The Heirs of Alfredo Cullado, namely Lolita Cullado, Dominador Cullado, Romeo Cullado,

Noel Cullado, Rebecca Lambinicio, Mary Jane Bautista And Jimmy Cullado vs. Dominic V.
Gutierrez, G.R. No. 212938, July 30, 2019.

FACTS:
 On May1995, OCT No. P-61499 which covered a parcel of land (18,280 square meters)
located at Isabela, was issued to Dominic Gutierrez
 On May 1997, Dominic's father, Dominador L. Gutierrez, representing Dominic who was
then still a minor, filed before the RTC an action for recovery of ownership, possession
with damages with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary
restraining order against Alfredo Cullado (Cullado).
 In the action for recovery of ownership, Dominic maintained that Cullado had been
squatting on the parcel of land covered by OCT No. P- 61499 as early as 1977, and that
despite repeated demands, Cullado refused to vacate the said lot.
 Cullado, in his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, interposed the special and affirmative
defenses of his actual possession and cultivation of the subject parcel of land in an open,
adverse and continuous manner. He likewise asked for the reconveyance of the property,
considering that Dominic and his father fraudulently had the subject property titled in
Dominic's name. As his counterclaim, he wanted to recover "incidental litigation
expenses in the amount to be determined during the trial."
 Cullado died during the course of the trial and was substituted by his heirs,
 Dominic's counsel repeatedly failed to attend the scheduled hearings, and as a
consequence, the heirs of Cullado were eventually allowed to present their evidence after
Dominic was deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine the witness of the heirs
of Cullado.
RTC Ruling:
 The RTC ruled in favor of the heirs of Cullado; ordering the dismissal of the complaint.
 On March 2011, Dominic filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment wherein he alleged,
among others, that his counsel's negligence in handling his case prevented him from
participating therein and from filing his appeal. However, the same was denied by the
RTC for having been filed out of time.
 On October 2011, Dominic filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment on the
ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The CA initially dismissed the petition
but reinstated the same upon Dominic's motion for reconsideration and gave it due course
in the CA October 23, 2012 Resolution
CA Ruling:
 The CA reversed the RTC’s decision in favor of Dominic
 In the action for recovery of possession filed by Dominic, the heirs of Cullado in their
Answer raised as affirmative defense and not as a counterclaim, and asked for, the
 reconveyance of the lot in issue as the same was supposedly fraudulently titled in
Dominic' s name, considering that neither Dominic nor his father actually possessed or
cultivated the same. These allegations constitute a collateral attack against Dominic's
title, which cannot be allowed in an accion publiciana. In sum, the defenses and grounds
raised by the heirs of Cullado ascribe errors in Dominic's title that would require a review
of the registration decree made in Dominic's favor.
ISSUE (S):
Whether the CA erred in reversing the Decision of the RTC and in granting Dominic's petition
for annulment of judgment.
RULING:
Proceeding now to the main issue, it may be recalled that the three usual actions to recover
possession of real property are:
1. Accion interdictal or a summary ejectment proceeding, which may be either for forcible entry
(detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), for the recovery of physical or material
possession (possession de facto) where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year,
and should be brought in the proper inferior court;
2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the better right of possession (possession de
jure), which should be brought in the proper inferior court or Regional Trial Court (depending
upon the value of the property) when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year (or for
less than a year in cases other than those mentioned in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court); and
3. Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion or reivindicatory action, which is an action
for recovery of ownership which must be brought in the proper inferior court or Regional Trial
Court (depending upon the value of the property)
Cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are governed by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 1 of Rule 70, "a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any
time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding
or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs."
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are governed by the rules on summary procedure. The
judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is conclusive with respect
to the possession only, will not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building, and
will not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building. When the
issue of ownership is raised by the defendant in his pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession
When the ejectment court thus resolves the issue of ownership based on a certificate of title to
determine the issue of possession, the question is posed: is this a situation where the Torrens title
is being subjected to a collateral attack proscribed by Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
152930 or the Property Registration Decree, viz.: "A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law." The answer to this is "No" because there is no real attack, whether direct
or collateral, on the certificate of title in question for the simple reason that the resolution by the
ejectment court cannot alter, modify, or cancel the certificate of title. Thus, the issue of whether
the attack on a Torrens title is collateral or direct is immaterial in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases because the resolution of the issue of ownership is allowed by the Rules of Court
on a provisional basis only. To repeat: when the issue of ownership is raised by the defendant in
his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession
In an accion reivindicatoria, the cause of action of the plaintiff is to recover possession by virtue
of his ownership of the land subject of the dispute. This follows that universe of rights conferred
to the owner of property, or more commonly known as the attributes of ownership
This follows that universe of rights conferred to the owner of property, or more commonly
known as the attributes of ownership. In classical Roman law terms, they are:
1. Jus possidendi or the right to possess;
2. Jus utendi or the right to use and enjoy;
3. Jus fruendi or the right to the fruits;
4. Jus accessionis or right to accessories;
5. Jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by its use;
6. Jus disponendi or the right to dispose or alienate; and
7. Jus vindicandi or the right to vindicate or recover
Jus vindicandi is expressly recognized in paragraph 2 of Article 428, Civil Code, viz.: "The
owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover
it."
If the plaintiffs claim of ownership (and necessarily, possession or jus possidendi) is based on his
Torrens title and the defendant disputes the validity of this Torrens title, then the issue of
whether there is a direct or collateral attack on the plaintiff’s title is also irrelevant. This is
because the court where the reivindicatory or reconveyance suit is filed has the requisite
jurisdiction to rule definitively or with finality on the issue of ownership - it can pass upon the
validity of the plaintiff’s certificate of title.
In an ordinary ejectment suit, the certificate of title is never imperiled because the decision of the
ejectment court on the issue of ownership is merely provisional. On the other hand, in a
reivindicatory suit, where the Torrens title or certificate of title is the basis of the complaint's
cause of action, there is always a direct attack on the certificate of title the moment the defendant
disputes its validity in a counterclaim or a negative defense.
As to accion publiciana, this is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of real property independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the
expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding
of possession of the real property
However, it should be noted that, unlike forcible entry and unlawful detainer which are
procedurally acknowledged, accion publiciana is not.
Article 555 of the new Civil Code recognizes that a possessor may lose his possession de facto
by the possession of another when the latter's possession has lasted longer than one year.
However, his real right of possession is not lost until after the lapse of 10 years. This same
Article 555 thus recognizes the registered owner's remedy to institute an accion publiciana within
the said 10-year period. Thus, the doubt expressed in The Bishop of Cebu was resolved in favor
of the subsistence of accion publiciana.
The issue in an accion publiciana is the "better right of possession" of real property
independently of title. This "better right of possession" may or may not proceed from a Torrens
title. Thus, a lessee, by virtue of a registered lease contract or an unregistered lease contract with
a term longer than one year, can file, as against the owner or intruder, an accion publiciana if he
has been dispossessed for more than one year. In the same manner, a registered owner or one
with a Torrens title can likewise file an accion publiciana to recover possession if the one-year
prescriptive period for forcible entry and unlawful detainer has already passed.
While there is no express grant in the Rules of Court that the court wherein an accion publiciana
is lodged can provisionally resolve the issue of ownership, unlike an ordinary ejectment court
which is expressly conferred44 such authority (albeit in a limited or provisional manner only,
i.e., for purposes of resolving the issue of possession), there is ample jurisprudential support for
upholding the power of a court hearing an accion publiciana to also rule on the issue of
ownership
The Court, recognizing the nature of accion publiciana as enunciated above, did not dwell on
whether the attack on Spouses Supapo's title was direct or collateral. It simply, and rightly,
proceeded to resolve the conflicting claims of ownership. The Court's pronouncement in Supapo
upholding the indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of Spouses Supapo's title was, however,
subject to a Final Note that emphasized that even this resolution on the question of ownership
was not a final and binding determination of ownership, but merely provisiona
From the foregoing, the Court thus clarifies here that in an accion publiciana, the defense of
ownership (i.e., that the defendant, and not the plaintiff, is the rightful owner) will not trigger a
collateral attack on the plaintiffs Torrens or certificate of title because the resolution of the issue
of ownership is done only to determine the issue of possession.

