REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.

G.R. No. 94053. March 17, 1993.

Facts:

On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for
the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, involving Article 41 of the Family Code.
The petition prayed that respondent’s wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the
marriage be declared null and void.

The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had
been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did
not possess a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead; and second, Nolasco’s attempt to
have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a cunning attempt to circumvent the law on marriage.

Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British
subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship’s port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica
Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six months until they returned to respondent’s hometown
of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman’s contract expired. On 15 January 1982,
respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van
Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.

He obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose,  Antique.
Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him
that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique.

Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved
fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton,
Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He
also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.

The trial court granted Nolasco’s petition hereby declaring the presumptively death of Janet Monica Parker
Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance.

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica
Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well founded
belief for such declaration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that respondent had
sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.

Issue:

Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

Ruling:

No. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such
diligence as to give rise to a “well-founded belief” that she is dead. Pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code, a
marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
and the spouse present had a well founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In fine,
respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife
was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively
dead. Thus, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s decision declaring Janet Monica
Parker presumptively dead is hereby reversed and both Decisions are hereby nullified and set aside.
 LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.,
respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

Facts:

Lupo Almodiel Atienza filed an administrative case against Judge Brillantes for Gross Immorality and

Appearance of Impropriety. Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are
living together at a subdivision in Makati, which he purchased in 1987. One day, he caught the respondent
asleep in his bedroom. He asked the houseboy about him and the latter said that the judge had been cohabiting
with De Castro. Atienza did not bother to wake up the respondent instead asked the houseboy to take care of his
two children.

After that, the respondent prevented him from visiting his child and has alienated the affection of his children.
The Complainant also claims that the respondent is married to Zenaida Ongkiko.

The judge denies having been married to Ongkiko because their marriage was celebrated twice without
marriage license, therefore, his marriage to De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California was because he
believed in good faith and for all legal purposes, that his first marriage was solemnized without
marriage license.

He further argues that Article 40 of the Family Code is not applicable in his case because his first marriage in
1965 was governed by the Civil Code and the 2nd relationship was 1991 under the Family Code. No retroactive
Effect.

Issue:

Whether or not the absence of marriage license of his previous marriage justifi3es his act to cohabit with De
Castro

Held:

Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time
he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured
any marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get
married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko
were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his
sinister motives and bad faith. 

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
“retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.” This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has
not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
 ERIC JONATHAN YU v. CAROLINE YU

         Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and dissolution of the absolute
community of property before the Pasig Regional Trial Court. The petition contains a prayer for the award of
sole custody of his daughter Bianca, subject to the final resolution by the Court of Appeals (CA) on his Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

            The CA dismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus for becoming moot and academic. Caroline
Tanchay-Yu, on the other hand, filed before the RTC Pasay a petition for habeas corpus, with a prayer for the
award of the sole custody to her of Bianca.

              Both the Pasig RTC and the Pasay RTC asserted their jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the question of custody over Bianca should be litigated before the RTC Pasay or before the RTC
Pasig

HELD:

Judgment on the issue of custody in the nullity of marriage case before the Pasig RTC, regardless of which
party would prevail, would constitute res judicata on the habeas corpus case before the Pasay RTC since the
former has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.

There is identity in the causes of action in Pasig and Pasay because there is identity in the facts and
evidence essential to the resolution of the identical issue raised in both actions – whether it would serve the best
interest of Bianca to be in the custody of Eric rather than Caroline or vice versa.

Since the ground invoked in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC is
Caroline‘s alleged psychological incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations as provided in Article
36 of the Family Code, the evidence to support this cause of action necessarily involves evidence of Caroline‘s
fitness to take custody of Bianca. Thus, the elements of litis pendentia, to wit: a) identity of parties, or at least
such as representing the same interest in both actions; b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that
may be rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in
the other, are present.

By Eric‘s filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC he automatically
submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca as an incident thereof. After the appellate court subsequently
dismissed the habeas corpus case, there was no need for Eric to replead his prayer for custody for, as above-
quoted provisions of the Family Code provide, the custody issue in a declaration of nullity case is deemed
pleaded.

Since this immediately-quoted provision directs the court taking jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage to resolve the custody of common children, by mere motion of either party, it could only
mean that the filing of a new action is not necessary for the court to consider the issue of custody of a minor.

