Concepts and Cognitive Science PDF

Chapter
Concepts and Cognitive Science

Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis
L. Introduction: Some Preliminaries

Concepts are the most fundamental constnrcts in theories of the mind. Given their
importance to all aspects of cognition, ifs no su{prise that concepts raise so many
.oitto,rersies in philosophy and cognitive science. These range from the relatively
local
Should concepts be thought of as bundles of feafures, or do they embody
mental theories?
to the most global

Are concepts mental representations, or might they be abstract entities?
Indeed, it's even controversial whether concepts are objects, as oPPosed to cognitive
or behavioral abilities of some sort. Because of the scope of the issues at stake, it's
inevitable that some disputes arise from radically different views of what a theory of
concepts ought to achieve-differences that can be especially plonounced across

discipiinary boundaries. Yet in spite of these differertces, there has been a significant
amount of interdisciplinary interaction among theorists working on concepts. In this
respect, the theory of concepts is one of the great success stories of cognitive science.
Psychologists and linguists have borrowed freely from philosophers in develoPing
detailed empirical theories of concepts, drawing inspiration from Wittgenstein's discussions of family resemblance, Frege's distinction between sense and reference, and
Kripke's and Putnam's discussions of externalism and essentialism. And piilosophers
have found psycJrologists' work on categorization to have powerful implications for
a wide r*g" of philosophical debates. The philosopher Stephen Stich (1993) has gone
so far as to remark that current empirical models in psychology undermine a traditional approach to philosophy in which philosophers engage in _co:rceptual analyses.
As a .*"qrrence of this *ork Stich and others have come to believe !h{ philosophers have to rethink their approach to topics in areas as diverse as the philosophy of
mind and ethics. So even if disciplinary boundaries have generated the appearance of
dis;oint research, it's hard to deny that significant interaction has taken place.
We hope this volume will underscore some of these achievements and- open the
way for increased cooperation. In this introduction, we sketch the recent history of
theories of concepts. However, our purpose isn't solely one of exposition. We also
provide a number of reinteqpretations of what have come to be standard arguments
in the field and develop a framework that lends more prominence to neglected areas
This paper was fully collaborative; the order of the authors'narnes is arbihary.
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Concepts and Cognitive
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fured concepts are primitive or atomic. What exactly it means to say that a concept
or lacfcs, stmcture is another matter. This brings us to our second preliminary
point.
has,
Two Models of Conceptual Stntcture
Most theories of concepts treat lexical concepts as structured complexes. This raises
the issue of what it is for such representational complexes to have structure. Despite
the important role that conceptual structure plays in many debates, there has been
little explicit discussion of this question. We discem two importantly different
models of stmcture that are irnplicit in these debates.
The first view we'll call the Containment Model. On this view, one concept is a
structwed complex of other concepts iust in case it literally has those other concepts
as proper parts. In this way, a concept C might be composed of the concepts X, Y,
*a Z. fnen an occturence of C would necessarily involve an occuffence of X, Y, and
Z because X, Y, and Z are contained within C, C couldn't be tokened wiihout X, y,
and Z being tokened. For example, the concept DRoppED rHE AccoRDloN couldn't be
tokened without AccoRDroN being tokened. As an analogy, you might think of
the relation that words bear to phrases and sentences. The word "accordion" is a
strucfural element of the sentence 'Tony dropped the accordion" in the sense that
it is a proper part of the sentence. Consequently, you can't utter a token of the sentence 'Tony dropped the accordion" without thereby uttering a token of the word
"accordion."
The second view, which we'll can the Inferential Model, is rather different. According to this view, one concept is a stmcfured complex of other concepts just in case it
stands in a privileged relation to these other concepts, generally, by way of some
type of inferential disposition. On this model, even though X, Y, arrd Z may be part
of the structure of C, C can still occur without necessitating their occurence. For
example, RED might have a structure implicating the concept colo& but on the
Inferential Model, one could entertain the concept nEo without having to token the
concept coloR. At most, one would have to have certain dispositions linking nno and
coloR-for example the disposition to infer X s coLonEp from X s nEp.
Thus, for any claim that a concept has such-and-such structure-or such-and-such
tVpe of strucfure (see sec. 7)-there will be, in principle, two possible inteqpretations
of the daim: one in terms of the Containment Model and one in terrns of the Inferential Model. The signiftcance of these distinctions will become clearer once we present
some speciftc theories of concepts. For now we simply want to note that discussions
of concepfual strucfure are often based on an implicit commitment to one of these
models and th"t a proper evaluation of a theory of concepts may hrrn on which
model is adopted.
Concepts as Abstracta os. Concepts as Mental Representations
The third and last preliminary point that we need to discuss concerns a more basic
issue-the ontological status of concepts. In accordance with virtually all discussions
of concepts in psychology, we will assume that concepts are mental particulars. For
examplq your concept cRANDMoTHER is a mental representation of a certain type Perhaps a shructured mental representation in one of the two senses we've isolated. It
should be sai4 however, that not all theorists accept as their starting point the thesis
that concepts are mental particulars. In philosophy especially it's not uncommon to
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expression "the morning stay'' refers to the object it does because this expression has the sense it does.
g. Senses are the indirect referents of erpressions in intmsional conterts Certain
'
linguistic contexts (e.g ., "... believes that . . ." and other propositional attitude
reports) have distinctive and peorliar semantic properties. Outside of these
contexts, one can freely substitute coreferential terms without affecting the
truth value of the sentence ("the morning star is bright" + "the evening star is
bright"), but within these contexts, the same substifutions are not possible
("Sue believes that the morning star is bright" # "Sue believes that the evening
star is bright"1. Frege's explanation of this bype of case is that in such contexts
expressions do not refer to their customary referents, but rather to their customary ssrrses. Since the expressions have different customary senses, they actually have different referents in these contexts. Thus Frege is able to maintain the
principle that coreferring terms can be substituted one for the other without a
.t *gL in truth value, despite what otherwise may have appeared to be a decisive counterexample to the principle.
Frege's semantic theory, and the phenomena he used to motivate it, have generated a great deal of controversy, and they have had an enorrnous influence on the
development of semantic theories in philosophy and linguistics. For now, though, the
important issue is the ontological stafus of senses. Frege argued that senses, construed in terms of these theoretical roles, cannot be mental entities. Since it's conrmon
in philosophy to hold that concepts just are Fregean senses, it would seem that
Frege's case against mental entities is especially pertinent. The problem, in his view,
is that mental entities are subjective, whereas senses are supposed to be obiective.
Two people "are not prevented from grasptng the same sense; but they cannot have
the same idea" (159211966, p. 60). (Note that for Frege ideas are mental entities.)
If this is the argument against the view that concepts are mental representations, however, it isn't the least bit convincing. To see why, one has to be careful
about teasing apart several distinctions that can get lumped together as a single contrast between the subjective and the objective. One of these concerns the difference
between mental representation+ thoughts, and experiences, on the one han4 and
exha-mental entities on the other. In this sensg a stone is objective but a mental
representation of a stone is subiective; it's subjective simply because ifs mental.
Notice, however, that sublectivity of this kind doesn't preclude the sharing of a mental representation, since two people can have the same type of mental representation.
Whaf isn't possible is for two people to have the very same tolcen representation. This
brings us to a second subjective-obiective distinction. It can be put this way: Mental
reptisentations are subjective in that their tokens are uniquely possessed; they belong
to one and only one subject. Their being subiective in this sense, however, doesn't
preclude their being shareable in the relevant sense, since, again, two people can have
lhe sa*e representation by eac} having tokens of the same type. When someone
says that two people have the same concept, there is no need to suppose that she
is saying that they both possess the same token concept. It would make as much
sense to say that two people cannot utter the same sentence because they cannot
both produce the same token sentence. Clearly what matters for being able to utter
the same sentence, or entertain the same concept, is being able to have tokens of
the same type. So while mental representations are subiective in the two senses
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11
Jo salroaql q suogpluesardar Fluau to alor aq1 uaal8
puv 'suollsluasardar lEuatu aq l,usJ sldaruor fqrn uospar ou aes arvt lroqs uI
Suraq
to asuar ".ll
a^lpafqo Sqaq urog
-"ql
dop l,usaop
s1q1
s'alqsaleqs
'palelo$ al,a,lr
qpSre;n1 puu
a)uams-I I
Science
Theory holds that most concepts-especially lexical concepts-have deffnitional

skucfure. What this means is that mo.st concepts encode necessary and sufficient
conditions for their own application.s Considet for examplq the concept BAcHELoR.
According to the Classical Theory, we can think of this concept as a complex mental
representation that speciftes necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be a
bachelor. So BACHELoR might be composed of a set of representations such as Is Nor
MARRTED, rs MAIE, and s ANr ADULT. Each of these components specifies a condition that
something must meet in order to be a bacJrelor, and anything that satisftes them
all thereby cowrts as a bacJrelor. These components, or feafures, yield a semantic
inteqpretation for the complex representation in accordance with the principles of a
compositional semantics.
T[is conception of concepts has a long history in philosophy. The seventeenthcentury philosopher Iohn Locke seems to be assuming u *t"tsion of the Classical
Theory when he gives his account of the concepts strN and corô (169A11975, pp.
2gS-299 and p. 317, respectively):
it, but an aggregate of those several simple ldeas,

a constant regular motion, at a certain distance
having
Bright, Hot, Roundish,
other....
from us, an4 perhaps, some
[TJhe ldea of the Sun, What is
[Tlhe greatest part of the ldeas, that make our complex ldea of Gold, are Yellowness, great Weight, Ductility, Fusibility, and Solubility, in Aquo Regia, etc. all
united together in an unknown Substratum ...e
On the Classical Theory, most concepts-including most lexical concepts-are

complex representations that are composed of structurally simpler representations.
What's more, it's nafural to construe their structure in accordance with the Containment Model, where the components of a complex concept are among its ProPer
parts.lo Some of these components may themselves be complex, as in the case of
BACFTELoR. But evenhrally one reaches a level of primitive representations, which
are undeftned. Traditionally, these prir.nitive representations have been taken to be
sensory or perceptual in character, along broadly empiricist lines.
It is, of course, an oversimplification to speak of the Classical Theory of concepts,
as though there were just a single, unitary theory to which all classical theorists subscribe. In redity, there is a diverse family of theories centered around the idea that
S. By -application" we mean a semantic relatioru that is, a concept encodes the conditions that are singly
necessary and lointly sufficient for something to bi in its extension Another sense of the term is to indicate
a psychologrcal process in whicJr an object is judged to fall under a concept. We'll try to avoid this ambigurty by always using "application" in the semantic sense, rrrless the context makes it very clear that the
psychological sense is intended. Notice, then, that in the ftrst instance we have characterized the Classical
tl,uory in semantic terms. This doesrt't meaR however, that the theory is devoid of psychological import
See the discussion of concept acguisition and categorization, below.
9. Locket views about natural kind concepts are complicated by the fact that he took nafural kinds to have
both a nominal and a real essence. For Locke, the real essence of a kind like gold isn't known, but the nominal essence ir, *d must be, in order to possess the corresporrding concept. Arguably, howevet he takes
the nominal essence to give necessary and suffcient conditions for the application of a kind concepb since
he holds that the nominal essence is deftned relative to the real essence in such a way that the two kack
one another.
10. It's naturat, but not mandatory. Alternatively, one could think of a classically shuctured concept as a
node that stands in inferential relations to its deffning features. The advantage of the Containment Model is
that it makes especially dear which associated concepts are its defining features and which are incidental.
s'r
arp,rpur il,am,aurnro^
luasard"n'ffi:ffiHrff#,1$iil,"J'il;;"":"#1ff1]['"1;l;if"?frtllT
'(g-T,g'dd'6g6tlZtOD sellr/n derue3 ,,'e8en8us-I to qsfpuy per8o1
q8norql srpfqdelaru to uolleunu{g aqJ-, u1 'detuef, JIopnX raqdosopqd uuuuag

frnluae-qlanua/q FlruanlJul aql q uoglsod srqi to aleJo^ps luarar aJoru letl/uaruos V
" "tue$ lnoqu suolluJado urno sll luog Jo 'asuas p spafqg

ruog raqlla pe{ ll lpql '*rpl raqlaSol SuJup[ puu Sugeadar l(q 'yps ll ol saurert
are 'spu!ru u/no rno Jo uogerado fue uro{
SulpuulsJapull eql sB 'qens fpo
Jo 'asuas uroJ, ruaas l(eur f,"ql Jalaos aloual ,vtotl 'seap1 e$upqu $ou eW uerulAl
pf
'(ggt' d' Sl.6tlO1gtl twpuapteryn uawnH Eryuat

-uo) frasrg uy ul ll lnd a{ro'I urlof sy 'sldaruor frosuas Jo )pols lpurs fplqepr B to
suual q peulJap aq p1no^ pua aql q sldacuor IIB 'Aet* sFil uI 'sarqea, asog sagslles
l! asu u1 pnf ldaeuoe xalduoc '^ au aql rapun s11e, Su.qtraulos p{l f,en E qrns tn
salqpa, lue aler aql se1urodroeur 1eql ldaruor xaldtuor B salqurassB ratueal ag tuaul
p"tllou Suyrug 'sapuaSupuoJ lpl
-uo4lua ra{ u.r aplarroJ sa!iladord asa{l fBrvl
".il
-uauruorlû? spagar leql fe^ p q paurof arp suoHpluasardar
4aql leql os parolluotu
ale sallradord frosuas 'uopdaerad qSnor{I '8ul^ olloJ aql aTI Sulqlaruos s! lp allrre
alvr laporu ag 'pnldarrad ro rftosuas arp sarnlpat a^Hllrr.ud 1eql uoltrepdlls raqpry eql
ppe a 'rtroaql prlssul) aql to uolsral lspr4drua aql ql1rr aruepro)re u! J1 'sarnlea;
^
s11 Sullqurasss ltq ldaruor B sarpbre raur?al aql araq A auo q uolllsJnbre ldaruor ;o
Iapou prnleu aql uaql 'uollprlrdde sy roJ suolllpuof, luaplgns pw d.ressarau aPorua
lprll sarnleat ro trno llpq uollepasardar xalduo) s s! ldaruor e;1 uorlrsmbty flatuo2
'suual pnldarrad ro &oeuas u1 'agpsod tolluelpde 4aql rot suolllpuot lueplttns pue fressaru
'dsa) qdaruot tsohl
1as s aporlp lsrn suoquluasardar Fgaru parnpuls a.re (qdaeuor JE lxq
,o
tuoaq1
prFsal)
aLLI
r xog
'suorlplqoru pnuqsqns E! pue froa{I lprlssplJ aql lno qsag o1 sdlaq lI aruls 'slunolle
asa{l /naller ,$npq ilp aM '(ItZ raldeqrJ 086I 'lB p 'V 't 'ropog aas) sluau
-lnuwor tlssq EI urort flparp /vlou tPlt{r'lt Jo IIP 'uollEuluuapP aruararar Pue 'luaur
lplua rpfpue 'uollprggsnf epualqda 'uo11uz1ro8a1er 'uo111qnbee ldaeuor ro slunoJre
pagFrn SuJrago 'sarrnosar froleueldxa lryrarviod seq /fuoaql aql lpre8ar q81q qrns ul
ppq uaaq froaql lprtsspl3 aql sprl fqm'r(Soloqrfsd ul so/6r aql pue '{qdosopqd ug
s0g6l aql Ulun l,uaram snlels sll ol sa8ualpqe snolras ls4J aql pul/ ,r'([aurnlon brul
ul U ralduqrl nil o1eld aas) ,qpbllue ol 1rpq alBP froaql aql to spadsy 'froaql
lprlssul3 aql to ailpuFuopard prlrolsFl aql alulsrelo ol lpr.grtp aq ppo/t ll
'saltrradord frosuas Sulssardxa sarqpaJ
p{l /nall pppldula plqs aql pauopwqe a^sq

slsFoaql prlsspp luarar fuu;41 :aar8esgp slsFoaql prlsselr qrltl&t uo lulod auo Fn[
Jo pasodruoe flaqerullp are strdaruoe
uoguau oI 'saruaragp rp{l ;o fueu urort Aellre spe4sq" l?rll lunoJts pazllBapl uB
froaql Frlssel3 aql ilpr a/n lEqM 'arnlf,ruls lpuolllugap a sq sqdaruor
s1
qdacuor ro
s1p8rery pue
aruarns-I
OI
Science
11
In the case of many words, speciftcally in the case of the overwhelming maiority of scientiftc words, it is possible to specify their meaning by reduction to
oih"t words ("constitution " definition). E.g- "'arthropodes' are animals with
segmented bodies and jointed legs." ... In this way every word of the language
is ieduced to other words and ftn"lly to the words which occur in the so-called
"observation sentences" or "protocol sentences-"l2
In the face of repeated failures to analyze everyday concepts in terms of a purely

sensory base, contemporary theorists have often relaxed the strong empiricist assumpti,on that all simple concepts must be sensory. I"I example-, Eve Clark (1973')
sees the process of acquiring the meaning of a word like 'trother" as comPrising
several stlges where semantic components get added to an initial rePresentation. In
the earliest stage the representation consists of only two components: *Manr, -ADULr.
In
is changed to tqourr, *slsuNc is added, and

In this way, a representation for "brothey'' is gradually con-
subsequ"ni stages, -ADULT
*necpnocar. is added.
structed from its constifuent representations, which collectively provide a definition

of the word and distinguish it from related words, such as 'boy." Though these components may not be primitive Clark isn't comrnitted to the idea that further decomposition will always lead to purely sensory congepts. In fact, she says that many
words, especially relational terms, require possibly irreducible features that encode
"function"l, ,o.ial, or cultural factors" (p. 106). Similarly, the linguist and philosopher
Ienold Katzwrites (J:972 [chapter 4 in this volume], P- 4O),
-chair- can be decomposed into a set of concepts which

tTlhe English noun
might be represented by the semantic markers in (a.10):
(4.10)
oBIECT,
ftryscAL NoN-uvING,
LEGS, SOMETHING WITH
ARTIFACT, FURNITURE, PoRTABIJ, SoMETIIING
wlrH
A BACK, SOMETHING WITH A SEAT, SEAT FOR ONE.
He adds that these semantic markers-or features-reguire further analysis, but, like
Clark, he isn't committed to a reduction that yields a purely sensory base.
No doubt, a component-by-component model of concept acquisition is compellilg
even when it is debached from its empiricist roots. The simplicity and Power of the
model provides considerable motivation for pursuing the Classical Theory.
Categorizntion The Classical Theory offers an equally compelling model of categorization (i.e., the application of a concept, in the psychological sose see note S). In
fact, the model of categorization is just the ontogeny run backwards; that is, something is judged to fall under a concept iust in case it is judged to fall under the features that .o*pote the concept. So, something might be categorized as falling under
the concept cHArR by noting that it has a seat, ba& legs, and so on. Categorization on
this model is basically a process of checking to see if the features that are part of a
concept are satisfted by ihe item being categorized. As wilh th-" g"t eral_model of
.ot."pt acquisition, this model of categorization is powerful and infuitively appealing, and it's a natural extension of the Classical Theory.
fZ. Thnoughout we'll ignore certain differences between language and thought, allorring daims about
words to stand in for daims about concepts. Carnay's account is about the semantics of linguistic items but
otherwise is a useful and explicit version of the Classical'lheory.
luoor aql q rpq? s sr araql (gt'r)
(err)
rrrory sa)uaraJul aql Jo ,QPIP^ aql to uolleuuldxa aru?s aql q?nul saa18 (Zt eD zp>l
's1sr(pue JaPun're1nu1s
aq ol 1no tunl (f) pue (g) snql'uo oj pup'oxluuvlarMl 'Nvm sldaruor eql salerqdr4 luql
ernpruls Fuolltugap surl uoritrrrvs trdaruor aql lzril SupupP ,tq '(s) Sulssassu ul PFolvl
aql q {ool l,upaiu auo dqrvr st4eldxa froaql PlIssBI) aql 'fpn1s pcfolopos B -oP
ol sstl auo JI sB lou s,ll 'uatu arp srolaqf,?q leql ,lolaql? q,, lo ttryrearu aql to iled sl
ll lerll pe; a{l fq paaluBren8 ag ol sruaas lnq parror fpo lou q (S) ul aruaraJu! aqJ.
'trelu P q qlruS oS 'rolaq?Eq P q
qlnus
(g)
:(g) rapFuo) 'uollrDvs ldaeuor aql q arnlpralll rtreroduraluor aql uI tq{

-ruuxa palp flappra lsoru aql to au6l '@v'd'ggi:rlnn),,enaqlults raqlo aql q '41/tl
-Err? $atu8pnf aql angua I aser auo aql uI 'll qllt uolpauuor u! puep PaaPu saoP
'y ldaeuoe aql apFlno sa{ g. ro :y qdacuor slql q Paurcluor (fpraaor)
11 qSnoqlp
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g aprlPard aq1 ra$g, 'luauuPluor
(1ettB
uon
q q?H^
sE
'y
pafqns
ag
o1 sSuoPq
pttld"i ro" se flpgr(F* to lunorf,? s,llle) Ianueunul ul ParnldP tt lhpn

to
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sl! aser ul isnf rljrtp.n ag ol ua14 uaaq suq luarualels ro arualuas P PtrB '8t4treau uo
saruaraJul aq o1 ua{e uaaq a^pq saJuaraJul eg^rtpne 'fgeuoplP"rl
paspq aru
pg
,,'uplrl Palrruurun, 'flaureu '(I) u1 aseqd

fa1 aql ;o Supreau ag ol 1ruq arerl ol sruaas aaluerenS q$ 'raAoaro;41 'aspuard
ol sruaas usru B sl tllFu5 ptll uolsnPuor ag '(Z) $l$m '(r) uI
aqt r({ plaltnrenS
"q
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q qlFus oS'raryIl-lr{8pm
"
q qlFus (z)
tllltus (f)
'tretu s q rnFus oS 'usru palrrBtuun u? sl
:(u) Pus
(f) ul saruaraJul aql uaamlaq aruarafllp +rurgptls e sl alag dpanruul 'satuaraln

leuaurouaqd rrluaras
flalren e upldxa ol dl[qe sll q e9"qf
rgfpue
Jo
{ppadsa
t11fr1mty Wa nWtlnryuv
Isrlssul) arn rot uorl?Anoru luuilodul raqlouv satuanlul
.{s!r enuapgda a1lil rlll/vr samparord aluc[drul
ryql
sdatrs Jo saFas
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ro
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qr?a to sluaqllsuor alauFln aql leql PaumssP uauo s,ll atuls Puv JIa't^ sP PagsllBs
s1
faeuor pau$ap ag
1eql
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,iair"- aqi Jo uoHluqap ? apFord lderuor aql olu! ralua luql sluauod
r".ir suy(tlra"
-ruoJ aql arqs '(g9 'd 'liotlzssl) ,,; " ,s&el palulol seq t, ,'f,poq paluau8as B sBtl 4
.,Ieurlup rre sl 4 rrrrot aql Jo sasFrard ruor; alqlJnpap,, s! ,,apodorqlr uB sl r Sqql aqltJ
apodorqlr? rre ag _ol 'r u1q1 e_8uqe4 u1 pagnsnf are aan leql
yed s1 (aaoqe) durue3 ulort uolplonb aq1.
uuo, aql Jo arualuas
rrrpfa*i rq
e JI
aSeisBd. ra8rel e
lo
"r"qpagsllBs a.rp quauodtuor Surugap sll raqlaq/u EqnanrrlapP
fq ldaruor ual18 p rapun IpJ ol uall ue Suupl q peggsnf aq Ppor auo letll sl EaPI
a{I .uollprggsnf cpuafslda;o froaql B se ltuld plnor ll alor aql pazlseqdura osle a Brl
prlisu13 aql to salBrolp? pegqdosopd to raqumu V uouat{1lst I tynpldT
&6qf
slp8rery pus aouams'I
ZT
to (4.t4)-(4.2I)
(4.14)
There is a physical object in the room.
(4.1,51 There is something nonliving in the room.
(4.16)
There is an artifact in the room.
(4.T7) There is a piece of furniture in the room.

(4.1S) There is something portable in the room.
(4.19) There is something having legs in the room.
@.2q
(4.2I)
There is something with a back in the room.

