GARCIA

Sept. 30, 1994

V.

COMELEC

FACTS:
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition
with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to
annul Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye
1993 which includes the Municipaloty of
Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic
Zone in accord with the RA No. 7227.
The municipality did not take any action on the
petition within 30 days after its submission; so,
they resorted to their power of initiative under
the Local Government Code of 1991. They
solicited the required number of signatures to
repeal the said resolution.
However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de
Leon, and the Presiding Office of the
Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong wrote a letter
dated June 11, 1993 to deny the petition for
local initiative and/or referendum.
On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the
petition for local initiative because its subject is
merely a resolution and not an ordinance.
ISSUE:
w/n the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye 1993 is the proper subject of an
initiative?
Sub-issue: w/n the decision of the Comelec to
deny the petition be set aside?
HELD:
The petition is granted and the decision of the
Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled and set
aside.
RULING:
The 1987 Constitution installed back the power
to the people regarding legislation because of
the event in February 1986. The new
Constitution became less trusting of public
officials.
Through initiative, the people were given the
power to amend the Constitution under Sec. 2
Art. 17 which provides amendments to this
Constitution may likewise be directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition
of at least 12% of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least 3% of
the registered voter therein.
The Comelec was also empowered to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an initiative and referendum.

On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA

No. 6735 entitled An Act Providing for a
System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor.
YES. Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides the Congress
shall provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom,
whereby the people can directly propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any act or
law or part thereof passed by the Congress or
local legislative body.
Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the
3
systems
of
initiative,
namely:
1. Initiative on the Constitution petition to
amend
the
Constitution
2. Initiative on statutes petition proposing to
enact
a
national
legislation
3. Initiative on local legislation petition
proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or
ordinance
Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations
on local initiatives, which is the power of local
initiative shall not be exercised more than once
a year.
ASTERN
SHIPPING
LINES,
INC.,
vs.
PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENTADMINISTRATION (POEA)166
SCRA 533, G.R. No. 76633, October 18,
1988Petitioner:
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.
Facts:
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V
Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an
accidentin Tokyo, Japan on March 15, 1985.His
widow sued for damages under Executive
Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No.
2of the POEA.The petitioner, as owner of the
vessel, argued that the complaint was
cognizable not by thePOEA but by the Social
Security System and should have been filed
against the State FundInsurance.The POEA
nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after
considering the position papers of theparties
ruled in favour of the complainant.The petition
is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner.
The
temporary
restraining
orderdated
December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so
ordered.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the POEA had jurisdiction
over the case as the husband was not an
overseasworker.2. Whether or not the validity

of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as

violative of the principleof non-delegation of
legislative power.

Held:
1. Yes. The Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration was created under Executive
OrderNo. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to
promote
and
monitor
the
overseas
employment of Filipinos and to protect their
rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board
created earlier underArticle 20 of the Labor
Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said
executive order, the POEAis vested with
"original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases,
including
money
claims,involving
employee-employer relations arising out of or
by virtue of any law or contractinvolving
Filipino contract workers, including seamen."
These cases, according to the 1985Rules and
Regulations on Over
seas Employment issued by the POEA, include,
claims for death,disability and other benefits
arising out of such employment.
The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits
and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made
bythe POEA pursuant to its Memorandum
Circular No. 2, which became effective on
February 1,1984. This circular prescribed a
standard contract to be adopted by both
foreign and domesticshipping companies in the
hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas
employment.2. No. Memorandum Circular No. 2
is an administrative regulation. The model
contractprescribed thereby has been applied in
a significant number of the cases without
challenge by theemployer. The power of the
POEA (and before it the National Seamen
Board) in requiring themodel contract is not
unlimited as there is a sufficient standard
guiding the delegate in theexercise of the said
authority. That standard is discoverable in the
executive order itself which, increating the
Philippine
Overseas
Employment
Administration, mandated it to protect the
rightsof overseas Filipino workers to "fair and
equitable employment practices."GENERAL
RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exceptionIt is
true that legislative discretion as to the
substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated.What can be delegated is the
discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what thelaw shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. Thisprerogative
cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the

legislature to the delegate.Two Tests of Valid

Delegation of Legislative PowerThere are two
accepted tests to determine whether or not
there is a valid delegation of legislativepower,
viz
, the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the lawmust
be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature such that when
itreaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it. Under the
sufficientstandard
test,
there
must
be
adequate guidelines or stations in the law to
map out the boundaries
of the delegates authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, whois not allowed to step into the
shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially
legislative.The
delegation
of
legislative power has become the rule and its
non-delegation the exception.

