GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Subsequently, on 22 August 2001, the petitioners 15 amended
1.Scope of the rules on evidence
2. Applicability of rules on evidence
G.R. No. 176240 October 17, 2008
ROLANDO SASAN, SR., LEONILO DAYDAY, MODESTO AGUIRRE,
ALEJANDRO ARDIMER, ELEUTERIO SACIL, WILFREDO JUEGOS,
PETRONILO CARCEDO and CESAR PACIENCIA, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION 4TH DIVISION,
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK and HELPMATE, INC., respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are
the Decision1 dated 24 April 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
79912, which affirmed the Decision dated 22 January 2003 of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-000241-
2002 finding that Helpmate, Inc. (HI) is a legitimate independent job
contractor and that the petitioners were not illegally dismissed from work; and
the Resolution2 dated 31 October 2006 of the same court denying the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners.
Respondent Equitable-PCI Bank (E-PCIBank),3 a banking entity duly
organized and existing under and by virtue of Philippine laws, entered into a
Contract for Services4 with HI, a domestic corporation primarily engaged in
the business of providing janitorial and messengerial services. Pursuant to
their contract, HI shall hire and assign workers to E-PCIBank to perform
janitorial/messengerial and maintenance services. The contract was impliedly
renewed year after year. Petitioners Rolando Sasan, Sr., 5 Leonilo
Dayday,6 Modesto Aguirre,7 Alejandro Ardimer,8 Eleuterio Sacil,9 Wilfredo
Juegos,10 Petronilo Carcedo,11 and Cesar Peciencia12 were among those
employed and assigned to E-PCIBank at its branch along Gorordo Avenue,
Lahug, Cebu City, as well as to its other branches in the Visayas. 13
O 23 July 2001, petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in
Cebu City separate complaints14 against E-PCIBank and HI for illegal
dismissal, with claims for separation pay, service incentive leave pay,
allowances, damages, attorney’s fees and costs. Their complaints were
docketed as NLRC RAB-VII Case No. 07-1381-2001 and raffled to Labor
Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez (Labor Arbiter Gutierrez) for their proper
disposition.
their complaints to include a claim for 13th month-pay.
Several conciliation hearings were scheduled by Labor Arbiter Gutierrez but
the parties still failed to arrive at a mutually beneficial settlement; hence,
Labor Arbiter Gutierrez ordered that they submit their respective position
papers.
In their position papers, petitioners claimed that they had become regular
employees of E-PCIBank with respect to the activities for which they were
employed, having continuously rendered janitorial and messengerial services
to the bank for more than one year; that E-PCIBank had direct control and
supervision over the means and methods by which they were to perform their
jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was null and void because the latter had
no power to do so since they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank.
For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract for Services
with HI, an independent job contractor which hired and assigned petitioners
to the bank to perform janitorial and messengerial services thereat. It was HI
that paid petitioners’ wages, monitored petitioners’ daily time records (DTR)
and uniforms, and exercised direct control and supervision over the
petitioners and that therefore HI has every right to terminate their services
legally. E-PCIBank could not be held liable for whatever misdeed HI had
committed against its employees.
HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was an independent job contractor
engaged in the business of providing janitorial and related services to
business establishments, and E-PCIBank was one of its clients. Petitioners
were its employees, part of its pool of janitors/messengers assigned to E-
PCIBank. The Contract for Services between HI and E-PCIBank expired on
15 July 2000. E-PCIBank no longer renewed said contract with HI and,
instead, bidded out its janitorial requirements to two other job contractors,
Able Services and Puritan. HI designated petitioners to new work
assignments, but the latter refused to comply with the same. Petitioners were
not dismissed by HI, whether actually or constructively, thus, petitioners’
complaints before the NLRC were without basis.
Labor Arbiter Gutierrez focused on the following issues: (a) whether
petitioners were regular employees of HI; (b) whether petitioners were
illegally dismissed from their employment; and (c) whether petitioners were
entitled to their money claims.
On 7 January 2002, on the basis of the parties’ position papers and
documentary evidence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez rendered a Decision finding
that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not
possess the required substantial capital or investment to actually perform the b) Separation Pay = ₱6,175.00
job, work, or service under its own account and responsibility as required Feb. 2, 1999 to July 15, 2001
under the Labor Code.16 HI is therefore a labor-only contractor and the real = ₱190.00 x 26 days x 2.5 years / 2
employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to petitioners. Total = ₱32,015.00
According to Labor Arbiter Gutierrez: III – Roland Mosquera (did not file Amended
Complaint)
[T]he undisputed facts show that the [herein petitioners] were made to a) Backwages = ₱25,840.00
perform not only as janitors but also as messengers, drivers and one of them (same as Paciencia)
even worked as an electrician. For us, these jobs are not only directly related b) Separation Pay = ₱7,410.00
to the main business of the principal but are, likewise deemed necessary in March 8, 1998 to July 15, 2001
the conduct of respondent Equitable-PCI Bank’s principal business. Thus, = ₱190.00 x 26 days x 3 yrs. / 2
based on the above, we so declare that the [petitioners] are employees of
Total = ₱33,250.00
respondent Equitable-PCI Bank. And having worked with respondent
Equitable-PCI Bank for more than one (1) year, they are deemed regular IV – Petronillo Carcedo
employees. They cannot, therefore, be removed from employment without a) Backwages = ₱25,840.00
cause and without due process, which is wanting in this case. Hence, the (same as Paciencia)
severance of their employment in the guise of termination of contract is b) Separation Pay = ₱41,990.00
illegal.17 Sept. 16, 1984 to July 15, 2001
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 17 yrs. / 2
In the dispositive portion of his 7 January 2002 Decision, Labor Arbiter c) 13th Month Pay = ₱4,940.00
Gutierrez awarded to petitioners the following amounts: = ₱190.00 x 26 days
Total = ₱72,770.00
I. – CESAR PACIENCIA V – Rolando Sasan, Sr.
a) Backwages a) Backwages = ₱25,840.00
(same as Paciencia)
July 15, 2001 to January 8, 2002 b) Separation Pay = ₱29,640.00
October 1989 to July 15, 2001
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 12 yrs. / 2
= ₱190.00 per day = ₱25,840.00
c) 13th Month Pay = ₱4,940.00
= ₱190.00 x 26 days
= 5 months and 6 days
Total = ₱60,420.00
VI – Leonilo Dayday
= 136 days x ₱190.00
a) Backwages = ₱25,840.00
b) Separation Pay =₱12,350.00
(same as Paciencia)
June 10, 1996 to July 15, 2001
b) Separation Pay = ₱44,460.00
= 5 years
Feb. 8, 1983 to July 15, 2001
=₱190.00 x 26 days x 5 years / 2
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 18 yrs. / 2
c) 13th Month Pay = ₱4,940.00
c) 13th Month Pay = ₱4,940.00
= ₱190.00 x 26 days
= ₱190.00 x 26 days
Total ₱43,130.00
Total = ₱75,240.00
II – Dominador Suico, Jr. (did not file Amended
VII – Eleuterio Sacil
Complaint)
a) Backwages = ₱25,840.00
a) Backwages = ₱25,840.00
(same as Paciencia)
July 15, 2001 to January 15, 2002
same as Paciencia
b) Separation Pay = ₱22,230.00 c) 13th Month Pay = ₱4,940.00
June 2, 1992 to July 15, 2001 = ₱190.00 x 26 days
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 9 yrs. / 2 Total = ₱59,185.00
c) 13th Month Pay = ₱4,940.00
= ₱190.00 x 26 days xxxx
Total = ₱53,010.00
VIII – Mario Juntilla WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby
a) Backwages = ₱25,840.00 rendered directing the respondents Equitable PCI Bank and Helpmate, Inc.
(same as Pacencia) to pay jointly and solidarily the complainants as follows:
b) Separation Pay = ₱34,580.00
October 7, 1987 to July 15, 2001
1. Cesar Paciencia - P 43,130.00
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 14 yrs. / 2
c) 13th Month Pay = ₱4,940.00 2. Dominador Suico, Jr. - 32,015.00
= ₱190.00 x 26 days
Total = ₱65,360.00 3. Roland Mosquera - 33,250.00
IX – Wilfredo Juegos 4. Petronilo Carceda - 72,770.00
a) Backwages = ₱25,840.00
(same as Pacencia) 5. Roland Sasan, Sr. - 60,420.00
b) Separation Pay = ₱27,170.00
6. Leonilo Dayday - 75,240.00
July 23, 1990 to July 15, 2001
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 11 yrs. / 2 7. Eleuterio Sacil - 53,010.00
c) 13th Month Pay = ₱4,840.00
= ₱190.00 x 26 days 8. Mario Juntilla - 65,360.00
Total = ₱57,950.00
9. Wilfredo Juegos - 57,950.00
X – Modesto Aguirre
a) Backwages = ₱25,840.00 10. Modesto Aguirre - 54,245.00
(same as Paciencia)
11. Alejandro Ardimer - 59,185.00
b) Separation Pay
TOTAL - ₱606,575.0018
= Jan. 5, 1992 to July 15, 2001 = ₱23,465.00
Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez, respondents E-
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 9.5 yrs. / 2 PCIBank and HI appealed the same to the NLRC, 4th Division, stationed in
c) 13th Month Pay = ₱4,940.00 Cebu City. Their appeals were docketed as NLRC Case No. V-000241-2002.
= ₱190.00 x 26 days In support of its allegation that it was a legitimate job contractor, HI submitted
Total = ₱54,245.00 before the NLRC several documents which it did not present before Labor
XI – Alejandro Ardimer Arbiter Gutierrez. These are:
a) Backwages = ₱25,840.00
1. Certificate of Filing of Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock, Certificate of
(same as Paciencia) Filing Amended Articles of Incorporation, and General Information Sheet
b) Separation Pay = ₱28,405.00 Stock Corporation of HI showing therein that it increased its authorized
= Jan. 20, 1990 to July 15, 2001 capital stock from ₱1,500,000.00 to ₱20,000,000.00 on 12 March 1999 with
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 11.5 yrs. / 2 the Securities and Exchange Commission;
2. Audited Financial Statement of HI showing therein that it has Total Assets 1. Aguirre, Modesto - P 5,434.00
of ₱20,939,935.72 as of 31 December 2000;
2. Ardimer, Alejandro - 5,434.00
3. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 110173 and Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-
063-00582 registered under the name of HI showing that it has a parcel of 3. Carcedo, Petronilo - 5,434.00
land with Market Value of ₱1,168,860.00 located along Rizal Avenue (now 4. Dayday, Leonilo - 5,434.00
Bacalso Avenue), Cebu City, and
5. Juegos, Wilfredo - 5,434.00
4. Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-00583 registered under the name of HI
showing that it has a commercial building constructed on the preceding lot 6. Juntilla, Mario - 5,434.00
located along Bacalso Avenue, Cebu City with market value of 7. Paciencia, Cesar - 5,434.00
₱2,515,170.00.19
8. Sacil, Eleuterio - 5,434.00
The NLRC promulgated its Decision on 22 January 2003 modifying the ruling
TOTAL ₱43,472.0023
of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. The NLRC took into consideration the
documentary evidence presented by HI for the first time on appeal and, on
the basis thereof, declared HI as a highly capitalized venture with sufficient Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its
capitalization, which cannot be considered engaged in "labor-only Resolution dated 1 July 2003.24
contracting."
Distressed by the decision of the NLRC, petitioners sought recourse with the
On the charge of illegal dismissal, the NLRC ruled that: Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79912.
The charge of illegal dismissal was prematurely filed. The record shows that
barely eight (8) days from 15 July 2001 when the complainants were placed In its Decision dated 24 April 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings
on a temporary "off-detail," they filed their complaints on 23 July 2001 and of the NLRC that HI was a legitimate job contractor and that it did not illegally
amended their complaints on 22 August 2001 against the respondents on the dismiss petitioners:
presumption that their services were already terminated. Temporary "off-
detail" is not equivalent to dismissal. x x x.20 As to the question of whether or not, as a legitimate independent job
contractor, respondent HI illegally dismissed the petitioners. We rule in the
The NLRC deleted Labor Arbiter Gutierrez’s award of backwages and negative.
separation pay, but affirmed his award for 13 th month pay and attorney’s fees
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the 13th month pay, to the It is undisputed that the contract between respondent HI and its client E-
petitioners.21 Thus, the NLRC decreed in its 22 January 2003 Decision, the PCIBank expired on July 15, 2000. The record shows that after said
payment of the following reduced amounts to petitioners: expiration, respondent HI offered the petitioners new work assignments to
various establishments which are HI’s clients. The petitioners, therefore,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of Labor Arbiter Jose G. were not even placed on "floating status." They simply refused, without
Gutierrez dated 7 January 2002 is MODIFIED, to wit: justifiable reason, to assume their new work assignments which refusal was
tantamount to abandonment. There being no illegal dismissal, petitioners are
Ordering respondents Helpmate, Inc. and Equitable PCI Bank to jointly and not entitled to backwages or separation pay.26
severally22 pay the complainants of their 13th month pay and attorney’s fees
in the aggregate amount of Forty-Three Thousand Four Hundred Seventy- The fallo of the 24 April 2006 Decision of the appellate court reads:
Two and 00/100 (₱43,472.00), broken down as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us DENYING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the
decision of the NLRC, Fourth Division, in NLRC Case No. V-000145-2003
promulgated on June 22, 2003.27
Petitioners now come before us via the instant Petition raising the following
issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN
EXCESS OF THEIR JURISDICTION AND/OR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE NLRC 4TH DIVISION’S DECISION
AND GRAVELY ERRED IN:
I. ACCEPTING AND APPRECIATING THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE
SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENTS DURING APPEAL, ALL EXISTING
DURING THE TIME THE NLRC RAB 7’S TRIAL, CONTRARY TO THIS
HONORABLE COURT’S PREVIOUS ESTABLISHED DECISIONS.
II. REVERSING, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, THE FACTUAL FINDING
OF NLRC RAB 7 THAT THE RESPONDENT HI WAS LABOR ONLY
CONTRACTOR.
III. RULING, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, THAT THE ILLEGAL
DISMISSAL COMPLAINTS WERE PREMATURELY FILED.28
Before proceeding to the substantive issues, we first address the procedural
issues raised by petitioners.
Petitioners object to the acceptance and consideration by the NLRC of the
evidence presented by HI for the first time on appeal. This is not a novel
procedural issue, however, and our jurisprudence is already replete with
cases29 allowing the NLRC to admit evidence, not presented before the
Labor Arbiter, and submitted to the NLRC for the first time on appeal.
Technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. Labor officials
should use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure,
all in the interest of due process.30
The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by
its New Rules of Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of
law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters
are directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law
and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. In keeping with this
directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as
documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on
appeal. The submission of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice
the other party for the latter could submit counter-evidence.31
In Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,32 we
again emphasized that:
[T]he NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time
on appeal, because technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor
cases.
The settled rule is that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence on
appeal as technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. In fact,
labor officials are mandated by the Labor Code to use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the
interest of due process. Thus, in Lawin Security Services v. NLRC,
and Bristol Laboratories Employees’ Association-DFA v. NLRC, we held that
even if the evidence was not submitted to the labor arbiter, the fact that it
was duly introduced on appeal to the NLRC is enough basis for the latter to
be more judicious in admitting the same, instead of falling back on the mere
technicality that said evidence can no longer be considered on appeal.
Certainly, the first course of action would be more consistent with equity and
the basic notions of fairness.
For the same reasons, we cannot find merit in petitioners’ protestations
against the documentary evidence submitted by HI because they were mere
photocopies. Evidently, petitioners are invoking the best evidence rule,
espoused in Section 3, Rule130 of the Rules of Court. It provides that:
Section 3. – Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself x x x.
The above provision explicitly mandates that when the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself. Notably, certified true copies of these documents,
acceptable under the Rules of Court33 were furnished to the petitioners. Even
assuming that petitioners were given mere photocopies, again, we stress that
proceedings before the NLRC are not covered by the technical rules of
evidence and procedure as observed in the regular courts. Technical rules of
evidence do not apply if the decision to grant the petition proceeds from an
examination of its sufficiency as well as a careful look into the arguments
contained in position papers and other documents. 34
Petitioners had more than adequate opportunity when they filed their motion
for reconsideration before the NLRC, their Petition to the Court of Appeals
and even to this Court, to refute or present their counter-evidence to the
documentary evidence presented by HI. Having failed in this respect,
petitioners cannot now be heard to complain about these documentary
evidences presented by HI upon which the NLRC and the Court of Appeals
based its finding that HI is a legitimate job contractor.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain one's side. It is also an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. It is not the denial of the right to be heard but
denial of the opportunity to be heard that constitutes violation of due process
of law. Petitioners herein were afforded every opportunity to be heard and to
seek reconsideration of the adverse judgment against them. They had every
opportunity to strengthen their positions by presenting their own substantial
evidence to controvert those submitted by E-PCIBank and HI before the
NLRC, and even before the Court of Appeals. It cannot win its case by
merely raising unsubstantiated doubt or relying on the weakness of the
adverse parties’ evidence.
We now proceed to the resolution of the substantive issues submitted by
petitioners for our consideration, particularly, whether HI is a labor-only
contactor and E-PCIBank should be deemed petitioners’ principal employer;
and whether petitioners were illegally dismissed from their employment.
Permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement
whereby a principal agrees to put out or farm out to a contractor or
subcontractor the performance or completion of a specific job, work or
service within a definite or predetermined period, regardless of whether such
job, work or service is to be performed or completed within or outside the
premises of the principal.35 A person is considered engaged in legitimate job
contracting or subcontracting if the following conditions concur:
(a) The contractor or subcontractor carries on a distinct and independent
business and undertakes to perform the job, work or service on its own
account and under its own responsibility according to its own manner and
method, and free from the control and direction of the principal in all matters
connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof;
(b) The contractor or subcontractor has substantial capital or investment; and
(c) The agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor
assures the contractual employees entitlement to all labor and occupational
safety and health standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization,
security of tenure, and social and welfare benefits. 36
In contrast, labor-only contracting, a prohibited act, is an arrangement where
the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to
perform a job, work or service for a principal.37 In labor-only contracting, the
following elements are present:
(a) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or
investment to actually perform the job, work or service under its own account
and responsibility; and
(b) The employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or
subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main
business of the principal.38
In distinguishing between permissible job contracting and prohibited labor-
only contracting,39 we elucidated in Vinoya v. National Labor Relations
Commission,40 that it is not enough to show substantial capitalization or
investment in the form of tools, equipment, etc. Other facts that may be
considered include the following: whether or not the contractor is carrying on
an independent business; the nature and extent of the work; the skill
required; the term and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the
performance of specified pieces of work; the control and supervision of the
work to another; the employer’s power with respect to the hiring, firing and
payment of the contractor’s workers; the control of the premises; the duty to
supply premises, tools, appliances, materials and labor; and the mode and
manner or terms of payment.41 Simply put, the totality of the facts and the
surrounding circumstances of the case are to be considered. 42 Each case
must be determined by its own facts and all the features of the relationship
are to be considered.43
In the case at bar, we find substantial evidence to support the finding of the
NLRC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that HI is a legitimate job contractor.
We take note that HI has been issued by the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) Certificate of Registration44 Numbered VII-859-1297-
048. The said certificate states among other things:
"CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION
Numbered VII-859-1297-048
is issued to
HELPMATE, INCORPORATED
330 N. Bacalso Avenue, Cebu City
for having complied with the requirements as provided for under the Labor
Code, as amended, and its Implementing Rules and having paid the
registration fee in the amount of ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P100.00) per
Official Receipt Number 9042769, dated October 16, 1997.
In witness whereof, and by authority vested in me by the Labor Code, as
amended, and its Implementing Rules specifically Department Order No. 10
series of 1997, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the Official on this
23rd day of December 1997."45
Having been issued by a public officer, this certification carries with it the
presumption that it was issued in the regular performance of official duty.46 In
the absence of proof, petitioner’s bare assertion cannot prevail over this
presumption. Moreover, the DOLE being the agency primarily responsible for
regulating the business of independent job contractors, we can presume in
the absence of evidence to the contrary that it thoroughly evaluated the
requirements submitted by HI as a precondition to the issuance of the
Cerificate of Registration.
The evidence on record also shows that HI is carrying on a distinct and
independent business from E-PCIBank. The employees of HI are assigned to
clients to perform janitorial and messengerial services, clearly distinguishable
from the banking services in which E-PCIBank is engaged.
Despite the afore-mentioned compliance by HI with the requisites for
permissible job contracting, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez still declared that HI was
engaged in prohibited labor-only contracting because it did not possess
substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work or service
under its own account or responsibility. Both the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals ruled to the contrary, and we agree.
"Substantial capital or investment" refers to capital stocks and subscribed
capitalization in the case of corporations, tools, equipments, implements,
machineries and work premises, actually and directly used by the contractor
or subcontractor in the performance or completion of the job, work or service
contracted out.47 An independent contractor must have either substantial
capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work
premises, among others. The law does not require both substantial capital
and investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, etc.48 It is
enough that it has substantial capital. In the case of HI, it has proven both.
We have expostulated that once it is established that an entity such as in this
case, HI has substantial capital, it was no longer necessary to adduce further
evidence to prove that it does not fall within the purview of "labor-only"
contracting.49 There is even no need for HI to refute the contention of
petitioners that some of the activities they performed such as those of
messengerial services are directly related to the principal business of E-
PCIBank.
In any event, we have earlier declared that while these services rendered by
the petitioners as janitors, messengers and drivers are considered directly
related to the principal business of a bank, in this case E-PCIBank,
nevertheless, they are not necessary in the conduct of its (E-PCIBANK’s)
principal business.50
HI has substantial capital in the amount of ₱20,939,935.72. It has its own
building where it holds office and it has been engaged in business for more
than a decade now.51 As observed by the Court of Appeals, surely, such a
well-established business entity cannot be considered a labor-only
contractor.
Etched in an unending stream of cases are four standards in determining the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, namely: (a) the manner of
selection and engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of
payment of wages; (c) the presence or absence of power of dismissal; and,
(d) the presence or absence of control of the putative employee’s conduct.
Most determinative among these factors is the so-called "control test."52
The presence of the first requisite for the existence of an employer-employee
relationship to wit, the selection and engagement of the employee is shown
by the fact that it was HI which selected and engaged the services of
petitioners as its employees. This is fortified by the provision in the contract
of services between HI and E-PCIBank which states:
Selection, Engagement, Discharge. [HI] shall have exclusive discretion in the
selection, engagement, investigation, discipline and discharge of its
employees.53
On the second requisite regarding the payment of wages, it was HI who paid
petitioners their wages and who provided their daily time records and
uniforms and other materials necessary for the work they performed.
Therefore, it is HI who is responsible for petitioner’s claims for wages and
other employee’s benefits. Precisely, the contract of services between HI and
E-PCIBank reveals the following:
Indemnity for Salaries and Benefits, etc. [HI] shall be responsible for the
salaries, allowances, overtime and holiday pay, and other benefits of its
personnel including withholding taxes.54
As to the third requisite on the power to control the employee’s conduct, and
the fourth requisite regarding the power of dismissal, again E-PCIBank did
not have the power to control petitioners with respect to the means and
methods by which their work was to be accomplished. It likewise had no
power of dismissal over the petitioners. All that E-PCIBank could do was to
report to HI any untoward act, negligence, misconduct or malfeasance of any
employee assigned to the premises. The contract of services between E-
PCIBank and HI is noteworthy. It states:
even dismissed by HI; they were only "off-detail" pending their re-assignment
by HI to another client. And when they were actually given new assignments
by HI with other clients,59 petitioners even refused the same. As the NLRC
pronounced, petitioners’ complaint for illegal dismissal is apparently
premature.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision dated 24 April 2006 and Resolution dated 31 October
2006 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO
ORDERED.

[HI] shall have the entire charge, control and supervision over all its
employees who may be fielded to [E-PCIBank]. For this purpose, [HI] shall
assign a regular supervisor of its employees who may be fielded to the Bank
and which regular supervisor shall exclusively supervise and control the
activities and functions defined in Section 1 hereof. x x x.55

All these circumstances establish that HI undertook said contract on its

account, under its own responsibility, according to its own manner and
method, and free from the control and direction of E-PCIBank. Where the
control of the principal is limited only to the result of the work, independent
job contracting exists. The janitorial service agreement between E-PCIBank
and HI is definitely a case of permissible job contracting.

Considering the foregoing, plus taking judicial notice of the general practice
in private, as well as in government institutions and industries, of hiring an
independent contractor to perform special services,56 ranging from janitorial,
security and even technical services, we can only conclude that HI is a
legitimate job contractor. As such legitimate job contractor, the law creates
an employer-employee relationship between HI and petitioners57 which
renders HI liable for the latter’s claims.

In view of the preceding conclusions, petitioners will never become regular

employees of E-PCIBank regardless of how long they were working for the
latter.58

