CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II TOPIC: EMINENT DOMAIN

ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, ASUNCION MANOSCA and LEONICA MANOSCA -vsHON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 168, HON. GRADUACION A. REYES CLARAVAL, Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 71, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 106440. January 29, 1996

In this appeal, via a petition for review on certiorari, from the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court is asked to resolve whether or not the "public use" requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land so declared by the National Historical Institute (NHI) as a national historical landmark through its Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark as approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports.

FACTS:
Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square meters. Subsequently, the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo. Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the Office of the SolicitorGeneral, instituted a complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI. At the same time, respondent Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. The motion was opposed by petitioners. After a hearing, the trial court issued, on 03 August 1989, an order fixing the provisional market (P54,120.00) and assessed (P16,236.00) values of the property and authorizing the Republic to take over the property once the required sum would have been deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint, he averred that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in the implementation of the 03rd August 1989 order of the trial court. The trial court issued its denial of said motion to dismiss. Petitioners then lodged a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. In its decision, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground that the remedy of appeal in the ordinary course of law was an adequate remedy and that the petition itself, in any case, had failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdictional competence on the part of the trial court. Hence, the case at bench.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the condemnation of the petitioners inherited piece of land for the setting up a landmark for Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, constitute a public use.

HELD:
The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency. Black summarizes the characterization given by various courts to the term; thus: Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, public use is one which confers same benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or many members of public, a public advantage or public benefit accrues sufficient to constitute a public use. "Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right to take private property in virtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning the whole community as distinguished from particular individuals. But each and every member of society need not be equally interested in such use, or be personally and directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is sufficient.

JLLEDDA, LLB1

21

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II TOPIC: EMINENT DOMAIN Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described as "the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government" that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. The only direct constitutional qualification is that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." This proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use. Petitioners contend that they have been denied due process in the fixing of the provisional value of their property. Petitioners need merely to be reminded that what the law prohibits is the lack of opportunity to be heard; contrary to petitioners argument, the records of this case are replete with pleadings that could have dealt, directly or indirectly, with the provisional value of the property. The petition is DENIED.

JLLEDDA, LLB1

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II TOPIC: EMINENT DOMAIN

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES -vsSALEM INVESTMENT CORPORATION, MARIA DEL CARMEN ROXAS DE ELIZALDE, CONCEPCION CABARRUS VDA. DE SANTOS, defendants-appellees. MILAGROS AND INOCENTES DE LA RAMA, petitioners, ALFREDO GUERRERO, respondent
G.R. No. 137569 June 23, 2000

FACTS:
The De la Ramas and Guerrero entered into a contract to sell with respect to Lot 834. This lot has an area of 4,075 square meters. This contract was executed on, December 14, 1988, after B.P. Blg. 340 was passed authorizing the expropriation of a portion of the land, consisting of 1,380 square meters, of the De la Ramas. The De la Ramas claim that they should receive the amount of just compensation because when they agreed to sell Lot 834 in 1988 to Guerrero, it did not include the portion expropriated by the Republic since, at that time, such portion had been expropriated by the government by virtue of B.P. Blg. 340, which took effect on February 17, 1983. On the other hand, Alfredo Guerrero argues that the title to the expropriated portion of Lot 834 did not immediately pass to the government upon the enactment of B.P. Blg. 340 in 1983, as payment of just compensation was yet to be made before ownership of the land was transferred to the government. As a result, petitioners still owned the entire Lot 834 at the time they agreed to sell it to Guerrero. Therefore, since Guerrero obtained ownership of Lot 834, including the 920 square meters expropriated by the government, he has the right to receive the just compensation over the said property.

ISSUE:
Who, between the De la Ramas and Guerrero, is/are entitled to receive payment of just compensation for the taking of 920 square meters of the land in question?

HELD:
It is true that the contract to sell did not convey to Guerrero the subject parcel of land described therein. However, it created an obligation on the part of the De la Ramas to convey the land, subject to the fulfillment of the suspensive conditions therein stated. The declaration of this contract's validity, which paved the way for the subsequent execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on March 8, 1994, following the order of the Regional Trial Court for its execution, by the Clerk of Court, Branch 113, Pasay City, effectively conveyed ownership of said parcel of land to Guerrero. The contention that the Deed of Absolute Sale excluded the portion expropriated by the government is untenable. The Deed of Absolute Sale does not say that the expropriated portion of the lot was excluded from the sale. Rather, it states that the entire property, consisting of 4,075 square meters, was being sold free from all liens and encumbrances except the lien in favor of the government over the portion being expropriated by it. Stated in another way, Guerrero was buying the entire property free from all claims of third persons except those of the government. Evidently, Lot 834 was conveyed in 1994 to Guerrero by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale. This contract was registered in the Register of Deeds and, accordingly, a new transfer certificate of title was issued to Guerrero. Pursuant thereto, and by virtue of subrogation, the latter became the rightful owner entitled to receive the just compensation from the Republic.

