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    Armstrong, David - What is Consciousness

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    215 views8 pages

    Armstrong, David - What Is Consciousness

    Uploaded by

    EricPezoa
    Armstrong, David - What is Consciousness

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    4 5 What Is Consciousness? David Armstrong ‘The notion of consciousness is notoriously ob- scure, Itis difficult to analyze, and some philos- fophers and others have thought it unanalyzable. It is not even clear that the word “consciousness” stands for jut one sort of entity, quality, process, for whatever. There is, however, one thesis about consciousness that T believe can be confidently rejected: Descartes’s doctrine that consciousness is the estonce of mentality. That view assumes that we can explain mentality in terms of con- sciousness. I think that the truth is in fact the ‘other way round. Indeed, in the most interesting sense of the word “consciousness,” consciousness isthe cream on the cake of mentality, a special and sophisticated development of mentality. It is not the cake itself. In what follows, I develop an aant-Cartesian account of consciousness. ‘Minimal Consciousness In thinking about consciousness itis helpful to begin at the other end and consider a totally un- ‘conscious person, Somebody in a sound, dream less sloop may be taken as an example. It has been disputed whether unconsciousness is really ever total. There is some empirical evidence that a person in dreamless sleep, or even under a total anesthetic, still has some minimal awareness Minimal behavioral reactions to sensory stimuli have been abserved under these conditions. But Jet us take it, if only as a simplifying and perhaps ‘unrealistic assumption, that we are dealing with {otal unconsciousness. ‘Notice first that we are perfectly happy to con- cede that such a person, while in this state of total unconsciousness, has @ mind. Furthermore, al- though by hypothesis this mind is in no way ac- tive—no mental events take place, no mental processes occur within it—we freely allow that this mind isin various states. ‘The totally unconscious person does not lack knowledge and beliefs. Suppose him to be a his- torian of the medieval period. We will not deny hhim a great deal of knowledge of and beliefs about the Middle Ages just because he is sound asleep. He cannot give current expression to his knowledge and his beliefs, but he does not lack them. The totally unconscious person also may be ‘credited with memories. He also can be said to have skills, including purely mental skills such as ‘an ability for mental arithmetic. The ability is not lost during sound sleep just because it then cannot be exercised, any more than an athlete loses his athletic abilities during sound sleep, when he cannot exercise them. A totally unconscious per- sen may be credited with likes and dislikes, atti- tudes and emotions, current desires and current aims and purposes. He may be said to have cer~ tain traits of character and termperament. He ray be said to bein certain moods: “He has been. dopressed allthis week.” How are we to conceive of these mental states (Gt seems natural to call them "states”) we atrib- ‘ule to the unconscious person? Some decades ago, ‘under the influence of positivstic and phenomen- alistic modes of thought, such attributions of ‘mental states to an unconscious person would not have been taken very seriously, ontologicaly. It would have been thought that to say that the currently unconscious person A believes that p, is simply to refer to various ways in which 4’s mind works, or would work in suitable circumstances, before andjor after he wakes up. (The same posi- tivist spirit might try further to reduce the way that ’s mind works to 4’s peripheral bodily be- havior or to the bebavior A would exhibit in suit able circumstances.) In historical perspective, wecan see clearly how ‘unsatisfactory such a view is. Consider two per- sons, A and B, unconscious at the same time, Where it is true of A that be believes that p, but false of B. Must there not be a difference between A and B at that time to constitute this difference in bolio-state? What else in the world could act as David Armstrong 4 truth-maker (the ground in the world) for the different conditional statements that are true of A and 2? The mind of the unconscious person can- not be dissolved into statements about what would be true of the person if the situation were other than it was; if, in particular, he were not Tn considering this point, Ifind very helpful the analogy between an unconscious person and a computer that has been programmed in various ways, that perhaps has partially worked through certain routines and is ready to continue with them, but is not currently operating. (I do not think that anything in the analogy tums on the material, physical nature of the computer. Even if the mind has to be conceived of in some imma terial way, the analogy will still hold.) The com- puter, pechaps, will have a certain amount of information stored in its memory banks. This stored information may be compared to the knowledge, belief, and memories the unconscious ‘person sill has during unconsciousness, Ifa Ma- terialist account of the mind is correct, then, of course, knowledge, belief, and memory will be physically encoded in the brain in some broadly similar way to the way in which information is stored in the computer. But the Dualist, say, will ‘equally require the conception of immaterial storage of knowledge, belief, and