN, page 12,
Oct. 18, 1983). Thereafter, he ran away but Alfredo Dollantes,
Pedro Dollantes and Danny Esteban stoned him because they
intended to kill him also. He also testified that when he returned
to the crime scene, he saw Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and
companions simultaneously kicking the dead body and shouting
"who is brave among here. "
Marciana Gabutero, the wife of the victim funy corroborated the

testimonies of Garol and Cero. She also added that Hugo

Grengia wanted to be a Barangay Captain and she happened to
know that as a fact, because he told the crowd not to long as
Barangay Captain. She also testified that the accused Leonilo
Villaester splashed one glass of tuba on the face of the
deceased and that the victim had had a misunderstanding with
the Dollantes on a theft case involving Hamlet Dollantes (Rollo,
pp. 68-69).
It will be noted that the above witnesses were categorical and
straightforward when they stated that they saw appellants stab
the victim. They even specified the type of weapon used by
each of said appellants.
There is no possibility that they could have been mistaken in
their Identification for apart from being near the crime scene
which was well illuminated with two Petromax lamps (TSN, page
6, Oct. 19, 1983), these witnesses are familiar with the
appellants since they are all residents of the same locality.
Furthermore, there is no showing that the witnesses had any
motive to testify falsely against the appellants.
In fact, under similar circumstances, the Court has held that
where the scene of the stabbing was clearly lighted and no
motive was shown why prosecution witnesses would incriminate
the appellants, identification would be given full faith and credit
(People v. Escoltero, 139 SCRA 218).
The theory of the defense in this case is that it was only the
accused Hamlet Dollantes who stabbed the victim while the
other accused did not participate in the stabbing incident (Rollo,
pp. 75-76).
In an attempt to disprove the findings of the trial court,
appellants pointed out that there are certain inconsistencies that
render the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, incredible.
For one thing they claim that Dionilo Garol could not have een
Hamlet Dollantes stab the victim because as Garol himself
stated, when said accused rushed towards the victim, he ran
away. The evidence shows however, that Garol clearly testified
that he saw au of them stab the Barrio Captain, one after
another and it was only after the Barrio Captain fell to the
ground that he ran towards the municipal hall to report the
incident to the police (TSN, page 11, Oct. 17, 1983).

Another circumstance allegedly raising grave doubts on the

credibility of Dionilo Garol was his failure to report to the police
authorities the fact of stoning (Rollo, pp. 71-72).
However, the fact of stoning was not the means used to kill the
victim and the omission of the same in the narration in the report
does not detract from the established fact that the victim was
stabbed several times which caused his death.
It was also pointed out that Dionilo Garol testified that the store
of the victim's wife was stoned while Bonifacio Cero also
testified that he was the one being stoned.
There appears to be no inconsistency between the two
testimonies. The fact that the store of the victim's wife was
stoned does not preclude the possibility that Bonifacio Cero was
also stoned.
Finally, appellants maintain that Bonifacio Cero could not have
seen with precision the stabbing of the victim while he was
being hugged by Danny Esteban and he had a feeling that he
would be killed by the group. Much less could it be possiblefor
accused Danny Esteban, Leonflo Villaester, Sidrito Lokesio and
Alfredo Dollantes who were at the store of Severina Cadillero, to
join in stabbing the victim, the appellants argued (Rollo, pp. 7374).
The records show that Cero testified that he saw appellants stab
the deceased before he was embraced by appellant Danny
Esteban who told him "do not interfere you are not a party to
this. We have already gotten what we have been aiming for."
(TSN, page 12, Oct. 18, 1983). Clearly, the language is
unmistakable that in that at said point, the stabbing and the
killing being described by all the witnesses had already been
accomphshed.
Indeed, if there be any inconsistency or contradictions in their
testimonies, the same are trivial and merely refer to minor
matters which do not affect credibility. They do not detract from
the essential facts or vital details of the crime pinpointing their
criminal responsibility (Appellee's Brief, p. 16). As held by this
Court, discrepancies in minor details are to be expected from an
uncoached witness (People v. Arbois, 138 SCRA 31). Such
minor variations would rather show the sincerity of the witnesses
and the absence of connivance between them to make their