We further rule that petitioners were not illegally dismissed by HI. Upon the
termination of the Contract of Service between HI and E-PCIBank, petitioners
cannot insist to continue to work for the latter. Their pull-out from E-PCIBank
did not constitute illegal dismissal since, first, petitioners were not employees
of E-PCIBank; and second, they were pulled out from said assignment due to
the non-renewal of the Contract of Service between HI and E-PCIBank. At
the time they filed their complaints with the Labor Arbiter, petitioners were not
G.R. No. 180291 July 27, 2010
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F.
GARCIA, in his capacity as PRESIDENT and GENERAL MANAGER of
the GSIS, Petitioners,
vs.
DINNAH VILLAVIZA, ELIZABETH DUQUE, ADRONICO A. ECHAVEZ,
RODEL RUBIO, ROWENA THERESE B. GRACIA, PILAR LAYCO, and
ANTONIO JOSE LEGARDA, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the August 31, 2007 Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 98952, dismissing the petition for
certiorari of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) assailing the Civil
Service Commission's Resolution No. 062177.
THE FACTS:
Petitioner Winston Garcia (PGM Garcia), as President and General Manager
of the GSIS, filed separate formal charges against respondents Dinnah
Villaviza, Elizabeth Duque, Adronico A. Echavez, Rodel Rubio, Rowena
Therese B. Gracia, Pilar Layco, and Antonio Jose Legarda for Grave
Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
pursuant to the Rules of Procedure in Administrative Investigation (RPAI) of
GSIS Employees and Officials, III, D, (1, c, f) in relation to Section 52A (3),
(20), Rule IV, of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (URACCS), in accordance with Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987, committed as follows:
That on 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together with some
employees, marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the
office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and
support for Messrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having
surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises;
xxx xxx xxx
That some of these employees badmouthed the security guards and the
GSIS management and defiantly raised clenched fists led by Atty. Velasco
who was barred by Hearing Officer Marvin R. Gatpayat in an Order dated 24
May 2005 from appearing as counsel for Atty. Molina pursuant to Section 7
(b) (2) of R.A. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees;
That respondent, together with other employees in utter contempt of CSC
Resolution No. 021316, dated 11 October 2002, otherwise known as
Omnibus Rules on Prohibited Concerted Mass Actions in the Public Sector
caused alarm and heightened some employees and disrupted the work at the
Investigation Unit during office hours.2
This episode was earlier reported to PGM Garcia, through an office
memorandum dated May 31, 2005, by the Manager of the GSIS Security
Department (GSIS-SD), Dennis Nagtalon. On the same day, the Manager of
the GSIS Investigation Unit (GSIS-IU), Atty. Lutgardo Barbo, issued a
memorandum to each of the seven (7) respondents requiring them to explain
in writing and under oath within three (3) days why they should not be
administratively dealt with.3
Respondents Duque, Echavez, Rubio, Gracia, Layco, and Legarda, together
with two others, submitted a letter-explanation to Atty. Barbo dated June 6,
2005. Denying that there was a planned mass action, the respondents
explained that their act of going to the office of the GSIS-IU was a
spontaneous reaction after learning that their former union president was
there. Aside from some of them wanting to show their support, they were
interested in that hearing as it might also affect them. For her part,
respondent Villaviza submitted a separate letter explaining that she had a
scheduled pre-hearing at the GSIS-IU that day and that she had informed her
immediate supervisor about it, attaching a copy of the order of pre-hearing.
These letters were not under oath.4
PGM Garcia then filed the above-mentioned formal charges for Grave
Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
against each of the respondents, all dated June 4, 2005. Respondents were
again directed to submit their written answers under oath within three (3)
days from receipt thereof.5 None was filed.
On June 29, 2005, PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded
decisions finding all seven (7) respondents guilty of the charges and meting
out the penalty of one (1) year suspension plus the accessory penalties
appurtenant thereto.
On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found the respondents guilty
of the lesser offense of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations
and reduced the penalty to reprimand. The CSC ruled that respondents were
not denied their right to due process but there was no substantial evidence to
hold them guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
Instead,
x x x. The actuation of the appellants in going to the IU, wearing red shirts, to
witness a public hearing cannot be considered as constitutive of such
offense. Appellants' (respondents herein) assembly at the said office to
express support to Velasco, their Union President, who pledged to defend
them against any oppression by the GSIS management, can be considered
as an exercise of their freedom of expression, a constitutionally guaranteed
right.6 x x x
PGM Garcia sought reconsideration but was denied. Thus, PGM Garcia went
to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules
on Civil Procedure.7 The CA upheld the CSC in this wise:
The Civil Service Commission is correct when it found that the act sought to
be punished hardly falls within the definition of a prohibited concerted activity
or mass action. The petitioners failed to prove that the supposed concerted
activity of the respondents resulted in work stoppage and caused prejudice to
the public service. Only about twenty (20) out of more than a hundred
employees at the main office, joined the activity sought to be punished.
These employees, now respondents in this case, were assigned at different
offices of the petitioner GSIS. Hence, despite the belated claim of the
petitioners that the act complained of had created substantial disturbance
inside the petitioner GSIS' premises during office hours, there is nothing in
the record that could support the claim that the operational capacity of
petitioner GSIS was affected or reduced to substantial percentage when
respondents gathered at the Investigation Unit. Despite the hazy claim of the
petitioners that the gathering was intended to force the Investigation Unit and
petitioner GSIS to be lenient in the handling of Atty. Molina's case and allow
Atty. Velasco to represent Atty. Molina in his administrative case before
petitioner GSIS, there is likewise no concrete and convincing evidence to
prove that the gathering was made to demand or force concessions,
economic or otherwise from the GSIS management or from the government.
In fact, in the separate formal charges filed against the respondents,
petitioners clearly alleged that respondents "marched to or appeared
simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass
demonstration/rally of protest and support for Mssrs. Mario Molina and Albert
Velasco, the latter surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises." Thus,
petitioners are aware at the outset that the only apparent intention of the
respondents in going to the IU was to show support to Atty. Mario Molina and
Albert Velasco, their union officers. The belated assertion that the intention of
the respondents in going to the IU was to disrupt the operation and pressure
the GSIS administration to be lenient with Atty. Mario Molina and Albert
Velasco, is only an afterthought.8
Not in conformity, PGM Garcia is now before us via this Petition for Review
presenting the following:
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I
WHETHER AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL MAY APPLY
SUPPLETORILY THE PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO DENY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT
AND FAILURE TO FILE ANSWER, WHERE THE RESPONDENTS IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS DID NOT FILE ANY RESPONSIVE
PLEADING TO THE FORMAL CHARGES AGAINST THEM.
II
WHETHER THE RULE THAT ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS CANNOT
BE EQUATED WITH DUE PROCESS IN JUDICIAL SENSE AUTHORIZES
AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL TO CONSIDER IN EVIDENCE AND GIVE
FULL PROBATIVE VALUE TO UNNOTARIZED LETTERS THAT DID NOT
FORM PART OF THE CASE RECORD.
III
WHETHER A DECISION THAT MAKES CONCLUSIONS OF FACTS
BASED ON EVIDENCE ON RECORD BUT MAKES A CONCLUSION OF
LAW BASED ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF A DOCUMENT THAT NEVER
FORMED PART OF THE CASE RECORDS IS VALID.
IV
WHETHER FURTHER PROOF OF SUSBTANTIAL REDUCTION OF THE
OPERATIONAL CAPACITY OF AN AGENCY, DUE TO UNRULY MASS
GATHERING OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSIDE OFFICE
PREMISES AND WITHIN OFFICE HOURS, IS REQUIRED TO HOLD THE
SAID EMPLOYEES LIABLE FOR CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST
INTEREST OF THE SERVICE PURSUANT TO CSC RESOLUTION NO.
021316.
V
WHETHER AN UNRULY MASS GATHERING OF TWENTY EMPLOYEES,
LASTING FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR DURING OFFICE HOURS, INSIDE
OFFICE PREMISES AND WITHIN A UNIT TASKED TO HEAR AN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, TO PROTEST THE PROHIBITION AGAINST
THE APPEARANCE OF THEIR LEADER AS COUNSEL IN THE SAID
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, FALLS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND
PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY.
VI
WHETHER THE CONCERTED ABANDONMENT OF EMPLOYEES OF
THEIR POSTS FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR TO HOLD AN UNRULY
PROTEST INSIDE OFFICE PREMISES ONLY CONSTITUTES THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF REASONABLE OFFICE
RULES AND REGULATIONS.9
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
Petitioners primarily question the probative value accorded to respondents'
letters of explanation in response to the memorandum of the GSIS-IU
Manager. The respondents never filed their answers to the formal charges.
The petitioners argue that there being no answers, the allegations in the
formal charges that they filed should have been deemed admitted pursuant
to Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted.- Material
averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of liquidated
damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.
Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed
admitted if not denied specifically and under oath.
According to the petitioners, this rule is applicable to the case at bench
pursuant to Rule 1, Section 4 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SECTION 4. In what cases not applicable. - These Rules shall not apply to
election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or
in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. (underscoring supplied)
The Court does not subscribe to the argument of the petitioners. Petitioners'
own rules, Rule XI, Section 4 of the GSIS' Amended Policy and Procedural
Guidelines No. 178-04, specifically provides:
If the respondent fails to file his Answer within five (5) working days from
receipt of the Formal Charge for the supporting evidence, when requested,
he shall be considered to have waived his right to file an answer and the
PGM or the Board of Trustees, in proper cases, shall render judgment, as
may be warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution.
A perusal of said section readily discloses that the failure of a respondent to
file an answer merely translates to a waiver of "his right to file an answer."
There is nothing in the rule that says that the charges are deemed admitted.
It has not done away with the burden of the complainant to prove the charges
with clear and convincing evidence.
It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be
applied in a "suppletory character." Suppletory is defined as "supplying
deficiencies."10 It means that the provisions in the Rules of Court will be
made to apply only where there is an insufficiency in the applicable rule.
There is, however, no such deficiency as the rules of the GSIS are explicit in
case of failure to file the required answer. What is clearly stated there is that
GSIS may "render judgment as may be warranted by the facts and evidence
submitted by the prosecution."
Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court finds application
in this case, petitioners must remember that there remain averments that are
not deemed admitted by the failure to deny the same. Among them are
immaterial allegations and incorrect conclusions drawn from facts set out in
the complaint.11 Thus, even if respondents failed to file their answer, it does
not mean that all averments found in the complaint will be considered as true
and correct in their entirety, and that the forthcoming decision will be
rendered in favor of the petitioners. We must not forget that even in
administrative proceedings, it is still the complainant, or in this case the
petitioners, who have the burden of proving, with substantial evidence, the
allegations in the complaint or in the formal charges. 12
A perusal of the decisions of the CA and of the CSC will reveal that the case
was resolved against petitioners based, not on the absence of respondents'
evidence, but on the weakness of that of the petitioners. Thus, the CA wrote:
Petitioners correctly submitted the administrative cases for resolution without
the respondents' respective answer to the separate formal charges in
accordance with Section 4, Rule XI of the RPAI. Being in full control of the
administrative proceeding and having effectively prevented respondents from
further submitting their responsive answer and evidence for the defense,
petitioners were in the most advantageous position to prove the merit of their
allegations in the formal charges. When petitioner Winston Garcia issued
those similarly worded decisions in the administrative cases against the
respondents, it is presumed that all evidence in their favor were duly
submitted and justly considered independent of the weakness of
respondent's evidence in view of the principle that ''the burden of proof
belongs to the one who alleges and not the one who denies."13
On the merits, what needs to be resolved in the case at bench is the question
of whether or not there was a violation of Section 5 of CSC Resolution No.
02-1316. Stated differently, whether or not respondents' actions on May 27,
2005 amounted to a "prohibited concerted activity or mass action."
Pertinently, the said provision states:
Section 5. As used in this Omnibus Rules, the phrase ''prohibited concerted
activity or mass action'' shall be understood to refer to any collective activity
undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their
employees organizations, with intent of effecting work stoppage or service
disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession, economic or
otherwise, from their respective agencies or the government. It shall include
mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature. (underscoring
supplied)
In this case, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU
office wearing red shirts to witness a public hearing do not amount to a
concerted activity or mass action proscribed above. CSC even added that
their actuations can be deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to
freedom of expression. The CA found no cogent reason to deviate therefrom.
As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to
regulate the political rights of those in the government service, the concerted
activity or mass action proscribed must be coupled with the "intent of
effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their
demands of force concession." Wearing similarly colored shirts, attending a
public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing with them recording gadgets,
clenching their fists, some even badmouthing the guards and PGM Garcia,
are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or service
disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force
concession.
Precisely, the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC
Resolution No. 02-1316 are there to temper and focus the application of such
prohibition. Not all collective activity or mass undertaking of government
employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we would be totally depriving our
brothers and sisters in the government service of their constitutional right to
freedom of expression.
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any
person in the land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be
a violation of their rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of
their freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the
government service, the members thereof have renounced or waived this
basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never
be taken away.
A review of PGM Garcia's formal charges against the respondents reveals
that he himself was not even certain whether the respondents and the rest of
the twenty or so GSIS employees who were at the GSIS-IU office that fateful
day marched there or just simply appeared there simultaneously. 14 Thus, the
petitioners were not even sure if the spontaneous act of each of the twenty or
so GSIS employees on May 27, 2005 was a concerted one. The report of
Manager Nagtalon of the GSIS-SD which was the basis for PGM Garcia's
formal charges reflected such uncertainty. Thus,
Of these red shirt protesters, only Mr. Molina has official business at the
Investigation Unit during this time. The rest abandoned their post and duties
for the duration of this incident which lasted until 10:55 A.M. It was also
observed that the protesters, some of whom raised their clenched left fists,
carefully planned this illegal action as evident in their behavior of arrogance,
defiance and provocation, the presence of various recording gadgets such as
VCRs, voice recorders and digital cameras, the bad mouthing of the security
guards and the PGM, the uniformity in their attire and the collusion regarding
the anomalous entry of Mr. Albert Velasco to the premises as reported
earlier.15
The said report of Nagtalon contained only bare facts. It did not show
respondents' unified intent to effect disruption or stoppage in their work. It
also failed to show that their purpose was to demand a force concession.
In the recent case of GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa
GSIS,16 the Court upheld the position of petitioner GSIS because its
employees, numbering between 300 and 800 each day, staged a walkout
and participated in a mass protest or demonstration outside the GSIS for four
straight days. We cannot say the same for the 20 or so employees in this
case. To equate their wearing of red shirts and going to the GSIS-IU office
for just over an hour with that four-day mass action in Kapisanan ng mga
Manggagawa sa GSIS case and to punish them in the same manner would
most certainly be unfair and unjust.
Recent analogous decisions in the United States, while recognizing the
government's right as an employer to lay down certain standards of conduct,
tend to lean towards a broad definition of "public concern speech" which is
protected by their First Amendment. One such case is that of Scott v.
Meters.17 In said case, the New York Transit Authority (NYTA), responsible
for operation of New York City's mass transit service, issued a rule
prohibiting employees from wearing badges or buttons on their uniforms. A
number of union members wore union buttons promoting their opposition to a
collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, the NYTA tried to enforce its
rule and threatened to subject these union members to discipline. The court,
though recognizing the government's right to impose reasonable restrictions,
held that the NYTA's rule was "unconstitutionally overboard."

In another case, Communication Workers of America v. Ector County

Hospital District,18 it was held that,

A county hospital employee's wearing of a "Union Yes" lapel pin during a

union organization drive constituted speech on a matter of public concern,
and the county's proffered interest in enforcing the anti-adornment provision
of its dress code was outweighed by the employee's interest in exercising his
First Amendment speech and associational rights by wearing a pro-union
lapel button.19

Thus, respondents' freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and

CSC's Resolution No. 02-1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity
or mass action has only tempered or regulated these rights. Measured
against that definition, respondents' actuations did not amount to a prohibited
concerted activity or mass action. The CSC and the CA were both correct in
arriving at said conclusion.

WHEREFORE, the assailed August 31, 2007 Decision of the Court of

Appeals as well as its October 16, 2007 Resolution in CA G.R. SP No. 98952
are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
3. Exclusionary Rule as the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was
inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to
G.R. No. 116437 March 3, 1997 the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, appellant dragged the unconscious
girl to an old toilet at the back of the house and left her there until dark. Night
came and appellant pulled Marianne, who was still unconscious, to their
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered on one side by a six-foot high
vs.
concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant lot. Appellant stood on a
PABLITO ANDAN y HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY, accused-appellant.
bench beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body over the
fence to transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head
with a piece of concrete block. He heard her moan and hit her again on the
face. After silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of the fence,
PER CURIAM: dragged it towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it. 2

Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was accused of At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994, the body of Marianne
the crime of rape with homicide committed as follows: was discovered. She was naked from the chest down with her brassiere and
T-shirt pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary
That on or about the 19th day of February 1994, in the napkin.
municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- The autopsy conducted by Dr. Alberto Bondoc revealed that Marianne died
named accused, with lewd design, by means of violence and of "traumatic injuries" sustained as follows:
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Marianne 1. Abrasions:
Guevarra y Reyes against her will and without her consent;
and the above-named accused in order to suppress
1.1 chest and abdomen, multiple, superficial,
evidence against him and delay (sic) the identity of the
linear, generally oblique from right to left.
victim, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent to kill the said Marianne Guevarra y Reyes,
attack, assault and hit said victim with concrete hollow blocks 2. Abrasions/contusions:
in her face and in different parts of her body, thereby
inflicting upon her mortal wounds which directly caused her 2.1 temple, right.
death.
2.2 cheek, right.
Contrary to Law.1
2.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in
Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag, Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, twenty years 2.4 breast, upper inner quadrant, right.
of age and a second-year student at the Fatima School of Nursing, left her
home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She was to
2.5 breast, upper outer quadrant, left.
prepare for her final examinations on February 21, 1994. Marianne wore a
striped blouse and faded denim pants and brought with her two bags
containing her school uniforms, some personal effects and more than 2.6 abdomen, just above the umbilicus,
P2,000.00 in cash. rectangular, approximate 3 inches in width,
from right MCL to left AAL.
Marianne was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited her
inside his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's 2.7 elbow joint, posterior, bilateral.
grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to take her blood pressure
3. Hematoma:
3.1 upper and lower eyelids, bilateral.
3.2 temple, lateral to the outer edge of
eyebrow, right.
3.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
4. Lacerated wounds:
4.1 eyebrow, lateral border, right, 1/2 inch.
4.2 face, from right cheek below the zygoma
to midline lower jaw, 4 inches.
5. Fractures:
5.1 maxillary bone, right.
5.2 mandible, multiple, complete, right, with
avulsion of 1st and 2nd incisors.
6. Cerebral contusions, inferior surface, temporal and frontal
lobes, right.
7. External genitalia
7.1 minimal blood present.
7.2 no signs of recent physical injuries noted
on both labia, introitus and exposed vaginal
wall.
8. Laboratory examination of smear samples from the
vaginal cavity showed negative for spermatozoa (Bulacan
Provincial Hospital, February 22, 1994, by Dr. Wilfredo S. de
Vera).
CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to
Cerebral Contusions due to Traumatic Injuries, Face. 3
Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor
Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form a crack team of police officers to look for
the criminal. Searching the place where Marianne's body was found, the
policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained with what
appeared to be blood. They also found a pair of denim pants and a pair of
shoes which were identified as Marianne's.4
Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police who found
bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed the
occupants of the house and learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of
appellant's wife, that accused-appellant also lived there but that he, his wife
and son left without a word. Calma surrendered to the police several articles
consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short pants with some
reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a wet T-shirt. The
clothes were found in the laundry hamper inside the house and allegedly
belonged to appellant.5
The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his parents live in
Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police
team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They took
him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the police headquarters where
he was interrogated. Initially, appellant denied any knowledge of Marianne's
death. However, when the police confronted him with the concrete block, the
victim's clothes and the bloodstains found in the pigpen, appellant relented
and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed
Marianne and that he was merely a lookout. He also said that he knew where
Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of Marianne.6 Immediately, the police took
appellant to his house. Larin and Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were
likewise brought there by the police. Appellant went to an old toilet at the
back of the house, leaned over a flower pot and retrieved from a canal under
the pot, two bags which were later identified as belonging to Marianne.
Thereafter, photographs were taken of appellant and the two other suspects
holding the bags.7
Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the police
headquarters. The following day, February 25, a physical examination was
conducted on the suspects by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Orpha
Patawaran.8 Appellant was found to sustain:
HEENT: with multiple scratches on the neck Rt side. Chest
and back: with abrasions (scratches at the back).
Extremities: freshly-healed wound along index finger 1.5 cm.
in size Lt.9
By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the
police headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad
arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor,
appellant approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately.
The mayor led appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and there,
appellant broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the
truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the
room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. The
mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was
available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped. 10 In the
presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and
appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed
how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show them the place where he
hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely
implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. 11 He also
said that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines
and tabloid he read almost everyday. 12 After his confession, appellant
hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to help
him. 13 His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media
nationwide. 14
Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days,
February 26 and 27, more newspaper, radio and television reporters came.
Appellant was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor
and reenacted the crime. 15
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified
that in the afternoon of February 19, 1994 he was at his parent's house in
Barangay Tangos attending the birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife
and son went home after 5:00 P.M. His wife cooked dinner while he watched
their one-year old son. They all slept at 8:00 P.M. and woke up the next day
at 6:00 in the morning. His wife went to Manila to collect some debts while he
and his son went to his parents' house where he helped his father cement
the floor of the house. His wife joined them in the afternoon and they stayed
there until February 24, 1994 when he was picked up by the police. 16
Appellant was brought by the police to a hotel at Bagong Nayon, Baliuag. In
one of the rooms, the policemen covered his face with a bedsheet and kicked
him repeatedly. They coerced him to confess that he raped and killed
Marianne. When he refused, they pushed his head into a toilet bowl and
injected something into his buttocks. Weakened, appellant confessed to the
crime. Thereafter, appellant was taken to his house where he saw two of his
neighbors, Larin and Dizon. He was ordered by the police to go to the old
toilet at the back of the house and get two bags from under the flower pot.
Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told. 17
In a decision dated August 4, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant and
sentenced him to death pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659. The trial court
also ordered appellant to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as moral
damages, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Pablito Andan y
Hernandez alias "Bobby is found guilty by proof beyond a
scintilla of doubt of the crime charged in the Information
(Rape with Homicide) and penalized in accordance with R.A.
No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) Sec. 11, Par. 8, classifying
this offense as one of the heinous crimes and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify
the family of Marianne Guevarra the amount of P50,000. 00
for the death of Marianne Guevarra and P71,000.00 as
actual burial and incidental expenses and P100,000.00 as
moral damages. After automatic review of this case and the
decision becomes final and executory, the sentence be
carried out.
SO ORDERED. 18
This case is before us on automatic review in accordance with Section 22 of
Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant contends that:
I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND USING
AS BASIS OF JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE INVESTIGATORS,
REPORTERS AND THE MAYOR ON THE ALLEGED
ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, THE ACCUSED NOT
BEING ASSISTED BY COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION;
II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE
WAS RAPE WHEN THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY
KIND TO SUPPORT IT;
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING
OF CONVICTION WHEN THE EVIDENCE IN ITS
TOTALITY SHOWS THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED
TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT
OF THE ACCUSED. 19
The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the testimonies of
the three policemen of the investigating team, the mayor of Baliuag and four
news reporters to whom appellant gave his extrajudicial oral confessions. It
was also based on photographs and video footages of appellant's
confessions and reenactments of the commission of the crime.
Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the policemen,
the mayor and the news reporters because they were made during custodial
investigation without the assistance of counsel. Section 12, paragraphs (1)
and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) . . .
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
(4) . . .
Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice;
and (3) to be informed of such
rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel. 20 Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this provision is inadmissible in evidence against
him. 21 The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the
defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through
menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for
compulsion physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. 22 The
incommunicado character of custodial interrogation or investigation
also obscures a later judicial determination of what really
transpired. 23
It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny
person under investigation for the commission of an offense." An
investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the
police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the
suspect in connection with an alleged offense. 24 As intended by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation conducted by police
authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal
police, the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our
government." 25
When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a
general inquiry about the death of Marianne. Indeed, appellant was already a
prime suspect even before the police found him at his parents' house. This is
clear from the testimony of SPO4 Danilo S. Bugay, the police chief
investigator of the crime, viz:
COURT How did you come about in concluding that it was
accused who did this act?
WITNESS: First, the place where Marianne was last found is
at the backyard of the house of the accused. Second, there
were blood stains at the pigpen, and third, when we asked
Romano Calma who were his other companions in the
house, he said that, it was Pablito Andan who cannot be
found at that time and whose whereabouts were unknown,
sir.
Q: So you had a possible suspect?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You went looking for Pablito Andan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then, what else did you do?
A: We tried to find out where we can find
him and from information we learned that his
parents live in Barangay Tangos in Baliuag.
We went there, found him there and
investigated him and in fact during the
investigation he admitted that he was the
culprit. 26
 Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he
confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform
appellant of his constitutional rights when he was investigated and
interrogated. 27 His confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence.
So too were the two bags recovered from appellant's house. SPO2
Cesar Canoza, a member of the investigating team testified:
Atty. Valmores: You told the court that you
were able to recover these bags marked as
Exhs. B and B-1 because accused pointed
to them, where did he point these bags?
A: At the police station, sir, he told us that he
hid the two (2) bags beneath the canal of the
toilet.
Q: In other words, you were given the
information where these two (2) bags were
located?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And upon being informed where the two
(2) bags could be located what did you do?
A: We proceeded to the place together with
the accused so that we would know where
the two (2) bags were hidden, sir.
Q: And did you see actually those two (2)
bags before the accused pointed to the
place where the bags were located?
A: After he removed the broken pots with
which he covered the canal, he really
showed where the bags were hidden
underneath the canal, sir. 28
The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled confession to
the police. They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible. 29
The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day,
Mayor Trinidad visited the appellant. Appellant approached the mayor and
requested for a private talk. They went inside a room and appellant
confessed that he alone committed the crime. He pleaded for forgiveness.
Mayor Trinidad testified, viz:
Mayor Trinidad: . . . . During the
investigation when there were already many
people from the media, Andan whispered
something to me and requested that he be
able to talk to me alone, so what I did was
that, I brought him inside the office of the
chief of police.
Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what
happened inside the office of the Chief of
Police, mayor?
A: While inside the office of the
headquarters he told me "Mayor patawarin
mo ako,! I will tell you the truth. I am the one
who killed Marianne." So when he was
telling this to me, I told him to wait a while,
then I opened the door to allow the media to
hear what he was going to say and I asked
him again whether he was the one who did
it, he admitted it, sir. This was even covered
by a television camera. 30
xxx xxx xxx
Q: During that time that Pablito Andan
whispered to you that he will tell you
something and then you responded by
bringing him inside the office of the Chief of
Police and you stated that he admitted that
he killed Marianne . . .
Court: He said to you the following words . .
.
Atty. Principe: He said to you the following
words "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! Ako ang
pumatay kay Marianne," was that the only
admission that he told you?
A: The admission was made twice. The first
one was, when we were alone and the
 second one was before the media people, relatives. 38 Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9 also
sir. interviewed appellant on February 25, 1994. He testified that:

Q: What else did he tell you when you were Atty. Principe: You mentioned awhile ago
inside the room of the Chief of Police? that you were able to reach the place where
the body of Marianne was found, where did
A: These were the only things that he told you start your interview, in what particular
me, sir. I stopped him from making further place?
admissions because I wanted the media
people to hear what he was going to say, Mr. Mauricio: Actually, I started my
sir. 31 newsgathering and interview inside the
police station of Baliuag and I identified
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's myself to the accused as I have mentioned
confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that earlier, sir. At first, I asked him whether he
a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local was the one who raped and killed the victim
police 32 and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for and I also learned from him that the victim
purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. was his cousin.
However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to
any interrogation by the latter. 33 In fact, the mayor did not question appellant Q: And what was the response of Pablito
at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was Andan?
appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor
for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to A: His response was he is a cousin of the
confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant victim and that he was responsible for raping
and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did and killing the victim, sir. And then I asked
not violate his constitutional rights. 34 Thus, it has been held that the him whether his admission was voluntary or
constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a that there was a threat, intimidation or
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, violence that was committed on his person
but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having because I knew that there were five other
committed the crime. 35 What the Constitution bars is the compulsory suspects in this case and he said that he
disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 was admitting it voluntarily to the policemen.
are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as I asked him whether he was under the
would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from influence of drugs but he said no, and
freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 36 Hence, we hold that appellant's "nakainom lang," sir.
confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Q: You mentioned earlier that the uncle of
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The the accused was present, was the uncle
confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by beside him at the time that you asked the
the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements question?
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview
are deemed voluntary an are admissible in evidence. 37 A: The uncle was there including the
barangay captain whose name I cannot
The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye" recall anymore. A barangay captain of the
on Channel 7, interviewed appellant on February 27, 1994. The interview place, I don't know if it is the place of the
was recorded on video and showed that appellant made his confession crime scene or in the place where Marianne
willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of his wife, child and other Guevarra resides but . . . All throughout the
scene inside the office of the Station
Commander, there was no air of any force
or any threatening nature of investigation
that was being done on the suspect, that is
why, I was able to talk to him freely and in a
voluntary manner he admitted to me that he
was the one who raped and killed, so we
went to the next stage of accompanying me
to the scene of the crime where the
reenactment and everything that transpired
during the killing of Marianne Guevarra.
Q: Before you started that interview, did you
inform or ask permission from the accused
Pablito Andan that you were going to
interview him?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You mentioned that after interviewing the
accused at the office of the Baliuag PNP,
you also went to the scene of the crime?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who accompanied you?
A: I was accompanied by some Baliuag
policemen including Mayor Trinidad and
some of the relatives of the accused.
Q: At this time, did you see the wife of the
accused, Pablito Andan?
A: Yes, sir, I saw her at the place where the
body of Guevarra was recovered.
Q: How many relatives of accused Pablito
Andan were present, more or less?
A: There were many, sir, because there
were many wailing, weeping and crying at
that time when he was already taken in the
patrol jeep of the Baliuag police, sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Mauricio, upon reaching the
scene of the crime in Concepcion, Baliuag,
Bulacan, what transpired?
A: I started my work as a reporter by trying
to dig deeper on how the crime was
committed by the accused, so we started
inside the pigpen of that old house where I
tried to accompany the accused and asked
him to narrate to me and show me how he
carried out the rape and killing of Marianne
Guevarra, sir.
Q: Did he voluntarily comply?
A: Yes, sir, in fact, I have it on my videotape.
Q: It is clear, Mr. Mauricio, that from the start
of your interview at the PNP Baliuag up to
the scene of the crime, all the stages were
videotaped by you?
A: Yes, sir. 39
Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite" likewise
covered the proceedings for three successive days. 40 His testimony
is as follows:
Atty. Principe: You mentioned that you had
your own inquiries?
A: We asked first permission from the mayor
to interrupt their own investigation so that we
can have a direct interview with the suspect.
Q: Were there people?
A: The people present before the crowd that
included the mayor, the deputy chief of
police, several of the policemen, the group
of Inday Badiday and several other persons.
I asked the suspect after the mayor
presented the suspect to us and after the
suspect admitted that he was the one who
killed Marianne. I reiterated the question to
the suspect. Are you aware that this offense
which is murder with . . . rape with murder is
a capital offense? And you could be
sentenced to death of this? And he said,
Yes. So do you really admit that you were
the one who did it and he repeated it, I
mean, say the affirmative answer.
Q: And that was in the presence of the
crowd that you mentioned a while ago?
A: Yes, yes, sir. And if I remember it right, as
I took my camera to take some pictures of
the suspect, the mayor, the policemen and
several others, I heard the group of Inday
Badiday asking the same questions from the
suspect and the suspect answered the
same.
Q: Also in the presence of so many people
that you mentioned?
A: The same group of people who were
there, sir.
Q: You mentioned that the answer was just
the same as the accused answered you
affirmatively, what was the answer, please
be definite?
Court: Use the vernacular.
A: I asked him the question, after asking him
the question," Ikaw ba talaga and gumawa
ng pagpatay at pag-rape sa kay Marianne?
Ang sagot nya, "Oo." Alam mo ba itong
kasalanang ito, kamatayan ang hatol,
inaamin mo pa ba na ikaw and gumawa sa
pagpatay at pag-rape kay Marianne?" Sagot
pa rin siya ng "Oo."
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did you ask him, why did you kill
Marianne?
A: I asked him, your Honor and the reason
he told me was because a devil gripped his
mind and because of that according to him,
your Honor, were the pornographic
magazines, pornographic tabloids which he,
according to him, reads almost everyday
before the crime.
Atty. Principe: At the time of your interview,
Mr. Reporter, will you tell the court and the
public what was the physical condition of
accused Pablito Andan?
A: As I observed him that time, there was no
sign on his body that he was really down
physically and I think he was in good
condition.
Court: So he was not happy about the
incident?
A: He even admitted it, your Honor.
Court: He was happy?
A: He admitted it. He was not happy after
doing it.
Court: Was he crying?
A: As I observed, your Honor, the tears were
only apparent but there was no tear that fell
on his face.
Court: Was he feeling remorseful?
A: As I observed it, it was only slightly, your
Honor.
 xxx xxx xxx 41
Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera" interviewed appellant
on February 26, 1994. 42 He also testified that:
Atty. Principe: Now, Mr. Witness, did the
accused Pablito Andan give you the
permission that you asked from him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when he allowed you to interview
him, who were present?
A: The first person that I saw there was
Mayor Trinidad, policemen from Baliuag, the
chief investigator, SPO4 Bugay, and since
Katipunan, the chief of police was
suspended, it was the deputy who was
there, sir.
Q: Were they the only persons who were
present when you interviewed the accused?
A: There were many people there, sir. The
place was crowded with people. There were
people from the PNP and people from
Baliuag, sir.
Q: How about the other representatives from
the media?
A: Roy Reyes, Orlan Mauricio arrived but he
arrived late and there were people from the
radio and from TV Channel 9.
Q: How about Channel 7?
A: They came late. I was the one who got
the scoop first, sir.
Q: You stated that the accused allowed you
to interview him, was his wife also present?
A: Yes, sir, and even the son was there but I
am not very sure if she was really the wife
but they were hugging each other and she
was crying and from the questions that I
asked from the people there they told me
that she is the wife, sir.
Q: How about the other members of the
family of the accused, were they around?
A: I do not know the others, sir. but there
were many people there, sir.
Q: Now, according to you, you made a news
item about the interview. May we know what
question did you ask and the answer.
A: My first question was, is he Pablito Andan
and his answer was "Yes."
Q: What was the next question?
A: I asked him how he did the crime and he
said that, he saw the victim aboard a
tricycle. He called her up. She entered the
house and he boxed her on the stomach.
Q: What was the next question that you
asked him?
A: He also said that he raped her and he
said that the reason why he killed the victim
was because he was afraid that the incident
might be discovered, sir.
Q: Now, after the interview, are we correct to
say that you made a news item on that?
A: Yes, sir, based on what he told me. That's
what I did.
Q: Were there other questions propounded
by you?
 A: Yes, sir. In his second assigned error, appellant questions the sufficiency of the
medical evidence against him. Dr. Alberto Bondoc, a Medical Specialist with
Q: "Ano iyon?" the Provincial Health Office, conducted the first autopsy and found no
spermatozoa and no recent physical injuries in the hymen. 49 Allegedly,
the minimal blood found in her vagina could have been caused by her
A: He said that he threw the cadaver to the
menstruation. 50
other side of the fence, sir.

We are unpersuaded. A second autopsy was conducted on March 1, 1994 by

Q: Did he mention how he threw the cadaver
Dr. Dominic L. Aguda, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
of Marianne to the other side of the fence?
Investigation. His findings affirmed the absence of spermatozoa but revealed
that the victim's hymen had lacerations, thus:
A: I cannot remember the others, sir.
Hymen — contracted, tall, thin with fresh lacerations with
Q: But can you produce the news item clotted blood at 6 and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to
based on that interview? the walls of the
clock. 51
A: I have a xerox copy here, sir.
Dr. Aguda testified that the lacerations were fresh and that they may
xxx xxx xxx 43 have been caused by an object forcibly inserted into the vagina when
the victim was still alive, indicating the possibility of
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from penetration. 52 His testimony is as follows:
any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as
news reporters when they interviewed appellant. 44 They were not acting Witness: When I exposed the hymen, I
under the direction and control of the police. They were there to check found lacerations in this 3 o'clock and 6
appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant o'clock position corresponding to the walls of
them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. 45 In fact, they the clock. . . . .
asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on
separate days not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he Court: Include the descriptive word, fresh.
repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the
commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his
Witness: I put it in writing that this is fresh
confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other
relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by because within the edges of the lacerations,
the news reporters. I found blood clot, that is why I put it into
writing as fresh.
We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered
Atty. Valmonte: Now, Doctor, you told the
by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights
Court that what you did on the cadaver was
does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and
merely a re-autopsy, that means, doctor the
another individual. 46 It governs the relationship between the individual and
body was autopsied first before you did you
the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and
re-autopsy?
its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need
of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by
government, rights that government has the duty to protect. 47 Governmental A: Yes, sir.
power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to
protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by Q: Could it not be, doctor, that these injuries
any department of government and its agencies. 48 you found in the vagina could have been
sustained on account of the dilation of the
previous autopsy?
A: Well, we presumed that if the first doctor
conducted the autopsy on the victim which
was already dead, no amount of injury or no
amount of lacerated wounds could produce
blood because there is no more circulation,
the circulation had already stopped. So, I
presumed that when the doctor examined
the victim with the use of forceps or
retractor, vaginal retractor, then I assumed
that the victim was already dead. So it is
impossible that the lacerated wounds on the
hymen were caused by those instruments
because the victim was already dead and
usually in a dead person we do not produce
any bleeding.
Q: What you would like to tell the Court is
this: that the lacerations with clotted blood at
6 and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to
the walls of the clock could have been
inflicted or could have been sustained while
the victim was alive?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: This clotted blood, according to you,
found at the edges of the lacerated wounds,
now will you kindly go over the sketch you
have just drawn and indicate the edges of
the lacerated wounds where you found the
clotted blood?
A: This is the lacerated wound at 3 o'clock
and this is the lacerated wound at 6 o'clock.
I found the blood clot at this stage. The
clotted blood are found on the edges of the
lacerated wounds, sir.
Q: What could have caused those
lacerations?
A: Well, it could have been caused by an
object that is forcibly inserted into that small
opening of the hymen causing lacerations
on the edges of the hymen, sir.
Q: If the victim had sexual intercourse, could
she sustain those lacerations?
A: It is possible, sir. 53
We have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa in the
vagina does not negate the commission of rape 54 nor does the lack of
complete penetration or rupture of the hymen. 55 What is essential is that
there be penetration of the female organ no matter how slight. 56 Dr. Aguda
testified that the fact of penetration is proved by the lacerations found in the
victim's vagina. The lacerations were fresh and could not have been caused
by any injury in the first autopsy.
Dr. Aguda's finding and the allegation that the victim was raped by appellant
are supported by other evidence, real and testimonial, obtained from an
investigation of the witnesses and the crime scene, viz:
(1) The victim, Marianne, was last seen walking along the subdivision road
near appellant's house; 57
(2) At that time, appellant's wife and her step brother and grandmother were
not in their house; 58
(3) A bloodstained concrete block was found over the fence of appellant's
house, a meter away from the wall. Bloodstains were also found on the grass
nearby and at the pigpen at the back of appellant's house; 59
(4) The victim sustained bruises and scars indicating that her body had been
dragged over a flat rough surface. 60 This supports the thesis that she was
thrown over the fence and dragged to where her body was found;
(5) Appellant's bloodstained clothes and towel were found in the laundry
hamper in his house;
(6) The reddish brown stains in the towel and T-shirt of appellant were found
positive for the presence of blood type "B," the probable blood type of the
victim. 61 Marianne 's exact blood type was not determined but her parents
had type "A" and type "AB." 62 The victim's pants had bloodstains which were
found to be type "O," appellant's blood type; 63
(7) Appellant had scratch marks and bruises in his body which he failed to
explain; 64

(8) For no reason, appellant and his wife left their residence after the incident
and were later found at his parents' house in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag,
Bulacan; 65

In fine, appellant's extrajudicial confessions together with the other

circumstantial evidence justify the conviction of appellant.

