8 Changes in the problem of inductive logic* INTRODUCTION A successful research programme bustles with a always dozens of puzzles to be solved and technical questions to be answered: even if some of these ~ inevitably ~ are the programme'sown creation. But this self-propelling force of the programme may carry away the research workers and cause them to forget about the problem, background. They tend not to ask any more to what degree they have. solved the original problem, to what degree they gave up basic positions in order to cope with the Although they may travel away from the original problem mous speed, they do not notice it. Problemshifts of this kind may. invest research programmes with a remarkable tenacity in di fing almost any criticism.* programmes. One freque! ferent problems from those which one has set out to some problems less interesting than extreme cases, one may end up with solving (or trying to solve) no other _ problems but those which one has oneself created while trying to solve * This paper was originally pu of the International Col ‘comment on Carnap's cknowledgment Howson, R Jefrey, . Levi, A. Musgrave, A. Shimony and J. I'o Carnap and Popper who both spent cays oa thereby contributed immensely tomy ‘even tomething Popper's adequacy requirem (Popper L957). CHANOES IN THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC original problem, In such cases we may talk about a ‘degenerating stops problem- Wving, and tries to recapitulate the problem background and assess problems Jn the case of Carnap's vast research programme one may wonder Jed him to tone down his original bold idea of an a priari, analytic ictive logic to his present caution about the epistemological nature hhis theory:? why and how he reduced the original problem of nal degree of belief in hypotheses (principally scientific theories) {to the problem of rational degree of belief in particular sentences,? finally to the problem of the probabilistic consistency (‘coherence’) start with a potted version of the problem background of nductive logic. 1 THE TWO MAIN PROBLEMS OF CLASSICAL EMPIRICISM: INDUCTIVE JUSTIFICATION AND INDUCTIVE METHOD epistemology in general can be characterized by its two main foundations of —€} .e. perfect, the problem of founded ~ knowledge or the problem of Heuristic, or of method (the logic of discovery) ‘The empiricist brand of classical epistemology in particular acknow- Jedged only one single source of knowledge about the external wor the natural light of experience.* But this light can illuminate at best the meaning and truth-value of propositions expressing ‘hard facts’ of ‘factual pro} ‘The logics of of classical epistemology ~ Whether empiricist or rationalist ~ maintained some strict, black-and~ ‘white appraisal of propositions. This amounted to a sharp demarca- tion between knowledge and non-knowledge. They equated know- edge — efistémé — with the proven; unproven daxa was ‘sophistry and 1 The degenerating problemshit’ can again be illustrated by the example of explan- * op Phare psuion conotetes tegaverscng robert “conventional” (re. contentreducing) stratagems, Cf. flo, p. 172. ation and a indidual eonstants Carap calle al oa her hand itemclgy om the other hand, was i eersre, istly~adited that at least logical knowledge the transmission of truth) was 6 privCHANGES IN THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTIVE LoGic CHANGES IN THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC illusion” or ‘meaningless gibberish’. This is how theoretical, non The methodological implications of this logic of justification were clear. factual knowledge was bound to become the central problem fi | method in general demands that the path of knowledge oeates * Thia, pp. 426-5. Gh Popper ing to Popper a probability funtion in roughly, (@ iis defined on & languageCHANGES IN THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTIVE LociG cp. But is o(f) = 0 so absurd? Carnap, Ramsey, gave a in 's defence is that naive int misguided into c(1) +0. He indicates that ‘degree of co betting quotient’, the mistake transpires at once o. This led him to th Keynes’ doubts about his postu disproof. ve hi te nt An or Popper's charge that Carnap adopts Pcie aga pol that els p Carnap dees net pt ‘of his later problemsbife from degiee of confirmation to being quoteots tle this but i not reo 9 0, 5-1], P. 160, Also cf. Popper [ + Ritchie (1926), esp. must not be uniformly zero and (I) is uniformly zero, | a vague concey we substitute for it the concept of ‘rat is very interesting. Ithad already been propos grave doubts whether any reasonable grout for universal propos ) =0 vas important bea leaely as this. But hisargumencisan interesting anilpa CHANGES IN THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC metaphysical speculation; but it seems to have disturbed y. Replying to Ritchie, he pointed out that 1) agree that inductive gene ticular expectations enter high numerical 1s need have no finite probs \diictive grounds