In the present case, the Answer of Cullado raised, as "special and affirmative defenses" to
Dominic's accion publiciana, the issue of fraud in obtaining Dominic's certificate of title on the
ground that "neither he nor his father had been in actual possession and cultivation of the subject
parcel of land" and that Dominic was not qualified as he was then a minor
In this regard, there is no dispute that Dominic was awarded a patent (no. 023118 95 10606) on
May 10, 1995 and Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT) P-61499 was issued in his name
pursuant to the said patent on May 17, 1995. Cullado's Answer, filed on August 18, 1997,
questioned the OCT issued in Dominic's name. At that time, Dominic's OCT had already become
incontrovertible upon the lapse of the one-year period to question it by reason of actual fraud as
provided in Section 32 of PD 1529
In Wee v. Mardo54 (Wee) the Court reiterated that: "A public land patent, when registered in the
corresponding Register of Deeds, is a veritable Torrens title, and becomes as indefeasible upon
the expiration of one (1) year from the date of issuance thereof. Said title, like one issued
pursuant to a judicial decree, is subject to review within one (1) year from the date of the
issuance of the patent.
The Court further stated in Wee that the issue as to whether title was procured by falsification or
fraud can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose and a Torrens title can
be attacked only for fraud within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of
registration
Since the period of one year had already lapsed when Cullado questioned the OCT's validity on
the ground of fraud via his Answer, then Dominic's OCT had already become indefeasible and,
until cancelled in an appropriate direct proceeding, remains to be valid.
In view of the foregoing, the RTC was clearly without jurisdiction in ruling that Cullado had
become the owner of the land in controversy "through the medium of acquisitive prescription"
having been in possession by himself and with his wife for 36 years and that Dominic must
reconvey the land in favor of the heirs of Cullado. While the RTC could have resolved the issue
of ownership provisionally to determine the "better right of possession," which is allowed in an
accion publiciana, it was without any power or jurisdiction to order the reconveyance of the land
in dispute because that can be done only upon a definitive ruling on the said issue - something
that cannot be done in an accion publiciana.
More than that, the RTC's ruling that Cullado had become owner by acquisitive prescription is
likewise without basis since the evidence adduced by the heirs of Cullado, as summarized in the
trial court's Decision, do not show that "the land which contains an area of more than one
hectare" which Cullado was claiming was already private land at the time Cullado started his
possession thereof. It must be recalled that the land in dispute was acquired through a free patent,
which presupposes that it was initially public agricultural land pursuant to Commonwealth Act
No. (C.A.) 141 60 or the Public Land Act. While the RTC's Decision reckoned the year 1974 as
the beginning of Cullado's possession, it was conjectural to conclude that Cullado acquired the
same by virtue of prescription in the absence of any clear indication as to when the land claimed
by him was declared alienable and disposable. To be sure, the land in dispute can be said to have
become private land only when Dominic was issued his OCT in May 1995.
Furthermore, the discrepancy in area of the "more than one hectare" land being claimed by
Cullado and the almost two hectares or 18,280 square meters land appearing in Dominic's OCT
was not satisfactorily reconciled in the RTC's Decision. The metes and bounds of the land being
claimed by Cullado being unclear, it could not be determined if it is within the boundaries of the
land technically described in Dominic's OCT. As required under Article 434 of the Civil Code,
"In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the
strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim." The heirs of Cullado have
failed to properly and sufficiently identify the property they are claiming as their own.
The Court notes that while the CA did not provisionally rule on the issue of ownership, it
nonetheless arrived at the same result, i.e., that the RTC had no jurisdiction to order the
reconveyance of the land covered by OCT P-61499 in the name of Dominic to the heirs of
Cullado and effectively nullify the said certificate of title
It was erroneous for petitioners to question the Torrens Original Certificate of Title issued to
private respondent over Lot No. 986 in Civil Case No. 671, an ordinary civil action for recovery
of possession filed by the registered owner of the said lot, by invoking as affirmative defense in
their answer the Order of the Bureau of Lands, dated July 19, 1978, issued pursuant to the
investigatory power of the Director of Lands under Section 91 of Public Land Law (C.A. 141 as
amended). Such a defense partakes of the nature of a collateral attack against a certificate of title
brought under the operation of the Torrens system of registration pursuant to Section 122 of the
Land Registration Act, now Section 103 of P .D. 1529. The case law on the matter does not
allow a collateral attack on the Torrens certificate of title on the ground of actual fraud. The rule
now finds expression in Section 48 of P.O. 1529 otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree. 62 (Emphasis in the original)
Since the special and affirmative defenses raised by the heirs of Cullado in the Answer pertain to
discrepancies or errors in Dominic's certificate of title, which necessarily entails a review of the
decree made in Dominic's favor, the RTC was bereft of any jurisdiction to rule on such defenses
in an action for recovery of possession or accion publiciana initiated by the registered owner.
The RTC even ruled on the issue of the nullity of Dominic's certificate of title on the ground of
his minority at the time of the issuance of the free patent in his favor - an issue that clearly
involved a collateral attack on Dominic's Torrens title, which "is beyond the province of this
proceeding and not within the jurisdiction of [the trial c]ourt.
Since the special and affirmative defenses raised by the heirs of Cullado in the Answer pertain to
discrepancies or errors in Dominic's certificate of title, which necessarily entails a review of the
decree made in Dominic's favor, the RTC was bereft of any jurisdiction to rule on such defenses
in an action for recovery of possession or accion publiciana initiated by the registered owner.
The RTC even ruled on the issue of the nullity of Dominic's certificate of title on the ground of
his minority at the time of the issuance of the free patent in his favor - an issue that clearly
involved a collateral attack on Dominic's Torrens title, which "is beyond the province of this
proceeding and not within the jurisdiction of [the trial c]ourt.
It is settled that in an action for reconveyance or accion reivindicatoria, the free patent and the
Torrens or certificate of title are respected as incontrovertible and what is sought instead is the
transfer of the property which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendant's
name. All that the plaintiff must allege in the complaint are two facts which, admitting them to
be true, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely, (1) that the
plaintiff was the owner of the land, and (2) that the defendant had illegally dispossessed him of
the same. 79 The action for reconveyance can be based on implied trust where the defendant
acquires the disputed property through mistake or fraud so that he would be bound to hold the
property for the benefit of the person who is truly entitled to it and reconvey it to him