Appellant 's defense of alibi cannot overcome the prosecution evidence. His
alibi cannot even stand the test of physical improbability at the time of the
commission of the crime. Barangay Tangos is only a few kilometers away
from Concepcion Subdivision and can be traversed in less than half an
hour. 66

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15,
Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 1109-M-94 is affirmed and accused-
appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez is found guilty of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659
amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to the
penalty of death, with two (2) members of the Court, however, voting to
impose reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is also ordered to indemnify
the heirs of the victim, Marianne Guevarra, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for her death and P71,000.00 as actual damages.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83

of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of
this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible
exercise of the pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.
II. Judicial Notice and Judicial Admissions
G.R. No. L-12449 May 30, 1961
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ESPIRIDION ALIDO, ET AL., defendants.
INOCENCIO HERVAS and MARCELO HERVAS, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Felipe R. Hipolito for defendants-appellants.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Hon. F. Imperial
Reyes, presiding, finding accused-appellants Inocencio Hervas and Marcelo
Hervas guilty of the murder of their cousin, Francisco Hervas, and sentencing
each of them to reclusion perpetua and to pay 1/3 of the indemnity of P6,000.
Espiridion Alido was also sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Francisco
Hervas 1/3 of the sum of P6,000, and to pay a proportionate share of the
costs, but he did not appeal.
On or before May 29, 1955, Francisco Hervas, his wife and their children
were living in their house on a land situated in the barrio of Dagami,
Municipality of Maasin, Province of Iloilo. At about 6:00 in the evening of that
day, Francisco Hervas seemed to have heard some noise coming from his
cornfield near their house, so he went to the batalan adjacent to their house
to find out what was the noise about, but suddenly a shotgun exploded from
the neighboring field, and the shot from it hit Francisco on the chest and he
fell down dead. The following morning, the widow, Concepcion Laserna sent
her eldest child, Ofelia Hervas, to the house of Inocencio Hervas, one of the
accused, which was nearest their house, and to the house of the brother of
the deceased, Proceso Hervas, farther away, to inform them of the incident.
The brother of the deceased happened to be away from home and as Ofelia
returned, she passed by the house of Inocencio Hervas, informing him that
the brother of the deceased could not come, so Inocencio went to the house
of the victim, accompanied by three individuals who helped him dig the grave
some distance away from the house and there interred him.
No steps were taken by the family or by relatives of the deceased to
Investigate who the author of the crime was. But news of the killing came to
the ears of the Philippine Constabulary. So one day the Philippine
Constabulary had the remains of the deceased exhumed. Those present at
the exhumation were the investigator of the Constabulary, Sgt. Pelagio
Agraviador the Chief of Police, the sanitary inspector and the municipal
mayor. They proceeded to the barrio of Dagami, passing first by the house of
Inocencio Hervas, and with the latter they went to the place where the body
of the deceased had been interred. The grave was dug and the dead body
was brought out. They found out that there were nine pellet holes.
Thereafter, the Constabulary began questioning the widow, Concepcion
Laserna. Her statement was taken at the municipal building and she declared
that she was able to recognize Espiridion Alido as the one who shot her
husband, accompanied at the time of the shooting by two persons whom she
could not recognize. This statement (Exhibit "1" Alido, 2 Hervas), of
Concepcion Laserna was made on June 13, 1955. A similar statement was
made by her daughter, Ofelia Hervas, and to the same effect.
The municipal police of Maasin could not effect the arrest of Alido, but before
July 13, 1955, he surrendered to the Philippine Constabulary at Sta. Barbara,
Iloilo. He surrendered to Sgt. Silverio Balmaceda at the barracks. Balmaceda
referred him to Cpl. Delfin de la Torre, who was then investigator of the
company. Alido's statement was taken down in writing and was presented in
court during the trial as Exhibit "C". According to this statement, Inocencio
Hervas invited him on May 29, 1955 to the house of one Carlos Camral, on
the occasion of the killing of a pig that in the afternoon of that day, Inocencio,
he and Marcelo proceeded to the house of Francisco Hervas, armed as
follows: Inocencio, with a shot gun (paltik), Marcelo with a rifle, and he with a
bolo; that once near the house of Francisco Hervas, he heard one shot and
upon hearing it he ran away, returning to the house of Carlos Camral that
about 9:00 that evening, Inocencio Hervas came back to the house of
Camral with a shotgun, boasting that they could now live in peace because
the arrogant man is already dead (referring to the deceased Francisco
Hervas.) .
As a result of this affidavit of Alido further investigation petitions were made.
Concepcion Laserna was again examined this time before the Justice of the
Peace of Maasin, and she then, declared in her affidavit (Exhibit I, Alido, 3
Hervas) dated July 20, 1955 that it was Inocencio Hervas who fired the shot
that killed her husband, and that Marcelo Hervas and Espiridion Alido were
with Inocencio at the time of the shooting. On July 20, 1955, the information
was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Maasin, charging the three
accused with the murder of the deceased. The information charges the
accused with having committed the crime with treachery and evident
premeditation.
Concepcion Laserna testified at the trial that three persons had approached
their house on the afternoon of May 29, 1955, namely, Inocencio Hervas,
Marcelo Hervas and Espiridion Alido that Inocencio was provided with
a paltik, Espiridion had a rifle and Marcelo had a bolo; that she actually saw
that it was Inocencio who fired the shot that killed her husband; and that as
soon as her husband had fallen down after the shot, the three persons ran
away. She further declared that she saw the assailant because she was at
the time of the shooting at the window of their house. Demetrio Hervas, a son
of the deceased, also testified and declared that when his father went to
the batalan attracted by a noise in the cornfield, he (witness) was at the door
of the house; that when he heard the shot which felled his father, he
immediately directed his eyes towards the place where the explosion had
come and saw the aggressor, Inocencio Hervas, and his companions,
Marcelo Hervas and Espiridion Alido.
Upon being asked why in her statement made before the Municipal Mayor on
June 13, 1955 (Exhibit "2" — Hervas; Exhibit "1" — Alido), she declared that
she saw Espiridion Alido fired the shot that killed her husband and that she
did not recognize Alido's companions, she explained that at that time she
was under the influence of fear of Inocencio Hervas. Explaining this, she
declared that the morning after the shooting she sent her daughter Ofelia to
the house of Inocencio Hervas to tell him that she should bury her husband;
that Inocencio Hervas threatened to kill her if she should disclose or point to
him as the author of the death; that he just suggested to her that she should
explain that the cause of her husband's death was his having bolo wounds,
instead of gunshot wounds. Upon being asked the probable reason why her
husband was killed by the accused, she declared that it was because the
accused had taken away bamboos from the land which the deceased was
taking care of, and her husband had denounced them to the owner of the
land, namely, Eugenio Maquiling.
The Constabulary investigator, Sgt. Pelagio Agraviador, who had seen the
exhumation, corroborates this alleged fear of Inocencio Hervas of
Concepcion Laserna. He testified that at the time he was investigating
Concepcion Laserna, Inocencio Hervas was present, and that every time
Concepcion was asked a question she would first look at Inocencio before
answering the question. Further elaborating on the matter, this witness
declared that when the investigation was being made in the building of the
puericulture center, the persons who were present were Concepcion
Laserna, her daughter Ofelia Hervas, Inocencio Hervas, a policeman and
himself, and that he observed that every time a question was directed to
Concepcion Laserna, she would look at Inocencio who, in turn would look at
her with sharp eyes; that he noticed such interest on the part of Inocencio
that in the middle part of the questioning of Concepcion, he had to ask
Inocencio to go out. He also declared that when Ofelia Hervas was
investigated, Inocencio Hervas again went inside the room where the
investigation was being conducted and again he had to ask him to go out of
the room, because he wanted to have secrecy in the investigation.
All of the three accused denied having participated in the commission of the
crime, including Espiridion Alido, who did not appeal from the decision.
Inocencio Hervas declared that he was always in good terms with Francisco
Hervas and his wife; that he was living at a distance of one-half kilometer
from the house of Francisco Hervas, and that the one carrying the work of
the family was the wife, Concepcion Laserna, because one of the hands of
Francisco Hervas had been cut in a fight during the Japanese regime; that
about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the day of the shooting, he had to go to
the house of one Carlos to help in the slaughter of a pig, and did not know of
the death of Francisco Hervas until the following morning when the daughter
of the deceased, Ofelia, informed him thereof; that when she went to the
house of Francisco there was no one there except the wife and the children,
and when he asked her if she recognized the persons who killed her
husband, she answered she did not because it was very dark; that thereafter
she left the house and went home, with the instruction that when the brother
of the deceased would arrive he (the accused) would be called. Further
testifying, he declared that he returned at about 4:00 in the afternoon, and
that since the younger brother of the deceased, Proceso Hervas, did not
come, they buried the deceased with the help of his children, namely, Carlos,
Martin and Juan. Testifying on the exhumation, he declared that the mayor,
the Chief of Police and some policemen came on the Sunday following the
burial on Monday; that the Chief of Police and the mayor called for him at his
house; that the son of Francisco Hervas, named Demetrio Hervas, Juan and
Martin were also called; that some Philippine Constabulary soldiers were
also with the party, and that it was he and the son of Francisco that indicated
to them where the body was buried; that they did not make any investigation
that afternoon because it was already very late when the exhumation was
finished; that they passed the night at his house and the following morning
the party returned back to the poblacion together with the wife of the
deceased. He also testified that he, the widow and her children were brought
to town, as the Mayor had asked him to accompany the widow. He denied
that at the time the widow was being investigated, he used to look at her with
sharp eyes. On being asked the possible reason why he was being accused,
he declared that he had an altercation with one Estong Amorte and Fabian
Resano, because when a certain parcel of land was surveyed, he stopped
them because his brother Marcelo was not present. (It is important to note
that the land which was supposed to be surveyed appears to be the cause of
the trouble, as it is the very land occupied by Francisco Hervas. Francisco
Hervas was the one named by the original owner, Eugenio Maquiling, to
cultivate and stay on the land. Later, Maquiling transferred it to Estong
Amorte and Fabian Resano.)
The accused Marcelo Hervas also denied the imputation, declaring that on
the day of the shooting, he was away from his house, and that he learned of
the death of Francisco Hervas only when he arrived home on Tuesday
(killing occurred on Monday). He stated. that he had come from the poblacion
because he was engaged in the business of making gold teeth for his
patients, so he had to go to the poblacion very often; that on the day
following his arrival on Tuesday, he asked for the wife of the deceased, and
he inquired from her what was the cause of her husbands death, and she
had answered that the deceased had stepped on a bolo; that she told him
that at the time of the wounding of her husband she had heard a sound
similar to a falling can. Asked if there was any ill-feeling between Francisco
Hervas and his family, he declared that there was none and the deceased
even frequented his house to drink tuba, the deceased being his first cousin.
Asked what the probable reason was why the widow had pointed to him as
one of the authors of the death of her husband, he declared that she acted
under the advice of their enemies Estong Amorte and Fabian Resano.
Explaining this matter he said that Fabian Resano had purchased a piece of
land from Arcadio Maquiling, the son of Eugenio Maquiling and as Resano
surveyed the land, he (Resano) tried to include the land belonging to him
(Marcelo), and that he (Marcelo), did not agree to this. As to the charge that
he had been stealing bamboos, he answered that the bamboos were not
Maquiling's but his own.
A consideration of the circumstances brought out at trial both by the
prosecution as well as by the defense, indicate that the probable cause of the
killing is, as indicated by the widow, Concepcion Laserna, that is, Inocencio
Hervas and Marcelo Hervas resented the act of Francisco Hervas in
denouncing them for cutting bamboos on the land of Maquiling. The land on
which the house of Francisco Hervas is erected belonged to Eugenio
Maquiling. Marcelo Hervas claimed that the bamboos that he cut were his
own; that when the land of Maquiling was sold to Fabian Resano and the
latter was trying to survey it, Marcelo objected to the survey on the ground
that Resano was including a portion of his own land. Both accused-
appellants Inocencio and Marcelo, both surnamed Hervas, admitted that the
relationship between them and the deceased and his family was cordial.
There is, therefore, no reason why the widow should point out to Marcelo and
to Inocencio as the authors of the death of her husband, unless she and her
children had actually seen them do the criminal act.
Her statement when she was brought to the municipal building for
investigation on June 13, 1955 pointing to Espiridion Alido as the one who
killed her husband and that his companions could not be recognized by her
must have been due to the fact that she was then under the influence of fear
of Inocencio Hervas. The conduct of Inocencio Hervas, a first cousin of the
deceased, in not initiating the move to have the authors of the death of his
cousin investigated and his advice of a prompt burial, in locate a guilty
conscience — he must have had part therein and he wanted to be saved
from being held to account for he murder. His advice that the widow should
declare hat the deceased had been killed by a bolo wound, also attests to his
interest in suppressing the truth, certainly to save himself. The testimony of
Marcelo to the effect hat the widow had told him that the deceased died of a
bolo wound is the very explanation that was taught by Inocencio Hervas to
the widow. Both of them, Inocencio and Marcelo, must have thought of
pretending that the death of Francisco Hervas was due to a bolo wound, not
from a gunshot wound, to suppress or prevent the investigation of the crime.
Marcelo Hervas was the barrio lieutenant. Why did he not take steps to have
the matter reported to the authorities for investigation? His only excuse was
that the widow supposedly told him that he lied of a bolo wound. If he was
satisfied with this false explanation, it must have been because he wanted to
shelter he culprits from investigation, which fact in turn shows also a guilty
mind.
The statement of the widow on June 13, 1955, when examined by the
municipal mayor, is explained away by he testimony of the sergeant of the
Constabulary who was resent at the time of the taking of the statement, to
the effect that every time a question was asked the widow, he would look at
Inocencio for an answer. This corroborates the story of the widow that she
was then under influence of Inocencio and her fear of him.
We are satisfied with the above circumstances and explanation of the widow
that her statement on June 13, was induced by her fear of Inocencio.
Proceeding now to the consideration of the direct evidence, we find that both
Demetrio Hervas, 15 years old, and his mother, Concepcion Laserna,
positively asserted that they saw the three accused Espiridion Alido, Marcelo
Hervas and Inocencio Hervas near their house on May 29, 1955 and that
they recognized the latter as the one who fired the shot from the "Paltik", that
killed Francisco Hervas. Demetrio Her was testified that it was in the
afternoon when the assault was made. The statement of the widow before
the mayor on June 13, 1955 placed the time of the assault at 6:10 in the
afternoon. We take judicial notice of the fact that in the month of May and
June, the days are long and the sun sets after 6:00 in the afternoon, for
which reason even though it was actually 6:00 in the afternoon, when the
assault was made, both Demetrio Hervas and his mother could easily see
and recognize the assailants of the deceased because it was not yet dark.
The assailants are well known to them, two of them being first cousins of the
deceased; so was Alido known to them. It is not that their faces were clearly
seen a person can necessary easily be recognized from his stature, by the
way he stands and moves. We are, therefore, satisfied that the two
witnesses, — the widow and her son, actually recognized the assailants as
Espiridion Alido, Inocencio Hervas and Marcelo Hervas. The testimony of the
boy, Demetrio, could not be impeached on the cross-examination. His
testimony was positive and direct, leaving absolutely no doubt as to the
circumstances under which he saw the shooting and the certainty of his
identification of the accused-appellants. As to the widow, the explanation
given as hereinabove stated, to the fact that she was under the influence of
fear of Inocencio Hervas, sufficiently explains why in her statement before
the mayor on June 13, 1955, she pretended not to have recognized the
companions of Espiridion Alido on the evening of May 29, 1955.

There was one other last incident which proves the consciousness of guilt of
Marcelo Hervas. This is the fact that he pretended to be away and was not in
his house when Ofelia went to notify him of the death of her father. When the
Constabulary also went to his house, when the matter was investigated, after
the surrender of Alido, he again was not at home. As a barrio lieutenant, he
should have been the first to make steps to report the crime, but he
pretended to be away. These are the circumstances which show
consciousness of guilt on his part.

With the above circumstances and the testimony of two witnesses identifying
the two accused-appellants and the finding of the trial judge who heard the
witnesses and the appellants testify, that the appellants are guilty, we are
forced to the conclusion that the said accused-appellants participated in the
commission of the offense charged, jointly with Espiridion Alido and are guilty
thereof. The crime committed is that of murder, qualified by the circumstance
of alevosia, as the attack was unexpected and the victim was even no
opportunity to defend himself. As to the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation, it is true that the confession of Espiridion Alido, Exhibit "C" is
to the effect that Inocencio had invited Alido, to go with them to kill the
deceased, and that he provided his companions with requisite arms.
However, this confession of Alido is not admissible in evidence against
Inocencio Hervas and Marcelo Hervas. We therefore had no sufficient
evidence of the evident premeditation.

WHEREFORE, we affirm the judgment of the court below finding the

appellants guilty of murder and the sentence imposed upon each of them
with costs of this appeal against the appellants.
G.R. No. L-16664 March 30, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN AYONAYON and GASPAR ACERADOR, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Bonifacio T. Doria for defendants-appellants.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur,
Hon. Felix Q. Antonio, presiding, finding Juan Ayonayon and Gaspar
Acerador guilty of murder, for the killing of Florentino Lazo and Jose Lazo
and, frustrated murder, for the wounding of Genoveva Lazo, and sentencing
each of them to death for the crime of murder, and to an indeterminate
penalty of from 8 years of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for the frustrated murder, with
the proper indemnities and the accessories of the law, and to pay each his
proportional part of the costs.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on August 5, 1959, while
Florentino Lazo and members of his family, namely, his wife, Juana
Resuello, his children, Jose Lazo, 25 years, Pergentino Lazo, 17 years,
Genoveva Lazo, 21 years, Samuel Lazo, 7 years, and Juan Lazo, 12 years,
were taking their supper around a low table in the bamboo kitchen of their
house at barrio Namalpalan, Municipality of Magsingal, Ilocos Sur, their two
dogs suddenly started barking and running to and fro, below and near the
house. Genoveva Lazo called the attention of her father to the unusual
behaviour of the dogs and commented that there must be some persons on
the ground. So she stood up and peeped thru the window of the kitchen and
saw a man dressed in dark green fatigue clothes, standing on the ground on
the opposite end of the kitchen, peeping at the southwestern part thereof in a
semi-stooping position, with his gun pointed thru the corner of the kitchen.
The kitchen floor was about four feet eight inches from the ground. The wall
of the kitchen was made of bamboo split and flattened as in "sawali". She
heard a burst of gunfire (parac-pac-pac) and she felt that she was hit on her
left shoulder. She fell to the floor of the kitchen wounded, and lying flat on the
floor hid herself near the stove.
With the first burst of the gunfire, Jose Lazo was also hit and he fell dead on
the floor of the kitchen. Pergentino Lazo, upon observing the gunfire and
what had happened to his brother and sister, promptly ran away from the
kitchen, crossing the batalan that separated the kitchen from the sala, and to
the sala, towards a side beside a wardrobe. Here, behind the wardrobe, he
hid himself. From this position, behind the wardrobe, he heard gunfire from
the batalan near the stairs of the house, and, directed his eyes to the place
where the gunfire came from, he saw through the opening of the window just
above the stairs, the accused Juan Ayonayon and his companion, the other
accused Gaspar Acerador. From the top of the stairs, the accused fired at his
father who had run to the sala, but who fell down on the other side opposite
the wardrobe.1äwphï1.ñët
Juana Resuello, got her two minor sons in her arms, Juan and Samuel, and
tried to run away from the kitchen also. It so happened, however, that her
husband Florentino was already ahead of her and was already crossing
the batalan that separated the kitchen from the sala, running to escape from
the gunfire.
As she was about to cross the batalan to the sala, she saw towards the left
the two accused Juan Ayonayon and Gaspar Acerador. At that time,
Ayonayon was already on top of the stairs, while his companion was on the
last rung of the stairs.
The prosecution also proved that, that same evening, upon receipt of news of
the murders in the barrio of Namalpalan, a group of Constabulary soldiers
stationed in the poblacion, together with the municipal health officers and
others, went to the scene of the murders. The soldiers found 30-calibre
empty shells on the ground near the kitchen, also on the batalan above the
stairs. They also found that the walls of the kitchen and a wall of the sala was
pierced by bullet holes. The dead body of Florentino Lazo was found lying on
the floor of the sala, and that of Jose Lazo also in the kitchen, both of them
riddled with bullets. Genoveva Lazo was found near the stove. Pergentino
Lazo, upon being questioned by the Constabulary sergeant, gave details of
the incident, also already described by the witnesses for the prosecution, and
pointed to the two accused herein as the ones responsible for the assault.
It is also shown that paraffin casts were taken of the hands of both accused
and the casts, upon examination in the National Bureau of Investigation, had
positive traces of nitrate.
Various slugs were extracted from the body of the deceased Jose Lazo and
another was also extracted from that of Genoveva Lazo, and these, upon
examination, were found to have been fired from a semi-automatic or an
automatic .30-caliber carbine, from the same gun firing the empty shells.
It was further shown that upon learning who the assailants were, as per
information by Pergentino Lazo, two soldiers went to the house of accused
Gaspar Acerador. He was not in his house and as he was then wearing
undershirt and drawers, he had to be taken to his house so he could put on
his clothes, before being brought to town for examination. The constabulary
men who accompanied him to his house saw that a green fatigue suit
and poncho were hanging on the wall. On the other hand, Juan Ayonayon
was arrested by a Constabulary captain and his company that same evening
in the house of Marcelino Uberita in Santo Domingo, about seven kilometers
from Magsingal.
As possible motive for the crime, it was shown that accused Gaspar
Acerador had been accused of the murder of Pablo Resuello, the brother of
Juana Resuello, wife of Florentino Lazo, the deceased. On the other hand,
Florentino Lazo used to drive a carromata where Hipolito Peralta, who was
accused of the murder of a relative of a cousin of Ayonayon, usually rode in
going to court. While nobody could testify as to the motive of the murder, it is
apparent from these circumstances that enmity must have existed between
Florentino Lazo and his wife Juana Resuello on one hand, and the accused
Gaspar Acerador and Juan Ayonayon, on the other.
The defenses presented by the accused are alibis testified to by their
respective relatives. Juan Ayonayon stated that at about 6:00 o'clock in the
evening of the day in question, he was in the house of his cousin Engineer
Uberita in Santo Domingo, with whom he was living then. But the barrio of
Santo Domingo is only seven kilometers from the house of the Lazos, the
victims, and he could easily have gone from his place of residence to the
house of the Lazos in 10 minutes by jeepney. For his part, Acerador was
living in a barrio of Panay, which is only a kilometer away from the scene of
the crime. The fact, therefore, that the relatives of the accused stated that
they were in their respective houses around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the
day of the crime, does not discount the possibility that the accused
themselves had actually gone to the house of their victims at about the time
of 6: 00 o'clock in the evening. It must be noted that the time given was
merely a calculation, and what may have been considered by one witness as
six o'clock may actually have been 5:30, etc. So that the defenses of alibis
appear to Us as of very little weight or value, especially in view of the fact
that the witnesses for the prosecution clearly identified the accused, such
identification being positive and immediate because given as soon as the
officers of the Constabulary arrived.
We will now proceed to the principal issue, namely, whether the three
witnesses who testified to having identified the accused were really in a
position to and did actually identify them. The first witness was Genoveva
Lazo who said that she peeped out of the window and saw the face and
figure of a man who later she identified as Gaspar Acerador. The description
that she gave at the trial coincides with the physical features that the court
saw in the person of the said accused at the time of the trial. Gaspar
Acerador was also identified by the wife of the deceased, Juana Resuello,
who declared that Acerador was seen by her on the last rung of the stairs
leading to their batalan. Pergentino Lazo also identified both accused when,
looking thru the window near the stairs, he saw them firing their guns at the
deceased Florentino Lazo.
With respect to Juan Ayonayon, his identification by Juana Resuello is
beyond question. As Juana was going to cross the batalan, she saw Juan
Ayonayon already on the batalan and was about to speak to him. He,
Ayonayon, was known to her, consequently, the identification was prompt
and immediate. It is a fact that when one meets a person known to him,
identification takes place at first sight, so the testimony of Juana Resuello
that she identified Ayonayon, who was known to her, should be accepted.
The same fact of identification is true as to the accused Gaspar Acerador,
also known to Juana Resuello..
As to the testimony of Pergentino Lazo, which testimony is being attacked, it
is to be noted that he saw the two accused while the latter were already on
the batalan. From a diagram of the house, We note that place where the
accused were standing, while firing at the decease Florentino Lazo, was
visible through a window from the place beside the aparador where
Pergentino Lazo, had stationed himself. But the fact that Pergentino Lazo,
when the officers came in the same evening, declared to the Constabulary
officers that the assailants were Ayonayon and Acerador, this readiness,
shows that he was able positively identify them at the time of the assault, the
accused being known to him.
Counsel for Acerador argues that since at the time of the assault, which was
6:00 o'clock in the evening, it was already dark, the accused could not have
been identified by Genoveva Lazo, Juana Resuello or Pergentino Lazo. We
checked the time when the sun set on August 5, 1959 and We have been
informed that the sun set on that date at about 6:38 in the evening, which
shows that at 6:00 o'clock, the surrounding of the house where the victims
were shot, were not yet dark. The use of a kerosene lamp inside a house
does not mean that outside the house, where the assailants were seen, was
also dark. The inside of a house is necessarily darker than the outside; so
the use of a kerosene lamp while the inmates are taking supper, does not
mean that persons outside cannot be identified from within the house.
Capital is made of the fact that the witness Genoveva Lazo said that during
the day there were stars. She did not say that during the daytime there were
stars; she must have meant that during the time when the assault was made
there were stars in the sky at night. Beside we take judicial notice of the fact
that while it is true that the month of August is characterized by showers or
rains, they generally are passing showers and rains, after which the
atmosphere becomes clear.
But as the most compelling reason why the witnesses for the prosecution
must be believed as to the identification of the accused by them, is the fact
that they had no cause or reason to charge or point out the accused as the
ones responsible for the offense, there being no strong reason why they
should violate their oaths and declare falsely.

