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TORTS DIGESTED CASE

TAMARGO VS CA
G.R. No. 85044 June 3 1992

[Parental Authority]

FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle. Jennifer's natural parents filed civil complaints for
damages with the RTC against Bundoc's natural parents.
In December 1981, spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was granted in November 1982.
Adelberto's parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to
them from the moment the petition for adoption was decreed. Spouses Tamargo contended that since Adelberto was then actually living with his
natural parents, parental authority had not ceased by mere filing and granting of the petition for adoption. Trial court dismissed the spouses Tamargo's
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by Adelberto.
RULING:
No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: "Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defences provided by law." In the case at bar, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents at the time the
shooting incident happened. It follows that the natural parents are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
SC held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, at the time the shooting happened. It do
not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of the adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the
time when adopting parents had no actual custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may be essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit
or advantage in favor of the adopted child.
Categories: G.R. No. 85044, Parental Authority, Persons and Family Relations
TAMARGO vs. CA et al G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS: Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil
complaint for damages was filed with the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur by petitioners, parents of Jennifer, against respondent spouses, Adelbertos
natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide
through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Adelberto, who was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted
without discernment.
Prior to the incident the spouses Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto before the then CFI of Ilocos Sur. This petition for
adoption was granted after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer
In their Answer, respondent spouses, Adelbertos natural parents, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents were indispensable parties to
the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
The trial court ruled against the adopting parents, who filed an MR which was later denied for being filed beyond the reglementary period. Petitioners
went to the CA on a petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial courts decision. The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners
had lost their right to appeal. Hence this petition for review
ISSUE: Who should be responsible for the tortuous act of the minor Adelberto, his natural parents or adopting parents?
HELD: Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the CA is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners
complaint filed before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for further proceedings
Natural parents.

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It is not disputed that Adelbertos voluntary act of shooting Jennifer with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be
caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)
The natural parent spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code 8 which reads as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. If, after considering the report of the Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and the
evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that the trial custody
period has been completed, and that the best interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall be entered, which shall
be effective he date the original petition was filed. The decree shall state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be known.
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in relation to Article 39 of the same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. The adoption shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the time the Petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship
existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control.
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have been in the actual
custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of
their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability
for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had
no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part
of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was
committed.
NOTES:
(On why this petition was accepted by the SC) In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant petition, and in order that substantial
justice may be served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice
of appeal as having been seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner in
the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary period for appeal.

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Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits.

Cresencio Libi et al vs IAC et al October 5, 2013

Since about 1976, minors Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were lovers. In December 1978, Julie Ann decided to break up with Wendell because
the latter has violent tendencies. Julie Ann refused to give Wendell his second chance. On January 14, 1979, both minors were found dead inside Julie
Anns house. Both were only 18 years of age (age of majority that time was 21).
Apparently, Wendell used his fathers gun to kill Julie Ann and then later he committed suicide.
The parents of Julie Ann (Felipe and Shirley Gotiong) then filed a civil case for recovery of damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code against
the parents of Wendell (Cresencio and Amelia Libi).
ISSUE: Whether or not the parents of Wendell are civilly liable?
HELD: Yes. It was determined from the evidence adduced that the Libis had been negligent in safekeeping their gun. Wendell gained access to the
gun in 1978 and the Libis did not know that their son had possession of said gun. They only found out about it when the shooting happened. Further,
they were not even aware that their son is a drug informant of the local Constabulary (police force at that time). Clearly, the parents were negligent
and were not acting with the diligence required by law (that of a good father of a family) in making sure that their minor children shall not cause
damages against other persons.
What is the nature of their liability?
In this case, the Supreme Court also clarified that the nature of the liability of parents in cases like this is not merely subsidiary. Their liability is
primary. This is whether or not what the damage caused by their minor child arose from quasi-delict or from a criminal act. This is also the reason
why parents can avoid liability if they will be able to show that they have acted with the diligence required by law because if their liability is merely
subsidiary, they can never pose the defense of diligence of a good father of a family.
SPS. BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME, petitioners,
vs.
RODRIGO APOSTOL, FIDEL LOZANO, ERNESTO SIMBULAN, MAYOR FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, MUNICIPALITY OF
KORONADAL (NOW CITY OF KORONADAL), PROVINCE OF SOUTH COTABATO, represented by the MUNICIPAL TREASURER
and/or MUNICIPAL MAYOR FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, and THE FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING AND INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 163609