testimonies tally in every respect (People v. Pielago, 140 SCRA

419, 423). Truth to tell, such trivial differences constitute failsafe reliability.
Accused Hugo Grengia claims that the trial court erred in not
giving weight to the admission of accused Hamlet Dollantes that
he was the lone perpetrator of the killing incident (Brief for
Accused-Appellant Hugo Grengia, p. 7). Thus the defense
argues that the accused Pedro Dollantes, Alfredo Dollantes,
Merlando Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesio, Monico
Dollantes and Leonilo Villaester, did not stab the victim and
were not at the scene of the crime and that it was only accused
Hamlet Dollantes who stabbed the victim.
As found by the trial court, such claim is not supported by
sufficient evidence. On the contrary, an entry in the Police
Logbook (Exhibit "D") of the Integrated National Police of
Tayasan, Negros Oriental, shows that one Gloria Callao, wife of
the accused Lauro Dollantes, turned over to the police two (2)
hunting knives owned by the accused Hamlet Dollantes and
Alfredo Dollantes. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the
Solicitor General, such theory is behed by the Identification
made by the prosecution witnesses and by the number and
location of the victim's wounds which are mute evidence that
several persons comn)itted the crime (People's Brief, p. 17).
As repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, the claim of alibi by
the accused cannot prevail over positive Identification by
credible witnesses (People v. Tirol, 102 SCRA 58); more so
where as in the case at bar, it was not demonstrated that it was
physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene
of said crime at the time of its commission (People v. Mercado,
97 SCRA 232).
On the other hand, the claim of Hamlet Dollantes of self-defense
when he stabbed the victim is not sustained by the records. As
found by the trial court, the victim was not armed at the time of
the incident, so that there was no danger to the life and limb of
the accused. The latter claims that he had to stab the victim who
boxed him and would not release his wounded hand (Rollo, p.
76). Apart from the obvious disproportion of the means used to
repel the alleged attack, three witnesses of the prosecution
testified that the accused Hamlet Dollantes rushed towards the

victim and stabbed the latter at the back. Said testimonies were
corroborated by the Post Mortem Examination (Exhibit "A") and
the Sketch (Exhibit "B") of the human body of the victim which
showed a stab wound at the back. Furthermore, the nature,
character, location and extent of the wound suffered by the
victim, negates the accused's claim of self-defense. (People v.
Tolentino, 54 Phil. 77). In fact, the eleven (11) wounds suffered
by "he victim are indicative of aggression (People v. Somera, 83
Phil. 548; People v. Mendoza, L-16392, Jan. 30, 1965).
Accused-appellant Hugo Grengia submits that the prosecution
failed to prove the existence of conspiracy. Among others, he
pointed out that he was unarmed at the time of the incident, that
his name was not mentioned in the report made by Dionilo Garol
to Patrolman Barrera as to the perpetrators of the crime; that his
name was not included in the entry in the police logbook of the
Integrated National Police of Tayasan, Negros Oriental and that
he had no participation in the commission ofthe felony except
the alleged nodding of his head at a time when he was trying to
wrest the knife from Pedro Dollantes which is not an indication
of conspiracy (Brief for Grengia, pp. 13-16).
While it is true that the accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban
and Leonilo Villaester did not participate in the stabbing, the
lower court finds them equally liable as principals with the other
accused in this case. They were found to be holding stones
which they threw at the store owned by the victim and his wife;
they participated in kicking and dancing around the dead body
of the Barangay Captain and although Grengia also tried to
wrest the knife from Pedro Dollantes, he clearly told Dionilo
Garol when the latter succeeded in getting the knife and was
holding the hands of Pedro Dollantes, "do not try to intervene
here because you might be included in the plan." (TSN, pp. 710, Octoer 17, 1983). Danny Esteban uttered the same
statements to Bonifacio Cero, saying "do not try to interfere you
are not a party to this. We have already gotten what we have
been aiming or." (TSN, pp. 9-14, October 18,1983).
Furthermore, as previously stated, while the victim was
delivering a speech, Hugo Grengia was telumg people not to
listen to the victim as he will not stay long as a Barangay
Captain. It is also to be noted that although he was a compadre

of the victim, he never tried to help the former while he was

being stabbed and after the incident, he never visited the
victim's family.
Thus, the lower court found the existence of conspiracy as
follows:
The accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo
Villaester by their acts, aimed at the same object, and their acts,
though apparently independent, are in fact concerted and
cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association,
concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. The conduct of
the defendants, before, during and after the commission of the
crime clearly shows that they acted in concert. (People v. Emilio
Agag, L-64951, June 29, 1984, Justice Relova) There being
conspiracy, the Court finds them guilty of Murder. (Decision,
Crim. Case No. 5832, Rollo p. 77)
In one case, this Court held "that while the acts done by the
petitioners herein vary from those of their co-accused, there is
no question that they were all prompted and linked by a
common desire to assault and retaliate against the group.....
Thus, they must share equal liability for all the acts done by the
participants in the felonious undertaking." (Pring v. Court of
Appeals, 138 SCRA 185-186 [1985]).
Appellant Hugo Grengia lays much stress on the testimony of
Dr. Rogeho Kho that it is possible that all the stab wounds were
inflicted by the same weapon, in a desperate effort to show that
only one person committed the crime and that there is no
conspiracy.
The records show however, that said Doctor merely replied to
he questions propounded by the defense lawyer as to the
different possibilities on how the wounds of the victim may have
been inflicted. But testifying specifically on the case at bar, he
categorically stated that actually the wounds could be produced
by a single bladed weapon with different sizes but not
necessarily only a single bladed weapon.
Thus, the Doctor testified as follows:
Atty. Jayme:
Q Basing upon your physical findings, Doc, upon the victim
Marcos Gabutero, is it possible Doc, that in accordance with
your drawing that the wounds inflicted was caused by a single