Manotok Realty Inc. vs. CLT Realty Devt. Corp. , G.R. No. 123346, December
14, 2007.
Facts:
CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought to recover from Manotok Realty, Inc. and
Manotok Estate Corporation (Manotoks) the possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate in an
action filed before the Regional Trial Court
CLT's claim was anchored on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-177013 issued in its
name by the Caloocan City Register of Deeds, which title in turn was derived from Estelita
Hipolito (Hipolito) by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage
Hipolito's title emanated from Jose Dimson's (Dimson) TCT No. R-15169, a title issued pursuant
to an order of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City, Branch 33. Dimson's title
appears to have been sourced from OCT No. 994.
For their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied on by CLT, claiming that
Dimson's title, the proximate source of CLT's title, was irregularly issued and, hence, the same
and subsequent titles flowing therefrom are likewise void.
The Manotoks asserted... their ownership over Lot 26 and claimed that they derived it from
several awardees and/or vendees of the National Housing Authority.
The Manotok title likewise traced as its primary source OCT No. 994 which, on 9 September
1918, was transferred to
Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio who had previously acquired the property on 21 August
1918 by virtue of an "Escritura de Venta" executed by Don Tomas Arguelles and Don Enrique
Llopis.
Ruiz and Leuterio sold the property to
Francisco Gonzalez who held title thereto until 22 August 1938 when the property was
transferred to Jose Leon Gonzalez... under TCT No. 35486.
The lot... was then, per annotation dated 21 November 1946, subdivided into seven (7) parcels
each in the name of each of the Gonzalezes.
The trial court, ruling for CLT... the latter's... property indeed encroached on the property
described in CLT's title.
The Manotoks appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Dimson filed with the then CFI of Rizal,... a complaint for recovery of possession and damages
against Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc. (Araneta).
Dimson alleged that he was the absolute owner of part of the Maysilo Estate in
Malabon covered by TCT No. R-15169 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City.
Alleging that Araneta had been illegally occupying the land and that the latter refused to vacate
the same despite repeated demands, he prayed that Araneta be ordered to vacate the same and
remove all... improvements thereon and to return full possession thereof to him.
Araneta for its part admitted occupancy of the disputed land by constructing some buildings
thereon and subdividing portions thereof in the exercise of its right as absolute owner. He alleged
that Dimson's title... to the subject land was void and hence he had no cause of action.
The trial court ruled for Dimson... there were inherent technical infirmities or defects in the titles
that formed each link in the chain of ownership that culminated in the Manotok title, i.e., that the
technical... descriptions in the titles were written in Spanish whereas those in the alleged mother
title, OCT No. 994, were in English, which, an abnormal state that deviated from the usual
practice in the issuance of titles... the absence of the original survey dates of OCT No. 994 on
Manotok's chain of titles, the... trial court added, should mean that OCT No. 994 was not the
mother title not only because the original survey dates were different but also because the
original survey date must always be earlier than the issue date of the original title.
Undaunted, Araneta interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which... affirmed the lower
court's decision.
In so holding, the appellate court declared that the title of Araneta to the disputed land is a
nullity.
Araneta then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court attributing error to the Court of
Appeals in failing to recognize that it had a better right of possession over the property than did
Dimson.
CLT... maintains that the OCT should be deemed registered as of the date of issuance of the
decree of registration, 19 April 1917, instead of the date it was received for transcription by the
Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917. The... argument is based on the theory that it is "the decree of
registration [that] produces legal effects," though it "is entered before the transmittal of the same
for transcription at the Register of Deeds."
Issues:
whether the titles issued in the name of Dimson and of CLT are valid.
Which of the Certificates of Title of the contending parties are valid:
A. Petitioner's titles:
B. Respondents' Title:
Can this Court still overturn at this point its Decision in Metropolitan Water Works and
Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 103558, November 17, 1992) and
Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 96259, September 3, 1996) sustaining...
the validity of OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917 and nullify the same OCT No. 994
registered later, or on May 3, 1917?
Ruling:
the absence of merit in the petitions.
First, particularly with respect to G.R. No. 123346, the Court upheld the validity of the trial
court's adoption of the commissioners' majority report as part of the decision inasmuch as the
same... is allowed by Section 11, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court and that a case of overlapping
titles absolutely necessitates the assistance of experts in the field of geodetic engineering who, on
account of their experience and expertise, are in a better position to determine which of... the
contending titles is valid.
Second, the Court pointed out that the titles of respondents in all three cases were derived from
OCT No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan City registered on 19 April 1917. However, because the validity of said mother title
was upheld by the Court itself in MWSS and reiterated in Heirs of Gonzaga, the Court chose not
to delve anymore into the correctness of the said decisions which had... already attained finality
and immutability.
The Manotoks and Araneta duly filed their respective motions for reconsideration.
the cases were elevated to the Court en banc, which heard oral arguments on 1 August 2006.