[November 27, 2008]

FACTS:
On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the
Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto
Simbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch his Manila flight.
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the National Highway in South Cotabato. The intensity of the
collision sent Marvin some 50 meters away from the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high speed at the time of
the accident. Marvin sustained severe head injuries. Despite medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after the accident.
ISSUE:MAY a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver assigned to him
MAY an LGU be held liable for the tortuous act of a government employee.
RULING:
1. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of
the accident is of no moment. The Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozanos employer notwithstanding Lozanos assignment to Mayor

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Miguel. Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions or directions to Lozano, he still cannot be held liable. In
Benson v. Sorrell, the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control
over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer of the driver.
Mayor Miguel was neither Lozanos employer nor the vehicles registered owner. There existed no causal relationship between him and Lozano or
the vehicle used that will make him accountable for Marvins death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the accident.
2. The municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit. This
immunity is illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, where the Court held that municipal corporations are suable because
their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge
of governmental functions and can only be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such
entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in governmental capacity when the injury
was committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
Liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer. Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is
jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers and third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the
operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the actual owner of the vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle as
regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences incident to its operation.
The petition is DENIED.
Professional Services, Inc. V. Natividad And Enrique Agana (2007)
G.R. No. 157906 November 2, 2006
Lessons Applicable: Res ipsa loquitur (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: Art. 2176 Art. 2180 and Art. 1869 of the Civil Code

FACTS:

April 4, 1984: Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal
discharge. Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid.

April 11, 1984: Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery on Natividad and found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had
spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it

Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividads husband, Enrique Agana to perform hysterectomy.

After a couple of days, Natividad consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about the excruciating pain in her anal region. Dr. Ampil
recommended that she consult an oncologist.

May 9, 1984: The Aganas went to the United States to seek further treatment and was told she was FREE from cancer.

August 31, 1984: Natividad's daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house and extracted
by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width and assuring that the pain will vanish.

When the pain intensified, Nativided went to Polymedic General Hospital where Dr. Ramon Gutierrez found a foul-smelling gauze
measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly infected her vaginal vault which formed a recto-vaginal fistula forcign her stool to excrete through
the vagina.

October 1984: Natividad underwent another surgery to remedy the damage

February 16, 1986: Natividad died so she was substituted by her children

RTC: PSI solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes for damages for negligence and malpractice

CA: absolved Dr. Fuentes upon the same advise from the PRC Board of Medicine for failure to show that he placed the guages or
concealed the fact from Natividad

ISSUE: W/N Dr. Fuentes may be held liable under the principle of res ipso loquitor

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HELD: NO. CA affirmed
Dr. Ampil as the negligent party

surgeons used gauzes as sponges to control the bleeding of the patient during the surgical operation

immediately after the operation, the nurses who assisted in the surgery noted in their report 2 sponges lacking

2 gauzes were extracted from the same spot of the body of Mrs. Agana
element 3 "control and management of the thing which caused the injury" to be wanting

Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter reported and showed his work to Dr. Ampil who allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave

the operating room

Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all

personnel connected with the operation

res ipsa loquitur

not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability, being a

mere evidentiary rule

mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.

Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons

for whom one is responsible.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

x x x

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage.

failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the accreditation and supervision

private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting consultant staff

control test is determining

for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists
between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians

ART. 1869. Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate
the agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without authority.