bladed weapon, is it possible, Doctor, that this wound was

caused by a single bladed weapon? Is it possible that this. I
repeat the question, your Honor.
Q According to your drawing which is labelled "BS" which
according to you "blunt and sharp bladed weapon which is
practically single bladed weapon, according to your physical
findings there is similarly in the weapons used, could we say
practically, Doctor, that these stab wounds as well as those
incised wounds may be caused by one single-bladed weapon?
A Actually it could be produced by a single bladed weapon with
different sizes but not necessarily only a single bladed weapon.
Q According to you it was a single bladed weapon with different
or several sizes, now, what is your honest observation upon
your physical findings, what will be themaximum weapon used?
I have here a zerox copy for your own reference.
A With respect to the length of the wound there are two wounds
that have three em. in length, it could be possible that the same
kind of weapon or instrument has been used. This refers to
Wounds Nos.10 and 11. By the way, Sir, this refers to the stab
wounds because the size of the incised wounds is difficult to
determine.
Atty. Jayme:
Yes, the stab wounds only.
A It's hard to determine Wound No. 9 because the length is not
indicated here, so it is possible that there are 3 or 4 kinds of
instrument or weapons being used. (TSN, pp. 26- 27, December
15, 1983)
Appellant Hugo Garcia also emphasizes the testimony of Dr.
Kho that the latter did not observe any contusions on the body
of the deceased, obviously to disprove that appellants danceda
round and kicked the body after the victim was slain.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, "although the
examining doctor failed to find any contusion or abrasion on the
cadaver of the victim, nevertheless, such absence is not
conclusive proof that appellants did not kick the deceased. It
might be possible that kicks did not cause or produce
contusions or abrasions or that they were not noticed by the
doctor." (Appellee's Brief, p. 22). Moreover, the fact of dancing
and kicking complained of, is only one of the acts showing

conspiracy, without which, conspiracy cannot be said not to

have been established.
The lower court also found that treachery was present in the
commission of the crime, and that the accused Alfredo
Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Monico Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesio
and Merlando Dollantes are as equally guilty as principals by
direct participation. These accused took turns in stabbing the
victim. In fact the victim was caught by surprise and did not have
time to defend himself.
Finally, the records show that the Barangay Captain was in the
act of trying to pacify Pedro Dollantes who was making trouble
in the dance hall when he was stabbed to death. He was
therefore killed while in the performance of his duties. In the
case of People v. Hecto (135 SCRA 113), this Court ruled that
"As the barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws
and ordinances within the barangay. If in the enforcement
thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people who thereafter
treacherously slew him the crime committed is murder with
assault upon a person in authority."
There is no qeustion that the trial court's conclusions on
credibilitY of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal.
(People v. Oliverio, 120 SCRA 22). After a careful review of the
records, no plausible reason could be found to disturb the
findings of fact and of law of the lower court in this case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-31839 June 30, 1980
EDMUNDO S. ALBERTO, Provincial Fiscal and BONIFACIO
C. INTIA 1st Asst. Provincial Fiscal, both of Camarines Sur,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the
CFI of Camarines Sur and ELIGIO ORBITA, respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminay injunction, to annul and set aside the order of the
respondent Judge, dated January 26, 1970, directing the
petitioners, Provincial Fiscal and Assitant Provincial Fiscal of
Camarines Sur, to amend the information filed in Criminal Case
No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of CamarinesSur,
entitled: "The People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Eligio
Orbita, accused," so as to include, as defendants, Governor
Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda, assistant provincial
warden of Camarines Sur; as well as the order dated February
18, 1970, denying the motion for the reconsideration of the said
order.
In Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, Eligio Orbita, a Provincial guard, is prosecuted
for the crime of Infedelity in the Custody of Prisoner, defined and
punished under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed, as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of September. 1968, in the barrio
of Taculod, municipality of Canaman, province of Camarines
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, being then a member of the Provincial
Guard of Camarines Sur and specially charged with the duty of
keeping under custody and vigilance detention prisoner Pablo
Denaque, did then and there with great carelessness and
unjustifiable negligence leave the latter unguarded while in said
barrio, thereby giving him the opportunity to run away and