Barstowe Philippines Corporation vs. Republic, G.R. NO. 133110, March 28,
2007.
Facts
This case involved the controversy as to who has the better right over the parcels of land. The
two conflicting parties are Barstowwe Philippines Corp (BRC) and the Republic.
BRC traced its title from Servando Accibal (Servando). On the contrary, the Republic traced its
title from First Philippine Holdings Corporation (FPHC).
The Republic filed a petition for cancellation of title against Antonio & Servando Accibal,
and BPC. During the pendency of the civil case, there are two intervenors. One intervenor is
Gloria Accibal Rettoriano who alleged that BCP’s TCT was obtained by Servando through fraud
and gross bad faith. The other intervenor is EL-VI Realty and Development Corporation (ERDC)
who alleged that it acquired interest in the subject lots after having entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement with BPC, for the development of the subject lots into a residential
subdivision. ERDC alleged that the action initiated by the Republic for the cancellation of
the TCTs of BPC was already barred by laches and estoppel because of the recognition accorded
upon the said TCTs by the instrumentalities of the Republic, particularly the Register of Deeds
and the HLURB.
The RTC ratiocinated that the title of BCP should prevail because the title of the latter’s
predecessor-in-interest were issued 5 or 6 years earlier than that of the predecessor-in-interest of
the Republic. However, the CA ruled in favor of the Republic. An investigation conducted by
the LRA revealed irregularities which raised serious doubts as to the validity and authenticity of
the certificate of titles of Servando. The LRA Report, found the said certificates of titles spurious
after a very detailed and exhaustive analysis of the evidence available. Hence, this petition.
In the petition before the Supreme Court, there are several parties who again filed a motion to
intervene, intervenors Abesamis, Nicolas-Agbulos, and spouses Santiago. All of them bought
some portions of the land which is the subject of the present controversy from BPC who is a
developer.
Moreover, the heirs of Servando filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Defer Resolution of the case
alleging that they were prevented from participating in Civil Case before the RTC because of the
fraudulent misrepresentations the BPC President.
Issue
Whether or not the State may still recover the ownership of lots sold in good faith by a private
developer to innocent purchasers for value.
Held
Generally, estoppel cannot lie against the State. An exception to that rule is when innocent
purchasers for value are involved. Time-settled is the doctrine that where innocent third persons,
relying on the correctness of the certificate of title, acquire rights over the property, courts cannot
disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. Such cancellation would impair
public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under
the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance whether the title has been regularly
issued or not.
In this case, the intervenor-buyers except for spouses Santiago are considered innocent purchaser
for value. Hence, their titles should be respected. In other words, the Republic cannot recover
from them.
Moreover, BPC is not an innocent purchaser for value. Hence, BPC’s title cannot prevail against
the State. As a result, the unsold lands should be returned to the Republic.
Hence, as far as the subdivision lots still in the name of BPC are concerned, the Republic has the
option to either (1) recover the said lots and demand that BPC demolish whatever improvements
it has made therein, to return the lots to their former condition, at the expense of BPC; or (2)
compel BPC to pay the price of the land. The choice can only be made by the Republic, as the
rightful owner of the said subject lots.
D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines and the Heirs of Julian Cruz,
represented by Macaria Cruz Estacio, G.R. No. 233339, February 13, 2019.
Facts:
DMCI filed an application for registration of title over a parcel of land with the MeTC. The
subject lot is denominated as Lot No. 5174-A, with an area of 4,935 square meters, more or less,
situated in Taguig, Metro Manila, and covered by survey plan. In its application, DMCI averred
that it acquired the land from Filomena D. San Pedro San Pedro by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale; that the land was not tenanted and there are no buildings or improvements thereon; that the
land was last assessed at P59,220.00 and that there is no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind
affecting the land; there are no other persons having any interest on or possession of the said
land; and that DMCI and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Julian Cruz, represented by Macaria C. Estacio, filed an opposition to the application claiming
that he is the owner of the subject parcel of land; that his predecessors-in-interest have occupied
and claimed the subject land since the 1920s as follows: 1) Pablo Cruz as shown by Tax
Declaration No. 4055, and 2) Abundia Cruz, as shown by Tax Declaration No. 10845 dated
October 26, 1941; and that the latest Tax Declaration over the subject property is under the name
of Abundia Cruz dated January 10, 1994. Cruz claims that San Pedro, who is claimed by DMCI
to be the former owner of the subject land, is one of the children of Dionisio who was a previous
tenant of the land; and that the tax declaration in the name of San Pedro, all dated 1995 or 1994,
cannot be considered as evidence of ownership.
Cruz died during trial. Upon motion of his heirs, represented by Macaria Cruz Estacio (Cruz
heirs), the MeTC granted the motion for substitution in an Order dated August 20, 2003.
After trial, the MeTC issued a Decision denying the application on the ground that DMCI failed
to prove its actual possession of the property and the possession of its predecessor-in-interest
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
DMCI filed a motion for reconsideration from the Decision dated July 28, 2011 claiming that 1)
inconsistencies in the testimony of San Pedro with respect to minor details may be disregarded
without impairing the credibility of the witness; and 2) DMCI has proven its open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945.
[Cruz heirs] opposed the motion for reconsideration, claiming that the testimony of San Pedro is
not only inconsistent but also false considering that DMCI failed to prove open, continuous, and
notorious possession over the subject property.
Republic of the Philippines [(Republic)], through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), also
opposed the motion for reconsideration, claiming that there is no showing that the subject land
forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of public domain and the documents offered in
evidence to prove this (survey plan and field inspection report) are not enough based on
prevailing jurisprudence; that neither [DMCI] nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land in the concept
of an owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier. San Pedro's inconsistent statements, as enumerated by
the MeTC, are clearly material and the documentary evidence presented by [DMCI] did not
show the required possession and occupation.
On September 7, 2012, the MeTC issued the assailed [O]rder granting the motion for
reconsideration and confirming the title of [DMCI] over the subject property. The said court
ruled that even if [DMCI's] earlier tax declaration was only for the year 1995, such fact will not
militate against the title of the former because as long as the testimony supporting possession for
the required period is credible, the court will grant the petition for registration; that [DMCI] has
acquired [registrable] title over the subject property anchored on its predecessors-in-interest's
possession tracked down from the time before the Japanese occupation; that the subject property
is within the area that was already declared as alienable and disposable, as shown by the
conversion plan and field inspection report for the subject property; and that the inconsistencies
in the testimony of San Pedro are minor which can be disregarded considering the other pieces of
evidence presented by [DMCI].
[The dispositive portion of the MeTC Order dated September 7, 2012 states:
WHEREFORE, the applicant's Motion for Reconsideration is granted. The Decision dated July
28, 2011 is hereby reconsidered and judgment is hereby rendered confirming the title of D.M.
Consunji, Inc. xxx over Lot 5174-A of conversion plan Swo-00-001460 covering an area of Four
Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty Nine (4,839) square meters situated at Barangay Bambang,
Taguig City, Metro Manila.
Hence, the appeal to the CA, which it found to have merit.][9]
Ruling of the CA
The CA in its Decision dated February 23, 2017 granted the appeal. The CA held that DMCI
failed to prove the following requisites under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1529 for land registration or judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title: (1) the subject
land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) the applicant
has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[10]
Regarding the first requirement, the CA held that the Survey Plan for Lot No. 5174-A, where
there is a notation which states that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable land area
as per project no. 27-B certified by the Bureau of Forest Development dated 03 January 1968"
and the Field Inspection Report issued by the South Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and the verification of the CENRO officer are inadequate to prove that the Subject Land is
alienable or disposable.[11]
Anent the second requirement, the evidence on record is insufficient to prove that San Pedro or
her father (Dionisio Dionisio) possessed or occupied the Subject Land in the concept of an owner
since June 12, 1945 or earlier as the records do not show proof of how San Pedro's father came
to own the Subject Land and how she inherited the same from her father and she admitted that
the Subject Land was only declared for tax purposes for the first time in 1995.[12]
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The order issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Taguig City Branch 74 dated September 7, 2012 in LRC Case No. 37 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The application for land registration filed by applicant-appellee D.M. Consunji, Inc.
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. [13]
DMCI filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its Resolution [14] dated
August 2, 2017.
Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition. The Cruz heirs filed their Comment [15] dated September 26,
2017. DMCI filed a Reply[16] dated September 7, 2018.
The Issues
The Petition raises the following issues:
1. whether the CA erred in ruling that DMCI failed to sufficiently prove that the Subject Land
forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
2. whether the CA erred in ruling that DMCI failed to sufficient y prove that its predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
Subject Land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition lacks merit.
Proof of alienability and disposability
DMCI insists that the Field Inspection Report conducted by the CENRO and the Survey Plan of
the Subject Land are adequate to prove that the Subject Land is included in the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain because the said Report contains the following statements:
1. The land is covered by Survey Plan Swo-00-001-1460 (5174 MCadm-590-D) approved by
the Director of Lands and re-approved by the Bureau of Lands DENR-NCR pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 239 dated July 9, 1975;
3. The entire area is within the alienable and disposable zone as classified under Project
No. 27-B, L.C. Map No. 2623;
7. It is covered by Tax Declaration No. D-010-00691 in the name of DMCI Project
Developers, Inc.[17] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
DMCI invokes Victoria v. Republic[18] (Victoria) and claims that the same pieces of evidence
which it adduced were presented by the applicant therein and the Court effectively recognized
in Victoria the authority of a Forest Management Specialist to issue a certification whether
certain public lands are alienable and disposable.[19]
In Victoria, Natividad Sta. Ana Victoria (Natividad) applied for registration of title to a 1,729-
square meter lot in Bambang, City of Taguig before the MeTC of that city. To show that the
subject lot is a portion of the land with an area of 17,507 square meters originally owned by her
father Genaro Sta. Ana, she presented Lot 5176-D, Mcadm-590-D of the Taguig Cadastral
Mapping. The Conversion/Subdivision Plan that Natividad presented in evidence showed that the
land is inside the alienable and disposable area under Project 27-B as per LC Map 2623, as
certified by the Bureau of Forest Development on January 3, 1968. The DENR Certification
submitted by Natividad reads:
This is to certify that the tract of land as shown and described at the reverse side of this
Conversion/Subdivision Plan of Lot 5176 MCadm 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping, Csd-00-
000648, containing an area of 17,507 square meters, situated at Bambang, Taguig City, Metro
Manila, as surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Justa M. de las Alas for Marissa S. Estopalla, et al.,
was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable Land, under Project No. 27-B, Taguig
City, Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on January 3, 1968.[20] (Emphasis omitted)
The Court[21] issued a Resolution dated July 28, 2010 requiring the OSG to verify from the
DENR whether the Senior Forest Management Specialist of its National Capital Region, Office
of the Regional Technical Director for Forest Management Services, who issued the aforesaid
certification, was authorized to issue certifications on the status of public lands as alienable and
disposable, and to submit a copy of the administrative order or proclamation that declared as
alienable and disposable the area where the property involved in Victoria was located, if there be
any. In compliance, the OSG submitted a certification from the DENR that Senior Forest
Management Specialist Corazon D. Calamno, who signed Natividad's DENR Certification, was
authorized to issue certifications regarding status of public land as alienable and disposable land.
The OSG also submitted a certified true copy of Forestry Administrative Order 4-1141 dated
January 3, 1968, signed by then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Arturo R.
Tanco, Jr., which declared portions of the public domain covered by Bureau of Forestry Map
LC-2623, approved on January 3, 1968, as alienable and disposable.[22]
The Court in Victoria observed that:
Since the OSG does not contest the authenticity of the DENR Certification, it seems too hasty for
the CA to altogether disregard the same simply because it was not formally offered in evidence
before the court below. More so when even the OSG failed to present any evidence in support of
its opposition to the application for registration during the trial at the MeTC. The attack on
[Natividad's] proof to establish the nature of the subject property was made explicit only when
the case was at the appeal stage in the Republic's appellant's brief. Only then did [Natividad] find
it necessary to present the DENR Certification, since she had believed that the notation in the
Conversion/Subdivision Plan of the property was sufficient.
In Llanes v. Republic,[23] this Court allowed a consideration of a CENRO Certification though it
was only presented during appeal to the CA to avoid a patent unfairness. The rules of procedure
being mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, the Court is empowered to
suspend their application to a particular case when its rigid application tends to frustrate rather
than promote the ends of justice.[24] Denying the application for registration now on the ground of
failure to present proof of the status of the land before the trial court and allowing [Natividad] to
re-file her application would merely unnecessarily duplicate the entire process, cause additional
expense and add to the number of cases that courts must resolve. It would be more prudent to
recognize the DENR Certification and resolve the matter now.[25]
On the other hand, the CA in its Decision cites Sps. Fortuna v. Republic[26] (Sps. Fortuna) in
support of its position that either the Survey Plan or the DENR-CENRO certification is sufficient
proof that the Subject Land is alienable and disposable. [27] In Sps. Fortuna, the CA declared that
the alienable nature of the subject land therein was established by the notation in the survey plan,
which states: "This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 13 L.C.
Map No. 1395 certified August 7, 1940. It is outside any civil or military
reservation."[28] However, the Court[29] in Sps. Fortuna ruled:
Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties'
alienable and disposable character.[30] These notations, at the very least, only establish that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved alienable and disposable
area per verification through survey by the proper government office. The applicant, however,
must also present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and
disposable land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.
[31]
In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,[32] the Court ruled that
[t]he applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that
the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO[33] or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of
the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the
DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President.
The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the President or the
DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the public land as alienable and disposable. The
offices that prepared these documents are not the official repositories or legal custodian of the
issuances of the President or the DENR Secretary declaring the public land as alienable and
disposable.[34]
In the recent case of In Re: Application for Land Registration, Suprema T. Dumo v. Republic of
the Philippines,[35] the Court reiterated the requirement it set in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc.[36] (T.A.N. Properties) that there are two documents which must be presented to prove that
the land subject of the application for registration is alienable and disposable. These are: (1) a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy
by the legal custodian of the official records, and (2) a certificate of land classification status
issued by the CENRO or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO)
based on the land classification approved by the DENR Secretary. [37] It must be noted that Sps.
Fortuna made reference to T.A.N. Properties.
Victoria and Sps. Fortuna are not incompatible with each other. In fact, they are complementary.
To recall, the Court ordered the OSG in Victoria to verify from the DENR whether the Senior
Forest Management Specialist, who issued the certification, was authorized to issue certifications
on the status of public lands as alienable and disposable, and to submit a copy of the
administrative order or proclamation that declared as alienable and disposable the area where the
property therein was located. In compliance therewith, the OSG submitted a certification from
the DENR that the officer, who signed the DENR Certification, was authorized to issue
certifications regarding status of public land as alienable and disposable land and a certified true
copy of Forestry Administrative Order 4-1141 dated January 3, 1968, signed by then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources Arturo R. Tanco, Jr. (Secretary Tanco), which declared
portions of the public domain covered by Bureau of Forestry Map LC-2623, approved on
January 3, 1968 as alienable and disposable. It is clear that the contents of the two documents,
adverted to above, that are needed to be presented to prove that the land subject of the
application for registration is alienable and disposable land of the public domain have been
substantially reflected in those submissions.
Unfortunately, in this case, the OSG has not been required to make the necessary verification and
has not submitted the two documents that it submitted in Victoria. The invocation by DMCI
of Victoria in this case is, thus, misplaced.
The stance of the Court in Victoria is understandable. It was convinced that: "[Natividad] has,
contrary to the Solicitor General's allegation, proved that she and her predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the subject lot continuously, uninterruptedly, openly, publicly, adversely
and in the concept of owners since the early 1940s. In fact, she has submitted tax declarations
covering the land way back in 1948 that appeared in her father's name."[38]
Proof of open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession since June
12, 1945 or earlier
The Court will now proceed to the second issue, which is factual. Under the Rules, a Rule 45
petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law [39] and a review is not a matter
of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor.[40]
DMCI has not directly pointed to any of the exceptions where the Court may review the findings
of fact of the CA in a Rule 45 certiorari petition. However, based on its arguments, it appears
that DMCI is invoking the MeTC's Order dated September 7, 2012 wherein it stated that the
issue on the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession since June 12, 1945 by DMCI
and its predecessors-in-interest was testified on by Hilberto Hostillero, representative of DMCI,
Francisco Esteban, former tenant of its predecessor-in-interest, Eugenio Castro, adjoining owner,
and San Pedro; and such proof of possession was bolstered by the Field Inspection Report of
DENR Special Investigator, Antonio M. Lachica. [41] Since the findings of fact of the trial court
are at odds with those of the CA, the Court is allowed to make a fact-check.
While DMCI insists that its evidence is sufficient, DMCI has, however, failed to squarely
address the CA's finding in its Decision that the records do not show proof of how San Pedro's
father came to own the Subject Land and how she inherited the same from her father. These are
crucial facts that DMCI needed to establish to show that its predecessor-in-interest had prior
valid claim of ownership over the Subject Land. Precisely, San Pedro's claim of ownership rests
on these crucial facts, and without them such claim becomes tenuous. With these facts missing,
the Court wholly agrees with the CA that "evidence on record is insufficient to prove that San
Pedro or her father possessed or occupied the subject land in the concept of an owner since June
12, 1945, or earlier."[42]
Also, the evidence that the Cruz heirs adduced to disprove DMCI's claim of ownership,
including Tax Declaration No. 10845 dated October 26, 1941, cast serious doubt on DMCI's
evidence to show its and its predecessors-in-interest's open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Without the Court being convinced that the CA erred in its ruling with respect to the second
issue, the Court cannot extend to DMCI the latitude it accorded to Natividad in Victoria.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated February 23, 2017 and
Resolution dated August 2, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 99963
are AFFIRMED SO ORDERED.