By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising their qualifications, the hospital created the impression that they were its
agents, authorized to perform medical or surgical services for its patients

doctrine of corporate negligence or corporate responsibility

knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City Hospital constitutes knowledge of PSI
It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with the assistance of the Medical City
Hospitals staff, composed of resident doctors, nurses, and interns

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Professional Services Inc. v. Agana
Professional Services Inc. (PSI) v. Natividad and Enrique Agana
Natividad and Enrique Agana v. Juan Fuentes
Miguel Ampil v. Natividad and Enrique Agana

FACTS
Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be
suffering from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery on her, and finding that the malignancy spread on her left
ovary, he obtained the consent of her husband, Enrique, to permit Dr. Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her. After the hysterectomy, Dr. Fuentes
showed his work to Dr. Ampil, who examined it and found it in order, so he allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil was about to
complete the procedure when the attending nurses made some remarks on the Record of Operation: sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon
search done but to no avail continue for closure (two pieces of gauze were missing). A diligent search was conducted but they could not be
found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed.
A couple of days after, she complained of pain in her anal region, but the doctors told her that it was just a natural consequence of the surgery.
Dr. Ampil recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation. After months
of consultations and examinations in the US, she was told that she was free of cancer. Weeks after coming back, her daughter found a piece of
gauze (1.5 in) protruding from her vagina, so Dr. Ampil manually extracted this, assuring Natividad that the pains will go away. However, the pain
worsened, so she sought treatment at a hospital, where another 1.5 in piece of gauze was found in her vagina. She underwent another surgery.
Sps. Agana filed a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of Medical City), Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, alleging that the latter are liable
for negligence for leaving 2 pieces of gauze in Natividads body, and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. Enrique Agana also filed
an administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against the two doctors with the PRC (although only the case against Dr. Fuentes
was heard since Dr. Ampil was abroad). Pending the outcome of the cases, Natividad died (now substituted by her children). RTC found PSI and
the two doctors liable for negligence and malpractice. PRC dismissed the case against Dr. Fuentes. CA dismissed only the case against
Fuentes.

ISSUE AND HOLDING

1.
WON CA erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice. NO; DR. AMPIL IS GUILTY
2.
WON CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability. NO
3.
WON PSI may be held solidarily liable for Dr. Ampils negligence. YES
RATIO
DR. AMPIL IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE
His arguments are without basis [did not prove that the American doctors were the ones who put / left the gauzes; did not submit evidence to rebut the
correctness of the operation record (re: number of gauzes used); re: Dr. Fuentes alleged negligence, Dr. Ampil examined his work and found it in
order].
Leaving foreign substances in the wound after incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. Even
if it has been shown that a surgeon was required to leave a sponge in his patients abdomen because of the dangers attendant upon delay, still, it is
his legal duty to inform his patient within a reasonable time by advising her of what he had been compelled to do , so she can seek relief from the
effects of the foreign object left in her body as her condition might permit. Whats worse in this case is that he misled her by saying that the pain was
an ordinary consequence of her operation.

Medical negligence; standard of diligence

To successfully pursue this case of medical negligence, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either failed to do something [or did
something] which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done [or wouldnt have done], and that the failure or action caused injury to
the patient.

Duty to remove all foreign objects from the body before closure of the incision; if he fails to do so, it was his duty to inform the patient
about it

Breach failed to remove foreign objects; failed to inform patient

Injury suffered pain that necessitated examination and another surgery

Proximate Causation breach caused this injury; could be traced from his act of closing the incision despite information given by the
attendant nurses that 2 pieces of gauze were still missing; what established causal link: gauze pieces later extracted from patients vagina
DR. FUENTES NOT LIABLE
The res ipsa loquitur [thing speaks for itself] argument of the Aganas does not convince the court. Mere invocation and application of this doctrine
does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence.

Requisites for the applicability of res ipsa loquitur

1.
Occurrence of injury
2.
Thing which caused injury was under the control and management of the defendant [DR. FUENTES] LACKING
SINCE CTRL+MGT WAS WITH DR. AMPIL

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3.

Occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those who had control or management used proper
care
4.
Absence of explanation by defendant
Under the Captain of the Ship rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the
operation. That Dr. Ampil discharged such role is evident from the following:

He called Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy

He examined Dr. Fuentes work and found it in order

He granted Dr. Fuentes permission to leave

He ordered the closure of the incision

HOSPITAL OWNER PSI SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH DR. AMPIL [NCC 2180], AND DIRECTLY LIABLE TO SPS. AGANAS [NCC 2176]
Previously, employers cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of its professionals. However, this doctrine has weakened since courts came to
realize that modern hospitals are taking a more active role in supplying and regulating medical care to its patients, by employing staff of physicians,
among others. Hence, there is no reason to exempt hospitals from the universal rule of respondeat superior. Here are the Courts bases for sustaining
PSIs liability:

Ramos v. CA doctrine on E-E relationship

For purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists
between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. [LABOR LESSON: power to hire, fire, power of control]
Agency principle of apparent authority / agency by estoppel

Imposes liability because of the actions of a principal or employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the
relationship or the authority exists [see NCC 1869]
PSI publicly displays in the Medical City lobby the names and specializations of their physicians. Hence, PSI is now estopped
from passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory, leading the public to believe that it
vouched for their skill and competence.

o
o

o
If doctors do well, hospital profits financially, so when negligence mars the quality of its services, the hospital should
not be allowed to escape liability for its agents acts.
Doctrine of corporate negligence / corporate responsibility

This is the judicial answer to the problem of allocating hospitals liability for the negligent acts of health practitioners, absent
facts to support the application of respondeat superior.
This provides for the duties expected [from hospitals]. In this case, PSI failed to perform the duty of exercising reasonable care to
protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment . PSI failed to conduct an investigation of the matter reported
in the note of the count nurse, and this established PSIs part in the dark conspiracy of silence and concealment about the gauzes.

o
o

PSI has actual / constructive knowledge of the matter, through the report of the attending nurses + the fact that the
operation was carried on with the assistance of various hospital staff
It also breached its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who practice medicine within its walls and take an active step in
fixing the negligence committed
PSI also liable under NCC 2180

It failed to adduce evidence to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the accreditation and
supervision of Dr. Ampil

So Ping Bun vs CA
FACTS:
In 1963, Tek hua Trading, through its Managing Director So Pek Giok, entered into a lease agreement with Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI )
covering four stalls in Binondo. The terms of the contract were initially for one year but after its expiry, they continued on a month to month basis.
In 1976, Tek Hua Trading was dissolved with the original members forming a new corporation named Tek Hua Enterprises, with Manuel Tiong as
one of the incorporators. So Ping Bun, on the death of his grandfather, So Pek Giok (Managing director of defunct Tek Hua Trading), occupied the
same stalls for his own textile business under the name, Trendsetter Marketing. In 1989, the lessor, DCCSI sent letters to Tek Hua Enterprises
advising that it will be increasing rent. Enclosed in both letters were new lease contracts for signing. While the letters contained a statement that the

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leases will be terminated if the contracts were not signed, the same were not rescinded. In 1991, Manuel Tiong (incorporator of Tek Hua Enterrises)
wrote a letter to So Ping Bun asking him to vacate the four stalls:
Dear Mr. So, Due to my closed (sic) business associate (sic) for three decades with your late grandfather Mr. So Pek Giok and late father, Mr. So
Chong Bon, I allowed you temporarily to use the warehouse of Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. for several years to generate your personal business.
Since I decided to go back into textile business, I need a warehouse immediately for my stocks. Therefore, please be advised to vacate all your stocks
in Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. Warehouse. You are hereby given 14 days to vacate the premises unless you have good reasons that you have the right
to stay. Otherwise, I will be constrained to take measure to protect my interest. Please give this urgent matter your preferential attention to avoid
inconvenience on your part.
But instead of vacating the stalls, So Ping Bun was able to secure lease agreements in favor Trendsetter Marketing from D.C. Chuan. Tek Hua
Enterprises filed a suit for injunction and pressed for the nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and So Ping Bun and as well prayed for
damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference of contract.
HELD:
Yes. The elements of tort interference are (a) existence of a valid contract (b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its existence (c)
interference of the third party is without legal justification or excuse
. Since there were existing lease contracts between DCCI and Tek Hua Enterprises, the latter had property rights over the leased stalls. The action of
Trendsetter in asking DCCSI to execute the contracts in their favor was unlawful interference.
As to the question of whether the interference may be justified, the Supreme Court stated that it is sufficient that
So Ping Buns conduct lies in a
proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives to conclude.
Nothing on the record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on the part of So Ping Bun.
Hence, while there is tortuous interference, this lack of malice precludes the award of damages.
But while the lower courts did not award damages. It does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of
existing ones. The Court of Appeals correctly confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and
Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding damages. The injunction saved
the respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioners interference. But due to So Ping Buns action of interference, Tek Hua was
forced to seek relief through the Court and thereby incur expenses to protect his interests.
Attorneys fees are in order.
Ramos v. CA
Facts:
Erlinda Ramos, a 47-year old robust woman, was normal except for her experiencing occasional pain due to the presence of stone in her gall bladder.
She was advised to undergo an operation for its removal. The results in the examinations she underwent indicate that she was fit for the operation.
She and her husband Rogelio met Dr. Hosaka, one of the defendants, who advised that she should undergo cholecystectomy. Dr. Hosaka assured them
that he will get a good anaesthesiologist. At 7:30 a.m. on the day of the operation at Delos Santos Medical Center, Herminda Cruz, Erlindas sister-inlaw and the dean of the College of Nursing in Capitol Medical Center, was there to provide moral support. Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez was to administer
the anaesthesia. Dr. Hosaka arrived only at 12:15 p. m. Herminda saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the patient, and heard the latter say Ang hirap maintubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O, lumalaki ang tiyan. Herminda saw bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the patient. She heard Dr.
Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon. The doctor arrived and placed the patient in trendelenburg position, wherein the head of the
patient is positioned lower than the feet, which indicates a decrease of blood supply in the brain. Herminda knew and told Rogelio that something
wrong was happening. Dr. Calderon was able to intubate the patient. Erlinda was taken to the ICU and became comatose.

