POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

MANOSCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Fact: Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig. Metro
Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square meters. When the parcel was
ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni
Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 42 of Presidential Decree
No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was approved by
the Minister of Education, Culture, and Sports At the same time, respondent Republic filed an
urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the
property. The motion was opposed by petitioners. After a hearing, the trial court issued an order
fixing the provisional market and assessed values of the property, and authorizing the Republic
to take over the property once the required sum would have been deposited with the Municipal
Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation
was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of
public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious
entity, contrary to the provision of the Constitution. Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, a
suspension in the implementation of the 03rd August 1989 order of the trial court. On 15
February 1990, following the filing by respondent Republic of its reply to petitioners’ motion
seeking the dismissal of the case, the trial court issued its denial of said motion to dismiss.6 Five
(5) days later, or on 20 February 1990,7 another order was issued by the trial court, declaring
moot and academic the motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the order of 03 August
1989 with the rejection of petitioners’ motion to dismiss. Petitioners’ motion for the
reconsideration of the 20th February 1990 order was likewise denied by the trial court in its 16th
April 1991 order. Petitioners then lodged a petition with the Court of Appeals which the
appellate court dismissed for failure to show any grave abuse of discretion or lack of
jurisdictional competence on the part of the trial court. A motion for the reconsideration of the
decision was denied subsequently by the appellate court.

Issue: Whether the expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act
would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article
VI, of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling: No, Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking
property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, “public use” confers the same benefit
or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by the public. It is measured in terms
of the right of the public to use proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long
as the public has right of use, whether exercised by one or many members of the public, a
“public advantage” or “public benefit” accrues sufficient to constitute a public use. The idea that
“public use” is strictly limited to clear cases of “use by the public” has long been discarded.
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 REYES VS. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
CITY OF MANILA VS. TE

EPZA VS. DULAY

Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export
Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio
Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered
under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the
agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the
appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that
the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was
objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just
compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and
the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of
the commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus
enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.
Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in
PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD
1533 is unconstitutional. The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes
impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a
matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation
in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be
awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial
function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but
when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may
not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can
mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the
courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.
REPUBLIC VS. CASTELLVI
Facts: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government
in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959.
During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the
property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings began. The owner
maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced occupying the
said land as lessee because the essential elements of the “taking” of property under the power of
eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemner upon the private property
for more than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.

Issue: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemner has entered
and occupied the property as lessee.

Ruling: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings
commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter private property, (2) for
more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public
use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5)
substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied
the property under a contract of lease.

REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS

POLICE POWER

LOZANO V. MARTINEZ
Facts: Petitioners were charged with violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Check Law). They moved
seasonably to quash the information on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an
offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial
courts, except in one case, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed
the case. The parties adversely affected thus appealed.

Issues:
1. Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to
debt
2. Whether it impairs freedom of contract
3. Whether it contravenes the equal protection clause

Ruling:
1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished by
BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation that the law punishes. The
law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by
the law. The law punishes the act, not as an offense against property, but an offense against
public order.

Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is
an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on
deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to
the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid
upon presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of
payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as
convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis or
foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of
checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice,
therefore, tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless
checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcend the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touch the interests of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The
harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand-
fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system, and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is the freedom to enter into
“lawful” contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must
bear in mind that checks cannot be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument
that, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of
the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the
laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is
contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since
without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would
be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should
punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners’ posture ignores the well-accepted
meaning of the clause “equal protection of the laws.” The clause does not preclude the
classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as
the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.

YNOT V. IAC
Facts: On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate
to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the
constitutionality of the executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the
merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the
constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court
but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

Issue: Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling: The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A
amending EO 626 in basic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The supreme court said that the reasonable connection between the means employed
and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court
do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in
one province than in another. Retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them
there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner, and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried
out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were
arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after
he had filed a complaint about recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The
measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard,
thus denying due process.

TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ

Facts: Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao
sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However,
they either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and administered by the Center for
Educational Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for
admission into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT,
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for
Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and
Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of
Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a)
and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23
August 1985 [which established a uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional requirement
for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines,
beginning with the school year 1986-1987] and from requiring the taking and passing of the
NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with
accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on
26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of a preliminary
injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and
administered as previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil Action
for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the RTC judge denying the
petition for issuance of a writ of the preliminary injunction.
Issues: Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee for the accessibility of education to all, and whether such regulation is
invalid and/or unconstitutional.
Ruling: No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the
“Medical Act of 1959″ defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization and
regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the
supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. The Statute
created a Board of Medical Education and prescribed certain minimum requirements for
applicants to medical schools.
The petitioners invoke several provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their assertion,
violated by the continued implementation of Section 5(a) and (f) of RA 238, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52 series 1985. One of the provisions in Article 14, Section 1 which states
“The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and
take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.
The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education “accessible to
all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely
to make such education accessible to all who qualify under “fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements.”
Also, the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by the petitioners, to the mind of
the Court, is a valid exercise of the Police Power of the State. The police power is the pervasive
and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote important interests
and needs -- in other words, the public order -- of the general community. An important
component of that public order is health and physical safety and well-being of the population, the
securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and
regulation.
The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and
control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine. Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who
wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been
recognized as valid exercises of governmental powers. Similarly, the establishment of minimum
medical education requirements for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained
as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.
Thus, prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain scores as a condition for admission to medical
schools do not constitute unconstitutional imposition.
Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS VS. CITY OF MANILA