After a review of all the evidence, We are convinced that the two accused
were really the ones who assaulted and fired at Genoveva, Florentino and
Jose Lazo, and killed Florentino Lazo and Jose Lazo, and that their guilt has
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The penalty that was imposed by the
lower court is that of death for the murders of Florentino Lazo and Jose Lazo.
There is no question that the murders were committed with the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation, and with the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and dwelling of the offended party. But while the
penalty imposed appears justified by the aggravating circumstances, there is
no sufficient number of votes to affirm the penalty of death for the reason that
it does not appear from the evidence that the accused-appellants were so
perverse as to deserve the supreme penalty. Hence, no sufficient number of
Justices voted to affirm the imposition of the death penalty.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by imposing

upon each of the accused-appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
the murder of Florentino Lazo and Jose Lazo, but the judgment is hereby
affirmed in all other respects. The judgment and sentence imposed upon
them for the wounding of Genoveva Lazo is affirmed, with costs against
accused-appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-35133 May 31, 1974
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAYMUNDO MADERA @ "Mundo", MARIANITO V. ANDRES @ "Totoy",
GENEROSO ANDRES @ "Ross", defendants-appellants.
Francisco G. Munsayac, Sr. for appellant Madera.
Apolinar F. Tolentino and Jose C. Vitug for appellant Andres, et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor
General Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Sinfronio I. Ancheta for appellee.
FERNANDEZ, J.:p
This case is now before Us on appeal of the three appellants from a decision
of the Circuit Criminal Court 1 finding them guilty of the crime of murder, and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to jointly and
severally indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost
proportionately.
There is no question that at about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of April
20, 1970, three men barged at the doorstep of the house of the victim Elino
Bana in Sitio Baag, Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. The gunman,
standing on the first rung of the stairs of the house, fired a volley of shots
from a .45 caliber gun at Elino Bana who was then sleeping on the floor of
his house near the stairs. Two gunshot wounds were inflicted on the victim
but the fatal one was the one that hit him on the abdominal region. Elino
Bana did not die immediately. He stood up and told his wife to call for his
brother Conrado who lives not far away from their house. The victim's wife
fetched Conrado; but when they returned, the wounded man was no longer
at home for he was already brought to the Municipal Building of Gabaldon.
He was carried by his son-in-law, Francisco Viloria, with the assistance of
some people. From the Municipal Building, he was brought to the Nueva
Ecija General Hospital, but he died on the way that same day, April 20,1970.
We affirm the lower court's finding that the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant Raymundo Madera was the one who fired
the shots at the victim Elino Bana, one of which was the fatal shot, and that
appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were with Madera at the
time.
Juanita Bana, a son of the victim, testified that he was awakened by the
gunfire and saw the appellant Raymundo Madera standing on the first step of
their stairs holding a .45 caliber firearm. He also saw the appellants Marianito
Andres and Generoso Andres just behind the appellant Madera, at a
distance of 1 1/2 meters from the stairs. Bernarda Bana, wife of the victim,
declared that she saw Raymundo Madem as the one who shot her husband
with a foot-long firearm, and appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso
Andres were then with Madera.
In addition to the testimonies of these two witnesses, the prosecution
presented the dying, declaration of the victim Elino Bana. The trip from the
house of Elino Bana to the Municipal Building took only about thirty minutes.
On the way, they were met by policeman Ambrosio Feliciano from Gabaldon
who was fetched from his house by Barrio Captain Emiliano Jornadal of
Bantug to look into the shooting incident. Upon reaching the Municipal
Building, Patrolman Feliciano told Elino Bana that he would have to take
down his written statement regarding the shooting incident, and the latter
agreed. The latter was then in agony. It was then 3:00 o'clock in the morning.
In said dying declaration, he was asked who shot him and the answer was:
Mundo Madera and two others whom he could not recognize.
The lower court was correct in refusing to give credence to the testimony of
Patrolman Feliciano that while they were on their way to the Municipal
Building, Elino Bana told him that he could not identify the persons who shot
him. Said policeman has been an investigator in the police force since 1964.
He should have asked Elino Bana while he was giving his dying declaration
in the Municipal Building why he said earlier that he did not know who shot
him. But Patrolman Feliciano did not do this. It must be noted that not only
Patrolman Feliciano but also Francisco Viloria, a witness to the dying
declaration, testified to its lawful execution.
The fact that Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana failed to reveal right away the
identities of the appellants to the Victim himself and to their relatives Conrado
Bana and Francisco Viloria, does not militate against their credibility. There is
no evidence on record that they were asked by their relatives about the
identity of the appellants. Had they been asked, they would have readily
revealed appellants' identities as they did to the Chief of Police and Municipal
Mayor of Gabaldon only a few hours after the fateful incident, during a formal
investigation of the case in the Office of the Chief of Police when and where
they executed their respective sworn statements.
In their respective written statements taken on April 20, 1970, subscribed and
sworn on the same date before the Mayor of Gabaldon, Bernardo Bana and
Juanito Bana categorically stated that Elino Bana was shot by Raymundo
Madera @ Mundo, while Ross and Totoy Andres were downstairs.
Juanito Bana was then living with his parents. He must be familiar with their
house. He testified on direct examination that he slept in the balcony of their
house. On cross examination, he said that he slept inside their house. That
does not show any inconsistency in his testimony, because on further
questioning, he said that the balcony referred to by him was inside their
house. Yes, he said that after he heard the shots, he jumped to the ground
through the back portion of their house. The falsity of this statement has not
been shown by the defense. The pictures presented by it which apparently
show that there was no such opening, can be explained by the fact that the
tall grasses could obscure the back portion of the house where the kitchen
door was located.
Juanito Bana admitted that he was gripped with fear when he heard the burst
of gunfire. But that would not prove that he failed to recognize the appellants.
An excited person may overlook the presence of another
whom he would otherwise have observed.
Under some circumstance, however, excitement may whet
the attention to a keen edge. In some other cases, it has
been observed, in effect, that the emotion incident to the
impending peril may not be the kind of excitement which
confuses, but that which focalizes the faculties to scrutinize.
the circumstance of the threatened danger in order to avoid
it.2
The appellants asserted in their briefs3 that "the evidence on record does not
show that there was a moon shining in the early morning of April 20, 1970, at
Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija;" that it was then "a moonless night;"
hence, Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana could not have recognized the
appellants. This position is untenable. Why?
The Court can take judicial notice of the "laws of nature" 4 and, under this
rule, of the time when the moon rises or sets on a particular day.5 This not
withstanding and for certainty, We took it unto Ourselves to get a certification
from the Weather Bureau6 which shows that the moon was bright at the time
of the shooting incident. It reads:
To whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that, based on the computations made by this office, the
following astronomical data for Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija are true and
correct:
1. that the moon rose at 4:11 P.M. on April 19, 1970 and set the
following day, April 20, at 4:27 A.M.;
2. that at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, the moon was at an altitude of 34
degrees above the western horizon with bearing of South 73 degrees
West;
3. and that the moon was illumined 97% at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970,
full moon having occurred at 00.21 A.M. on April 22,1970.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mr. Estanislao
Fernandez, Associate Justice, Supreme Court, Manila.
For the Administrator:
(Sgd) Simeon V. Inciong
SIMEON V. INCIONG Chief, Astronomical Division
It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove motive on the part of the
appellants for there is no doubt as to their identities.
It is true that, according to Maximo A. Obra, the forensic chemist of the NBI,
appellant Raymundo Madera was found negative in a paraffin test. But Obra
himself admitted that, the paraffin test having been conducted fourteen days
after the incident, the test could have given a negative result even if the
appellant had fired a gun fourteen days earlier, because the nitrate deposits
on his hands could have been washed off by washing or could have been
removed by perspiration.
The defense of the appellants was alibi. But said defense cannot prevail over
the positive identification of the appellants by the prosecution witnesses. The
house of appellant Raymundo Madera is just about 400 meters away from
that of the victim Elino Bana.
We need not discuss further the defense of alibi of the appellants Marianito
Andres and Generoso Andres because the Solicitor General recommended
their acquittal. And We agree.
The fact that these two appellants were standing behind appellant Madera
when the latter fired shots at Elino Bana, did not make them liable for what
Madera did, there being no proof whatsoever of any conspiracy among the
three appellants. They were not armed. They did nothing to help Madera.
Their mere passive presence at the scene of the crime did not make them
liable either as co-principals or accomplices. In one of the latest decisions of
this Court, penned by Justice Felix Q. Antonio, We held:
 It is well to recall the settled rule that conspiracy
presupposes the existence of a preconceived plan or
agreement and in order to establish the existence of such a
circumstance, it is not enough that the persons supposedly
engaged or connected with the same be present when the
crime was perpetrated. There must be established a logical
relationship between the commission of the crime and the
supposed conspirators, evidencing a clear and more intimate
connection between and among the latter, such as by their
overt acts committed in pursuance of a common design.
Considering the far-reaching consequences, of criminal
conspiracy, the same degree of proof required for
establishing the crime is required to support a finding of its
presence that is, it must be shown to exist as clearly and
convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.
protect the innocent. We, therefore, commend Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Sinfronio I.
Ancheta for having correctly recommended the acquittal of the appellants
Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with respect to
the appellant Raymundo Madera alias "Mundo", with 1/3 of the cost charged
against him; and it is hereby reversed as regards appellants Marianito
Andres alias "Totoy" and Generoso Andres alias "Ross", who are hereby
acquitted of the crime charged with proportionate costs de oficio. Their
immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered unless they are held
for another legal cause.

The evidence fails to meet such requirements. To hold him

liable, upon the other hand, as an accomplice, it must be
shown that he had knowledge of the criminal intention of the
principal, which may be demonstrated by previous or
simultaneous acts which contributes to the commission of
the offense as aid thereto whether physical or moral. As
aptly stated in People v. Tamayo: "It is an essential condition
to the existence of complicity, not only that there should be a
relation between the acts done by the principal and those
attributed to the person charged as accomplice, but it is
further necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the
criminal intent, should cooperate with the intention of
supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime
in an efficacious way." ... From our view of the evidence it
has not been convincingly established that appellant
cooperated in the commission of the offense, either morally,
through advice, encouragement or agreement or materially
through external acts indicating a manifest intent of
supplying aid in the perpetration of the crime in an
efficacious way. Such circumstances being absent, his mere
passive presence at the scene of the crime certainly does
not make him either a co-principal or an accomplice in the
commission of the offense.7

This is good a time as any to emphasize upon those in charge of the

prosecution of criminal cases that the prosecutor's finest hour is not when he
wins a case with the conviction of the accused. His finest hour is still when,
overcoming the advocate's natural obsession for victory, he stands up before
the Court and pleads not for the conviction of the accused but for his
acquittal. For indeed, his noble task is to prosecute only the guilty and to
G.R. No. L-45857 October 27, 1983
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ERNESTO SISON Y AVILES, defendant-appellant.
Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Emilio Abrogena for defendant-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J:
In her sworn complaint, complainant Violeta Begino y Aquino accused
defendant-appellant of forcible abduction with rape allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1973, in Quezon City
Philippines, the above-named accused with lewd design, and
then and there wilfully, unlawfully appeal feloniously, by
means of force and intimidation abduct the undersigned, by
then and there forcibly dragging her into a tricycle, after
which the undersigned was brought to a house located at
Novaliches. this City where said accused by means of force
and intimidation had carnal knowledge of the undersigned,
all against the will and without the consent of the
undersigned, to her damage and prejudice in such amount
as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil
Code.
Contrary to law (p. 2, rec.).
The trial court convicted him of the charge and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with accessories of the law, to indemnify the
complainant in the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the
costs, crediting him however with the entire period of his temporary
detention.
Complainant Violeta Begino, a native of Cabcab Catanduanes, was about 15
years and 10 months old on July 15, 1973, a Sunday. About 4 feet and 7
inches tall and weighing about 93 lbs., she was the housemaid of Jose
Baruela of Galas, Quezon City.
Between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday, July 15, 1973, Violeta
was standing at the corner of Luzon Avenue and Union Civica St., Galas,
Quezon City, waiting for a ride to Quiapo, Manila to buy slippers for her
employer. Appellant Ernesto Sison, then about 23 years old, who was
courting her, approached her and invited her to take the tricycle then driving.
When she refused, appellant allegedly drew 7-inch knife and poked it at her
abdomen, threatening to kill her if she did not board his tricycle. He allegedly
seized her and forced her to get into the tricycle.
This is quite incredible because on such Sunday afternoon, with many
people passing by or walking in the vicinity, as Galas is thickly populated by
low-income and middle-class groups - of which fact the Supreme Court can
take judicial notice - she could have resisted and shouted for help. It was not
easy for appellant to grab her and force her into the tricycle without being
noticed by passersby and bystanders. She claims that after she was seated
inside the tricycle, appellant drove his tricycle to the España Rotonda, a busy
intersection of España St., Manila, Quezon Avenue, España Extension (now
E. Rodriguez Ave.), Mayon St., and Pulog St. going towards Galas, Quezon
City. Said rotonda is over one kilometer from Galas, with several street
corners to pass along the way.
With appellant driving the tricycle, complainant could have shouted for help
while seated in the rear compartment for passengers behind him, since as
aforestated, from the corner where she was allegedly forced to board the
tricycle up to España Rotonda is quite a distance, with so many houses and
several persons along the way. And children would be playing on the streets.
Or she could have jumped out of the tricycle for a tricycle does not run fast
and the tricycle is always open at its right side just behind appellant who was
on the driver's seat. Appellant could not be poking a knife with one hand at
Violeta and driving the tricycle with the other hand.
From the España Rotonda, they took a passenger jeepney for Balintawak,
Quezon City. They were allegedly the only passengers of the jeepney, with
appellant holding her hands and telling her that he would kill her if she tried
to go home. From España Rotonda to Balintawak is a distance of about five
kilometers. Being a passenger jeepney, it presumably took the usual
passenger jeepney routes. It would be unbelievable that all throughout the
distance of about five kilometers, a Sunday afternoon, no other passenger
boarded the jeepney between España Rotonda and Balintawak. The route of
said jeepney must pass through Mayon St. towards North Cemetery beside
Balintawak. But even assuming that they were the lone passengers of the
jeepney throughout the distance she could have shouted for help or created
a commotion to alert the jeepney driver. It is also possible that she must have
seen policemen along the route, especially near the gate of the North
Cemetery. The various jeepney routes from Quezon City to North Cemetery
include Mayor Norberto Amoranto St. (formerly Retiro), Del Monte Avenue,
Dapitan, Laong-Laan St., and from Manila to the North Cemetery then to
Balintawak, via Dimasalang St., and coming from Rizal Avenue Extension
and passing the Chinese General Hospital via Blumentritt. Upon reaching the
busy intersection in front of the North Cemetery gate, with a lot of people
around, including employees of the gas station just across the gate of the
North Cemetery, she could have screamed for help, but she did not.
At Balintawak, appellant allegedly brought her to the house of his aunt, to
whom he allegedly introduced her as his girlfriend. After talking to her aunt,
he and complainant left the house and rode in a passenger jeepney bound
for Novaliches, passengers inside the jeepney Quezon City. There were
other pass but she did not make any outcry nor ask help from the other
passengers during that long trip from Balintawak to Novaliches, which is a lot
farther than from España Rotonda to Balintawak. Balintawak is also a busy
street all the way to Clover Leaf (the hub connecting to Novaliches) and there
are many houses' and shops along the way - more so upon reaching the
busy market near the Clover Leaf. And then from Clover Leaf through Quirino
Avenue towards Novaliches, there must have been numerous persons that
Sunday afternoon, because Quirino Avenue is likewise a busy avenue, being
the only route to Novaliches from the Clover Leaf and the traffic along that
thoroughfare is heavy at all hours of the day because of the numerous
passenger buses, jeepneys, cargo trucks, and private cars on the road. But
she did not cry for help.
At Novaliches, appellant led her to the house of another aunt, Maria Aviles
Reyes and took her purse containing P12.00. After eating their supper,
appellant allegedly brought her to a room and ordered her to lie down. She
resisted and appellant slapped her repeatedly. She became unconscious and
upon regaining consciousness, she found herself naked with appellant on top
of her and his penis inside her vagina "up to her stomach." If she resisted as
she claimed, there should have been some commotion and maybe pieces of
furniture like chairs and tables being pushed or the sound of shuffling feet,
accompanied by her cries or screaming indicating resistance. When he
slapped her repeatedly, she must have shouted in pain and even cursed him
aloud with the usual vulgar rivectives With such commotion, screaming, cries
of pain and vulgar purses it is unthinkable that the aunt and the rest of the
inmates of the house would not have heard the same. They could have been
curious about the commotion and could have frustrated whatever criminal
Intention appellant might have towards her.
She alleged that he had sexual intercourse with her three times that July 15
even as she was experiencing pain. The following day (July 16), he had
sexual intercourse with her four times. Then on the third day (July 17), he did
the same to her. They stayed in Novaliches from July 15 to July 21, 1973.
.Never did she complain to his aunt or to the other inmates of the house
about what appellant did to her. During those six days, she must have gone
out of the room to eat or to attend to personal necessities in the bathroom.
During those six days too, his aunt and the other members of the family
would have noticed her painful expression or her moaning in pain and would
have asked her the cause of the same.
In the afternoon of July 21, 1973, appellant, with his mother and his aunt
Maria, brought Violeta to his house in Sampaloc, Manila, and from there, to
Violeta's mother at 11-B Luzon Avenue, Galas, Quezon City. All the mother
did was to slap her.
It should be stressed, as heretofore intimated, that this Court sitting in Metro
Manila, can take judicial notice of the geography of said metropolis, and the
approximate distance from Galas to España Rotonda, from España Rotonda
to Balintawak, and from Balintawak to Novaliches, the passenger routes to
said place, the nature of traffic along said routes, the heavy population in
Metropolitan Manila, and the habits of the residents therein.
There is nothing in the record to indicate as to why her mother and her
employer did not look for her during the six days that she was missing from
the house of her employer and why they did not report to the police
authorities said fact of her being missing for almost a week. Neither is there
any intimation that her employer inquired about the money he gave to her to
purchase slippers, which is quite unnatural.
All the foregoing circumstances not only negate the conclusion that she was
sexually assaulted by appellant against her will, but also affirm that she went
willingly with the appellant and submitted to his lewd design.
Consequently, the only possible conclusion is that she voluntarily went with
appellant on that six-day tryst with him. for which appellant could have been
convicted of consented abduction as Violeta was then over 12 but under 18
years of age (Art. 343, R.P.C.), if the complaint included the essential
elements of abduction with consent Valdepeha vs. People, 16 SCRA 871,
April 30, 1966; U.S. vs. Asuncion, 31 Phil. 614, Oct. 2, 1915). Unfortunately,
the complaint as aforequoted does not allege that the offended party was a
virgin, over 12 years and under 18 years of age Barba vs. People, 89 SCRA
112, March 28,1979; People vs. Castro, 58 SCRA 473, Aug. 19, 1974;
People vs. Samillano, 56 SCRA 573, April 22, 1974; People vs. Magat, 94
Phil. 118, Dec. 29, 1953).
Hence, the appellant should be acquitted of the charge.
WHEREFORE, APPELLANT ERNESTO SISON Y AVILES IS HEREBY
ACQUITTED. WITH COSTS DE OFICIO.
HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED UNLESS HE IS HELD
FOR SOME OTHER VALID CHARGES.
G.R. No. 159467 December 9, 2005
SPOUSES NORA SAGUID and ROLANDO P. SAGUID, Petitioners,
vs.
SECURITY FINANCE, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure are the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 68129 dated 31 January 2003 reversing the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 135, in Civil Case No. 98-1803,
dated 07 July 2000, ordering respondent Security Finance, Inc. to pay
petitioner Spouses Nora and Rolando Saguid the daily earnings of the seized
motor vehicle as well as damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit, and its
Resolution2 dated 10 June 2003 denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
On 30 July 1998, respondent filed a case for Recovery of Possession with
Replevin with Alternative Prayer for Sum of Money and Damages against
petitioners and one John Doe in whose possession and custody the
mortgaged property may be found.3 It alleged that petitioners, for value,
jointly and severally executed in its favor a Promissory Note 4 in the amount of
₱508,248.00, payable in monthly installments per schedule indicated therein.
To secure payment of the Promissory Note, petitioners executed a Chattel
Mortgage5 over a motor vehicle particularly described as follows:
MAKE : TOYOTA COROLLA XL
MODEL : 1996
ENGINE NO. : 2E-2895512
SERIAL NO. : EE100-9555787
Respondent alleged that petitioners defaulted in complying with the terms
and conditions of the Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage by failing to pay
several monthly installments on the Promissory Note. As provided for in the
Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage, the failure of the petitioners to pay
any installment when due shall make the entire balance of the obligation
immediately due and payable. The total obligation of petitioners amounted to
₱756,634.64 as of 15 May 1998.6
Despite demand7 for payment or the surrender, if in good order and condition,
of the mortgaged motor vehicle, petitioners failed and refused to comply with
the demand. Thus, respondent was constrained to file the instant case
praying that (1) a Writ of Replevin be issued ordering the seizure of the
afore-described vehicle, complete with all its accessories, and that same be
delivered to it; or (2) in the event that manual delivery thereof cannot be
effected, order the petitioners to pay the amount of ₱756,634.64 exclusive of
accruing interest and penalty charges thereon at the rate of five percent (5%)
per month until fully paid. In either case, to order petitioners to pay
respondent the amount of ₱189,158.66 as and for attorney’s fees, replevin
bond premium and other expenses incurred in the seizure of the motor
vehicle, and costs of suit.
On 03 August 1998, the Hon. Francisco B. Ibay, Presiding Judge, Branch
135, RTC, Makati City, issued an Order directing the branch sheriff to seize
the aforementioned vehicle upon filing of a bond in the amount of
₱1,513,270.00 which is double the value of the property to be seized, and to
take it into his custody upon further orders from the court. 8
Upon being informed by respondent in a Motion for Clarification 9 that the
reasonable estimated value of the vehicle involved is ₱150,000.00, the RTC
lowered the Replevin Bond to be filed to ₱300,000.00 10 which respondent
filed on 12 August 1998.
On 12 October 1998, the RTC issued a Writ of Seizure ordering the Branch
Sheriff to seize the vehicle, to keep it in his possession for five (5) days, and
then to deliver it to respondent.11
On 13 October 1998, after service upon petitioners of the copy of the
summons with the complaint and annexes, affidavit, writ of seizure and bond,
the vehicle subject of this case was repossessed by the sheriff upon
issuance of the corresponding receipt. On 20 October 1998, the vehicle was
delivered to respondent.12
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,13 petitioners specifically
denied the allegations in the Complaint. They maintained they, whether
individually or as spouses, did not and never executed a Promissory Note
and Chattel Mortgage in favor of respondent. They claimed they bought the
car subject of the case in cash as evidenced by the Vehicle Sales Invoice 14 of
Toyota Balintawak, Inc. dated 15 March 1996. Petitioner Nora Saguid alleged
that she could not have physically executed the Promissory Note on 23 April
1996 as she was in Australia when the same was supposedly executed. On
the part of petitioner Rolando Saguid, he admitted that he signed the
promissory note in preparation for an application for loan upon the request of
one Sonny Quijano who promised to facilitate the same for the purchase of
another motor vehicle to be converted into a taxicab, but not with respondent.
As compulsory counterclaim, they ask that respondent be ordered to pay
moral, exemplary and actual damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs
of suit.
After pre-trial, the RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order containing the following
stipulation of facts:
1. The personal and corporate personalities of the parties;
2. That the promissory note dated April 23, 1996 in the amount of
P508,248.00 in favor of plaintiff was signed by defendant Rolando Saguid;
and
3. That the chattel mortgage was signed by defendant Rolando Saguid; . . . 15
Trial ensued. The respective evidence of the parties are substantially
summarized in the decision of the RTC.
Evidence of the Petitioners:
The plaintiff presented two (2) witnesses: 1] Rosauro G. Maghirang, Jr., 43
years of age, married, Assistant Vice-President for Marketing of the plaintiff,
and a resident of No. 140 J. Molina Street, Marikina City; and 2] Antonio B.
Placido, 37 years of age, married, an employee of the plaintiff, and a resident
of 263 Santo Cristo Street, Angat, Bulacan.
It can be culled from plaintiff’s evidence that an application [Exhibit A] for a
loan to finance the purchases [of] a new car was filed with the plaintiff. The
application was not signed by any of the defendants. The signature
appearing on the application [Exhibit A] belongs to one David Garcia, a
Marketing Assistant of the plaintiff. The application was evaluated and
investigated and was approved. The Promissory Note No. 96-01447 dated
April 23, 1996 [Exhibit B] and the Chattel Mortgage Contract dated
September 3, 1996 [Exhibit D] were signed. Submitted to the plaintiff were
postdated checks [Exhibits E, E-1 to E-12]. When deposited these checks
were dishonored for the reason that the account was already closed. The
dishonored checks were replaced with P27,137.67 cash for which O.R. No.
12467 dated June 27, 1996 [Exhibit F]. After the payment made on June 27,
1996, the checks that subsequently bounced were not replaced. The case
was referred to counsel for collection. A demand letter was delivered by
witness Placido to the residence of the defendants. There being no response
from the defendants this case was filed against them. Placido conducted a
surveillance of the place where the vehicle could possibly be found. He
accompanied the sheriff in implementing the writ of seizure. After seizure of
the vehicle it was stowed at the warehouse of plaintiff in Las Pinas.
On cross-examination of Rosauro G. Maghirang, Jr., Assistant Vice-
President for Marketing of the plaintiff, it was established that the mortgage
of subject motor vehicle was not registered with the LTO because the dealer
did not submit to plaintiff the certificate of registration. In transactions of this
nature, loan applicants are required to submit the original certificate of
registration and the official receipt. The dealer, Toyota Balintawak, did not
send to the plaintiff these documents.16
Evidence of the Respondent:
Defendants testified for and in their behalf. Zenaida Marquinez Maralit, 33
years of age, single, a resident of Orlon Street, Litex Village, San Jose,
Rodriguez, Rizal, and the Credit and Collection Head of Toyota Balintawak
testified for the defendants. Defendant Rolando bought in cash the subject
motor vehicle from Toyota Balintawak. He was issued Vehicle Delivery
Invoice No. 7104 [Exhibit1] and Vehicle Delivery Note No. 7104 [Exhibit 2].
The same vehicle was registered [Exhibit 3]. He identified his signatures in
the promissory note [Exhibit B] and in the chattel mortgage [Exhibit D]. He
was asked by one Sonny Quijano to sign these documents in blank on the
representation of the latter that he will help him secure additional capital to
enable him to purchase another taxi.
Rolando met for the first time Sonny Quijano sometime in January 1996 at
Toyota Quezon Avenue. Rolando was then planning to purchase two units of
taxi colored white. But at that time there was only one available unit at
Toyota Quezon Avenue. Quijano approached Rolando informing him that
there are units colored white available at Toyota Balintawak and that he will
help him secure one. Rolando was able to secure one. In the month of May,
Quijano went to the house of defendants and asked Rolando if he is still
interested in getting additional capital to purchase a taxi. Rolando was asked
to sign documents in blank. The name of the plaintiff does not appear in
these documents. When Rolando asked Quijano why the documents are in
blank, Quijano told him just to sign and that he will take care of everything.
Nora did not sign the documents because at that time she was in Australia.
Rolando do (sic) not know what happened to the documents he signed. He
read from the papers that Quijano was shot. He denied the issuance of the
checks [Exhibits E, E-1 to E-12]. Defendants received a letter [Exhibit 8]
dated February 21, 1997 from De Castro Law Office. Rolando went to this
Law Office and presented his documents evidencing payment of the subject
motor vehicle. He was told by Atty. De Castro that everything is okay and
that he will take care of everything.
On October 28, 1998 at about 7:00 in the morning two [2] units of taxi
including subject motor vehicle were seized by the sheriff assisted by three
[3] SWAT members. The boundary of the subject motor vehicle, which is a
taxi, is P750.00 for every 24 hours. From October 28, 1998 to October 1999
defendants lost P180,000 in income. Defendants retained the services of
counsel for P100,000 plus P1,500 per appearance. With this incident on
October 28, 1998, Rolando was embarrassed in front of his neighbors. For
his sufferings Rolando is praying for P1 Million in damages plus P3 Million in
exemplary damages.
Witness Maralit corroborated that testimony of Rolando that the subject
motor vehicle was purchased in cash and not through financing. Had subject
vehicle been purchased through financing the original Certificate of
Registration and Certificate of Registration would have been transmitted to
the financing company marked by the LTO "encumbered". This did not
happen in this case. Security Finance, the plaintiff in this case was not
accredited by Toyota Balintawak not even in one transaction. The
appearance in both Exhibits 1 and 2 of "SPQ Center/Nora Saguid" as
purchaser of the subject motor vehicle was satisfactorily explained by
witness Maralit. The subject motor vehicle was initially reserved by SPQ
Center but later on it waived its right in favor of Nora. It is for this reason that
"SPQ Center/Nora Saguid" appears as the purchaser of the vehicle. 17
In its decision18 dated 07 July 2000, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering plaintiff SECURITY
FINANCE, INCORPORATED to pay defendant-spouses ROLANDO and
NORA SAGUID:
1. The total amount of the daily earnings of the seized motor vehicle
computed from the date of its seizure on October 28, 1998 up to its return to
the defendants, at the rate of P750.00 daily;
2. The amount of P500,000 for moral damages;
3. The amount of P1,000,000 for exemplary damages;
4. The amount P200,000 for and as attorney’s fees; and
5. The Costs.
In reaching its verdict, the RTC ruled that the promissory note and the deed
of mortgage were not valid contracts and were not binding on petitioners. It
explained that respondent failed to show with convincing evidence that it
loaned to petitioners the money used in the purchase of the subject motor
vehicle. On the contrary, it found that there was preponderance of evidence
showing that the motor vehicle was purchased in cash by petitioners from
Toyota Balintawak, Inc.
Respondent appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals via a Notice of
Appeal.19
On 31 January 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and ruled in favor of
respondent. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the trial court
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one is rendered in favor
of the plaintiff-appellant. Costs against the defendants-appellees.20
The Court of Appeals found the ruling of the trial court that there was no valid
contract entered into between the parties on the ground there was no cause
or consideration when they executed the same, and that respondent failed to
show with convincing evidence that it loaned the money to petitioners which
was used to purchase the subject motor vehicle, to be bereft of factual and
legal basis. It relied heavily on the admission of petitioner Rolando Saguid
during pre-trial and during his direct-examination that he signed the
promissory note dated 23 April 1996 and the chattel mortgage dated 03
September 1996. It did not give weight to petitioners’ bare denial that they
never transacted with respondent for the subject loan and that they never
executed the promissory note and the deed of chattel mortgage because it
belied the admission made by petitioner Rolando Saguid.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration21 dated 24 February 2003 while
respondent filed a Motion for Clarificatory Judgment 22 dated 17 February
2003.
In a resolution dated 10 June 2003, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion
for Reconsideration and granted the Motion for Clarificatory Judgment. It
amended the dispostive portion of its 31 January 2003 decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the trial court
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one is rendered in favor
of the plaintiff-appellant ordering the defendants-appellees:
1) To deliver to the plaintiff-appellant the motor vehicle described as follows:
MAKE : Toyota Corolla XL
MODEL : 1996
ENGINE NO. : 2E-2895512
SERIAL NO. : EE100-9555787
2) In the event the manual delivery of the above-described motor vehicle is
not feasible, to pay the plaintiff appellant the amount of ₱508,248.00 plus
interest and penalty charges at the legal rate per annum until fully paid, in
line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Medel vs. Court of
Appeals, 299 SCRA 481; and
3) To pay the costs of suit.23
Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I the subject car. Though petitioner Rolando Saguid admitted that the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ENTERED INTO
A TRANSACTION WITH RESPONDENT CONCERNING THE SUBJECT
MOTOR VEHICLE BASED ON THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND CHATTEL
MORTGAGE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT PETITIONER ROLANDO
SAGUID’S ADMISSION OF HAVING SIGNED THE DOCUMENTS WAS
MERELY IN PREPARATION FOR A LOAN APPLICATION PRESENTED TO
HIM BY THE LATE SONNY QUIJANO, A CAR SALES AGENT.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PROMISSORY NOTE
AND THE DEED OF MORTGAGE ARE NOT VALID AND NOT BINDING ON
THE PETITIONERS CONSIDERING PETITIONER ROLANDO SAGUID’S
EXPLANATION REGARDING HIS ADMISSION AND THE SOLID AND
COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WIFE WAS NOT IN THE
PHILIPPINES AT THE TIME OF THE EXECUTION OF THE SAID
DOCUMENTS BUT WAS IN AUSTRALIA.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND THE EVIDENCE WHEN IT
GRANTED RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATORY JUDGMENT
AND ORDERED PETITIONER TO DELIVER THE SUBJECT MOTOR
VEHICLE TO RESPONDENT AND TO PAY RESPONDENT THE AMOUNT
OF P508,248.00 PLUS INTEREST AND PENALTY CHARGES IN CASE
MANUAL DELIVERY OF THE VEHICLE WAS NOT FEASIBLE,
OVERLOOKING THE FACT THAT THE SUBJECT MOTOR VEHICLE WAS
ALREADY FORCIBLY CONFISCATED AND SEIZED BY THE SHERIFF BY
VIRTUE OF THE WRIT OF SEIZURE ISSUED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND
DULY ACKNOWLEDGED TO HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BY THE SHERIFF
FROM THE PETITIONERS.
Respondent would like to impress on the Court that there is a valid Contract
of Loan between it and petitioners, and that the proceeds of the loan were
used to buy the vehicle involved in this case. In support thereof, it offered,
among other things, a Promissory Note24 dated 23 April 1996 and Chattel
Mortgage25 dated 03 September 1996 over the subject vehicle which served
as security for the payment of the amount indicated in the former. On the
other hand, petitioners contend that they neither entered into any contract
with respondent nor did they receive any money from it that was used to buy
signatures in the Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage are his, he clarified
that when he signed said documents upon the prodding of Sonny Quijano, he
signed them in blank. Petitioner Nora Saguid, on her part, denied signing
said documents. She claimed that the signatures purporting to be hers are
forgeries since she was in Australia when said documents were executed.
Petitioners maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that they
entered into a transaction with respondent based on the promissory note and
chattel mortgage despite petitioner Rolando Saguid’s explanation of the
circumstances surrounding his signing thereof, and in not holding that these
documents are not valid and binding on them.
To ascertain whether or not petitioners are bound by the promissory note and
chattel mortgage, it must be established that all the elements of a contract of
loan are present. Like any other contract, a contract of loan is governed by
the rules as to the requisites and validity of contracts in general. It is basic
and elementary in this jurisdiction that what determines the validity of a
contract, in general, is the presence of the elements constituting the same,
namely: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the
subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation which is
established.26 In this case, petitioners insist the third element is lacking since
they never transacted with respondent for the proceeds of the loan which
were used in purchasing the subject motor vehicle.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners transacted with respondent and
are bound by the promissory note and chattel mortgage they signed. It
anchored its ruling on the admission of petitioner Rolando Saguid that he
signed said documents. Citing Section 4, Rule 12927 of the Rules of Court, it
reasoned out that petitioner Rolando Saguid’s bare denial cannot qualify the
admission he made during pre-trial and during trial that they transacted with
respondent and executed the aforesaid documents. It brushed aside the
explanation made by petitioner Rolando Saguid that he signed the same in
blank and only as preparation for a loan application presented to him by
Sonny Quijano.
From the record, it is clear that what petitioner Rolando Saguid admitted was
only his signatures in the aforementioned documents and not the contents
thereof. In petitioners’ Answer, Rolando Saguid admitted signing the
promissory note in preparation for an application for loan upon the request of
Sonny Quijano who promised to facilitate the same for the purchase of
another motor vehicle to be converted into a taxicab, but not with respondent.
During trial, Rolando Saguid explained the circumstances under which he
signed the documents with emphasis that he signed them in blank.
We find that the Court of Appeals committed an error when it closed its eyes
to the clarification made by petitioner Rolando Saguid on the ground that
same belied his admission. The rule that an admission cannot be
contradicted unless it can be shown that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made will not apply under the
circumstances obtaining in this case. It does not follow that the admission of
the signatures carries with it the admission of the contents of the documents
especially when the person who affixed his signatures thereon questions its
execution and the veracity of the details embodied therein. Petitioners could
have been bound by the terms and conditions of the promissory note and
chattel mortgage if petitioner Rolando Saguid admitted not only his
signatures but also as to what are contained therein. This is not to be in the
case before us. Petitioners can therefore adduce evidence that would nullify
or invalidate both the promissory note and the chattel mortgage. In other
words, they can show that the elements of the contract of loan are wanting.
The Court of Appeals held that it was not in a proper position to entangle
itself in resolving the matter as regards the qualification made by petitioner
Rolando Saguid on his admission because whatever the documents he
signed in favor of Mr. Quijano is not the concern of the court as the same is
not one of the issues presented before it, and that Mr. Quijano is not a party
in the case. Petitioners claim that if only the Court of Appeals ruled on the
matter, it could have ruled in their favor and sustained the decision of the trial
court.
The Court of Appeals should have ruled on the same it being the primal
defense of petitioners. It should not have wholly disregarded the qualification
made by petitioner Rolando Saguid considering that said defense can easily
be supported by other competent evidence. Instead of relying heavily on the
admitted signatures, it should have evaluated other evidence that could have
either bolstered or disproved the defense of petitioners.
This did not happen in this case. The Court of Appeals conveniently did not
mention in its decision the testimony of Zenaida M. Maralit, an employee of
Toyota Balintawak, Inc., who testified as to the circumstances on how the
subject car was bought, and the documentary evidence that originated from
Toyota Balintawak, Inc. We consider her to be an impartial witness whose
testimony is vital in the proper resolution of this case.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the ruling of
the trial court that the promissory note and the deed of chattel mortgage are
not valid contracts and are not binding on them on the ground that the
contracts did not contain the essential element of cause. The Court of
Appeals said the trial court did not clearly declare in categorical terms the
absence of cause in the aforesaid contracts and that petitioners failed to
disprove that they are debtors of respondent since it is presumed that the
cause exists in the contract.
Under Article 1354 of the Civil Code, it is presumed that
consideration28 exists and is lawful unless the debtor proves the
contrary.29 Moreover, under Section 3(r) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it
is presumed that there is a sufficient consideration for a contract. The
presumption that a contract has sufficient consideration cannot be
overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no consideration. 30 To overcome
the presumption of consideration, the alleged lack of consideration must be
shown by preponderance of evidence.31
In proving that there is no consideration for the aforementioned documents,
petitioners proffered in evidence the following documents that showed that
they bought the subject vehicle in cash and not in installment basis: (a)
Vehicle Sales Invoice No. 7104;32 (b) Vehicle Delivery Note;33 (c) Official
Receipts No. 20864634 and No. 208648;35 (d) Certificate of Registration No.
32862328;36 and (e) Official Receipt No. 40459605.37 In addition, Ms. Zenaida
Maralit of Toyota Balintawak, Inc. confirmed that the subject car was indeed
paid in cash and not through financing for the reasons that the originals of
the Certificate of Registration and the Official Receipt of the subject vehicle
have not been marked as encumbered by the Land Transportation Office and
are in the possession of the buyer. She added that respondent is not
accredited in Toyota Balintawak, Inc. She testified:
Q: Madam Witness, do you know if this vehicle was purchased in cash or
through financing?
A: It was purchased in cash.
Q: What proof do you have to show that it was purchased in cash?
A: There was an invoice cash return.
Q: By the way, being the head of the Credit and Collection, what are your
duties and functions?
A: We are in-charge of collection, we are in-charge of the documentation with
LTO, insurance and financing documents.
Q: As far as the purchase of vehicle through financing, what is your specific
duty?
A: We are the one who asked the client to sign the documents.
Q: Will you tell the Honorable Court what is the procedure in case the vehicle
is purchased from your office through financing?
A: After the client signed the documents, we get all the requirements based
on the credit advice issued by the financing company. So together with the
documents and all the requirements, valid ID, post dated checks, we are the
one transmitting them to the financing company and after processing, the
financing company gave us the proceed two to four days after the release of
the vehicle.
Q: As far as the Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt are
concerned, what did you do with them if the vehicle was purchased through
financing?
A: If it was through financing, the original Official Receipt and Certificate of
Registration goes to the financing company. We are the one transmitting
them. Only the xerox copies of the Official Receipt and Certificate of
Registration go to the client through financing transaction.
Q: As far as the security of the financing company, when it comes to
purchase of vehicle through financing, what do you do with the Official
Receipt and Certificate of Registration?
A: The LTO marked there encumbered. It means it was mortgaged to that
particular financing company.
Q: Where it was marked?
A: At the Certificate of Registration, it was marked encumbered.
Q: On the face?
A: On the face.
Q: Do you have any policy as far as your company is concerned with regards
to the purchase of vehicle through financing?
A: We have only the accredited financing companies.
Q: Is the plaintiff herein, Security Finance, accredited in your company?
A: No, not even in one transaction.
Q: What would be the significance if the original copy of the Certificate of
Registration and the corresponding Official Receipt is in the possession of
the buyer?
A: That means it was on cash transaction.38
On the other hand, respondent, through Rosauro G. Maghirang, Jr., Vice-
President for Marketing, said that it paid the dealer in checks and that they
have proof of payment. He testified:
Q: Mr. witness, you said you paid the dealer. In what form did you pay the
dealer?
A: In checks, sir.
Q: Do you have any proof of your payment?
A: Yes, sir. 39
It is thus clear that the subject car was bought in cash and not through
financing via respondent. We find the evidence presented by respondent to
be unreliable and erratic. The testimony of Rosauro Maghirang, Jr. that
respondent paid Toyota Balintawak, Inc. is simply unsubstantiated by
competent evidence. If respondent truly paid the dealer how come it never
presented the checks it used to pay Toyota Balintawak, Inc.? Even
assuming arguendo that respondent released the loan proceeds to
petitioners, the same would be inconsistent with its allegation that it was the
one that paid the dealer. Furthermore, another telltale sign that strengthens
the claim of petitioners that they did not transact with respondent for a loan
was the fact that the alleged loan/credit application 40 was not signed by any
or both of them.
Respondent’s contention that petitioners did not deny drawing postdated
checks in its favor is untenable. Petitioner Rolando Saguid categorically
denied issuing the check and claimed that the signatures appearing thereon
were not his.41
As to the alleged signature of petitioner Nora Saguid in the promissory note,
evidence points that she could not have signed the document she being in
Australia when she allegedly executed said document on 23 April 1996 as
established by a certification42 from the Bureau of Immigration that she left for
Sydney, Australia, on 30 September 1995 and returned to the country on 15
June 1996.
From the foregoing, the Court is convinced that petitioners’ allegation of
absence of consideration has been substantiated and the presumption of
consideration disproved and overcome. We are of the mind that petitioners
bought the car with their own money. There being no cause or consideration
in the contract of loan allegedly entered into by the parties, the promissory
note is not binding on the petitioners.
As regards the chattel mortgage, it is settled that a mortgage is a mere
accessory contract and its validity would depend on the validity of the loan
secured by it.43 The chattel mortgage constituted over the subject vehicle is
an accessory contract to the loan obligation as embodied in the promissory
note. It cannot exist as an independent contract since its consideration is the
same as that of the principal contract. A principal obligation is an
indispensable condition for the existence of an accessory contract. 44 Since it
has been sufficiently established that there was no cause or consideration for
the promissory note, it follows that the chattel mortgage has no leg to stand
on. Hence, it must be extinguished and cannot have any legal effect on
petitioners.
Having ruled that both promissory note and chattel mortgage are not binding
on petitioners, the return of the subject vehicle to petitioners is in order. In
case the vehicle can no longer be delivered in the condition when it was
seized, respondent shall pay petitioners the amount of ₱150,000.0045 plus
interest of 6% per annum to be computed from 13 October 1998, 46 the date
when said vehicle was seized, until finality of judgment after which interest
rate shall become 12% per annum until actual payment.
We now go to the award of damages.
It is well-settled that actual or compensatory damages must be proved and
proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A party is entitled only up to such
compensation for the pecuniary loss that he has duly proven. 47 It cannot be
presumed.48 Absent proof of the amount of actual damages sustained, the
Court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact
and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they
have been suffered by the injured party and on the best obtainable evidence
of the actual amount thereof.49
In the instant case, the trial court awarded as actual damages the amount of
₱750.00 per day as daily earnings of the seized vehicle from 28 October
1998 until its return. Same should be deleted for lack of competent proof.
The bare assertion of petitioner Rolando Saguid that the subject vehicle was
earning ₱750.00 a day before it was seized is inadequate, if not speculative,
and should not be accepted because it is not supported by independent
evidence. Petitioners should have at least presented a record or journal that
would clearly show how much the vehicle earned in a specific period. This,
petitioners failed to do. Instead, they relied on mere allegations that do not
prove anything.
Petitioners are entitled to moral damages having suffered undue
embarrassment when the subject vehicle was seized from their home. There
is no hard-and-fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount
of moral damages since each case must be governed by its own peculiar
facts. The yardstick should be that it is not palpably and scandalously
excessive.50 We find the amount of ₱500,000.00 awarded by the lower court
to be excessive. In our view, the award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages is
reasonable under the facts obtaining in this case.
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated
or compensatory damages.51 When moral damages are awarded, exemplary
damages may also be granted.52 We, however, find the ₱1,000,000.00
awarded by the lower court to be excessive and should accordingly be
reduced to ₱50,000.00.
Moreover, attorney’s fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to
litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act
of the other party.53 Petitioners are entitled thereto because they were
compelled to litigate in order to protect their interest. Moreover, there being
an award for exemplary damages,54 it follows that there should be an award
thereof. An award of ₱20,000.00 will be sufficient as the award of
₱200,000.00 by the RTC is too much.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68129 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Security Finance, Inc. is ordered to deliver the possession of the subject
vehicle to petitioners, or, in the alternative if such delivery can no longer be
made, to pay petitioners the amount of ₱150,000.00 plus interest of 6% per
annum to be computed from 13 October 1998 until finality of judgment after
which interest rate shall become 12% per annum until actual payment.
Respondent is also ordered to pay petitioners ₱50,000.00 as moral