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Rogelio filed a civil case for damages. The trial court ruled in his favor, finding Dr. Gutierrez, Dr. Hosaka, and the hospital, guilty of negligence, but
the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. Hence, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied for having been
filed beyond the reglementary period. However, it was found that the notice of the decision was never sent to the petitioners counsel. Rather, it was
sent to the petitioner, addressing him as Atty. Rogelio Ramos, as if he was the legal counsel. The petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari. On
the procedural issue, the Supreme Court rules that since the notice did not reach the petitioners then legal counsel, the motion was filed on time.
Issue: Whether a surgeon, an anaesthesiologist, and a hospital, should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled
for cholecystectomy
Held:
Res Ipsa Loquitor
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself." The phrase "res ipsa loquitur'' is a maxim for
the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of
negligence, or make out a plaintiff's prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the thing which
caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course
of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation
by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of care. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human
experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself.
However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, does not create or constitute an independent or
separate ground of liability. Mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is
simply a step in the process of such proof, permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending
circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence, and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going
forward with the proof. Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown.
(1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence;
(2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and
(3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus, res ipsa loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant
upon the harm are themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that harm. Although generally, expert
medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard
medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because
the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician
negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can
determine the proper standard of care. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or
omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical
testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions,
by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of
each case. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if
the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. The real question, therefore, is whether or
not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the
regular scope of customary professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man as
the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence.
We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. Erlinda submitted herself for cholecystectomy and expected a routine general
surgery to be performed on her gall bladder. On that fateful day she delivered her person over to the care, custody and control of private respondents
who exercised complete and exclusive control over her. At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound and, except for a few minor
discomforts, was likewise physically fit in mind and body. However, during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of
cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went out of the operating room already
decerebrate and totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not normally occur in the process of
a gall bladder operation. In fact, this kind of situation does not in the absence of negligence of someone in the administration of anesthesia and in the
use of endotracheal tube. Furthermore, the instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all under the

