Fuentes v. Roca, G.R. No.

178902, April 21, 2010

FACTS: On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in Zambales from his mother.
Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Fuentes spouses through the help
of Atty. Plagata who would prepare the documents and requirements to complete the sale. In the
agreement between Tarciano and Fuentes spouses there will be a Php 60,000 down payment and Php
140,000 will be paid upon the removal of Tarciano of certain structures on the land and after the consent
of the estranged wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained. Atty. Plagata went to Manila to get the
signature of Rosario but notarized the document at Zamboanga . The deed of sale was executed January
11, 1989. As time passed, Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses and possession and
control over the lot. Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul
the sale and reconvey the property on the ground that the sale was void since the consent of Rosario was
not attained and that Rosarios’ signature was a mere forgery. The Fuentes spouses claim that the action
has prescribed since an action to annul a sale on the ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery. The RTC
ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses. CA reversed this ruling stating that the action has not prescribed
since the applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that the sale of Conjugal Property without
the consent of the other spouse is voidable and the action must be brought within 10 years. Given that the
transaction was in 1989 and the action was brought in 1997 hence it was well within the prescriptive
period.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarciano’s sale of their
conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged.
HELD: The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the difference in the signatures of Rosario in the
document giving consent and another document executed at the same time period.

2. Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already
prescribed;

HELD: Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during the 1950 civil code, the sale was done in 1989,
after the effectivity of the Family Code. The Family Code applies to Conjugal Partnerships already
established at the enactment of the Family Code. The sale of conjugal property done by Tarciano without
the consent of Rosario is completely void under Art 124 of the family code.

No Digest

PEDRITA M. HARAYO v. JUDGE MAMERTO Y. COLIFLORES, AM No. MTJ-92-710, 2003-06-19

Case Digest: G.R. No. 174689. October 22, 2007

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, petitioner, vs. Republic of the Philippines, respondent.
______________________________________________________________________
_ 

Facts: Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male
transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and that
he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment, breast augmentation and sex reassignment surgery.
From then on, petitioner lived as female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then
sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely,
and his sex from male to female. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth
certificate.

Ruling: Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error Law
which does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must
show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.  In this case, he
failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his
true and official name. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The birth certificate of
petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his
first name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413 of
the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status
shall be governed by special laws. However, there is no such special law in the
Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a
birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of
birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering
that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error is immutable

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change
of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his
petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. The remedies
petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.

NO DIGEST Escleo vs. Dorado, A.M. No, P-99-1312, July 31, 2002

Ninal v. Bayadog
G.R. No. 133778, 14 March 2000

FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children
namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the
latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of EngraceNinal. 1 year and
8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted
an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the
marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said
marriage was void for lack of marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.Norma filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among
the persons who could file an action for “annulment of marriage” under Article 47 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?

2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s
marriage after his death?

RULING:

1. The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. The two marriages
involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of
their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio. However, there are several
instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is
that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at
least five years before the marriage.

In this case, they cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they
cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time
of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.

2. No. Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. “A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the
parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction. Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties is as though no marriage
had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of
either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage
void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts.” It is not like a voidable marriage
which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the
parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.
But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such
absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heir
ship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.

Republic vs CA and Castro

Republic vs. CA and Castro
GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994

FACTS:

Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas.  They
did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant that
they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months.  Thereafter, they
parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas. 

The baby was brought in the US and in Castro’s earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to put
in order her marital status before leaving for US.  She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the
nullity of her marriage.  Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to
the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient
to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their
marriage.

HELD:

The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar
unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not issue a
marriage license to the contracting parties.  Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not
supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar
circumstances of her case.  Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings,
which he chose to ignore.

Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.

G.R. No. 175581               March 28, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x

G.R. No. 179474

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

Chico-Nazario, J.:

FACTS:   On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City
through the execution of a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the
age of maturity and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years. Then Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on
August 31, 1990. On June 3, 1993 Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.  Then
on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna. He contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between
the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had
lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage
was secured through fraud. The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for
the ground that the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa was valid. Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose assertion that
his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.  Jose filed a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the
proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 34 of the New
Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the legal condition that the
man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least
five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab initio?