damages, ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages and ₱20,000.00 by way of

attorney’s fees.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 148273 April 19, 2006
MILAGROS SIMON and LIBORIO BALATICO, Petitioners,
vs.
GUIA W. CANLAS, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 23, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62789 which
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Tarlac
City dated July 31, 1998 in Civil Case No. 7384.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On February 11, 1991, Edgar H. Canlas (Edgar) filed a complaint for judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage against Milagros Simon (Milagros) and
her husband, Liborio Balatico (petitioners). In the complaint, Edgar alleges
that: on September 10, 1987, Milagros obtained a loan from him in the
amount of P220,000.00 secured by a real estate mortgage 2 over her
paraphernal property, a 748-square meter parcel of land located at San
Nicolas, Victoria, Tarlac, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
139884; the loan was payable within a period of three years or until
September 18, 1990; Milagros defaulted in the payment of the loan and
repeated demands for payment went unheeded, prompting the filing of a
case in court.3
On March 25, 1991, petitioners filed their Answer with Counterclaim, alleging
that Milagros never transacted any business with Edgar and she did not
receive the consideration of the alleged mortgage.4
On March 26, 1991, Edgar filed his Reply and Answer to Counterclaim,
reiterating validity and due execution of the real estate mortgage. 5
On November 12, 1991, with leave of court,6 petitioners filed a Third-Party
Complaint against Virginia Canlas (Virginia) and Aurelia Delos Reyes
(Aurelia), claiming that they duped Milagros to part with her title and sign the
mortgage documents without giving her the consideration and refusing to
return her title when demanded.7
On November 18, 1991, Virginia and Aurelia filed their Answer with
Counterclaim to Third-Party Complaint, alleging that the complaint states no
cause of action against them since they are not privies to the real estate
mortgage and Aurelia is only a witness to the mortgage document.8
On November 28, 1991, petitioners filed their Reply and Answer to
Counterclaim, reiterating their claims in the third-party complaint.9
Edgar died during the pendency of the case. On December 4, 1991, upon
proper motion,10 the RTC ordered that Edgar be substituted by his wife, Guia
W. Canlas (respondent), as plaintiff.11
On August 12, 1996, the RTC issued a pre-trial order stating that the parties
failed to arrive at a settlement. However, they agreed to stipulate on the
following: "[t]hat the defendant executed a deed of real estate mortgage in
favor of the plaintiff involving a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 139884
located at San Nicolas, Victoria, Tarlac."12
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with respondent presenting her
witnesses, namely: Nelson Nulud, the records custodian of the Registry of
Deeds of Tarlac; Aurelia, the third-party defendant and one of the
instrumental witnesses to the real estate mortgage; and respondent herself.
When petitioners’ turn came, they presented Crisostomo Astrero, the other
instrumental witness to the real estate mortgage. 1avvphil.net
On April 15, 1998, petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Norberto De Jesus, filed an Ex-
Parte Urgent Motion for Postponement since he is busy campaigning as a
candidate in the coming elections.13 There being no objection from
respondent, the RTC reset the hearing to May 28, 1998.14
On May 28, 1998, Atty. De Jesus and petitioners failed to appear in court.
The RTC reset the hearing on June 17, 1998 with a warning that if the
petitioners will still fail to appear on said date, they will be considered to have
waived their right to present further evidence.15
On June 17, 1998, Atty. De Jesus failed to appear in court but petitioners
were present. Milagros informed the RTC that Atty. De Jesus withdrew his
appearance as their counsel. In view thereof, the RTC directed petitioners to
secure the services of another counsel and the hearing was reset to June 24,
1998 with a warning that should petitioners still fail to present evidence at
said hearing, they will be considered to have waived their right to present
further evidence.16 On June 23, 1998, Atty. De Jesus filed his Withdrawal of
Appearance as Counsel for the Defendants with the conformity of Milagros. 17
On June 24, 1998, Milagros informed the RTC that they have retained Atty.
Alejo Y. Sedico18 as new counsel. The hearing was again reset to July 2,
1998 with the final warning that should petitioners’ witnesses fail to appear at
the said hearing, they would be considered to have waived their right to
present further evidence.19
On July 1, 1998, Atty. Sedico formally filed his Entry of Appearance with
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Reset, praying that the hearing scheduled on July
2, 1998 be reset to August 12, 1998 due to conflict of schedule and his trial
calendar for July is fully occupied, as well as to give him more time to study
the case since he had just been retained.20
On July 2, 1998, the RTC allowed, in the interest of justice, the resetting of
the hearing for presentation of petitioners’ evidence for the last time on July
15, 1998. The RTC directed petitioners to secure the services of a counsel of
their choice to represent them in the said hearing considering that it
postponed motu propio the hearing in the interest of justice over the vigorous
objection of the respondent due to failure of petitioners’ counsel to appear for
three successive times. It warned petitioners that in case they would be
unable to present evidence in the next scheduled hearing, they would be
deemed to have waived their right to present further evidence. 21
On July 9, 1998, Atty. Sedico filed an Urgent Motion to Reset the scheduled
hearing on July 15, 1998 due to a previously scheduled hearing on the same
date of Criminal Case Nos. 6463 to 6510 for Estafa entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Eddie Sentero" before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172,
Valenzuela. He reiterated that his trial calendar for the whole month of July is
fully occupied and requested the hearing be reset to August 10 or 19, 1998. 22
At the scheduled hearing on July 15, 1998, the RTC was apprised of the
Urgent Motion to Reset filed by petitioners’ counsel. In view of the vigorous
objection of respondent’s counsel on the ground that the case has been
postponed several times at petitioners’ instance, the RTC denied the motion
to reset and petitioners were deemed to have waived their right to present
evidence. The case was then considered submitted for decision. 23
Sixteen days later, on July 31, 1998, the RTC rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff having substantiated her claim by a
preponderance of evidence, this Court hereby renders judgment in her favor,
ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff within a period of ninety (90) days
from the entry of judgment hereof, the following sums of:
(1) P220,000.00, representing the principal obligation plus interest
thereof of 12% per annum from the filing of the complaint until fully
paid;
(2) P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
(3) The costs of suit.
It is further adjudged that in the event defendants default in the payment of
the above determined amounts, Lot No. 2763, with an area of 748 square
meters situated in San Nicolas, Victoria, Tarlac and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 13984 – Tarlac Registry, particularly identified and
described in the Real Estate Mortgage contract (Exhibit "A"), shall be sold at
public auction to satisfy this judgment.
SO ORDERED.24
The RTC held that Milagros executed a deed of real estate mortgage in favor
of Edgar and she received the consideration for the mortgage in the amount
of P220,000.00; that petitioners’ inaction for three years before the filing of
the complaint against them to protest the alleged non-receipt of the
consideration for the mortgage casts serious doubts on their claim; and that
the deed of real estate mortgage was duly notarized and assumed the
character of a public instrument.
On September 2, 1998, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
claiming that they were denied due process when the RTC decided the case
without petitioners’ evidence.25 On October 16, 1998, the RTC denied the
motion for reconsideration, holding that petitioners were given ample
opportunity to hire a counsel, prepare for trial and adduce evidence, which
they took for granted and they should bear the fault.26
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA. On May 23, 2001, the
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.27 The CA ruled that petitioners were not
denied due process since they were duly accorded all the opportunities to be
heard and present evidence to substantiate their defense but they forfeited
their right for not appearing in court together with their counsel at the
scheduled hearings; that since Milagros admitted the existence, due
execution, authenticity and validity of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
during the Pre-Trial Conference on June 7, 1995, absence of consideration is
no longer an issue; that, in any case, the amount of P220,000.00 was
actually received by Milagros per the testimony of Aurelia; that petitioners
slept on their rights, if they had any, since they never lifted a finger to protect
and preserve their alleged rights and interests; and that the mortgaged
property is not conjugal property but the exclusive property of Milagros which
she could validly dispose of or encumber without her husband’s consent.
The CA merely noted that the RTC failed to dispose of petitioners’ third-party
complaint and without any further discussion, dismissed the third-party
complaint in the dispositive portion of its decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto as
to the main case. The third-party complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.28
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following
Assignment of Errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE QUESTIONED REAL ESTATE
MORTAGE EVEN AS THERE WAS LACK OF CONSIDERATION
AND THAT THE SAME WAS EXECUTED THROUGH
FRAUDULENTLY [sic] SCHEME;
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE DUE EXECUTION OF THE REAL ESTATE
MORTGAGE WAS ADMITTED WHILE WHAT WAS ADMITTED
ONLY IS ITS EXECUTION;
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY IS
PARAPHERNAL EVEN AS EXISTING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
HAD CONSIDERED IT CONJUGAL OR ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY
OF PROPERTY;
4. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
RULED THAT DESPITE OF [sic] HAVING DENIED PETITIONER
TO BE REPRESENT [sic] BY A COUNSEL OF CHOICE DUE
PROCESS IS SATISFIED.29
Petitioners contend that the real estate mortgage was fraudulently executed
and there was lack of consideration but material facts relating thereto were
not fully ventilated because the RTC denied petitioners’ motion to reset the
hearing. They maintain that they never admitted the due execution of the real
estate mortgage, but only its execution or existence. They further insist that
the mortgaged property is conjugal, not paraphernal, and therefore, Milagros
could not dispose of or encumber without her husband’s consent; and the CA
disregarded Article 9930 of the Family Code which provides that all the
property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage
or acquired thereafter forms part of the community property. Lastly, they
submit that while they were given the opportunity to secure the services of a
new counsel to defend them, the RTC’s apathy to the plight of petitioners’
counsel on the latter’s conflict of schedule amounted to stripping such right to
counsel and denial of due process.
For her part, respondent contends that the petition should be dismissed
outright for impleading the CA as respondent, despite the clear directive of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure against it. She further points out that the
petition lacks verification, a certification against forum shopping, a copy of
the assailed CA decision, and it fails to raise any specific question of law but
only presents and discusses an "assignment of errors."
In any event, even if these procedural defects are disregarded, respondent
argues that petitioners were not denied due process when the RTC denied
their motion for postponement since they were duly accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present their evidence to substantiate their
defense but they forfeited this right for not appearing in court together with
their counsel at the scheduled hearings. They also aver that the real estate
mortgage is valid and duly executed and the mortgaged property is the
paraphernal property of Milagros such that she can validly dispose of or
encumber it without her husband’s consent.
Anent the procedural defects raised by respondent, the Court agrees that the
correct procedure, as mandated by Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, is not to implead the lower court which rendered the assailed
decision.31 However, impleading the lower court as respondent in the petition
for review on certiorari does not automatically mean the dismissal of the
appeal but merely authorizes the dismissal of the petition. 32 Besides, formal
defects in petitions are not uncommon. The Court has encountered previous
petitions for review on certiorari that erroneously impleaded the CA. In those
cases, the Court merely called the petitioners’ attention to the defects and
proceeded to resolve the case on their merits.33
The Court finds no reason why it should not afford the same liberal treatment
in this case. While unquestionably, the Court has the discretion to dismiss
the appeal for being defective, sound policy dictates that it is far better to
dispose of cases on the merits, rather than on technicality as the latter
approach may result in injustice.34 This is in accordance with Section 6, Rule
1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure35 which encourages a reading of the
procedural requirements in a manner that will help secure and not defeat
justice.36
As to respondent’s claim that the petition lacks verification, a certification
against forum shopping and a copy of the assailed CA decision, the Court
has carefully examined the rollo of the case and found them to be attached to
the petition.37
Anent respondent’s submission that the petition failed to raise a question of
law, the Court disagrees. For a question to be one of law, it must not involve
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them.38 Petitioners’ contention that they were denied
substantive due process is a pure question of law.39
As a rule, the grant or denial of a motion for postponement is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court, which should always be predicated on the
consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts or of the
parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness should be served
thereby. After all, postponements and continuances are part and parcel of
our procedural system of dispensing justice."40 When no substantial rights
are affected and the intention to delay is not manifest with the corresponding
motion to transfer the hearing having been filed accordingly, it is sound
judicial discretion to allow the same to the end that the merits of the case
may be fully ventilated.41 Thus, in considering motions for postponements,
two things must be borne in mind: (1) the reason for the postponement, and
(2) the merits of the case of the movant.42 Unless grave abuse of discretion is
shown, such discretion will not be interfered with either by mandamus or
appeal.43
In the present case, there are circumstances that justify postponement of the
July 15, 1998 hearing. Atty. Sedico had only been formally retained as
petitioners’ new counsel as of July 1, 1998, or merely two weeks before July
15, 1998. Atty. Sedico also had a previously intransferable hearing in a
criminal case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela
scheduled on the same date of July 15, 1998. The distance factor, from
Valenzuela to Tarlac, is enough consideration to call for postponement.
Moreover, Atty. Sedico twice informed the RTC that his entire calendar for
July is already full such that he requested specific dates in August for the
hearing.44 The motion to reset the hearing has not been shown to be
manifestly dilatory. Besides, except for the May 28, 1998 scheduled
hearing,45 petitioners have always been present in court. They cannot be
said to have lost interest in fighting the civil case to the end; only that Atty.
De Jesus withdrew his appearance as their counsel and petitioners had to
look for new counsel to take their case on short notice. Absolutely wanting
from the records is any evidence that the change of counsel was intended to
delay the proceedings. In fact, only 48 days have lapsed from the time Atty.
De Jesus failed to appear on May 28, 199846 to the time when Atty. Sedico’s
motion to reset was denied on July 15, 1998.47 Such intervening time cannot
be said to have greatly impaired the substantial rights of respondent. Thus,
absent unreasonable delay and manifest intent to employ dilatory tactic
prejudicial to the respondent and trifling court processes, Atty. Sedico’s
request for resetting should have been granted.
It cannot be disputed that the case has been pending since February 11
1991,48 or more than seven years until petitioners were able to start their
presentation of their evidence on March 11, 1998. 49
The Court is as aware as anyone of the need for the speedy disposition of
cases. However, it must be emphasized that speed alone is not the chief
objective of a trial. It is the careful and deliberate consideration for the
administration of justice, a genuine respect for the rights of all parties and the
requirements of procedural due process, and an adherence to this Court’s
standing admonition that the disposition of cases should always be
predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the
courts and of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness would
be served thereby. These are more important than a race to end the
trial.50 Indeed, court litigations are primarily for the search for truth, and a
liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest
opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth. 51
Ironically, the precipitate action of the RTC prolonged the litigation and
unnecessarily delayed the case, in the process, causing the very evil it
apparently sought to avoid. Instead of unclogging dockets, it has actually
increased the workload of the justice system as a whole. Such action does
not inspire public confidence in the administration of justice.
Moreover, it is noted that petitioners filed a third-party complaint which the
RTC simply disregarded. On the other hand, the CA, while stating in its
Decision that "[a]ll thus told, we find no reversible error in the judgment of the
trial court, except that it failed to dispose of the third-party complaint,"52 it
simply proceeded to dismiss the third-party complaint in the dispositive
portion of herein assailed decision, without giving any reason or justification
therefor.
As to the effect of petitioners’ admission of the due execution of the real
estate mortgage during the pre-trial conference, it must be noted that
in Benguet Exploration, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 53 this Court ruled that the
admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document simply
means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily
signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his
authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as
set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was
delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.
However, it does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of
fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel and
want of consideration. Petitioners therefore are not barred from presenting
evidence regarding their claim of want of consideration.

It bears stressing that the matter of absence of consideration and alleged

fraudulent scheme perpetuated by third-party defendants, being evidentiary,
should be threshed out in a proper trial. To deny petitioners their right to
present evidence constitutes a denial of due process, since there are issues
that cannot be decided without a trial of the case on the merits.

Ordinarily, when there is sufficient evidence before the Court to enable it to

resolve the fundamental issues, the Court will dispense with the regular
procedure of remanding the case to the lower court, in order to avoid further
delays in the resolution of the case.54 However, a remand in this case, while
time-consuming, is necessary, because the proceedings had in the RTC are
grossly inadequate to settle factual issues. Petitioners were unduly deprived
of the full opportunity to present evidence on the merits of their defense and
third-party complaint.