Facts: On June 13, 1963, the

Municipal Board of Manila passed
Ordinance No. 4760 with the
following
provisions questioned for its violation
of due process: refraining from
entertaining or accepting any guest
or customer unless it fills out a
prescribed form in the lobby in open
view; prohibiting admission o less
than 18 years old; usurious increase of
license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o
150% and 200% respectively
(tax issue also); making unlawful lease
or rent more than twice every 24
hours; and cancellation of
license for subsequent violation. The
lower court issued preliminary
injunction and petitioners raised the
case to SC on certiorari.
Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with
the due process requirement of the
constitution?
Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals.
There is no violation o constitutional
due process for being reasonable and
the ordinance is enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality
absent any irregularity on its face. .As
such a limitation cannot be viewed
as a transgression against the
command of due process. It is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the
opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such
premises could be, and, according to
the explanatory note, are being
devoted. Taxation may be made to
implement a police power and the
amount, object, and instance of
taxation is dependent upon the local
legislative body. Judgment of lower
court reversed and injunction lifted
Facts: On June 13, 1963, the
Municipal Board of Manila passed
Ordinance No. 4760 with the
following
provisions questioned for its violation
of due process: refraining from
entertaining or accepting any guest
or customer unless it fills out a
prescribed form in the lobby in open
view; prohibiting admission o less
than 18 years old; usurious increase of
license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o
150% and 200% respectively
(tax issue also); making unlawful lease
or rent more than twice every 24
hours; and cancellation of
license for subsequent violation. The
lower court issued preliminary
injunction and petitioners raised the
case to SC on certiorari.
Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with
the due process requirement of the
constitution?
Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals.
There is no violation o constitutional
due process for being reasonable and
the ordinance is enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality
absent any irregularity on its face. .As
such a limitation cannot be viewed
as a transgression against the
command of due process. It is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the
opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such
premises could be, and, according to
the explanatory note, are being
devoted. Taxation may be made to
implement a police power and the
amount, object, and instance of
taxation is dependent upon the local
legislative body. Judgment of lower
court reversed and injunction lifted
Facts: On June 13, 1963, the
Municipal Board of Manila passed
Ordinance No. 4760 with the
following
provisions questioned for its violation
of due process: refraining from
entertaining or accepting any guest
or customer unless it fills out a
prescribed form in the lobby in open
view; prohibiting admission o less
than 18 years old; usurious increase of
license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o
150% and 200% respectively
(tax issue also); making unlawful lease
or rent more than twice every 24
hours; and cancellation of
license for subsequent violation. The
lower court issued preliminary
injunction and petitioners raised the
case to SC on certiorari.
Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with
the due process requirement of the
constitution?
Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals.
There is no violation o constitutional
due process for being reasonable and
the ordinance is enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality
absent any irregularity on its face. .As
such a limitation cannot be viewed
as a transgression against the
command of due process. It is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the
opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such
premises could be, and, according to
the explanatory note, are being
devoted. Taxation may be made to
implement a police power and the
amount, object, and instance of
taxation is dependent upon the local
legislative body. Judgment of lower
court reversed and injunction lifted
Facts: On June 13, 1963, the
Municipal Board of Manila passed
Ordinance No. 4760 with the
following
provisions questioned for its violation
of due process: refraining from
entertaining or accepting any guest
or customer unless it fills out a
prescribed form in the lobby in open
view; prohibiting admission o less
than 18 years old; usurious increase of
license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o
150% and 200% respectively
(tax issue also); making unlawful lease
or rent more than twice every 24
hours; and cancellation of
license for subsequent violation. The
lower court issued preliminary
injunction and petitioners raised the
case to SC on certiorari.
Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with
the due process requirement of the
constitution?
Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals.
There is no violation o constitutional
due process for being reasonable and
the ordinance is enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality
absent any irregularity on its face. .As
such a limitation cannot be viewed
as a transgression against the
command of due process. It is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the
opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such
premises could be, and, according to
the explanatory note, are being
devoted. Taxation may be made to
implement a police power and the
amount, object, and instance of
taxation is dependent upon the local
legislative body. Judgment of lower
court reversed and injunction lifted
Facts: On June 13, 1963, the
Municipal Board of Manila passed
Ordinance No. 4760 with the
following
provisions questioned for its violation
of due process: refraining from
entertaining or accepting any guest
or customer unless it fills out a
prescribed form in the lobby in open
view; prohibiting admission o less
than 18 years old; usurious increase of
license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o
150% and 200% respectively
(tax issue also); making unlawful lease
or rent more than twice every 24
hours; and cancellation of
license for subsequent violation. The
lower court issued preliminary
injunction and petitioners raised the
case to SC on certiorari.
Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with
the due process requirement of the
constitution?
Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals.
There is no violation o constitutional
due process for being reasonable and
the ordinance is enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality
absent any irregularity on its face. .As
such a limitation cannot be viewed
as a transgression against the
command of due process. It is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the
opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such
premises could be, and, according to
the explanatory note, are being
devoted. Taxation may be made to
implement a police power and the
amount, object, and instance of
taxation is dependent upon the local
legislative body. Judgment of lower
court reversed and injunction lifted
Facts: On June 13, 1963, the
Municipal Board of Manila passed
Ordinance No. 4760 with the
following
provisions questioned for its violation
of due process: refraining from
entertaining or accepting any guest
or customer unless it fills out a
prescribed form in the lobby in open
view; prohibiting admission o less
than 18 years old; usurious increase of
license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o
150% and 200% respectively
(tax issue also); making unlawful lease
or rent more than twice every 24
hours; and cancellation of
license for subsequent violation. The
lower court issued preliminary
injunction and petitioners raised the
case to SC on certiorari.
Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with
the due process requirement of the
constitution?
Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals.
There is no violation o constitutional
due process for being reasonable and
the ordinance is enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality
absent any irregularity on its face. .As
such a limitation cannot be viewed
as a transgression against the
command of due process. It is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the
opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such
premises could be, and, according to
the explanatory note, are being
devoted. Taxation may be made to
implement a police power and the
amount, object, and instance of
taxation is dependent upon the local
legislative body. Judgment of lower
court reversed and injunction lifted
Facts: On June 13, 1963, the
Municipal Board of Manila passed
Ordinance No. 4760 with the
following
provisions questioned for its violation
of due process: refraining from
entertaining or accepting any guest
or customer unless it fills out a
prescribed form in the lobby in open
view; prohibiting admission o less
than 18 years old; usurious increase of
license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o
150% and 200% respectively
(tax issue also); making unlawful lease
or rent more than twice every 24
hours; and cancellation of
license for subsequent violation. The
lower court issued preliminary
injunction and petitioners raised the
case to SC on certiorari.
Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with
the due process requirement of the
constitution?
Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals.
There is no violation o constitutional
due process for being reasonable and
the ordinance is enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality
absent any irregularity on its face. .As
such a limitation cannot be viewed
as a transgression against the
command of due process. It is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the
opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such
premises could be, and, according to
the explanatory note, are being
devoted. Taxation may be made to
implement a police power and the
amount, object, and instance of
taxation is dependent upon the local
legislative body. Judgment of lower
court reversed and injunction lifted
Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the
following provisions questioned for its violation of due process: refraining from entertaining or
accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in open view;
prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old; a usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and
6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also); making unlawful lease or rent more than
twice every 24 hours and cancellation of license for a subsequent violation. The lower court
issued a preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari.
Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution?
Ruling: The ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to
public morals. There is no violation of constitutional due process for being reasonable and the
ordinance is enjoying the presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. As
such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is
neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the
immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory
note, are being devoted. Taxation may be made to implement a police power and the amount,
object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of lower
court reversed an injunction lifted.