Intentional tort

INTENTIONAL TORTS - Harmful consequences are substantially certain to

occur or are intended

NEGLIGENT TORTS - The act or omission merely creates a foreseeable risk

or harm, which may or may not actually be realized.

Concept

Intentional torts include conduct where the actor desires to cause the
consequences of his act or believes the consequences are substantially certain to
result from it.

Abuse of right

Art. 19, CC. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.

Elements

1. There is a legal right or duty;

2. Which is exercised in bad faith;
3. For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Test of abuse of rights

No hard and fast rule; depends on the circumstances of each case. The exercise
of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established,
and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure
another.

Generally, the exercise of any right must be in accordance with the purpose for
which it was established. It must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must
be no intention to injure another.

There is abuse of right when:

1. The right is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring
another
2. The objective of the act is illegitimate
3. There is an absence of good faith

Effects of the application of Art. 19:

 Intentional tort

a. “A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as

such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality” [Globe
Mackay v. CA, G.R. No. 81262 (1989)];
b. It precludes the defense of damnum absque injuria. Damnum absque
injuria does not apply when there is an abuse of a person’s right

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE vs CA

August 25, 1989
 
Facts: Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the
engineering operations manager, discovered fictitious purchases and other
fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp
loss of several thousands of pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior
Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the Executive Vice President and General
Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report, Hendry told Tobias that he
was number one suspect and ordered him one week forced leave. When Tobias
returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a “crook” and a
“swindler”, ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to submit specimen of
his handwriting, signature and initials for police investigation. Moreover,
petitioners hired a private investigator. Private investigation was still
incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila
police investigators and from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document
Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscal’s Office of
Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases against private respondent Tobias, but
were dismissed.
 
Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in
January 1973, effective December 1972. He sought employment with the
Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to
RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to
dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged
unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered
judgment in favor of private respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him eighty
thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as
exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney’s fees, and
costs; hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
 
Issue: Whether petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
 
 Intentional tort

Held:  Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain
significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right
that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter
must now be indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the
company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail;
his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos (“You Filipinos cannot be
trusted.”) as well as against Tobias (“crook”, and “swindler”); the writing of a
letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to
dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal cases by petitioners against private
respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious and
unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to private respondent.
The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during
the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set
forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
 
The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an
employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is
exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively,
then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. Under the
circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a
legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to
recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Breach of statutory duty

Art. 20, CC. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

The provision is intended to provide a remedy in cases where the law declares
an act illegal but fails to provide for a relief to the party injured. [Jarencio]

Art. 20 does not distinguish, and the act may be done willfully or negligently.

Violation of a statutory duty is negligence [Garcia v. Salvador, G.R. No.

168512 (2007)].

Requisites
1. The act must be willful or negligent;
2. It must be contrary to law; and
3. Damages must be suffered by the injured party.
 Intentional tort

Interference with contractual relations

Art. 1314, CC. Any person who induces another to violate his contract with
another person shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party.

Elements of tort interference [So Ping Bun v. CA, G.R. No. 120554
(1999)]:
1. Existence of a valid contract.
2. Knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract;
and
3. Interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse.

Bad faith/Malice is required to make the defendant liable for damages in cases
of tortuous interference.

JOSE V. LAGON, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

On June 23, 1982, petitioner Jose Lagon purchased two parcels of land located
at Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi. A few months
after the sale, private respondent Menandro Lapuz filed a complaint for torts
and damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Sultan Kudarat. Private respondent claimed that he entered into a contract of
lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi over three parcels of land in Sultan
Kudarat, Maguindanao beginning 1964. It was agreed upon that private
respondent will put upcommercial buildings which would, in turn, be leased to
new tenants. The rentals to be paid by those tenants, would answer for the rent
private respondent was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease of the
land. In 1974, the lease contract ended but was allegedly renewed. When Bai
Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started remitting his rent to the court-
appointed administrator of her estate. But when the administrator advised him
to stop collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings heconstructed, he
discovered that petitioner, representing himself as the new owner of the
property, had been collecting rentals from the tenants. He thus filed a
complaint against the latter, accusing petitioner of inducing the heirs of Bai
Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold rights
over it. Petitioner denied the allegation, thus contending that the heirs were in
dire need of money to pay off the obligations of the deceased. He also denied
interfering with private respondent's leasehold rights as there was no lease
contractcovering the property when he purchased it; that his personal
 Intentional tort

investigation and inquiry revealed no claims or encumbrances on the subject

lots. On July 29, 1986, the RTC decided in favor of the private respondent.
Petitioner appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
affirmed the ruling of the trial court with modification. It held for petitioner
liable for damages, reasoning that he must have known of the lease contract
and must have also acted with malice or bad faith when he bought the subject
parcels of land.

ISSUE: Whether or not the purchase by petitioner of the subject property,

during the supposed existence of private respondent's lease contract with the
late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for which petitioner
should be held liable for damages. NO

HELD:

In this case, petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of the lease contract.
His sellers (the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi) likewise allegedly did not inform him
of any existing lease contract.

Art. 21, CC. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the 

damage.

Acts Contra Bonus Mores Moral damages are recoverable where the
dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an
act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy.

Elements [Albenson v. CA, supra].

1. There is an act which is legal;

2. But which is contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy; and
3. It is done with intent to injure.


This article is designed “to expand the concept of torts and quasi-delict in this
jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in statute books”

The injury suffered by the plaintiff may refer to any determinate right or
property, whether material or not. The doctrine of proximate cause must apply,
 Intentional tort

because the defendant must have caused the injury through their act or
omission.