The only explicit exception to the earlier-quoted second paragraph of Art. 50 of the Family Code is when “such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings,” which is not the case here.

The elements of litis pendentia having been established, the more appropriate action criterion guides this Court
in deciding which of the two pending actions to abate.

The petition filed by Eric for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC is the more appropriate
action to determine the issue of who between the parties should have custody over Bianca in view of the express
provision of the second paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code. This must be so in line with the policy of
avoiding multiplicity of suits.

Republic vs. CA and Molina

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:

The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo
Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity.  The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo
manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with
friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife
in regard to their finances.  In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged.  
Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her
and their child.  Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid.  What constitutes psychological incapacity is not
mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities.  It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit
inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. 
Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for
psychological incapacity.  The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with
each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.  In addition, the
expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered
as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:
burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital obligations of
marriage
such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code
decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected
court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.

Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA

GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997

FACTS:

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988.  After the celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the house
of defendant’s mother.  There was no sexual intercourse between them during their first night and same thing happened
until their fourth night.  In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives
went with them.  Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta
or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room.  Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed
but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them.  Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examination
to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989.  The result of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while
that of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed.  There were allegations that the reason why Chi
Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in the country.  Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi
Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity.  On the other hand, the latter
does not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is
physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still overcome their
differences.  Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the result was there is not evidence of
impotency and he is capable of erection.

ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital obligations and the
refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal.  Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus
constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.

Antonio vs. Reyes

GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006

FACTS:

Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989.  Barely a year after their first
meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990.  A child
was born but died 5 months later.  Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things.  She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she
represented to her husband as adopted child of their family.  They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for
reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November 1991.  Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage
with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage null and void.

HELD:

Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere inability
to comply with them.  The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who
attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations
on his wife’s behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.  Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent, fabricate
stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.   The root causes of Reyes’
psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts.  The gravity
of respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of
nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent.   It
would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on
love, trust and respect.  Furthermore, Reyes’ case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her
behavior remain unchanged.  

Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of
the Family Code.

Choa vs. Choa

GR No. 1473376, November 26, 2002

FACTS:

Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981.  They have 2 children namely Cheryl Lynne and Albryan.  In 1993,
Alfonso filed an annulment of his marriage to Leni.  Afterwards, he filed an amended complaint for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage based on psychological incapacity.  The case went to trial and the trial court further held that
Alfonso presented quantum evidence that Leni needs to controvert for the dismissal of the case.

Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and deportation which shows latter’s psychological
incapacity because according to him it clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him behind bars but also to banish
outside the country.  

ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni
on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:
The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the case do not in any way show the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife.  The evidence was insufficient and shows grave abuse of discretion bordering on
absurdity.  Alfonso testified and complained about three aspects of Leni’s personality namely lack of attention to children,
immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and none of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes
psychological incapacity.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.   It must be more than
just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of marital obligations.  A mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity.

Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to identify and prove root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity.  It just established that the spouses had an incompatibility or a defect that could possibly be
treated or alleviated through psychotherapy.  The totality of evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.

Buccat v Buccat de Mangonon GR No. 47101   April 25, 1941

GODOFREDO BUCCAT, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
LUIDA MANGONON DE BUCCAT, defendant-respondent.

HORRILLENO, J.:

FACTS:

1. It was established before the trial court:

a. The Plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938
b. After several interviews, both were committed on September 19 of that year
c. On November 26 the same year, the plaintiff married the defendant in a Catholic Cathedral in Baguio
d. They, then, cohabited for about eighty-nine days
e. Defendant gave birth to a child of nine months on February 23, 1939
f. Following this event, Plaintiff and Defendant separated.
2. On March 20, 1939 the plaintiff filed an action for annulment of marriage before the CFI of Baguio City. The
plaintiff claimed that he consented to the marriage because the defendant assured him that she was virgin.
3. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Hence, this appeal.

BASICALLY: Godofredo Buccat (Plaintiff) and Luida Mangonon (Defendant) got married on November 26, 1938. Luida
gave birth after 89 days and on March 20, 1939 Godofredo filed for annulment of marriage before the CFI because he was
led to believe by Luida that she was a virgin. The trial court dismissed the complaint, so Godofredo appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was fraud in obtaining the consent of Plaintiff to the marriage?