There is a seat for one person in the room.
According to Katz, all of these inferences are to be explained by reference to the

concept cHArR and its definitioo given above as (4.10). The deftnition is supposed to
be tnderstood in Kantian terms, by supposing that the one concept
contains within it the other concepts that secure the inferences-ARTrFAcr, pHysrcAl o&
rECr, and so on. The only difference then between (1) and (3), or (1) and the inferences from (4.13) to (4.14-4.2!'), is that the logical form of (f) is manifest, whereas
the forms underlying the other inferences are hidden.r3
Refrmce Determination One of the most important properties of concepts is that
they are semantically evaluable. A thought may be true or fdse, depending on how
things are with that portion of the world which the thought is about. In like fashion,
an item may fall under a concept or not, depending on the concept's referential properties. When someone categorizes something as a bir4 for example she may or may
not be right. This is perhaps the most basic feature of what is called the normatioity of
meafting. lust because she applies the concept srRp to the item (in the sense that she
judges it to be a bird) doesn't mean that the concept truly applies to the item (in the
sense that the item is in the extension of the concept nno).
The referential properties of a concept are among its most essential properties.
When one acquires the concept RoBrN, doing so crucially involves acquiring a concept
that refers to robins. And when one draws an inference from RoBrN to n A BrRD, or rs AN
Ar{rMAr, one draws an inference about robins. This isn't to say that reference is sufficient to distinguish behnreen concepts. rRrANcr,rrrR and rmnrrner refer to exactly the
sirme dass of mathematical objects, yet they are different concepts for all that. And in
Plato's time one might have believed that prEry and AcrrNG rN A wAy rHAr rs pLE^&srNG ro
rHE GoDs are coextensive-perhaps even necessarily coextensive-but that doesn't
make them the same concept. Thus Plato can sensibly ask whether an action is pious
because it is pleasing to the gods or whether it is pleasing to the gods because it is
pious (19SI).
That concepts have referential properties is a truism, but an important truism. A
clear desiderat"* on a theory of coniepts is that it should account for, or at least be
13. If (1) is considered to be a logicd truttr" then much the same point can be put by saying that the
Classiel Theory explains the other inferences by reducing informal validity to logical necessity.
.augap ol pu?q fpuraqxa are sldaeuor pg sl 'taaairaog 'uolpas pasard aql

ro tuaJuoJ aq1 'atuapadxa
pailu4l rno uaag8 ,op erl s? q?nru sE l ouD! uH, a*r luorl qlp s! ruaJuo) s,flsruoq3 {996I) dlsuoqS uPoN
ltq auztr aru"s aql ua !8 sl qrlq anss! us tilpr pasryuor aq l,uPpotls tualqord sppld [tt:l a^ l?tlM 'SI
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q uo Flsu! ol lu?,r a { lEql uollrullslp q?rr arf,L '$aryor luasard aql q parqdqru are faql lnq tqdosolH{
u! sansq IEFra oquor pue dop oqul de1 sruatuot s,goptrape( 'il Sqzrynldaruor;o s[e,n rno to ,{puapuad
-apq fprJgn splxa ppo^ aql qrlq^ o1 Sr4proris auo 's4s/tqdqau parro)tt! tt? ol PaH are suollou paFpr
raldapl
raqlo pue gru1 pup aruaraJar 1afl $fuFll aq truql s1 uograloo ttt?tu s,ttoPua)P?f 'fiatunlo s$ll ul 91
6961l pu? (166I) gogra:1ret ,Qf ^8'a 'aag'aar8esro s&rqlo 1nq tunlerapfap rpaP " sl slt1l leg fes
aM
'tI
frosuas to laâl aql ol nsop fue sn SuJrq a)po"I l(q palsa88ns auo aql sP qJns suoglu
-Uap lprll realr uala l,usl ll '(196I 'V '[ topog {aumloa sFn ul 91 raldYqrl g6l''le la
Suoqsuuy) paruasqo aAEq sroqlne lpralas sV'sluauoduroo rfuosuas 1dur1s olu! u/vroP
ldaruor aql Suuearq 'slsl(leue aql aplduror ol Mor.l sttolaqo fiq flu sl ll 'flaleuniloJun
'Jlastunr ol lno
a{pul ol alqs aq lnq loutrBr a{ ?ps uaaq sBq lPq/Yr luoJ' 'tPFlrvl lauo xaldulor
sFIl oluJ sao8 treql 'aepl aldrurs repDgred frana to uolleraurnua alnulru arotu
p ql!^ uIH alqnorl o|_tapeax fut ol ssausnolPel a lsuaJJo trE aq |nq lou Plnor ll
a Eq I lBt{M :aft7
puv $aaf[ a1du4s;o dn aperu sl lI let{l '^ aqs o1 q8noua sl
PIes
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s
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q are 'ro; pusls daql *tH
aql lptfl aslmraqlo 'uoJ1e8au
ro uogpuusrp fq raqla8ol 1nd suSF asoql 'V 'svdpl asog ;o suSrs a{l sProâ
asoql 'E 'raryadg aqt to pqru aql v saapl ulEra) 'z 'sPunos alPImHrY 'I
ppor{s sluauodruor srr lpq' to q4ills s saAJB 'ur rrrffir"it'HtrJJffrfi';1ffi"1
'sernlrlrls ppHdrua WFn aJrrpproJJp u! suual rtrosuas ro pnldarrad q paqJnor
ag ol a Eq faql JI dppadsa ,ltq aruor ol lprrgtlp z(geuoqdarxa uaaord a^pq suolllu
-ga6 'suopprsep ,tup l,uare fldrugs ara{l 'strdaruoJ lsolu rot 'letil s1 froaql prlsselJ
aql lsule8e paplal uaaq seq 1eql rualqord tlspq lsoru aql sdeqra; s{ilelqotd 1oyld
'froaql lsrlsssl) aql FutpSu paspr
.)|ro/r^ ol aPPru aq
uaaq e^Bq |gql surslrllFr rrlBru aql to xls ls lool il,aM
l,uPr /troaql
lprlssBl) aql suollrerllp sno!^qo sll to aqgds q l?ql 1aa; fueru pue 'urslrllpr asualul
ol papalqns ueaq seg froaql aql taaaaroq 'sreaf luarar uI 'uogeraP1suor snolras
ol sasluord froaql lerlsselJ aql s" qrnul sp op tIEr lptll froa{l ,fuV
suouu{ag uo4 pe4ey eql 'T'T
se/uasap op
'Jaraod fropueldxa s,froaqg prIssBI) aql sagprn lpq^^ s! uoppuruualap atuararar

to lunorru sll 'ldaruor E Jo a)uaraJar aql saunurapp letn arnpn4s puoglultap aql ,o
suual u! paulpldxa ilp eJE uo os pus 'uoprzpoSaler 'uolltsmbre ldaruo) 'suollel$our
raqlo s,froaq; prlssplJ atfi {lFa saqsaru 1; fplp rvrotl sl lunorre sltn Jo padde
aql 'saporua arnpruls sll lern suollrpuor a{l f;sqes lutll s8urql asoql 1sn[ sluasardar
ldaruor ? 'sl lpr{I 'uollnuap sll f;spes lprll s8m4 asog ol srarar ldaruol e 'r(loaql
p)lss"l) aql ol SurprorrV rr'sldaruor to salpadord Flluara;ar a{l 'tllp a[Qgedtuor
slptrery
puP
aruarnu'I
VI
Science
15
concepts than the concept under analysis. Are the concepts snnercrn, AFFIRMATIoN, NEGArroN, or STANDTNG FoR really any closer to the sensory level than the concept uE.16
Even putting aside the empiricist shictures, however, there are few, if any, examples of deftnitions that are uncontroversial. Some of the most intensively sfudied
concepts are those connected to the cenhal topics of philosophy. Following Plato,
many philosophers have hied to provide definitions for concepts like xr'rowrnDcE, IUs
BEAUTv. Though much of interest has come from these
deftnitions
have resulted.
attempts, no convincing
has been the traditional account of KNot^rLcandidates
One of the more promising
account
is now widely thought to be inadeBEUEF.
But
even
this
rRr,rE
EDGE as IUsrrFrED
(named after Edmund Gettier who
examples
of
because
Gettier
quate, in particular,
in
paper "Is |ustified True Belief
kind
his
1963
of
this
ftrst put forward an example
(Dancy
p. 25):
1985,
a
case
is
sample
Gettier
Knowledge?"). Here
rrcq
cooDNEss, rRUrH,
and
Henry is watching the television on a fune afternoon. It is Wimbledon men's

finals duy, and the television shows McEnroe beating Connors; the score is two
sets to none and match point to McEnroe in the third. McEnroe wins the point.
Henry believes justifiably that
I have just seen McEnroe win this year's Wimbledon ftnal.
and reasonably infers that
McEnroe is this year's Wimbledon champion.
Actually, however, the carireras at Wimbledon have ceased to function, and the
television is showing a recordi.g of last year's matc}. But while it does so
McEnroe is in the process of repeating last yeay's slaughter. So Henry's belief Z
is true, and surely he is iustifred in believing 2. But we would hardly allow that
Henry knows 2.
Notice that the signiftcance of the example is that each condition in the proposed
analysis of rNowr..EDGE is satisfted yet, intuitively, we all know that this isn't a case of
knowledgu. Philosophers concemed with the nature of xr.rowrocn have responded in
a variety of ways, usually by supplementing the analysis with further conditions (see
D"ncy 1985 for discussion). One thing is clear, though: Despite a tremendous
amount of activity over a long period of time no uncontroversial deftnition of
KNowLEDGT
has emerged.
Nor is the situation conftned to concepts of independent philosophical interest.

Ordinary concepts have resisted attempts at deftnition as well. Wittgenstein (1953/
1955). famously argues that the concept cAME cannot be defrned. His argument consists of a series of plausible stabs at deftnition, followed by clear counterexamples
(see the excerpt reprinted as chapter 6 in this volume). For instance, he considers
and rejects the proposal that a game must be an activity that involves competition
(counterexample a card game such as patience or solitaire), or that a game must
involve winning or losing (counterexample throwing a ball against a wall and
catching it).
seem to involve functional elements that can't be eliminated (e.g.,
chairs that they are designed or used to be sat upon). These predude a deftnition in
purely sensory terms. Cf. Clark (1973), quoted above, and Miller and Iohnson-Laird (1976).
16. Arelated point is that many concepts
it may be essential to
.arpu sasuD rpzrrralqord 'rmao saq?lsruslru qrns lptn luaga aql oI 'Ppo A aql lnoq? Moll)l aftr pq,l tl$Etu
,{payrad l,usaop lprll Japour aappor pszl1',eapl,, u" ol Pxzllnelat s! uoHlrrqaP aql lz$ lnq uollruqaP
IB4ssBI)
? serl uo.Erlrvx lsql sulelr4Bur aq 'ragu[ 'r(um lerfl saeuc ffiqt pear ruu s.Fqlo q8*$
aql pu? uorrtDvs ryql suHslsq lsnf ueql Parcgdruo.r aroul sl
saldruuxaralunor apilFuor
aql
uoJlpod sgo:p1 tsrlt pps Hnoqs ap1 {[aurnpn sgl ul 8I raldapl 1f,6D to)F I PIIB (U86I) arout111g aas 'SI
trT{L
q[
'Iguorn 4$rsuas
e o1 Eqmo
a{ lou fetu ssauppo aql 1nq qsru$q?d qg s$lud_opSuqaqlml luql 8uy(es T"q PPo tultBaluor s! araql
rpaelra3 .uoprj ipuurterd ,*r$ raqlur '4rlwd p Su.nreatu aql ruo{ $uaF salduexaralunot qq ro arrot aql
pql reap pu si! ,repcpred q 'froaql FcFsep aql ol ac1trsn[ op lou feu uolssnrslP s,rcPo{ 'r.rPt ag oL 'Lr
'arnlrruls PuoHlultaP
)|JPI
sldaeuor rno asnef,aq al?Flruot ol prerl aru suorllt4taP lEtfl aq ol atuor sEq aruaps
aapruSor to qrnru ul uolrrdsns aql 'SaHIrrrIJJIP qf,ns to lpsar P sV srlsrEa/l rot tlllm
pa^[ s?q aq ruoq/6 raqred trual-8uol B tnyt ueru palrJettrun uE sI laosruJ uosulqoU
q Folarppq p ado4 aql sl 'palsaluoJ uaaq _seq (r.rvrt omruvhtNn : xoIiIlDYs) uo111u1
-trp p qrrm ld"euor e to aldurexa agutuSgpured aql uaAA 'saldurexalalunot ol aununul
luaas Ja1au suonpgap pasodor; :sangopRc s,olpld ul pafe4rod sB 'srolnr_olra$l
jleq feul ll sp arups aql qrnur q uolrenlgs a{l lng 'Pasoddns seq
,salerro5 ol pareadde
auortue usql rapreq qrnu s! uoglultap E 8qzlpads ;o paford aql leql q aug 'suo!l$
-gap alqlsneld Jo )pq aql rot suospar to raqumu l(ue aq PFot ara{l 'asrnor 19
i[:"llT:::ilTi;
pu' suoplugap pasodord ro uorssarord ssalptrnoq e pnf-ruat, ",

-airq
f"- auo Ptre 'q8noua PBq seq_roPod 1u1od sFIl
lV qsruqlqud tq
b.rg1"";
-aq1-Sugutsd
"q1
l,ust aq ?e$ Ip roJ trnq ?qud _qtVn rfruqlryd tH Jo 4t aql ralor
to dn
ol s! uo!ilalq ,fueur.ud sH'luled aql q qsruQlupd sq sdp opSrrepq?U{ uaq ^'salou
ropod sV 'srualqord sil lnoqlpt l,uq uolltugep sFIl uala laA 'JNIvd I{lrM ,(, uiu\oJ or
$ iIJrwJsM SlHr Nt NOrJJ\rsIr.II ruvhlrud sx qNv JNrvd r{ilM I do lDvduns il{r srllAoJ ITIVNoLT
-NirlNr
X oNv rNaev rw $ X # fpo pup JI,f, amuva;6 :uolflugaP 8uy'ro11ot lttl a111 8m4
-auos lE a^lrrs a/vr lunorre olu! uolpugqp srutr Surxet 'Sq[ar ag lulud pu uqrar
papualu! qFeTpd n,{ lpqryl 'uorrualu! s,olaSue
aql uo arnleJd aql luled sBaa op
9l
'luFd $Fa Sqpar nT Sqtnlor fgeuoHuailI
frlDIIA[ Wpn ag ol srueas rualqord a{I
rlni qbtroql uala 'arul q IHI '8u1gae aql uo arnqr;d e Sqluled sern aq pdeq3
"qaql -8q1pe aql Sqlqed l,use^ ola8uelaqtgl1 'srles_toPod sy 'q8noua l,usl
aqls$
,o
sFfl ua a pA 'lulud ,nl- aru;rns aql sreôe fgeuollualq lua8e aql leql Paau ol ruaas
saoqs r'rau rnof raloJ ltqaraql Pu? 'lupd
aM .uaql palupd l,ualuq nof '1qred
Wp,r
'raqla lro/fr l,usaoP uoHlugaP sFil lng 'rNlvd
to p>1rnq p ralo :ppl tua8e tre 'nolt 1
Hilrn ,1 do iDvdllfis itr{t suil o) X ot{v JI\n9v tw st X tl fpo PUP il L 4ttwa X_:sPJoll Jaqp
.r1 .1.rJBe a{l to suopre atfl to lpsar s sp os saop lupd u! paraloe sp8 leql arefln:
arn pup parrlorrq aq o1 spaiu rya8e uB lall sg 8u1s_sp aq ol _suaas luqu 'psodord
piippo iql lb af,uelsq u? q aser aql plt-srolppads ag lulpd l,usaoP uoJsoldxa aql
io ,fuop"l nqr-DNnNrvd Jo aruplsul rru sB lunoJ l,usaop sFll 'lupd uI sJolepads aruos
sralor plre sapoldxa /ftopq lured B JI ''Luva'ldaeuoe a{l raPun tqpl 8ug;auos
rot uoprpuor luapgJns B aplôrd o1 s1Je, ll lsql sl {ro^ l,usaoP uoqpqaP sFIl uosear
auo l?rn sariSre ropod '(916l ra[[lhl uo pasBg) luva HrIM I sril of, X :q sraPlsuor aq
uoq$ltap 1s4t aql,'lrr.red,, trnou aql ol Supuodsarror 'rhrvd trdaruor aq1 's8utp rag!
Suoruri ,rpn uala paulJap aq lourrpJ {rxrva lpql /vtotls ol salq eq s? 'tHYrueJP_ alFb
q aldurexa slopod',,'l.i["d,, qJaA a Hlstruq at1tr ol SupuodsarJor 'q$trva trdaruor
aql rot spsodord prarras sraplsuor (rgOr) ropod ,{rra[ 'llrlds aures aql qrntu uI
sqoSrery pue
aruarns-I gI
Science !7
The Problem of Psychological Reality A related difficulty for the Classical Theory is
that, even in cases where sample deftnitions of concepts are granted for the pu{pose
of argument, defrnitional strucfure seems psychologically irrelevant. The problem is
that definitional structure fails to turn up in a variety of experimental contexts where
one would expect it to. In particular, the relative psychological complexity of lexical
concepts doesn't seem to depend on their relative deftnitional complexity.le
Consider the following example of an experiment by Walter Kintsch, which has
been used to try to locate the effects of concepfual complexity in lexical concepts
(reported in Kintsch !974, pp.230-2317.20 It is based on a phoneme-monitoring task
originally developed by D. f. Foss, where subjects are given two concurrent tasks.
They are asked to listen to a sentence for comprehension and at the same time for
the occurrence of a given phoneme. When they hear the phoneme, they are to indicate its occurrence as quickly as they can, perhaps by pressing a button. To ensure
that they continue to perform both tasks and that they don't just listen for the phoneme, subjects are asked to repeat the sentence or to produce a new sentence that is
related to the given sentence in some sensible way.
In Foss's original study, the critical phoneme occurred either directly after a
high-frequency word or directly after a low-frequency word. He found that reaction
time for identifying the phoneme corelated with the frequency of the preceding
word. Phoneme detection was quicker after high-frequency words, slower after lowfrequency words (Foss 1969). The natural and by now standard explanation is that
a greater processing load is introduced by low-frequency words, slowing subjects'
response to the critical phoneme.
Kintsc} adopted this method but changed the manipulated variable from word frequency to definitional complexity. He compared subjects' reaction times for identifying the same phoneme in the same position in pairs of sentences that were alike apart
from this difference In one sentence the phoneme occured after a word that, under
typical deftnitional accounts, is more complex than the corresponding word in the
other sentence. The stimuli were controlled for frequency, and Kintsch used a variety
of nouns and verbs, including the mainstay of definitional accounts, the causatives.
For example, consider the following pair of sentences:
(1)
(2)
The doctor was conoinced cnly by his visitor's pallor.

The story was belieoed gnly by the most gullible listeners.2r
This ftrst test word ("convince") is, by hypothesis, more complex than the second
('telieve"), since on most accounts the ffrst is analyzed in terms of the second. That
is, "convince" is thought to mean cause to belieoe, so that cohMNcE would have BEuEVE
as a constituent.
Kintsch found that in pairs of sentences like these the speed at which the critical
phoneme is recognized is unaffected by which of the two test words precedes it. So
19. The reason the focus has been on lexical concepts is that there is little doubt that the psyehological
complexity associated with a phrase exceeds the psychological complexity associated with one of its constituents. In other words, the psychological reality of deftnitions at the level of phnases isn t in dispute.
20. For related experiments and disctrssion, see I.A Fodor et al. (I9S0 [chapter 21 in this volumeD, and I. D.
Fodor et al (1975).
21. Italics indicate the words whose relative complexity is to be tested; underlines indicate the phoneme to
be detected.
lsrn SuppHl uI pagpsnl aq o1 ';daruor p{l Surnlonur qq8noql rot Yolle gttrsnt;o
uoplpuor e saplaord gdaruoe e lo qsltpue ro uoHlugap aql lpql eapl s,duure3 Pulqaq
s1 ureord srql '8u1ueaur qr apnord aruaq pue pagua aq PFolta luarualels B tlrltl/vl
repun suonlpuor a{l armas ol alqe aq ppoqs srsfpue elprn8u[ FoFd e 'uaq1 'lta1n
sFll uO .gopd p u/rôml arotaraql pue a8BnSuel p to suopualuor_aql /tq Paxg_are letll
saiaololnsl arp saqnqr[Fue lpql urIBIr ol spm uoHnlos ,sls!^lllsod aq1 'punor8 aql ]t_o
pB oi uerSord aloqan Jq1 rc; rapro ul pue p;8u1ueau aq ol raPro ul snlqs rluratrslda
ppads e papaau u(aql 'uopenrasqo qtnorql alqegga^ sa^psuaql lou are saHlrll
lltp* lnoqg spp, aJuls 'suonlpuor a_lqe^rasqo podar flparp lptll aso{l PUP a)ua
-pid*" tuory paaoruar are feg saserqd ro suolssardxa asog uaa^tpq aSppq P sP IJP
q '/qlJllr(pup uodn puadap ol Pasoddns se,rn 'utnl ur 'uoper
ol aran sapnJy(lsus
lpql
suoprpuor sll tlll/vt pag$uaPl_a_q ol ss/vl luauapJs P_ ro tulueaur
-glran .uollerglral
to
lerll sauo aql ag ol pasoddns ara^ suoHlsodgrd lryEurueaul
aq1 araqnn ,alqugpaa ara^^
,flqSnoX .sauo (FrSuprau ro) aupua8 pu? suolllsodord-opnasd ssa18ulueau
-aq uorpullslp sil ul fqdosop{d sll
,uriprglsod
uaa/vrl
to raluar fraa aql ;e fi1rufpue lnd Peq lPItlM
prpol ;o luarussassp pagEap pup tplr e salnlnsuof, PtrP .;uaunSre ;o

q anbgue s,aupQ 'gl.OtlUg6T'9/6119g6l auln$ 'dsa aas) {ro/t{
saul pralas sa^lo
palqar pue [aurnlo^ srql ul g raldeqrl ,,urspFldurg ;o suulSog oMJ,, u! uollou aql ,o
inblip snorust qaup$ 'O 'n'M ol [1a8re1 8uy*o q /qlrnr(F* lnoq" ursppdalS
'froaql IBrlssBI)
ou q ara{l lgpnrtsup lnoqllM 'sapppfleup papodrnd Jo uolpailor P ol Punoq flqur
B sE froaql aql uoHsanb olq sller
-lqxau! si ldaeuor B ;o srsl(pue drana aruls
"1oqan
'froaql lprFsplf, aql roJ uollu^llour
paplos! up aSuageqr_fpraq ltsaop l!
1g rageU
?q8p sl ruspplrc sFIl tl 'asmor JO 'r(ue l,ualp arag 'pe! u1 'asneraq Surureldxa armbar
l,uop sallnqfpue lpql Surn8re l(q uoJlelJloru sFn lrurapun ol slule lxs!]lllrl luasard
a{I 'saruaraJul r1y(pue flplradsa ?uaruouaqd epueuas snoFpn qeldxa o1 l$11qe
qi kq dlged- pale^lloru sl {roaq1 [BrrssEI) aql l"tll uaas aA,aM 'slFaru froleueldxa
sl! uo ltpnrg Esar froaql prlssq) agl rot uaprnq aql 'arnlrruls IPUoHlt4raP rot aruaP
prpoloqrfsd ou pup ratto uo saldurexa rvral qltM fi11t11fr1utv Io walqo4 aW
-1na
'sralrpnb raqlo urort aslrp lprll slqnop aql ol sppp 11 'froaql IPrlssPI)_ aql lsup8e
plod anlsnap B suparu ou fq sl sFIl aUqM 'froaql IsrIssEIJ aql ,o poddns u! atuaP
-na Jo )pq aql arorsrapun op il aTI sraqlo PUP ltpnts _s,tpsluJ) 'ttltS 'allqns aroru
a{ ol spq arqrruls pnldaruor to uogespsalul lBilaulradxa aql ttll sA oqs_arqf,nqs
pnlaaeuor to lapou a^nprualle uB to /q$qBIlB^B aql 'salPnls Sulssarord q tPsll
lsaJluplr ol papadxa aq l,uPpo/n $galdwor lsuon1ugaP uag 'laPolrrl lenuaraJul aql
'(PPoru luatr
,o sau{ aq1 Suolu poolsrapun ara/n arnpruls pnldaruo_r 'Pualsu! ?l
-ulpluo) aql "z!A) asoddnsard suolleSnsa^q Fluau.uadxa asaql letll alnlJrult Pt l
-dar-uoJp iapo* aql uopu?g? ppof, slslroaql IprlssBIJ 1lam sp alq"llsl? s1 asuodsar
,o pupl luaratJlp raqlpr e 'f18u11saralul 'llun Sulssaeord e s? uoHf,ury daql leql
os 'aJuplsq ro; ,,?a{unq+, aq ry81ur suonlugap urssarord patJe ol suollggaP ,o
arnlleJ aql rot paratto aq ppor suonpupldxa raqlo 1etll alqssod s,11 teprqred uI 'aq
o1 lqtno froaql l?rlssq) aql to srapuatap papro^ rvrotl 'ranarnoq 'snopqo pu s,ll
'paga
a^pq ol araql qou ar,faql l"tll s1 Supsaeord pagp
flprrSoloqefsd l,uare suolllugaP 1eql s! llet slt! ro,
l,uop suonrugap uosuar aql :parûe
uo11",re1dxa lprnlsu aql 'puol Sulssarord ralearS flanqelar E arnPoJlul l,uoP xaldruor
arour are plpard slunorrp puoplugap leq (sldaeuor Surpuodsarror PUE) sPro/vr aql
s;p8re61 pu?
aruarne1 gI
Science
19
spiders are artluopods one need only verify that spiders are animals, have jointed
legs, segmented bodies, and so on.
The theory that analytic statements are tautologies also helped the positivists in
addressing a long-standing difficulty for empiricism, namely, how to account for the
fact that people are capable of a priori knowledg" of factual matters even though,
according to empiricism, all knowledge is rooted in experience. Mathematics and
logic in particular, have always been sfumbling blocJcs for empiricism. The positivists' solution was to claim that logical and mathematical statements are analytic.
Since they also held that analyticities are tautologie+ they were able to claim that we
can know a priori the truths of logic and mathematics because, in doing so, we don't
really obtain knowledge of the rvorld (see, e.g., Ayer 194611952; Hahn 193311959).
As is clear from this brief account of the role of analyticity in logical positivism,
the positivists' program was driven by epistemological considerations. The problem
was, assuming broadly empiricist principles, how to explain our a priori knowledg"
and how to account for our ability to know and speak of scientific truths that aren't
directly observable. Considering the vast range of scientiftc claims-that atoms are
composed of protons, neuhons, and elechons, that the universe originated from a
that all animals on Earth descended from
cosmic explosion 10 to 2O billion years
"Eo, positivists' program had huly enonnous
is
clear
that
the
a common ancestor, etc.-it
scope and ambition.
Quine's attack on the notion of analyticity has several components. Perhaps the
most influential strand in Quine's critique is his observation, following Pierre Duhem,
that confirmation is inherently holistic, that, as he puts it, individual statements are
never conftrmed in isolation. As a consequence, one can't say in advance of empirical
inquiry what would conftrm a particularstatement. This is partly because cotrfitm"tion involves global properties, such as considerations of simplicity, conseryatism,
overall coherence, and so on. But it's also because conftrmation takes place against
the background of auxiliary hypotheses, and that, given the available evidencg one
isn't forced to accept, or reiect, a partictrlar statement or theory so long as one is
willing to make appropriate adjustments to the auxiliaries. On Quine's reading of
science, no statement has an isolatable set of conftrmation conditions that can be
established a priori, and, in principle there is no guarantee that any statement is
immune to revision.
Some examples may help to darifu these points and ground the discussion. Consider the case of Newton's theory of gravitatioo which was confirmed by a variety of
disparate and (on a priori grounds) unexpected sources of evidence, suclr as obseryations of the moons of |upiter, the phases of Venus, and the ocean tides. Similarly, part
of the conftrmation of Darwin's theory of evolution is owing to the development of
plate tectonics, which allows for past geographical continuities between regions
which today are separated by oceans. This sarne case illustrates the dependency of
conftrmation on auxiliary hypotheses. Without plate tectonics, Darwin's theory
would face inexplicable data. A more striking case of dependency on auxiliary
hypotheses comes from an early iugument against the Copernican system that cited
the absence of annual parallax of the fixed stars. Notice that for the argument to
worh one has to assume that the stars are relatively close to the Earth. Change the
assumption and there is no incompatibility between the Earth's movement and the
failure to observe parallax. There are also more mundane cases where auxiliary
hypotheses account for recdcitrant data for instance, when college sfudents attempt
Qret) opgnbegg Ve (966I) prmurol aas lloutDvs'1dar