Republic vs. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc., G.R. No. 156951 &
173408, Sept. 22, 2006
NATURE: Two consolidated cases.
 G.R. No. 156951: Petition for review under Rule 45 from the CA decision affirming RTC’s
dismissal of the Republic’s complaint.
 G.R. No. 173408: Contempt proceedings against Lt. Gen. Esperon.
FACTS:
 July 12, 1957: Pres. Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423 establishing a military
reservation (Fort William McKinley, now Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation [FBMR]).
 The proclamation withdrew from sale or settlement and reserved for military purposes, under
the administration of the Chief of Staff of the AFP certain parcels of land:
o Parcel No. 2
o Parcel No. 3-A – 15,912,684 sq. m.
o Parcel No. 4-A – 7,660,128 sq. m.
 Excludes American Battle Monument Cemetery, Traffic Circle, and Diplomatic & Consular
Area.
 1965: Proclamations No. 461 and 462 excluded certain portions of the land from the operation
of Proclamation No. 423. o AFP Officer’s Village o AFP EM’s Village
 1922: Congress enacted the Bases Conversion and Development Act (BCDA, RA 7227). o
BCDA authorized to dispose of certain portions of Fort Bonifacio 6 months after approval of the
Act.
 This case concerns an area of 39.99 hectares known as the JUSMAG Housing Area. o
Occupied by military officers and their families.
 Southside Homeowners Association, Inc. (SHAI) is composed mostly of AFP.
 Oct. 30, 1991: RD of Rizal issued TCT No. 15084 on the basis of a deed of sale purportedly
executed by LMB Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr. in favor of SHAI. o P30/ sq. m. =
P11,997,660.
 DOJ invested reported land scams at the FBMR. The Oct. 30, 1991 deed of sale was sent to the
NBI for examination. o Result: Palad’s signature is the product of TRACING PROCESS by
CARBON-OUTLINE METHOD.
 Oct. 16, 1993: Pres. Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 173 directing the OSG to institute
cancellation proceedings concerning TCT No. 15084.
 Nov. 15, 1993: The OSG filed the complaint for nullification and cancellation of title before
the Pasig RTC. Alleging the nullity of the title, the OSG averred that: o Palad’s signature on the
deed of sale was a forgery; o There are no records with the LMB of the application to purchase
and the payment of the purchase price; and o The property is inalienable as it forms part of the
military reservation established under Proclamation No. 423.
 SHAI: The deed of sale is a valid document which the Republic is estopped to deny. o Also
presented receipts to reflect payment of the purchase price.
 Pre-trial: Issues limited to the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale and TCT.
 Witnesses for the Republic: o NBI Document Examiner Constantino: Signature is a forgery. o
Director Palad: He did not sign the same, let alone before a notary public outside the LMB. Also,
the land is inalienable.
 Witnesses for SHAI:
o Police Inspector Caimbon: Signature is genuine.
o SHAI President Santos: Applications to purchase were signed and filed with a certain Engr.
Eugenia Balis.
o Also presented a letter purportedly authored by Dir. Palad opining that the TCT must be
genuine as it emanated from the RD of Rizal. He later denied authorship.
 RTC: Dismissed the complaint. (Oct. 7, 1997)
 CA: Affirmed. (Jan. 28, 2003)
 Hence this appeal by the Republic, alleging that the CA completely ignored, overlooked and/or
grossly misappreciated facts of substance which, if duly considered, will materially affect the
outcome of this case.
 According to SHAI, the issue of inalienability of the area in dispute is outside the issue agreed
upon at pre-trial.
ISSUES + RULING:
WoN the issue of inalienability of the disputed portion of land may still be litigated in the present
case. YES.
 This case falls under the exception to the rule that Rule 45 petitions are limited to questions of
law, specifically:
o When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which if properly considered would justify a different conclusion.
 Besides, the Court has the inherent power to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case
from its operations whenever the demands of justice so require.
 The rationale behind the rule that issues must be limited to those discussed at pre-trial is to
prevent surprise. Here, the element of surprise is not present as the issue of inalienability was
raised in the Republic’s complaint.
 Moreover, Palad was examined as to the issue. SHAI did not object to his testimony.
WoN the JUSMAG area may be the subject of disposition. NO. It is still part of the military
reservation, hence, not alienable and disposable.
 Under Sec. 83 of the Public Land Act, the President, by proclamation, may designate any tract
or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic or any of its
branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes. o Land reserved as such will be non-alienable, not
subject to sale or other disposition.
 Consistent with the foregoing postulates, jurisprudence teaches that a military reservation, like
the FBMR, or a part thereof is not open to private appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not
registrable, unless it is in the meantime reclassified and declared as disposable and alienable
public land. o Until reclassified by law or presidential proclamation, its status as part of a
military reservation remains, even if it is not used as a military camp or for defense.
 SHAI: The JUSMAG area is private property of the government, removed from the concept of
public domain.
 SC: SHAI’s evidence belies this claim.
o Technical description in TCT No. 15084: the parcel of land is a portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-
2031.
o To recall, Proclamation No. 423 listed Parcel No. 3 as falling within its coverage.
 The Republic only had to prove that Parcel No. 3 has been reserved for military purposes. The
evidence of this fact is Proclamation No. 423, of which the Court can take judicial notice.
 SHAI failed to specifically deny the Republic’s allegation that the JUSMAG area is part of the
coverage of Proclamation No. 423.
o The defendant must specify each material factual allegation the truth of which he absolutely
denies and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he will
rely to support his denial.
 SHAI had the burden of proving that the parcels of land covered by TCT No. 15084 had
already been withdrawn from the reservation or excluded from the coverage of Proclamation
NO. 423.
o It failed to prove that there exists any presidential act specifically withdrawing the disputed
parcels from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423.
o Instead, SHAI actually made a judicial admission:
 In a letter addressed to the SHAI President, the possibility of exclusion of the Southside
Housing Area from the military reservation was discussed.
 The CA was swayed by SHAI’s assertion that since Proclamations No. 461 and 172 excluded
the total area of 4,436,678 sq. m. from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423, the JUSMAG area
should be deemed excluded since what will be left is only 16 ha. o Per the SC’s count,
Proclamation No. 423 reserved for military purposes roughly a total area of 25,875,000 square
meters, not 7,053,143. On the other hand, Proclamation Nos. 461 and 172 excluded a combined
area of 6,892,338 square meters.
o SHAI’s conclusion is merely speculative.
 The October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale purportedly executed by Palad, assuming for the nonce its
authenticity, could not plausibly be the requisite classifying medium converting the JUSMAG
area into a disposable parcel.
o The Republic cannot be estopped from questioning the validity of the deed of sale.
o It is not usually estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.
 Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private respondent are, or at least at
the time of the supposed transaction were, still part of the FBMR, the purported sale is
necessarily void ab initio. Assuming arguendo that the JUSMAG area is alienable and
disposable,
WoN SHAI may acquire the same. NO.
 §3, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution forbids private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain, except through lease for a limited period.
o The reason for the ban is not very clear under existing jurisprudence.
WoN Dir. Palad’s signature on the Oct. 30, 1991 deed of sale is authentic. NO.
 Palad categorically declared that his said signature on the deed is a forgery. o NBI and PNP
experts cancel each other out.
 Palad signed in Manila (LMB office), but the deed of sale was notarized the same day in Pasig.
o Entire process completed in one day.
o Why would a bureau head go to another city just to have a deed of sale notarized?
 There is no record of the requisite public land application to purchase required under §89 of the
Public Land Act.
  The Official Receipt No. 6030203C presented by SHAI does not pertain to the LMB. Neither
is it attached or appended to any of SHAI’s pleadings.
 The entire amount (11 million) was apparently paid in P500 and P100 denominations.
 Engr. Eugenia Balis, the purported facilitator of this transaction, was never presented in court.
WoN Lt. General Esperon should be cited in contempt. NO.
 The question raised by the petitioners therein respecting the ownership of the JUSMAG area
and, accordingly, of the right of the petitioning retired military officers to remain in the housing
units each may be occupying is now moot and academic. DISPOSITION: Reversed. TCT No.
15084 is VOID.