memory, ‘What we can say both of the knowledge, be- lief, and so forth possessed by the totally uncon- scious person, and also of the information stored in the switched-off computer, is that they are ‘causally quiescent, Of course, nothing is causally quiescent absolutely: while a thing exists, it has effects upon its environment. But the information stored in the switched-off computer is causally quiescent with respect to the computing oper- ations of the computer, and for our purposes this ‘may be called causal quiescence, (The informa- tion may remain causally quiescent even after the ‘computer has been switched on, unless that piece of information is required for current calcu- lations, In the same way, knowledge and beliefs ‘may be said to be causally quiescent while they ™ sre not prodvcing any mental eet in the person ‘The mental sacs of totally unconscious person are thus causally quiescent Gf they are not, we ‘may stipulate that the person isnot totally'un- conscious). Knowledge, beliefs, and so on may ‘eran causally quiescent inthis sense even when the mind is operational, fo instance, where there iso call to ue a particular pice of knowledge, Tt seems, theo, that we atibute mental states of various sorts to a totally unconscious person. But there are certain mental atributions we do not make. The totally unconscious person does not pereive, has no sensation, fesings, or pangs of desire, He cannot think, contemplate, or en- fnge in any sort of deliberation, (He can have purposes, because purposes are capable of causal {uiewance, but he cannot be engeged in carrying them out) This is because pereetion, sensation, and thinking ae mental activities in'a way that knowledge and beliefs are not. The distinction appears, roughly at any rate, to be the distinction between events and occurences on the one band, and states on the other. When a mental state is producing mental effects, the comingsto-be of such effets are mental evens: and so mental ac- {vty i involved. ‘We now have a first sense for the word “con- sciournese” If there is mental activity cocurring in the mind, if something mental is actaally ap- pening, then that mind isnot totaly unconscioss. {eis therefore conscious. A singe faint sonsation isnot much, but fit ours, to that extent there conicioumess, Unconsciousness is not total. I call consciousness in tis sense “minimal” con- This alleged that it sometimes occurs thet someone wakes up knowing the solution to, say ‘mathematical problem, which they did no krow when they went to sleep. If we rule out magical cxplanations, then there must have been mental activity during sep. To that exten, there was rinimal consciournest. Ths is compatible with the completest “unconsciousness” in a sense sill tobe identified. ‘What Is Conscioust Perceptual Consciow ‘Among the mental that we make a spe ness and perception sciousness of what i environment and in consciousness may important sense in ceiving, then he is n ceiving, then he is ¢ to be dreaming. Si going on, the perso He is minimally coz obvious sense in wt suppose that this pe vironment and bodi "suppose he wakes ‘more to waking up again.) T think that that the person was the had not been be! Let us say, therefor. ceptual” consciousn the word “consciow: ness entails minima consciousness does sciousness. Introspective Consci Let us suppose, now going om in a persc cludes perception. Il accepted, then there a person can be sait has minimal consci consciousness, Thert in which such a pers ness.” Various cas, My own favorite is truck driver. Ithas t ple have experienced m2 in the person, sscious person ¥ are not, we ot totally un- d 50 on may ase even when 2 where there knowledge, mental states reious person, tutions we do 5 person does ings, oF pangs aplate, or en- He can have able of causal odin carrying on, sensation, ma way that 1e distinction, be distinction the one hand, rental state is ings-to-be of so mental ac- word “con- ‘ity occurring ‘actually hap- tint sensation extent there is not total. 1 \inimal” con: occurs that tion to, say, a did not know ‘out magical ‘been mental at, there was patible with 1 sense still ‘What Is Consciousness? ‘Perceptual Consciousness ‘Among the mental activities, however, it appears that we make a special link between conscious- ness and perception. In perception, there is con- sciousness of what is currently going on in one's environment and in one's body. (Of course, the consciousness may involve illusion) There is an important sease in which, if a person is not per- ceiving, then he is not conscious, but i he is per- ceiving, then he is conscious. Suppose somebody to be dreaming. Since thero is mental activity going on, the person isnot totally unconscious. He is minimally conscious. Yet is there not some obvious sense in which he is unconscious? Now suppose that this person starts to perceive his en- vironment and bodily state. (Lo not want to say “suppose he wakes up", because perhaps there is ‘more to waking up than just starting to perceive again) [think that we would be inclined to say that the person was now conssious in a way that hho had not been before, while merely dreaming. [Let us say, therefore, that he has regained ‘per- ceptual” consciousness. This is a second sense of the word “consciousness.” Perceptual conscious- ness entails minimal consciousnes, but minimal consciousness does not entail perceptual con- Introspective Consciousness Let us suppose, now, that there is mental activity ‘going on ina person, and that this activity in-

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