Republic vs Nolasco (Presumptive Death)

Facts:
Gregorio Nolasco filed before the RTC of Antique a petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of his wife, Janet
Monica Parker, incolving Article 41 of the Family Code. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition.
Respondent was a seaman who first met his wife, a British subject, in a bar in England. They returned to Nolasco’s
contract and got married two years after. Nolasco obtained another contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents.
Nolasco was informed that Parker left and he claimed to have searched his wife in Antique and England but to no avail.
He have no knowledge of her family background and did not report the disappearance to authorities. His petition was
granted by both the lower and appellate courts. This is the Republic’s appeal to SC.
Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
Held:
No. Respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his wife was already dead. The
Court considers respondent’s investigation is too sketchy and finds his claim that Parker declined to give any information
as to her personal background too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to find her.

Lourdes V. Lukban (Presumptive Death)

Facts:
Lourdes G. Lukban, Petitioner herein, contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on December 10, 1933 at the Paco
Catholic Church, Manila. On December 27, of the same year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel and since then
he has not been heard from despite diligent search made by her. She also inquired about him from his parents and friends
but no one was able to indicate his whereabouts. She has no knowledge if he is still alive, his last known address being
Calle Merced, Paco, Manila. She believes that he is already dead because he had been absent for more than twenty years,
and because she intends to marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined in order that she may be relieved of any
liability under the law.
Issue:
Whether or not, Lourdes G. Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive death before she can remarry.
HELD:
NO,
The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure declaration of presumptive death of her husband because Civil Code
prevails during their marriage in 1933. It provides that “for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to
have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the
former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does
not know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse
present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Armas V. Calisterio (Presumptive Death)
FACTS:
Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in April 1992 leaving several parcel of
land estimated value of P604,750.00. He was the second husband of Marietta who was previously married with William
Bounds in January 1946. The latter disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance
of Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a court declaration of Bounds’
presumptive death.
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the
latter and that marriage between Marietta and his brother being allegedly bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed
that her son Sinfroniano be appointed as administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and inheritance be
adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.
ISSUE:
Whether Marrieta and Teodorico’s marriage was void due to the absence of the declaration of presumptive death.
HELD:
The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in May 1958 where the law in force at that time
was the Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took effect in August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself
limit its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive death is not
essential before contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of absence of the spouse is enough to remarry
then Marrieta’s marriage with Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right can claim portion of the estate.

Anaya V. Palaroan (consent obtained through force and intmidation)

FACTS:
Fernando Palaroan filed a complaint for annulment of marriage against Aurora Anaya on the ground that his consent was
obtained through force and intimidation. The court dismissed the complaint and granted Aurora's counterclaim. While the
amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando allegedly divulged that several months prior to the marriage,
he had pre-marital relationships with a close relative of his. Anaya filed suit to annul the marriage and to recover moral
damages, alleging that the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent.
Fernando denied the allegation. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was
legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage. Aurora appealed.
ISSUE:
Is non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman a ground for annulment of
marriage?
HELD:
No. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated
circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article,
providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage.
While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving
her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for
upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent
being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.
Buccat V. Buccat (concealment of pregnancy ground for anullment)
Facts:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938, became engaged in September, and got married in
Nov 26. On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a son. After
knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her. On March 23, 1939, he filed for an
annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin.
The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
Issue:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage be granted on the grounds that Luida concealed her pregnancy
before the marriage?
Held:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which the State is interested
and where society rests. In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting
fraud as a ground for annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything about
Luida’s condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation,
ie. enlarged stomach) when they got married.

Aquino V. Delizo (concealment of pregnancy ground for anullment)

FACTS:
Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud against Conchita Delizo that at the date of
her marriage with the former on December 1954, concealed the fact that she was pregnant by another man and sometime
in April 1955 or about 4 months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco
represent the state in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only documentary evidence
presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented any evidence.
CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioner’s complaint for annulment of marriage, which was affirmed by CA thus a petition for
certiorari to review the decisions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not constitute such fraud as would annul a marriage.
HELD:
The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo was allegedly to be only more than four
months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent
especially since she was “naturally plump” or fat. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the
woman’s abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and
apparent.
Menciano V. San Jose (Declaration of Heirs and Settlement of Estate of Deceased)