escape, as in fact said detention prisoner Pablo Denaque did

run away and escape from the custody of the said accused. 1
In the course of the trial thereof, or more particularly during the
cross-examination of prosecution witness Jose Esmeralda,
assistant provincial warden of Camarines Sur, the defense
brought forht and confronted the witness with a note, marked as
exhibit, purportedly written by Gov. Armando Cledera, asking
Jose Esmeralda to send five men to work in the construction of
a fence at his house at Taculod, Canaman, Camarines Sur, then
leased by the province and used as an official guest house.
Jose Esmeralda, declared, however, that he could not
remember who ahnded the note for him; that he was not sure as
to genuineness of the signature appearing therein and that he
was not preszent when the note was made and signed by Gov.
Cledera. 2 Beleiving that the escape of Pablo Denaque was
made possible by the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda
and that Cledera and Esmeralda are equally guilty of the offense
for which tha accused Eligio Orbita had been charged, the
defense cousel filed a motion in court seeking the amendment
of the information so as to include Gov. cledera and Jose
Esmeralda as defendants therein. 3
Acting upon said motion, as well as the opposition of the
prosecution officers 4 and finding that "the court cannot grant the
motion or order the inclusion of Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda
at this stage unless an investigation is made," the respondent
Judge directed the Fiscals office, within 15 days from date, to
cause the further investigation of the case, taking into
consideration the provisions of Article 156 in relation to Articles
223 and 224 of the Revised Penal Code in order to determine
once and for all whether the Governor as jailer of the Province
and his assistant have any criminatory participation in the
circumstances of Pablo Denaque's escape from judicial custody.
5

In compliance with said order, the Fiscal set the reinvestigation

of the case for December 19, 1969. Summonses were issued to
Gov. Cledera Jose Esmeralda, Lorenzo Padua, the provincial
warden, and the accused Eligio Orbita to be present thereat. 6
Dr. went thereat But, on the date set for the reinvestigation of
the case, only Gov. Cledera Jose Esmeralda and Lorenzo

Padua appeared. The accused Eligio Orbita did not appear.

Neither was the note (Exhibit 2) produced. Since no additional
evidence was presented, the Fiscal manifested in Court on
January 2, 1970 that "after conducting a reinvestigation of the
case and after a thorough and intelligent analysis of the facts
and law involved, no prima facie case against Governor Cledera
and Jose Esmeralda exist, hence, they cannot be charged. 7
On January 19, 1970, the accused Eligio Orbita filed a "Motion
for Reconsideration" praying "that the Order of this Honorable
Court dated December 11, 1969 be, in that instead of ordering
the Fiscal to reinvestigate this case, on the basis of the
evidence already adduce during the trial of this case, he be
ordered to amend the information on to include Cledera and
Esmeralda it appearing the on record that their inclusion is
warranted. 8
On January 26, 1970, the respondent Court issued the order
complained of, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, in the light of the facts
brought about by the prosecuting fiscal let the charges be so
amended by including in the information the author or writer of
Exhibit 2 and the person or persons who carried out the said
orders considering the provisions of Article 156 in relation to
Articles 223 and 224 of the Penal Code. 9
The Fiscal filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order, 10
but the motion was denied on February 18, 1970. 11 Hence, the
instant recourse.
From the facts of the case, We are convinced that the
respondent Judge committed an error in ordering the fiscal to
amend the information so as to include Armando Cledera and
Jose Esmeralda as defendants in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. It is the rule that a
fiscal by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a
particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he
has evidence to support the allegations thereof. 12 Although this
power and prerogative of the Fiscal, to determine whether or not
the evidence at hand is sufficient to form a reasonable belief
that a person committed an offense, is not absolute and subject
to judicial review, 13 it would be embarrassing for the
prosecuting attorney to be compelled to prosecute a case when

he is in no position to do so because in his opinion, he does not

have the necessary evidence to secure a conviction, or he is not
convinced of the merits of the case. The better procedure would
be to appeal the Fiscal's decision to the Ministry of Justice
and/or ask for a special prosecutor.
Besides, it cannot be said that the Fiscal had capriciously and
whimsically refused to prosecute Cledera and Esmeralda.
In his order directing the Fiscal's office to conduct a further
reinvestigation of the case, the respondent Judge candidly ad.
muted that without a reinvestigation of the case, he cannot
determine once and for all whether or not to include Gov.
Cledera and Jose Esmeralda in the information. Pursuant
thereto, a reinvestigation was conducted by the fiscals office.
Summonses were issued. But, no additional fact was elicited
since Eligio Orbita did not appear thereat. Neither was the note
(Exh. 2) presented and produced. Gov. Cledera could not admit
nor deny the genuineness of the signature appearing in the note
since it was not on hand. Such being the case, the prosecuting
officers had reason to refuse to amend the information filed by
them after a previous pre examination and investigation.
Moreover, there is no sufficient evidence in the record to show a
prima facie case against Gov. Cledera and Jose Esmeralda.
The order to amend the information is based upon the following
facts:
1. Pablo Denaque, a detention prisoner for homicide, while
working at the Guest House of Governor Cledera on September
12, 1968;
2. The Governor's evidence at that time is being rented by the
province and its maintenance and upkeep is shouldered by the
province of Camarines Sur,
3. That neither Governor Cledera nor Lt. Jose Esmeralda was
charged or entrusted with the duty of conveying and the
detainee from the jail to the residence of the governor.
4. That the de worked at the Governor Is by virtue of an order of
the Governor (Exhibit 2) which was tsn by Lt. Esmeralda; and
5. That it was the accused Orbita who himself who handpicked
the group of Prisoners to work at the Governor's on 12, 1968. 14
Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 156. Delivering prisoners from jails. The city Of arrests