Province Of North Cotabato vs. Republic Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, Gr

No.183591, Oct 14, 2008.
Facts:

Subject of this case is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
which is scheduled to be signed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
MILF in August 05, 2008. Five cases bearing the same subject matter were consolidated by this
court namely:-

 GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol on its

prayer to declare unconstitutional and to have the MOA-AD disclosed to the
public and be open for public consultation.
 GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare null and
void said MOA-AD and to exclude the city to the BJE.
 GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from signing the
MOA-AD and additionally impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita.
 GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to declare
null and void the MOA-AD and without operative effect and those
respondents enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.
 GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a judgment
prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and
executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or
similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and
illegal and impleading Iqbal.
 The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by and between the
government and the MILF starting in 1996; then in 1997, they signed the Agreement on General
Cessation of Hostilities; and the following year, they signed the General Framework of
Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. However, in 1999 and in the early of 2000, the MILF
attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao. In March 2000, they took the hall of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte; hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an all-out war-which tolled the
peace negotiation. It was when then Pres. Arroyo assumed office, when the negotiation regarding
peace in Mindanao continued. MILF was hesitant; however, this negotiation proceeded when the
government of Malaysia interceded. Formal peace talks resumed and MILF suspended all its
military actions. The Tripoli Agreement in 2001 lead to the ceasefire between the parties. After
the death of MILF Chairman Hashim and Iqbal took over his position, the crafting of MOA-AD
in its final form was born.