Rationale
for
Delegation
of
Legislative
PowerThe reason is the increasing complexity
of the task of government and the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with
the myriad problems demanding its attention.
The growth of society has ramified its activities
and created peculiar and sophisticated
problems that thelegislature cannot be
expected
to
reasonably
comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation hasbecome
necessary. Too many of the problems attendant
upon present-day undertakings, thelegislature
may not have the competence to provide the
required direct and efficacious, not tosay,
specific solutions. These solutions may,
however, be expected from its delegates, who
aresupposed to be experts in the particular
fields.Power of Subordinate LegislationThe
reasons given above for the delegation of
legislative
powers
in
general
are
particularlyapplicable to administrative bodies.
With the proliferation of specialized activities
and theirattendant peculiar problems, the
national legislature has found it more and more
necessary toentrust to administrative agencies
the authority to issue rules to carry out the
general provisions
of the statute. This is called the power of
subordinate legislation.

With this power, administrative bodies may

implement the broad policies laid down in
statute by
filling in the details which the Congress may
not have the opportunity or competence to
provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one
such administrative regulation.Administrative
agencies are vested with two basic powers, the
quasi-legislative and quasi- judicial. The first
enables them to promulgate implementing
rules and regulations, and thesecond enables
them to interpret and apply such regulations

G.R. No. 82849 August 2, 1989CEBU

OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC. (COACO)
petitioner,vs.
SECRETARY FRANKLIN M. DRILON OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ANDEMPLOYMENT,
ASSISTANT REGIONAL DIRECTOR CANDIDO
CUMBA OF THEDEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 7 AND
CEBUOXYGEN-ACETYLENE & CENTRAL VISAYAS
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (COACVEA)
respondents.
.
GANCAYCO,
J.;
FACTS:Petitioner and the union of its rank and
file employees, Cebu Oxygen, Acetylene and
CentralVisayas
Employees
Association
(COAVEA) entered into a collective bargaining
agreement(CBA) covering the years 1986 to
1988.1)For the first year which will be paid on
January
14,
1986

P200
to
each
coveredemployee.2)For the second year which
will be paid on January 16, 1987-P 200 to each
coveredemployee.3)3) For the third year which
will be paid on January 16, 1988 P300 to
each coveredemployee.On December 14,
1987, Republic Act No. 6640 was passed
increasing the minimum wage, insum, Section
8 of the implementing rules prohibits the
employer from crediting anniversarywage
increases negotiated under a collective
bargaining
agreement
against
such
wageincreases mandated by Republic Act No.
6640.On February 22, 1988, a Labor and
Employment Development Officer, pursuant to
InspectionAuthority No. 058-88, commenced a
routine
inspection
of
petitioner's
establishment.
Uponcompletion
of
the

inspection on March 10, 1988, and based on

payrolls and other records, hefound that
petitioner committed violations of the law as
follows:1. Under payment of Basic Wage per
R.A. No. 6640 covering the period of two(2)
months representing 208 employees who are
not receiving wages aboveP100/day prior to
the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640 in the aggregate
amount of EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND AND
TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P83,200.00); and2.
Under payment of 13th month pay for the year
1987, representing 208employees who are not
receiving wages above P 100/day prior to the
effectivityof R.A. No. 6640 in the aggregate
amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND ANDFORTY
EIGHT PESOS (P48,048.00).ISSUE:The principal
issue raised in this petition is whether or not an
Implementing Order of theSecretary of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) can provide for a
prohibition not contemplated bythe law it seeks
to implement.HELD:
260

As to the issue of the validity of Section 8 of

the rules implementing Republic Act No.
6640,which prohibits the employer from
crediting the anniversary wage increases
provided incollective bargaining agreements, it
is a fundamental rule that implementing rules
cannot add or detract from the provisions of
law it is designed to implement. The provisions
of Republic ActNo. 6640, do not prohibit the
crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases
for purposes of compliance with Republic Act
No. 6640. The implementing rules cannot
provide for such aprohibition not contemplated
by the law. Administrative regulations adopted
under legislativeauthority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, andshould be for the sole
purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions. The law itself cannotbe expanded
by such regulations. An administrative agency
cannot amend an act of Congress.
3
Thus petitioner's contention that the salary
increases granted by it pursuant to the
existingCBA
including
anniversary
wage
increases should be considered in determining
compliancewith the wage increase mandated
by Republic Act No. 6640, is correct. However,
the amountthat should only be credited to
petitioner is the wage increase for 1987 under
the CBA when thelaw took effect. The wage
increase for 1986 had already accrued in favor
of the employeeseven before the said law was