mayor in its maximum period to prison correccional in its

minimum Period shall be imposed upon any person who shall
remove from any jail or penal establishment t any person
confined therein or shall help the escape of such person, by
means of violence, intimidation, or bribery.
If other means are used the penalty of arresto mayor shall be
imposed. If the escape of the prisoner shall take place outside of
said establishments by taking the guards by surprise, the same
penalties shall be imposed in their minimum period.
The offenders may be committed in two ways: (1) by removing a
person confined in any jail or penal establishment; and (2) by
helping such a person to escape. To remove means to take
away a person from the place of his confinement, with or without
the active compensation of the person released To help in the
escape of a Person confined in any jail or penal institution
means to furnished that person with the material means such as
a file, ladder, rope, etc. which greatly facilitate his escape. 15
The offenders under this article is usually committed by an
outsider who removes from jail any person therein confined or
helps him escape. If the offender is a public officer who has
custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the
custody of prisoner defined and penalty under Article 223 of the
Revised Penal Code. Since Gov. Cledera as governor, is the
jailer of the province, 16 and Jose Esmeralda is the assistant
provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted for the escape Of
Pablo Denaque under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code.
There is likewise no sufficient evidence to warrant their
prosecution under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code, which
reads, as follows:
ART. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. Any
Public officer who shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in
his custody or charge, shall be punished
1. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
and temporary disqualification in its minimum period to
perpetual special disqualification, if the fugitive shall have been
sentenced by final judgment to any penalty.
2. By prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary
special disqualification, in case the fugitive shall not have been
finally convicted but only held as a detention prisoner for any

crime or violation of law or municipal ordinance.

In order to be guilty under the aforequoted provisions of the
Penal Code, it is necessary that the public officer had consented
to, or connived in, the escape of the prisoner under his custody
or charge. Connivance in the escape of a prisoner on the part of
the person in charge is an essential condition in the commission
of the crime of faithlessness in the custody of the prisoner. If the
public officer charged with the duty of guarding him does not
connive with the fugitive, then he has not violated the law and is
not guilty of the crime. 17 For sure no connivance in the escape
of Pablo Denaque from the custody of the accused Eligio Orbita
can be deduced from the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose
Esmeralda asking for five men to work in the guest house, it
appearing that the notes does not mention the names of the
prisoners to be brought to the guest house; and that it was the
accused Eligio Orbita who picked the men to compose the work
party.
Neither is there evidence to warrant the prosecution of Cledera
and Esmeralda under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code.
This article punishes the public officer in whose custody or
charge a prisoner has escaped by reason of his negligence
resulting in evasion is definite amounting to deliberate nonperformance of duty. 18 In the constant case, the respondent
Judge said:
We cannot, for the present be reconciled with the Idea that the
escape. of Denaque was facilitated by the Governor's or . his
assistants negligence. According to law, if there is any
negligence committed it must be the officer who is charged with
the custody and guarding of the ... 19
We find no reason to set aside such findings.
WHEREFORE, the orders issued on January 26, and February
18, 1970 in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, entitled: "The People of the
Philippines, plaintiff, versus Eligio Orbita, accused are hereby
annulled and set aside. The respondent Judge or any other
judge acting in his stead is directed to proceed with the trial of
the case. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27191
February 28, 1967
ADELAIDA TANEGA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. HONORATO B. MASAKAYAN, in his capacity as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V, and
the CHIEF OF POLICE OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
Ramon V. Sison for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General
for respondents.
RESOLUTION
SANCHEZ, J.:
Pressed upon us in this, an original petition for certiorari and
prohibition, is the problem of when prescription of penalty should
start to run. The controlling facts are:
Convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City petitioner
appealed. Found guilty once again by the Court of First
Instance,1 she was sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor, to
indemnify the offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of
P100.00, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and
to pay the costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed.2 We declined to
review on certiorari.3 Back to the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City, said court, on January 11, 1965, directed that
execution of the sentence be set for January 27, 1965. On
petitioner's motion, execution was deferred to February 12,
1965, at 8:30 a.m. At the appointed day and hour, petitioner
failed to show up. This prompted the respondent judge, on
February 15, 1965, to issue a warrant for her arrest, and on
March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of arrest. Petitioner was never
arrested.1wph1.t
Then, on December 10, 1966, petitioner, by counsel, moved to
quash the warrants of arrest of February 15, 1965 and March
23, 1965. Petitioner's ground: Penalty has prescribed.
On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "the
penalty imposed upon the accused has to be served", rejected
the plea of prescription of penalty and, instead, directed the
issuance of another alias warrant of arrest. Hence, the present
petition.