If through the plaintiff ’s own fault or negligence, they sustained injury, they
cannot recover. Does a “willful” act require malice or deceit?

Yes. The Code uses the motive-laden word “willfully” rather than the
comparatively weaker word “intentionally.” An act which is “willful” connotes
an evil or malicious motive, while an act which is merely intentional has
ordinarily no such implication.

Breach of Promise to Marry and Moral Seduction (fraud and deceit)

Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally

set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized,
is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs
Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a
sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and
that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could
justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful
injury to her honor and reputation. It is essential, however, that such injury
should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy [Baksh v. CA, supra]. (Note on Baksh: The test, however, is
problematic, in that it employs the concept of proximate cause even if Article
21 cases do not require the application of proximate cause.)

However, when for one whole year, the plaintiff, a woman of legal age,
maintained sexual relations with the defendant, with repeated acts of
intercourse, there is here voluntariness. No case under Article 21 is made
[Tanjanco v. CA, G.R. No. L-18630 (1966)]. In an action by the woman, the
enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; mere proof of
intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery. It is not seduction where the
willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the female, and the
defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the
act.
 Intentional tort

Independent Civil Actions

Civil Code provisions on independent civil actions include Articles 32-35.

In these cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal action,
even if there has been no reservation made by the injured party; the law in
itself makes such reservation.

The result of the civil action is thus independent of the result of the criminal
action. The underlying purpose for this independent civil action is to allow the
citizen to enforce his rights in a private action brought by him, regardless of the
action of the State attorney.

Violation of civil and political rights

Art. 32, CC. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:

(1) Freedom of religion; (2) Freedom of speech; (3) Freedom to write for the
press or to maintain a periodical publication; (4) Freedom from arbitrary or
illegal detention; (5) Freedom of suffrage; (6) The right against deprivation
of property without due process of law; (7) The right to a just
compensation when private property is taken for public use; (8) The right to
the equal protection of the laws;

Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person “directly or indirectly”

responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another.
Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must
answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also
to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Article 32
makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the
transgression, joint tortfeasors [MHP Garments v. CA, G.R. No. 86720
(1994)].

It is not necessary that the defendant under Article 32 should have acted with
malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the
effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the
constitutional right of the plaintiff.

Art. 34, CC. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or
fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or
 Intentional tort

property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city
or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein
recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a
preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

Strict Liability Tort

This refers to instances where negligence is not required to be proven to incur

liability; and diligence is not a defense.

Art. 2183, CC. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the
same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape
or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come
from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.

The law makes no distinction as to what kind of animal is used or possessed.

Hence, it may be construed as applicable generally to all animals, whether
domestic, domesticated, or wild. It would seem that birds are covered since they
can also cause damage.

Possible defenses against this liability

1. Force Majeure
2. Fault of person suffering damage
3. Act of third persons

BASILIO HISOLE and FRANCISCO HISOLE, Defendants-Appellees

G.R. No. L-2075 [November 29, 1949]

Facts of the Case:

                      Deceased Loreto Afialda was employed by the defendant spouses as

caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation. On March 21, 1947, while
he was tending the animals, he was gored by one of them and consequently
died of his injuries. Thus, herein appellant, Loreto’s elder sister who depended
on him for support, filed the action for damages.  The complaint was dismissed
by the trial court upon granting a motion to dismiss filed by spouses Hisole.
Subsequently, the plaintiff had taken the present appeal.

Issue:
 Intentional tort

                      Whether or not defendants may be held liable for damages when

damage is caused to the animal’s caretaker.

Ruling of the Court:

            Under Article 1905 of the old Civil Code, the owner of an animal is
answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused
to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been
negligent or at fault under Article 1902 of the same code. In the case at hand,
the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid
for his work as such. Thus, it was his business to try to prevent the animal from
causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. Being injured by the
animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation
which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the
consequences. Deceased does not fall within the ambit of “stranger”, which is
significant for the claim for damages under the said article.

Moreover, under the said circumstances, the action should not come under
Article 1905 of the Civil Code but under the labor laws, i.e. Workmen’s
Compensation Act. The complaint contained no allegation as to constitute
liability under the Civil Code nor the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Hence, it
alleges no cause of action.

            The order appealed from was affirmed.

Products liability; manufacturers or processors

Art. 2187, CC. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet

articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any
noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists
between them and the consumers.

Under the foregoing provision, liability is not made to depend upon fault or
negligence of the manufacturer or processor.
 Intentional tort

The provision likewise dispensed with any contractual relation between the
manufacturer and the consumer, thereby clearly implying that liability is
imposed by law as a matter of public policy.

Requisites of Liability

1. Defendant is a manufacturer or possessor of foodstuff, drinks, toilet articles

and similar goods;
2. He used noxious or harmful substances in the manufacture or processing of
the foodstuff, drinks or toilet articles consumed or used by the plaintiff;
3. Plaintiff ’s death or injury was caused by the product so consumed or used;
and
4. The damages sustained and claimed by the plaintiff and the amount
thereof.

Burden of proof

The burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time it
left the hands of the manufacturer and particular seller is upon the injured
plaintiff.

Who may recover

Although the article used the term “consumer”, such term includes a “user”
and “purchaser” of the injuriously defective food product or toilet article. The
person who may recover need not be the purchaser of the foodstuff or toilet
article.

Art 2193, CC. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof,
is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same.

The purpose of the law is to relieve the injured party of the difficulty of
determining and proving who threw the thing or what caused it to fall, or that
either was due to the fault or negligence of any particular individual. Lessee is
considered as the head of the family. It is enough that he lives in and has
control over it.