enacted.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby

GRANTED. Section 8 of the rules implementing
Republic6640, is hereby declared null and void
in so far as it excludes the anniversary wage
increasesnegotiated
under
collective
bargaining agreements from being credited to
the wage increaseprovided for under Republic
Act No. 6440. This decision is immediately
executory.
The petitions assail the constitutionality of
various provisions of RA 8180 entitiled the
Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of
1996. Under the deregulated environment,
any person or entity may import or purchase
any quantity of crude oil and petroleum
products from a foreign or domestic source,
lease or own and operate refineries and other
downstream oil facilities and market such
crude oil or use the same for his own
requirement, subject only to monitoring by the
Department of Energy.

Tatad vs. Secretary of Energy

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitions raise a
justiciable controversy
(2) Whether or not the petitioners have the
standing to assail the validity of the law
(3) Whether or not Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180
violates the one title one subject requirement
of the Constitution
(4) Whether or not Sec. 15 of RA 8180 violates
the constitutional prohibition on undue
delegation of power
(5) Whether or not RA 8180 violates the
constitutional prohibition against monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair
competition

Held: As to the first issue, judicial power

includes not only the duty of the courts to
settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable,
but also the duty to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. The courts, as guardians of the
Constitution, have the inherent authority to

determine whether a statute enacted by the

legislature transcends the limit imposed by the
fundamental law. Where a statute violates the
Constitution, it is not only the right but the
duty of the judiciary to declare such act as
unconstitutional and void.

The effort of respondents to question the legal

standing of petitioners also failed. The Court
has brightlined its liberal stance on a
petitioners locus standi where the petitioner is
able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people. In the case,
petitioners pose issues which are significant to
the people and which deserve the Courts
forthright resolution.

It is also contended that Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180

on tariff differential violates the provision of the
Constitution requiring every law to have only
one subject which should be expressed in its
title. The Court did not concur with this
contention. The title need not mirror, fully
index or catalogue all contents and minute
details of a law. A law having a single general
subject indicated in the title may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse
they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance
of such subject by providing for the method
and means of carrying out the general subject.
The Court held that Sec. 5 providing for tariff
differential is germane to the subject of RA
8180 which is the deregulation of the
downstream oil industry.

Petitioners also assail Sec. 15 of RA 8180 which

fixes the time frame for the full deregulation of
the downstream oil industry for being violative
of the constitutional prohibition on undue
delegation of power. There are two accepted
tests to determine whether or not there is a
valid delegation of legislative power: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard
test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislative such that when it reaches
the delegate the only thing he will have to do is
to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test,
there must be adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegates authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot.
Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness
test and the sufficient standard test. Congress

expressly provided in RA 8180 that full

deregulation will start at the end of March
1997, regardless of the occurrence of any
event. Full deregulation at the end of March
1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no
discretion to postpone it for any purported
reason. Thus, the law is complete on the
question of the final date of full deregulation.
The discretion given to the President is to
advance the date of full deregulation before
the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down
the standard to guide the judgment of the
President. He is to time it as far as practicable
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and
when the exchange rate of the peso in relation
to the US dollar is stable.

Petitioners also argued that some provisions of

RA 8180 violate Sec. 19, Art. XII of the
Constitution. Section 19, Art. XII of the
Constitution
espouses
competition.
The
desirability of competition is the reason for the
prohibition against restraint of trade, the
reason
for
the
interdiction
of
unfair
competition, and the reason for regulation of
unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus
the underlying principle of Sec. 19, Art. XII of
the Constitution which cannot be violated by
RA 8180. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the
only major league players in the oil market. As
the dominant players, they boast of existing
refineries of various capacities. The tariff
differential of 4% on imported crude oil and
refined petroleum products therefore works to
their immense benefit. It erects a high barrier
to the entry of new players. New players that
intend to equalize the market power of Petron,
Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their
own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those
who will not build refineries but compete with
them will suffer the huge disadvantage of
increasing their product cost by 4%. They will
be competing on an uneven field. The provision
on inventory widens the balance of advantage
of Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective
new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily
comply with the inventory requirement of RA
8180 in view of their existing storage facilities.
Prospective competitors again will find
compliance with this requirement difficult as it
will entail a prohibitive cost.