FACTS:
Settlement of Estate of Faustino Neri San Jose
Matilde Menciano, in her behalf and in behalf of the minors Carlo Magno Neri and Faustino Neri, Jr., filed a motion for
declaration of heirs, alleging that she is the widow of the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose, to whom she was married
according to the rites of the Roman Catholic Church on September 28, 1944. Before the marriage the deceased and she
lived together as husband and wife, there having been no impediment to their marriage; that as a result of their
cohabitation before the marriage the child Carlo Magno Neri. Said child having enjoyed the status of a recognized natural
child; that their second child Faustino Neri, Jr., was born on April 24, 1945; and that Carlo Magno Neri was legitimized
by the subsequent matrimony of his parents and Faustino Neri, Jr., is a legitimate child born in lawful wedlock.
Paz Neri San Jose, then executrix of the estate of the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose, and Rodolfo Pelaez, designated
universal heir in the will of the deceased dated December 19, 1940, filed an amended answer:
Alleging:
1. Deceased from 1943 suffered senile dementia caused by anemia, bombarded by American Planes.
2. Marriage bet Matilde and deceased, if solemnized, was in violation of legal provisions and requisites because:
Deceased was deprived of his free will due to his age, sickness and bombardment, Matilde took advantage of his condition
by intrigue and threat of abandoning him, forced by means of deceit and threat to marry her, Deceased was sterile, unable
to procreate, impotent and congenitally sterile same as his brothers and sister who had no children
3. P286,000 worth of certain properties, jewels and cash retained & illegally disposed of by Matilde Menciano
ISSUE:
(1) Was the marriage between the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde Menciano valid?;
(2) Are, the children Faustino Neri, Jr. and Carlo Magno Neri the legitimate children of the deceased Faustino Neri San
Jose and Matilde Menciano?
(3) Did Matilde Menciano have in her possession and illegally disposed of the cash, jewels, and certain properties above
mentioned?
RULING:
1. Documents and all pieces of evidence were signed and executed properly by both spouses. Doctrine applied
Testamentary Capacity- Capacity to Contract Marriage (requires same mental condition): Torres, et al v. Lopez-
Neither old age, physical infirmities, feebleness of mind, weakness of the memory, appointment of a guardian, nor
eccentricities are sufficient singly/jointly to show testamentary incapacity

Testamentary Capacity

a. Can relate to capacity to contract marriage which requires the same mental condition
b. Possessed spark of reason and of life
c. Strength of mind to form a fixed intention
d. Summon his enfeebled thoughts to enforce intention
2. CARLO MAGNO NERI has not been acknowledged as natural child and cannot be legitimized by subsequent
marriage of his parents; FAUSTINO NERI, JR legitimate

Married September 28, 1944

Faustino Neri, Jr- Apr 24, 1945 (280d after marriage/more than 180d after marriage but less than 300d after death
of deceased)
Before and after marriage, H&W cohabited
Rule 123, Sec 68
Issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband (who is not impotent) is indisputably presumed to be legitimate if not
born within 180d immediately succeeding marriage/after expiration of 300d following its dissolution
Impotency not presumed. Presumption in favor of potency.
Impotency (physical inability to have sexual intercourse) not synonymous to sterility (Lack of fertility in the
reproductive elements of either sex).
Best evidence: Potency of deceased according to statement of Dr. Garcia. Faustina used condom and a woman
Essential element of impotency- absence of complete power of copulation

3. Such allegation has not been substantiated, no satisfactory evidence of misappropriation

Jimenez V. Canizares (Impotency as grounds for annulment of marriage)

FACTS:

Joel Jimenez and Remedios Cañizares are husband and wife. Joel later filed for annulment on grounds that Remedios
is impotent because her genitals were too small for copulation and such was already existing at the time of the
marriage. Remedios was summoned to answer the complaint of Joel but she refused to do so. It was found that there
was no collusion between the parties notwithstanding the non-cooperation of Remedios in the case. Remedios was
ordered to have herself be submitted to an expert to determine if her genitals are indeed too small for copulation.
Remedios again refused to do as ordered. The trial was heard solely on Joel’s complaint. The marriage was later
annulled.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Remedios’s impotency has been established

RULING:

No. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of Joel who was
expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether
Remedios is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because from the
commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although
her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the
presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred, because women of this country
are by nature coy, bashful, and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent
authority. Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency.
The lone testimony of Joel that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the
ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.

Sin V. Sin (Absence of the Participation of the State in declaration of Nullity)

FACTS:

Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987. Florence filed in September
1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented their
respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed Florence’s petition and
throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a
manifestation dated November 1994 stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively
participated therein. Other than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him.

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the participation of the State in
the proceedings.

HELD:

Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court
should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence that the State
participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.

De Ocampo V. Florenciano (Confession of Judgment done in court or through pleading)

FACTS:

Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children who are not living with
plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining
illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture
where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other
than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately.
In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his
intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided she is not
charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.

ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed by the
Family Code.

HELD:

Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of
adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code.
What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is
evidence of the adultery independent of the defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of
separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the
plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendant’s confession. The petition should be
granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.
Lapuz Sy V. Eufemio (Death of Plaintiff before Final Decree)

FACTS:

Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging that they were married
civilly on September 21, 1934; that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her
husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired properties during their marriage; and, that she
discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok in 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a
decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the
conjugal partnership profits.