JLLEDDA, LLB1

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II TOPIC: EMINENT DOMAIN

MARINA Z. REYES; ALFREDO A. FRANCISCO; ANGELITA Z. GARCIA; ALFREDO Z. FRANCISCO, JR; ARMANDO Z. FRANCISCO; ALMA C. FRANCISCO; EUGENIA Z. LUNA; CLARITA Z. ZABALLERO, LEONARDO Z. ZABALLERO, JR., and TEODORO Z. ZABALLERO, in substitution of LEONARDO M. ZABALLERO; AUGUSTO M. ZABALLERO; FRINE A. ZABALLERO; ELENA FRONDA ZABALLERO; VICTOR GREGORIO F. ZABALLERO; MARIA ELENA F. ZABALLERO; LOURDES ZABALLERO-LAVA; SOCORRO EMILIA ZABALLERO-YAP; and TERESITA F. ZABALLERO -vsNATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 147511 January 20, 2003

FACTS:
Records show that in 1977, respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed separate complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands, particularly Lot Nos. 6450, 6448-E, 6198-A and 6199 of the cadastral survey of Dasmarias, Cavite belonging to the petitioners, before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, and docketed as Civil Case Nos. T.G.-392, T.G.-396 and T.G.-417. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of just compensation. For the alleged failure of respondent NHA to comply with the above order, petitioners filed on April 28, 1992 a complaint for forfeiture of rights. They alleged that respondent NHA had not relocated squatters from the Metropolitan Manila area on the expropriated lands in violation of the stated public purpose for expropriation and had not paid the just compensation fixed by the court. They prayed that respondent NHA be enjoined from disposing and alienating the expropriated properties and that judgment be rendered forfeiting all its rights and interests under the expropriation judgment. In its Answer, respondent NHA averred that it had already paid a substantial amount to herein petitioners and that the expropriation judgment could not be executed in view of several issues raised by respondent NHA before the expropriation court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent NHA violated the stated public purpose for the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project when it failed to relocate the squatters from the Metro Manila area.

HELD:
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain over private properties upon payment of just compensation. More specifically, Section 9, Article III states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation. Petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been abandoned. The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience." The act of respondent NHA in entering into a contract with a real estate developer for the construction of low cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated public purpose of their taking. Jurisprudence has it that the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns. Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of the social justice provision under Section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution. We likewise do not subscribe to petitioners' contention that the stated public purpose was abandoned when respondent NHA failed to occupy the expropriated lots by relocating squatters from the Metro Manila area. The expropriation judgment declared that respondent NHA has a lawful right to take petitioners properties "for the public use or purpose of expanding the Dasmarias Resettlement Project." The taking here is absolute, without any condition, restriction or qualification.

JLLEDDA, LLB1

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II TOPIC: EMINENT DOMAIN

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION -vsSPOUSES

MISERICORDIA GUTIERREZ and RICARDO MALIT and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 60077. January 18, 1991

FACTS:
The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), a government owned and controlled entity, in accordance with Commonwealth Act 120, is invested with the power of eminent domain for the purpose of pursuing its objectives, which among others is the construction, operation, and maintenance of electric transmission lines for distribution throughout the Philippines. For the construction of its 230 KV MexicoLimay transmission lines, NAPOCORs lines have to pass the lands belonging to Matias Cruz, Heirs of Natalia Paule and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit. NAPOCOR initiated negotiations for the acquisition of right of way easements over the aforementioned lots for the construction of its transmission lines but unsuccessful in this regard, NAPOCOR was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings against Gutierrez, et. al. on 20 January 1965. Upon filing of the corresponding complaint, NAPOCOR deposited the amount of P973.00 with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga, tendered to cover the provisional value of the land of the Malit and Gutierrez. And by virtue of which, NAPOCOR was placed in possession of the property of the spouses so it could immediately proceed with the construction of its Mexico-Limay 230 KV transmission line. In this connection, by the trial courts order of 30 September 1965, the spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixed provisional value of their land in the sum of P973.00. Meanwhile, for the purpose of determining the fair and just compensation due Gutierrez, et. al., the court appointed 3 commissioners, comprised of one representative of NAPOCOR, one for the affected families and the other from the court, who then were empowered to receive evidence, conduct ocular inspection of the premises, and thereafter, prepare their appraisals as to the fair and just compensation to he paid to the owners of the lots. With the reports submitted, the lower court rendered a decision, ordering NAPOCOR to pay Malit and Gutierrez the sum of P10 per square meter as the fair and reasonable compensation for the right-of-way easement of the affected area, which is 760 squares, or a total sum of P7,600.00 and P800.00 as attorneys fees. Dissatisfied with the decision, NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration which was favorably acted upon by the lower court, and in an order dated 10 June 1973, it amended its previous decision, reducing the amount awarded to to P5.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable market value of the 760 square meters belonging to the said spouses, in light of the classification of the land to be partly commercial and partly agricultural. Still not satisfied, an appeal was filed by the NAPOCOR with the Court of Appeals but appellate court, on 9 March 1982, sustained the trial court. NAPOCOR filed the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the spouses are deprived of the propertys ordinary use and thus the easement of right of way in favor of NAPOCOR constitutes taking