The most important question is whether the

offending provisions can be individually struck
down without invalidating the entire RA 8180.
The general rule is that where part of a statute

is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while

another part is valid, the valid portion, if
separable from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced. The exception to the general rule is
that when the parts of a statute are so
mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, inducements or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a
belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the
rest. RA 8180 contains a separability clause.
The separability clause notwithstanding, the
Court held that the offending provisions of RA
8180 so permeate its essence that the entire
law has to be struck down. The provisions on
tariff differential, inventory and predatory
pricing are among the principal props of RA
8180. Congress could not have regulated the
downstream
oil industry
without
these
provisions. Unfortunately, contrary to their
intent, these provisions on tariff differential,
inventory and predatory pricing inhibit fair
competition, encourage monopolistic power
and interfere with the free interaction of
market forces.

Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs

Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency
NOTE: This is consolidated with Laserna vs
DDB and PDEA ( G.R. No. 158633 ) and
Pimentel vs COMELEC ( G.R. No. 161658 )
In 2002, RA 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous
Drugs
Act
of
2002
was
implemented.
Sec
36
thereof
requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary
schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutors office with certain offenses. On 23
Dec 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on
the mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office in connection with the May 10,
2004 synchronized national and local elections.
Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for reelection in the May elections, filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it,
he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated

December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional

in that they impose a qualification for
candidates for senators in addition to those
already provided for in the 1987 Constitution;
and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from
implementing Resolution No. 6486. According
to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a
maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be
a candidate for, elected to, and be a member
of the Senate. He says that both the Congress
and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and
Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant,
among other candidates, to undergo a
mandatory drug test, create an additional
qualification that all candidates for senator
must first be certified as drug free. He adds
that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to
expand the qualification requirements of
candidates for senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 is an
amendment to the Constitution on the
qualifications of Senators.
HELD:
Pimentels
contention
is
valid.
Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and
has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law
to which all laws must conform; no act shall be
valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the
discharge of their defined functions, the three
departments of government have no choice
but to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must
be observed.
The provision [n]o person
elected to any public office shall enter upon the
duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test. Is not tenable as it
enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot,
in the guise of enforcing and administering
election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly
impose qualifications on candidates for senator
in addition to what the Constitution prescribes.
If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification,
the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such
power. The right of a citizen in the democratic
process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution.
BANAT v. COMELEC
GR Nos. 179271 & 179295, 21 April 2009
Carpio, J.

Facts: COMELEC applied the

Federation Party v. COMELEC

Veterans

formula upon the completion of the canvass

and party-list results, thereby proclaiming 15
party-lists to have obtained 21 seats in
Congress. Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed a
petition to proclaim the full number of partylistrepresentatives (all 55 seats have to be
proclaimed) provided by the Constitution
before the COMELEC en banc.The COMELEC
denied the said petition, stating that it had
already become moot and academic.Issues and
Ruling:1.W/N the three-seat limit provided in
Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional.YES.
The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the
number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy,remains a valid
statutory device that prevents any party from
dominating the party-list elections.2.W/N the
2% threshold and qualifier votes prescribed in
Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional. NO.
In computing the allocation of additional seats,
the continued operation of the 2% threshold for
the distributionof the additional seats as found
in the second clause of Section 11(b) of RA
7941 is unconstitutional. The Courtfinds that
the 2% threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available partylist seats when the number of
available party list seats exceeds 50. The
continued operation of the 2% threshold inthe
distribution of the additional seats frustrates
the attainment of the permissive ceiling that
20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.The Court strikes down the 2%
threshold only in relation to the distribution of
the additional seats as found in thesecond
clause of Section 11(b) of RA 7941.
1
The 2% threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the fullimplementation of Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents
the
attainment
of
the
broadest
possiblerepresentation of party, sectoral or
group
interests
in
the
House
of
Representatives.3.How shall the party-list
representatives be allocated?In determining
the
allocation
of
seats
for
party-list
representatives under Section 11 of RA 7941,
the following procedure shall be observed:
(1)
The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall
be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
on thenumber of votes they garnered during