-uor IEE lssup rgetuSlpered ,,n uala ;o sagradord Sulugap aql 1noqp uaryFltu aq ol lno uml iltlrrl arlr l?tn
quarun8re rcd16tOt) aSrng aas u.npear-.re1algnb'ppJ u'are nroperaplsuoJ asa{l luql quaurnSre tod 'ZZ,
-ret$ $ apnlllle slrfl letn realr fpreq s,ll 1aA 'alpry sl suoplugaP rot tule aql letll
smor,ls-luaru.rradxa lq8noql lptllsBlrls, B Jo suolllpuoD rapun rtpo Jl-luauralels
fraaa fpeau ,o flqlqesllar ppualod aql lptll sI lq8noql aqJ. 'snlels tFual
-sgda rpql ;o ssalpreSar 'uuo; ltrns u1 sasdletrp puoqpgap ;o prgdols aq o1 sraqdo
-sogqd /tu?ru pal sptl lq8noql to uoprarlP sFfi 'ssa1 ro aroIAI 'fupnns ol dn ppq ilF
,qpHqBue papodrnd ou sdeqrad uaql 'suollrauuor pnldaruoJ asaql Jo uolpafar aq1
rot lvrolp sparudolaaap letparoaql il 'f1n1trfpue to uogou aql PuaraP ol q{ PFo^
otlm aso$ otr Sulqrnlsp aq l(eu (" ' rvrsr^r Morrit t ) cloo Jo (" ' lDtIr/JsICl rsrruoHs + )
lNn JnervuJs aryl saldtuexa ol suogeraplsuoJ s,aup$ to uolsualxa s,ureulnd 'nnS
'atuaps ;o yed Jaqlo fue q stuleP s? uoJlstrf,rguoJslP to sa$ruq
-1ssod aures aql ol uado are prre sptrnor8 Foualsod e uo paqs[qslsa aq ol are saHlrll
-rtp* papodrn; 'alsq ol ll {ool slsllrlrsod aql lptll aeuerryuEls pe;8o1oruap1da
aql to auou sprl lprll auo lsnf s,ll luoqrullslp ]Haqlu[s-rqdleue alqeual dpea;rad u aq
pp feu arag 'sr(Bs aum$ lerll Ip rot 'q lpql '(766t tppliroH q.gOI l(uolqrr) sryo^
uralsfs pnldatuof, upurnq aql pw a8er,8*l lprnlBu lpql l(e aql Sulqlr]saP uI uonou
^
ss PoolsraPun
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OZ
Science 2l
ranted. Its appeal may stem from payrng too much attention to a limited range of
examples. It may be that the cases Putnam and others have discussed are simply misleading; perhaps the concepts for the kinds in science are special. This would still
leave us with thousands of other concepts. Consider, for example, the concept KILL.
What surrounding facts could force one to revise the belief that killings result in
death? Take someone who is honest and sincerely claims that although he killed his
father, his father isn't dead or dying. No matter what the surrounding facts, isn't the
plausible thing to say that the person is using the words "kill" and "dead" with
anomalous meanings? At any rate, one doesn't want to preiudge cases like this on
the grounds that other cases allow for rvisions without changes in meaning.
In the ftrst instance, Quine's critique of analyticity turns out to be a critique of the
role of the Classical Theory in theories of justification, at least of the sort that the
positivists imagined. To the extent that his arguments are relevant to the more genlrd issue of analyticity, thafs because the potential revisability of a statement shows
that it isn't analytic; and many philosophers hold that this potential spans the entire
language. Whether they are right, however, is an empirical question. So the issue of
what analyticities there are turns on a variety of unresolved empirical matters.
Enor
In the t97ils Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam both

desniptioist views of the meaning of proper
against
advanced important arguments
(Kripke
Putnam t97O [chapter 7 in this
19721T980;
names and nafural kind terms
(Roughly,
according to which, in order
is
one
descriptivist
view
a
volumel, 1975).23
know
a description that counts
with
a
term,
one
must
to be linguistically competent
ff
correct,
these arguments
out
its
referent.)
and
i"rtr,
picks
tL"
of
as the *"*ing
descriptivism
is,
in
effect,
Theory,
which
the
Classical
undermine
would apparently
an
alternative
outlines
of
the
also
sketched
and
Putnam
lGipke
concepts.2a
applied to
discussions,
Iike
their
critical
meaning
of
such
terms,
which,
the
of
positive account
has been extremely influential in philosophy.
Iftipke and Putnam offer at least three different types of arguments that are relevant to the evaluation of the Classical Theory. The frst is an argument from error. It
seems that we can possess a concept in spite of being mistaken about the properties
that we take its instances to have. Consider, for example, the concept of a disease,
like *,reu-pox. People used to believe that diseases like smallpox were the effects of
evil spirits or divine retribution. If any physical account was offered, it was that these
diseases were the result of "bad blood." Today, however, we believe that such people
were totally mistaken about the nature of smallpox and other diseases. Sayrng this,
however, presupposes that their concept, sMAlrpox, was about the same disease that
our concept is about. They were mistaken because the disease that their concept
referred to-smallpox-is very different in nature than they had supposed. Presumably, then, their most fundamental beliefs about smallpox couldn't have been part of
a definition of the concept. For if they had been, then these people wouldn't have
been wrong about smallpox; rather they would have been thinking and speukit g
The Problem of lgnorance and
23. For arguments that similar considerations apply
to an even wider range of term+ again,
see Burge
(te7el.
24. Again, we will move freely from daims about language to daims about thought, in this case adapting
Kripk& and Putnam's disorssions of natural kind terms to the corresponding
concepts. For an interesting

discussion of how these arguments relate to the psychology of concepts, see Rey (19S3 [chapter 12 in this
volume}.
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Science
23
true essence. They believe that humans were created by deity, and that they have
"
an eternal life. Others believe that human beings are nothing but complex collections
of physical partides, that they are the result of wholly physical processes, and that
they have short, frnite lives. And of course there are other views of humans as well.2s
Such beliefs about humans are held with deep conviction and are just the sort that
one would expect to form part of a classical definition of HTJMAN BETNG. But presumably, at least one of these groups of people is gravely mistakery notice that people
from these different groups could-and do-argue about who is right.
How, then, is the reference of a concept to be ftxed if not by * internalized definition? The Kripkefutnam alternative was originally put forward in the context of a
theory of nafural langu ?ge, but the picfure can be extended to internal representations, with some adjustmentp. Their model is that a natural kind term exhibits a
causal-historical relation to a kind and that the term refers to all and only members of
the kind. In the present case, the assumption is that human bt ng constifutes a kind
and that, having introduced the term and having used it in (causal-historical) corurection with humans, the term refers to all and only humans, regardless of what the
people using it believe.26
This theory isn't without its problems, but for present pu{poses it pays to see how
it conhasts with the Classical Theory.z7 One way to put the difference between the
Kripke/Putnam account and the Classical Theory is that the Classical Theory looks
to internal, psychological facts to account for reference, whereas the Kripke/Putnam
account looks to external facts, especially facts about the nature of the paradigmatic
examples to which a term has been historically applied. Thus much of the interest in
Kripke's and Putnam's work is that it cdls into question the idea that we have internally represented necessary and sufficient conditions that determine the extension of
a concept.
Their arguments are similar in spirit to ones that came up in the discussion of
analyticity. Here, too, classical theorists might question the scope of the objection.
And, in fact, it does remain to be seen how far the Kripke/Putnam arguments for an
extemalist semantics can be extended. Even among the most ardent supporters of
externalism, there is tremendous controversy whether the same treatment can extend
beyond names and nafural kind terms.
The Problem of Conceptwl Fuzziness Another ditriculty often raised against the
Classical Theory is that many concepts appear to be "htzzy" or inexact. For instance,
Douglas Medin remarks that "the classical view implies a procedure for unambiguously determining category membership; that is, check for defining features." Yet, he
adds, "there are nrunerous cases in which it is not clear whether an example belongs
to a category" (Medin !989, p. t47O). Are caqpets furnihrre? One often buys carpet25. Tomention just one, ftmy people believe in reincarnation. Presumably, they take human beings to be
something like transient stages of a life that includes stages in other organisms. It's also worth noting that
past theoretical accounts of the nature of humans have been flawed. For example neither "featherless
biped' nor "rational animal" is sufficiently restrictive.
26. Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny have done the most to develop the theory. See esp. Devitt (fggr)
and Devitt and Sterelny (t9s7r.
27. \'he most serious of these problems has come to be known as the Qtn hoblcm, tllrtt is, how to account
for the fact that a word or concept has a determinate reference, despite being causally related to multiple
kinds. For example, what accounts for the fact that cer refers to cats and not to mammals, living things, or
material objects? If the concept is causally related to cats, then it is automatically causally related to these
other kinds too. For discussioru see Devitt and Sterelny (1987).
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25
Table I.L
Typicality rating on a scale of

(with I being highest)
Apple
1.3
Plum
2.3
Pineapple
2.3
Shawberry
2.3
Fig
4.7
Olive
6.2
t-r
Table 1.2
Bird
Chicken
no
yes
yes
no
no
yes
yes
yes
no
Is small
yes
yes
no
no
Nests in trees
yes
yes
no
yes
Eats insects
yes
yes
no
no
Flies
yes
yes
Sings
yes
lays eggs
properties occurred in many of the lists that went with a category, others occurred
ler" frequently. What Rosch and Mervis found was that independent measures of
typicality predict the distribution of properties that occur in such lists. An exemplar is
judged to be typical to the extent that its properties are held to be comlnon among
other exemplars of the same superordinate category.3o For instance, robins are taken
to have many of the properties that other birds are taken to have, and coffespondingly, robins are judged to be highly typical birds, whereas chickens or vultures,
which are judged to be signiftcantly less tlryical birds, are taken to have fewer properties in common with other birds (see table 1.2\.31
Importantly, typicality has a direct effect on categorization when speed is an issue.
The finding has beery if subiects are asked to iudge whether an X is a y, that independent measures of typicality predict the speed of correct affirmatives. So subiects
are quicker in their correct responses to "Is an apple a fruit?" than to "Is a pomegranate a fruit?" (Rosch 1973; Smith, Shoben, and Rips T974). What's more, error rates
correlate with typicality. The more typical the probe relative to the target category,
the fewer errors.32
The problem these results pose for the Classical Theory is that it has no natural
model for why they should occur. Rather, the Classical Theory seems to predict that
30. In the literature nemplar is used to denote subordinate concepts or categories, where as instance is used
to denote individual members of a given category.
31. Based on Smith (1995), table 1.3.
32. Typicality measures correlate with a variety of other phenomena as well. See Rosch (1975 [chapter 8 in
this volume}.
'lupâpr ruaas l,useop il leql sno!^qo os s,l! asnnaq q sql rfpU FoIAI'spafqo are
ous roJ sls[ auo ou'eruplsu! roJ'srope; rlpur8erd fg pauraaoS aq ol {a{il ere lsll s1rafqns leql
sp4q
1uql
sarnl?at aql ss 'anle af,el lp ,,sls[ a.rnluat, 8q1q Foq? Ftar"J aQ ol seq auo lng 'sauo peffie ro; ueg
'gg
*relduraxa p4d& rot sarqeat aroru qsq flpnsn spalqns aruls qJsoddo aql aq PFoil tr1 uqlfue
il
.1rolrn ol appru aq
l,usr dldruls froaql prlssel) aql 'suoqp^Horu anlssardurJ
sll ,o allds ur !e{l {uFll slsFoaql lsoru a{pur o1 q8noua uaaq seq PUP letluelsqns s!
,troaq aql 1supfie 1q81am a^qBInuIrD aql lng 'a8etu?p aql ap8glur oq sasuodsar
pnuqod anros szq froaql IBrlssBIJ aql 'azlseqdua_ol Palrl aA,aM s? ?uu ql8uar1s
aures aql Jo IIs pu arp suografqo asag ltq pasod slparql ar11 'swalqord snolras
;norllyn pu Jj froaql aql 'q8no{l 'uaas lsnl a^pq a/n sV '/tpuaoar ailnb fpo Fun
ulort sldaruor lnoqe SupJroaql paletmrop set{ ltroaql IBr,lssBIJ aql
sarug
luapus
.?lep
lucpopqrfsd luepodrul;o aSuer apl/vl e Sugpldxa u1 deld ol alor alil[
seq froa{I lprlsspl3 eql leql 1sa88ns faql 'ltlpraua8 arou 'lng 'sassarord uollezp
-o8a1er ug froaql IsrlssslJ aql to alor aql auruIrapun daql 'lseal fraa aql lV 'froaql
u1
Isrlsspl3 aql rot sualgord droleueldxa snopas asl?r spa#a &ryeldrQ 'uaql 'urns
'lPJIssEIt
l,uare a:lpls lB sarnleat aql aruls 'aee1d ls4, aql q punor8 aql Jto pB dlpar l,trer sarnl
-ee! lo raqumu aql Jo suual u! uollsupldxa rre oS 'srelduraxa aarll IIB ,(q Pareqs sl
auou :prlq e Sugaq ro; fressarau sl araql paFII samlPa, aql to euou :realt sFn_sa{Bul
z.r alqq lB {ool ppb

aIB Erep'QrFer&Q aqr
y 'fressaJau lou are lsoru aJuls sarqsat F IssBIr aleruqr8al lou

q pa^roû! aIE
.H5ill":fil;;3,r];'::::ilfr:1'"?:l;
sarnleat to uo$nqlqslp aql Wpn seplaroe lt1rrcr1dfi fqm ;o uoq?u?1dxa ou set{

ltrnoeee aql ,tileu!{ 'os l,usl lsnl sql lnq 'qsg B lou $ utqor e p{l aSpnt ol uetll _tlsg
lou sr ua{rlqr e lpql a8pnt ol 'sl lerll 'ra8uol a)pt ppotls lI '(71 ? lou q X ue) pBrel
"pale8au B salloAul uogpzlroSaler aql araq saspr ul ssaf,ord o1 ra8uo1 qq Ppotls
^
ireldtuaxa prrddle 1eg sppard /llparroeul ppour aql 'oslv r'sauo prldrQ uetn sarnl
-ea! aloru a Eq srelduraxa peldfle lpql asoddns ol uosear ou s! alaql 'aJuelsu! Jod
'Blpp raqlo Wyrn pruuor prrp suoqdumss? rorl pe a^lonur faql lstll sI slaPow PalPPr
pup sqq tlllm alqnorl aql lng 'Sutssarord ;o sa8els arotu aq IIIl.vt 1a$ Taq? ol
saJnlBet aroru $p,r 'llB rauv 'srorJa Sulssarord arou esnP) PuE azFoSaler o1 ra8uo1
a{Bl plnoqs sraqtuaru pudQ ssal uaql 'ssarord 8u1qrleu-amlpa; 'ppas 'aallsneqxa
up sallonul uonr-z;yrcEa1er lprn aurnsse osle arvr pue 'sauo prld$ _uet{l sarnleat arolu
a^pq sraqruau pe1dfi ssal letll aunsse e/n JI lpql 1sa88ns 4"W 'alduluxa uP sV '(196I
uparu pue {lgrtrS) qpsar lQ{"rldf1 snopp^ qlp^ alqgudurof, arp lpql spPour lerls
u1 'are ara{l lprn alou upan se18no6 pue {lFuS pTBrvnPA 'froaql PllssPIJ
-sep
?lut
ggs pnlrallalug a{t to MaIAraAo pguanlJul pue lueyodrur uB ul
aqj urorj r(e
ê
ldrqsraquaur froSaler rot suolllpuor lua!f,
-gps pup ,fupssaJau arups aql /qslles [p ztaql leql luaullJtrnuor s,froaql PJISSBI) aql
u5rrr8-'saldruexa poo8 fgenba aq sreldruaxa 11e l,uppotls '11e raUV'are r(aq1 ,,alduruxa
ue poo8 Moq,, to suual u! srelduraxa 8u11er to {sel IBIllul aql J9 asuas a{ey ol rvtotl
rsalr uala pu s,ll 'fpuapgga arour pazuo8alpr aq ppoqs sre_ldluaxa ,,lsrlddl arotu,,
ol uospar ou sl araql 'prlq e Supq ro, sarnleal parpbar aql to qrea sagsllss
1eql ry1q1
E sl p4q s sp Sulqpuros Sulzuo8aler il PuV 'dlpnba

(ltpo pup) tp ua{l 'suoplpuor lualrgtns Pu? ,fuPssarau to ps
ll ieqi Supgualap ,o railsru

s1tll op pporls sprlq
auos
8 .fJqlps Jo raileru p $ ours rapun 8u;11u; JI 'rsd ? uo aq pFoqs srqdruaxa il?

srlo8re61 pue
atueJns-I
gZ
27
Box 2
Summary of Criticisms of the Classical Theory
1. Plato's Problem
There are few,
if
any, examples
of deftned concepts.
2. The Problem of Psydrological Reality

Lexical concepts show no effects of deftnitional structure in psychological experiments.
3. The Problem of Analyticity

Philosophical arguments against analyticity alrc work against the claim that concepts
have definitions.
4. The Problem of lgnorance and Error

It is possible to have a concept in spite of massive ignorance and/or error, so concept
possession can't be a matter of knowing a definition.
5. The Problem of Conceptual Fuzziness

The Classical Theory implies that concepts have determinate extensions and that
categorization judgments should also yield determinate answers, yet concepts and
categorization both admit of a certain amount of indeterminacy.
5. The Problem of Typicality Effects

Typicality effects can't be accommodated by dassical models.
3, The kototqpe
3.7.
Theory of Concepts
The Emergence of PrototVpe Theory
During the T970s, a new view of concepts emerged, providing the ftrst serious alternative to the Classical Theory. This new view-which we will call the &ototype
Theory-was developed, to a large extent, to accommodate the psychological data
that had proved to be so damaging to the Classical Theory. It was the attractiveness
of this new view, as much as anythit g else, that brought about the downfall of the
Classical Theory.
There is, of course, no single account to which all prototype theorists subscribe.
What we are calling the Prototype Theory is an idealized version of a broad class of
theories, which abstracts from many differences of detail. But once again putting
qualiftcations to the side the core idea can be stated plainly. According to the Prototype Theory, most concepts-including most lexical concepts-:lre complex representations whose structure encodes a statistical analysis of the properties their
members tend to have.34 Although the items in the extension of a concept tend to
have these properties, for any given feabure and the property it expresses, there may
be items in the extension of a concept that fail to instantiate the property. Thus
the features of a concept aren't taken to be necessary as they were on the Classical
Theory. In addition where the Classical Theory charactenzed sufficient conditions for
concept application in terms of the satisfaction of all of a concept's features, on the
Prototype Theory application is a matter of satisfying a sufficient number of features,
where some may be weighted more signiftcantly than others. For instance, if BIr.D is
composed of such features as FLrEs, srNct NEsrs IN TREEs, IAys EGcs, and so oo then on the
34. More likely they are structured and interconnected sets of features Malt and Smith llgk4).For examsize and communication might be linlced by the information that
ple with the concept uno, feafures for

small birds sing and large birds don't.
(oue ro; a&Qoprd aql s! Nrsou pq1 sfes auoauos uaq A -8'a 'su;1dar
-uor alsugproradns B ro, sSqpr $11eqdrQ paqSgq aql setl pql_rslduaxa eql ol ratar ol Pesr ua$o s,rl luql
pue arqpJalq luasard erll ul Squeau paxg E alpq l,usaop ,,a&Qoprd,, tutal eql lstn 'rarraitroq lno ppd
'99
pporls aM ,,'drqo1otd,, srldaruol e sP amlJruF qf,ns P ol Jatal ol lryasn aq mr l! 'arualualuor rod
a{!qs ol aÊq srualsfs leuolleluasardar lsrn q supau sFil l"qM '(gz, 'd'[aurnlorr s1ql
u.rg'JalirWl gL6I) ,, "lto11a aaqruSor lseal 4,{1- uopeuuotq urnurxeru appord
ol s! sualsfs fro8apr Jo {sul ar{[I],, !r slnd q]so1 sV 'sttoaPurl sl! lnoqlp{ l,usl
uollpuuotq Surooeua dl 'ieldruaxa Jo arrrelsul ue Sq4roSaler uodn uon?uuotul
uollrunt auo atqs 'froa{l
lug1alar rpaq oj Supq oq aldoad
-'pe! rvrolp ol sl sldacuor Jo
u! 'sl sF{I 'aruaraJu! aÎFqsuoruaPuou uo srseqd
iqt $ a3eluenpe rarpoue
--a s,froaql ad[1o1ord aql qq811q8Fl osp suoqlpuoe ^&ressarau Jo uolpafar aq1
.slq arnlpal uollBrauaS aql q salyadord fressaeau
to
-uou 1q1 ltprauaS spa[qns leql pBJ aql to asuas salgrr /ftoaql ql tttt"IglllPPv
.flppfpue'io anbnlrr ueaurnQ aql a)Erqrua flpalreaqel-otlm uur froaql ad[1o1or6
aq1 ,uoitealldde 4aql roJ suoqlpuoc fressarau aporua sldaruor leql eapl F)lssPP aql
'ltlpnr(lpue rlll/yt seq droaql F)lss?l) ltll lBYl sunlqord aq1 o1
to uollratar sll ua^D
n*,*.r1 s1 froaql adflolor; ag '/tl{Utulq 'suolllugaP ,t leads o1 8uyt4 ut PBtl aÊq

qspoaql leelsspp lsql /qlmgtlp aql sproard fpllre lnq sPloae fpo pu ll 'arn1rru1s
'suolllu
aql
_atuls
Fuollplrap a pq l,uop sldaeuoe leql srupp froaql adflolorg
{Pp
,o )pq nqi rl asa{l Suours lsrl{ 'froaql lprlsspl) eql roJ SupualFqr
sasodurl
-gap
-5a1"
'sarnlua;_s,ldaeuot
-" i",ir saplmlttp aql to aruos ol aununul sl llfroaql
froaql
pe;isu13 aql l?ql sluleqsuor
aql uFlll^ slpt
ag
saxplar
ll lpril sr auBS e Suqlauros sa{eu luqM
uo
adf;o1ord aql asrurag

'aleds sFIl Jo sausPunoq
'arsds ,(lrytlulls ? saqsu
i;np
q deparro sauns8 Jo sa_nradord aq1 'uollelrp^ stql alldsap lng 'asoql

-qqsa i"qr
ai"q aruos tagradord asaql a^sq saueS auros 'sluaruaSuerrB luaraglP uI rnJro feul
Paua
PaPua-uado {qrssod E ,(q raqPr lnq uoIlIuHaP
rplrlr\^ salpadord
;o ps
"jq
-"oi l,usl irr^rvD a111 faruor ro pro/r^ B 'sIAraI I ptre tpsou rot sE 'u1a1sua8g64
suuar
q poorsrapun aq upr'rpnqs *"rr;tfJ1fi:il:ffii
rog
f il*:ru;:
plrallrr ssassod o1 readde pu op rplr{r'r sauo8aler ul dqsuolPlar pelroSalec

a$ :&lssaJau pefoloqefsd rou prr8o1 raqllau ?r? EIrallD IEtluoJ letll iuau
" pel4dura uP q rQnls ;uasard a{I
-#o (SSOI) s,qalsuaSifUn uopsuultuor
Jo
:(gO9 'd'g/.GI) ryorvr

s,ulapua8lllM ol lallerpd aq r'rprp dpplldxa 'l(roaq1 adflo1or; aql to truatudoP aP
aql q sarnSg IpHuanUFt pu? pelrodrul o 'sranay41 ufp1e3 pue tlrsou rotreala 'pBt
^l
uppuaSiltAD -ll:pP Jo salllrelltuls
ri .(zg 'd laurnlo sFIl uI 9 ratrdeq2l 996ll96T
saunaruos,sanlrpllruls lpralo sarqlauos :SurssorJ-ssFJ pue tulddepano sagFelluls
uaryo ldaruor
to {ro/r^lau Palerlla*"J 8,, tluo, /btp _'atuelqruasal ,tgulet B llqFlxa
p rapun
s8truq aW ler1l uopsaSSns s,utalsuaSlllM o1 $Iuge uP srseq suonP
11et ;erp
-uor luaDgrns pue &essarau pasodord s,froaql prlssBlf, aql Jo uopra[ar sqJ.
,r'ruag;o qSnoua aAEq rtaql
,salpadord asaql
to Ip a Eq l,uop saqrplso q8noql uala alns?ag saq?Flso ol sallddu
osle ous taaamog :J1a 's88a fq ltaql 'ltg sulqor :saqradord Surpuodsarro? aql to
sulqor '{roaq1 adflo1or6
ilp a^?q ol pual frql asruraq ours Jo uolsualxa a{l u! ars
sqo8re61 puP
af,uernrl
gZ,
Science
29
a balance.36 On the one hand, a concept should encode a considerable amount of

information about its instances and exemplars, but on the other, it shouldn't include
so much that the concept becomes unwieldy. The solution offered by the Prototype
Theory is that a concept should encode the distribution of statistically prominent
properties in a category. By representing statistically prominent properties, concepts
with prototype structure generate many more inferences than do classical representations; they hade a few maximally reliable inferences for many highly reliable though
fallible ones.37
The Prototype Theory also has an attractive model of concept acquisition-in fact,
much the same model as the Classical Theory. In both cases, one acquires a concept
by
assemblit S
its feafures. And, in both
cases,
it's often assumed that the feafures
correspond to sensory properties. The main difference is that on the Prototype