In his Answer, Eufemio counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen on the
ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok. In
1969, during the pendency of the case, Carmen died in a vehicular accident. Eufemio moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the death abated the action for legal separation.

Carmen's counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio
opposed the motion. The trial court dismissed the case.

ISSUE/S:

1.) Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action?

2.) If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights? YES changes in property relations
between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the
death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree.

RULING:

1.) An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses is
purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100 (Art. 56, FC), by allowing
only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108 (Art. 66, FC), by
providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of
legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action
causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur cum persona.
FROILAN GANDIONCO V. HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA AND TERESITA S. GANDIONCO
(Concubinage)

FACTS:

Oct 23 1986- Criminal case of Concubinage

Nov 14 1986- Provisional remedy of Support Pende Lite, pending a decision in the action for legal separation (not to
recover civil liability but aimed at conjugal rights of spouses and their relations to each other c/o arts 7-108, cc

Civil action for legal separation and application for support pendente lite should be suspended in view of the crim
case for concubinage

Civil action arose from the criminal action. All proceedings related to leg sep will have to be suspended to await
conviction/acquittal of concubinage in crim case

RULING:

Civil action for legal separation based on concubinage may proceed ahead of or simultaneously with criminal action
for concubinage because said civil action is not one to enforce civil liability arising from offense even if both civil and
criminal action arise from or are related to the same offense.

No Criminal Proceeding is necessary. Decree of Legal Separation only needs proof of preponderance of evidence.

Bugayong V. Ginez (Condonation)

FACTS:

As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco (plaintiff’s sister-in-law)
and some from anonymous writers (which were not produced at the hearing) informing him of alleged acts of
infidelity of his wife which he did not even care to mention. On cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that his wife
also informed him by letter, which she claims to have destroyed, that a certain “Eliong” kissed her. All these
communications prompted him in October, 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain as to the propriety of a legal
separation between him and his wife on account of the latter’s alleged acts of infidelity, and he was directed to consult
instead the navy legal department.

Benjamin Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had committed
adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left, which he took as a confirmation of
the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her and
failing to find her, he went to Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, “to soothe his wounded feelings.”

ISSUE:

WON the adultery has been condoned by the husband

RULING:

ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation
of or consent to the adultery or concubinage

The act of the husband in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented
to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as husband and wife for one
day and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as
husband and wife — all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation
between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred
almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.

Pacete V. Carriaga (Legal Separation Nitty Gritty)

FACTS:

Enrico Pacete and Concepcion Alanis were married in 1938. Pacete contracted another marriage to Clarita de la
Concepcion, which Alanis knew about only on August 1, 1979. During the marriage, Pacete acquired properties that
he registered either under his name or Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita or with other dummies.
Thus, on October 29, 1979, Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Pacete and de
la Concepcion as well as for legal separation between her and her husband.

The defendants were served with summons on November 15, 1979. They filed a motion for extension of 20 days,
which the court granted. On December 18, 1979, the defendants again filed a motion for extension through a new
counsel. The court granted the motion, setting the deadline to January 9, 1980. Although the court’s order was mailed
to the defendants’ counsel on January 11, 1980, they again filed a motion for extension on February 5, 1980. The next
day, the court denied the motion for extension and granted petitioner Alanis’ motion to declare the defendants in
default.

The Court of First Instance, in its decision on March 17, 1980, decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis as
well as declared null and void ab initio the marriage between Pacete and de la Concepcion.

ISSUE:

Did the Court of First Instance commit grave abuse of discretion?

RULING:

Yes. A petition for certiorari is applicable when grave abuse of discretion attended the declaration of the decision.
Article 101 of the Civil Code, which was later reproduced in Article 60 of the Family Code, provides

“No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case
of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion
between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to
take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated”

The court did not follow the procedure mandated by the said procedure. Furthermore, Article 3 of the Civil Code, now
Article 58 of the Family Code, mandates that an action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before 6 months
shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition to allow the parties to have a cooling-off period.
Macadangdang vs. CA (Death of Spouse after Decree of Leg Sep)

FACTS:

Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang were married in 1946 after
having lived together for two years and had 6 children. They started a buy and sell business and sari-sari store in
Davao City. Through hard work and good fortune, their business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking,
transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate etc. Their relationship became complicated and
both indulged in extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so they separated in 1965 when private
respondent left for Cebu for good. When she returned in Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her
estranged husband. She then decided to take the initial action. In April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal
separation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has effect on the legal separation.

HELD:

The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the legal separation. When the decree
itself is issued, the finality of the separation is complete after the lapse of the period to appeal the decision to a higher
court even if the effects, such as the liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor terminated.

The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal property. Therefore, upon the
liquidation and distribution conformably with the effects of such final decree, the law on intestate succession should
take over the disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased spouse.

Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code, now
Article 63 of the Family Code provides the effects of the decree of legal separation. These legal effects ipso facto or
automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of
determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.