 MOA-AD Overview
This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as reference in the birth of
this MOA-AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law, international laws
such as ILO Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e compact right
entrenchment (law of compact, treaty and order). The body is divided into concepts and
principles, territory, resources, and governance.

Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as all indigenous peoples
of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These people have the right to self- governance of their
Bangsamoro homeland to which they have exclusive ownership by virtue of their prior rights of
occupation in the land. The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First
Nation' with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of
amity and commerce with foreign nations." It then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral
Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.

As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region, involving the present ARMM, parts of which are those which voted in the
inclusion to ARMM in a plebiscite. The territory is divided into two categories, “A” which will
be subject to plebiscite not later than 12 mos. after the signing and “B” which will be subject to
plebiscite 25 years from the signing of another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD
that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline of the BJE
territory; they shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal
waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of
mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the government shall
exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural resources. There will also
be sharing of minerals in the territorial waters; but no provision on the internal waters.

Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade
missions in those countries, as well as environmental cooperation agreements, but not to include
aggression in the GRP. The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of
the government. The BJE shall have participation in international meetings and events" like
those of the ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to
participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border
agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of incomes and
revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the
ancestral domain. The BJE shall also have the right to explore its resources and that the sharing
between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources
is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. And they shall have the right to cancel or modify concessions
and TLAs.

And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship between the GRP and
MILF is associative i.e. characterized by shared authority and responsibility. This structure of
governance shall be further discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which was
highly contested before the court. The BJE shall also be given the right to build, develop and
maintain its own institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the comprehensive
compact as well.

Issues:

1. WON the petitions have complied with the procedural requirements for the exercise of judicial
review

2. WON respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and
the right to information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD; and

3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the laws

Ruling:

The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law and the Constitution.

 On the Procedural Issue

1st issue: As regards the procedural issue, SC upheld that there is indeed a need for the exercise
of judicial review.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversy, that is the court will
decline on issues that are hypothetical, feigned problems or mere academic questions. Related to
the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. The contention of
the SolGen is that there is no issue ripe for adjudication since the MOA-AD is only a proposal
and does not automatically create legally demandable rights and obligations. Such was denied.

The SC emphasized that the petitions are alleging acts made in violation of their duty or in grave
abuse of discretion. Well-settled jurisprudence states that acts made by authority which exceed
their authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution
and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus,
and an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of
government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. This is aside from the fact that concrete
acts made under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe and that
the law or act in question as not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the personalities of the Province of Cotabato,
Province of Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention
Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon to have locus standi
since it is their LGUs which will be affected in whole or in part if include within the BJE.
Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that
government funds would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional
plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing.
Senator Mar Roxas is also given a standing as an intervenor. And lastly, the Intervening
respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group
for justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal
Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers since they stand
to be benefited or prejudiced in the resolution of the petitions regarding the MOA-AD.

On the contention of mootness of the issue considering the signing of the MOA-AD has already
been suspended and that the President has already disbanded the GRP, the SC disagrees. The
court reiterates that the moot and academic principle is a general rule only, the exceptions,
provided in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, that it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic,
if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional
character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case
is capable of repetition yet evading review; and that where there is a voluntary cessation of the
activity complained of by the defendant or doer, it does not divest the court the power to hear
and try the case especially when the plaintiff is seeking for damages or injunctive relief.

Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the MOA-AD and the disbandment of the GRP did not
render the petitions moot and academic. The MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments
including possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to
formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the
government and its negotiating entity.

At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions. There is a
reasonable expectation that petitioners will again be subjected to the same problem in the future
as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. But with respect to the
prayer of Mandamus to the signing of the MOA-AD, such has become moot and academic
considering that parties have already complied thereat.

 On the Substantive Issue

2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving as it does the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at
large.

As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, and integrated therein is the recognition of the duty of the officialdom to
give information even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete
ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the
people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by
following such policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and
essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people.

Also, it was held that such stipulation in the Constitution is self-executory with reasonable
safeguards —the effectivity of which need not await the passing of a statute. Hence, it is
essential to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the
government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political
discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the
people's will.

The idea of a feedback mechanism was also sought for since it is corollary to the twin rights to
information and disclosure. And feedback means not only the conduct of the plebiscite as per the
contention of the respondents. Clearly, what the law states is the right of the petitioners to be
consulted in the peace agenda as corollary to the constitutional right to information and
disclosure. As such, respondent Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion for failing to carry
out the furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in
excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and
despotic exercise thereto. Moreover, he cannot invoke of executive privilege because he already
waived it when he complied with the Court’s order to the unqualified disclosure of the official
copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD.

In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right to be involved in matters related to such peace talks
as enshrined in the State policy. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and
unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could
pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants
from their total environment.

With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the right to participate fully at all levels on decisions
that would clearly affect their lives, rights and destinies. The MOA-AD is an instrument
recognizing ancestral domain, hence it should have observed the free and prior informed consent
to the ICC/IPPs; but it failed to do so. More specially noted by the court is the excess in authority
exercised by the respondent—since they allowed delineation and recognition of ancestral domain
claim by mere agreement and compromise; such power cannot be found in IPRA or in any law to
the effect.
3rd issue: With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they
cannot be all accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them:

 On matters of the Constitution.

Association as the type of relationship governing between the parties. The parties manifested
that in crafting the MOA-AD, the term association was adapted from the international law. In
international law, association happens when two states of equal power voluntarily establish
durable links i.e. the one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other,
principal, while maintaining its international status as state; free association is a middle ground
between integration and independence. The MOA-AD contains many provisions that are
consistent with the international definition of association which fairly would deduced that the
agreement vest into the BJE a status of an associated state, or at any rate, a status closely
approximating it. The court vehemently objects because the principle of association is not
recognized under the present Constitution.