Theory, the features of a concept express statistically prominent properties. So on the
Prototype Theory the mechanism of acquisition embodies a statistical procedure. It
doesn't aim to monitor whether various properties always co-occur, but only whether
they tend to. Of course, to the extent that the Prototype Theory inherits the empiricist program associated with the Classical Theory, it too faces the problem that most
concepts resist analysis in sensory terms. The houble with empiricism, remember,
isn't a commitment to deftnitions but a commitment to analyzing concepts in purely
sensory terms. If uE was a problem for Lockg it's just as much a problem for prototype theorists. Assuming they can artictrlate some plausible candidate features, there
is still no reason to think that all of these can be reduced to a sensory level. This is
tme even for their stock examples of concepts fqr concrete kinds, concepts like BIRD or
rRur.3s But, like the Classical Theory, the Prototype Theory can be relieved of its
empiricist roots. When it is, its model of concept acquisition is at least as compelling
as the Classical Theory's.
Probably the most attractive aspect of the Prototype Theory is its treatment of
categorization. Generally speaking, prototype theorists model categorization as a
similarity comparison process that involves operations on two representations-one
for the target category and one for an instance or an exemplar. (For ease of expression, we'll frame the discussion in terms of instances only, but the same points go for
exemplars as well.) On these models, an instance is taken tg be a member of a category just in case the representation of the instance and the representation of the
category are judged to be sufficiently similar. The advantage of this approach is that
similarity-based categorization processes lay the groundwork for a natural explana36. Rosch, however, sharply distances herself fiom any psychological inteqpretation of this work (see
Rosclr tgzlr. But as we are interested in the bearing of research in this hadition on theories of concepts
construed as mental particulars, we will not discuss nonpsyclrological interpretations.
37. For Rosc.h, much of the interest in the efficiency of a conceptual system concems its hierarchical strucfure. "[Nlot all possible levels of categorization are equally good or usefu] rather, the most basic level of
categorization will be the most indusive (abskact) Ievel at which the categories can rnirror the strucfure of
athibutes perceived in the world- (1978, p. 30).According to Rosch and her colleagues the basic level in a
conceptual system is deftned in terms of its informational potential relative to other levels in the hierarchy,
and its effects are widespread and can be independently measured. For instance, basic level concepts appear
early in cognitive and linguistic development, they have priority in perceptual categorization, and, in a
hierarchy, they pick out the most abshact catqgories whose members are similar in shape. For discussion"
see Rosch (1978, and Rosch et al. (1976').
38. Look at most disctrssions and you'll find that the sample features for uno are things like vuxcs, FLrEs, EArs
woruvrs, srNcs, and so on. Notice, though, that none of these is more "sensory" than srRD itself.
,uJe'e
Hl|"iHil#ltHlJ:i:fi1il::
aw pu? ,s: o- o - e s! ou,s or Nrsou,o AFer."rs ag
;;",r3,;i;
uoslreduror aql q qrcru osl? aJns?aut
uorlpluasardar
-radns p pup reldruaxa
"-"ti}*ril
u" ,o
? to
ol paloâp ansq ppads e--r,'sou '99 uorll,uto3 Vn '(966r)

;o 4do1 aqt,uotssnrslp
uparu
aas
raqlrry to{'(?66l) salsg
pn (Vrct) predaqg
'lP
aas ',{1pe1Frls
p
la usu4lalD '(966I)
to sarnsEatu Ftllo rc{ '69
.le
aql ol rpllwls aroru are fe{l sauo at{I 'sraqlo ue$ IBJIqi arour aQ ol ParaPlsuor
are sreldtuaxa aruos lprll asudrns ou s,l! 'uo11ou paper8 p Jlasll s1 $pe1pu!s aJuls
pup luatuSpnt flpeilruls e q Elnsar usluptlraur ag aruls 'sluau8pnt firpe
-1d{ ro; al$suodsar osp q uonuzuoSalee ro, alqlsuocfsar q leql ustusqrau
aures drarr aql 1eql uopdurnsse aqt rapun euaurouaqd sF{l supldxa PP_our
rolelnurnrrp ar.IJ 'ar" salqo ueg lryr;o prldfl arou e_g ol paSpnf aru salddy
.froSape uaa18 e rot are ltaql
Frld/q rvroq roJ sreldtuaxa {uer ol {sel IEr
-nleu p ll pu.g spa[qns letp unleP aql IIPTaU ssawnldwaq lo syuawtpn[ payatg
:El"p gqe4dfi eql to qrnru seluraua8 tqt sp pre/wro;lq8prls sE auo uala
pA 'slslroaql adfiolord o1 uado sJ lpql uollezlro8atret Jo lapour ,(Fo aql l,usl sltll
'sraquaruuou ag ol ua{el are l(aql
fpualrgJnsur pa8pn[ ar? anFA ramol p a^pq o1 palndruoJ arp leql sruall iraq
-rplprgs
-ruaru
E s? lunor o1 fro8aler p8rel aql ol rBIIuqs dpuanggns sl ural! aql l"tfl aPeur sl
'lou ro alnleat uounuoJ
truaulSpnt aql 'anprr ulplJal E saqJpal rolppumtee a{l uaqryl
E sl ll raqlaq uo Surpuadap 'rolepurneru us ol anpn aageSau ro aallrsod _e sPPl auo
^
?a)pap sr amlsal qrea sV 'pllered q sarnlpat aql 11e Suqraqr dlqlsso_d '&o8aler
iql'p.i pa[qo aql qll/yr palprrossP sps arnlPal aql sareduror auo 'fro8aler p8re;
p ol palqo uarr18 e ro flrrelpurs a{l atrndruor oI z(SOOt tlllrus_:tg_6t uparu pue {lFuS
aas) lunorre rllpruaqes aldruls sFll raplsuoe Japou Eulssarord aldues P rog 'luau8pnt
aql saprauaS flenlre leql arnparord puouelnduot aql_ $pads l,usaoP ll lnq 'sag
orq ;o ltlpepqs plSoloqtfsd aql samssatu aldnulrd lserluo) aql /vtoN
-o-8a1er
-r-
*,,'f;llililH'lilT:it?'ltitii:i?$:;
sq1 'rtlqeurnsard 'z o

r sr
sarnlpal pnpppq ?ql ,o tpea_suSysse / uoqeury
ai aqi-8ursn 'ua{I 'l{8;aan pnba ,.a'!)
aql l"rll prre (I IIB are r pup 'q'e
I Jo lq8garvr pnba uE ual!8 qeea are sarnlea,
allpullslp prre uounuoJ to slas aql lpql aumssp os[V 'seeit sl\n_Pus 'rlv]Ns st Scnts 's:nr
:sarq?al rnot
salerodro)ul 'ltlpqduls rot 'lpql uoneluasardar E sl rellel_aql alaqm
1sn[
,ur.srmr pr.rp tnrn uaamlaq &peUurls
to alnssaru aql JaplsuoJ 'sryorvr aldpupd aqt
,\ orl alE4snlll oJ 'sarnlBat [pnPFIPq ol pauSlssP aq o1 slq8la/vr rot sfvlolP / uoqrury
aql puc ,(l - [ pus f - I) sarnleal a^lpuqsp to ps q)Ea ol PUP ({, 1) sarnleal uounuor
lvrolp r Pus 'g'e sluelsuo) aql
Jo 1as aql ol pauSlsse aq o1 qqSpm lualagp roJ
(r
filt - (f -illq-
(f
ville - (f 'l) ,'ls
:s^ oilot sB paugap aq uer uolpury aql 'slas arnlea, aql arP I PUB I araqM
.uag
{lfn palelross? ar? lpql sarnlpal a^nrupslp pus paruqs to sps aql _Sulredulor
dq p"-s?aru q '{pue t suall o/vrl l(ue ;o fipeprrls paSpnt aql letn s1 aldputd tlql
puqag eapl aql 5r'flaurn1o^ sFll ul /.1 raldeqel ggfi1e la qlps_ "8'a'aas) ,,a1dpuJr6
s,flsrall sour\e/ sl pasn ltpotutuo) lsour aql sdeqrad '&gelltuls rot
1ser1uo3 ,, (/.,L6T)
sarnsearu
prpoloqrfsd luaraflp to raqurnu p padolanap aÊq qsJroaql adflopr;
aql lE {oor rasop e a{el ol paau a", '$rro snn ,*oq aas o,
^
'rrr"rf,illffifit:"il;
srtoSreyq pue
a)ualn"'I
0g
Science
31
target are the ones that are judged to be more typical; the ones that are less
similar to the target are the ones that are judged to be less typical.
Typicality Conelates with Property Lists The reason the distribution of feafures
in subjects' property lists predicts the typicality of an exemplar is that the
properties that are the most common on sucJr lists characterize the strucfure of
the concept that is the target of the similarity-comparison process. Taking the
example of rnp and its exemplars, the idea is that the properties that are commonly cited across categories such as robin, sp&rrout, hawk, oshich, and so on,
are the very properties that correspond to the features of ilRD. Since noshr has
many of the same features, robins are judged to be highly typical birds. osrRrcH,
on the other hand, has few of these features, so ostriches are judged to be less
typical birds.
Graded Speed of fuick Categorization Judgrnents Assuming that the individual
feafure comparisons in the similarity-comparison process take varying amounts
of time the outcome of each comparison will affect the accumulator at different
times. As a result, items that are represented to have more feafures in common
with a target will be judged more q"i.kty to be members. A less thorough comparison is reguired before a sufficient number of shared feafures is registered.
Categorization Enors Are Inoersely Conelated with Typicality For less typical
exemplars, more feature comparisons will be needed before a sufficient number
of shared features is reached, so there are more chances for error.
The accumulator model also explains certain aspects of concepfual fuzziness. Prototype theorists often cite fuzziness as a point in favor of their theory, while not
saying mucJr about what the funiness of concepts consists in. One way of trnpacking
the notion, however, is that judgments about whether something falls under a concept are indeterminate that is, the psycJrological mechanisms of categorization do not
yield a judgment one way or the other.
Fuzziness To predict fuzziness in this sense, the model need only be supplemented with the following qualiftcation: Where an exemplar isn't clearly similar
enough to a target by prespecified margin the result is neither the judgment
" concept nor the judgment that it doesn't.
that it falls under the target
From this brief survey of the data, one can see why the Prototype Thgory has been
held in such high regard. Not only does it seem to be immune to some of the difficulties surrounding the Classical Theory, but it addresses a wide variety of empirical
data as well. While there is virtually no doubt about the importance of these data, a
number of problems have been raised for the theory, problems that are largely
directed at its scope and interpretation. Some of these problems have been thought to
be serious enough to warrant a radical reworking of the theory, or even its abandonment. We'll discuss four.
Box 3
The kototVpe Theory
Most concepts (esp. lexical concepts) are structured mental representations

properties that obiects in their extension tend to possess.
that encode the
-{'rt ;:!*Htfiffi
au{ud ? to aldusxa ,"l,,q ? s! / l'ql {?s PForr spalqns 1,ql laq a^ 'aldu?xa
pporr^ tdaru- sltll lpgl des o1 aIEs s,l! IaaJ a lnsnnN eruud ldaruor aqf lsel l,WlP [aq1 qSnoqf iIf,nDI{ AUL
,r,rwad lusr{nN ooo 'EffmN Ns^ r alam papSJpaaul 'F la Suorlsurry qdaeuoe rnot arf,L 'If
sl^tcrttg aNy-rd.puB
adflolord rc1 an8rB oP spaga /qrytd/q 1eql PPaFU! Ppq PJnoe auo 'uolsnlruof,
p
pA 'srualqord prfolopoqlau d-P a^lolt4 arnpruls
Jo 8uor1s ool aq feru sFn
adrqolord rcl quaurnSre aql lerll atuaptla raqlrnt ag ol sFIf {oot
.f,
f, ffitffi"
ua1a u? to aldurexa Jailaq B sl g fes o1 ilHs sem fruapual aql 'fro8atree auou-Jo-lp
up sl nqwnu ueoe 1eql pps flsnour$eun spafons s,'p la Suo4suuy qSnoqllv 'sraq
-uraru sB arp faql pooS ,uor{ rot srBlduaxa TuBr o1 8u11yvl ulPuar faql os uaâ lnq
paper8- 1,uare '#n4 se q?ns 'sapoSalst raql_o lsql PIoq fueur Pu"-Paper8
-ra{ltasldaeuoc pau.gap-llam letn ruPP ttlpnpe aldoad 'fprarp Pa{sB _uaq/n ?"q!
l,uare
r"- puro, d".{t lprlM 'sapoSalpr paugapllam rnoJ rl?ql Supnpul 'papurS ars sauo8
-aler snolrsl rbqpqaa lqSlrqno spafqns palsp 'p p Suorlsuuy 'arntrrru1s a&!o1ord
o1 sluaur8pnt &ipildrQ urort salow lerll paunSre arg qly\ PagsHesug 'fro8_a1ur
s alsgrrelsul relduraxa uB to saJuelsq aql qrqm o; aarSap aql 1noqe s/utall s,aldoad
Sulpagar sE pauleldxa uaql are sluadpt I ft{"rt&tt 'sluatuSPnf &{eeldr$ uo srr:loJ
aW to asneraq $ r(s r spn ppar are saddloqord uos?ar a{I 'u1[V ltpool4 uetll raflel
lfteia111 $ upprol pe{eln sE Fn[ 'saq?Flso uug _,,PIPrl$, /t1pra1ll are sulqor 1etll
,furqt rir"tq"i 'sadrtloio td p /naln slql uO 'paper8 _8upq sp uolsualxa sMuasardar
slealqttr ptil Suytldul sp arnpruls adfp1ord,n1rn ldaeuoe u prdralq ol sl-aumsse
-F -Suorlsruy lpql auo aql pue-sadzlotrord lnoqu SuquHl ;o r(ervr uounuof, V
1a
.arnlrruls adzlo1ord ro; an8rp l,uop sparJa ,qrytdrq 1uql aruaP!â a{ ol sSul
-pulJ 4ag lool 'p p Suorlsuuy 'sprorvt ratllo uI '(ogu 'd; ,,s1daruo) Jo arnpruls aql
1it"{" 8tfileinar lou s! ruag ol sasuodsar uaa/qaq {sp8ulplp lotnrur leql uSrperud
e ,samlruls guaraglp a sq sunerd ,l,u,urr roae all\nd pup xnxd "t'a ?Eql #pop Plofaq
armas q ll lpril lualxa aql o[11,, 'pa/vlug arp froaql adf1o1or4 aql ro^BJ ol trq8noq1
dpreprqs are lerll suonpraplsuor eql lstfi sB^ paq?Parp la Suortrsurry lBtll uolsnP
-uoJ aql/Jaqumu uaâ ve v sL, Jot uBrn JaFPt ,/Jaqumu uaâ _uP g sL, JOJ sJaMsuE
parJoJ arnpord faql ,,ll1nrt e 8g E sl,, roJ lrptfi rappt ,,lllrut e aldde uB sL, rot srarnsuP
parroJ arnpord spa[qns se trsnf 'uonv4rotatrer ;o feernme PuP Paads qlyvr salelar
-ror ,$ryrldrq ,relnclilBd uI 'spatta ,QWq&Q prepuels ag Jo aruos qllrvl arueProrr?
uI slpp raqlo qll/yr alplaror sldaeuor paugap{arl ro; s8uquelQryrld',Q treql P*oJ
.p 1a Buorlsurry 'arour s,lprlM 'sl 7g raqumu aql upt$ Jaqumu uala uB Jo aldurexa
railaq ? sE pDlrrer sI g Jaqumu aql 'ars s8g ueql ilru, ;o salduru:<a ralleq s_P PDttrBr
aru sjldde se fn1 ,o'sldaruoJ q)ns Jo sraqruaru ss_ere_ l(aql pooS -o! o1 EuRrrorre
srelduaxa {uer ol lemlsu ll pug ssapqpuou aldoad leql Pa/noqs f,",n 'sldaeuoe
paugapnam rnot Sulsn 'slf,atta fi{eeldrq lqqxa l,uPpotl: qdaluor PaugaP-ryueqi 'arnpruF prllsg?ls seq faruor e tre{l Fa^?r spafa ,Qryrldr$ il le-q] pan8re
.tr Suorlsrrlry ('suolluqap
,sldaruoc ag aenpord {pear uer PtrB_^ôDI aldoad leql
in
suparu alaq ,,paugaP-lP/W,) '(gg6I'P p Suorlsuuy) spaga &ry4drq l$qxa 'uil+rornl
-oN'rlro Jo uirsr nN Nnfir sB q?ns 'qdaruoJ pau$ap{arr Jaqpqla to uonsanb aql pa1u811
-salu! uaullalg druaH pus 'usrqlal9 BII1 uorlsuuv uorBtls 'froaql add1otrord
aql to uolssruslP prllpe dpea lueilodurl uB .uI sawyd yt1dftyo1ot4 to uenoq ?W
fuoatg edfio4ot1 aq1 nl ilnnoq 'T'
sqo8rery pus
aruam"f
T,
Science
33
structure but that prototype stnrcture has no implications for whether subiects rePresent a category as being graded. In other words, the proposal is that typicality iudg-
ments reflect an underlying prototype; it's just that prototyPes needn't involve a
commitment to graded membership.
If typicality judgments aren't about degrees of membership, what are they about?
We are not sure that there is a simple answer. Yet it's not unreasonable to think much
of what's going on here relates back to properties that are rePresented as being
highly indicative of a category. The difference between RoBw and osrRrcH, on this
view, is that robins are represented as possessing more of the properties that, for one
reason or anoth er, are taken to be the usual signs that something is a bird. But the
usual signs needn't themselves be taken to be constih'rtive of the category. So long as
one believes that they aren't, and that they merely provide evidence for whether
something is a member of the category, the number of signs an item exhibits needn't
determine a degree to which it instantiates the category.
The distinction between properties that are represented as being evidential and
those that are represented as being constitutive is especially pertinent when categorization takes place under pressures of time and limited resources. In a pinch, it makes
sense to base a categorization judgment on the most salient and accessible properties-the very ones that are most likely to be merely evidential. The conclusion
that many psychologists have drawn from this observation is that categorization can't
be expected to be a univocal affair. Given the correlations between judged typicality
and quick category judgments for both accuracy and speed, the Prototype Theory
provides a compelling account of at least part of what goes on in categorization. But
ionsidered ludgments of category membership seem to tell a different story. This has
prompted a variety of theorists to put forw ard Dual Theories of concepts, where one
iomponent (the "identification procedure") is responsible for quick categorization
judgments and the other component (the "core") is called upon when cognitive
resources aren't limited (Osherson and Smith I98t [chapter 1.1 in this volume]; Smith
et al. 7984; Landau tg82).42 Such Dual Theories have often been thought to give the
best of both worlds-the Prototype Theory's account of fast categorization and
the Classical Theory's account of more thoughtful categorization, especially where
the relevant properties are hidden or in some way less accessible. For instance, in discussing the merits of Dual Theories, Smith et al. (1954) are careful to insist that both
the core and the identiftcation procedure are accessed in categorization processes.
The difference between them, they claim, can be illustrated with the concept cENDER.
"ldentiftcation properties might include style of clothing, hair, voice, etc., while core
properties might involve having a particular kind of sexual organs. As this example
suggests, our distinction centers on notions like salience, computability, and diagnosticity. . ." (p. 267).
42. The division of labor between the core and the identiftcation procedure hasn't been fully worked out
in the literafure. For instancg in the text we adopt the interpretation according to which the difference
between cores and identification procedures is just a matter of how they enter into categorization processes. fuiother difference thafs often cited is that cores are the primary, or perhaps the only, component
that enters into the compositional principles that determine the semantics of complex concepts on the basis
of their constituents. But it is at least open to question whether the components responsible for making
considered judgments of category membership are also the ones that compositionally generate the semantics of complex concepts. We discuss this issue further below.
ou s! alaql uonsaSSns s!r.n uo ?roqs ul 'a{pus p $ ll 'uvNs rapun 8u1ge; sB Pazlro8aler