HELD:
The acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in similar cases of easement of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use. Herein, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NAPOCOR against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives spouses Malit and Gutierrez of its ordinary use. For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The price or value of the land and its character at the time it was taken by the Government are the criteria for determining just compensation. The above price refers to the market value of the land which may be the full market value thereof. It appearing that the trial court did not act capriciously and arbitrarily in setting the price of P5.00 per square meter of the affected property, the said award is proper and not unreasonable.

JLLEDDA, LLB1

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II TOPIC: EMINENT DOMAIN

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION -vsCOURT OF APPEALS and ANTONINO POBRE

G.R. No. 106804 August 12, 2004

FACTS:
Pobre initially had a total area of 141,300 square meters. Pobre converted the property into a resort-subdivision and sold lots to the public. In 1977, NPC filed an expropriation case to acquire 8,311.60 square meters of Pobre's property and successfully expropriated and fully paid for the same. In 1979, NPC filed a second expropriation case to acquire an additional 5,554 square meters of the property. Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for expropriation and claimed that NPC damaged his property. In 1984, Pobre prayed for just compensation of all the lots totaling 68,969 square meters affected by NPC's actions and for the payment of damages. In 1985, NPC filed a motion to dismiss the second expropriation case on the ground that it (NPC) had already abandoned its project within the property due to Pobre's opposition. The trial court granted NPC's motion to dismiss but allowed Pobre to adduce evidence on his claim for damages. NPC failed to appear to present its evidence. Thereafter, the trial court rendered judgment ordering NPC to pay for Pobre's 68,969 square-meter property. The CA upheld the trial court's decision, but deleted the award of attorney's fees.On appeal, NPC claimed that the dismissal of the expropriation case should have carried with it the dismissal of the entire case including Pobre's counterclaim. NPC also claimed that the trial court gravely erred in holding that NPC had "taken" the entire property, and in not excluding therefrom the 8,311.60 square-meter portion it had previously expropriated and paid for. In denying the petition, the Supreme Court held that the dismissal of an expropriation case does not carry with it the dismissal of Pobre's claim for damages which may be made either in a separate or in the same action, for all the damages occasioned by the institution of the expropriation case; that there was no reason to deviate from the trial and appellate courts' finding that the pollution generated by NPC's construction and operation of geothermal plants drastically changed the topography of the property, making it no longer viable as a resort-subdivision; and that NPC must pay just compensation for the entire property it has damaged since it is no longer possible and practical to restore possession of the property to Pobre which has become worthless to him and is now useful only to NPC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Pobre is entitled to just compensation of all the lots affected by NPCs actions.

HELD:
Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the expropriated land to the landowner. However, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of just compensation. In this case, we agree with the trial and appellate courts that it is no longer possible and practical to restore possession of the Property to Pobre. The Property is no longer habitable as a resort-subdivision. The Property is worthless to Pobre and is now useful only to NPC. Pobre has completely lost the Property as if NPC had physically taken over the entire 68,969 square-meter Property. In United States v. Causby, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that when private property is rendered uninhabitable by an entity with the power to exercise eminent domain, the taking is deemed complete. Such taking is thus compensable. In this jurisdiction, the Court has ruled that if the government takes property without expropriation and devotes the property to public use, after many years the property owner may demand payment of just compensation. This principle is in accord with the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

JLLEDDA, LLB1

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II TOPIC: EMINENT DOMAIN HEIRS OF

ALBERTO SUGUITAN -vs-

CITY OF MANDALUYONG
G.R. No. 135087 March 14, 2000

FACTS:
On October 13, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City issued a resolution authorizing Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos to institute expropriation proceeding over the property of Alberto Suguitan located at Boni Avenue and Sto. Rosario Streets in Mandaluyong City for the expansion of Mandaluyong Medical Center. On January 20, 1995, Mayor Abalos wrote Alberto Suguitan offering to buy his property, but Suguitan refused to sell. Consequently, the City of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the said motion and subsequently, it allowed the expropriation of the subject property. Aggrieved by the said order, the heirs of Suguitan asserted that the City of Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated power of eminent domain by means of an ordinance as required by Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160, and not by means of a mere resolution.Petitioners assert that the city of Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated power of eminent domain by means of an ordinance as required by Section 19 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160, and not by means of a mere resolution. Respondent contends, however, that it validly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain; that pursuant to Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 7160, a resolution is a sufficient antecedent for the filing of expropriation proceedings with the Regional Trial Court. Respondent's position, which was upheld by the trial court

ISSUE:
Whether or not the exercise of eminent domain by the City of Mandaluyong requires an ordinance and not just a mere resolution.