Considering the foregoing, the Court need not delve on the other issues
raised by petitioners. Suffice it to say that such matters are best decided by
the RTC only after full reception of petitioners’ evidence.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

dated May 23, 2001 of the Court of Appeals and the Decision dated July 31,
1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac City in Civil Case No.
7384, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the said
Regional Trial Court for reception of petitioners’ evidence and further
proceedings.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165987 March 31, 2006
JOSHUA S. ALFELOR and MARIA KATRINA S. ALFELOR, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSEFINA M. HALASAN, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify the Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74757, as well as the
Resolution2 dated June 28, 2004 denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof.
On January 30, 1998, the children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo
and Cecilia Alfelor filed a Complaint for Partition3 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Davao City. Among the plaintiffs were Teresita Sorongon and
her two children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, who claimed to be the surviving
spouse of Jose Alfelor, one of the children of the deceased Alfelor Spouses.
The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 26,047-98, was raffled to Branch 17 of
said court.
On October 20, 1998, respondent Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for
Intervention,4 alleging as follows:
1. That she has legal interest in the matter of litigation in the above-
entitled case for partition between plaintiffs and defendants;
2. That she is the surviving spouse and primary compulsory heir of
Jose K. Alfelor, one of the children and compulsory heirs of Telesforo
I. Alfelor whose intestate estate is subject to herein special
proceedings for partition;
3. That herein intervenor had not received even a single centavo
from the share of her late husband Jose K. Alfelor to the intestate
estate of Telesforo K. Alfelor.
WHEREFORE, movant prays that she be allowed to intervene in this case
and to submit attached Answer in Intervention.5
Josefina attached to said motion her Answer in Intervention, 6 claiming that
she was the surviving spouse of Jose. Thus, the alleged second marriage to
Teresita was void ab initio for having been contracted during the subsistence
of a previous marriage. Josefina further alleged that Joshua and Maria
Katrina were not her husband’s children. Josefina prayed, among others, for
the appointment of a special administrator to take charge of the estate.
Josefina attached to her pleading a copy of the marriage contract 7 which
indicated that she and Jose were married on February 1, 1956.
Since petitioners opposed the motion, the judge set the motion for hearing.
Josefina presented the marriage contract as well as the Reply-in-
Intervention8 filed by the heirs of the deceased, where Teresita declared that
she knew "of the previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor with that of the
herein intervenor" on February 1, 1956.9 However, Josefina did not appear in
court.
Teresita testified before the RTC on February 13, 2002. 10 She narrated that
she and the deceased were married in civil rites at Tagum City, Davao
Province on February 12, 1966, and that they were subsequently married in
religious rites at the Assumption Church on April 30, 1966. Among those
listed as secondary sponsors were Josefina’s own relatives–Atty. Margarito
Halasan, her brother, and Valentino Halasan, her father. 11 While she did not
know Josefina personally, she knew that her husband had been previously
married to Josefina and that the two did not live together as husband and
wife. She knew that Josefina left Jose in 1959. Jose’s relatives consented to
her (Teresita’s) marriage with Jose because there had been no news of
Josefina for almost ten years. In fact, a few months after the marriage,
Josefina disappeared, and Jose even looked for her in Cebu, Bohol, and
Manila. Despite his efforts, Jose failed to locate Josefina and her
whereabouts remained unknown.
Teresita further revealed that Jose told her that he did not have his marriage
to Josefina annulled because he believed in good faith that he had the right
to remarry, not having seen her for more than seven years. This opinion was
shared by Jose’s sister who was a judge. Teresita also declared that she met
Josefina in 2001, and that the latter narrated that she had been married three
times, was now happily married to an Englishman and residing in the United
States.
On September 13, 2002, Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an
Order12 denying the motion and dismissed her complaint, ruling that
respondent was not able to prove her claim. The trial court pointed out that
the intervenor failed to appear to testify in court to substantiate her claim.
Moreover, no witness was presented to identify the marriage contract as to
the existence of an original copy of the document or any public officer who
had custody thereof. According to the court, the determinative factor in this
case was the good faith of Teresita in contracting the second marriage with
the late Jose Alfelor, as she had no knowledge that Jose had been
previously married. Thus, the evidence of the intervenor did not satisfy the
quantum of proof required to allow the intervention. Citing Sarmiento v. Court
of Appeals,13 the RTC ruled that while Josefina submitted a machine copy of
the marriage contract, the lack of its identification and the accompanying
testimony on its execution and ceremonial manifestation or formalities
required by law could not be equated to proof of its validity and legality.
The trial court likewise declared that Teresita and her children, Joshua and
Maria Katrina, were the legal and legitimate heirs of the late Jose K. Alfelor,
considering that the latter referred to them as his children in his Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, among others. Moreover, the oppositor did not present
evidence to dispute the same. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of intervenor, Josephina (sic) Halasan
through counsel, not sufficient to prove a preponderance of evidence and
compliance with the basic rules of evidence to proved (sic) the competent
and relevant issues of the complaint-in-intervention, as legal heir of the
deceased Jose K. Alfelor, the complaint (sic) of intervention is ordered
dismiss (sic) with cost[s] de oficio.
On the other hand, finding the evidence by Teresita Sorongon Aleflor,
oppositor through counsel sufficient to proved (sic) the requirement of the
Rules of Evidence, in accordance with duly supporting and prevailing
jurisprudence, oppositor, Teresita Sorongon Alfelor and her children, Joshua
S. Alfelor and Maria Katrina S. Alfelor, are declared legal and legitimate Heirs
of the late Jose K. Alfelor, for all purposes, to entitled (sic) them, in the
intestate estate of the latter in accordance to (sic) law, of all properties in his
name and/or maybe entitled to any testate or intestate proceedings of his
predecessor-[in]-interest, and to receive such inheritance, they are legally
entitled, along with the other heirs, as the case maybe (sic).13
Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration,15 insisting that under Section 4,
Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court, an admission need not be proved.
She pointed out that Teresita admitted in her Reply in Intervention dated
February 22, 1999 that she (Teresita) knew of Jose’s previous marriage to
her. Teresita also admitted in her testimony that she knew of the previous
marriage.16 Since the existence of the first marriage was proven in
accordance with the basic rules of evidence, pursuant to paragraph 4, Article
80 of the New Civil Code, the second marriage was void from the beginning.
Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Article 83 of the Civil Code
provides that the person entitled to claim good faith is the "spouse present"
(thus, the deceased Jose and not Teresita). Josefina concluded that if the
validity of the second marriage were to be upheld, and at the same time
admit the existence of the second marriage, an absurd situation would arise:
the late Jose Alfelor would then be survived by two legitimate spouses.
The trial court denied the motion in its Order 17 dated October 30, 2002.
Aggrieved, Josefina filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the
CA, alleging that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring that she failed to prove the fact of
her marriage to Jose, in considering the bigamous marriage valid and
declaring the second wife as legal heir of the deceased. Josefina also
stressed that Articles 80 and 83 of the New Civil Code provide for a
presumption of law that any subsequent marriage is null and void. She
insisted that no evidence was presented to prove that she had been absent
for seven consecutive years before the second marriage.
In their comment, Teresita and her children countered that anyone who
claims to be the legal wife must show proof thereof. They pointed out that
Josefina failed to present any of the following to prove the fact of the
previous marriage: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple’s
public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedding;
the birth and the baptismal certificates of children during such union, and
other subsequent documents mentioning such union. Regarding Teresita’s
alleged admission of the first marriage in her Reply in Intervention dated
February 22, 1999, petitioners claim that it was mere hearsay, without
probative value, as she heard of the alleged prior marriage of decedent Jose
Alfelor to Josefina only from other persons, not based on her own personal
knowledge. They also pointed out that Josefina did not dispute the fact of
having left and abandoned Jose after their alleged marriage in 1956, and
only appeared for the first time in 1988 during the filing of the case for
partition of the latter’s share in his parents’ estate. They further pointed out
that Josefina does not even use the surname of the deceased Alfelor.
Contrary to the allegations of Josefina, paragraph 2, Article 83 of the Civil
Code, now Article 41 of the Family Code, is applicable. Moreover, her
inaction all this time brought to question her claim that she had not been
heard of for more than seven years.
In its Decision dated November 5, 2003, the CA reversed the ruling of the
trial court. It held that Teresita had already admitted (both verbally and in
writing) that Josefina had been married to the deceased, and under Section
4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, a judicial admission no longer
requires proof. Consequently, there was no need to prove and establish the
fact that Josefa was married to the decedent. Citing Santiago v. De los
Santos,18 the appellate court ruled that an admission made in a pleading
cannot be controverted by the party making such admission, and is
conclusive as to such party; and all contrary or inconsistent proofs submitted
by the party who made the admission should be ignored whether objection is
interposed by the other party or not. The CA concluded that the trial court
thus gravely abused its discretion in ordering the dismissal of Josefina’s
Complaint-in-Intervention. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed orders, having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Resultantly, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is
ordered to admit petitioner’s complaint in intervention and to forthwith
conduct the proper proceeding with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.19
Thus, Joshua and Maria Katrina Alfelor filed the instant petition, assailing the
ruling of the appellate court.
Petitioners limit the issue to the determination of whether or not the CA erred
in ordering the admission of private respondent’s intervention in S.P. Civil
Case No. 26,047-98. They insist that in setting aside the Orders of the trial
court, dated September 13, 2002 and October 30, 2002, the CA completely
disregarded the hearsay rule. They aver that while Section 4 of Rule 129 of
the Revised Rules of Evidence provides that an admission does not require
proof, such admission may be contradicted by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake. Moreover, Teresita’s statement in the Reply-in-
Intervention dated February 22, 1999, admitting knowledge of the alleged
first marriage, is without probative value for being hearsay.
Private respondent, for her part, reiterates that the matters involved in this
case fall under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, and
thus qualify as a judicial admission which does not require proof.
Consequently, the CA did not commit any palpable error when it ruled in her
favor.
Petitioners counter that while Teresita initially admitted knowledge of Jose’s
previous marriage to private respondent in the said Reply-in- Intervention,
Teresita also testified during the hearing, for the purpose, that the matter was
merely "told" to her by the latter, and thus should be considered hearsay.
They also point out that private respondent failed to appear and substantiate
her Complaint-in-Intervention before the RTC, and only submitted a machine
copy of a purported marriage contract with the deceased Jose Alfelor.
The issue in this case is whether or not the first wife of a decedent, a fact
admitted by the other party who claims to be the second wife, should be
allowed to intervene in an action for partition involving the share of the
deceased "husband" in the estate of his parents.
The petition is dismissed.
The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs, petitioners
herein, admitted the existence of the first marriage in their Reply- in-
Intervention filed in the RTC, to wit:
1.1. Plaintiff Teresita S. Alfelor admits knowledge of the previous marriage of
the late Jose K. Alfelor, with that of the herein intervenor were married on
February 1, 1956;20
Likewise, when called to testify, Teresita admitted several times that she
knew that her late husband had been previously married to another. To the
Court’s mind, this admission constitutes a "deliberate, clear and unequivocal"
statement; made as it was in the course of judicial proceedings, such
statement qualifies as a judicial admission.21 A party who judicially admits a
fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of
proof;22 production of evidence is dispensed with.23 A judicial admission also
removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy.24 Consequently, an
admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making
such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the
contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is
interposed by the party or not.25 The allegations, statements or admissions
contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot
subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was
pleaded.26
On the matter of the propriety of allowing her motion for intervention, the
pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court is Section 1, Rule 19, which
provides:
SEC. 1. Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof
may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal
interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties;
(3) or an interest against the parties; (4) or when he is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in the custody of
the court or an officer thereof.27 Intervention is "a proceeding in a suit or
action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a
party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or
uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding
something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third Complaint-in-Intervention and forthwith conduct the proper proceedings with
person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by dispatch.
leave of court, of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings,
by which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some SO ORDERED.
right of interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings." 28

Considering this admission of Teresita, petitioners’ mother, the Court rules

that respondent Josefina Halasan sufficiently established her right to
intervene in the partition case. She has shown that she has legal interest in
the matter in litigation. As the Court ruled in Nordic Asia Ltd. v. Court of
Appeals:29

x x x [T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between

other parties must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal
operation and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties to the
action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily
complicated, expensive and interminable. And this would be against the
policy of the law. The words "an interest in the subject" means a direct
interest in the cause of action as pleaded, one that would put the intervenor
in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint without the
establishment of which plaintiff could not recover.30

In Uy v. Court of Appeals,31 the Court allowed petitioners (who claimed to be

the surviving legal spouse and the legitimate child of the decedent) to
intervene in the intestate proceedings even after the parties had already
submitted a compromise agreement involving the properties of the decedent,
upon which the intestate court had issued a writ of execution. In setting aside
the compromise agreement, the Court held that petitioners were
indispensable parties and that "in the interest of adjudicating the whole
controversy, petitioners’ inclusion in the action for partition, given the
circumstances, not only is preferable but rightly essential in the proper
disposition of the case."32

Contrary to petitioners’ argument, the case of Sarmiento v. Court of

Appeals33 is not in point, as the Court therein did not discuss the propriety of
allowing a motion for intervention, but resolved the validity of a marriage. In
relying on the merits of the complaint for partition, the Court ultimately
determined the legitimacy of one of the petitioners therein and her
entitlement to a share in the subject properties.

CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. SP No. 74757 is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 17,
Davao City, is ORDERED to admit respondent Josefina Halasan’s
G.R. No. 190321 April 25, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SAMMY UMIPANG y ABDUL, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the 21 May 2009 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA)1 affirming the 24 July 2007 Joint Decision of the Pasig City
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Cases No. 14935-D-TG and No.
14936-D-TG.2 The RTC Decision convicted Sammy Umipang y Abdul
(Umipang) for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 (R.A. 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.
Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the CA, are quoted as follows:
Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that a person named Sam was
selling drugs along Cagayan de Oro Street in Maharlika Village, Taguig City,
a buy-bust team from the [Station Anti-Illegal Drugs – Special Operation Task
Force (SAID-SOTF)] of the Taguig City Police was dispatched on April 1,
2006 at around 6:00 in the evening. [Police Officer (PO) 2] Gasid was
assigned to act as poseur buyer and he was given a ₱ 500.00 marked
money. The operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA).
Upon arrival at the area, PO2 Gasid and the confidential informant sauntered
the length of the street while the other members of the team strategically
positioned themselves. The confidential informant saw the man called Sam
standing near a store. The confidential informant and PO2 Gasid then
approached Sam. Straight off, the confidential informant said "Sam, pa-iskor
kami." Sam replied "Magkano ang iiskorin nyo?" The confidential informant
said "Five hundred pesos." Sam took out three (3) plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance with various price tags–500, 300, and 100. After
making a choice, PO2 Gasid handed the marked ₱ 500.00 to Sam who
received the same.
Upon receipt by Sam of the marked money, PO2 Gasid took off his cap as
the pre-arranged signal that the sale had been consummated. Sensing
danger, Sam attempted to flee but PO2 Gasid immediately grabbed and
arrested Sam. In a few seconds, the rest of the buy-bust team [comprised of
their team leader, Police Senior Inspector (PS/INSP.) Obong, Senior Police
Officer (SPO) 1 Mendiola, PO3 Hajan, PO3 Maglana, PO3 Salem, and PO1
Ragos] joined them. PO1 Ragos handcuffed Sam. Five (5) more plastic
sachets containing the same white crystalline substance were recovered
from Sam. PO2 Gasid marked the items with the initials "SAU" [which stood
for Sammy A. Umipang, the complete name, including the middle initial, of
accused-appellant]. Sam was forthwith brought to the police station where he
was booked, investigated and identified as accused-appellant Sammy
Umipang y Abdul. PO2 Gasid then brought the confiscated items to the crime
laboratory for testing. The specimens all tested positive for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as "shabu," a
dangerous drug.
On the other hand, the defense presented accused-appellant himself and his
brother Nash Rudin Umipang. According to them:
In the evening of April 1, 2006, while they were sleeping, accused-appellant
and his family were awakened by loud knocking on the door. The persons
outside shouted "Mga pulis kami. Buksan mo ang pinto kung hindi gigibain
namin ito." Accused-appellant obliged and opened the door. Five (5)
policemen barged into his house and pointed a gun at him. Against his will
and amid the screams of his wife, accused-appellant was brought to a
waiting vehicle and brought to the police headquarters. At the Taguig Police
station, PO2 Gasid tried to extort from him ₱ 100,000.00 for his release. He
denied the charges and that the alleged evidence were all "planted" by the
police.3
Consequently, the following charges were brought against Umipang:
That on or about the 1st day of April 2006, in the City of Taguig, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without having been authorized by law, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly sell deliver and give away to poseur buyer PO2
Ruchyl Gasid, one heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.05
gram of white crystalline substance, which substance was found positive to
the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride also known as "shabu" a
dangerous drug, in consideration of the amount of ₱ 500.00, in violation of
the above-cited law.
That on or about the 1st day of April 2006, in the City of Taguig, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without having been authorized by law, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly possess and have in his custody and control five
(5) heat sealed transparent plastic sachets, each containing 0.05 gram, 0.05
gram, 0.05 gram, 0.04 gram and 0.04 gram with a total weight of 0.23 gram
of white crystalline substance, which substances were found positive to the
tests for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride also known as "shabu" a
dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
RTC Ruling
In its 24 July 2007 Joint Decision, the Pasig City RTC found accused-
appellant guilty of violating Section 5 (Sale, Trading, Administration,
Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals) and Section 11
(Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II of R.A. 9165. The RTC gave
more weight to the testimonies of the arresting officers on how they
conducted the buy-bust operation than to accused-appellant’s claim of frame-
up by the police. Thus, for violating Section 5 (Criminal Case No. 14935-D-
TG), Umipang was sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
₱ 500,000. For violating Section 11 (Criminal Case No. 14936-D-TG), he was
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day as minimum to fourteen (14) years one (1) day as
maximum and to pay a fine of ₱ 300,000.
CA Ruling
In its 21 May 2009 Decision, the CA affirmed in toto the 24 July 2007 Joint
Decision of the RTC. According to the appellate court, the elements
necessary for the prosecution of the illegal possession and sale of dangerous
drugs were present and established. Thus, it no longer disturbed the RTC’s
assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Furthermore, the
CA found that there was no showing of improper motive on the part of the
police officers. With the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties, it ruled against the denials of accused-appellant, and his
defense of frame-up.
We have consistently declared that a review of the factual findings of the
lower courts is not a function that is normally undertaken in appeals before
this Court. However, after a careful scrutiny of the CA Decision, we find it
proper to reevaluate the factual issues surrounding the present case,
especially since it is not clear from the Decision whether the proper
implementation of the strict procedural safeguards laid down in R.A. 9165
was established.
Issue
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the testimonial
evidence of the prosecution witnesses were sufficient to convict accused-
appellant of the alleged sale and possession of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, which are violations under Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of
R.A. 9165.
Discussion
Accused-appellant argues4 that since there were two versions presented
during trial – one, that of the prosecution; and the other, that of the accused –
the latter version must be adopted, because the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties should not take precedence over the
presumption of innocence of the accused. He also contends that a
surveillance of just 30 minutes was insufficient to establish that Umipang was
engaged in the sale of illegal drugs. Lastly, accused-appellant claims that the
fact of possession of the confiscated plastic sachets was not clearly
established, and that the evidence allegedly confiscated from him was
merely planted.5 Alluding to the testimony of PO1 Ragos, he points out that
the former did not see him holding the drugs, and that the sachet was shown
only to PO1 Ragos by PO2 Gasid.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the
affirmation of the RTC Joint Decision in all respects, as it was decided in
accord with law and evidence.6 The OSG argues7 that the necessary
elements to convict a person under Sections 5 and 11 were proven beyond
reasonable doubt. It then contends that, absent independent proof and
substantiated evidence to the contrary, accused-appellant’s bare-faced
denial should be deemed merely as a self-serving statement that does not
hold merit. Finally, the OSG asserts that, where there is no evidence of
improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to testify falsely
against accused-appellant, the testimony must be given full faith and
credence.
Substantive law requires strict observance of the procedural safeguards
outlined in R.A. 9165
At the outset, we take note that the present case stemmed from a buy-bust
operation conducted by the SAID-SOTF. We thus recall our pronouncement
in People v. Garcia:
A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this kind of
operation has been proven to be an effective way to flush out illegal
transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy, a buy-bust
operation has a significant downside that has not escaped the attention of
the framers of the law. It is susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of
which is its use as a tool for extortion. In People v. Tan, this Court itself
recognized that "by the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for
entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease
with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets
of or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably
shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great. Thus, courts have
been exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent
person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses."
Accordingly, specific procedures relating to the seizure and custody of drugs
have been laid down in the law (R.A. No. 9165) for the police to strictly
follow. The prosecution must adduce evidence that these procedures have
been followed in proving the elements of the defined offense. 8 (Emphasis
supplied and citations omitted.)
Section 21 of R.A. 9165 delineates the mandatory procedural
safeguards9 that are applicable in cases of buy-bust operations:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the
same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a
qualitative and quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results,
which shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory
examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the
receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled
precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of
testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report
shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of
dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic
laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be
issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the
same within the next twenty-four (24) hours;
(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within
seventy-two (72) hours, conduct an ocular inspection of the
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment, and through the PDEA shall within twenty-four (24) hours
thereafter proceed with the destruction or burning of the same, in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the DOJ, civil society groups and
any elected public official. The Board shall draw up the guidelines on
the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s
which shall be borne by the offender: Provided, That those item/s of
lawful commerce, as determined by the Board, shall be donated,
used or recycled for legitimate purposes: Provided, further, That a
representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained;
(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of
destruction or burning of the subject item/s which, together with the
representative sample/s in the custody of the PDEA, shall be
submitted to the court having jurisdiction over the case. In all
instances, the representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum
quantity as determined by the Board;
(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be
allowed to personally observe all of the above proceedings and
his/her presence shall not constitute an admission of guilt. In case
the said offender or accused refuses or fails to appoint a
representative after due notice in writing to the accused or his/her
counsel within seventy-two (72) hours before the actual burning or
destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice shall
appoint a member of the public attorney's office to represent the
former; x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Congress introduced another complementing safeguard through Section 86
of R.A. 9165, which requires the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
Philippine National Police (PNP), and Bureau of Customs (BOC) to maintain
close coordination with PDEA in matters of illegal drug-related operations:
Section 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on
Illegal Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory Provisions. – x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of the
NBI and the PNP on all other crimes as provided for in their respective
organic laws: Provided, however, That when the investigation being
conducted by the NBI, PNP or any ad hoc anti-drug task force is found to be
a violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the PDEA shall be the lead
agency. The NBI, PNP or any of the task force shall immediately transfer the
same to the PDEA: Provided, further, That the NBI, PNP and the Bureau of
Customs shall maintain close coordination with the PDEA on all drug related
matters. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the 2002 Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165 (IRR) set
the following procedure for maintaining close coordination:
SECTION 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on
Illegal Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory Provisions. — x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
(a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and Other Agencies — The
PDEA shall be the lead agency in the enforcement of the Act, while the PNP,
the NBI and other law enforcement agencies shall continue to conduct anti-
drug operations in support of the PDEA: Provided, that the said agencies
shall, as far as practicable, coordinate with the PDEA prior to anti-drug
operations; Provided, further, that, in any case, said agencies shall inform the
PDEA of their anti-drug operations within twenty-four (24) hours from the
time of the actual custody of the suspects or seizure of said drugs and
substances, as well as paraphernalia and transport equipment used in illegal
activities involving such drugs and/or substances, and shall regularly update
the PDEA on the status of the cases involving the said anti-drug
operations; Provided, furthermore, that raids, seizures, and other anti-drug
operations conducted by the PNP, the NBI, and other law enforcement
agencies prior to the approval of this IRR shall be valid and
authorized; Provided, finally, that nothing in this IRR shall deprive the PNP,
the NBI, other law enforcement personnel and the personnel of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from effecting lawful arrests and seizures in
consonance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Given the nature of buy-bust operations and the resulting preventive
procedural safeguards crafted in R.A. 9165, courts must tread carefully
before giving full credit to the testimonies of those who conducted the
operations. Although we have ruled in the past that mere procedural lapses
in the conduct of a buy-bust operation are not ipso facto fatal to the
prosecution’s cause, so long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items have been preserved,10 courts must still thoroughly evaluate
and differentiate those errors that constitute a simple procedural lapse from
those that amount to a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the
safeguards drawn by the law. Consequently, Section 21(a) of the IRR
provides for a saving clause in the procedures outlined under Section 21(1)
of R.A. 9165, which serves as a guide in ascertaining those procedural
aspects that may be relaxed under justifiable grounds, viz:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — x x
x:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further,
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; (Emphasis
supplied.)
We have reiterated that "this saving clause applies only where the
prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the
cited justifiable grounds" after which, "the prosecution must show that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized have been
preserved."11 To repeat, noncompliance with the required procedure will not
necessarily result in the acquittal of the accused if: (1) the noncompliance is
on justifiable grounds; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. 12
Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of the
official duties of law enforcers,13 we stress that the step-by-step procedure
outlined under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be
simply brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. The provisions
were crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address potential police
abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life
imprisonment. In People v. Coreche,14 we explained thus:
The concern with narrowing the window of opportunity for tampering with
evidence found legislative expression in Section 21 (1) of RA 9165 on the
inventory of seized dangerous drugs and paraphernalia by putting in place a
three-tiered requirement on the time, witnesses, and proof of inventory by
imposing on the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs the duty to "immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof".
(Emphasis supplied.)
Consequently, in a line of cases,15 we have lain emphasis on the importance
of complying with the prescribed procedure. Stringent compliance is justified
under the rule that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the
government and liberally in favor of the accused.16 Otherwise, "the procedure
set out in the law will be mere lip service."17
Material irregularities in the conduct of the buy-bust operations
In the recent case of People v. Relato, we reiterated the following:
In a prosecution of the sale and possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride prohibited under Republic Act No. 9165, the State not only
carries the heavy burden of proving the elements of the offense of, but also
bears the obligation to prove the corpus delicti, failing in which the State will
not discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. It is settled that the State does not establish the corpus
delicti when the prohibited substance subject of the prosecution is missing or
when substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the prohibited substance
raise grave doubts about the authenticity of the prohibited substance
presented as evidence in court. Any gap renders the case for the State less
than complete in terms of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, Relato deserves exculpation, especially as we recall that his
defense of frame-up became plausible in the face of the weakness of the
Prosecution’s evidence of guilt.18 (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.)
The conduct of the buy-bust operations was peppered with defects, which
raises doubts on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items from accused-appellant.
First, there were material inconsistencies in the marking of the seized items.
According to his testimony, PO2 Gasid used the initials of the complete
name, including the middle initial, of accused-appellant in order to mark the
confiscated sachets. The marking was done immediately after Umipang was
handcuffed. However, a careful perusal of the testimony of PO2 Gasid would
reveal that his prior knowledge of the complete initials of accused-appellant,
standing for the latter’s full name, was not clearly established. Thus, doubt
arises as to when the plastic sachets were actually marked, as shown by
PO2 Gasid’s testimony:
A [PO2 Gasid]: We conducted a buy-bust operation on April 1, 2006.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Against whom did you conduct this buy-bust operation?
A: Against alias Sam, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What prompted you to conduct this operation against
this alias Sam?
A: We received information from our confidential informant that one alias
Sam is selling shabu at Cagayan De Oro Street, Maharlika Village, Taguig.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Aside from this information that you received from your
informant, was there anything more that your informant told you about the
real identity of this alias Sam?
A: Nothing more, sir, he gave us only his alias, sir.19
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. SANTOS: So, after you have taken the item and paid alias Sam
and then you executed the pre-arranged signal that you have already
purchased from him, what happened then?
A: After I made the pre-arranged signal, mabilis po yung mata ni alias Sam,
para ho bang balisa, siguro napansin nya na hindi lang kami dalawa (2),
aakma syang tatakbo, sinunggaban ko na po sya.
PROSEC. SANTOS: So, you held Sam already during that time?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened after that?
A: I introduced myself as police officer and at that time I arrested him.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What about your companions who serves [sic] as your
immediate back up, what happened to them when you were already hold and
arrested [sic] this alias Sam?
A: I noticed my companions approaching us.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. SANTOS: And what did your colleague Ragos do when he arrived
at your place?
A: When he arrived at the place, after arresting alias Sam, he was the one
who handcuffed him.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Was there anything more that was done in that place of
occurrence during that time, Officer?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Tell us please?
A: After arresting alias Sam, I frisk [sic] him for the remaining items he
showed me and the buy-bust money I gave him.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. SANTOS: Was there anything that you and your team did in the
items that you confiscated from the possession of the accused during that
time and the shabu that you bought from him?
A: I marked the items I confiscated at the place of incident.
PROSEC. SANTOS: How did you marked [sic] the item that you bought from
this alias Sam?
A: SAU, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: And what does that stand for? That SAU?
A: Stands for the initials of alias Sam.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Is that the only thing that you placed on the plastic
sachet containing the shabu that you bought from this alias Sam during that
time?
A: I marked the shabu I bought as SAU-1.
PROSEC. SANTOS: How about the other five (5) plastic sachets containing
the suspected shabu, what happened to that?
A: I marked them as SAU-2, SAU-3, SAU-4, SAU-5 and SAU-6.20
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, after you have marked and inventoried the items
that you bought and confiscated from this alias Sam during that time, what
else happened?
A: After the inventory of the evidences, I turn [sic] them over to the
investigator.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Where did you turn these items to your investigator?
A: At the office, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Who was your investigator during that time?
A: PO1 Alexander Saez, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: When you turn these items to your investigator, where
were you?
A: At the office, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened to these items that you turn it over [sic]
to your investigator?
A: He made a request for laboratory examination of the items confiscated.21
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, Officer, this Sam when you have already arrested ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And also your other members, they did not know the
him, were you able to know his real name? accused?

A: Yes, sir. A: Yes, sir.23 (Emphasis supplied.)

PROSEC. SANTOS: What was his real name? A clearer picture of what transpired during the buy-bust operation, from the
marking of the confiscated items to the arrest of accused-appellant, is
A: Sammy Umipang, sir. provided by the testimony of PO1 Ragos:

PROSEC. SANTOS: Is he present here in Court? PROSEC. SANTOS: And what is the effect to you of the act of Gasid taking
off his cap?
A: Yes, sir.22
A: That is the sign that he already bought the shabu.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. SANTOS: When you saw Gasid acting that way, being the back
up of him during that time, what did you do?
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: When you arrived at the place, by the way, where was
your target area, Mr. Witness?
A: I run [sic] towards them.
A: Cagayan De Oro Street, Barangay Maharlika, Taguig City.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Were you able to go near him when you run [sic]
towards him?
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: When you were there, you did not buy [sic] anybody to
buy shabu from the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
A: No, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened?
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: So, you did not conduct any test buy?
A: I saw him holding Sam.
A: No, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: When you saw Gasid already holding Sam, what did
you do?
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Nor did you make any inquiry with Cagayan De Oro
Street regarding the accused?
A: I handcuffed Sam.
A: Not anymore, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: After that, what happened?
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: At that moment, you don’t have any idea regarding the
identity of the accused and also whether he was engaged in illegal activity? A: The items confiscated by Gasid were marked with his initials.

A: Regarding the identity, he was described by the informant. PROSEC. SANTOS: Did you see Gasid marking those things that he took
from this Sam during that time?
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: It was only the informant who knows the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. SANTOS: What marked [sic] did he put on these plastic sachets? A: We prepared an affidavit of arrest.24

A: SAU, sir. xxx xxx xxx

PROSEC. SANTOS: Do you know what SAU connotes? ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And this information regarding the accused was
relayed to you by your immediate superior?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Tell us?
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And this information was the first information regarding
A: Sammy Abdul Umipang. the accused, is that correct?

PROSEC. SANTOS: After that, what happened? A: Yes, sir.

A: He was apprising [sic] of his constitutional rights. ATTY. HERNANDEZ: What was told you was that your target person was
alias Sam?
PROSEC. SANTOS: After this person was apprised of his rights, was there
anything more that was done? A: Yes, sir.

A: We went back to the office. ATTY. HERNANDEZ: No photographs of alias Sam was shown to you?

PROSEC. SANTOS: All the members of the team went back to the office? A: None, sir.

A: Yes, sir. ATTY. HERNANDEZ: You have no derogatory records of this alias Sam in
your office?
PROSEC. SANTOS: And together with this alias Sam?
A: None, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: You have no warrant of arrest?
PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened in your office?
A: None, sir.
A: We turn [sic] over the evidence to the investigator.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: This alias Sam was not included in your watch list?
PROSEC. SANTOS: Who was your investigator during that time?
A: No, sir.25
A: PO1 Saez.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: So, the markings were placed on the plastic sachets?
PROSEC. SANTOS: So, after the team has turn [sic] over the evidences to
your investigator in the person of Officer Saez, was there anything more that A: Yes, sir.
transpired in relation to this event, this incident?
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: After that Mr. Witness, you brought the accused PROSEC. SANTOS: No re-direct, Your Honor. x x x26 (Emphasis supplied.)
together with the items to your office?
The circumstances surrounding the marking of the seized items are suspect.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Already answered, Your Honor. We are just repeating From their testimonies during the trial, PO2 Gasid and PO1 Ragos both
the same pattern, Your Honor. admitted that they only knew their target by the name "Sam." They both
testified that, after accused-appellant was handcuffed, frisked, and read his
xxx xxx xxx rights, they immediately brought him to the police precinct. They then said
that it was a certain PO1 Saez who investigated him. In fact, in their joint
affidavit, PO2 Gasid and PO1 Ragos stated thus:
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Mr. Witness, you investigated the accused?

Na dinala namin siya [accused] sa aming opisina para sa pagsisiyasat at

A: No more, it was PO1 Saez who investigated the accused.
pagtatanong tungkol sa detalye ng kaniyang pagkatao at sa layuning
masampahan ng kaukulang reklamo sa paglabag ng Section 5 and 11 of RA
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: So, you did not ask the full name of the accused? 9165.27 (Emphasis supplied.)