Arresto menor and a fine of P100.00 constitute a light penalty. 4

By Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code, light penalties
"imposed by final sentence" prescribe in one year. The period of
prescription of penalties so the succeeding Article 93
provides "shall commence to run from the date when the
culprit should evade the service of his sentence".5
What then is the concept of evasion of service of sentence
Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code furnishes the ready
answer. Says Article 157:
ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. The penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall
be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his
sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment 6 by
reason of final judgment. However, if such evasion or escape
shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking
doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs or floors, or by using
picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation,
or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the
penal institution, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its
maximum period.
Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender
is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence
which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades
service of sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence.7 This must be so. For, by the express terms of the
statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence", by "escaping
during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment." That escape should take place while serving
sentence, is emphasized by the provisions of the second
sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher penalty if
such "evasion or escape shall have taken by means of unlawful
entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors
or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or
intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or
employees of the penal institution, ... "8 Indeed, evasion of
sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking".9
A dig into legal history confirms the views just expressed. The
Penal Code of Spain of 1870 in its Article 134 from whence
Articles 92 and 93 of the present Review Penal Code originated

 reads:
Las penas impuestas por sentencia firme prescriben:
Las de muerte y cadena perpetua, a los veinte aos.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Las leves, al ao.
El tiempo de esta prescripcion comenzara a correr desde el dia
en que se notifique personalmente al reo la sentencia firme, o
desde el quebrantamiento de la condena si hubiera esta
comenzado a cumplirse. x x x
Note that in the present Article 93 the words "desde el dia en
que se notifique personalmente al reo la sentencia firme",
written in the old code, were deleted. The omission is significant.
What remains reproduced in Article 93 of the Revised Penal
Code is solely "quebrantamiento de la condena". And,
"quebrantamiento" or evasion means escape.10 Reason dictates
that one can escape only after he has started service of
sentence.
Even under the old law, Viada emphasizes, where the penalty
consists of imprisonment, prescription shall only begin to run
when he escapes from confinement. Says Viada:
El tiempo de la prescripcion empieza a contarse desde el dia en
que ha tenido lugar la notificacion personal de la sentencia firme
al reo: el Codigo de 1850 no expresaba que la notificacion
hubiese de ser personal, pues en su art. 126 se consigna que el
termino de la prescripcion se cuenta desde que se notifique la
sentencia, causa de la ejecutoria en que se imponga la pena
respectiva. Luego ausente el reo ya no podra prescribir hoy la
pena, pues que la notificacion personal no puede ser suplida
por la notificacion hecha en estrados. Dada la imprescindible
necesidad del requisito de la notificacion personal, es obvio que
en las penas que consisten en privacion de libertad solo porda
existir la prescripcion quebrantando el reo la condena pues que
si no se hallare ya preso preventivamente, debera siempre
procederse a su encerramiento en el acto de serle notifirada
personalmente la sentencia.11
We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of
imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to run,
the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.
Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who

sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment was

thereafter never placed in confinement. Prescription of penalty,
then, does not run in her favor.
For the reasons given, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition
for certiorari and prohibition. No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1960
November 26, 1948
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLORENTINO ABILONG, defendant-appellant.
Carlos Perfecto for appellant. Assistant Solicitor General
Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Manuel Tomacruz for
appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Manila with evasion of service of sentence under the following
information:
That on or about the 17th day of September, 1947, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a convict
sentenced and ordered to serve two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of destierro during which he should not enter
any place within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City of
Manila, by virtue of final judgment rendered by the municipal
court on April 5, 1946, in criminal case No. B-4795 for attempted
robbery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
evade the service of said sentence by going beyond the limits
made against him and commit vagrancy.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, with the accessory penalties of the law and to pay
the costs. He is appealing from that decision with the following
assignment of error:
1. The lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the accused
under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, which does not
cover evasion of service of "destierro."
Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the
accused evading a sentence of destierro is not criminally liable
under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly
article 157 of the said Code for the reason that said article 157
refers only to persons who are imprisoned in a penal institution

and completely deprived of their liberty. He bases his contention

on the word "imprisonment" used in the English text of said
article which in part reads as follows:
Evasion of service of sentence. The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his
sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by
reason of final judgment.
The Solicitor General in his brief says that had the original text
of the Revised Penal Code been in the English language, then
the theory of the appellant could be uphold. However, it is the
Spanish text that is controlling in case of doubt. The Spanish
text of article 157 in part reads thus:
ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. Sera castigado
con prision correccional en sus grados medio y maximo el
sentenciado que quebrantare su condena, fugandose mientras
estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad por sentencia firme; . . .
.
We agree with the Solicitor General that inasmuch as the
Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in
Spanish, the Spanish text governs (People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil.,
665, 668). It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the
English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase
"sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is
equally clear that although the Solicitor General impliedly admits
destierro as not constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of
liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present case,
the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the
liberty to enter the City of Manila. This view has been adopted in
the case of People vs. Samonte, No. 36559 (July 26, 1932; 57
Phil., 968) wherein this Court held, as quoted in the brief of the
Solicitor General that "it is clear that a person under sentence of
destierro is suffering deprivation of his liberty and escapes from
the restrictions of the penalty when he enters the prohibited
area." Said ruling in that case was ratified by this Court, though,
indirectly in the case of People vs. Jose de Jesus, (45 Off. Gaz.
Supp. to No. 9, p. 370)1, where it was held that one evades the
service of his sentence of destierro when he enters the
prohibited area specified in the judgment of conviction, and he