HELD:
The courts have the obligation to determine whether the following requisites have been complied with by the local government unit concerned: (1) An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property; (2) The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless; (3) There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws; and (4) A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong seeks to exercise the power of eminent domain over petitioners' property by means of a resolution, in contravention of the first requisite. The law in this case is clear and free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. We cannot uphold respondent's contention that an ordinance is needed only to appropriate funds after the court has determined the amount of just compensation. An examination of the applicable law will show that an ordinance is necessary to authorize the filing of a complaint with the proper court since, beginning at this point, the power of eminent domain is already being exercised. Clearly, although the determination and award of just compensation to the defendant is indispensable to the transfer of ownership in favor of the plaintiff, it is but the last stage of the expropriation proceedings, which cannot be arrived at without an initial finding by the court that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint. An order of condemnation or dismissal at this stage would be final, resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain.

JLLEDDA, LLB1

27

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II TOPIC: EMINENT DOMAIN

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES INC. -vsSECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM

July 14, 1989

FACTS:
On 17 July 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of Presidential Decree 27 providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on 22 July 1987 by PD 131, instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation. Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of Republic Act (RA) 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on 10 June 11988. This law, while considerably changing RA 3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code, 8 August 1963) and PD 27 (21 October 1972), nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. GR No.79777 Nicolas Manaay and his wife owned a 9-hectare riceland worked by 4 tenants, while Augustin Hermano Jr. owned a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants. The tenants therein were declared full owners of these lands by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. Manaay and Hermano questioned the constitutionality of PD 27, and EOs 228 and 229, before the Supreme Court, in GR 79777, on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. In the amended petition dated 22 November 1988, it was contended that PD 27, EOs 228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by RA 6657, but that the latter statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures. A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on 1 June 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a 1.83-hectare land, who complained that the department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) was insisting on the implementation of PD 27 and EO 228 despite a compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant on the payment of rentals. GR No. 79310 Arsenio Al.Acua, Newton Jison, Victorino Ferraris, Dennis Jereza, Herminigildo Gustilo, and Paulino D. Tolentino are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental; while the Planters Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. They filed a petition seeking to prohibit the implementation of Proclamation 131 and EO 229, claiming that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President; that although they agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period; and that, even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proclamation 131 and EO 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal protection. Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the EO 229. On the contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be established by the government, which shall be based on the owners declaration of current fair market value as provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council. This compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of several modes that may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing periodically, or direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or approved by the PARC. On 11 April 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf, assailing the constitutionality of EO 229. In addition to the arguments already raised, Serrano contends that the measure is unconstitutional because (1) only public lands should be included in the CARP; (2) EO 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the title; (3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on 2 July 1987; and (4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did not originate from the House of Representatives.

JLLEDDA, LLB1

28

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II TOPIC: EMINENT DOMAIN GR No.79744 Inocentes Pabico alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to Salvador Talento, Jaime Abogado, Conrado Avancea, and Roberto Taay, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him. On 3 September 1986, Pabico protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land Transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the Talento, et. al. Pabico claims that on 24 December 1986, his petition was denied without hearing. On 17 February 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when EO 228 and 229 were issued. These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his land to Talento, et. al. Pabico argues that (1) EOs 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines; 92) the said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation; and (3) Pabico is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987 Constitution. GR No.78742 The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., Juanito D. Gomez, Gerardo B. Alarcio, Felife A. Guico, Jr., Bernardo M. Almonte, Canuto Ramir B. Cabrito, Isidro T. Guico, Felisa I. Llamido, Fausto J. Salva, Reynaldo G. Estrada, Felisa C. Bautista, Esmenia J. Cabe, Teodoro B. Madriaga, Aurea J. Prestosa, Emerenciana J. Isla, Felicisima C. Apresto, Consuelo M. Morales, Benjamin R. Segismundo, Cirila A. Jose, and Napoleon S. Ferrer invoke in their petition the right of retention granted by PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands. They claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has so far not issued the implementing rules required under PD 316, implementing PD 27. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to issue the said rules.

ISSUE:
Whether just compensation should exclusively be made in money and not other things of value.

HELD:
The Court assumes that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. The court may therefore assume that their intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of value. The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement among the members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated. On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we are making of the general sentiments and intention of the members on the content and manner of the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator. Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, the Court find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are negotiable at any time. The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation. Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small, not a little inconvenience. However, this cannot be avoided.

JLLEDDA, LLB1

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