se,lt ll aJuls :e{Bus p aq ol serl ualr sFfl uaql ldaruor aql to uolsualxa a{l auluuaFP
sassaJor d uoqqrz;lro8ape JI lng '[s lB Dlsus s lou pue 'auJa padeqs-a{Bus p ,tq palilBls
ss/r^ aqs lpql 1no urnl ppot ll letll 'ua{plslul aq dlpnlre plnor aqs letn alqpsod aq
ol ll lup^^ arr ?eaqe Fn[ Wed raq ssoraB 8uil[l algus p aq ol sa)pl aqs leqrn ltq
pallrEls q aqs puB 'saleus f lryrea; tpunf uozeruy aql qSnor.ll Surptar; flsnoarau
s1 anef uaq1\A 'uorleluasardarsyu fiua to /q$qgssod aql lno alru ppo/n l! 'lerauaS ul
pq re sfol ra8Jl Supumuor lprn pup sra8g l,uare sra8J1 oulqp pa88a1-g letll fldrur
ll pporn ltpo loN 'eprur ool rsJ ztgear s,ll-{ro/r^ ol aperu aq l,uet 11 padde PHIuI
aluos a^?q rteu arn srql a[qm ;aA 'll rapun IIB; suall letl saqruuapp par(o1dap
^
^
sr ldaeuor p *ro.rl lerll s! uoqsaSSns sFIl pulqaq sapl aql 'arnlparr pa88a1-g 'ssapllool
rno ol saqdde uaerr lsrfl 8uy(uap to aloru prlper aql a{Bur il8fu auo 's! lEt{I 'ldaeuor
aql rapun IIE; fgear l,usaop 1; ua{l 'ad$olord s,gdaruoJ B lg l,usaoP Sulqpruos J!
lpril rrysp ol s! Suqdrual pug lq8pu aruos lern suolsnlruor asaql plonB o1 fervt auo
'sra811 ro sprlq l,uare prll s8urql sapnlrur
ler{l uoppuuoJul fpoqura daql treql q qJIr ool 'asuas B u! 'are faql auql atu?s aql le
pue 'sra8g 11e ro sprlq IIp epnlrul ol ssauqJrr lualrlrlns {rpl suollpluasardar adfio1or6
'raor.r ro crun a111 ldaJuor e rc! uolsualxa parJoa ag auFrualap l,uop suoneluasal
-dar adl(loqord t1qftl umo r;ag r(q'os !1 a8palruoulre o1 paredard sr PuP sF{l smotnl
auodraaa lug s1 1u1od eql 'ra8p e ra8r1 t(ol Sultulnuor P sl roN 'gOZ 'd'g96T) sra811
Fls are ,,sra811 ourqp 'ssaFllool 'atuel 'pa88al-g,, pup 'sprlq ilHs are paryn1d sraqleaJ
rlaql IIB rnyr sprlq 'a;ou 'F la Suoqsuuy sV 'sluoldurds aql lnoqlyrt asPeslP eql
a pq ppor auoeruos pue 'aseasJp aql Suppq lnoqltm sruoldurfs aql aÊq PInoJ auo
o1 sappS alqpllar flaplduor l,uare faql 'suolpe
-auos 'assaslp aql to aruasard
",n aql ppapul arp
-ralq psner Jo ,QapBA B Jo spatta
lnq aseaslp p ro a^Hqnsuor l,uare
snolras e sarp, froaql addloprd aql rauQ atues a{l
paporua 8u1aq roJ saleplpupr poo8 are faql 'aseaslP
a&(1o1ord
lV 'suogpluasardar
:fipe$tp
sruoldurfs asnurag
E to spatta alqBllar lerauaS uI ',alg suoldufs af,uls Puv 'uo os pue 'suorldnra uHs
'tanal qSq-sruolduds q! ale 'fus fl 'aseaslp sltll W$a alpposse aldoad trsoru lpql
sapradord aq; 'xo{t'tvrs ldaruor aql 'up8e aruo taplsuo) 'u/vlou1 fpraua8 l,uare
suorlrugap asoqm ro suo$lugap :pq luql qdaruor ol sarldde lurod aurcs aql q?nt{
'8.raqp1og ldooqpl
s! oS 'rarllotupuer8 p sr rarunl BulI 'salpadord asaql Surdrsqss lnoqllm raqloupuerS
E eq uer auoauros pup 'raq;orupuerS e 8u!aq lnoqf'r sagradord asaql {sges uue
auoauros lprn sl ualqord aq1 'saploor a{pq o1 a{{ daql 'asoddns s,lal ?us 'uarPllt{)
ol puq are faql 'sasse18 pue rleq [et8 a^pq daql ?lo ars srarlloruPuer8 pr1dfio|
-ord 'uirrdrohror{\rue ldaeuoe aq1 eldtuexa roJ 'a{BI 'froaql addlolord aql roJ ulalqord
e Jo aroru ,!1enpe are l(aq1 sfervt aruos ul 'PaaPul 'froaql IPrlssPI) aql ro, aram_lbql
sp ualqord e qrntu sg IIIIs arp rorJa pu? aruerouSl 'sldaruor Jo suoJsualxa a{l Sulxg
1o freln e sa4nbar rfuoaql ad&olord aql aluls tottT pua aruatou8l to uapoq eW
'froaql IBnO e to!
asps 1nq dlaq l,upr os pup uollelos! q saFoa{l qloq roJ sasFe 'lno sunl l! sp
"pltlm
'rorrg pu? aruprouSl ,o ualqor; aq1 $frr dp,{ ll saop roN 'ulalqord aql alpuFulla
gu$J
l,usaop luauoduror lpJlsspp p ol luauodruoe a&!o1ord B Surppp 'suollF$ap
-pads lnoqp arotaq ualqord p sern eraql ,l 'aJuplsu! JoJ 'aulqtuoJ ol saFl lI salroaql
arfl qllm palpposse are lpql saplmgtp aql saroutg /vrall s tpns tpleunilotun
qlotre4
pua a)uarne
ve
Science
35
room for the possibility of a concept being misapplied, and this is just too high a
price to pay.a3
Notice that Dual Theories might help somewhat, if it's assumed that conceptual
cores are involved in categorization. The core would provide ]ane with a definition of
5NAKE that would have the final word on whether something falls under the concept
by providing a more substantial procedure for deciding whether something is a
snake. Then her mistake could be credited to the deployment of an identification procedure; what would make it a mistake is that the outcome of the identiftcation procedure fails to matcl the outcome of the core. Presumably, were lane to deploy the
core, she'd be in a position to recogni2e her own error. But as we've already noted,
Dual Theories aren't much of an advance, since they reintroduce the difftculties that
face the Classical Theory.
Another mark against the present form of a Dual Theory is that it inherits the difficulties associated with a verificationist semantics. For instance, people's procedures
for deciding whether something falls under a concept are subject to change as they
acquire new information, new theories, and (sometimes) new technologies. Yet this
doesn't mean that the concept's identity automatically changes. To rehnrn to the
example of a disease, when two people differ on the symptoms they associate with
measles, they would appear to be in disagreemenb that is, they appear to be arguing
about the best evidence for deciding whether measles is present. But if the identity of
MEASLEs is given by the procedures under which one decides whether it is instantiated, then we'd have to say that the two couldn't genuinely disagree about the
symptoms associated with measles. At best, they would be talking at cross PurPoses,
one about one ailment, the other about another. The same goes for a single Person
over time. She couldn't come to change her mind about the best indications of measles, since in adopting a new procedure of veriftcation she'd thereby come to deploy a
new concept. We take it that these difficulties offer good prima facie grounds for
shying away from a 'veriftcationist version of the Dual Theory.
The Missing PrototVpes koblem The strongest evidence in favor of the Prototlrye
Theory is that subjects find it natural to rate exemplars and instances in terms of how
representative they are of a given category and the fact that these ratings correlate
with a range of psychological phenomena. But although this is true of many concepts, it is by no means true of all concepts. Many concepts aren't associated with
typicality judgments, and for many concepts, people fail to represent any central tendencies at all. As ferry Fodor has put it (lgSt, pp. 296-297):
There may be prototlryical cities (London Athens, Rome, New York); there may
even be prototypical American cities (New York, Chicago, Los Angeles), but
there are surely no prototypical Ameican cities situated on tlu hst Coast iust a
little south of Tennessee. Similarly, there may be prototypical grandmothers (Mary
Worth) and there may be prototypical properties of grandmothers (good, old Mary
Worth). But there are surely no prototypical properties of, say, Chaucer's grand43. Note that nothing turns on the example b"ing a natural kind (where ifs plausible that science is the
best arbiter of category membership). The point is iust that, wherever there is representation, there is the
potential for misrepresentation An account that doesn't permit misrepresentation simply isn't an adequate
theory of concepts.
-olord 1,q faql dJaure' 'uqqotd twunaql silpt atl lptlir^ o1 pafqns fgerauaS are sldaruoe asa{l
dr"ffi
qul.od ropod .(966I) ropog aas 'suoplruFuot u?apog a lolu! 1erfl sldaruor Jo uolssroslP aruos rod '9t
'eapl sqn8glul pf an8ea lsqflauos B-,,alpJplu!,, ool are faql asneca{ aJqtn4s
adeolord :ppl IEur rrusnt pue 'rumo 'mlxs a1q qdacuor lptll pa88ns (196I) ttlFrs PUP uosraqsg '??
uorssessod trdaruo,
r'qr
",iilH: ;ff:;lTl;3&Tilnil"?'fT
:;::3;:*:';:;
nod 'ppomtapun lo ddor E aas nof pup alqoN pus sarupg o; oB nof uaqm 'ra;q PUV
nol(
Iooq oil{a6 E ss ll raquaruar III^^ nof uaql 'yltoouepun q Falq sH leql Ppl are
sarusg lptn ratq z(su nof uaql
JI 1ooq 1saIEI s,orupg a Bq o1 fp11l $ alqoN pup
'alqoN ptrs saueg lB poPols ila^ fgensn arP $looq s,o[1p6 uo6 lutn -o1r1 noll
poddns o1
It'ironezrto&ale) q aBBSua ro 'r(rotuaut aznnBto 'sarualaJiul elptnPul
tuo{ nof dop ol s,lptlm 'ttltS 'sFn 1o fuu rrtotnl lou
11 Sursn ldaeuor aql Sulssassod
fetu nof qoog oil{a6 p pear l,ualeq nof il 1ng 'arnllm relndod uerlraury to suolle^
-rasqo lueuSrod qVn parel are prre tpld qls aÊq f".n 'fwry ltgunsn are $looq sFl
lpql otl)l su?t omlac 'ralleru aql lnogP s/UtaIA Suoqs a^Pq furu aldoad ra$! qSnoqt
uana^talro8ape Supuodsauor a{l ur luaunuord flpf,Hsp?ls Supq su saliladord fue
Sulluasardar 1noqllm rDvoJ floe+assrud B ro )oos orrnxg NoCI e Jo ldaeuoe aql aAEq
plnor nof 'aldruexa roJ 'snql 'op ldaeuor aql ssassod_oql sraqlo JI uala 'addlolord e
Fuprrourl lnorllllvr ldaruot p a Bq ol alqlssod flpa;rad s,ll lPql s! ualqord palepr y
JI{9IN JS\n )SitO AIÎ NO -L:41 t UiIdVd dO lDiIId
x'urvt{f, v sI x fl
s?uosoNtM
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v or
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lrtt .
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v hlvt{r suon
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rvHr snrtgo .
iIsllINNn rHr Nr No 9NrO9 TttIS STSSI)OUd Ty)IS t{d do iDtlsnoasruor
v.
:snoauaSorapq ool ars suolsualxa Jlaql asnuraq alqJruls adf1oprd 1ePI sJeqlo
OUO{MVU) ACINIJ dO O1IHf,CNVIID
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ilNoHdox\4s AuruNiD
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:sldaruoJ palulltrelsu3rn fueul

'sapo8aler Sulpuodsauor a{l to sapuaPual P4uar
W$n aspr aql aq ol suaas sFlI
aql lnoqe s/na!^ a^sq l,uop l(ldrurs aldoad asnpf,aq arnpruls adflolord_ a Bq ol 1let
aruos 'arnlrru1s adflolord {r?l sldaeuoe xalduror r(ueur fplpgaPul 'saldurexa rlloxa
,râl e to pptllrB rrs ro 'ualqord paleloq u? IIE le pu s! sFIl lEt0 aas ol luepodtul s,ll
'stslpep ol peunut ata uarylrytyua8
lo pow snqlowryus 1o salpadord peffiolord ou are araql pve 'ualloru
asoqm
qp8rery pue eJuarnu'I g
Science
37
The objection that many concepts lack prototype structure is standardly presented
as an issue about compositionality, since most of the concepts that lack prototypes
important feature of the conare patently complex. Compositionality is certainly
ceptual system, as it provides the best explanation for one of the most important and
shiking features of human thought-its productivity. Important as compositionality
is, however, it's not really needed for the present objection. The force of the Missing
Prototypes Problem is simply that many concepts lack prototype structure and that
it's often possible to possess a concept without thereby knowing a prototype.
The implications of this objection aren't always given their full due. Edward Smith,
for example, suggests that the Prototype Theory isn't intended to be a general theory
of concepts. He says that some classes, such as objects that weryh fortV pounds, ue
arbitrary and that "the inductive potential of a class may determine whether it is
treated as a category" (1995,p.7). The representation oBIEcrs rllAr wEIGH FoRrY PotrNDs,
however, is a perfectly fine concept, which one can readily use to pick out a property.
For any of a variety of puqposes, one might seek to find an object that weighs forty
pounds, categorize it as such, and reason in accordance with the coresponding concept. In any event, though there is nothing wrong with the idea that concepts divide
info groups requiring different theoretical treatments, we still require an account of
the concepts that aren't covered by the Prototype Theory. Given that there seem to
be indefinitely many such concepts, the question arises whether prototypes are central and important enough to concepts generally to be considered part of their nahrre.
Perhaps it is more appropriate to say that many lexical concepts have prototypes
associated with them but that these prototypes aren't in any way constitutive of the
concepts.
that aims to mitigate the damage caused by the Missing
Another
Prototlryes Problem-is (once again) to appeal to a Dual Theory. The idea might be
that for sorne concepts it is possible to have the concept without having both components. So for these concepts, not knowing a prototype is ftne. The advantage of
this sort of Dual Theory would appear to be that it allows for a univocal treatment of
all concepts; one needn't appeal to a completely distinct theory for those concepts
that lack prototypes. Yet it's hardly clear that this is much of a Bain since the result-
option
ing Dual Theory fails to preserve the spirit of the Prototype Theory. It looks like
whafs essential to a concept, on this view, is the classical cor; with the prototype
being (in many cases) merely an added option. In short, the Dual Theory is beginning
to sotrnd more and more like a supplemented version of the Classical Theory.
The koblem of Compositionality One of the most serious and widely discussed
obiections to the Prototype Theory is the charge that it's unable to account for the
phenomenon of compositionality. This difficulty seems especially pressing in light of
the importance of compositionality in accounting for our ability to entertain an unbounded number of concepts. To the extent that anyone can foresee an explanation
of this ability, it's that the concepfual system is compositional.a6
Early discussions of compositionality in the literafure on Prototlrye Theory were
concerned with explaining how graded extensions could be combined. Thus these
discussions were based on the assumption that most categories are graded in the
46. Which isnlt to say that the details have been completely worked out or that there is no controversy
about the content of the principle of compositionality. For discussio& see Grandy (1990b).
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Science
39
Though difficulties like these may seem to be decisive against hwzy set theory's
model of compositionality, we should note that tuzzy set theory doesn't provide the
only model of compositionality that is compatible with the Protokype Theory.5o Still,
compositionality has proven to be a notable stumbling block for protot5ryes.
The general objection that Prototype Theory cannot provide an adequate account
of concepfual combination has been pushed most vigorously by Ierry Fodor. In this
context, Fodor has argued both that many complex concepts simply don't have Prototypes and that, when they do, their prototypes aren't always a function of the prototypes of their constituents. We've already dealt with the first sort of case, under the
heading of the Problem of Missing Prototypes. To get a feel for the second, consider
the concept pnr FrsH. The prototype for pEr FIsH is a set of feafures that picks out something like-a goldfish. Prototypical pet ftsh are small, brightly colored, and they live in
fish bowls (or small tanks). How does the prototype for rer rsH relate to the prototypes of its constifuents, namely, pff and Rsn?sl Presumably, the features that consti-
tute the prototypes for pEr pick out dogs and cats as the most rePresentative
examples of pets-features such as FuRRy, AFFEcTToNATE, TAIL-WAGGING, and so on. The
protobype for FrsH, on the other hand, picks out something more like a hout or a
bass-flatures such as cRAy, r.JNDoMEsncATED, MEDtuM-stzED, and so on. Thus prototypical pet fish make rather poor examples both of pets and of fish. As a result, ifs
difficult to see how the prototype of the complex concept could be a function of the
prototypes of its constituents.
One of the most interesting attempts to deal with the composition of complex
prototypes is Smith, Osherson, Rips, and Keane's (198S [chapter 17 in this volumeJ)
Selective Modiftcation Model. According to this model, conceptual combinations
that consist of an adjectival concept (e.g. RED, RotrND) and a nominal concept (e.g., arpLE, FRUrr) in the form Adi + N are formed by u process where the adjectival concept
modiftes certain aspects of the nominal concept's structure. The nominal concept is
taken to decompose into a set of features organized around a number of attributes.
Each athibute is weighted for diagnosticity, and instead of having default values,
each value is assigned a certain number of 'totes," indicating its probabiliLy. For
simplicity, Smith et al. consider only adiectival concepts assumed to have a single attribute (see ftgure 1.1). The way concepfual combination works is that the adjectival
concept selects the corresponding attribute in the nominal concept's representation,
increases its diagnosticity, and shifts all of the votes within the scope of the attribute
to the value that the adjectival concept picks out. For instance, in the combination nnp
AppLE, the attribute coloR is selected in the representation Apptn, its diagnosticity is
increased, and the votes for all of the color features iue shifted to nrn (see ftgure I.2).
Smith et al. subjected this model to the following sort of experimental test. By
asking subjects to list properties of selected items, they obtained an independent
measure of the attributes and values of a range of fruit and vegetable concepts. They
took the number of listings of a given feafure to be a measure of its salience (i.e., its
number of votes), and they measured an attribute's diagnosticity by determining how
useful it is in distinguishing fruits and vegetables, This allowed them to generate
50. Indeed, Osherson and Smith have proposed an dtemative model of their own, which we will discuss
shortly. See also Hampton (1991.).
51. We take it that the empirical claims made here about the prototypes of various conceph are extremely
plausible in tight of other finding+ but the daims are not based on actual experimmtd results. Accordingly,
the arguments ultimately stand in need of empirical conftrmation
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Science
4'l'
than other spoons and used for cooking, not eating.)s3 It doesn't even cover the case
we started with, namely, Prr F-tsH.
Smith et al. suggest some ways in which the model might attempt to cope with
these difficulties. One borrows an idea from |ames Hampton (1'9ST), who notes that
the prototypes for some complex contepts may be sensitive to real-world knowledge. For instance your prototype for wooDEN spooN may be more a result of
experience with wooden spoons than your having constructed the concept from
compositional principles. In Smith et al.'s hands, this suggestion emerges as a twostage model. In the first stage, a prototyp" is constructed on a purely comPglitional
basis, in accordance with the original mechanism of the Selective Modiftcation
Model in the secon4 the prototype is subject to changes as world knowledge is
brought into play. In principle a more complicated model like this_ is capable of
dealing with i fî, number of the difficult examples we've mentioned. For instance,
wooDrr.r snooN needn't be so houblesome anymore. Perhaps people do construct a
prototype in which iust the r'aarnnraL coMposmoN attribute for spoon is altered. Later,
in the slcond stage the athibute szr is altered as experiCnce teaches that wooden
spoons are typically larger than metal spoons. Perhaps pEr FtsH can be acconunodated
by u two-stage model as well.
The strongest objection to Hampton's suggestion is owing to Jerry Fodor and
Ernest Lepore. They emphasize that one can't allow experience to fix the prototype
of a .o*pl"* concept without admitting that such prototypes are essentially idioms.
But, they argue, if prototypes are idioms, then the Prototype Theory offers a wholly
inadequate account of concepts (1996, p. 267):
Prototypes aren't compositional; they work like idioms. Concept+ however,

must be compositional; nothing else could explain why they are productive. So
concepts aren't prototypes.
In addition, they argue that the two-stage model is implausible since as concepts get
more complex (and we are less likely to have real-world knowledge about them), we
don't default to a compositionally determined prototype. As an exiunple, they point to
the concept rur
FrsH
tltHo rlvE rN ARMENIA AhrD HAvE REcENTLv swAtrowED
THEIR
ot
,NERs.
Though
no one his real-world knowledg" for a concept like this-knowledge that might interfere with the effects of the Selective Modification Model-no one has a compositionally determined prototype either. Concepts like these simply lack prototypes.
Notice that the second of these objections is no more than a repetition of the
Missing Prototypes Problem. The reply here will be much the same as it was there.sa
j3. For another example,
consider MAr.E Nr,rRsE. Male nurses aren't taken to be iust like other nurses,
only male. Among other things, they wear different sorts of uniforms-slacks, not dresses. Thus the combination can't iust-be a matter of the modifter affecting the sox attribute in lrun.se, shifUng all the votes to the
value MA;..E. For some discussion of the significance of context effects in concepfud combination see Medin
and Shoben (198S).
54. Actually, we aren't so sure that highly modiffed concepts inevitably lack prototypes. For many cases it
seems likely that people will have a sketchy idea of how to rank exemplars or instances for typicality. Take
While we arert't prepared to say too much about these unusual ftsh, we do
Fodor and lepori's
"*"*ple
know they hive to be fairly large if they are going to swallow people (who but a Person owns a ftsh?).
Among other things, this knowledge implies that goldfish are going to be extremely Poor exemplarl *d
that white sharks may be better. To the extent that one can make such ludgments, this counts as evidence
for a schematic prototype. If ifs idiomatie that's just to say that there are other ways to construct an
idiomatic prototype than by having experience with members of the corresPonding category. In this
anse, the idiom could derive from a reasoning process that incoqporates information from the dassical core
and general background knowledge.
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aruarns-I z,
Science
43
with the core of a concept apparently doing so much work, the Dual theory beings to
look more like a supplemented version of the Classical Theory. We should end this
discussion, however, by emphasizing that the issues surrounding comPositionality
are extremely complicated and that there is much more to be said. We'll refurn to
these issues in what we hope will be a new and illuminating context, when we exarnine some of the problems associated with Conceptual Atomism (sec. 6.2).
The Prototype theory continues to be one of the dominant theories of concepts in
psychology and cogr,itive science. This is understandable, given its ability to- explain
a wide range of psychological data. We've seen, however, that in the face of a nurnber of problems related to concept possession and reference determination, prototype
theoriJts are apt to fall back on the idea that concepts have classical cores. The result
is that the Prototype Theory may inherit some of the difficulties that motivated it in
the first place. This rnay be so, regardless of how strong the evidence is that concepts
have prototype shrrcfure.
Box 4
Summary
af Criticisms of the Prototype Theory
1. The Problem of Prototypical Primes

Typicality effects don't argue for prototype structure, since even welldefined concepts
exhibit typicality effects.
2. The Problem of Ignorance and Eror
Ignorance and error is as much a problem for the Prototype Theory as it is for the
Classical'llheory. Indeed, the problem is considerably worse for the Prototype Theory,
since concepts with prototype structure fail to cover highly atlpical instances and
incorrectly include non-instances.
3. The Miseing Proto$ryes Problem

Many concepts lack prototypes.
4. The Problem of Compositionality

The Prototype Theory does not have an adequate account of compositionality, since the
prototypes of cornplex concepts aren't generally a function of the prototypes of their
constituent concepts.
4. The Theory-Theory of Concepts

4.7. Tlwories, Fsplanations, and Conceptual Stntcture
In the past ten years or so, an increasing number of psychologists have gravitated to
a view in which cognition generally is assimilated to scientific reasoning. The analogy to science has many strands. One is to distance the theory of categorization from
early empiricist models, where categorization consisted of nothing more than a process of checking an instance against a list of sensory properties. Another is to liken
concepts to theoretical terms, so that philosophical heatments of theoreticd terms
can be recruited in psycholory. Yet another is to provide a characterization and explanation of conceptual c}ange along the lines of theory change in science. Within
the boundaries of these explanatory goals lies the Tlvory-Theory of Concepts.sT
the terminology here is somewhat unforfunate, since 'Theory-Theory" is also used in reference to a
speciftc account of how people are able to athibute mental states to one another. The view is that they
have an intemalized theory of mind. See, e.8., Wellman (1990).
ST.
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Science
45
don't want to have to settle this dispute here, so we'll opt for a more permissive
understanding of theories. For our purposes, the point to focus on is that a concepfs
identity is determined by its role within a theory.
Now there would be little to argue about if the claim were merely that concepts
are embeddei in explanatory schemas of sorts. Few would deny this. The interesting
daim is that a concept's identity is constifuted by its role in an explanatory schema.
To put this claim in a way that brings out its relation to other theories of concepts,
we can say that according to the Theory-Theory concepts are structured mental
representations and that their structure consists in their relations to other concepts
specifted by their embedding theories. Notice that put this way the Theory-Theory
can't appeal to the Containment Model of conceptual structure. For any two conqepts
that participate in the same mental theory, the struchre of each will include the otheu
but if the ftrst contains the second, the second can't contain the ftrst. What this shows
is that the Theory-Theory is partial to the Inferential Model of structure. Concepts
are individuated in virfue of the inferences they license based on their role in the
theories that embed them.
When it comes to concept application, the Theory-Theory appeals to the structure
of a concept, just as the Classical Theory and the Prototype Theory do. Generally,
psychologists haven't been explicit about how the mechanism works, but their
remarks about how they view scientiftc terms places them squarely in a hadition that
is familiar from the philosophy of science (see, e.8., Kuhn- t962; Sellars t956; and
Lewis tg7l, t972). On this account the meaning of a theoretical term is determined
by its role in a scientific theory. This can be given as a de{inite description that characterizes the role that the term plays in the theory.6o Then the referent of the term is'
whatever unique entity or kind satisftes the description.6r
One advantage of the Theory-Theory is in the'models of categorization that it
encourages. Many psyc-hologists have expressed dissatisfaction with earlier theories
of concepts on the grotrnds that they tail to incorporate people's tendency toward
essentialist thinking-a view that Douglas Medin and Andrew Ortony (1959') have
dubbed psychological essentialism. According to psychological essentialism, people
are apt to view category membership for some kinds as being less a matter of an
instance's exhibiting certain observable properties than the item's having an appropriate internal structure or some other hidden property. For instancg we all recognize
ihe humor in the Warner Brothers cartoons involving Pepe LePew. In these sketches,
a delicate and innocent black female cat is subjected to the inappropriate attention of
a gregarious male skunk when she accidentally ftnds herself covered head to toe by
"
stripe of whitg n3in1. The joke of course, is that she isn't a skunk, even lhough to all
appeiuances she looks like one. As most people see it, what makes something a skunk
isn't the black coat and white marhtrgs, but rather having the right biological history,
or the right genetic make-up.
Ifs not just adults who think this. Prompted by an interest in the development of
essentialist thinkitrg, a number of psychologists have investigated its emergence in
60. See kwis's pape$, in partiarlar, for an account based on the work of Frank Ramsey (192911990) which
shows how one can provide definite descriptions for theoretical terms when their meanings iue interdeftned.
61. An altemative actounb which theory-theorists generally haven't explore4 is to say that much of the
content of a concept is given by its role in cognition but that its referent is determined independently, perhaps by a causal relation that concepts bear to items in the world. Cf. trnro-factor conceptual role theories in
philosophy, such as Block (r9s6l.
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a)uarnel
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Science
47
Alison Gopnik puts it, "scientists and children both employ the same particularly
powerful and flexible set of cognitive devices. These devices enable scientists and
children to develop genuinely new knowledge about the world around them" (1996,
p. 486; see also Gopnik and Meltzoff r997).In other words, cognitive development
and theory change (in science) are to be understood as two facets of the very same
phenomenon.
In sum, the Theory-Theory appears to have a number of important advantages.
By holding that concepts :ue individuated by their roles in mentd theories, theorytheorists can tie their account of concepts to a realistic theory of categorization-one
that respects people's tendency toward essentialist thinking. They also can address a
variety bf developmental concerns, characteriang cognitive development in terms of
the principles relating to theory change in science. Despite these attractions, however, the Theory-Theory isn't without problems. Some shouldn't be too surprising,
since they've cropped up before in other guises. Yet the Theory-Theory also raises
some new and interesting challenges for theorizing about concepts.
Box 5
The Theory-Theory
Concepts are representations whose structure consists
specified by a mentd theory.
in their
relations
to other concepts
as
4.2. Problems for the Theory-Theory

