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SYLLABUS
Introduction to metaethics: fact and value, objectivity and subjectivity.
Consequentialism, deontology, virtue ethics.
Egoism and altruism.
Rights: analyses of rights; natural rights; rights and utility; rights and interests;
rights and choice.
Political obligation, authority and dissent: what is (the problem of) political
obligation?; attempted justifications of political authority; anarchism; civil
disobedience and political dissent.
pain? Must we act only in ways that are universalizable? Is it permissible to kill one so
that five others may live? What is virtue? Students will be introduced to three central
approaches to normative ethics: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics.
Rights: Much moral and political argument invokes the notion of rights. Theories that
invoke rights often appear to be in opposition to consequentialism. Central questions
about rights include: What sorts of rights are there? How do rights relate to duties? Does
the existence of rights depend on human interests? What is the relationship between
rights and free choice? The course considers various influential answers to these and
related questions.
Political Obligation: A central, if not the central problem for political philosophy is that of
how to justify the authority of the state. Should we obey the law just because it is the law?
When, if ever, is it justified to break the law or to overthrow the state? How should we
respond to the anarchist claim that no actual, or even possible, political authority is
legitimate?
As well as looking forward to topics covered in the IB and Part II Ethics papers, the study
of IA Ethics and Political Philosophy looks forward to some of the themes studied in the
Political Philosophy papers in Parts IB and II.
Prerequisites
Course Outline
None
The course introduces students to a selection of the main problems in moral and political
philosophy. The topics studied are divided into five main subject areas:
Objectives
Introduction to Metaethics: This part of the course introduces students to some of the
central questions in metaethics. One topic centres on the so called fact/value distinction.
Is there, indeed, such a distinction? If so, what is it? Is it possible to make inferences from
descriptive or non-moral claims to evaluative, normative, or moral claims? Can moral
properties be identified with natural properties? A second topic is concerned with whether
moral judgments are objective or subjective. Can we know what is morally right and
wrong? Or is there nothing to be known because moral judgements merely express
emotions or preferences? Are there facts about what is good or valuable, and if there are
do they obtain independently of human thought or feeling?
Egoism and altruism: The second area of the syllabus is focused on three questions.
First, what sorts of motivation are humans capable of? Second, what sorts of motivation
does morality require? Third, what sorts of justification can be given in favour of moral
motivation? In particular, the course is directed at studying whether people can possibly
act altruistically, whether there must always be a selfish element in motivation, and
whether, if we can act altruistically, we are rationally required to do so even when it is
inconvenient or costly for us.
Preliminary Reading
Introduction to Normative Ethics: This part of the course is concerned with the question
what the right thing to do is. Does morality require us to maximise pleasure and minimise
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READING LIST
INTRODUCTION TO METAETHICS
Fact and Value
*MOORE, G. E., 'The Subject-Matter of Ethics', in T. Baldwin, ed., Principia Ethica. Rev.
ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Also available on Camtools.
*SEARLE, John R., 'How to Derive "Ought" From "Is"', Philosophical Review, 73 (1964):
43-58. Reprinted in P. Foot, ed., Theories of Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1967), pp. 101-14.
ALTHAM, J. E. J., 'Wicked Promises', in I. Hacking, ed., Exercises in Analysis
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 1-22. Also available on
Camtools.
FOOT, Philippa, 'Moral Beliefs', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59 (1958-9): 83104. Reprinted in her Theories of Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967),
pp. 83-100.
FRANKENA, W. K., 'The Naturalistic Fallacy', Mind, 48 (1939): 464-77. Reprinted in
P.Foot, ed., Theories of Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 50-63.
HARE, R. M., 'The Promising Game', Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 70 (1964):
398-412. Reprinted in P. Foot, ed., Theories of Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1967), pp. 115-27.
HUEMER, Michael, Ethical Intuitionism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), ch. 4.
Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.
MACKIE, J. L., 'The Meaning of "Good"', in his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
(London: Penguin, 1977), ch. 2. [Overview]
SOBER, Elliott, From a Biological Point of View (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994), ch. 5.
Objectivity and Subjectivity
*FOOT, Philippa, 'Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives', Philosophical
Review, 81, no. 3 (1972): 305-16.
*MACKIE, J. L., 'The Subjectivity of Values', in Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
(London: Penguin, 1977), pp. 15-49. Also available on Camtools.
*SMITH, Michael, 'Realism', in P. Singer, ed., A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell,
1991), pp. 399-410. Also available online at: http://bit.ly/singer1991. [Introductory]
AYER, A.J., 'Critique of Ethics and Theology', in his Language, Truth and Logic (London:
Gollancz, 1936), ch. 6. Also available on Camtools.
BLACKBURN, Simon, Ruling Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), ch. 3.
FOOT, Philippa, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Also
available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com.
HARMAN, Gilbert, and Judith JARVIS THOMSON, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
LILLEHAMMER, Hallvard, Companions in Guilt: Arguments for Ethical Objectivity
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), ch. 5. Also available online at:
www.dawsonera.com.
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Virtue ethics
Forms of Consequentialism
RIGHTS
Analyses of Rights. Natural Rights. Rights and Utility. Rights and Interests. Rights
and Choice.
GEWIRTH, Alan, 'Are There Any Absolute Rights?', Philosophical Quarterly, 31 (1981): 116. Reprinted in J. Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1984).
HART, H. L. A., 'Are There Any Natural Rights?', Philosophical Review, 64 (1955): 17591. Reprinted in J. Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1984), pp. 77-90.
HART, H. L. A., 'Bentham on Legal Rights', in A.W.B. Simpson, ed., Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence (2nd Series) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 171-201.
KAGAN, Shelly, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 1-32.
Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198239165.001.0001.
KRAMER, Matthew H., Nigel E. SIMMONDS, and Hillel STEINER, A Debate over Rights
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). Also available online at:
www.oxfordscholarship.com. [Especially pp. 60-100; 195-232; 283-302]
MACKIE, J. L., 'Can There Be a Right-Based Moral Theory?' Midwest Studies in
Philosophy, 3 (1978): 350-59. Also available online at:
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1978.tb00366.x/abstract.
Reprinted in J. Mackie & P. Mackie, eds., Persons and Values: Selected Papers.
Vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 105-19; and in J. Waldron, ed.,
Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
RAZ, Joseph, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), chs. 7 &
8. Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198248075.001.0001.
SCANLON, T.M., 'Rights, Goals and Fairness', Erkenntnis, 11 (1977): 81-95. Reprinted in
J. Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp.
137-52.
THOMSON, Judith Jarvis, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1990), pp. 1-36.