DECISION:

There is no fraud because:

The Supreme Court states that: “We see no reason to overturn the ruling appealed.” It is unlikely that the plaintiff,
Godofredo, had not suspected that the defendant, Luida, was pregnant. (As she gave birth less than 3 months after they got
married, she must have looked very pregnant even before they were married.) Since Godofredo must have known that she
was not a virgin, the marriage cannot be annulled.

The Sacred Marriage is an institution: it is the foundation on which society rests. To cancel it, reliable evidence is
necessary.

*Consent freely given: ARTICLE 4 and 45 FC.

 G.R. NO. 174451; October 13, 2009
Alcazar vs. Alcazar

FACTS:
Petitioner Veronica Alcazar was married to Respondent Rey Alcazar on October 11, 2000. The couple lived together for
five days in Bacolod before the two went to Manila to live there separately. A few days after, respondent left for Riyadh
without ever contacting petitioner. Petitioner’s attempt to communicate with respondent during their physical separation
turned out in vain. A year and a half later, respondent returned back to the Philippines.

Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner
concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for
annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Petitioner availed
of an expert witness, who presented the psychological evaluation of petitioner and respondent.

The RTC rendered its decision denying petitioner’s complaint for annulment of marriage, reasoning that the  acts of the
respondent in not communicating with petitioner and not living with the latter the moment he returned home from Saudi
Arabia despite their marriage do (sic) not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his defects were already present at the inception of their marriage or that these are
incurable. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, as defined by the law and jurisprudence, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations.

HELD:
The law invoked by petitioner, Article 45(5) of the Family Code, refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to
consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse.
The Court held that there had been no evidence presented to establish that respondent was in any way physically incapable
to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her cross-examination that she and
respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before respondent left for abroad. As can be gleaned though
from the evidence presented by petitioner and the observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appeared that
petitioner was actually seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the latter’s psychological
incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code and not Article 45(5) of
the Family Code.

Petitioner attributed the filing of the erroneous Complaint before the RTC to her former counsel’s mistake or
gross ignorance. But even said reason could not save petitioners Complaint from dismissal. It is a settled doctrine that the
client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of procedural technique. Petitioner failed to
convince the court that such exceptional circumstances exist.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the court could treat the Complaint as one for declaration of nullity based on
Article 36 of the Family Code, the court will still dismiss the Complaint for lack of merit, consistent with the evidence
presented by petitioner during the trial.

The evidence presented by petitioner was not enough to merit a favorable ruling. The court further held that
psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal, or neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.

Valdez v. Republic

G.R. No. 180863, 8 September 2009

FACTS:

Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named Nancy. They argued
constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, the latter left their house.
Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972, they decided to go back to her parent’s home. 3 years have passed
without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a
document to that effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio
was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilio’s application for naturalization in US was
denied because petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking
declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

RULING:

Yes. Petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

Pursuant to Article 83 of the Civil Code, any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the
first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid
in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.

Therefore, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is needed for the
presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed
dead starting October 1982. Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to
petitioner’s capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.

Gandionco v. Penaranda

G.R. No. L-7294, 27 November 1987

FACTS:

Private respondent filed for legal separation against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court presided over by respondent
judge. Private respondent invoked concubinage as a ground. The court rendered the decision ordering petitioner to pay his
wife and child support pendente lite. The court also denied his petitioner’s petition to suspend hearing pending the
criminal case filed against him by his wife for concubinage.

Petitioner contends that the 1985 Rules of Court provide that civil cases are suspended such as legal separation and the
incidents attached to it like support pendente lite pending a criminal case arising from the same offense until final
judgment has been rendered. Petitioner also claims that the presiding judge was biased and should no longer preside over
the case by reason of his decision and his denial of petitions to suspend the hearings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a civil action must be suspended pending a criminal action for the same offense.

RULING:

No. The court ruled that a civil action for legal separation can proceed simultaneously with a criminal case arising from
the same offense.
The court interpreted the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure stating that: “a civil action for legal separation, based on
concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action
is not one “to enforce the civil liability” arising from the offense even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or
are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal
consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offspring, support, and
disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of
concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal
proceeding or conviction is necessary.