RULING: Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for lacking the requirements
of valid marriage in which the sworn affidavit that Felisa executed is merely a scrap of
paper because they started living together five months before the celebration of their
marriage. That according to the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article
34 “No license shall be necessary for the marriage for a man and a woman who have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediments to marry each other… “ it means that a five years period computed back
from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day
of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity, meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the five years and continuity that is unbroken.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and
unwary parties. 

The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision that the marriage between Jose A. Dayot
and Felisa C. Tecson is void ab initio.

Estrada vs. Escritor A.M. No. P-02-

1651. August 4, 2003 Benevolent
Neutrality
JANUARY 26, 2018

FACTS:

Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors that
respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, is living with a man not her
husband.  They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. He filed the charge against
Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the
court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the
court condones her act.

 
ISSUE:

What is the doctrine of benevolent neutrality? Is respondent entitled thereto? Is the doctrine of
benevolent neutrality consistent with the free exercise clause?

RULING:

Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but
at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits.  Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not
offend compelling state interests. It still remains to be seen if respondent is entitled to such
doctrine as the state has not been afforded the chance has demonstrate the compelling state
interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the case is remanded to the RTC.

Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits such
exercise given a compelling state interest. It is the respondent’s stance that her conjugal
arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise
protection.  Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free
Exercise Clause, the Court’s action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to
religious freedom. We cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of
religious freedom, but must instead apply the “compelling state interest” test.  The government
must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of
demonstrating the state’s compelling interest which can override respondent’s religious belief
and practice.

NO DIGEST Mecaral vs. Velasquez, A.C. No. 8392, June 29, 2010

EDWIN A. ACEBEDO v. EDDIE P. ARQUERO

399 SCRA 10 (2003)

Position in the judiciary requires greater moral righteousness and uprightness.

Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal Trial

Court (MTC) of Brooke’s Point, Palawan for immorality, alleging that his wife, Dedje
Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the MTC Brooke’s Point, and Arquero
unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife.

Arquero claimed that Acebedo himself had been cohabitating with another woman.
Based on Arquero’s testimony, he justified his having a relationship with Irader solely
on the written document purportedly a ―Kasunduan‖ or agreement entered into by
Acebedo and Irader, consenting to and giving freedom to either of them to seek any
partner and to live with him or her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Arquero should be held guilty of immorality

HELD:

Arquero’s justification fails. Being an employee of the judiciary, Arquero ought to have
known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the validity of the
marriage between Acebedo and Irader. Article 1 of the Family Code provides that
marriage is ―an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation.‖ It is an institution of public order or
policy, governed by rules established by law which cannot be made inoperative by the
stipulation of the parties.

Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a
greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in the
judiciary. That is why the Court has firmly laid down exacting standards of morality
and decency expected of those in the service of the judiciary.

Their conduct, not to mention behavior, is circumscribed with the heavy burden of

responsibility, characterized by, among other things, propriety and decorum so as to
earn and keep the public’s respect and confidence in the judicial service. It must be
free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in the judicial
branch but also to their behavior outside the court as private individuals

Arquero’s act of having illicit relations with Irader is, within the purview of Section 46
(5) of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, a disgraceful and immoral conduct.

DUPLICATE Estrada vs. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, Aug. 4, 2003

ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant, vs. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000

Facts:
Judge Daguman solemnized the marriage of Zenaida Beso with Nardito A. Yman out
from his jurisdiction as a judge. After the marriage was solemnized, the man just
abandoned his wife without any light or reason. Because of this, the woman had to go to
the registrar to secure their marriage contract but to her surprised, no marriage contract
that has been registered in the office of the registrar, so, however, the registrar gave
advice to Zenaida Beso to write the judge who solemnized their marriage but likewise to
her surprised, judge Daguman who solemnized their marriage told her that
her husband got sall the copies of their marriage certificate and none was even left to
him or was retained to the judge.

This is the reason why Zenaida learned that the judge solemnized their marriage out of
his jurisdiction and was negligent in not retaining a copy and likewise in not registering
their marriage to the civil registrar as prescribed by law.

Issue:

Whether or not the effect of good faith is acceptable in the case at bar as a solemnizing

officer.

Held:

No, good faith is not a defense because to abide with the law is what matters most and
good faith is not acceptable if it violates the law how noble is your intention. A judge is,
presumed to know the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdictionof his court. A
judge solemnized a marriage out from his jurisdiction shows an irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in art.3 which while it may not affect the validity of marriage
of marriage but may subject the officiating officer to administrative authority.