10
exclusive control of private respondents, who are the physicians-in-charge. Likewise, petitioner Erlinda could not have been guilty of contributory
negligence because she was under the influence of anesthetics which rendered her unconscious.
Negligence of the Anaesthesiologist
The pre-operative evaluation of a patient prior to the administration of anesthesia is universally observed to lessen the possibility of anesthetic
accidents. Respondent Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was, therefore,
an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is, therefore, a clear indicia of her
negligence. Erlinda's case was elective and this was known to respondent Dra. Gutierrez. Thus, she had all the time to make a thorough evaluation of
Erlinda's case prior to the operation and prepare her for anesthesia. However, she never saw the patient at the bedside. She herself admitted that she
had seen petitioner only in the operating room, and only on the actual date of the cholecystectomy. She negligently failed to take advantage of this
important opportunity. As such, her attempt to exculpate herself must fail.
Opinion of Expert Witness
An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced bronchospasm properly falls within the fields of anesthesia, internal medicine-allergy, and
clinical pharmacology. The resulting anoxic encephalopathy belongs to the field of neurology. While admittedly, many bronchospastic-mediated
pulmonary diseases are within the expertise of pulmonary medicine, Dr. Jamora's field, the anesthetic drug-induced, allergic mediated bronchospasm
alleged in this case is within the disciplines of anesthesiology, allergology and pharmacology. On the basis of the foregoing transcript, in which the
pulmonologist himself admitted that he could not testify about the drug with medical authority, it is clear that the appellate court erred in giving
weight to Dr. Jamora's testimony as an expert in the administration of Thiopental Sodium. Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have
acquired special knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by the study of recognized authorities on the subject or by
practical experience. Clearly, Dr. Jamora does not qualify as an expert witness based on the above standard since he lacks the necessary knowledge,
skill, and training in the field of anesthesiology. Oddly, apart from submitting testimony from a specialist in the wrong field, private respondents'
intentionally avoided providing testimony by competent and independent experts in the proper areas.
Proximate Cause
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears
from the evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that
the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. Instead of the intended endotracheal
intubation what actually took place was an esophageal intubation. During intubation, such distention indicates that air has entered the gastrointestinal
tract through the esophagus instead of the lungs through the trachea. Entry into the esophagus would certainly cause some delay in oxygen delivery
into the lungs as the tube which carries oxygen is in the wrong place. That abdominal distention had been observed during the first intubation
suggests that the length of time utilized in inserting the endotracheal tube (up to the time the tube was withdrawn for the second attempt) was fairly
significant. Due to the delay in the delivery of oxygen in her lungs Erlinda showed signs of cyanosis.
Responsibility of the Surgeon
As the so-called "captain of the ship," it is the surgeon's responsibility to see to it that those under him perform their task in the proper manner.
Respondent Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed
proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly
intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the
same time as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to
confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient.
Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda's condition.
Responsibility of the Hospital
Hospitals hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a
point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to
terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages. In
assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the
purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their
attending and visiting physicians.
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria
potestas. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family

11
to prevent damage. In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to
adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce
evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar nature,
respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is
consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlinda's condition.
Damages
At current levels, the P8000/monthly amount established by the trial court at the time of its decision would be grossly inadequate to cover the actual
costs of home-based care for a comatose individual. The calculated amount was not even arrived at by looking at the actual cost of proper hospice
care for the patient. What it reflected were the actual expenses incurred and proved by the petitioners after they were forced to bring home the patient
to avoid mounting hospital bills. And yet ideally, a comatose patient should remain in a hospital or be transferred to a hospice specializing in the care
of the chronically ill for the purpose of providing a proper milieu adequate to meet minimum standards of care. Given these considerations, the
amount of actual damages recoverable in suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct minimum cost of proper care, not the cost of
the care the family is usually compelled to undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy.
Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of litigation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of
negligence has been completed and that the cost can be liquidated. However, these provisions neglect to take into account those situations, as in this
case, where the resulting injury might be continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the injury, while certain to occur, are
difficult to predict. Temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic
and continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for.
The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases. As it would not be equitable - and certainly not in the best interests of the administration
of justice - for the victim in such cases to constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the compensatory damages
previously awarded - temperate damages are appropriate. The amount given as temperate damages, though to a certain extent speculative, should take
into account the cost of proper care. In the instant case, petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing care for a comatose patient who has
remained in that condition for over a decade. Having premised our award for compensatory damages on the amount provided by petitioners at the
onset of litigation, it would be now much more in step with the interests of justice if the value awarded for temperate damages would allow
petitioners to provide optimal care for their loved one in a facility which generally specializes in such care. They should not be compelled by dire
circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate. Under the
circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable.
Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred. She has been in a comatose state for over fourteen years now. The
burden of care has so far been heroically shouldered by her husband and children, who, in the intervening years have been deprived of the love of a
wife and a mother. Meanwhile, the actual physical, emotional and financial cost of the care of petitioner would be virtually impossible to quantify.
Even the temperate damages herein awarded would be inadequate if petitioner's condition remains unchanged for the next ten years. The husband and
the children, all petitioners in this case, will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of the patient's illness, knowing any hope of recovery is close
to nil. They have fashioned their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner, altering their long term goals to take into account their life with a
comatose patient. They, not the respondents, are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim. The family's moral injury and
suffering in this case is clearly a real one. For the foregoing reasons, an award of P2,000,000.00 in moral damages would be appropriate.

Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature of the instant
suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at P100,000.00 are likewise proper.
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners, and
solidarily against private respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision
plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000.00 as moral
damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages; 4) P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages and attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.
Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, et al.
29 Phil 542 (February 18, 1915)
Facts:
Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar. Gilchrist was the owner of
a theatre in Iloilo. They entered into a contract whereby Cuddy leased to

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Gilchrist a movie entitled Zigomar for exhibition in his theatre for a week
for PhP125. Days before the delivering the film, Cuddy returned the money already paid by Gilchrist so that he can lease the film to cinema owners
Espejo and Zaldarriaga, who offered to pay a higher price for lease of the film. Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance with prayer for
damages against Cuddy, Espejo and Zaldarriaga.
Issue: Whether such acts of Espejo and Zaldariaga were actionable and if so under what legal principle. Can Espejo and Zaldariaga their lack of evil
motive use as defense by alleging that their intention was purely for business?
Held:
The only motive for the interference with the Gilchrist - Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the
film in their theater.There was no malice beyond this desire; but this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that contract
and causing its breach.
Hence,
they are liable to Gilchrist for the damages caused by their acts. The liability of the Espejo and Zaldriagga arises from unlawful acts and not from
contractual obligations, as they were under no such obligation to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. So that if the action of Gilchrist
had been one for damages, it would be governed by chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the Civil Code. Article 1902 of that code provides that a person
who, by act or omission, causes damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. There is nothing
in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes
damages. In fact, the chapter wherein this article is found clearly shows that no such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may
recover for the damage suffered
G.R. No. L-9356

February 18, 1915

Lessons Applicable: Interference with Contractual Relations (Torts and Damages)

Laws Applicable: Article 1902 (old law)
FACTS:
Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar
April 24: He rented it to C. S. Gilchrist for a week for P125
A few days to the date of delivery, Cuddy sent the money back to Gilchrist
Cuddy rented the film to Espejo and his partner Zaldarriaga P350 for the week knowing that it was rented to someone else and that Cuddy accepted it
because he was paying about three times as much as he had contracted with Gilchrist but they didn't know the identity of the other party
Gilchrist filed for injunction against these parties
Trial Court and CA: granted - there is a contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy
ISSUE: W/N Espejo and his partner Zaldarriaga should be liable for damages though they do not know the identity of Gilchrist
HELD: YES. judgment is affirmed
That Cuddy was liable in an action for damages for the breach of that contract, there can be no doubt.
the mere right to compete could not justify the appellants in intentionally inducing Cuddy to take away the appellee's contractual rights
Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill and credit. He has no right to be free from malicious and
wanton interference, disturbance or annoyance. If disturbance or loss come as a result of competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, it is
damnum absque injuria(loss without injury), unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered with
Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond this
desire; but this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that contract and causing its breach.