The Problem of Ignorance and Enor Lefs start with the Problem of Ignorance and
Error. Does it affect the Theory-Theory too? [t certainly does, and in several ways.
For starters, we've seen that theory-theorists typically allow that people can have
rather sketchy theories, where the "essence placeholdey'' for a concept includes relatively little information. Notice, however, that once this is granted, most concepts are
going to encode inadequate information to pick out a correct and determinate extension. If people don't represent an essence for birds, apart from some thin ideas about
genetic endowment, then the siune goes for dogs, and bears, and antelopes. In each
case, the theory in which the concept is embedded looks about the same. People have
the idea that these creatures have some property in virfue of which they fall into their
respective categories, but they don't have much to say about what the property is.
How, then, will these concepts come to pick out their respective extensions?
When we faced a comparable problem in the context of the Prototype Theory, the
natural solution was to rely on a Dual Theory that posited classical cores. If prototypes don't determine reference (because of the Problem of Ignorance and Error), then
perhaps that isn't their job; perhaps they should be relegated to identification procedures. Within the context of the Theory-Theory, however, the analogous move is
something of a strain. As we've noted, the Theory-Theory is generally understood to be about considered acts of categorization and hence is itself most naturally
conshrued as giving the structure of conceptual cores. In any event, it's not likely that
appealing to the Classical Theory can help, since it too faces the Problem of lgnorance and Error.
A lack of represented information isn't the only difficulty for the Theory-Theory.
In other cases, the problem is that people represent incorrect information. A simple
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"1"1ttrd"tt"
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1u1od aules
aql ?upl
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r;ag olq o/vq ro Jallaq aspJ u aqurodroJu! il8Fu auoaruos lsql s1 alduexa
aruassa
s1p8rery pue
aruernrl gt
Science
49
beliefs. The dternative suggestion is that people need only have similar concepts.
That is, the suggestion is to concede that differences in belief yield distinct concepts
but to maintain that two concepts might be similar enough in content that they
would be subsumed by the sarne psychological generalizations.
Suppose, for instance, that your theory of animals says that animals are entirely
physical entities while your friend's theory of animals says that some animals (Perh"pt humans) have nonphysical souls. This might mean that you don't both- Possess
the same concept eNna,rl. Still, by hypothesis, you both possess concepts with similar
contents, and t[ough shictly speaking they aren't the same, they are similar enough
to say that they are both animal-concepts. Let's call the'problem of explaining how
the content of a concept can remain invariant across changes in belief, or how two
people with different blhef systems can have concepts with the same or similar coniu"t, the koblem of Stability. The suggestion that is implicit in many psychological
discussions is that strict content stability is a misguided goal. Really what matters is
content similarity. As Smith et al. (I9s4) put it, "[T]here is another sense of stability,
which can be equated with similarity of mental contents (e.g., inteqpersonal stability'
in this sense t"fets to situations where two people can be judged to have similar
mental contents) ..." (p. 26e).
As tempting as this strategy may be, it's not as easy to maintain as one might have
thought. The diffiarlby is that the notion of content similarity is usually unpacked in a
way that presupposes a prior notion of content identity (Fodor and Lepore T992).
Consider, for instance, Smith et al.'s explanation. They proPose that two concepts are
similar in content when they have a sufficient number of the same feafures. Moreover,
they point out that subiects tend to cite the same properties in expelments where they
are asked to list characteristics of a category. Following Rosch and others, they take this
to be evidence that people's concepts, by and large, do incoqporate the same feafures.
The consequence is supposed to be that people's concepts are highly similar in content.
But notice the structure of the argument. Feafures are themselves contentful rePresentations; they are just more concepts. Smith et al.'s reasoning, then, is that two
concepts are similar in content when their structure implicates a sufficient number of
with the same content. But if these other concepts have to share the same
cot
"epts then that's to say that the notion of content similarity is building upon the
content,
notion of content identity; the very notion that content similarity is supposed to replace is hidden in the explanation of how two concepts could be similar in content.
al.'s proposal is hardly idiosyncratic. Content similarity is

generally understood in terms of overlapping sets of features. But again feature sets
ian't overlap unless they have a certain number of the same features, that i9, representations with the same content. And if they have representations with the same
content, then one might as well admit that concepts have to have the same content
(not similar content), despite differences in belief. This brings us full circle.
The scope of this problem hasn't been absorbed in the cognitive science community, so perhaps it pays to consider another proposed solution. Here's one owing to
Lance Ripr (f-ggS). He suggests that we think of concepts as being individuated
along fu; dimensions, One is a mental theory; the other, a formally specified mental
symbol. So the concept Doc is a formally individuated mental representation taken
together with a colleition of contentful states that incorporate salient information
about dogs. Rips likens his model to a Dual Theory of concepts, but one that incorporates neithei a classical core nor a prototype-based identiftcation procedure. The
advantage of the model is supposed to be that without postulating deftnitions for
Wh"t" more, Smith et
,4
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05
Science
51
The "Mysteries of Science" Prohlem Not all theory-theorists daim that cognitive
development mimics patterns in the history of science but among those that do,
another problem is specifying the mechanism responsible for cognitive development.
Alison Gopnik and Andrew Meltzoff take up this burden by claiming that the very
same mechanism is responsible for both scientiftc theory change and cognitive development. Yet this raises a serious difficulty: The appeal to science isn't informative if
the mechanisms of theory change in science are themselves poorly understood.
Unfortunately, this is exactly the situation that we seem to be in. Gopnik and
Meltzoff do their best to characterize in broad terms how one theory comes to give
way to another in science. Some of their observations seem right. For instance,
theories are often protected from recalcitrant data by ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses,
and these eventually give way when an intense period of investigation uncovers
more recalcitrant data alongside a superior alternative theory. But how do scientists
arrive at their new theories? Gopnik and Meltzoff have little more to say than that
this is the "mysterious logic of discovery" (1997, p.40). And what is distinctive
about the transition from one theory to another? Here they emphasize the role of
evidence and experimentation. It too is "mysterious, but that it plays a role seems
plain" Q. aO). We don't doubt that experimentation is at the heart of science but
without articulated accounts of how transitions between scientific theories take place
it simply doesn't help to claim that scientific and cognitive development :ue one and
the same. Saying that two mysterious processes are really two facets of a single process is suggestive, but it hardly dispels either mystery. In other words, it's simply
misleading to cite as an advantage of the Theory-Theory that it solves the problem
of cognitive development when the mechanism that is supposed to do all the work is
as intractable as the problem it's supposed to explain.
Like the other theories we've discussed so far, the Theory-Theory has substantial
motivation and a number of serious cJrallenges. Though it does well in explaining
certain types of categorization iudgments, it has trouble in allowing for stability
within the conceptual system and in accounting for the referential properties of concepts. This isn't to say that there is no analogy between concepts and theoretical
terms. But it does call into question whether the Theory-Theory can provide an adequate account of the nature of concepts.
Box 6
Summary of Criticisms of the Theory-Theory

1. The Problem of lgnorance and Emor
It is possible to have a concept in spite of its buirg tied up with a deftcient or erroneous
mental theory.
2. The Problem of Stability

The content of a concept can't remain invariant across changes in its mental theory.
3. The 'Mysteries of Science" Problem

The mechanisms that are responsible for the emergence of new scientiftc theories and for
the shift from one theory to another are poorly understood.
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aruarnrl
Z,S
Science
53
might hold, for example, that the structure of the concept nep embodies the condition
that something can't be red without being colored. What makes this a partial deftni
tion is that this much structure encodes only a necessary condition an4 at any rate,
doesn't specify a sufficient condition for something's falling under the concept.
Though the appeal to partial definitions may be viewed bV some as something of
a cop-out, the situation isn't that lexical semanticists are iust trying to put a happy
face on Plato's Problem. Rather, neoclassical theorists begin with a variety of interesting linguistic phenomenon and argue that only concepts with neoclassical strucfure can explain this data. It may help to work through an example. Consider
Iackendoff's explanation of causative constructions-a fairly standard treatment in
the field of lexical semantics. Iackendoff's starting point is the observation that causatives exhibit a pronounced distributional pattern (T959 [chapter 13 in this volume],
P. 50).
(16) a. rkilledy+ydied
b. rlifted y+ yrose
c.
d.
rBavezto y + yreceivedz
x persuaded y that P + y came to believe that
Now these inferences could all be treated as having nothing to do with one another.
But they are strikingly similar, and this suggests that they have a conrmon explanation. |ackendoff's suggestion is that the meaning of a causative implicates a proprietary e'rent and that, under this assumption, the pattern of inferences can be
explained by introducing a single rule that covers all these cases, namely,
(TT)
Xcause Eto occur
+ Eoccur
For instance, the proper analysis of (f6d) is supposed to be r cause [y calne to

believe that PJ. This analysis, taken in conjunction with the inference rule (I7) implies
y me to believe that P. In the present context, however, this is just to say that
the concept pERsuADE has structure. cAUsE ro BELTEvE gives a partial definition of pERsuADE.
There may be more to persuading someone that P than causing them to believe P,6E
but at least this provides a necessary condition for the application of pERsuADE. Moreover, this necessary condition is one that is evidenced in the distributional pattem of
English illustrated by (16a)-(16d).
The causatives are just one example of how the Neoclassical Theory frnds support in
Iinguistic phenomena. Neoclassical structure has also been invoked to explain a variety
of data connected with polysemy, syntactic altemations, and lexical acquisition.6e
In philosophy, too, neoclassical strucfure is taken to have explanatory support.
Some of the data at stake include people's intuitions about the application of a concept. Georges.Rey, for example, claims that Quine's arguments against the analyticsynthetic distinction are flawed and holds, as a consequence, that
it is an open
question how we .ue to understand what he calls the analytic data. The analytic data
68. For example, suppose you fall down the stairs when you are walking just a bit too fast. This might lead
an observer to believe that one should approach the stairs with caution. Yet, intuitively, you didn't persuade the observer of this; you merely caused him to believe it.
69. On polysemy, see |ackendoff (rgA9) on syntactic alternations and lexical acquisition, see Pinker (19E9).
For a useful collection that shows the scope of contemporary lexical semantics, see Levin and Pinker
(rggrb).
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fla8rel
-o"n-1""ldrt aHI 'froaql IErlssBI) aql a^rasard ol arlsep due ,o luaPuadapur

s1 ltroaql lerlss?lroaN aql rot uorlentlou a{l lng 'suoHlugaP PHred ol luarqlunuor
sll Jo asnpraq froaql IE TssBIJ aql qllâ figge uP set{ froaq; PrIssEIroaN aqJ.
uolllu$eP
oz-alplmllre ol lpcllJ1p flaula4xa are leql salru lpel sa^lolul
aql lprll Fn[ s;r luorllu!1ap pluBd E lseal lE ro 'll? raup uonrugaP P aAPq zteu lDoa
-rMorsr ss qrns ldaeuor y'sldaruoJ rno Suoure suog?lar angnllFuol pelJar lbql lPtll
&oaql aW /tq patneldxa Faq are suoplqul eqfpue aql !8rel pue fq '1eql sl ra^rsue
r,f"X .(Sg -d-,g66Tj ,,1s1uaru8pn[ s,aldoad q suonraford PuP sruaged aql sule1dxa
lerl^ :xelufs lnoqu pDlss flsuroq) 1eql uollsanb aqt fprexa araq {s? ol Paau n[M],,
os sl qq1 fqm ;o utuojql P Paau arvr feg q tulelf, 1,f,t1 tuoglqul s!{l aÊq aldoad
lerll ll si r(,{rtn Jallaq arul palJllsnl (lsnt) aq l,uer a8palnnoul ?rrot sll alulrardde o1
,roitt pallar;4 irr-aldoad lsoru '(g 'ras aas) aldruexa ranpg e Sulruag uodn 'alduexa
rog .ldaruoJ e 8uy(;sp?s rot suoqlpuoJ a^llnlnsuor eql lnoqe quaulEpn[ rno tuaJuor
q1o8rz61 pue
aruarrul
vg
Science
55
They are interested, instead, in grammatically relevant aspects of word meaning. For
instance, when Steven Pinker claims that his "deftnitions" aren't intended to capture
all of a verb's meaning, we take it that his point is that he isn't aiming to provide
a complete characterization of the concept that the verb encodes. Understandably,
given his interest in nafural language, his focus is on those aspects of conceptual
stmcture that are manifested in grammatical processes. His slots for "bits of [realworld knowled gel" are a gesture toward the larger proiect outside of the study of
grammar, yet this is a project that Pinker is under no obligation to pursue. Iane
Grimshaw is perhaps even dearer on this point. For example, she states that the
words "do'and 'tat," or "melt" and "freeze," are qrnon5rmous. She doesn't mean
senses of the term, they have the same content. The point is
rather that they have the same content insofar as content has grammatical influence.
"Linguistically speaking pairs like these are synonyms, because they have the same
structure. The differences between them are not visible to the language" (unpublished
by this that, in all
ffis., p. 2). These remarks indicate a circumscribed yet sensible research program.
Grimshaw is concerned with conceptual structure, but only from the point of view of
its effects on gramrnar. Grammatically relevant structure she calls semantic shucture;
the rest she calls semantic content. "semantic strucfure has linguistic life semantic content does not" (p. Z).
Still, those of us who are interested in the nature of concepts can't be so indifferent
to the Problem of Completers. Either partial deftnitions are fleshed out or they are
not. If they are, then the problems associated with the Classical Theory return. If they
are not, then we are left without an account of how concepts apply to their instances.
What makes it the case that Doc applies to all and only dogs? The fact that the concept incorporates the feature ANIrvrArE may place a constraint on an explanation-Doc
can only apply to animates-but it is a constraint that is far too weak to answer the
question.
The Problem of lgnorance and
Error
Because so many neoclassical theorists shy away
from defending comprehensive theories of concepts, it's hard to say whether their
theories are subject to the Problem of Ignorance and Error-a problem that we've
seen crops up for just about everyone else. Among those neoclassical theorists who
expect to complete their partial deftnitions, it's likely that they would have as much
trouble with ignorance and error as classical theorists have. This is one respect in
which the Neoclassical theory may be on the same footing as its predecessor. In both
cases, there is the strong danger that the structure of a concept will encode insufficient information, or erroneous information, and so won't be able to fix the concept's
reference.
Still, some neoclassical theorists may have views on reference determination that
aren't readily assimilated to the Classical Theory. R"y |ackendoff's work in this area
stands out. For while his theory is sensitive to grammatical indices of conceptual
structure, it doesn't stop short with what Grimshaw calls semantic strucfure. |ackendoff's theory is about the nafure of concepts. What's more, the shuCfure that he takes
concepts to have, in addition to their necessary conditions, isn't just a tluowback to
the Classical Theory. He has a number of interesting suggestions about other aspects
of conceptual structure.
We won't be able to review all of his innovations, but one seems especially pertinent. IacJcendoff asks the question of how to distinguish between the lexical entries
;I:
slspoaql adfioqord fuBru se 'rfuoar11 FnO ag Jo uolsra^ e ldarru ol ilr'^^ PFo^^ goPu'pst ryql
-moq ,Fflqnop s;I 'suolreluasardar O-g ry8Fu os 'anrara;ar auluuapp l,uop faq qSnoql ue a sldaruor;o
amlpu aql to ilEd aq IIHs tr{8pu sa&Qoprd se 1sn['8uorm fprqua sr froaql aql lst$ des otr l,usl q4tllvt 'Zl
B ol drepudord are 1eql saruaraJu! Jo strrailpd ssarf,p ol pasoddns are sarnluet asaql
'sarnleal plag rprrnuas a^pq qdaeuor PJIxal aql rp$a,t o1 EulprouE sJlluauas IErIxal
q sluaurnSrp allpluasardar aruos o1 uopea[qo prlSolopoqlau B ssmslp fg"pq ilm
ar'a lnq 'araq ilos aql to Sulqytue apprord l,w) aM 'Euatuouaqd r11sp8u1l to toq e ,o
uollErreldxa-paq aql go ped sl arnlf,ruls p)IssplJoau rarpaqrn to uoqenleâ q8noroql
e arpbar ppo^^ froaql aql to uopsnlpâ Ury B 'sI lpt11 'BIBP aql spatu l! lrtoq uo
ol 'sn1e1s qr 'spo8 fropueldxa to ps asra^JP B /tq Pap^nour
?quaw?S nt ualqoq ssattaA etll
stuq
,luaqxa a8re1 B
q froaql lprlssslroaN aql aruls
sempe]
neg
fldruls sl lrBJ spn ol arqsnf op l,upJ lpql sldaruor to froaql _y 'sra8q

'are d",11 'sra8q oulqp 'ssap1lool 'aruel 'pa88al- rno
ol
aq"r.aqenbapeul
pazyt&orar
'ssalaqlauou
.lrsJ slql alppardde flJpear a1doa; 'auo a{[
{ool ol IIeJ uosear ra aleqm ro; feul
[p)ag
asoo8 p pue 'auo aq l,upaau asooS E salqruasar dlSuoqs lptp letrlus uB 'aJuelsul JoC
'uon?lualardar ppeds aql /tq pagpads sagradord aql 8uy$sgss poqlpn ldgcuor aql
rapun [st upD Sulqlaruos pup 'trdaeuor aql rapun 8,r{I"J lnorfiIm uoHsluagardar ppuds
aql ,(q pagpads sapradord aql fysges uer Sulqlauos 'l,uq arqrruls adflolord lr.tlt
uospar aurus aql qrnru rot pup lsBl aql ol dn 1,us1 arqrruls qJns 'r{p1etrntrrctun
'ldacuoJ P Japun
geJ sSuql rplrlm saururrapp arqrruls tugpsar ag 1eql pue 'suoplpuor fressarau
roJ salqpal ilarualddns suop?luasardar pqeds lptll $ Sutureilalua are a/n uopsaSSns
ar11 '(?I alou aas) uollezlJoSagec lpJlplran Jo saspJ uro{ uonuzlJoSapa snoauo[a to
saler pude 8q1pd fq 'umummu u 1e-suFrparu ro uolsuptulp alp?truou B arnldue o1
spaau sldaruol ro froaql e leg $ a{els ls s,l?ql\A 'lugod arfi aplsaq ar? fpar suoll?A
-rasar asa{l lng 'aruaratar Jo uoHou aql tuog rleme saqs l(gerauaS Pw sJllueuas
rnaroaql-qlrul prp^ ol apnlgls alqe8au E sstl Jtopua{ref 1eg q ualqord aq1 'rBaP
ssal sl uollpuFruapp aruaratar Jo sansq qll/vt pauuoJ ol pasoddns s! rvral^ aql /noq
'pusq raqlo aql uo 'rEalr sruaas sldaruor Prlxal to /vlal s,JtoPua>puf sl sltn lsql
srlluswas lerlxal Jo aPPq PUP Pols
aql ars l?r{l sarnl"at auppunu arow ar{l ol uoHIPPP uI PPotlI cl-g B salProdrorur lEr{l
arnpruls B aABq spafqo roy sldaJuor prlxa] 'ssardxa spro lptll sldaeuoJ aql lnoqe
^
ltgear s! /nap s,Jopualrpf truril 1r a{H arvr 'sSu.nrearu pro^ uo q ar]{ qseqdrua _aql
qlinoql '(IOZ'd'tg61 ttopuilpsfl ,,ol[ qool pafqo uB qrns 1eqlra 8up'aorq yed u;
sallolul treafqo pr;sfqd p salouap l?rn prom e lo Supeau aqq SuyrroY{,, letll YaPI aql
to uogproqpla ue s! /troaql s,tJopuapef 'aruassa u! 1nq 'uopsluasardar pgeds palee
-lpqdos s sJ laPou O-g V '(786I rrPI I Jo sauq aq1 Suole Poolsrapun) IaPou O-f e
punore pazgeSro uollprruoJul pqeds apnpq sprom pafqo rot saFlya lurlxal aql letll
i1 uo1trsa88ns aAIlEual[B s,JJopua)ps[ '(W 'd '696I) ,,arnleeJ pnldaruoe aleurgfal
B olq ll a{pu l,usaop l(ldurs uolssardxa plo due punore sla{rprq ;o 4ed B Pup uBIs
e trnd oL,, )JirN DNor+ ,,asoo8,, prre xJirN 9No'r- seq ,,{Jnp,, t! sE lou s,ll lPJnsqB
-l+
s! arqea, puolllppe a18u!s ? ol padsar Wyn raJtlp f,",11 letll uo1pa88ns a{l gopuapef
rog ls8uruparu luaraJtlp a^Bq o^q aql sa{pu lprl^^ lng 'NwrnHNoN PtrB s.wrtlrw se sarnl
-ee! prauaS qrns llgqxa qloq lpql ul arnpruls atups aql qtnu alpq spro/r^ asaql letll
salou aH,,'asoo8,, pw,,{Jnp,, ss qJns ugeaul q PalPPr dpsop eJP letg sPJofr^ rot
s1p8re;rq puP
etuarnsf
gS
Science
57
particular fteld. For instance, concepts with a feature indicating the field "spatial localion and motion" may license one body of inferences, while a feature indicating the
field "scJreduling of activities" may license another. Such differences are suPPosed to
account for distributional patterns where lexical items that have similar meanings
nonetheless permit distinct and characteristic inferences.
Ray Jackend off, for example, argues for the existence of semantic field feafures on
the basis of the following evidence, labeled according to four proposed fields (Jack-
endoff 1989, p.
a.
b.
c.
Spatial locatian and mation

The bird went from the ground to the tree.
The bird is in the tree.
Harry kept the bird in the cage.
i.
ii.
iii.
Passession
i.
ii.
iii.
The inheritance went to PhiliP.

The money is Philip's.
Susan kept the money.
of properties
'lsription
i. The light went/changed from green to red.
ii.
d.
37):
Harry went from elated to depressed.

The light is red.
Harry is depressed.
Sam kept the crowed happy.
Scheduling of actioities
The meeting was cJranged from Tuesday to Mond"y.
iii.
i.
ii.
iii.
The meeting is on Monday.

Let's keep the trip on Saturday.
The intuition that is the basis of laclendoff's argument is that "go," "be," and "keep"
are polysemous whereby, in a given semantic field, each verb has a different though
similar meaning to the one it has in any other semantic field. "The go sentences each
express a change of some sort, and their respective terminal states are described by
thi correspondin g be sentences. The keep sentences all denote the causation of a state
that endures over a period of time. One has the sense, then that this variety of uses
is not accidental" (1989, p. 37).lackendoff's suggestion is that these infuitions ought
to be taken seriously and that the way to do this is by introducing two degrees of
freedom. First, the similarities of meaning can be capfured under the assumPtion that
the similar items are associated with partially identical representations. Second, the
differences in meaning can be captured under the assumption that their associated
representations differ with respect to a constituent that picks out a semantic fteld.
ttiis constituent may then interact with inference rules that explain why a single
word licenses different inferences depending on its context.
To take an exarnple, Jackendoff's representation for the "keep" verbs all share this
much strucfure:
(1)
lEvent
CAUSE ([rr,ing x],
[s.,"r,t
STAY ([ ], I
DD]
The way we are to understand the notation is that the word 'teep" expresses a function (labeled "CAUSE") that takes two .rguments (one labeled "Thing," the other
-qns ssardxr ,'ql suo'quasardar l,tualul qpq aJP ,,gSn\D,, PuP ,,lua^+, O,t'qdttiJ::tll;{Tilili"i:
po opld uo11q;r s,ttopua:lDp[ le$ sual! eql Jo ge 'frequor aql uo 'qdaruoa are spldec fq paleuttsap
'sdur 1leurs to asn Jno salquta6ar
srual! aq1
dpo
pt11
Suquqt o$l paFgu aq l,uom srapuar adoq
3railq lqdsr to asn slq aruls qm1uor
aptr11
a1y1
e aq ,tuur qrlqrt^ uollslou s,goPua{JP[ Paqqu!"ur
a^PM 'gl
'eunuagP sloPo{ lnoqe Pa!ilo^ aq PFor1s t;oPuaPef

,tq- uossar ou aas a,rt aroJs slql uo prre 'auo leefoppoqlaT aql s! anssl rfreurrd aql
tanarnoq ,sasodrnd ;uasard ro{ 'lsaralq lsotu aql Jo uollsanb aql 'flalerunp 'sl:aml
-sal plag rJlupruas sele lldq 1eql arqrruls _Jetlsselroau a^Pq sqra^ raqlo Pf ,,daar;
-lqfp
s! aq ra{laqM 'luaurnSre ;o f8aprls s,ttopuolref ul Pamsp fpuaraq{l
lpril
Suiqpir sr araql lpql ,vrorls ol arllJns ny'r 11 'uopea[qo pr;SoloPoqlau e Supq sHI
'Es
.d,g661ropog)
sz(urvrp
suparu
l! asnuJaq pJoAIun q,asnvJ, letl! fes o1 parpbar
,?ffifr
rapro u1 'se lsnl :dm1 suuaru sfervtp ll asnEraq
sl tJopua>1le{ ,ssarSar aql plone
-1ou ol
f.ltw, ,;daa>tr, trsr os ua{l 'amlmtls IsrlssePoau 8ur
6"i"tt sl ,d""+ lsrll ltus
-^pr{ sll lnoqll^ splag rnusruas ssorre SuJuearu q! urelar tIEr lsnYJ JI ?ueq raqlo aql
uO :lqflIs q pua ou qlp^ 'suogrugap eroru prt alepllsod ol a sq il,arrr 'sluaqllsuor
Supgap sl! rct up8e dn sdore ualqord aruss aql uaq/n ua{l bt il luoHlultaP e seq ool
ll lpril Suguplsod ztq lgqeeonrun s,ssnvr upldxa ol e/n are lng ?snvr 't?tl.ll raqlo
A.ro*r" ?o ,q{sroalun aq1 uodn spuadap_ ,,daa1,, to /qIProAIun arn oS '8ulrreau sl1
ua$ '1xaluoe /nau E u! rrlDo faql atuH
;o /tue ulepr o1 uodn pallal aq l,uplnoJ ,,daa1
rfuana Eurueau Jlaql aSueqr DNIHI ptre $mll 'aldurexa rc, 'll'sPlalJ tHtrBtues ssoJJB
pJollun aq sallasnrag lsnu sluanlqsuoJ rllupuas sl! 'splag JlluPruas ssorf,P Supeaur
sll to ilBd ulEer otr ,,daa1,, a{{ qra^ e rc! lsql peJ aql s! ElrrutapP aql to arrnos a{I
-sttolpler8 dldruls s! arqrruls
F Isselroau Jo uorleplsod aql_ asla ro ssarSar ssalPua
uB salloû! ll raqllA 'sunua[p ? sluortuoJ uollpupldxa ;o adfi slql asnsraq aJqeat
ppg rlluetuas p pup apldulal qra^ B to uolpera1u1 a$ /tq roy Paluno)re aq l,wr
Itruisflod pql q luarun8re slopod 'flsnoro8ra saqsnd 1966I) roPog fuaf leql auo
uoq"uepxi ;o adl(1 sql rfll^{ palplross? sr 1e{l uolpafqo prfoloPoqlau aql
s1
-pal prag f,llrr'uas luarattp ul'ruor suollptuasardar paq"rrorr"t?"ll"l?"::;"tiill

p,iljrip are daql lprll lualxa aql ol :(l) '/tlaupu tpldural lernpruls 8uy(papun atues
aql are{s faql asnpraq sl sgl :rplF4s are daql lpql lualxa aql oI '8u1ueaur q lua
-raJJIp pue repuls qloq ruaas ,dee>1,, ro saruarrrpJo paralJlp aq1 ltSnn ,o uolleueldxa
r,gop.rbp"1 ipqdxi sa{pru uonelou s$ll rnot{ $ uo afa rnof daal ol SuHl aql
-
'[OUIS
IIHI
sqqtD
t((acvr iIHr NI """ldl
AVIS
ruaâl
'[AUUVH 8"!'q) Fn"dsgSnVJ
r*"E
(r)
:(H-P) 'alualuas aldrues P ro,
araq auop aA,aM sE 'salqsupl aql ul
8ulftl sa4nbar sarualuas a{l to uolleroq?P nry V
t(( I t D AVIS rua al {r tunrl) '*dASnVJ tue rl (g)

t(( I 1 D,wfS ila sl {r 8"ur1; rneasqsnvJ ruaâl (Z)
:,,AS1V),, uo ldpesqns a{l llq paprlpq aq ol
uaamlaq aruarafllP aql snql'sPqq uoglunt aql
(gfe) u1
q (H-q) u1
,,daa1,,
,,daa1,,
PuP
aq uaql feru sPPg rlluauaS
uo qd;rf,sqns s?
PalaqBD uolpury
Pal?rlPul
'''L,AVIS,,
B oluo (,,1uana, PaPqs[
parunSre Puof,as aq1 alaqrr '(,,1uan1, PaPqPp anpn
?
lasll
s1
q1o8reyr1 puP
aJuarne"I gg
Science
59
As we see it, Jackendoff should take hold of the second horn. He should admit that,
in principle, a word can retain aspects of its meaning across semantic ftelds without
having neoclassical structure. That is, just as cAUsE retains its meaning, so might
"keep." But iust because this is the case in principle doesn't mean that the best explanation requires that one withhold the postulation of neoclassical strucfure. If one has
an explanatory reason to invoke neoclassical structure in some cases (but not all),
then the postulation of such stmcfure isn't the least bit gratuitous. Nor need it lead to
a regress. The reason for saying that "keep" has structure needn't be applicable at all
levels of representation. Maybe it simply isn't valid once one gets to the level of the
concept cAUsE. In short, polysemy doesn't require neoclassical structure, but there
may still be an explanatory advantage to posfulating the structure. It remains for
Jackendoff to demonstrate this explanatory advantage. The main point, however, is
that there is no a priori reason to think that there isn't one.
In general, the merits of postulating neodassical shucfure depend upon the
explanations that prove the most tenable for a variety of data-not just evidence of
polysemy, but also data concerning slmtactic phenomena, lexical acquisition, and our
intuitions about the constitutive relations among concepts.Ta We see no reason why
neoclassical structure shouldn't be implicated to explain these things, but iust because
it is doesn't mean we've been given a full account of the nature of concepts. How
partial definitions are to be filled in and how their application is to be determined
remain to be seen.
Box 8
Summary of Criticisms of the Neoclassical Theory
1. The Problem of Completers