und: ic measure of confirmation oriented towards Thas overwhelming ve opp that the explanat rended result’, namely that ‘{Carnap’ th an adequate definition of “degree of 2 In particular, he pointed out that measure’ a refuted theory scarcely indeed, there is no guarantee that a ied instance confirmation than any of falsified, on the average, in 1ce confirmation’ approached it ought to do, so that the law ‘All tossed pennies always ‘has the instance confirmation ¥ instead of o. In discussing in my ; theory of Reichenbach's which leads to mathematically equivalent sults, I described this unintended consequence of his theory as devastating’. firmation measure with relia betting on a law with betting on age" and contained only monadie tqslifed instance confirmation 0CHANGES IN THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTIVE Locic CHANGES IN THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC. (®) The weak atheor thesis: confirmation theory nut theories Since the term ‘qualified instance confirmation of theories’ was manner of speech for the confirmation of certain particular pi ns (of the ‘next instances’), it was, strictly speaking, redundani 1950 Carnap still kept ‘qualified instance confirmation’ for the sf of those who found it difficult to get rid of the old-fashioned idea the main problem of inductive logic is the partial justific vories by evidential support; but after 1950 he abandoned quali But this decision was vated by Popper’s 1954 Finetti by Shimony (and following him by Lehmann and Kemeny) to the Ramsey-De Finetti theorem a betting syst probabilistic.* Thus, at the Popper showed that there is somethi Carnap's 1 quotients f were proved to be probabilistic. The fi of the problem of evidential support in terms of rat later. But Carnap had to p fo collmably addi metrics) or as Carnap puts it, a system of beliefs is ‘strit ivial appraisal of universal ‘was esentially concerned with betting on js theory had also another important ent for any particular pre ic of confirmation — jointly as the ‘weak atheoretical thes 1o the thesis that theories are dispensable both in confirmation theory the logic of discovery, as the ‘strong atheoretical thesis the confirmation of theories or of predict or should they be on a par? they depend upon dons, Others believe that ability of a theory cannot there is a gene hess of any form with respect to given lar predictions are in this case regarded as merely two special kinds Hiypotheses?* decided to opt for the second view." But we find some trace of his final deci ie book, where he introduced ies only to particular predictions, and not wy the result all along, Paper in Philosophy of “On Inductive Logic’. The clearest count of what happened is already contained in this early her theory. Tue arguments fofCHANGES IN THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC inference is not even the most important one; role of universal sentences in the inductive proce teen overestimated. The predictive inference ithe mos impo tive inference So Carnap first" widens’ the classical problem of inductive justification a then omits the original part. wondering what persuaded Carna radical problemshift. Why did he not at least perhaps following the Wrinch-Jeffreys idea of simplicity order (expounded in 1921),’ to introduce immediately a system with posi measures for universal propositions? A tentative answer is of cout that he would have encountered many more technical difficulties am he first wanted (0 try a relatively easier approach. There is, of cours nothing wrong with such a consideration: itis understandable that om osimplify the technical of one’s research program But one sill might be more cautious and not shift one’s philosop ition too hastily under such temptation.‘ (This is of course not t say that problem-cuts and problemshifts ~ and feedbacks from tech nical difficulties to basic philosophical assumptions ~ are not inevitab companions of any major research programme.) 1§ quotients on par s)eit will be wor ies of Popper's propositions. But before we do to make a few comments on the Carnap’s prograt atheoretical thesis isproblemshifi goes back Kes form of inductive correlations rather dian turn” was rather a return |ANGES IN THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC d) The conflation of the weak and the strong atheoretical theses ippendix of his Logical Foundations Carnap concludes the section 8 1g Predictions?’ with this statement: ‘We the use of laws is not indispensable for making predictions. , of course, to state universal laws in books tainly a sharp statement of an unusual position. As we jended to express nothing more than Carnap's‘ weak But the unfortunate formulation made some did express more, that it expressed the 'stro1 science. They thou values to such predictions already passage that provoked Popper into his onslaught on .ged strong atheoretical thesis and into neglecting the “weak thesis’. Popper, of course, remembered his old Hole Vienna days when he fought the Vienna Circle in order to ly justified ( verified’). He thought he had won that b: , his horror, he thought that Carnap was going to ban them in seience, Carnap in eff had held in the heyd: ized this doctrine in my f. Sc. D.; and when Carnap accepted my the Syntax and in Testability I thought that the doctrine was Garnap, in his reply, unfortunately, ignored Popper's otest and did not clear up the misunderstanding, BiCHANGES IN THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC logic of discovery and with ts emphasis on the central role play theories in the growth of scence, For instance in 1946 he Wrote From the purely theoretical point of vi end and goal of snes, the theory Telus procedure in adeition tok tperienct in working wath other theories, or the inspiration of genius play a de proposed there may bea rational procedure for examin Cla tha the elton beiween theory and the aeration eo valle 3 not chat of fering te one from tke thal ha of judging the theory onthe bass ofthe evidence when bod ready theories, not how to discover them, that even if judging th could be reduced to judging particular predictions, discov theories could not be reduced to discovering pa : roeasure Ge support the given evidence supplies ford sumed hypothets A recent passage in Carnap's Intellectual Autobiography sho interestingly Carnap's reluctant, restricted, but undeniable appred mn of the role of theoties in the growth of science: the interpretation of theoretical terms isalwaysincomplete, sentences are in general not translatable into the observation language. Th great advantages of the th jt. the great freedom of concept formation and thet and the explanatory advantages have so Why then Carnap’s misleading formulation in the Appendix? 7] explanation, L hink, lies inthe conflation ofthe conceptual and terminolog frameworks of the logics of justification and discovery, caused by Carat rhs led then (othe subsequent ~ unintended ~ confi 165, Carnap does not draw the atten’ cording to his theory (an 1955) th ridence Sa tegal te aa Aaa + Carnap (of) p80. 148 CHANGES IN THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC the interconnection between the weak and strong atheortical theses thought that ‘those who identify ation with probability believe that a high degree of y isdesirable. They implicitly accepr he rule: pst probable hypothesis”. Why must? Why must Carnap impli he explicitly ejects? (He even says ~ followi tists devise ‘daring guesses be fair to Popper, one has to point out that y th probability. Always choose the most probable hypo! 0 Jeffreys, Keynes, Russell, and Reichenbach ~ to those whom jticized in 1934. And mistake about Carnap’s actual beliefs, Popper touched here on a weakness of Carap's philosophy: the loose, and even paradoxical, between his elaborate logic of confirmation (or reliability) and ion is there between a theory of confirmation di logic of discovery? (A theory of confirmation assigns marks ~ directly or indirectly ~ ives a value judgment, an appraisal of theories. Now the sal of any finished product is bound to have decisive pragmatic yequences for the method of its production. Mi ndards, by Nich one judges people, have grave pragmatic implications for edu- is, for the method of their production. Similarly, scie fandards by which one judges theories, have grave pragmatic ions for scientific method, the method of their production. important pattern of criticism of moral standards is to show that lead to absurd educational consequences (for instance utopian 1a] standards may be criticized by pointing to the hypocrisy towhich he ). There should be an analogous pattern of icism for confirmation theory. ‘The methodological tions of Popperian appraisals are rel: ly easily discernible. Popper wants the scientist to aim at highly im to aim at very severe tests of 5 28 * Caray 8, Metre ei We hl of gun nance Coubenaton G1, blow, section 6. gan Always choos the mastimprobable hypothesis 1 careles formulation, since according to ied hy his non-quandiatve is Logie of Scene Discovery. 447 “CHANGES IN THE PROBLEM OF INDUGTIVE LOGIC. yn? Or should he only Itcan be shown by a simple ex: im at them, bu L ple of ' positi relevance’, t is, in the language of qualified instance confirmation, ce’ of L According to Carnapians, Principle is a precise version of an axiom of informal ing to the formulae Carnap ol mn for a hypothesis ; ndgment seems to lead to strange pragma consequences, Let us have two rival theories such that b certain welldefined experiments. We programme two mac perform and record the two experiments respectively. Will he This is connected with what Keynes called the problem of the of evidence’. Indec i a8 ‘ noticed (as some of his predecessors already had) that the reli and the probability of a hypothesis may differ, On doubt, he would have simply commente theor! 1e same.’ Keynes emphasized that ‘weight cannot in terms of probat beats 939), 68) 45 Keynes would have ul! apvah co destroy the very foundatins of inductive loge. For athe paradox o the weight of evidence 3 2 i Nagel had! already put this argument forvard again CHANGES IN THE PROSLEM OF INDUGTIVE LoGrC it Popper who admits as evidence however, can only by insisting that his appraisal of theories in of supporting evidence must have no methodological impli- 1 such evidence. But can one completely sever isal of theories from its methodological implications? Or perhaps i diferent appraisals ave needed, some appraising tharies fom the 1 of methodology, others from the point of view of confirmation? A Camapian logic of discovery a‘Carnapian’ logic of discovery which would be married jurally to Carnap’s inductive logic as Popper's logic of discovery \eory of empirical content and corroboration (or as the jcs of discovery are married to their corresponding logics ion)? It 40 happens that Kemeny did offer such a Carnapian heuris ply ‘Aimat theories with high Carnapian fence. According to Kemeny, the task of th ‘certain data collected through care Ip of ‘scientifically acceptable" hypotheses. potheses can be analysed into three stages Bpquage in terms of which the hypothesis ito be exprested i nent from this language, which He as the hypothesis. ;nifically justified to accept the hypothesis on the given Phen Kemeny continues: ‘It is the last step that Carnap is interested he salves by his -funetions). It.can beseen that if Carnap he makes (2) superfluous: language, we can consider any meaningful statement of cory. Then the "best confirmed hi is amare for of an. among equally confirmed hypotheses.) , 1 three stages of ‘selecting an acceptable spothesis'. But could not these three stages represent a full account fc method? There would then be three stages in the growth \guaages (and the determination the calculation of the c-values for non-universal hypotheses, WO ae iealisa Gcverprostion) ofthe ctunctions* Theeccond sige, since h and ¢ are nov universal statements, could be programmed 1 hog Yon Kemeny Liss m2 tp ithe construction adh lating wi overatondanguageCHANGES IN THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC GANGES IN THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC on an inductive machine. The third seems to be trivial. But, K ee eee aener a nce reece (cic naturally associated with Carnap's inductive method (of on), Carnap's “weak atheoretical thesis’ ~ no theories in the remain as the truly creative step mation strongly suggests Kemeny's ‘strong athcor- Let us now look more closely at Kemeny's methodology. Fit i" no theories in the logie of discovery either. But Carnap devise a language. Then we define a probability distribution of Ihever followed up this suggestion - even at the price of a stark Boolean algebra of its (possibly only particular) sentences. TI between his ocensionally expressed, almost Popperian views perform experiments and calculate, tr \ethod of discovery and his own method of confirmation. fe ‘p(hye!) where et is the conjunction o 8 Weny's heuristic, of course, in a sense vindicates Popper's fears: eo Ikeatheoretical thesis’ strongly suggests the ‘strong atheoretical But while the historian of thought must point out the strong jon between the two, he must not condemn the “weak thesis! of the strong method- Provement of our sis and the weak What is wrong E ie : fons to flog the dead horse and spare th no way to discal eck free. However, before embarking on this Act th g Process is strictly confined tp us see how Carnap's programme shifted, prison of the language. Explanat 4 lar propositions but also from ev and criticisms that break ee 5 ra strongest criticism within a language ~ refutation ich one can refute a deterministic theory ~is also ruled out, this approach science becomes statistics writ arge. But statics ha PROBABILITY, EVIDENTIAL SUPPORT, RATIONAL BELIEF Bayesian fae tionatization writ large, for refutation by statistical reje ee a ae tion methods is ruled out too: no finite sample can ever prev roblem of inductive logic from universal to "posible world fvom exerting etal infsctoc ot ont bea ors wan accompanied bya paral hie rom the In this method there is no place of honour accorded any mo theories or laws. Any sentence is a8 good as any other, and if th a preferred class, then ~at leat in Carnap's present class of particular sentences. The concept of explanation (agai i a nee appears! hough we may retain the term avamanner ofapecch fo carp ea a sentences whose instantiations have high confirmation. Testa in some giver language Ly disappears too, for there are no potential falsifiers. No state Ge eoat affairs is ever excluded. The recipe is: guesses, eel aA sees eaeaey : ronment the general mtd or akg replaces testing an sen he factcorrecting” expla he explanandum, and change me, begin. 