The civil action is not suspended because it does not intend to produce the civil liability arising from offense prosecuted
under the criminal action but rather it intends to obtain the right to live separately with the legal consequences
aforementioned. The support pendente lite was also found to be correctly granted, and in case petitioner does not agree
with the amount may file a motion in court for modification or reduction.

Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio

43 SCRA 177

FACTS:

Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953.  They were married
civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days.  They had lived together as husband and wife continuously
without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her.  They acquired properties during their marriage. 
Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949.  She
prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio
should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. 

Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and
subsisting marriage with Go Hiok.  Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence.  However, before
the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular
accident on May 1969.  Her counsel duly notified the court of her death.  Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal
separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102
of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.  Petitioner’s counsel moved to
substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. 

ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the action and will it
also apply if the action involved property rights.

HELD:

An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are
mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into
existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during
the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and
the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of  Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further interest in
continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union.  Any property rights acquired by
either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper
action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

De Ocampo vs. Florenciano

107 Phil 35

FACTS:

Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938.  They begot several children who are not living with
plaintiff.  In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit
relations with Jose Arcalas.  Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she
stayed for one year.  Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other than Arcalas.  In
1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately.  In June 1955, plaintiff
surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame.  He signified his intention of filing a petition
for legal separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal
action.  Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.

ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed by the Family
Code.
HELD:

Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of adultery
other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code.  What is
prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading.  Where there is evidence of the
adultery independent of the defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be
granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff.  What the law
prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendant’s confession.  The petition should be granted based on the second
adultery, which has not yet prescribed.

Brown v. Yambao

G.R. No. L-10699, 18 October 1957

FACTS:

On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain legal separation
from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese invaders, from
1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with
one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl that Brown learned of his wife’s misconduct only in 1945, upon
his release from internment and that they have lived separately thereafter.

Brown prayed for confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children issued of the marriage;
that the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just and
equitable.

The court subsequently declared Juanita Yambao in default, for failure to answer in due time, despite service of
summonsand directed the City Fiscal or his representatives to investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the
Civil Code, if collusion exists between the parties.

During the cross-examination of the plaintiff by Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose, it was found out that after the
liberation,Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had begotten children by her. Thereafter, the
court rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, on the ground that, while the wife’s adultery was
established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action under Article
100 of the new Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for legal separation should be granted?

RULING:

No.The court below correctly held that the appellant’s action was already barred, because Brown did not
petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife’s adultery, which was upon
his release from internment in 1945.Appellant’s brief does not even contest the correctness of such findings and
conclusion.

Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that:“The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse,
provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are
offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal
separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.”

In the case at bar, it is pursuant to the second sentence of the aforementioned law, wherein Brown and Yumbao
are both offenders, hence, a legal separation cannot be granted.

Article 102 of the Civil Code provides that:“An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one
year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and
after the date when such cause occurred.”
In the case at bar, Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his
wife’s adultery.

It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance
thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest
and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the
record.

Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for denying the remedy sought (commission
of similar offense by petitioner and prescription of the action), it becomes unnecesary to delve further into the
case and ascertain if Brown’s inaction for ten years also evidences condonation or connivance on his part. Even
if it did not, his situation would not be improved. It is thus needless to discuss the second assignment of error.

The third assignment of error being a mere consequence of the others must necessarily fail with them. The
decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

Pacete v. Carriaga

G.R. No. L-53880, 17 March 1994

FACTS:

Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile
husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete,
accounting and separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and
they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion
and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since
he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.

The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer, which the court
partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file an answer
on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court
forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980.
After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17, 1980.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file their
answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal
separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.

RULING:

The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for
the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”

The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal
separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation
must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to
provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to
reconcile.