the elections.(2)The parties, organizations, and

coalitions receiving at least 2% of the total
votes cast for the party-listsystem shall be
entitled to one guaranteed seat each.(3)Those
garnering sufficient number of votes, according
to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled
toadditional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats
are allocated.(4)Each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than 3
seats.In computing the additional seats, the
guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already beenallocated, at
one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus,
the remaining available seats for allocation as
additionalseats are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed
seats.
Fractional
seats
aredisregarded in the absence of a provision in
RA 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats. 4.Does the Constitution
prohibit the major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections? If not,
can the major political parties be barred from
participating in the party-list elections?
1
Section 11.
Number of Party-List Representatives.
In determining the allocation of seats for the
second vote, the following procedure shall
beobserved:(a)The parties, organizations, and
coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
thelowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.(b)The parties,
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
2% of the total votes castfor the party-list
system shall be entitled to one seat each:
Provided, that thosegarnering more than 2% of
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats
inproportion to their total number of votes:
Provided, finally, that each party,organization,
or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three seats.

NO. Political parties, particularly minority

political parties, are not prohibited to
participate in the party list electionif they can
prove that they are also organized along
sectoral lines. Neither the Constitution nor RA
7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in party-list elections through
their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of
the Constitutional Commission voted down any
permanent sectoral seats, and in the
alternative the reservation of the party-list
system to the sectoral groups. In defining a

party that participates in party-list elections

as either a political party or a sectoral party,
RA 7941 also clearly intended that major
political parties will participate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political parties
in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution,the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and RA 7941. Furthermore, under
Section 9 of RA 7941, it is notnecessary that
the party-list organizations nominee wallow in
poverty, destitution, and infirmity as there is
nofinancial status required in law. It is enough
that
the
nominee
of
the
sectoral
party/organization/coalition
belongs
tothe
marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided
to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing
major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
According to Chief Justice Punos dissent, the
party-list representatives are no match to our
traditional political parties in the political
arena; and that if major political parties are
allowed to participate in the party-list system
electoral
process,
the
voices
of
the
marginalized would be surely suffocated, and
that the democratic spirit of the Constitution
would be betrayed. He cited the 2001 party-list
elections where the major political parties
figured in the disproportionate distribution of
votes. 8 Justicesconcurred. Additional Note:
Justice Nachura concurs with Justice Carpio and
further adds that the 2% threshold vote
required for entitlement by a political party-list
group to a seat in the HR in RA 7941 is
unconstitutional because, according to him,
therewill never be a situation where the
number of party-list representatives will exceed
50, regardless of the number of district
representatives. He then submits the standard
of proportional representation and the
adoption of a gradually regressive threshold
vote requirement, inversely proportional to the
increase in the number of party-list seats. He
proposes
this
new
formula
for
the
threshold:100% (total number of votes cast for
partylist)-------------------------------------------------------=1.818%55 party-list seats And that the
minimum vote requirement should gradually
lessen as the number of party-list seats
increases.
Doctrines: A Philippine-style party-list election
has at least four inviolable parameters:
1.

20% allocation

. The combined number of all party-list

congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the

totalmembership
of
the
House
of
Representatives, including those elected under
the party list;
2. 2% threshold
. Only those parties garnering a minimum of
2% of the total valid votes cast for the partylistsystem are qualified to have a seat in the
House of Representatives;
3. Three- seat limit
. Each qualified party, regardless of the number
of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to
amaximum of three seats; that is, one
qualifying and two additional seats;
4. Proportional representation
. The additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed in proportion to
their total number of votes.In declaring the 2%
threshold unconstitutional, the Court does not
limit the allocation of additional seats to the
two- percenters. The percentage of votes
garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived
at by dividing the number of votes garnered by
each party by the total number of votes cast
for party-list candidates. There are two steps in
thesecond round of seat allocation. First, the
percentage is multiplied by the remaining
available seats (the difference between the
maximum seats reserved under the Party-List
System and the guaranteed seats of the twopercenters).The whole integer of the product of
the percentage and of the remaining available
seats corresponds to a partysshare in the
remaining available seats. Second, one partylist seat is assigned to each of the parties next
in rank untilall available seats are completely
distributed. Finally, the three-seat cap is
applied to determine the number of seatseach
qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