If partial deftnitions are tumed into full definitions, then the Neoclassical Theory has all
the problems that are associated with the Classical Theory. If, instea4 they are left
incomplete, then the Neoclassical Theory has no account of reference determination.
2. The Problem of lgnorance and Emor

Supplementing neoclassical structure with 3-D models won't help in accounting for
reference determination.
3. The Regresa Problem for Seurantic Fields

Neoclassical structure can't explain how a word retains aspects of its meaning across
different semantic fields. Either its conceptual constituerrts must themselves have
neodassical structure, and so on, or else no structure is needed at all.
6.
Conceptual Atomism
6.7.
Concepts Without Shucture
All of the theories that we've covered so far disagree about the strucfure of concepts,
but that most concepts have strucfure-especially lexical concepts-is an assump74. We've postponed the discussion of the latter until sec. 6.2, where we contrast neoclassical and atomistic accounts of the analytic data.
sr' ruq'"."os
.sassaldxa r dpadorr
l
"*uit#,,*X#l"11lln:il
'j,
ffi"[]Ti,T J:l;ffi ::["il
op nout pue ratll rano flgua aql ol Mo) ldaruoe aq1 dldde nol( '/[ss ol_s,leql 'Peor
aql puoltaq 1sn[ ppg aql q r'ror E aas nolt {qql nor[ pue '[88o1ltQ e sdeqrad ?q8p
'alqs
rypp p s,ll 'rood arp suoplpuoe Suynap uaqm uollenlls u 'aruelsul Jot '"rf"I
-llal 'uosBar Jalaluq/n roy 's1 ldaeuor e lo uoll"JllddB snoauoila uP aJaq A uog"nlls ?
q puq sql to aspr prspuels aql 'uorsualxe sl! ul lou are ;eql s8u1q1 Jo paJta alqellar
e sr ldaruoJ p araq/vr saspr 1o dlarrel B a.Is arag pazptoear z(1aplm sl sV 'uoHeuuoJul
uerfi lualuoJ leluaru ol arou q araql lng 'sassardxa 11 firadord aql Inoqe uolleuuoln
frree ldaeuor e p{l sarJnbar 'ropod roJ ?ueluor leluaur oS 'ls4t aql lnoqe uopeuiloJ
-ur frrer ol pJes s! puof,as ag taqloue to asnpr alqpllar ? s! luaâ to ad/Q auo araqM
'suoqBlarror alqsllar to railpw e z(geags?q q uonoutotul '$gfi a:lEar6 aas) luapor
Fuollpuuotur Jo salJads e q ilaluot lEuaru tpum o1 Sqprorrs 'uoHIPBq srllustuas
paspq-uoq?uuotul aql q flarenbs lunorre slopod sareld froaqt aql to qrnul sFlI
r'rpl IEsnP) E sl araql
s4'oura qdaruor aql rnF p4q e Sqaq;o flradord aql Suprauuo)
asnpJaq ?red q 'p4q f;radord ag1 sassardxa oue taqle1 'uo os PUP 'set{A,l 'rvruNrr
se sldaruor rpns ol uogplar ql fq uaag8 ag of l,uq oue ldatuor aql Jo $aluor aql
'alduexa rog 'ssardxa sua{ol 4ag sapradord aql pue sldaeuor Jo sa&Q uaamlaq
uorlf,arruof, f,lruou B sl uoHBIar lpsnPr aql toPod ro{ 'Plro/r aql q sSuql ol uoHslar
a^llpulrd u
Ipsner alepdordds up uJ Eulpuep s,ldaruor aql t(q pauluuapp sJ ldaeuof,
to lualuoe ag lsql eapl aql q froaql aql to ilsaq aql 'urerllnd pue a1dlry Jo salroaql
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'(1066I 'qO66I'V '[ 'ropog osle pas l[aurnlol sl{l uI ZT raldeqrl eOOet
'V'f topog aas) ppg aql q padoprrap Forrr aql Jo auo sI lI arugs 'droaql aruaPuad"O
rFpunufsv slopoJ asn illrn alt 'uogysodxa;o sasodrnd rog paqruua1ap q strdaruot
parnlrrulsun Jo aruarerar aql oq ;o froaql p q papaau s,lpWVI 'a{[ qool tusFuolv
^
Fqdaruo) to uolsral padolaaap B lprlt Suuapuom auo aneal feru sFII 'arnPruls ou
Wyn sldaruor qlsod lI 'aJnlrruls /troaql $pn sldaruor 11sod l,usaop ll pup 'arnlrnrls
adfloprd qlpa sldaeuoc 11sod l,usaop l! 'arnpruls lprlsselroau ro p)lssplr tlll/yl qdar
-uor lpod l,usaop ll '^ aln arrpe8au e ltla8rq q tusFuolv pnldaruo) ?alqs sV
'8uruearu Jo salroaql lsppdg.osap puge8e
urpqnd pue aldp) /tq uaa18 lsrg sluaurn8re aql q poddns pug slsluolu pqdaruor
'uonppe ul '(froaql adfloprd aql rot) /q[puonlsodutoe to saglmlttlp 8u1sodru1 aql
pue (froaql prlssplJ aq1 ro;) suonggap ,o )ppl aql /qplradsa 'sagoaql raqlo asa{l
jo sSqlIpJ aner8 nq ol a{gl ltaql 1eq ltq palenqou arp 'ralanôq 'us1tuo1V Fnldae
^
are sldaruor Jo sapoaql leql euaurouaqd
-uo) to srapuaJa6l 'ssarppp ol ua{q fgensn
raqlo aql Ip puD 'uogrspbre 'uoprzFoSalee to slunorrp ul paqurqdrul q leql arnlJruls
s,ldaruor B s,lr 'sapoaql Jaqlo u! 'lle JaUV lrar'rod froptruldxa fue ;o ura{l qor 1etn
l,uppoÂ 'sruole are faql tl tlle le arnlJn4s ou alpq sldaruor IEJIxal UBJ /!toH '&lpp
-anul :lrqs wrn 1atu saunauos s7'wsrwolv prydatwS II?J IIIrl arlA tlJltfivt 'ma1n SFII
rarqf, rur s ou aAEq s uo npr ua r"ru":T""rf" J#::t;"# i'T.flff :i :l;::::;::
s
r
;
aruapFa ag uo "' ,,leoo ldaruor aql to arnlJruls a{l q lpqlw,
s,ll
"lqBIIBne
ll lpql
:(paaoruar slseqdwa !77 'd'966I) 11 qnd ropo{ ,ftraf sV 'uogdurnsse sFn sa$ap
ltaql uon
u1 anbprn q ssmslp nlm arvr fetfi sldaruor Jo /ftoaql 1sEI aqJ 'arPqs
qlo8rery pue aruarne
09
Science
61.
so for understandable reasons-it looks like a cow. Nonetheless, ifs a horse; you've
misapplied your concept. That's to be expected in conditions like these since under
the conditions we are envisioning, the horse acfually looks like a cow. The result is
that your concept cow is the reliable effect of at least two causes: cows and horses. [f,
however, there is nothing more to content than information, we would not have a
case of error here at all, but rather a veridical application of a concept expressing the
disjunctive property cou, or harse. In philosophical circles, this issue has come to be
known as the Disjunction Problem.
Information-based semanticists have explored a number of ways to overcome the
Disjunction Problem. Fodor's solution is to claim that certain informational relations
are more basic than others and that this difference is what counts. His theory has two
parts:
(1) A concept-cow, for example-stands in a lawful relation, L, to the property it expresses, namely, cour.
(2) Other lawful relations involving cow , Lt-Ln, are aslmrmetrically dependent
upon the lawful relation between cow and cow. That is, L1-Ln wouldn't hold but
that L does, and not the other way around.
Thus the critical difference between the cowfcow law and the horsefcow law is that although both are reliable the first is the more fundamental: It would obtain even if the
horsefcow dependence did not, whereas the horsefcow dependence would not obtain
without the cowfcow dependence. That's why cow expresses the property cout and
not, as it might be, cow or horse.76
Notice that an advantage of the Asymmetric Dependence Theory is that it implies
that no representation that is associated with a concept is essential to its having the
content that it does. In principle, one might even have the concept cow without having the concept ANTMAL. AII that is required is that there be some mechanism or other
that secures the right mind-world relations. As a result, Concepfual Atomism is able
to sidestep some of the most persistent difftculties that confront other theories. For
instance, there needn't be a problem about ignorance and error. So long as cow is appropriately connected with cow (the properry), it doesn't matter what you believe
about cows. For muclr the same reason, there needn't be a problem about stability. So
long as cow continues to stand in the siune mind-world relation, variations in surrounding beliefs can have no effect on its content.TT
76. We should emphasize that Conceptual Atomism shouldn't be conflated with any partiorlar theory of
reference determination and its way of dealing with the Disjunction Problem. Ruth Millikan, e.g., makes use
of a theory that is similar to Fodorrs but which requires certain historical facts as well. "A substance concept
causally originates from the substance that it denotes. It is a concept of A, rather than B, not because the
thinker will always succeed in reidentifyttg A, never confusing it with B, but because A is what the thinker
has bem conceptually, hence physically, hacking and picking up information aboub and because the concept has been tuned to its present accuracy by causal interaction with either the members of A's speciftc
domain or with.rt itself, during the evolutionary history of the species or ttuough the leaming history of
the individual" (199s [cJrapter 23 'ryr this volumeL p. 63; see also Millikan l9&4r. For a useful overview of
theories of mental content, see Crane (1995').
77. To the extent that the mind-world relation is supported by varying sets of beliefs, these can be
thought of as forming an equivalence class. Each set is semantically the same as all the others since they all
converge on the sirme mind-world relatiory it's this relation however, and not the specific belief contents,
that determine a concepfs content.
'ESA arodal pu? roPo{t1g61 roPoJ)

sJllgpues rllslloq elqpua$m up aq oq pasoddns s! lpsar aql 'erP It? l"tll IIutPP ol Paf,rot s! auo lualuoa
.tusltuole
to
4aql to alnqllsuoJ are sldaruor Suoue suoll?lal atuos l?tfl slttrrPu auo aruo letll qq$ aH
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-qar ou lsnuop uB rot ,uorlauorul Fralqlor ssardxa fp.raru lpql asoql ulog lualuot rlaql to aAllnfHsuor
ol a^q l;rop sFlrudlp pnldaruol lst$ st ratllouv '9l
arg 1erll sldatuor Suoure suollelar aqg qs.mSwFp
'(os 'd
,69611 paurpal aq
l,upJ trl 'sr(es ay ?arqilulsun s1 ldatuoJ P J! s,,flPuoqlPuoJun,, luatu
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'appru are strdaruor tlrltlm
1no
JJnls aleuq aql lnoq? a_ruaPlla
Jo
aq loutrer asodurorap s8ulueatu
IBlrruJ sap!ôrd uolleSqsalur qtns ro1 'paluap
proll,r rpFlrt ol lualxa aql SuPu?lsraPun to aru?yodu4 aql 'aJuaPna aql to
'el?uuJ sl u\l) ldaruoe aql
luaussassB s,Jopod WF,r saar8e auo lou Jo laqlaw
leql sp salrplloJoJ alnmluualunoJ qJns 8urpn1eu1'artolradar pnldaruof, uPumrl
a1uuq arfl Jo ssauqrlr aql roJ 1rpt sp{l to suollerlldrq aql qllm Supn ilPls lsnu
aaa ,pa1sa88ns aq 'aroyeraql-alqesoduroJap lou arp s8uprearu Pro/\ lsotu luql
papnlJuol ?ruapyra luelalal frerodualuoJ aq1 Surssasse_JaryE 'ropog " "sauo
aleuq aql ar? qoqruds leluaw (pasodruorapuou) aaHlrspd aql ?qul ;o uftoaql
puog?lnduor aql ol Sulpromy 'r18ol alqeroxau! lnq qsreq ag lno slulod "'
ol progs louuer "' r(8o1oqrlts4
ropod .srpueuas IpJIxal Jo /ftoaql E lnoqlp op
,ft'd'eT66Il
arnpruls prydaeuor roJ paau arfl puatap ltaql uaq/n aJualJs arrgluSor q aldoad
ltueru Jo, {pads ralurd uana$ pue u!â'l Wag 'alduexa roJ 'dpppb os Pass$IslP
aq ol l,uare anss! aqt to alrergpSts aql pup luaun8rB sFl Jo rr8o1 _aql _lnq 'tustnqeu
to uuot prlppr s q?ns Sunurqrua poqe rllsplsnHlua uaaq a^pq aldoad r'ra, r,roN
'uolsnPuor sltll PasroPua Suyreq roJ-snoureJul taqlpr ro-snousJ
sr ropoJ ',r.)ftnve pup 'uor-xunsurp lrorrous sp sa1uplpupe lt1a111un qJns 8u1pnpu1_'qdal
-uoJ a1euq to {rols atnq ? ol pallruruoJ aq ppo/vl qspuole 'algltuud are sldaeuot
prlxal lprll sdes rusFuolv lpnldaruoJ aruls '(oeoilF p 'V 'I _'toPo{ osle aas 11961
.[ topog) aleuu! ag ol a^pq sldaruo] a^Hltulrd 1eq1 luaurn8re sloPog frraf uor;
1o'
saruor ,vrall slrll JoJ yoddns aql 'sldaruoJ alptru! ol luarqFrnuoJ B to 8uor1s ool rst
sellolur rusFuolv pnldaJuo) leql /vtarl aql q sHI 'pelelsun Ual sl ll uaâ 'punorS
-piq aql ul 8uqrn1 uago s1 fu{l frrorvr e sr strdaJuor Jo slunorJe f,Ilsnuoleuou 8u1
-dolanap roJ suonslnou" rnrla^ od poru aql to
"f**tl"iffi::::#j;rf#:E'y,
'arqJruls ou aApq daql :aaggru.ud are sldaruoJ 1?elxa'l
wslwolv pn7datuo3
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'lxau asa{l ol trlnl aM'swal

-qord umo slr lnoqlyfr l,uq rusFuolv pnldaJuoJ 'sldaruor to /fuoaql Fqlo fue a{{
?ng s/'rusnuolv pnldaruo) to suon)P41u ,alqr aqtr Suour? aru asag ?qnop oN
q1o8rery
PUP
atuarne'I
z9
Science
63
Let's put aside the question of whether nonatomic theories of lexical concepts are
defensible. What is the reasoning behind the rest of Fodo/s argument? Briefly, Fodor
sees only one way that cognitive science can explain the learning of a concept. This
is by postulating a mechanism whereby a new complex concept is assembled from
its constituents. To take a simple example, suppose that the concept FATHER is the
concept of a male parent and that the concept has the strucfure MALE pARENr, that is, it
is literally composed of the concepts MALE and p,rnnr.n (and whatever logico-syntactic
concepts may be involved). In this case, one can imagine that the acquisition of rerHsn
proceeds by noticing that some parents are male and by constnrcting a complex con-
cept to reflect this contingensy, namely, MALE pARENT (: rarrnn). Notice that, in this
way, the learning of FATHER takes place only on the condition that the agent previously
possesses the concepts MAL"E and panevr. Turning to the component concepts, MALE and
pARENr, we can now ask the same question about how they are acquired. Perhaps they
too decompose into simpler concepts and are acquired in much the same way as we
are supposing FATHER is acquired. Yet clearly this process has to stop. Eventually decomposition comes to an end, and at that point we simply can't explain acquisition in
terms of a constructive process. Since this is the only explanation of how a concept is
learne4 there is no explanation of how primitive concepts can be learned. Thus they
must be innate.
In one form or another, this argument has led many people to be weary of Conceptual Atomism. After all, accepting the innateness of cer.,,,rcv and c.rnsuREroR is no
small matter. Forfunately, Fodor's ilgument isn't sound, though not primarily for the
reasons that are usually cited. What's really wrong with Fodor's position is that with
his focus on conceptual structure, he fails to pose the issue of conceptual acquisition
in its most fundamental terms. If to possess a concept is to possess a contentful representation, the issue of acquisition is how given the correct theory of mental content, one can come to be in a state in which the conditions that the theory specifies
obtain. To answer this question one needs to look at the acquisition process from the
vantage point of a developed theory of content. One of the reasons atomistic theories may have appeared to prohibit leaming is precisely because they have rarely
been articulated to the point where one can ask how a mind comes to satisfy their
constraints. Ironically, now that Fodor has provided a detailed atomistic theory, we
can see by relation to the theory how an unstructured concept might be learned.
To explain acquisition on the Asymmetric Dependence Theory one needs an
account of how the mind-world dependencies that are constitutive of content come
to obtain. The key to the explanation is the notion of a sustaining mechanism. A sustaining mechanism is a mechanism that supports a mind-world dependency relation.
For some concepts there will be sustaining mechanisms in terms of neurologically
specifted hansducers, but the majority of concepts require sustaining mechanisms that
take the form of inferential processes. The idea is that although speciftc inferences
implicating a concept aren't constitutive of the concept's content, they nonetheless
contribute to the explanation of why the concept is tokened in a variety of contexts.
Since having a concept involves having an appropriate sustaining mechanism, a
psychological model of concept acquisition is to be directed at the question of how
various sustaining mechanisms are acquired. Margolis (199S [chapter Zlinthis volume])
examines this question in detail and catalogs a number of distinct types of sustaini.g
mec}anisms. An interesting result of this work is that a typical sustaining mechanism
for nafural kind concepts implicates a kind syndrome-the sort of information that
'@OOtl PtrstrrJo'I ^8'a'aa5
.uralsfs aagpSoe a$ q uollquasardar raqp {raaa ol uoqelar slt r(q pau.uuapP s! uoHeluc:trdar ppau
? to $aluor aql q"i.l- oq Sqproreu 'ursllotl Suprearu to uuoJ aruaqxa us aq PForlr uogdalxa uV 'OS
.ir-l sqoSrerypu" a:uamsl eas 'sanssl a6aql to uolsstusp paPualxa uP rog'parpbru arz sldaruor tr orlto
uqpanb aql ssarppe fgear l,usaop lt aruls lunorre frope;srrestm rre q slql'sn oI'"Pf".tt lsql sn uo slr:ttJD
'uollppbeu ldaouor ro; alqlnrodsar
aql a q sinraaiia ruig1
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are 1e{l slusruztparu angguSor aql to anl?u aql lnoqu Sunrpu sfes_aq tanaatog 'sPtrt.ru uarmq uo a Bq
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u|
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a , roq;o uolsanb
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oNarud
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papposse flaraur 8ulaq s,uoHsluasardar p uaa/\Apq uontrnlslD aII
raqlouB
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aql qlp\ Pepposse rtpreu,Supg
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sp palpaq ag ol s! arnlrruls sFII :uollpf,gltenb snouas auo_Wlm pQ luau/toldap q1
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SuHl rneru aql sdeqrad 'll ol asuodsar ? an"q sFlllrgle treg
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ll ,arnpruls fue lnoqllM luogulJo8apr Jo asuas a>I"tu slsFuole uet 11 oq 'aJuPlsu!
rog .gtry1y(uu upldxaol sarrnosar aql )pq py'a$ 'stuop qdaruoJ aJaM'uuaruouaqd
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i"qr fian"q1 aql q luarunuas sFrl roJ slssq ag.! 'apls aql ol lnd s1 rusl^lleu ldaeuot
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tulproree ,{ol{m suollpuor ag rapun ldaruor Jaq ua{ol ol lua8e aq1 sasna} letll ulslu
-Erparu lenuaratu! up saqs[qslsa 'uonrsodqp pr1ua8_arour aql qlF fqlaSol 'uolleru
-rofll sl+L 'pupl B 1noq? uop?uuotut 'pnfdacrad fp8rul 'lua8unuor Eupepurnne r(q
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rbql Jl dtuo l(ro8alee aql to sraqtuatu sB saruelsuJ lsarl ol
E rllpr Suop-puq e Squatrunotua uI ale1nurmre lq8Fu euo
Fpuassa auss aql a^sq
uoglsodslp lerauaS arou
s1p8rery pue
atuarns-I
?g
Science
65
remarns outside of the strucfure of s,{cHEron simply because it's not part of the defini-
tion of secrfrron Like any other theorist, the atomist holds that people associate a
considerable amount of information with any concept they possess. The only difference is that whereas other theorists say that much of the information is collateral (and
that only a small part is constifutive of the concept itself ), atomists say that all of it is
collateral. Thus for concepfual atomists a lexical concept can be unstructured while
retaining its linlqs to the representational resoruces that explain how it finctions.
We take it that a move like this is implicit in most discussions of Conceptual
Atomism. For instance, in spite of Fodoy's defense of the idea that lexical concepts are
primitive, he fully acknowledges the importance of prototlpe structure. He writes
(t98T, p. 293)z
Now, what is striking about prototypes as opposed to deftnitions is that,

whereas the evidence for the psychological reality of the latter is, as we've seen,
exiguou+ there is abundant evidence for the psychological reality of the former.
Eleanor Rosch ... and her colleagues, in particular, have provided shiking demonstrations that the prototype strucfure of a concept determines much of the
variance in a wide variety of experimental tasks, chronometric and otherwise....
Insofar as theses get established in cognitive psycholory, I think we can take
the reality of prototype strucfures as read.
In other words, Fodor endorses the existence of prototype structure and its explanatory signiftcance, yet he denies that this structure is part of the nature of concepts; for
him it's entirely collateral.sl For Fodor, prototypes are related to their concepts in
much the way that a classical theorist would say that rruEr.ro is related to secHrron. If
there is any difference, it's just that prototypes involve cognitive relations that have
more reliable and pervasive effects.
The koblem of the Analytic Data As we noted earlier, one re:rson that philosophers
cite for thinking that concepts have partial deftnitions is that this provides an explanation of the analytic data. People can feel the pull of a proposed deftnition or a
counterexample and, more generally, they are able to form iudgments about the constifutive conditions for satisfiiing a concept. George Rey (1,993) has marshaled an
argument. against Conceptual Atomism based on this data. His claim is that quite
apart from the question of whether there are any analytic truths, people certainly
have intuitions about what's analytic. One explanation of these intuitions is that they
reflect constifutive relations among the concepts at stake. So barring an altemative
atomistic explanation, we have simultaneously an argument against Conceptual
Atomism and an argument for the Neoclassical Theory. Rey's position is that no
plausible atomistic altemative exists.
One atomistic proposal Rey considers is that infuitions of analyticity reflect the
way that a concept is introduced. For instance, one might try to maintain that we
learn a concept like BAcHELon by being told that bachelors are unmarried men. This
explanation is inadequate, however, as it fails to address a range of cases where there
8I. More precisely, he denies that protobypes are part of the semantic structure of concepts. Since he
seen$ to assume that there is nothing more to the strucfure of a concept than its semantic shucfure, he
doesn't distinguish between the two daims. Wdve seen, however, that some theorists do distinguish them
(e.g- dual theorists), so one has to be careful. We'll return to the guestion of how to think about conceptual
strucfure in sec. 7.
s,il
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pasodxa are aldoad
q?H.
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aql ur rftea faql 1eql q 4pHr(leu" to suonFlul ag Sulpunorrns spEJ pcrEoloqr