The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal
separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if there is
no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.”
PERSONS Cases under Family Code - RHODA
SABALONES vs CA
SAMSON T. SABALONES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-SABALONES G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994
THE CASE husband disputes the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court
FACTS
 As member of diplomatic service assigned to different countries, petitioner Samson Sabalones left to his wife (respondent), the
administration of some of their conjugal properties for 15 years.
 He retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines, but not to his wife and children.
 4 years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot in Greenhills, San Juan. He claimed that he was
68 years old, sick and living alone without any income, and that his share of the proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive
cost of his hospitalization and medical treatment.
 In her answer, wife opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that the house in
Greenhills was occupied by her and their 6 kids, and that they were depending for their support on the rentals from another
conjugal property (building and lot in Forbes Park). She also informed the court that despite her husband’s retirement, he had
not returned to his legitimate family and was instead maintaining a separate residence with another woman and their 3 kids.
 Wife asked the court to grant legal separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her
husband’s share because of his adultery.
RTC RULING RTC found that petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous marriage. Court thus decreed the legal separation and
forfeiture of petitioner’s share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to support from his wife.
CA RULING (wife filed motion for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioner from interfering with
administration of their properties. She alleged that he had harassed the tenant in Forbes Park that his lease would not be renewed)
=granted by CA
(petitioner now assails this decision, arguing that since the law provides for joint administration of conjugal properties, no injunctive
relief can be issued against one or the other because no right will be violated. He also cited Art 124 and Art 61 of FC).
ISSUE W/N a preliminary injunction can be issued by the Court (despite joint administration of conjugal properties) YES
SC RULING We agree with CA that pending the appointment of an administrator over the whole mass of conjugal assets, the
respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to continue with her administration. It was also correct, taking into account the
evidence adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the petitioner from interfering with his wife’s administration pending resolution of the
appeal.

The law does indeed grant joint administration over the conjugal properties, as clearly provided in Art 124. However, Art 61 states
that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a written agreement, appoint either
one of the spouse or a 3rd person to act as administrator.

While no formal designation of administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying
the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in
effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the wife with the preliminary injunction.

The primary purpose of injunction is to preserve status quo. The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject
properties for 19 years now, without complaint on the part of petitioner. He has not alleged, much less shown, that her
administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. In her motion for issuance of preliminary injunction, the
respondent wife alleged that the petitioner’s harassment of their tenant in Forbes Park would jeopardize the lease and deprive her
and her children of the income therefrom. She also complained that petitioner executed a quitclaim over their conjugal property in
USA in favor of Thelma Cumareng (the other woman) to improve her lifestyle, to the prejudice of his legitimate family. These
allegations show that injunction is necessary to protect the interests of wife and kids.

The twin requirements of a valid injunction are: existence of a right and its actual or threatened violation. Regardless of the outcome
of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the petitioner’s legitimate wife, she has a right to a share (if not the whole) of the conjugal
estate. There is also enough evidence to raise apprehension that entrusting said estate to petitioner may result in its disposition to
the detriment of the wife and kids.

Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the administrator of the whole mass of
conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the
petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance with Art 61.
Art 124: The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision .

Espiritu vs. CA
GR 115640, March 15, 1995

FACTS:

Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law relationship of husband while in US.  
Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer, National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a
temporary post.  They begot a child in 1986 named Rosalind.  After a year, they went back to the Philippines for a brief
vacation when they also got married.  Subsequently, they had a second child named Reginald.  In 1990, they decided to
separate.  Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo and the children and
went back to California.  Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left them with his sister.  When Teresita
returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his
sister to gain custody of the children. 

ISSUE: WON the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.

HELD:

In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be the paramount concern and that
even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated from the mother for compelling reasons.   The
presumption that the mother is the best custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but not conclusive.   At the
time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over 7 years of age.  The choice of the child to whom she
preferred to stay must be considered.  It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his
father/aunt.  She was found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother’s infidelity.  Furthermore, there was
nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to give the children the kind
of attention and care which their mother is not in the position to extend.  On the other hand, the mother’s conviction for
the crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at
least with the daughter.    

Hence, petition was granted.  Custody of the minors was reinstated to their father.

Laperal vs. Republic

GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962

FACTS:

The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria on March 1939.  
However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses.   Aside from that, she ceased to live with
Enrique.  During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria.  She filed this petition to be permitted to resume
in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal.  This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates
Art. 372 of the Civil Code.  She was claiming that continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her
finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific provision of Art. 372
of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his husband.   

HELD:

In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum.   The
finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without
basis.  It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal
partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated.  Hence, there could be no more
occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to hold otherwise
would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372.

Petition was dismissed.