cannot invoke the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law

which provides that its provisions do not apply to those who
shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence.
In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of
evasion of service of sentence under article 157 of the Revised
Penal Code (Spanish text), in that during the period of his
sentence of destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein he was
prohibited from entering the City of Manila, he entered said City.
Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the
same is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon and Tuason, JJ.,
concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 76872
July 23, 1987
WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF
PARDONS AND PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
PRISONS, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of
petitioner Wilfredo S. Torres, presently confined at the National
Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. We issued the writ and during the
hearing and from the return filed by the respondents through the
Solicitor General, and other pleadings in this case, the following
facts emerged:
1. Sometime before 1979 (no more specific date appears in the
records before this Court), petitioner was convicted by the Court
of First Instance of Manila of the crime of estafa (two counts)
and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from eleven
(11) years, ten (10) months and twenty-two (22) days to thirtyeight (38) years, nine (9) months and one (1) day, and to pay an
indemnity of P127,728.75 (Criminal Cases Nos. 68810, 91041
and F-138107). These convictions were affirmed by the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos. 14773-CR and 17694-CR). The
maximum sentence would expire on 2 November 2000.1
2. On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the
petitioner by the President of the Philippines on condition that
petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be
proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law." 2 Petitioner
accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released
from confinement.
3. On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the
"Board") resolved to recommend to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner.
In making its recommendation to the President, the Board relied
upon the decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons

(68 Phil. 154 [1939]) and Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of

Bohol (108 Phil. 356 [1960]). The evidence before the Board
showed that on 22 March 1982 and 24 June 1982, petitioner
had been charged with twenty counts of estafa in Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-19672 and Q-20756, which cases were then (on
21 May 1986) pending trial before the Regional Trial Court of
Rizal (Quezon City). The record before the Board also showed
that on 26 June 1985, petitioner had been convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon City) of the crime of
sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926; this conviction was then
pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court. The
Board also had before it a letter report dated 14 January 1986
from the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"), addressed to
the Board, on the petitioner. Per this letter, the records of the
NBI showed that a long list of charges had been brought against
the petitioner during the last twenty years for a wide assortment
of crimes including estafa, other forms of swindling, grave
threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms,
ammunition and explosives, malicious mischief, violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and violation of Presidential Decree
No. 772 (interfering with police functions). Some of these
charges were Identified in the NBI report as having been
dismissed. The NBI report did not purport to be a status report
on each of the charges there listed and Identified.
4. On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to
the President of the Philippines informing her of the Resolution
of the Board recommending cancellation of the conditional
pardon previously granted to petitioner.
5. On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the
conditional pardon of the petitioner.
6. On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice
issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and
Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was
accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence.
Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and
Recommitment. He claims that he did not violate his conditional
pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the
twenty (20) counts of estafa charged in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-

19672 and Q-20756 nor of the crime of sedition in Criminal

Case No. Q-22926.3 Petitioner also contends that he was not
given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and
recommitted to prison, and accordingly claims he has been
deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the
Constitution.
The issue that confronts us therefore is whether or not
conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary
before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted
for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and
accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
This issue is not novel. It has been raised before this Court
three times in the past. This Court was first faced with this issue
in Tesoro Director of Prison.4 Tesoro, who had been convicted
of the crime of falsification of public documents, was granted a
parole by the then Governor-General. One of the conditions of
the parole required the parolee "not [to] commit any other crime
and [to] conduct himself in an orderly manner." 5 Two years after
the grant of parole, Tesoro was charged before the Justice of
the Peace Court of San Juan, Rizal, with the crime of adultery
said to have been committed with the wife of Tesoro's brotherin-law. The fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance the
corresponding information which, however, was dismissed for
non-appearance of the complainant. The complainant then went
before the Board of Indeterminate Sentence and charged
Tesoro with violation of the conditions of his parole. After
investigation by the parole officer, and on the basis of his report,
the Board recommended to the President of the Philippines the
arrest and recommitment of the petitioner. Tesoro contended,
among other things, that a "judicial pronouncement to the effect
that he has committed a crime" is necessary before he could
properly be adjudged as having violated his conditional parole.
Addressing this point, this Court, speaking through then Mr.
Justice Moran, held that the determination of whether the
conditions of Tesoro's parole had been breached rested
exclusively in the sound judgment of the Governor-General and
that such determination would not be reviewed by the courts. As
Tesoro had consented to place his liberty on parole upon the
judgment of the power that had granted it, we held that "he