A: It was PO1 Saez who investigated him, sir. Evidence on record does not establish that PO2 Gasid had prior knowledge
of the complete name of accused-appellant, including the middle initial, which
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: It was PO1 Saez who got his full name and on you enabled the former to mark the seized items with the latter’s complete initials.
[sic] part, that was the first time that you were able to learned [sic] the full This suspicious, material inconsistency in the marking of the items raises
name of the accused? questions as to how PO2 Gasid came to know about the initials of Umipang
prior to the latter’s statements at the police precinct, thereby creating a cloud
A: Yes, sir. of doubt on the issues of where the marking really took place and whether
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. All
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Because you knew him only as alias Sam? that was established was that it was PO1 Saez who asked accused-appellant
about the latter’s personal circumstances, including his true identity, and that
the questioning happened when accused-appellant was already at the police
A: Yes, sir.
station. We thus reiterate:
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: How about Officer Gasid, it was also the first time that
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other
he learned the full name of the accused?
related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking
after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the
A: Maybe not, sir. seized contraband[s] are immediately marked because succeeding handlers
of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Mr. Witness, you mentioned that it was Officer Saez evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all
who delivered the items to the crime lab? other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the
accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings,
A: No sir, it was Gasid. obviating switching, "planting", or contamination of evidence.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: But you were not with him when he delivered the Long before Congress passed RA 9165, this Court has consistently held that
specimen to the crime laboratory? failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs raises
reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti and suffices to
A: Yes, sir. rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, the
doctrinal fallback of every drug-related prosecution. Thus, in People v. Laxa
and People v. Casimiro, we held that the failure to mark the drugs
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: No further question, Your Honor. immediately after they were seized from the accused casts doubt on the
prosecution evidence, warranting acquittal on reasonable doubt. These
rulings are refinements of our holdings in People v. Mapa and People v.
Dismuke that doubts on the authenticity of the drug specimen occasioned by
the prosecution’s failure to prove that the evidence submitted for chemical
analysis is the same as the one seized from the accused suffice to warrant
acquittal on reasonable doubt.28 (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.)
It is true that the failure of the arresting officers to mark the seized items at
the place of arrest does not by itself impair the integrity of the chain of
custody and render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. 29 We
have already clarified that the marking upon "immediate" confiscation of the
prohibited items contemplates even that which was done at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending team. 30 We will analyze this
possible seed of doubt that has been planted by the unexplained marking of
the shabu with the complete initials of Umipang, together with the other
alleged irregularities.
Second, the SAID-SOTF failed to show genuine and sufficient effort to seek
the third-party representatives enumerated under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165.
Under the law, the inventory and photographing of seized items must be
conducted in the presence of a representative from the media, from the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and from any elected public official. The
testimony of PO2 Gasid, as quoted below, is enlightening:
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Mr. Witness, you also made the certificate of inventory,
is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And since this is a drug operation, you are required by
law to make a certificate of inventory?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And that inventory, you are required by law that there
should be a signature of any representative from the media, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And also representative from the Department of
Justice, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And also elected official, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: I’m showing to you Mr. Witness your certificate of
inventory, do you confirm that there are no signatures placed by any member
of the media, representative from the Department of Justice and any elected
official?
A: Yes, sir, there is none, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And there appears to be an initial of RS above the type
written name Sammy Umipang, who wrote this initial RS?
A: That stands for refuse [sic] to sign, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Who refuse [sic] to sign?
A: Sammy Umipang, sir.31
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. SANTOS: Why was the certificate of inventory not witnesses [sic]
and signed by any members of the media, the DOJ and elected officials,
Officer?
A: That time there is no available representative, sir.
COURT: How did you exert effort to locate available representative of those
officers or persons in the certificate of inventory?
A: The investigator contacted representative from the media, Your Honor.
COURT: What barangay this incident happened?
A: Barangay Maharlika, Your Honor.
COURT: Did you talk to the barangay captain?
A: No, Your Honor.
COURT: What about the barangay councilman?
A: No, Your Honor.32 (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, the absence of these representatives during the physical inventory
and the marking of the seized items does not per se render the confiscated
items inadmissible in evidence. However, we take note that, in this case, the
SAID-SOTF did not even attempt to contact the barangay chairperson or any
member of the barangay council. There is no indication that they contacted
other elected public officials. Neither do the records show whether the police
officers tried to get in touch with any DOJ representative. Nor does the SAID-
SOTF adduce any justifiable reason for failing to do so – especially
considering that it had sufficient time from the moment it received information
about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest.
Thus, we find that there was no genuine and sufficient effort on the part of
the apprehending police officers to look for the said representatives pursuant
to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. A sheer statement that representatives were
unavailable – without so much as an explanation on whether serious
attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the
circumstances – is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse. We stress that it is the
prosecution who has the positive duty to establish that earnest efforts were
employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under Section 21(1)
of R.A. 9165,33 or that there was a justifiable ground for failing to do so. 34
Third, the SAID-SOTF failed to duly accomplish the Certificate of Inventory
and to take photos of the seized items pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A.
9165. As pointed out by the defense during trial,35 the Certificate of Inventory
did not contain any signature, including that of PO2 Gasid – the arresting
officer who prepared the certificate36 – thus making the certificate defective.
Also, the prosecution neither submitted any photograph of the seized items
nor offered any reason for failing to do so. We reiterate that these
requirements are specifically outlined in and required to be implemented by
Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165.37
Minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. 9165 would not
automatically exonerate an accused from the crimes of which he or she was
convicted.38 This is especially true when the lapses in procedure were
"recognized and explained in terms of [] justifiable grounds." 39 There must
also be a showing "that the police officers intended to comply with the
procedure but were thwarted by some justifiable
consideration/reason."40 However, when there is gross disregard of the
procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious
uncertainty is generated about the identity of the seized items that the
prosecution presented in evidence.41 This uncertainty cannot be remedied by
simply invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties, for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural
safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of official
duties.42 As a result, the prosecution is deemed to have failed to fully
establish the elements of the crimes charged, creating reasonable doubt on
the criminal liability of the accused.43 1âwphi1
For the arresting officers’ failure to adduce justifiable grounds, we are led to
conclude from the totality of the procedural lapses committed in this case that
the arresting officers deliberately disregarded the legal safeguards under
R.A. 9165. These lapses effectively produced serious doubts on the integrity
and identity of the corpus delicti, especially in the face of allegations of
frame-up. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we must resolve the doubt in
favor of accused-appellant, "as every fact necessary to constitute the crime
must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt." 44
As a final note, we reiterate our past rulings calling upon the authorities "to
exert greater efforts in combating the drug menace using the safeguards that
our lawmakers have deemed necessary for the greater benefit of our
society."45 The need to employ a more stringent approach to scrutinizing the
evidence of the prosecution – especially when the pieces of evidence were
derived from a buy-bust operation – "redounds to the benefit of the criminal
justice system by protecting civil liberties and at the same time instilling
rigorous discipline on prosecutors."46
WHEREFORE, the appealed 21 May 2009 CA Decision affirming the 24 July
2007 RTC Joint Decision is SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Sammy
Umipang y Abdul is hereby ACQUITTED of the charges in Criminal Cases
No. 14935-D-TG and No. 14936-D-TG on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby ORDERED to
immediately RELEASE accused-appellant from custody, unless he is
detained for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
DNA
G.R. No. 144656 May 9, 2002
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GERRICO VALLEJO Y SAMARTINO @ PUKE, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88,
Cavite City, sentencing Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino to death and ordering
him to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for the rape-slaying of a 9-year
old child, Daisy Diolola, in Rosario, Cavite on July 10, 1999.
The Information charging accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo with the crime of
Rape with Homicide alleged:
"That on or about the 10th day of July 1999, in Barangay Ligtong I,
Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Trial Court, the above-named accused,
with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with DAISY DIOLOLA Y DITALO, a nine-year old child against the
latter's will and while raping the said victim, said accused strangled
her to death."
"CONTRARY TO LAW."2
Accused-appellant was arraigned on July 26, 1999 and, with the assistance
of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, whereupon trial ensued.
Ten (10) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola,
the victim's mother; Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, medico-legal officer of the NBI;
Atty. Lupo Leyva; Mayor Renato Abutan of Rosario, Cavite; Atty. Sikat
Agbunag of the Public Attorney's Office; Pet Byron Buan, NBI Forensic
Biologist; Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, NBI Forensic Chemist; SPO1 Arnel Cuevas
of the Rosario, Cavite police station; and Jessiemin Mataverde and Charito
Paras-Yepes, both neighbors of the victim.
The victim's mother, Ma. Nida Diolola, testified that at around 1:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of July 10, 1999, she sent her 9-year old daughter Daisy
Diolola to their neighbor's house in Pilapil, Ligtong I, Rosario, Cavite, so that
Aimee Vallejo, the sister of accused-appellant, could help Daisy with her
lessons. Aimee's house, where accused-appellant was also staying, is about
four to five meters away from Daisy's house. Ma. Nida saw her daughter go
to the house of her tutor. She was wearing pink short pants and a white
sleeveless shirt. An hour later, Daisy came back with accused-appellant.
They were looking for a book which accused-appellant could copy to make a
drawing or a poster that Daisy would submit to her teacher. After finding the
book, Daisy and accused-appellant went back to the latter's house. When
Ma. Nida woke up at about 5:30 o'clock after an afternoon nap, she noticed
that Daisy was not yet home. She started looking for her daughter and
proceeded to the house of Aimee, Daisy's tutor. Aimee's mother told Ma.
Nida that Daisy was not there and that Aimee was not able to help Daisy with
her lessons because Aimee was not feeling well as she had her menstrual
period. Ma. Nida looked for Daisy in her brother's and sister's houses, but
she was not there, either. At about 7:00 o'clock that evening, Ma. Nida went
back to her neighbor's house, and there saw accused-appellant, who told her
that Daisy had gone to her classmate's house to borrow a book. But, when
Ma. Nida went there, she was told that Daisy had not been there. Ma. Nida
went to the dike and was told that they saw Daisy playing at about 3:30
o'clock in the afternoon. Jessiemin Mataverde also told Ma. Nida that Daisy
was playing in front of her house that afternoon and even watched television
in her house, but that Daisy later left with accused-appellant.
Ma. Nida and her brother and sister searched for Daisy the whole evening of
June 10, 1999, a Saturday, until the early morning of the following day, June
11, 1999, a Sunday, but their search proved fruitless. Then, at about 10:00
o'clock in the morning of June 11, 1999, she was informed that the dead
body of her daughter was found tied to the root of an aroma tree by the river
after the "compuerta" by a certain Freddie Quinto. The body was already in
the barangay hall when Ma. Nida saw her daughter. Daisy was wearing her
pink short pants with her sleeveless shirt tied around her neck. Barangay
Councilmen Raul Ricasa and Calring Purihin reported the incident to the
Rosario police. The other barangay officers fetched accused-appellant from
his house and took him to the barangay hall. At the barangay hall, Ma. Nida
pointed to accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo as the probable suspect since
he was with the victim when she was last seen alive.3
Another witness, Jessiemin Mataverde, testified that at around 3:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of that day, she saw Daisy playing with other children outside
her house. She asked Daisy and her playmates to stop playing as their noise
was keeping Jessiemin's one-year old baby awake. Daisy relented and
watched television instead from the door of Jessiemin's house. About five
minutes later, accused-appellant came to the house and told Daisy
something, as a result of which she went with him and the two proceeded
towards the "compuerta."
Jessiemin testified that at around 5:00 o'clock that afternoon, while she and
her daughter were in front of a store across the street from her house,
accused-appellant arrived to buy a stick of Marlboro cigarette. Accused-
appellant had only his basketball shorts on and was just holding his shirt.
They noticed both his shorts and his shirt were wet. After lighting his
cigarette, accused-appellant left.4
Charito Yepes, another neighbor of Ma. Nida, also testified. She said that at
about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, while she and her
husband and children were walking towards the "compuerta" near the
seashore of Ligtong, Rosario, Cavite, they met a fisherman named Herminio
who said that it was a good day for catching milkfish (bangus). For this
reason, according to this witness, they decided to get some fishing
implements. She said they met accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo near the
seashore and noticed that he was uneasy and looked troubled. Charito said
that accused-appellant did not even greet them, which was unusual. She
also testified that accused-appellant's shorts and shirt (sando) were wet, but
his face and hair were not.5
SPO1 Arnel Cuevas testified that upon receipt of the report, Rosario Police
Chief Ricardo B. de la Cruz, Jr. responded to the call together with his men,
PO2 Garcia, SPO1 Araracap and PO2 Lariza. When they arrived, Daisy's
body was already in the barangay hall. SPO1 Cuevas took photographs of
the body. At that time, Daisy was wearing pink short pants and a dirty white
panty with a dirty white sleeveless shirt wrapped around her neck. The body
was afterwards taken to the Samson Funeral Parlor in Rosario, Cavite. The
inquiries conducted by the police showed that one Freddie Quinto was
fishing near the compuerta when he accidentally hit the body of Daisy, which
was in the mud and tied to the root of an aroma tree.
Accused-appellant was invited by the policemen for questioning. Two others,
a certain Raymond and Esting, were also taken into custody because they
were seen with accused-appellant in front of the store in the late afternoon of
July 10 1999. Later, however, the two were released. Based on the
statements of Jessiemin Mataverde and Charito Paras-Yepes, the policemen
went to the house of accused-appellant at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon
of July 11, 1999 and recovered the white basketball shirt, with the name
Samartino and No. 13 printed at the back, and the violet basketball shorts,
with the number 9 printed on it, worn by accused-appellant the day before.
The shirt and shorts, which were bloodstained, were turned over to the NBI
for laboratory examination.6
Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, testified that at about 9:00
o'clock in the evening of July 11, 1999, he conducted a physical examination
of accused-appellant. His findings7 showed the following:
"PHYSICAL FINDINGS:
"Abrasions: thigh, right, antero-lateral aspect, lower 3rd 5.0 x 0.1
cm., knee, left, 7.0 x 6.0 cm. legs, right anterior aspect, 28.0 x 8.0
cms., left anterior aspect, 24.0 x 10.0 cms., feet, plantar aspects;
right, 9.0 x 3.0 cms. and left, 13.0 x 5.0 cms.
"Hematoma, left ring finger, posterior aspect, 1.0 x 0.5 cm.
"Lacerations, left ring finger, posterior aspect, 0.3 cm.
"(Living Case No. BMP-9902, p. 101, records)"
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Dr. Vertido went to the Samson
Funeral Parlor in Rosario, Cavite for an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim
Daisy Diolola. The autopsy revealed the following postmortem findings:8
"Body in early stage of postmortem decomposition characterized by
foul odor, eyes and tongue protruding, bloating of the face and blister
formation.
"Washerwoman's hands and feet.
"Contusion, (pinkish) face, right, 14.0 x 10.0 cms. and left, 13.0 x 6.0
cms. Contused abrasions, forehead, 13.0 x 5.0 cms. upper lip, 5.0 x
22.0 cms., lower lip, 3.0 x 2.0 cms., neck (nailmarks) anterior aspect,
8.0 x 5.0 cms., arms, right antero-medial aspect, middle 3rd 3.0 x
15.0 cms. posterior aspect, upper 3rd, 1.5 x 1.0 cms., left posterior
aspect, 20.0 x 9.0 cms., forearm, left, posterior aspect, 21.0 x 8.0
cms. left thumb, anterior aspect, 1.5 x 1.0 cms., left middle, ring and
little fingers, dorsal aspect, .50 x 4.0 cms. knees, right, 3.0 x 2.0 cms.
and left, 8.0- x 5.0 cms., legs, right anterior aspect, upper and middle
3rd 3.0 x 2.5 cms. foot right, dorsal aspect.
"Hematoma, periorbital right, 5.0 x 3.0 cms. and left, 4.5 x
3.0 cms.
"Fracture, tracheal rings.
"Hemorrhages, interstitial, neck, underneath, nailmarks.
"Petechial hemorrhages, subendocardial, subpleural.
"Brain and other visceral organs are congested.
"Stomach, contains ½ rice and other food particles.
"CAUSE OF DEATH: -Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation.
 "GENITAL EXAMINATION: - Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora
and minora, gaping and congested. Hymen, moderately tall, thick
with fresh lacerations, complete at 3:00, 6:00 and 9:00 o'clock
positions, edges with blood clots." [Autopsy Report No. BTNO-99-
152]
Renato Abutan, Municipal Mayor of Rosario, Cavite, testified that he was
informed of the rape and murder at past 10:00 o'clock in the evening of June
11, 1999. The mayor said he immediately proceeded to the municipal jail,
where accused-appellant was detained, and talked to the latter. Accused-
appellant at first denied having anything to do with the killing and rape of the
child. The mayor said he told accused-appellant that he could not help him if
he did not tell the truth. At that point, accused-appellant started crying and
told the mayor that he killed the victim by strangling her. Accused-appellant
claimed that he was under the influence of drugs. The mayor asked accused-
appellant if he wanted to have the services of Atty. Lupo Leyva, a resident of
Rosario, as his lawyer. When accused-appellant said he did, Mayor Abutan
fetched Atty. Leyva from his house and took him to the police station about
11:00 o'clock that evening.9
Atty. Lupo Leyva corroborated Mayor Abutan's testimony. He said that upon
arriving at the police station, he asked accused-appellant if he wanted his
services as counsel in the investigation. After accused-appellant assented,
Atty. Leyva testified that he "sort of discouraged" the former from making
statements as anything he said could be used against him. But, as accused-
appellant was willing to be investigated, Atty. Leyva said he advised him to
tell the truth. PO2 Garcia, the investigator, informed accused-appellant of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel and
warned him that any answer he gave could and might be used against him in
a court of law. PO2 Garcia asked questions from accused-appellant, who
gave his answers in the presence of Atty. Leyva. After the statement was
taken, Atty. Leyva and accused-appellant read it and afterwards signed it.
Atty. Leyva testified that he did not see or notice any indication that accused-
appellant had been maltreated by the police. In his sworn statement (Exh.
M), accused-appellant confessed to killing the victim by strangling her to
death, but denied having molested her.10
Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, testified that on July 12, 1999,
he took blood samples from accused-appellant in his office for laboratory
examination to determine his blood type. Likewise, the basketball shorts and
shirt worn by accused-appellant on the day the victim was missing and the
victim's clothing were turned over to the Forensic Chemistry Division of the
NBI by PO1 Amoranto of the Rosario, Cavite police for the purpose of
determining the presence of human blood and its groups. 11
The results of the examinations conducted by Pet Byron T. Buan showed
accused-appellant to belong to Group "O". The following specimens: (1) one
(1) white no. 13 athletic basketball shirt, with patches "Grizzlies" in front and
"SAMARTINO" at the back; (2) one (1) violet no. 9 athletic basketball short
pants; (3) one (1) white small "Hello Kitty" T-shirt with reddish brown stains;
(4) one (1) "cut" pink short pants with reddish brown stains; (5) one (1) "cut"
dirty white small panty with reddish brown stains, were all positive for the
presence of human blood showing the reactions of Group "A". 12
Pet Byron Buan also testified that before he took the blood samples, he had
a conversation with accused-appellant during which the latter admitted that
he had raped and later killed the victim by strangulation and stated that he
was willing to accept the punishment that would be meted out on him
because of the grievous offense he had committed. Mr. Buan observed that
accused-appellant was remorseful and was crying when he made the
confession in the presence of SPO1 Amoranto at the NBI laboratory. 13
When accused-appellant was brought before Inquest Prosecutor Elpidia J.
Itoc at around noon of July 13, 1999 in Cavite City, accused-appellant had
with him a handwritten confession which he had executed inside his cell at
the Municipal Jail of Rosario. In his confession, accused-appellant admitted
not only that he killed the victim but that he had before that raped her.
Accused-appellant said he laid down the victim on a grassy area near the
dike. He claimed that she did not resist when he removed her undergarments
but that when he tried to insert his penis into the victim's vagina, she
struggled and resisted. Accused-appellant said he panicked and killed the
child. He then dumped her body in the shallow river near the "compuerta"
and went home.14
Atty. Sikat Agbunag, a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office, testified that
at noon of July 13, 1999, while she was in their office in Cavite City,
Prosecutor Itoc came together with accused-appellant and some policemen.
Prosecutor Itoc asked Atty. Agbunag to assist accused-appellant about his
confession. Atty. Agbunag read the document, informed accused-appellant of
his constitutional rights, and warned him that the document could be used
against him and that he could be convicted of the case against him, but,
according to her, accused-appellant said that he had freely and voluntarily
executed the document because he was bothered by his conscience.
Accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Agbunag, then affixed his signature to
the document and swore to it before Prosecutor Itoc. 15
At the instance of City Prosecutor Agapito S. Lu of Cavite City, NBI Forensic
Biologist Pet Byron Buan took buccal swabs and hair samples from accused-
appellant, as well as buccal swabs and hair samples from the parents of the
victim, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola and Arnulfo Diolola. The samples were
submitted to the DNA Laboratory of the NBI for examination.
Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, conducted DNA tests on
the specimens collected by Dr. Vertido. She testified that the vaginal swabs
of the victim taken by Dr. Vertido during the autopsy contained the DNA
profiles of accused-appellant and the victim.16
The defense then presented as witnesses accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo
and his sister Aimee Vallejo. Their testimonies show that at about 1:00
o'clock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, accused-appellant, Aimee, and their
sister Abigail were in their house in Barangay Talisay, Ligtong I, Rosario,
Cavite when Daisy Diolola came to ask accused-appellant to draw her school
project. After making the request, Daisy left.17 Accused-appellant did not
immediately make the drawing because he was watching television.
Accused-appellant said that he finished the drawing at about 3:00 o'clock in
the afternoon and gave it to the victim's aunt, Glory. He then returned home
to watch television again. He claimed he did not go out of the house until
7:00 o'clock in the evening when he saw Ma. Nida, who was looking for her
daughter. Accused-appellant said he told her that he had not seen Daisy.
After that, accused-appellant said he went to the "pilapil" and talked with
some friends, and, at about 8:00 o'clock that evening, he went home.
At 9:00 o'clock in the morning of July 11, 1999, barangay officials fetched
accused-appellant from his house and took him to the barangay hall, where
he was asked about the disappearance of Daisy. He claimed that he did not
know anything about it. Accused-appellant was allowed to go home, but, at
11:00 o'clock that morning, policemen came and invited him to the police
headquarters for questioning. His mother went with him to the police station.
There, accused-appellant was asked whether he had something to do with
the rape and killing of Daisy. He denied knowledge of the crime.
At 4:00 o'clock that afternoon, accused-appellant accompanied the police to
his house to get the basketball shorts and shirt he was wearing the day
before, which were placed together with other dirty clothes at the back of
their house. According to accused-appellant, the police forced him to admit
that he had raped and killed Daisy and that he admitted having committed
the crime to stop them from beating him up. Accused-appellant claimed the
police even burned his penis with a lighted cigarette and pricked it with a
needle.
Accused-appellant confirmed that Mayor Renato Abutan and Atty. Lupo
Leyva went to see him in the investigation room of the police station and told
him that they would help him if he told the truth. Atty. Leyva asked him
whether he wanted him to be his counsel, and accused-appellant said he
answered in the affirmative. He said Atty. Leyva informed him of his
constitutional rights. Accused-appellant claimed that, although he admitted to
Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva the commission of the crime, this was
because the police had maltreated him. Accused-appellant said he did not
tell the mayor or Atty. Leyva that he had been tortured because the
policemen were around and he was afraid of them. It appears that the family
of accused-appellant transferred their residence to Laguna on July 12, 1999
because of fear of reprisal by residents of their barangay.18 According to
accused-appellant, Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva were not present when he
gave his confession to the police and signed the same. Accused-appellant
claims that although Exhibit "N" was in his own handwriting, he merely copied
the contents thereof from a pattern given to him by the police. 19
On July 31, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-
appellant guilty of the offense charged. The dispositive portion of its decision
reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Court
finds the accused Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide, as charged in
the Information, accordingly hereby sentences him to the supreme
penalty of DEATH. The accused is directed to indemnify the heirs of
the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
"SO ORDERED."20
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that:
"I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE
INSUFFICIENCY AND WEAKNESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION.
"II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT TO THE ALLEGED ORAL CONFESSIONS
OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE ITS BEING HEARSAY
IN NATURE.
"III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE WRITTEN EXTRA-JUDICIAL
CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE SAME WAS OBTAINED THROUGH FORCE AND
INTIMIDATION AND THAT THE LAWYER WHO ASSISTED HIM
DURING HIS CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DID NOT AND COULD
NOT POSSIBLY GIVE HIM EFFECTIVE LEGAL ASSISTANCE."
We find accused-appellant's contentions to be without merit.
First. An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available,
provided sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime. 21 In
rape with homicide, the evidence against an accused is more often than not
circumstantial. This is because the nature of the crime, where only the victim
and the rapist would have been present at the time of its commission, makes
the prosecution of the offense particularly difficult since the victim could no
longer testify against the perpetrator. Resort to circumstantial evidence is
inevitable and to demand direct evidence proving the modality of the offense
and the identity of the perpetrator is unreasonable. 22
Under Rule 133, section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if:
"(a) there is more than one circumstance;
"(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
"(c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce
conviction beyond reasonable doubt."23
In the case at bar, the following circumstantial evidence establish beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant:
1. The victim went to Aimee Vallejo's house, where accused-
appellant was residing, at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 10,
1999, for tutoring.
2. At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant and
Daisy went together to the latter's house to get a book from which
the former could copy Daisy's school project. After getting the book,
they proceeded to accused-appellant's residence.
3. From accused-appellant's house, Daisy then went to the house of
Jessiemin Mataverde where she watched television. Accused-
appellant thereafter arrived and whispered something to Daisy, and
the latter went with him towards the "compuerta."
4. At about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the spouses Iluminado and
Charito Yepes saw accused-appellant coming out of the
"compuerta," with his clothes, basketball shorts, and t-shirt wet,
although his face and hair were not. According to these witnesses,
he looked pale, uneasy, and troubled (balisa). He kept looking
around and did not even greet them as was his custom to do so.
5. The fishing boat which accused-appellant used as a bomber (a
boat for catching fish with dynamite) was docked by the seashore.
6. A little before 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Jessiemin Mataverde
also saw accused-appellant buying a Marlboro cigarette from a store.
Jessiemen also noticed that accused-appellant's clothes were wet
but not his face nor his hair.
7. By 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, as Ma. Nida Diolola looked for
her daughter, she was told by accused-appellant that Daisy had
gone to her classmate Rosario's house. The information proved to be
false.
8. Daisy's body was found tied to an aroma tree at the part of the
river near the "compuerta."
9. During the initial investigation, accused-appellant had scratches
on his feet similar to those caused by the thorns of an aroma tree.
10. The clothes which accused-appellant wore the day before were
bloodstained. The bloodstains on accused-appellant's clothes and on
Daisy's clothes were found positive of human blood type "A."
11. Accused-appellant has blood type "O."
12. The vaginal swabs from Daisy's body contained her DNA profile
as well as that of accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant contends that the bloodstains found on his garments were
not proven to have been that of the victim as the victim's blood type was not
determined.
The contention has no merit. The examination conducted by Forensic
Biologist Pet Byron Buan of both accused-appellant's and the victim's
clothing yielded bloodstains of the same blood type "A". 24 Even if there was
no direct determination as to what blood type the victim had, it can
reasonably be inferred that the victim was blood type "A" since she sustained
contused abrasions all over her body which would necessarily produce the
bloodstains on her clothing.25 That it was the victim's blood which
predominantly registered in the examination was explained by Mr. Buan,
thus:26
"ATTY. ESPIRITU
 Q: But you will agree with me that more probably than not, if a
crime is being committed, and it results in a bloody death, it is very
possible that the blood of the victim and the blood of the assailant
might mix in that particular item like the t-shirt, shorts or pants?
A: It is possible when there is a huge amount of blood coming
from the victim and the suspect, Sir. It is possible. It will mix.
Whichever is the dominant blood in it, it will be the one which will
register. For example, if there is more blood coming from the victim,
that blood will be the one to register, on occasions when the two
blood mix.
Q: But in these specimens number 1 to 5, it is very clear now
that only type A and no type O blood was found?
A: Yes, sir."
Accused-appellant also questions the validity of the method by which his
bloodstained clothes were recovered. According to accused-appellant, the
policemen questioned him as to the clothes he wore the day before.
Thereafter, they took him to his house and accused-appellant accompanied
them to the back of the house where dirty clothes were kept. 27 There is no
showing, however, that accused-appellant was coerced or forced into
producing the garments. Indeed, that the accused-appellant voluntarily
brought out the clothes sought by the police becomes more convincing when
considered together with his confessions. A consented warrantless search is
an exception to the proscription in Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution.
As we have held, the consent of the owner of the house to the search
effectively removes any badge of illegality.28
The DNA analysis conducted by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Viloria-Magsipoc
is also questioned by accused-appellant. He argues that the prosecution
failed to show that all the samples submitted for DNA testing were not
contaminated, considering that these specimens were already soaked in
smirchy waters before they were submitted to the laboratory.
DNA is an organic substance found in a person's cells which contains his or
her genetic code. Except for identical twins, each person's DNA profile is
distinct and unique.29
When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime
or from the victim's body for the suspect's DNA. This is the evidence sample.
The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from
the suspect and the victim.30
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists
between the evidence sample and the reference sample. 31 The samples
collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their
profile.32 The test may yield three possible results:
1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from
different sources (exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and
requires no further analysis or discussion;
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test,
whether the samples have similar DNA types (inconclusive). This
might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation,
contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various
parts of the analysis might then be repeated with the same or a
different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same
source (inclusion).33 In such a case, the samples are found to be
similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical significance
of the Similarity.34
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should
consider, among others things, the following data: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and
the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of
accused-appellant, the smears taken from the victim as well as the strands of
hair and nails taken from her tested negative for the presence of human
DNA,35 because, as Ms. Viloria-Magsipoc explained:
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: I noticed that specimens 1 to 5 consisting of bloodstains
taken from the clothing of the victim and of the accused gave
negative results for the presence of human DNA. Why is it so? What
is the reason for this when there are still bloodstains on the clothing?
A: After this Honorable Court issued an Order for DNA analysis,
serological methods were already conducted on the said specimens.
And upon inquiry from Mr. Buan and as far as he also knew of this
case, and we also interviewed the mother who came over to the
laboratory one time on how was the state of the specimens when
 they were found out. We found that these specimens were soaked in
smirchy water before they were submitted to the laboratory. The
state of the specimens prior to the DNA analysis could have
hampered the preservation of any DNA that could have been there
before. So when serological methods were done on these
specimens, Mr. Byron could have taken such portion or stains that
were only amenable for serological method and were not enough for
DNA analysis already. So negative results were found on the
clothings that were submitted which were specimens no. 1 to 5 in my
report, Sir.
Q: I also noticed that specimen no. 6-B consisting of the smears
taken from the victim also proved negative for human DNA, why is it
so?
A: Because when we received the vaginal smears submitted by
Dr. Vertido, the smear on the slide was very, very dry and could have
chipped off. I already informed Dr. Vertido about it and he confirmed
the state of the specimen. And I told him that maybe it would be the
swab that could help us in this case, Sir. And so upon examination,
the smears geared negative results and the swabs gave positive
results, Sir.
Q: How about specimen no. 7, the hair and nails taken from the
victim, why did they show negative results for DNA?
A: The hair samples were cut hair. This means that the hair did
not contain any root. So any hair that is above the skin or the
epidermis of one's skin would give negative results as the hair shaft
is negative for DNA. And then the nails did not contain any
subcutaneous cells that would be amenable for DNA analysis also,
Sir.
Q: So it's the inadequacy of the specimens that were the reason
for this negative result, not the inadequacy of the examination or the
instruments used?
A: Yes, Sir."
Thus, it is the inadequacy of the specimens submitted for examination, and
not the possibility that the samples had been contaminated, which accounted
for the negative results of their examination. But the vaginal swabs taken
from the victim yielded positive for the presence of human DNA. Upon
analysis by the experts, they showed the DNA profile of accused-appellant:36
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: So based on your findings, can we say conclusively that the
DNA profile of the accused in this case was found in the vaginal
swabs taken from the victim?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: That is very definite and conclusive?
A: Yes, Sir."
In conclusion, we hold that the totality of the evidence points to no other
conclusion than that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged.
Evidence is weighed not counted. When facts or circumstances which are
proved are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also
inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in its weight and probative
force, may surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the court. 37 This is how
it is in this case.
Second. Accused-appellant challenges the validity of the oral and written
confessions presented as evidence against him. He alleges that the oral
confessions were inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay, while the
extrajudicial confessions were obtained through force and intimidation.
The claim is untenable. Section 12 of Art. III of the Constitution provides in
pertinent parts:
"(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence against him."
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this Q: But it will appear in this recital of constitutional rights that you
constitutional provision: (1) coerced confessions, the product of third degree did not inform the accused that the statement that he will be giving
methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, and intimidation, which are might be used against him in a court of justice?
dealt with in paragraph 2 of Section 12, and (2) uncounselled statements,
given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of A: I did that, Sir.
paragraph 1 of the same section.38
Q: But it does not appear in this statement?
Accused-appellant argues that the oral confessions given to Mayor Abutan of
Rosario, Cavite and to NBI Forensic Biologist should be deemed PROSECUTOR LU
inadmissible for being violative of his constitutional rights as these were
made by one already under custodial investigation to persons in authority
without the presence of counsel. With respect to the oral confessions, Atty. The best evidence will be the statement, your Honor.
Leyva testified:39
ATTY ESPIRITU
"PROSECUTOR LU:
The only thing that is stated here is that "Maaaring gamitin
Q: Upon meeting this Gerrico Vallejo at the police station were pabor o laban sa iyo."
you able to confer with him?
COURT
A: Yes, Sir.
Let the witness answer.
Q: Did you ask him whether he really wants you to represent or
assist him as a lawyer during that investigation? A: I told him that, as a matter of fact, and I also told him to tell
the truth and nothing but the truth."
A: I did, as a matter of fact, I asked him whether he would like
me to represent him in that investigation, Sir. The testimony of Atty. Leyva is not only corroborated by the testimony of
Mayor Renato Abutan,41 it is also confirmed by accused-appellant who
Q: And what was his answer? testified as follows:42