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uo
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,s1
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-qnsuor q ll l"ql-OzH sl ralpm lprll paru!ûoo r(pe1ol arp aldoad fuerrl 'aldrrrexa
rog 'rq/\Bu? luaas lou oP letfl letlm ,o annnlllsuof, s,le_tlâ 1noqe stalPq PaqJuarlua
a^pq uEf, a,vr lpql arpoN 'lq8lr allnb l,uq uoqaulxordde ls4t sq; 'ltpleunilotun
'salnu$u
a^g uprll arou rot pelsxa aAEq P1noqs qlrsit aql let{l 8u1qytrry to a^llnlHsuo) s,ll leql
aâllaq l,uop a,vr 1ng Jallaq arul paggsnf lsea1 lp aq ll leql a8_payvtoq to a^qqnsuor
s,lt leql aâuaq aM 'prlraruv paralorslP aq leql snqunlo) 8u1aq Jo aAunlqsuor s,ll
lerll alarlaq l,uop a/vr lng 'aput pup paFlpurun aq uosrad aqt lBtll rolaqrPq e Suraq
'sallr ,ta1 letll

to a Hnlpsuof, s,ll l?ril ana{aq a/n sm{I
sassarPP?
sasuJ aql
[P
to
raqlB_r
|q'suotl
rtroaql sFIl lerll argoN'suollrpuor qrns lnoqp staryq ppq dldaap rno
-lpuoJ a^lplllsuo, Ipqre pegar l,uop faql 's! lBtll 'sldaruot *Frlped Surfrsqus
suoqlpuor a^qqnsuor aql lnoqp sJa{aq Paqruaqua rno lf,altar_ {"qf t?ql 8,tl
,tq p"nleldxa aq 1q81ru ,qp$ztrue ro
tq
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-upp
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{uF0 a^^ lng
aql urort 'llr raUV :suo!lln1u1 a{l to uogeueldxa apqs
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e padxa otr Suor/vr s,ll l?rll lsrsu il8Fu slsFuolp 'asmot ,O 'f1nqfpua ,o suonl
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'(salnupu alq ueql arou roJ PaFIxa set{ tnreg
aql leql ^8'a) egltpue lseal aql q ruaas l,uop paqruarlua fldaaP arP let{l sJa[aq z(ueur
'arueldarre peardsapl{ pupunuor uala l,_uop daql lPaq)uaqua
?uerl raqlo aql uO
ipr"q are (aconrnoml ^8'a) sldaruor Suqsaralur flprqdosollqd J9 sasfpue
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egr{pue ro, salsplpuer Faq aqq Suoure uaag ftealle a^sq sqln4 lsf,Iletuaqlsur Pue
prpol ,aluelsul rod 'rua{l uopueqp ol alqlssodut _fpeau il PtrIJ arvr letn Paqruaqua
os ro'8uqul{l rno ol lequar os are treql sauo sdeqrad 'sJallaq PPq fldaap pagar
dlaraw ltaql 1erll st /qppfpue ,o suollFlul mo ,o uotleueldxa rlFlurole raqpuv
ze'rnfleup sl ,,PJIJaurV PaJaAoJslP snqumlo3,, lstll
uonFlul aql s?q auo ou 'etpaury PeranotslP snqrunlo) leql Ppl Eupq fq snqutnlo3
,"qdolrtrqj $pn aruplulenbre lsrg mo petl sn ,o IIE lsorrp fe{l pE aql ;o a11ds ur
puv Jatlaq arul pagnsnl (1sea1 lp) q a8palmoq leql plol Supq ,(q tl a8pa11oml
lprll paupal sn to lvra, 'lno qulod ,(aU se 'snq1 'auou are araql araql saseJ ul /qpn
-ltp e to suoglnlu! aq ppoqs araql lerll sallduJ ll pup $pgflsus Jo suonlnlu! are
sqoSreyq pue
aruarnPf
gg
Science
67
extent to which they hold our convictions. The examples involving BAcHELoR are
about as ftrm as they come. But other cases are less secure. Is it analytic that cats are
animals? Here our own intuitions waver, and the controversies surrounding this case
seem to suggest that other people's intuitions are less secure as well. Our account of
the analytic data predicts this variability. Part of the variability traces back to the
clause that the constitutive relation has to seem obvious; surely some things are less
obvious than others. But another part traces back to the clause that the belief is
entrenched. We need only add that not all such beliefs are equally entrenched. Those
that are highly entrenched will give rise to ftrrn intuitions of analyticity; those that
are less enhenched will give rise to shikier intuitions. As far as we can tell, Rey has
no comparable explanation. Since he relies upon acfual analytic cormections among
concepts, they would seem to be all on a par. So at this point in the debate, Conceptual Atomism may have an advantage over the Neoclassical Theory.
The koblem of Compositionality In a sense, an atomistic theory of concepts such
as Fodor's doesn't have any problem with conceptual combination. Yet this is only
because, as the theory is posed, it is restricted to lexical concepts.
Suppose, however, that we treat Fodor's theory of reference determination as a
comprehensive theory of concepts, in the same way that we initidly treated the Prototype Theory. Then his theory appears to have difficulties that will seem all too
familiar. Consider, for examplq a concept we discussed in connection with the Proto-
type Theory, an example that's owing to Fodor himself-cRANDMoTHERs Mosr oF

IV{ARRIED ro DENnsrs. It is hardly likely that this concept stands
in a lawful dependency relation with the property of being a grandmother most of
whose grandchildren are married to dentists. Nor is it likely that any other dependency relations that it might stand in are asyrnmetrically dependent on this one
wHosE GRANDCFIILDREN ARE
(Laurence 1993).83
Earlier (in sec. 3.2) we quoted Fodor and Lepore arguing against Prototlpe Theory
in the following way:
7. Prototypes aren't compositional.
2. Concepts are compositional.

3. So concepts aren't prototlryes.
But asymmetric dependence relations are in exactly the same position. The
asymmetric dependence relations of complex concepts aren't a function of the
asymmetric dependence relations of their constituents. Thus one could adopt an
argument against the Asymmetric Dependence Theory that runs parallel to Fodor
and Lepore's argument against the Prototype Theory:
1,. Representations
in asymmetric dependence relations aren't compositional.
2. Concepts are compositional.

3. So concepts aren't representations in asynrmetric dependence relations.
Fodor, of course, is aware of the difficulties surrounding complex concepts. His own
way out has two parts. The ftrst we've already noted: He stipulates that his theory
applies to lexical concepts only. The second, which is just as important, is that he
appeals to a different theory to account for complex concepts. This move on his part
83. Fodor's theory also has special difficulties with any complex concept that by definition picks out items
that can't be detected,, e.g., r.JNDErEcrABrE srAR BtRl{.
-([aurqo slqt
uaaq seq apl{
s,ropod rod 'll 1noqe
Fldsqrl eO66I; ropod aas 'sualqord asaql ssarppe o1
ul
ldrnalp
PlPs
ZZ
r(ran pq ,fgerauaS lualuor to se-rroaql rot uralqo.rd snopas e alpb fpqru q s$I 'slxeluof, asaql u! l,uo
^
ll 1zrp J"ap fpard suraas 11 'frer;uoe aql uO 'srvnntw sw stw uala to tYf, v roN sJYlll ro J:INLLKI:ruY srvJ
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ol suopqar Iry_nEI fiua u7
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".lt
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8rq ,s8op Slq ol suogplar af,uapuadap rplaruufss q puels uo os PT 'slu.L els 'r\D
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aq lq8Fu auo 'lualuoJ sll au.ruuapp ol suonplal atuapuad"p rFpunufse /ftEssaoau
aql q Strpuels Drs trdaruor prlxal aql aqtpull ol ltn4Jlp s,ll 'sse1l uospeduor aruos
oi anqepi fpo 81q 1nq tlaplosqe 81q l,uarp s8u1q1 af,uls 'froaql aql roJ quasard
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,1
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4ag asnnaq 'uopua11e allll panlarar alsq leql sldaruor Jo ,qagea e qllaa salllmgilIP
a sq feru froaql aruepuadnq rularuurfsy ag letp Suqreuar ylrom q lI 'rtPttl
'l(roaq1 adflolord aql ralo rusFuolv pndaruoJ rolst l,upaau daql
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lpql sl 'Jala/uoq 'alaq illod aqJ 'Jallrpa passruslp ana uralqord s-s1d3luor p_rlxal
deur froagl adfiotr
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uaql 'sldaruoJ lerlxal sraloJ fpo l(roaql adfloprd aql 'uoqeulruapP aruaratar
'8qgtrou :st ra/\ stre lrotls
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'sluanlqsuor Isrlssep a pq sldaruor xalduror fpualed treql surJep ropod 'flqlsneldrsl
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eppunufse prrp 'sldatuor xalduoJ roJ lunoJJB o; fern aruos spaau aq atuls 'pPnn sg
sqo8re;41 pus
aruamrl
gg
Science
69
The Problem of E*ptV and Coertensioe Concepts Conceptual Atomism implies that the
of a lexical concept isn't determined by its strucfure. This view contrasts

with all the other theories we've looked at, in that on all the other theories, lexical
concepts have shructure and it's their strucfure that determines their reference. One
way of putting the difference is that other theories of concepts are descriptivisb an
item fatls under a concept just in case it satisfies the description that is encoded by
reference
the concept's shucfure. We've seen that the advantage of a nondescriptivist theory is
that it is better equipped to handle diffictrlties such as the Problem of Stability; but
descriptivist theories have their advantages too. One is a point that will be familiar
from our disctrssion of Frege. If all there is to the content of a concept is its reference,
then there is no way to distinguish coreferential concepts. Descriptivist theories have
no trouble here, since they distinguish coreferential concepts in terms of their differing strucfures; the structure of a concept acts as its mode of presentation. In contrast,
atomic theories have considerable trouble with coreferential concepts.
To see the significance of this issue, consider a case where two concepts are coextensive as a matter of necessity. Take for instance, the concepts rRIAt{cutAR and rnrI-ATERAL. Since every geometrical object that instantiates the one must instantiate the
other, it's hard to see how to pull apart the properties triangular and trilateral. Supposing that there is a law connecting triangular with TRIANGUI-AR, there must also be a
law cont ecting hilateral with rruANcur.r,n. But surely the latter isn't asyrnmehically
dependent on the former. If hilateral obiects didn't cause tokenings of TRIANGUI R,
how could hi"t g,rlar objects cause tokenings of TRLANGUTnn?s6 To take another exarnple, suppose, as many philosophers do, that the properties water and HzO are identilal. How, then, can the Asymmetric Dependence Theory distinguish between the
concepts wArER and Hzo? Both would be nomically dependent upon the very same
property. These considerations are dl the more vivid if we consider the large stock of
empry concepts that we all possess, concepts such as LrNlconr.r and nr. All of these
concepts are correlated with the same thing, namely, nothing. Yet they are clearly
distinct from one another.
Another sort of example may be of special interest to psychologists. Many species
besides humans are selectively sensitive to stimuli in a way that argues that they
should be credited with concepts. At the same time, it seems that the concepts they
have are not always the same as our own, even when they apparently have the same
extension. For instancg Richard Herrnstein and his colleagues have conducted a
range of experiments where pigeons have proven to be highly skilled at sorting
photographs into those that depict trees from those that do not (Herrnstein 1979,
IgS4). The photographs were taken from a variety of perspectives-some showing
dose-ups of the ends of a few branches, some showing tree-covered shores from a
substantial distance, and so on. Conhasting photographs depicted close-ups of celery
stalks and the like. Despite the vast differences runong the photographs of trees and
the existence of the treelike items in the nontree photographs, pigeons are able to
sort them with considerable accuracy. Whafs more, they are able to do much the
siune for a number of other categories, including human, fith, flower, and automobile.It
looks as though they are cadsally responsive to groupings of objects that are very
nearly coextensive with salient categories of human cognition. At the same time it
56. Cf. also pairs of concepts such as Bny and seu. Every event in which something is bought is also an
event in which something is sold How can Asymmetric Dependence distinguish the two?
saldurpxa
-"if.y
or {1uo ,"0r" :?::l"tT":f;:t;i:A

$rEiI qrvrr paila-os urort asup rprp sualqord aqr qil/ur Fap
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"11ii.8."
f,"U
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sapoaql rcp"J-oi
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,/qnuapJ
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.sldaeuor
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ol 8qilir rl aq araH 'aspr ozs/uarvm aql qlp sdlaq s,ropoJ Jo uoqsaSSns raqpuv
'^ sl nuorrNn/tuof,lun aql uo luapuadap flpr
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larsor^lomv ldaruor eql elpq fpar uoa8rd s sao6 'oP
a,vr 1eql
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er lstll ,ta{$-
s11o8re61 pue
sruaas
aruarnrl
OL
Science 7t
Not surprisingly, Fodor is reluctant to supplement his Asyrnmetric Dependence

Theory with inferential roles. His alternative suggestion is that coextensive concepts
can be distinguished in terms of their formal properties. Like words, concepts are
objects with formal and semantic properties. So just as the words "trilateral" and "triangular" are to be distinguished by their spelling or their orthography (as well as
their content), the concepts rRr.ANGr,Ju,R and TRTLATERAT are to be distinguished by
whatever properties account for their being of distinct formal types. lA/hether this
proposal works remains to be seen. It's an interesting suggestion, however, since it
pulls apart several strands in the Fregean response to coextensive concepts. In the
Fregean tradition, coextensive concepts are handled by saying that they have different modes of presentations. But the notion of a mode of presentation is generally ut derstood in terms of its relevance for semantic phenomena. Don't forget: Frege said
that a mode of presentation is contained within the sense of an expression and determines its reference. Another way of looking at Fodor's treatment of coextensive concepts is that he too, wants to say that coextensive concepts differ with respect to
their modes of presentation. Fodor would only add that modes of presentation
needn't be part of the content of a concept; they needn't even determine a concept's
reference. They simply give us a means for dealing with Frege's puzzle.In this way,
Fodor may be able to maintain the view that lexical concepts are primitive while
avoiding some of the pitfalls that go with purely referential theories of content.
This completes our survey of theories of concepts. While our discussion is by no
means exhaustive, we have tried to touch on the advantages and the problems associated with the major theories of concepts that are currently under debate.88 As
we've left things, no theory stands out as providing the best comprehensive account
of concepts. One reason for this may be that there are different ways for a theory of
concepts to contribute to an understanding of their nature. We'll take up this question in the next section.
Box
1O
Summary of Criticisms of Conceptual Atomism
1. The Problem of Radical Nativism

Under Concepfual Atomism, most lexical concepts turn out to be innate, induding such
unlikely candidates as xyLopHoNE and cennunsroR.
2. The Problem of F,xplanatory Impotence
If lexical concepts are primitive they can't explain psychological phenomena such as
categorization.
3. The Problem of the Anatytic Data

Concepfual Atomism lacks an adequate explanation
analyticity.
of why people have intuitions of
4. The Problem of Compositionalit5r

Atomistic theories of concepts have as much ditriorlty with bonceph,ral combination
as
the Prototype Theory.
5. The Problem of Empty and Coextensive Concepts

If concepts are atoms and the content of a concept is iust its reference, then coextensive
concepts can't be distinguished. As a resulb all empty concepts have the same contmt.
S8. An important exception is the Exemplar Theory. See, e.g., the excerpt from Smith and Medin (19EI
[chapter 9 in this volumel) and Estes (1994).
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Science
73
This challenge-to single out those relations among concepts

identity-is especially difftcult when one is concemed
with nonsemantic components. Without the constraint that a concept's structure must
contribute to its content, there rnay be no principled way to draw th" lit One sug". has to be
gestion-though admittedly a sketchy one-is that a concept's structure
robust and theoretically signiftcant. We aren't sure what to say in general terms about
when a structure is theoretically significant. As a guideline, however, we'd suggest
cases where it's universal, or nearly universal or where its appearance is a matter of
psyc}ological necessity. To the extent that prototypes are good candidates for nonsemantic structurg this is because their deployment in fast categorization does appear
to be psychologically necessary, and because particular prototypes ftgure in robust
explanations of a variety of data. So maybe the claim that concepts have nonsemantic
rFtAN A RocK
and
rues?Ee
that ar constitutive of their
structure can be made to stick.
Yet another view of concepfual strucfure is that a concept may have components
that are relevant to its semantics but not to its reference. In much this spirit, Hilary
Putnam suggests that a word's meaning includes a prototype-like structure even
though it plays no part in the determination of the word's reference (Putnam !97Ot,
p. t48):
with the word "tiger" a theorV; not the actual

theory we believe about tigers, which is very complex, but an oversimplified
theory which describes a do to speak, tiger stereotype. lt describes . . . a normal
member of the natural kind. It is not necessary that we believe this theory,
though in the case of "tiger" we do. But it is necessary that we be aware that
this theory is associated with the word: if our stereotype of tiger ever eJranges,
then the word "tige{' will have changed its meaning.
[TJhere is somehow associated
This claim easily translates into a view about concepts. The suggestion is that a concept can have structure that is partly constitutive of its content even if the structure
isn't implicated in an account of the concept's reference. The thing we want to emphasize is that this is a different position than the Fregean view that there is more to
the meaning of a concept than its reference. After all, it was part of the Fregean program that sense determines reference. In contrast, the present suggestion is that in
addition to a reference, concepts have another aspect to their content, but one that
doesn't determine their reference.eo
Finally, a fourth way of understanding conceptual structure is in terms of the sustaining mechanisms that support a reference-determining relation, such as as)nnmetric
dependence. On this view, one concept may be part of anothey's strucfure if the ftrst
is part of a theoretically signiftcant sustaining mechanism associated with the second.
Again, what counts as theoretically significant is a hard question. But as before, it's
plausible enough to include ones that are universal (or nearly universal), or ones that
appear to be a matter of psychological necessity. This might be where Jackendoff's
J-D representations find their place. Perhaps they are part of the structure of obiect
concepts. Though they have problems determining reference, there is no reason why
89. Notice that it can't simply be a matter of distinguishing which is "psychologically real"-a suggestion
'that is implicit in some writings on the Dual Theory (see, e.g., Landau 1952). Both are psychologically real
in that the conceptual relations have psychological effects. Surely, if you ask someone whether birds are
smarter than rocks, she'd say they are.
90. In philosophy, some h'vo-factor conceptual role theories may fall in this category.
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Science
75
descriptivist theories, including the Classical Theory and the Theory-Theory,

since these face the Problem of Ignorance and Error.
Utlimate Arbiters of Categorizntion Atomic cores do not S.re a satisfactory account of our most considered judgments about category membership, so they
aren't suiled to be the ultimate arbiterb of categorization. Arguably, however,
classical cores and cores with theory structure can do no better. Given the
implications of conftrmation holism, it may be that nothing short of the
entire belief system can act as the ultimate arbiter of categorization.
At best, the
Theory-Theory might allow for the claim that reflective category judgments
implicate theoretical knowledg", including knowledge that implicitly involves
a commitment to essentialism. And, of course this information couldn't be part
of an atomic core. But Conceptual Atomism can explain these judgments by
appeal to the same theoretical beliefs, claiming they are merely associated with
the concept in question or, altematively, claiming that they are part of the
nonsemantic strucfure of the concept, alongside its prototype. The fact that the
information specifted by suc} beliefs appears to be of great theoretical signiftcance argues for the atomist taking the latter view.e3
Stability Since Conceptual Atomism is not a descriptivist account, the concepts it covers are largely unaffected by changes in the beliefs that are associated with them. In conhast, the Classical Theory can't provide stability until it
first overcomes the Problem of Ignorance and Error, and the Theory-Theory is
notoriously poor at providing stability.
In short, atomistic cores are the best of the lot. To the extent that a version of the
Dual Theory is to be preferred, ifs one that brings together atomic cores with prototlpes and perhaps some theory structure too, all united by a nondescriptivist account
of reference.
This brings us full circle.
At the beginning of our discussion, we took pains to emof concepts has had a rich history of interdisciplinary interaction. Also, all along we've been careful to tease apart the different explanatory
phasize that the study
goals that have accompanied the major theories. The integration of these goals yields
four general ways of construing the nafure of a concept. In our view, each deserves
to be explored in considerable detail. No doubt, this will require frrther cooperation
across the disciplinary boundaries of cognitive science.
8. Appendir: More on OntoloW
We suspect that some philosophers may be unsatisfied with our brief discussion of
the ontology of concepts, since there are other reasons than Frege's for claiming that
concepts can't be mental representations. Christopher Peacocke and Georges Rey
may be more representative of contemporary theorists who hold that concepts are
93. We should note that the question of whether people's knowledge in a given domain is organized
around a theory is distinct from the question of whether that theory determines the content of the concepts
involved. Theory-theorists usually assume that the daim about content comes for free orrce ifs established
that people have intemdly represented theories. But it doesrt't (see Margolis 1995). For instance, one could
easily maintain that an intemal theory of belief zubserves commonsense psychological reasoning, while
also maintaining that this theory fails to determine the contents for BETJEF, DEsrRE, etc Instead their contents
may be determined, for example, in accordance with an information-based semantics.
p
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Science
77
these two should be treated as the same concept would seem to be an open theoretical question, not one to be settled by fiat. For instance, one would face the question
of whether inferential roles are constihutive of cc,ncepts and, to the extent that they
are, the question of which inferential roles are relevant to conceptual identity. Given
the tremendous controversy surrounding both of these issues, it makes no sense to
assume from the outset that any partiorlar difference in inferential role is irrelevant to
the issue of conceptual identity.
What about Rey's second :ugument, that a given type of representation might be
used to express different concepts by different individuals?es Here too the point can
be granted without abandomng the claim that concepts are mental representations. If
a given type of representation, M, can be used to express different t1ryes of concepts,
then of course we cannot identify these different concepts with M. But nothing stops
us from identifying each of the different types of concepts (e.g.; pARrs and rneNce)
with other typings of mentd representations, each of which can be instantiated by
instances of M. For example, M might be a representation that is typed in terms of
its orthographic or imagistic properties (or some other nonsemantic property). At the
same time, M will represent one thing or anothea depending upon various other
facts about it-facts about its relations to other mental representations, or perhaps
facts about its causal or nomic relations to things in the world. Which concept a
given instance of M expresses will then depend not just on its being a token of M
but also on its t1rying in virtue of these other facts. In other words, concepts can still
be rnental representations, so long as the conditions for typing representation tokens
arert't confined to a highly limited set of formal properties.
As before, though, it's hardly clear that representationalists have to be so concessive. That is, it isn't obvious that as a matter of. psychological fact, a given type of
representation can be used to express different concepts by different individuals. For
all we know, one's image of Paris might not be suited to serve as a concept of France,
even if it seems on a given occurence that it does. Why trust introspection in such
cases? Perhaps whafs really going on is that one consciously entertains an image of
Paris and this occasions a (distinct) mental representation of France.e6
In short, Peacocke's and Rey's arguments don't work. We haven't been given sufficient reason to think that corrcepts can't be mental representations, even if we accept
the assumptions they ask us to make. Granting the psychological reality of mental
representations, the implications are clear: Nothing is lost by saying that concepts are
mental representations.ez
References
Antony, L. (t,gl7r. Naturalized Epistemology and the Study of language. In A. Shimony and D. Nails
Gds.), Naturalistic Epistemology (pp. Z.3S-257). DordrecJrt: D. Reidel.
95. Or, for that matter, that a single individual might use the sarne type of representation to express different concepts at different times.
96. That sai4 it does seem likely that for at least some tlpings of mental representations, representations
so typed should be capable of instantiating more than one oncept. For example, sometimes mental representations may acquire new rireanings and thereby become different concepts. But even then there is no
reason to say that the concepts-old and new-arenit mental representations.
g7. We would like to thank Peter Camrtherg Richard Grandy, IeanY.,azea Daniel Oshersoru Sarah Sawyer,
Scott Sfurgeou and lonathan Sutton for their comments on this c.hapter.
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og
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Chapter

Concepts and Cognitive Science

L. Introduction: Some Preliminaries

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rtus o1 a^pq sldaruoJ Jo salroaql 1uqm 8u1ru1suot

aq uBf, arnpruls pnldaruor Surpru8ar suoqdo aql qtq/vr q spadsar Jo raqurnu E

e'suogpluasardar arB sldaruoc rpqm o1 Eugprorf,B 'a8Bsn

prpprqs olloJ ol anulluor l,arn-suoppluasardar lquaru aql q Palsaralul /tpruu

a^lpafqo Sqaq urog

Concepts and Cognitive

Theory holds that most concepts-especially lexical concepts-have deffnitional

it, but an aggregate of those several simple ldeas,

On the Classical Theory, most concepts-including most lexical concepts-are

'(g-T,g'dd'6g6tlZtOD sellr/n derue3 ,,'e8en8us-I to qsfpuy per8o1

q8norql srpfqdelaru to uolleunu{g aqJ-, u1 'detuef, JIopnX raqdosopqd uuuuag

" "tue$ lnoqu suolluJado urno sll luog Jo 'asuas p spafqg

'(ggt' d' Sl.6tlO1gtl twpuapteryn uawnH Eryuat

p{l /nall pppldula plqs aql pauopwqe a^sq

Jo pasodruoe flaqerullp are strdaruoe

Concepts and Cognitive

In the face of repeated failures to analyze everyday concepts in terms of a purely

is changed to tqourr, *slsuNc is added, and

subsequ"ni stages, -ADULT

structed from its constifuent representations, which collectively provide a definition

-chair- can be decomposed into a set of concepts which

LEGS, SOMETHING WITH

ARTIFACT, FURNITURE, PoRTABIJ, SoMETIIING

A BACK, SOMETHING WITH A SEAT, SEAT FOR ONE.

luoor aql q rpq? s sr araql (gt'r)

:(g) rapFuo) 'uollrDvs ldaeuor aql q arnlpralll rtreroduraluor aql uI tq{

pttld"i ro" se flpgr(F* to lunorf,? s,llle) Ianueunul ul ParnldP tt lhpn

,,'uplrl Palrruurun, 'flaureu '(I) u1 aseqd

'tretu s q rnFus oS 'usru palrrBtuun u? sl

(f) ul saruaraJul aql uaamlaq aruarafllp +rurgptls e sl alag dpanruul 'satuaraln

bu$luart-oj qtmourelupl q pagslles arp quauodrtor esaql

slp8rery pus aouams'I

Concepts and Cognitive Science

There is a physical object in the room.

(4.1,51 There is something nonliving in the room.

There is an artifact in the room.

(4.T7) There is a piece of furniture in the room.

There is something with a back in the room.

According to Katz, all of these inferences are to be explained by reference to the

.augap ol pu?q fpuraqxa are sldaeuor pg sl 'taaairaog 'uolpas pasard aql

n,.r1 s1 froaql adflolor; ag '/tl{Utulq 'suolllugaP ,t leads o1 8uyt4 ut PBtl a^Eq