 On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies power beyond what
the Constitution can grant to a local government; even the ARMM do not have such
recognition; and the fact is such concept implies recognition of the associated entity as a
state. There is nothing in the law that contemplate any state within the jurisdiction other
than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to
prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. The court disagrees with the
respondent that the MOA-AD merely expands the ARMM. BJE is a state in all but name
as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into
relations with other states. As such the MOA-AD clearly runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

 On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in the BJE includes
those areas who voted in the plebiscite for them to become part of the ARMM. The
stipulation of the respondents in the MOA-AD that these areas need not participate in the
plebiscite is in contrary to the express provision of the Constitution. The law states that
that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." Clearly, assuming that the BJE is
just an expansion of the ARMM, it would still run afoul the wordings of the law since
those included in its territory are areas which voted in its inclusion to the ARMM and not
to the BJE.
  On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity. The respondents contend that the powers
vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD shall be within sub-paragraph 9 of sec 20, art. 10 of
the constitution and that a mere passage of a law is necessary in order to vest in the BJE
powers included in the agreement. The Court was not persuaded. SC ruled that such
conferment calls for amendment of the Constitution; otherwise new legislation will not
concur with the Constitution. Take for instance the treaty making power vested to the
BJE in the MOA-AD. The Constitution is clear that only the President has the sole organ
and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nation. Should the BJE be granted
with the authority to negotiate with other states, the former provision must be amended
consequently. Section 22 must also be amended—the provision of the law that promotes
national unity and development. Because clearly, associative arrangement of the MOA-
AD does not epitomize national unity but rather, of semblance of unity. The associative
ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of
Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a
preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.

 On matters of domestic statutes.

o Provisions contrary to the organic act of ARMM. RA 9054 is a bar to the adoption of the
definition of Bangsamoro people used in the MOA-AD. Said law specifically distinguishes
between the Bangsamoro people and the Tribal peoples that is contrary with the definition of the
MOA-AD which includes all indigenous people of Mindanao.

o Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also, the delineation and recognition of the ancestral
domain is a clear departure from the procedure embodied in the IPRA law which ironically is the
term of reference of the MOA-AD.

 On matters of international law.

The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part of the law of
the land. In international law, the right to self-determination has long been recognized which
states that people can freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social, and cultural development. There are the internal and external self-determination—
internal, meaning the self-pursuit of man and the external which takes the form of the assertion
of the right to unilateral secession. This principle of self-determination is viewed with respect
accorded to the territorial integrity of existing states. External self-determination is only afforded
in exceptional cases when there is an actual block in the meaningful exercise of the right to
internal self-determination. International law, as a general rule, subject only to limited and
exceptional cases, recognizes that the right of disposing national territory is essentially an
attribute of the sovereignty of every state.

On matters relative to indigenous people, international law states that indigenous peoples
situated within states do not have a general right to independence or secession from those states
under international law, but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the
right to internal self-determination; have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters
relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their
autonomous functions; have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.

Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the State to guarantee the indigenous people
their own police and security force; but rather, it shall be the State, through police officers, that
will provide for the protection of the people. With regards to the autonomy of the indigenous
people, the law does not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status
of a state; since it would impair the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent states.

 On the basis of the suspensive clause.

o It was contented by the respondents that grave abuse of discretion cannot be had, since the
provisions assailed as unconstitutional shall not take effect until the necessary changes to the
legal framework are effected.

The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive clause runs contrary to Memorandum of Instructions
from the President stating that negotiations shall be conducted in accordance to the territorial
integrity of the country—such was negated by the provision on association incorporated in the
MOA-AD. Apart from this, the suspensive clause was also held invalid because of the delegated
power to the GRP Peace panel to advance peace talks even if it will require new legislation or
even constitutional amendments. The legality of the suspensive clause hence hinges on the query
whether the President can exercise such power as delegated by EO No.3 to the GRP Peace Panel.
Well settled is the rule that the President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not
possess. The power of the President to conduct peace negotiations is not explicitly mentioned in
the Constitution but is rather implied from her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-
chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace,
and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion
and lawless violence.

As such, the President is given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations,
solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. At all event, the
president may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable; but
she may not be prevented from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could
then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional
amendment and revision.

While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only
by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum - she
may submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve
the arrogation of constituent powers. Clearly, the principle may be inferred that the President - in
the course of conducting peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those
policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them
without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were
assumed as a certainty. The President’s power is limited only to the preservation and defense of
the Constitution but not changing the same but simply recommending proposed amendments or
revisions.

o The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is not a suspensive condition but is a term because
it is not a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will take effect; but,
when. Hence, the stipulation is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal
framework –which changes would include constitutional amendments. Simply put, the
suspensive clause is inconsistent with the limits of the President's authority to propose
constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points"
found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional.

 On the concept underlying the MOA-AD.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration
binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments
is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. The
MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law
notwithstanding, respondents' almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal
framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not
in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a
state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people
would give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such an act would amount to
authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional
Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the
Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or
interference with that process.

Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. vs. Masweng, Gr No. 180882, Feb. 27, 2013.
Chavez vs. Philippine Estates Authority, GR 133250, July 9, 2002.
FACTS:
Through PD No. 1084, the Public Estates Authority (PEA) was tasked by former president and
dictator Ferdinand Marcos, to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas and to
develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. As a result, an amendment
was made on a previous contract with Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP). Prior to PEA, CDCP was tasked to reclaim certain forshore and offshore
areas of Manila Bay. The amended contract now directed CDCP to transfer to PEA all the
development rights, title, interest and partitipation of CDCP in the reclamation.
Under former President Cory Aquino, titles of parcels of land reclaimed under Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) were transferred to PEA. These covered three
reclaimed islands known as the “Freedom Islands.”
PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation to
develop the Freedom Islands, notably the reclamation of an additional 250 ha of submerged areas
surrounding these islands to complete the plan. The JVA was entered into through negotiation
without public bidding. Former President Fidel Ramos then approved the JVA.
Controversy broke out when then Senate President Ernesto Maceda denounced the JVA as the
grandmother of all scams. The Senate conducted a joint investigation and concluded that the
reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of public domain
which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate
these lands. Moreover, the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands were void, and that
the JVA itself was illegal.
In his capacity as taxpayer, petitioner Frank Chavez filed a petition for mandamus with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. He argued
that the government will lose billions of pesos in the JVA. He sought for the public disclosure of
the renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Constitutional right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.
He also alleged that the JVA is against the Constitutional prohibition on the sale of alienable
lands of the public domain to public corporations.
A year after the filing of the petition, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement (Amended JVA). Former President Estrada signed the Amended JVA.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the amended JVA violates the Constitution. -- YES.
2. Whether information on ongoing negotiations may be disclosed to the public. --
NO.
HELD:
The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157. 84 ha have been
reclaimed. The rest are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay. Under the agreement,
AMARI will shoulder the reclamation of the freedom island and it will get 70% of the usable
area. AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5 ha of reclaimed land wich will be titled
in its name.
PD No 1085, coupled with President Aquino’s actual issuance of a special patent covering the
Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Freedom Islands are thus alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.
However, at this time, the Freedom Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of the
land mass after PEA had already reclaimed it. However, the additional 592.15 ha are still
submerged and forming part of the Manila Bay. There is also no legislative or presidential act
regarding these remaining areas.
Also, the mere physical act of reclamation of PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not
make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less
patrimonial lands of PEA. It still needs the authorization of DENR, which classifies lands of
public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the President’s approval.
Absent two official acts – a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to
disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed
by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain.
PEA is also mandated to call for a public bidding. Only if this failed that a negotiated sale is
allowed. The failure of the public bidding involving only 407.84 ha is not a valid justification for
a negotiated sale of 750 ha.
A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government BOT
project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in view of the
constitutional ban.
Ownership of PEA of the said lands of public domain does not convert them to private lands.
Jurisprudence holding that there is conversion to private land upon the grant of the patent or
issuance of the certificate of title does not apply to government units like PEA.
The rationale behind ban on corporation acquiring, except through lease, alienable lands of
public domain is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage "owner-cultivatorship and
the economic family-size farm" and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge
landholdings spawn social unrest. In practice, this ban strengthens limitation on individuals from
acquiring more than the allowed area by simply stting up a corporation to acquire more land.
On the right to information:
The right to information does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under
the separation of powers. In this case, the information demanded by Chavez is privileged
information rooted in the separation of powers.