A: He said "yes". "ATTY. ESPIRITU:

Q: After agreeing to retain you as his counsel, what else did you Q: Did Atty. Leyva explain to you the meaning and significance
talk about? of that document which you are supposed to have executed and
signed?
A: I told him that in the investigation, whatever he will state may
be used against him, so it's a sort of discouraging him from making A: Yes, Sir.
any statement to the police, Sir."
Q: What did Atty. Leyva tell you?
40
Upon cross-examination, Atty. Leyva testified as follows:
A: That they are allowing me to exercise my constitutional right
Q: You stated that you personally read this recital of the to reveal or narrate all what I know about this case, Sir.
constitutional rights of the accused?
Q: Did Atty. Leyva tell you that if you do not want, nobody can
A: Yes, Sir. force you to give that statement?
 A: Yes, Sir. A: At first he said that he did not do that. That was the first thing
he told me. Then I told him that I will not be able to help him if he will
Q: And did he tell you that what you would be giving is an extra- not tell me the truth.
judicial confession?
Q: And what was the reply of the accused?
A: Yes, Sir."
A: He had been silent for a minute. Then we talked about the
Clearly, accused-appellant cannot now claim that he was not apprised of the incident, Sir.
consequences of the statements he was to make as well as the written
confessions he was to execute. Neither can he question the qualifications of Q: And what exactly did he tell you about the incident?
Atty. Lupo Leyva who acted as his counsel during the investigation. To be an
effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being A: I asked him, "Were you under the influence of drugs at that
propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an time"?
accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was
adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead Q: What else did he tell you?
the accused to admit something false. Indeed, counsel should not prevent an
accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 43
A: I told him, "What reason pushed you to do that thing?" x x x
Indeed, accused-appellant admitted that he was first asked whether he
wanted the services of Atty. Leyva before the latter acted as his defense Q: Please tell us in tagalog, the exact words that the accused
counsel.44 And counsel who is provided by the investigators is deemed used in telling you what happened.
engaged by the accused where the latter never raised any objection against
the former's appointment during the course of the investigation but, on the A: He told me that he saw the child as if she was headless at
contrary, thereafter subscribed to the veracity of his statement before the that time. That is why he strangled the child, Sir. ("Ang sabi niya po
swearing officer.45 Contrary to the assertions of accused-appellant, Atty. sa 'kin, nakita niya raw 'yung bata na parang walang ulo na
Leyva was not the municipal attorney of Rosario, Cavite but only a legal naglalakad. Kaya po sinakal niya.")
adviser of Mayor Renato Abutan.46
xxx xxx xxx
Accused-appellant contends that the rulings in People vs.
Andan47 and People vs. Mantung48 do not apply to this case. We disagree. COURT:
The facts of these cases and that of the case at bar are similar. In all these
cases, the accused made extrajudicial confessions to the municipal mayor Q: When you told the accused that you will help him, what kind
freely and voluntarily. In all of them, the extrajudicial confessions were held of help were you thinking at that time?
admissible in evidence, being the spontaneous, free, and voluntary
admissions of the guilt of the accused. We note further that the testimony of
A: I told him that if he will tell the truth, I could help give him
Mayor Abutan was never objected to by the defense.
legal counsel.
Indeed, the mayor's questions to accused-appellant were not in the nature of
Q: And what was the answer of the accused?
an interrogation, but rather an act of benevolence by a leader seeking to help
one of his constituents. Thus, Mayor Abutan testified:49
A: Yes, he will tell me the truth, Your Honor."
"PROSECUTOR LU:
In People vs. Mantung,50 this Court said:
Q: And during the conversation you had with Accused Gerrico
Vallejo, what exactly did he tell you?
 "Never was it raised during the trial that Mantung's admission during Q: What did you talk about during your conversation?
the press conference was coerced or made under duress. As the
records show, accused-appellant voluntarily made the statements in A: I asked him if he was the one who did the killing on this
response to Mayor Marquez' question as to whether he killed the victim, Daisy Diolola, Sir.
pawnshop employees. Mantung answered in the affirmative and
even proceeded to explain that he killed the victims because they Q: And what was the reply of the accused?
made him eat pork. These circumstances hardly indicate that
Mantung felt compelled to own up to the crime. Besides, he could
have chosen to remain silent or to do deny altogether any A: He said yes, Sir.
participation in the robbery and killings but he did not; thus accused-
appellant sealed his own fate. As held in People v. Montiero, a Q: What else did you ask the accused?
confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by
the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would A: I remember that while asking him, he was crying as if feeling
deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by remorse on the killing, Sir.
truth and his conscience."
....
And in People vs. Andan, it was explained:
Q: And it was you who initiated the conversation?
"Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on
custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not A: Yes, Sir.
elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed
Q: Do you usually do that?
the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as A: Yes, Sir. We usually do that.
would lead the accused to admit something false, not prevent him
from freely and voluntarily telling the truth."51 Q: Is that part of your procedure?

For the same reason, the oral confession made by accused-appellant to NBI
Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan is admissible. Accused-appellant would
have this Court exclude this confession on the ground that it was
uncounselled and that Mr. Buan, who initiated the conversation with
accused-appellant, was part of the NBI. The issue concerning the sufficiency
of the assistance given by Atty. Leyva has already been discussed. On the
other hand, the questions put by Mr. Buan to accused-appellant were asked
out of mere personal curiosity and clearly not as part of his tasks. As Buan
testified:52
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: What was the subject of your conversation with him?
A: It is customary when we examine the accused. During the
examination, we talk to them for me to add knowledge on the case,
Sir.
A: It is not SOP. But for me alone, I want to know more about
the case, Sir. And any information either on the victim or from the
suspect will help me personally. It's not an SOP, Sir."
The confession, thus, can be likened to one freely and voluntarily given to an
ordinary individual and is, therefore, admissible as evidence.
Third. The admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellant
is also attacked on the ground that these were extracted from him by means
of torture, beatings, and threats to his life. The bare assertions of
maltreatment by the police authorities in extracting confessions from the
accused are not sufficient. The standing rule is that "where the defendants
did not present evidence of compulsion, or duress nor violence on their
person; where they failed to complain to the officer who administered their
oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action
against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to
be no marks of violence on their bodies; and where they did not have
themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim," all Q: Between 10:30 in the morning up to 11:00 o'clock in the
these will be considered as indicating voluntariness.53 Indeed, extrajudicial evening, what did you do there?
confessions are presumed to be voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive
evidence showing that the declarant's consent in executing the same has A: They were interrogating and forcing me to admit something,
been vitiated, the confession will be sustained.54 Sir.

Accused-appellant's claim that he was tortured and subjected to beatings by Q: In what way did they force you to admit something?
policemen in order to extract the said confession from him is unsupported by
any proof:55 A: They were mauling me, Sir.

"ATTY. ESPIRITU: Q: The 5 of them?

Q: Did they further interrogate you? A: Yes, Sir.

A: Yes, sir. Q: The 5 of them remained inside that room with you throughout
the questioning?
Q: What else did they ask you?
A: Yes, Sir.
A: They were asking me the project, Sir.
Q: In what way did they hurt you?
Q: What else?
A: They burned my private part with a lighted cigarette butt and
A: That is the only thing, Sir. pierced me with a needle, Sir.

Q: Who was doing the questioning? Q: Who did these things to you?

A: The investigator, Sir. A: Mercado, Sir.

Q: How many were they inside that room? Q: Who is this Mercado?

A: Five, Sir. A: EPZA policemen, Sir.

Q: They are all policemen? Q: Did the other policemen help in doing these things to you?

A: Yes, Sir. A: No, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx Q: Were you asked to undress or you were forced to do that?

Q: Until what time did they keep you inside that room? A: They forced me to remove my clothes, Sir.

A: Up to 11:00 in the evening, Sir. Q: In what way did they force you to remove your clothes?
 A: They were asking me to take off the pants which I was xxx xxx xxx
wearing at the time, Sir.
Q: In your findings, it appears that the accused in this case
Q: Did they do anything to you to force you to remove your suffered certain physical injuries on his person like this abrasion on
pants? the thigh, right anterior lateral aspect lower third of the knee, what
could have caused this injury?
A: Yes, Sir.
A: Abrasions are usually caused when the skin comes in
Q: What? contact with a rough surface, Sir. Hematoma are usually caused by a
blunt instrument or object and laceration is the forcible contact of the
skin from that blunt object.
A: They boxed me, Sir.

Q: What else, if any? Q: I am particularly interested in your findings hematoma on the

left ring finger, posterior aspect and laceration left ring finger
posterior aspect, what could have caused those injuries on the
A: They hit me with a piece of wood, Sir. accused?

Q: What did you feel when your private part was burned with a A: My opinion to these hematoma and laceration found on the
cigarette butt? said left ring finger was that it was caused by a bite, Sir."

A: It was painful, Sir. If the account of accused-appellant that he was beaten up is true, Dr. Antonio
Vertido would have found more than mere abrasions and hematoma on his
Q: In what part of your body were you pricked by a needle? left finger. Dr. Vertido's findings are more consistent with the theory that
accused-appellant sustained physical injuries as a result of the struggle
A: At my private part, Sir." made by the victim during the commission of the rape in the "compuerta."

These bare assertions cannot be given weight. Accused-appellant testified
that he was made to stay in the municipal hall from 10:00 o'clock in the
morning until 11:00 o'clock that night of July 10, 1999, during which time he
was boxed, tortured, and hit with a piece of wood by policemen to make him
admit to the crime. However, accused-appellant was physically examined by
Dr. Antonio Vertido at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day.
While the results show that accused-appellant did sustain injuries, the same
are incompatible with his claim of torture. As Dr. Vertido testified: 56
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: What were your findings when you conducted the physical
examination of the suspect?
A: I found abrasions, your Honor, abrasions on the thigh, knees,
legs and feet of the suspect, and I also found hematoma on the left
ring finger, posterior aspect and at the same time, a laceration on the
left ring finger.
At all events, even if accused-appellant was truthful and his assailed
confessions are inadmissible, the circumstantial evidence, as already shown,
is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. The
prosecution witnesses presented a mosaic of circumstances showing
accused-appellant's guilt. Their testimonies rule out the possibility that the
crime was the handiwork of some other evil mind. These witnesses have not
been shown to have been motivated by ill will against accused-appellant.
On the other hand, no other witness not related to accused-appellant was
ever called to corroborate his claim. The defense presented only accused-
appellant's sister, Aimee Vallejo, to corroborate his story. We have held time
and again that alibi cannot prosper if it is established mainly by the accused
and his relatives, and not by credible persons.57 It is well settled that alibi is
the weakest of all defenses as it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove.
For this reason, this Court looks with caution upon the defense of alibi,
especially when, as in this case, it is corroborated only by relatives or friends
of the accused.58
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides that "When by reason or
on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death."59 Therefore, no other penalty can be imposed on accused-appellant.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the decision of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, finding accused-appellant
Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of DEATH
and directing him to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, is hereby
AFFIRMED.

In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of the Revised

Penal Code, upon the finality of this decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the possible
exercise of the pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162571 June 15, 2005
ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE
PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE
ANGELA PROLLAMANTE, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
At issue in this petition for certiorari 1 is whether or not the Court of Appeals
(CA) gravely erred in exercising its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in issuing a decision2 and resolution3 upholding the resolution
and order of the trial court,4 which denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss
private respondents’ complaint for support and directed the parties to submit
themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity testing.
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s
alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and
support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 106.5
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after
which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly
impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnel’s
insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out
of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in
Quezon City. The baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as
the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later
refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his adequate
financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for
adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.
On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the
Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with
the open car door hitting Fe’s leg. This incident was reported to the police. In
July 2001, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been
undergoing chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for
support.6
In his amended answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair
and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martin’s
conception. He claimed that Fe had at least one other secret lover. Arnel
admitted that their relationship started in 1993 but "he never really fell in love
with (Fe) not only because (she) had at least one secret lover, a certain Jun,
but also because she proved to be scheming and overly demanding and
possessive. As a result, theirs was a stormy on-and-off affair. What started
as a romantic liaison between two consenting adults eventually turned out to
be a case of fatal attraction where (Fe) became so obsessed with (Arnel), to
the point of even entertaining the idea of marrying him, that she resorted to
various devious ways and means to alienate (him) from his wife and family….
Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and children, Arnel terminated
the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as by referring
potential customers to the car aircon repair shop"7 where she worked. Later
on, Arnel found out that Fe had another erstwhile secret lover. In May 2000,
Arnel and his entire family went to the United States for a vacation. Upon
their return in June 2000, Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he
had impregnated her. Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as his because
their "last intimacy was sometime in 1998."8 Exasperated, Fe started calling
Arnel’s wife and family. On January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel to the
Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot to demand that he
acknowledge Martin as his child. According to Arnel, he could not get through
Fe and the discussion became so heated that he had no "alternative but to
move on but without bumping or hitting any part of her body."9 Finally, Arnel
claimed that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed
to him in the acknowledgment of Martin’s birth certificate were falsified. The
CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was actually
married and that his birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964. 10
In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel vehemently denied having
sired Martin but expressed willingness to consider any proposal to settle the
case.11
On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing
all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule
28 of the Rules of Court.12
Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-
incrimination.13 He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of
action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery
and that, under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not
recognized by the putative father.14 In his motion, Arnel manifested that he
had filed criminal charges for falsification of documents against Fe (I.S. Nos.
02-5723 and 02-7192) and a petition for cancellation of his name appearing
in Martin’s birth certificate (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-46669). He
attached the certification of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
that his signature in the birth certificate was forged.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the
parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the
applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Thus, this petition.
In a nutshell, petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether a complaint for support
can be converted to a petition for recognition and (2) whether DNA paternity
testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating
petitioner’s constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.15
The petition is without merit.
First of all, the trial court properly denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss
because the private respondents’ complaint on its face showed that they had
a cause of action against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action
are: (1) the plaintiff’s primary right and the defendant’s corresponding primary
duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which
the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is
determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.16
In the complaint, private respondents alleged that Fe had amorous relations
with the petitioner, as a result of which she gave birth to Martin out of
wedlock. In his answer, petitioner admitted that he had sexual relations with
Fe but denied that he fathered Martin, claiming that he had ended the
relationship long before the child’s conception and birth. It is undisputed and
even admitted by the parties that there existed a sexual relationship between
Arnel and Fe. The only remaining question is whether such sexual
relationship produced the child, Martin. If it did, as respondents have alleged,
then Martin should be supported by his father Arnel. If not, petitioner and
Martin are strangers to each other and Martin has no right to demand and
petitioner has no obligation to give support.
Preliminaries aside, we now tackle the main issues.
Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin as his own child and denies the
genuineness and authenticity of the child’s birth certificate which he
purportedly signed as the father. He also claims that the order and resolution
of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, effectively converted
the complaint for support to a petition for recognition, which is supposedly
proscribed by law. According to petitioner, Martin, as an unrecognized child,
has no right to ask for support and must first establish his filiation in a
separate suit under Article 28317 in relation to Article 26518 of the Civil Code
and Section 1, Rule 10519 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner’s contentions are without merit.
The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into
one for recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause
of action against petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the
documentary evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed
resolution and order effectively integrated an action to compel recognition
with an action for support, such was valid and in accordance with
jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of Appeals,20 we allowed the integration of
an action to compel recognition with an action to claim one’s inheritance:
…In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and
successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his
filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the
complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the
illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the
basis of the right to inherit. There being no allegation of such
acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which
cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio
decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for
failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint,
but the prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner
contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges
that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is
actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be
considered as one to compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of
action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance,
may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al. (43
Phil. 763 [1922]) wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in
any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child
and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one
which in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative,
provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct
causes of action are present in the particular case. In other words, there is
no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel
acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a
successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff
seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing
so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule
should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other cases.
xxx
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by
this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions.
Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be
considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel
acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged,
may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance
against his coheirs x x x; and the same person may intervene in
proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father,
or mother x x x. In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary
for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The
obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other
persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the
declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings. (Underscoring
supplied)
Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as
in Tayag, the basis or rationale for integrating them remains the same.
Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to support depends completely
on the determination of filiation. A separate action will only result in a
multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the main issues in both
cases are. To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely
appropriate to these proceedings.
On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by this
Court as a conclusive means of proving paternity. He also contends that
compulsory testing violates his right to privacy and right against self-
incrimination as guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution. These contentions
have no merit.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a
means for determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a
controversy, a brief historical sketch of our past decisions featuring or
mentioning DNA testing is called for.
In the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee21 where the appellant was
convicted of murder on the testimony of three eyewitnesses, we stated as
an obiter dictum that "while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as
accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence
such as the fingerprint or the DNA test result (emphasis supplied)."
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous
decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals,22 promulgated in 1997, we cautioned
against the use of DNA because "DNA, being a relatively new science, (had)
not as yet been accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity (would)
still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant
incriminating acts, verbal and written, by the putative father."
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of
parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals:23
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods
unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we
have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the
capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis.
The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2)
copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA
from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test
as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case
comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA
evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science
when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said
result is to deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence
in Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002 with our en banc decision in People
v. Vallejo24 where the rape and murder victim’s DNA samples from the
bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We
reasoned that "the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an
association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference
sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical
processes to establish their profile."
A year later, in People v. Janson,25 we acquitted the accused charged with
rape for lack of evidence because "doubts persist(ed) in our mind as to who
(were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had) been perpetrated
but who (were) the perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other
scientific evidence to still our doubts!"
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC26 where the Court en banc was faced
with the issue of filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando Poe Jr., we
stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily
establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic
codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical
residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would
clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing…
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar,27 we affirmed the
conviction of the accused for rape with homicide, the principal evidence for
which included DNA test results. We did a lengthy discussion of DNA, the
process of DNA testing and the reasons for its admissibility in the context of
our own Rules of Evidence:
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the genetic
information in all living organisms. A person’s DNA is the same in each cell
and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s
blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and
shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.
Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no
two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical
twins.
xxx xxx xxx
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should
consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected,
how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the
analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified
by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification
techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was determined that the
gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts
subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the appellant showed
that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP29/10
and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victim’s
vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the
victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the
course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and
technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious
as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit
from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other
jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven
instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it was
ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be
used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were
allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial,
including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is
one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in
issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying
the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR
testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a
quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid
principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and
the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA
samples from semen recovered from a rape victim’s vagina were used to
positively identify the accused Joel "Kawit" Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed
that the compulsory extraction of his blood sample for DNA testing, as well
as the testing itself, violated his right against self-incrimination, as embodied
in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution. We addressed
this as follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all
compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-
incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of
the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence
taken from the person of the accused from the realm of self-incrimination.
These include photographs,28 hair,29 and other bodily substances.30 We have
also declared as constitutional several procedures performed on the accused
such as pregnancy tests for women accused of adultery, 31 expulsion of
morphine from one’s mouth32 and the tracing of one’s foot to determine its
identity with bloody footprints.33 In Jimenez v. Cañizares,34 we even
authorized the examination of a woman’s genitalia, in an action for
annulment filed by her husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her
orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures were, to be
sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally
sound. DNA testing and its results, per our ruling in Yatar,35 are now similarly
acceptable.
Nor does petitioner’s invocation of his right to privacy persuade us. In Ople v.
Torres,36 where we struck down the proposed national computerized
identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not
bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle
scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and
the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper
safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and
seizures,37 and the infringement of privacy of communication38 where the
constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioner’s case
involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against
self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his
constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they
are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose
very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no
reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such dire
consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.
DNA paternity testing first came to prominence in the United States, where it
yielded its first official results sometime in 1985. In the decade that followed,
DNA rapidly found widespread general acceptance. 39 Several cases decided
by various State Supreme Courts reflect the total assimilation of DNA testing
into their rules of procedure and evidence.
The case of Wilson v. Lumb40 shows that DNA testing is so commonly
accepted that, in some instances, ordering the procedure has become a
ministerial act. The Supreme Court of St. Lawrence County, New York
allowed a party who had already acknowledged paternity to subsequently
challenge his prior acknowledgment. The Court pointed out that, under the
law, specifically Section 516 of the New York Family Court Act, the Family
Court examiner had the duty, upon receipt of the challenge, to order DNA
tests:41
§ 516-a. Acknowledgment of paternity. (a) An acknowledgment of
paternity executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the
social services law or section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b
of the public health law shall establish the paternity of and liability for
the support of a child pursuant to this act. Such acknowledgment
must be reduced to writing and filed pursuant to section four
thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law with the
registrar of the district in which the birth occurred and in which the
birth certificate has been filed. No further judicial or administrative
proceedings are required to ratify an unchallenged acknowledgment
of paternity.
(b) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section
one hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section four
thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law may be
rescinded by either signator’s filing of a petition with the court to
vacate the acknowledgment within the earlier of sixty days of the
date of signing the acknowledgment or the date of an administrative
or a judicial proceeding (including a proceeding to establish a
support order) relating to the child in which either signator is a party.
For purposes of this section, the "date of an administrative or a
judicial proceeding" shall be the date by which the respondent is
required to answer the petition. After the expiration of sixty days of
the execution of the acknowledgment, either signator may challenge
the acknowledgment of paternity in court only on the basis of fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof on the
party challenging the voluntary acknowledgment. Upon receiving a
party’s challenge to an acknowledgment, the court shall order
genetic marker tests or DNA tests for the determination of the
child’s paternity and shall make a finding of paternity, if
appropriate, in accordance with this article. Neither signator’s
legal obligations, including the obligation for child support arising
from the acknowledgment, may be suspended during the challenge
to the acknowledgment except for good cause as the court may find.
If a party petitions to rescind an acknowledgment and if the court
determines that the alleged father is not the father of the child, or if
the court finds that an acknowledgment is invalid because it was
executed on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact,
the court shall vacate the acknowledgment of paternity and shall
immediately provide a copy of the order to the registrar of the district
in which the child’s birth certificate is filed and also to the putative
father registry operated by the department of social services
pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two-c of the social
services law. In addition, if the mother of the child who is the subject
of the acknowledgment is in receipt of child support services
pursuant to title six-A of article three of the social services law, the
court shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the child
support enforcement unit of the social services district that provides
the mother with such services.
(c) A determination of paternity made by any other state, whether
established through the parents’ acknowledgment of paternity or
through an administrative or judicial process, must be accorded full
faith and credit, if and only if such acknowledgment meets the
requirements set forth in section 452(a)(7) of the social security act.
 (emphasis supplied)
DNA testing also appears elsewhere in the New York Family Court Act: 42
§532. Genetic marker and DNA tests; admissibility of records or reports of
test results; costs of tests.
a) The court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more
genetic marker tests or DNA tests and, on the court’s own motion or
the motion of any party, shall order the mother, her child and the
alleged father to submit to one or more genetic marker or DNA tests
of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by an accreditation
body designated by the secretary of the federal department of health
and human services and performed by a laboratory approved by
such an accreditation body and by the commissioner of health or by
a duly qualified physician to aid in the determination of whether the
alleged father is or is not the father of the child. No such test shall
be ordered, however, upon a written finding by the court that it
is not in the best interests of the child on the basis of res
judicata, equitable estoppel, or the presumption of legitimacy of
a child born to a married woman. The record or report of the
results of any such genetic marker or DNA test ordered pursuant to
this section or pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social
services law shall be received in evidence by the court pursuant to
subdivision (e) of rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice
law and rules where no timely objection in writing has been made
thereto and that if such timely objections are not made, they shall be
deemed waived and shall not be heard by the court. If the record or
report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test or
tests indicate at least a ninety-five percent probability of
paternity, the admission of such record or report shall create a
rebuttable presumption of paternity, and shall establish, if
unrebutted, the paternity of and liability for the support of a
child pursuant to this article and article four of this act.
(b) Whenever the court directs a genetic marker or DNA test
pursuant to this section, a report made as provided in subdivision (a)
of this section may be received in evidence pursuant to rule forty-five
hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules if offered by any
party.
(c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) of this
section shall be, in the first instance, paid by the moving party. If the
moving party is financially unable to pay such cost, the court may
direct any qualified public health officer to conduct such test, if
practicable; otherwise, the court may direct payment from the funds
of the appropriate local social services district. In its order of
disposition, however, the court may direct that the cost of any such
test be apportioned between the parties according to their respective
abilities to pay or be assessed against the party who does not prevail
on the issue of paternity, unless such party is financially unable to
pay. (emphasis supplied)
In R.E. v. C.E.W.,43 a decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court, DNA tests
were used to prove that H.W., previously thought to be an offspring of the
marriage between A.C.W. and C.E.W., was actually the child of R.E. with
whom C.E.W. had, at the time of conception, maintained an adulterous
relationship.
In Erie County Department of Social Services on behalf of Tiffany M.H. v.
Greg G.,44 the 4th Department of the New York Supreme Court’s Appellate
Division allowed G.G., who had been adjudicated as T.M.H.’s father by
default, to have the said judgment vacated, even after six years, once he had
shown through a genetic marker test that he was not the child’s father. In this
case, G.G. only requested the tests after the Department of Social Services,
six years after G.G. had been adjudicated as T.M.H.’s father, sought an
increase in his support obligation to her.
In Greco v. Coleman,45 the Michigan Supreme Court while ruling on the
constitutionality of a provision of law allowing non-modifiable support
agreements pointed out that it was because of the difficulty of determining
paternity before the advent of DNA testing that such support agreements
were necessary:
As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which paternity can be proven
has increased significantly since the parties in this lawsuit entered into their
support agreement…(current testing methods can determine the probability
of paternity to 99.999999% accuracy). However, at the time the parties
before us entered into the disputed agreement, proving paternity was a very
significant obstacle to an illegitimate child's access to child support. The first
reported results of modern DNA paternity testing did not occur until 1985. ("In
fact, since its first reported results in 1985, DNA matching has progressed to
'general acceptance in less than a decade'"). Of course, while prior blood-
testing methods could exclude some males from being the possible father of
a child, those methods could not affirmatively pinpoint a particular male as
being the father. Thus, when the settlement agreement between the present
parties was entered in 1980, establishing paternity was a far more difficult
ordeal than at present. Contested paternity actions at that time were often no
more than credibility contests. Consequently, in every contested paternity
action, obtaining child support depended not merely on whether the putative
father was, in fact, the child's biological father, but rather on whether the
mother could prove to a court of law that she was only sexually involved with
one man--the putative father. Allowing parties the option of entering into
private agreements in lieu of proving paternity eliminated the risk that the
mother would be unable meet her burden of proof.
It is worth noting that amendments to Michigan’s Paternity law have included
the use of DNA testing:46
§722.716 Pretrial proceedings; blood or tissue typing determinations as to
mother, child, and alleged father; court order; refusal to submit to typing or
identification profiling; qualifications of person conducting typing or
identification profiling; compensation of expert; result of typing or
identification profiling; filing summary report; objection; admissibility;
presumption; burden of proof; summary disposition.
Sec. 6.
(1) In a proceeding under this act before trial, the court, upon
application made by or on behalf of either party, or on its own
motion, shall order that the mother, child, and alleged father
submit to blood or tissue typing determinations, which may
include, but are not limited to, determinations of red cell
antigens, red cell isoenzymes, human leukocyte antigens,
serum proteins, or DNA identification profiling, to determine
whether the alleged father is likely to be, or is not, the father of
the child. If the court orders a blood or tissue typing or DNA
identification profiling to be conducted and a party refuses to
submit to the typing or DNA identification profiling, in addition
to any other remedies available, the court may do either of the
following:
(a) Enter a default judgment at the request of the
appropriate party.
(b) If a trial is held, allow the disclosure of the fact of the
refusal unless good cause is shown for not disclosing
the fact of refusal.
(2) A blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling shall be
conducted by a person accredited for paternity determinations by a
nationally recognized scientific organization, including, but not limited
to, the American association of blood banks.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) If the probability of paternity determined by the qualified
person described in subsection (2) conducting the blood or
tissue typing or DNA identification profiling is 99% or higher,
and the DNA identification profile and summary report are
admissible as provided in subsection (4), paternity is presumed.
If the results of the analysis of genetic testing material from 2 or
more persons indicate a probability of paternity greater than
99%, the contracting laboratory shall conduct additional genetic
paternity testing until all but 1 of the putative fathers is
eliminated, unless the dispute involves 2 or more putative
fathers who have identical DNA.
(6) Upon the establishment of the presumption of paternity as
provided in subsection (5), either party may move for summary
disposition under the court rules. this section does not abrogate the
right of either party to child support from the date of birth of the child
if applicable under section 7. (emphasis supplied)
In Rafferty v. Perkins,47 the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test
results showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow the presumption of
legitimacy of a child born during the course of a marriage:
The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of the
blood test eliminating Perkins as Justin's father, even considering the
evidence in the light most favorable to Perkins, we find that no reasonable
jury could find that Easter is not Justin's father based upon the 99.94%
probability of paternity concluded by the DNA testing.
In S.J.F. and J.C.F. v. R.C.W.,48 the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld an
order for genetic testing given by the Court of Appeals, even after trial on the
merits had concluded without such order being given. Significantly, when
J.C.F., the mother, first filed the case for paternity and support with the
District Court, neither party requested genetic testing. It was only upon
appeal from dismissal of the case that the appellate court remanded the case
and ordered the testing, which the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld.
The case of Kohl v. Amundson,49 decided by the Supreme Court of South
Dakota, demonstrated that even default judgments of paternity could be
vacated after the adjudicated father had, through DNA testing, established
non-paternity. In this case, Kohl, having excluded himself as the father of
Amundson’s child through DNA testing, was able to have the default
judgment against him vacated. He then obtained a ruling ordering Amundson
to reimburse him for the amounts withheld from his wages for child support.
The Court said "(w)hile Amundson may have a remedy against the father of
the child, she submit(ted) no authority that require(d) Kohl to support her
child. Contrary to Amundson's position, the fact that a default judgment was
entered, but subsequently vacated, (did) not foreclose Kohl from obtaining a
money judgment for the amount withheld from his wages."
In M.A.S. v. Mississippi Dept. of Human Services,50 another case decided by
the Supreme Court of Mississippi, it was held that even if paternity was
established through an earlier agreed order of filiation, child support and
visitation orders could still be vacated once DNA testing established
someone other than the named individual to be the biological father. The
Mississippi High Court reiterated this doctrine in Williams v. Williams.51
The foregoing considered, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the public respondent for upholding the orders of the trial court which both
denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss and ordered him to submit himself
for DNA testing. Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
remedy of certiorari is only available "when any tribunal, board or officer has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law."52 In Land Bank of the Philippines v. the Court of Appeals53 where we
dismissed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, we discussed at
length the nature of such a petition and just what was meant by "grave abuse
of discretion":
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
the act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the said Rules. (emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness,
passion, prejudice or personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. The respondent court acted
entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its decision and resolution, and
any error made would have only been an error in judgment. As we have
discussed, however, the decision of the respondent court, being firmly
anchored in law and jurisprudence, was correct.
Epilogue
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who
choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing
technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and
abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and
have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a
perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and
authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity
to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of
determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
Court of Appeals’ decision dated January 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80961
is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioner.

The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction
SO ORDERED.
of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison d’etre for the
rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so
engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error
is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such
a scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the
issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision—not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision—the same
is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.

The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a

petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or