13
liability of the appellants arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations, as they were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy to
violate his contract with Gilchrist
So that if the action of Gilchrist had been one for damages, it would be governed by chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the Civil Code.
Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be
obliged to repair the damage do done
There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the identity of a person to
whom he causes damages
An injunction is a "special remedy" which was there issued by the authority and under the seal of a court of equity, and limited, as in order cases
where equitable relief is sought, to cases where there is no "plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law," which "will not be granted while the rights
between the parties are undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where material and irreparable injury will be done," which cannot be
compensated in damages, and where there will be no adequate remedy, and which will not, as a rule, be granted, to take property out of the
possession of one party and put it into that of another whose title has not been established by law
irreparable injury
not meant such injury as is beyond the possibility of repair, or beyond possible compensation in damages, nor necessarily great injury or great
damage, but that species of injury, whether great or small, that ought not to be submitted to on the one hand or inflicted on the other; and, because it
is so large on the one hand, or so small on the other, is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor
in a court of law
Gilchrist was facing the immediate prospect of diminished profits by reason of the fact that the appellants had induced Cuddy to rent to them the film
Gilchrist had counted upon as his feature film
It is quite apparent that to estimate with any decree of accuracy the damages which Gilchrist would likely suffer from such an event would be quite
difficult if not impossible
So far as the preliminary injunction issued against the appellants is concerned, which prohibited them from exhibiting the Zigomar during the week
which Gilchrist desired to exhibit it, we are of the opinion that the circumstances justified the issuance of that injunction in the discretion of the court
the remedy by injunction cannot be used to restrain a legitimate competition, though such competition would involve the violation of a contract.
Torts And Damages Case Digest: Ramos V. CA (1999)
G.R. No. 124354 December 29, 1999
Lessons Applicable: Personal Injury and Death (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable:

FACTS:

June 17, 1985 afternoon: Erlinda Ramos, 47-year old robust woman underwent on an operation to the stone at her gall bladder removed
after being tested that she was fit for "cholecystectomy" operation performed by Dr. Orlino Hozaka. Dr. Hosaka charged a fee of P16,000.00,
which was to include the anesthesiologist's fee and which was to be paid after the operation. He assured Rogelio E. Ramos, husband that he will
get a good anesthesiologist who was Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez. Erlinda's hand was held by Herminda Cruz, her sister -in-law who was the Dean
of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center together with her husband went down with her to the operating room.

Instead of 9:30 am, Dr. Hosaka arrived at about 12:15 P.M.

Herminda noticing what Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez was doing, saw the nailbed of Erlinda becoming bluish and Dr. Hosaka called for
another anesthesiologist Dr. Calderon.

She went out of the operating room to tell Rogelio that something is wrong.

When she went back she saw Erlinda in a trendelenburg position and at 3 p.m. she was taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) where she
stayed for a month due to bronchospasm incurring P93,542.25 and she was since then comatosed.

14

She suffered brain damage as a result of the absence of oxygen in her brain for four to five minutes.

She was also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage"

Monthly expenses ranged from P8,000 to P10,000

Spouses Ramos and their minors filed against Dr. Hosaka and Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez

RTC: favored the Ramos' awarding P8,000 as actual monthly expenses totalling to P632,000 as of April 15, 1992, P100,000 atty.
fees, P800,000 moral damages,P200,000 exemplary damages and cost of suit
CA: reversed ordering the Ramos' to pay their unpaid bills of P93,542.25 plus interest

ISSUE: W/N the Ramos' are entitled to damages

HELD: YES. CA modified in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000 actual damages computed
as of the date of promulgation plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2)
P2,000,000 moral damages, 3) P1,500,000 temperate damages; 4) P100,000 exemplary damages and P100,000 attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of
the suit.

The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases presents a question of law since it is a judicial function to determine
whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of law, permit a given inference.

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself
provides the proof of negligence - applicable in this case

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a
scientific treatment

As borne by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient according to witness Herminda
With her clinical background as a nurse, the Court is satisfied with her testimony
Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an act of
exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility

Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to
testify, either by the study of recognized authorities on the subject or by practical experience.

Dr. Jamora, not an anesthesiologist, stated that oxygen deprivation which led to anoxic encephalopathy was due to an
unpredictable drug reaction to the short-acting barbiturate was not accepted as expert opinion

Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed
proper anesthesia protocols

Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over
three hours late for the latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia
delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient

private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not,
technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised,
the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of
the payment of wages.

Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered
by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.

15

temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and
continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for.
The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.

They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of professionals, for anything less
would be grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable.

the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic
changes which her body would normally undergo through the years.

Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred. She has been in a comatose state for over fourteen years now

Ramos' are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim. The family's moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a
real one. Award of P2,000,000 in moral damages would be appropriate.

Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature of
the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at P100,000 are likewise proper.