[could not] invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the
findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered." 6
Thus, this Court held that by accepting the terms under which
the parole had been granted, Tesoro had in effect agreed that
the Governor-General's determination (rather than that of the
regular courts of law) that he had breached one of the
conditions of his parole by committing adultery while he was
conditionally at liberty, was binding and conclusive upon him. In
reaching this conclusion, this Court relied upon Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code which empowered the
Governor-General
to grant to convicted prisoners reprieves or pardons, either
plenary or partial, conditional or unconditional; to suspend
sentences without parole, remit fines, and order the discharge of
any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as
he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and recommitment
of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply
with the condition or conditions, of his pardon, parole or
suspension of sentence. (Emphasis supplied)
In Sales vs. Director of Prisons,7 the petitioner had been
convicted of the crime of frustrated murder. After serving a little
more than two years of his sentence, he was given a conditional
pardon by the President of the Philippines, "the condition being
that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines and that, should this condition be violated, he shall
be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law." 8 Eight
years after the grant of his conditional pardon, Sales was
convicted of estafa and sentenced to three months and eleven
days of arresto mayor. He was thereupon recommitted to prison
to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence. Sales
raised before this Court two principal contentions. Firstly, he
argued that Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code
had been repealed by Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.
He contended, secondly, that Section 64 (i) was in any case
repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution (Article
III [1], 1935 Constitution). This Court, through Mr. Justice
Ozaeta speaking for the majority, rejected both contentions of
Sales.
Sales held, firstly, that Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code

did not repeal Section 64 (i) Revised Administrative Code. It was

pointed out that Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
which was enacted subsequent to the Revised Penal Code,
expressly preserved the authority conferred upon the President
by Section 64. The Court also held that Article 159 and Section
64 (i) could stand together and that the proceeding under one
provision did not necessarily preclude action under the other.
Sales held, secondly, that Section 64 (i) was not repugnant to
the constitutional guarantee of due process. This Court in effect
held that since the petitioner was a convict "who had already
been seized in a constitutional was been confronted by his
accusers and the witnesses against him-, been convicted of
crime and been sentenced to punishment therefor," he was not
constitutionally entitled to another judicial determination of
whether he had breached the condition of his parole by
committing a subsequent offense. Thus:
[a] statute [like Section 64 (i)] supervenes to avoid the necessity
for any action by the courts in the premises. The executive
clemency under it is extended upon the conditions named in it,
and he accepts it upon those conditions. One of these is that the
governor may withdraw his grace in a certain contingency, and
another is that the governor shall himself determine when that
contingency has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full
competency to bind himself in the premises, had expressly
contracted and agreed, that, whenever the governor should
conclude that he had violated the conditions of his parole, an
executive order for his arrest and remandment to prison should
at once issue, and be conclusive upon him. 9
In Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol,10 the petitioner had
been convicted of the crime of inciting to sedition. While serving
his sentence, he was granted by the President a conditional
pardon "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the
penal laws of the Philippines."11 Espuelas accepted the
conditional pardon and was released from confinement.
Sometime thereafter, he was convicted by the Justice of the
Peace Court in Tagbilaran, Bohol, of the crime of usurpation of
authority. He appealed to the Court of First Instance. Upon
motion of the provincial fiscal, the Court of First Instance
dismissed the case provisionally, an important prosecution

witness not having been available on the day set for trial. A few
months later, upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons
and Parole, the President ordered his recommitment to prison to
serve the unexpired period of his original sentence.
The Court in Espuelas reaffirmed the continuing force and effect
of Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. This Court,
quoting Tesoro and Sales, ruled that:
Due process is not necessarily judicial The appellee had had his
day in court and been afforded the opportunity to defend himself
during his trial for the crime of inciting to sedition, with which he
was charged, that brought about or resulted in his conviction,
sentence and confinement in the penitentiary. When he was
conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief
Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance
thereof by the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or
power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or
conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other
department of the Government [has] such power been intrusted.
12

The status of our case law on the matter under consideration

may be summed up in the following propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and
conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts
which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a
condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such
breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to
judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial
for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President
opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a
subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor
by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial
process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had
already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and

conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally

pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is
not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
We do not believe we should depart from the clear and well
understood rules and doctrine on this matter.
It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is
not the prosecution of the parolee for a subsequent offense in
the regular course of administration of the criminal law. What is
involved is rather the ascertainment of whether the convict has
breached his undertaking that he would "not again violate any of
the penal laws of the Philippines" for purposes of reimposition
upon him of the remitted portion of his original sentence. The
consequences that we here deal with are the consequences of
an ascertained breach of the conditions of a pardon. A convict
granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is
recommitted must of course be convicted by final judgment of a
court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was
charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent
offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again, since Article 159 of
the Revised Penal Code defines a distinct, substantive, felony,
the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the
provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted
by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty
prescribed in Article 159.1avvphi1
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been
conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the
conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two
options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him
under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the
penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict
who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon."
Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the
petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive
prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ.,
concur. Yap, J., is on leave. Narvasa, J., took no part.