3 ae ee in preeting fe pesd Kemeny’ anaes ppecensCHANGES IN THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC interpretation of inductive logic as providing primarily deg evidential support to its interpretation as providing primarily ral betting quotients. In order to appreciate this important parallel lemshiff, let me give another piece of potted history. ‘Neoclassical empiricism had a central dogma: the dogma of thei of: (1) probabilities, (2) degrees of evidential support (or confi (3) degrees of rational belief, and (4) rational betting quotients This ‘neoclassical chain of identities’ is not implausible, true empiricist the only source of rational belief is evident thus he will equate the degree of rationality of a degree of its evidential support. But rational belief is pla measured by rational betting quotients. And it was, after determine rational betting quotients that the probability calculus invented. This chain was the basic hidden assumption underlying Carni whole programme. At first he was, as it transpires from Test ‘and Meaning, primarily interested in evidential support. But in 1% when he embarked on his research programme, he saw his basic ti primarily as that of finding a satisfactory ‘explication’ of the cept of logical probability. He wanted to perfect the work initia by Bernoulli, Laplace, and Keynes. But Bernoulli, Laplace and Keynes developed their theory of lo probability not for its own sake but probability to be identical with rational betting quotients, degrees rationality of belief and of evidential support. ‘And so did Carnap. A brief glance at the order of his problen (confirmation, induction, probability) on page 1 of his Logical Fo dations of Probability shows this. Thus his theory of probability was solve the time-honoured problem of induction, which, according & Carnap, was to judge laws and theories on the basis of evidence. Bi as long as evidential support = probability, Logical Foundations 0 Probability = Logical Foundations of Evidential Support = Logical Theo Gonfirmation. Carnap, after some hesitation, decided to call his exp catum for logical probability ‘degree of confirmation’ ~ a choice whi later turned out to be something of an embarrassment. (a) Are degrees of evidential support probabilities? Already at an early stage of his work Carnap came to feelthatevident support is the weak point in the chain of neoclassieal empiricis Indeed, the discrepancy between rational betting quotients at degrees of evidential support was so glaring in the case of theories thi he had to split the two already in his 1950 exposition. For the rz betting quotient for any theory is zero, but its ‘reliability’ (that is, evidential support) varies. Therefore he split his concept of con: firmation for theories into two: their ‘degree of confirmation’, he CHANGES IN THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC ‘was zero, but their degree of confirmation (ie. qualified confirmation) was positive.* throws new light on Carnap's first step in his ‘atheoretical’ if: the first atheoretical move was due to the first crack in ical chain. sy soon he found that even by formulating his philosophy of completely in terms of particular propositions he could not iL further cracks. The identity of degrees of evidential support onal betting quotients for particular propositions is not sclf- Acither: the probabilistic character of the second may seem to jar, but the probabilistic character of the first is anything but his is what he had in mind when he wrote: ‘Although this jon [.e. explanation of logical probability as evidential prt] may be said to outline the primary and simplest meaning it alone is hardly sufficient for the clarification of 4a a quantitative concept.” Since Garnap had, at this point, dy realized that his argument that evidential support = logical ity, is based on ‘entirely arbitrary’ assumptions, he shifted emphasis to betting intuition. But he did not realize that not only concerning the identity of evidential 1 and logical probability based on unsatisfactory assumptions fe thesis may be altogether false — even in the case of particular sitions. thout realizing it, he introduced two different concepts in his leal Foundations of Probability for rational betting quotients and for 0); for degrees of evidential support he used p(i, e)~p(h). But he tative and come wative theory) he a grees of evidential support are p(h, ¢); in $8865, 87, 88 (in his icatory theory), however, he slipped into the thesis that Both are (We) 2 Ii is the irony of the story that in these sections Carnap ed Hempel for having two different explicanda for evidential support in ind,’ and for having, in the main, opted for the wrong, probabilisti betting approach, "The two conflated notions are, of course, radically different. The Garnapian bettor's p(k, ¢) is maximal when h is a tautology: the ability of a tautology, on any evidence, is 1. The Carnapian cientist’s p(h, ¢)~p(h) is minimal when his a tautology: the evidential Hooks are usually characterized by 2 certain inconsistency ~ atleast in emplases. One oclfes, velf-crtially, one's postion when elaborating it, but one seldom rewrites If only for lack of dime =the whole book on each such occasion Ibid, © Thids p. 475.