The judge was fined at the amount of 5,000 pesos and any repetition with the same
offense will be dealt severely

DUPLICATE CASE: Ninal vs. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000

Roehr v. Rodriguez
G.R. No. 142820, 20 June 2003

FACTS:

Wife Rodriguez filed for declaration of nullity of marriage, which was subsequently moved for
dismissal by husband Roehr, a German national. Pending decision, the husband obtained a decree
of divorce from a German Court, providing for (1) the dissolution of their marriage and (2) the grant
of parental custody of the children to Roehr.
Thereafter, wife moved for partial reconsideration with a prayer that the case proceed for the
purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties
between the Roehr and Rodriguez. Motion was granted and thus challenged by Roehr.

ISSUE:

W/N there is nothing left to be tackled by the Court since there are no conjugal properties alleged in
the annulment and the divorce decree provides for the finality of the custody of children.

RULING:

No. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in
our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must
be determined by our courts. The Court held that before our courts can give the effect of res judicata
to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be
shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on
grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court.

Pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Moreover, Section 50 of the Rules of Court states that the effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.

Since the proceedings in the German court were summary, the wife was not given opportunity to
challenge said judgment. Therefore, the divorce decree did not provide for the finality of the custody
of children.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, v.

REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001

FACTS:

Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson,

an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as
husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992,
respondent became an Australian citizen and was married again to petitioner Grace
Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their applicationfor
a marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage.

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on

the ground of bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time
he married her. On his Answer, Rederick contended that his first marriage was validly
dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry Grace.

On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending , respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from
a family court in Sydney, Australia because the “marriage had irretrievably broken
down.”

The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved
on the ground that the Australian divorce had ended the marriage of the couple thus
there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.

2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner

RULING:

1st issue:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of
respondent’s marriage to Samson is insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Furthermore, the divorce
decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authenticone issued by
an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

2nd issue:

Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless
the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorrecce obtained by respondent may
have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial
court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving
evidence. The Court mentioned that they cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her
marriage to respondent null and void because of the question on latter’s legal capacity to
marry.

G.R. No. 168785

Herald Black Dacasin, Petitioner, 

versus

Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin, Respondent.

FACTS:
1. On April 1994, petitioner and respondent got married here in the Philippines.
2. The following year respondent got pregnant and gave birth to a baby girl whom they
named Stephanie.
3. In June of 1999 respondent sought and obtained from the Illinois Court a divorce
decree against petitioner.
4. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and
respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction
over the case for enforcement purposes.
5. On 28th of January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract
(Agreement) for the joint custody of Stephanie.
6. Two years after, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City. 7. Petitioner claimed that respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
8. Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint due to lack of jurisdiction, since
Illinois Court hold the jurisdiction in enforcing the divorce decree.
ISSUES:
– Whether the Trial Court have the jurisdiction over the case
– Whether the agreement or contract is valid
HELD:
Case was dismissed dated March 1, 2005.
It is precluded from taking cognizance over suit considering the Illinois Court’s
retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding
sole custody of Stephanie to respondent. The divorce decree is binding on petitioner
following the “nationality rule” prevailing in this jurisdiction. Agreement is void
The agreement is void for contravening Article 2035 paragraph 5 of the Civil
Code prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction.
II. FACTS:
1. Petitioner sought reconsideration his new argument is that the divorce decree
obtained by respondent is void.
2. The divorce is no bar to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the
case.
3. In its order on June 23, 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration because
petitioner is under the laws of his nationality, which is American. Hence, the petitioner
filed alternative theories for the validity of the agreement:
> The agreement noted the valid divorce decree, modifying the terms of child custody
from the
sole to joint
> The agreement is independent of the divorce decree obtained by respondents
II. ISSUE
– Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit
– Whether the trial curt can enforce the Agreement on joint custody
II. HELD
Agreement is still void but the court calls for the remand of the case to settle
Stephanie’s custody. (Article 213 of the Family Code lost its coverage over
Stephanie. Stephanie was already almost 15 during this time thus, she is entitled to
choose to whom she want to be)
Instead of dismissing the case, court chose to remand the case in order to settle
Stephanie’s custody. Court decided to REVERSE the orders dated March 1, 2005 and
June 23, 2005. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with its
ruling.