The 20% allocation of party-list representatives

is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives
cannot be more than20% of the members of
the House of Representatives.
Obiter: It is the intent of the sovereign people
that matters in interpreting the Constitution. It
is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and
underrepresented in our midst are the majority
who wallow in poverty, destitution, and
infirmity. It was for them the party-list system
was
enactedto
give
them
not only
genuinehope, but genuine power; to give them
the opportunity to be elected and to represent
the specific concerns of their constituencies;

and simply to give them a direct voice in

Congress and in the larger affairs of the
State.Time changes and the laws change with
it. Justice Nachura
Bagabuyo v Comelec
In 2006, RA 9371 was promulgated by
Congress. It was entitled An Act Providing for
the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative
District of the City of Cagayan De Oro. This
was proposed by Rep. Jaraula from Cagayan de
Oro. It increased Cagayan de Oros legislative
district from one to two. In the next election,
Cagayan de Oros voters would be classified as
belonging to either the first or the second
district, depending on their place of residence.
The constituents of each district would elect
their own representative to Congress as well as
eight
members
of
the
Sangguniang
Panglungsod. On 13 March 2007, the COMELEC
en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 7837
implementing R.A. No. 9371. Bagabuyo filed
the present petition against the COMELEC on
March 27, 2007 asking for the nullification of
R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on
constitutional grounds, the petitioner argued
that 1.) Cagayan de Oro Citys reapportionment
under R.A. No. 9371 falls within the meaning of
creation,
division,
merger,
abolition
or
substantial alteration of boundaries of cities
under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution;
2.) the creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government
units
involve
a
common
denominator the material change in the
political and economic rights of the local
government units directly affected, as well as
of the people therein; 3.) a voters sovereign
power to decide on who should be elected as
the entire citys Congressman was arbitrarily
reduced by at least one half because the
questioned law and resolution only allowed him
to vote and be voted for in the district
designated by the COMELEC; 4.) a voter was
also arbitrarily denied his right to elect the
Congressman and the members of the city
council for the other legislative district, and 5.)
government funds were illegally disbursed
without prior approval by the sovereign
electorate of Cagayan De Oro City.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 9371 merely
provide for the legislative reapportionment of
Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve the
division and conversion of a local government
unit. Whether or not it violates the equality of
representation doctrine.
HELD: Legislative apportionment is defined by
Blacks Law Dictionary as the determination of

the number of representatives which a State,

county or other subdivision may send to a
legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a
legislative body in proportion to the population;
the drawing of voting district lines so as to
equalize population and voting power among
the districts. Reapportionment, on the other
hand, is the realignment or change in
legislative districts brought about by changes
in
population
and
mandated
by
the
constitutional requirement of equality of
representation. RA 9371 does not have the
effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro
into two political and corporate units and
territories. Rather than divide the city either
territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect
is merely to enhance voter representation by
giving each city voter more and greater say,
both in Congress and in the Sangguniang
Panglunsod.

Valles v Comelec

Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one

congressman and 12 city council members
citywide for its population of approximately
500,000. By having two legislative districts,
each of them with one congressman, Cagayan
de Oro now effectively has two congressmen,
each one representing 250,000 of the citys
population. This easily means better access to
their congressman since each one now services
only 250,000 constituents as against the
500,000. The fewer constituents represented
translate to a greater voice for each individual
city resident in Congress and in the
Sanggunian. The City, for its part, now has
twice the number of congressmen speaking for
it and voting in the halls of Congress. Since the
total number of congressmen in the country
has not increased to the point of doubling its
numbers, the presence of two congressman
(instead of one) from the same city cannot but
be
a
quantitative
and
proportional
improvement in the representation of Cagayan
de Oro City in Congress. Bagabuyo further
contends that RA 9371 violates the equality in
representation doctrine as it appears that one
district has a higher number of voters as
compared to the other and that one is
urbanized the other is rural. This is the
clarification; the law clearly provides that the
basis for districting shall be the number of the
inhabitants of a city or a province, not the
number of registered voters therein

Ruling: Respondent is a Filipino. In 1934, the

controlling laws of the Philippines were the
Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine
Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916 (Jones Law).
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the
Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April
11, 1899 and resided therein, including their
children, are considered Philippine citizens.
Respondents father was therefore a
Filipino, and consequently, her.

Facts: Petitioner questions the qualification of

private respondent RosalindYbasco Lopez to
run for governor of Davao Oriental on
citizenship grounds. Respondent was born in
1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an
Australian mother. In 1998, she applied for an
Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and
was issued an Australian passport.

Issue: WON respondent is a Filipino; and if she

is, WON she renounced her citizenship by
applying for ACR and ICR and being issued an
Australian passport.

Respondent did not lose her citizenship.

Renunciation of citizenship must be express.
Applying for ACR, ICR, and Australian passport
are not enough to renounce citizenship. They
are merely acts of assertion of her Australian
citizenship before she effectively renounced
the same.

Dual citizenship in the LGC, Sec 40, means

dual allegiance.