Philosophy Faculty Reading List and Course Outline 2014-2015

PART IB PAPER 03:

ETHICS

Prerequisites
There are no formal prerequisites, but the course builds on material that has been
covered in Part IA. Those who have not already taken the Part IA Ethics and Political
Philosophy course are strongly advised to study some of the recommended reading for
that course.
Objectives

SYLLABUS
Helping and harming: demands and limits of beneficence, aggregating
interests, consent, collective harms, poverty, climate change, abortion
Promising: contractualism, conventionalism
Reasons for action: Humean theories and intellectualist accounts
Kantian constructivism
Moral psychology: moral motivation, virtues, vices, moral learning

Students taking this paper will be expected to:

1. Acquire a detailed knowledge of some of the central arguments contained in the
texts studied on the topics chosen.
2. Acquire an understanding of how the different topics studied relate to one another.
3. Engage in close criticism with the arguments studied.
4. Develop their own powers of philosophical analysis and argument, through study of
the readings set for the topics chosen.
Preliminary Reading

COURSE OUTLINE
This paper covers a wide range of topics in moral philosophy, ranging from metaethics,
normative ethics, to moral psychology and covering both historical and modern
perspectives.
The first two sections deal with normative questions. Helping and Harming, is concerned
with normative questions about the nature and scope of our moral obligations. How
demanding are moral requirements? What obligations do we have to future people? Why
does consent alter what we are allowed to? These questions are considered both in the
abstract, as well as applied to specific moral issues: poverty, climate change, and
abortion.
The second section, Promising, considers a central moral practice and asks about its
foundation.
The next two sections, Reasons for action and Kantian Constructivism concern
foundational questions in metaethics. What is the relationship between the considerations
that justify our actions and those that explain why we acted a particular way? The paper
considers these questions both from a historical perspective as well as looking at
contemporary debates.
The final section of the paper focuses on what it is for us to be good. Does moral
motivation require that we deliberate about what reasons we have? Is being virtuous a
matter of having certain character traits and dispositions? What does psychology tell us
about character traits and how we acquire them? And what is the relationship between
being good and having a good life?
1

ANNAS, Julia, Intelligent Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

COHON, Rachel, Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008). Also available online at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268443.001.0001.
SMITH, Michael, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). [Especially chs. 3-5]
WILLAND, Eric, Reasons (London: Continuum, 2012).

READING LIST
*Material marked with an asterisk* is important

HELPING AND HARMING

Demands and Limits of Beneficence
*MURPHY, Liam B., 'The Demands of Beneficence', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 22
(1993): 267-92.
*RAILTON, Peter, 'Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality',
Philosophy & Public Affairs, 13, no. 2 (1984): 134-71.
*SINGER, Peter, 'Famine, Affluence, and Morality', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1, no. 3
(1972): 229-43.
BUSS, Sarah, 'Needs (Someone Else's), Projects (My Own), and Reasons', Journal of
Philosophy, 103, no. 8 (2006): 373-402.
CULLITY, Garrett, The Moral Demands of Affluence (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004). Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199258112.001.0001.
HERMAN, Barbara, 'The Scope of Moral Requirement', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 30,
no. 3 (2001): 227-56.
2

MILLER, Richard, 'Beneficence, Duty, and Distance', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 32, no.
4 (2004): 357-83.
Aggregating Interests

MILLER, Franklin, and Alan WERTHEIMER, 'Preface to the Theory of Transactions:

Beyond Valid Consent', in their The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 79-106. Also available online at:
www.dawsonera.com.

*NORCROSS, Alastair, 'Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives', Philosophy &
Public Affairs, 26, no. 2 (1997): 135-67.
*SCANLON, T.M., 'Aggregation', in his What We Owe Each Other (Cambridge, MA:
Belknap, 1998), ch. 5, sect. 9. Also available on Camtools.
*TAUREK, John M. , 'Should the Numbers Count?', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 6, no. 4
(1977): 239-316.
HIROSE, Iwao, 'Saving the Greater Number without Combining Claims', Analysis, 61, no.
4 (2001): 341-42.
PARFIT, Derek, 'Different Attitudes to Time', in his Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1986), ch. 8. Also available online at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019824908X.003.0008.
PARFIT, Derek, 'Justifiability to Each Person', Ratio, 16, no. 4 (2003): 368-90.
THOMSON, Judith Jarvis, 'The Trolley Problem', The Yale Law Journal, 94, no. 6 (1985):
1395-415.
VELLEMAN, J. David, 'Well-Being and Time', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 72, no. 1
(1991): 48-77.
WASSERMAN, David T., and Alan STRUDLER, 'Can a Nonconsequentialist Count
Lives?', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 31, no. 1 (2003): 71-94.

*GLOVER, Jonathan, and M.J. SCOTT-TAGGART, 'It Makes No Difference Whether or

Not I Do it', Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 49 (1975): 171-209.
*KAGAN, Shelly, 'Do I Make a Difference?', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 39, no. 2 (2011):
105-41.
NEFSKY, Julia, 'Consequentialism and the Problem of Collective Harm: A Reply to
Kagan', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 39, no. 4 (2011): 364-95.
PARFIT, Derek, 'Five Mistakes in Moral Mathematics', in his Reasons and Persons
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 67-86. Also available online at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019824908X.003.0003.
PARFIT, Derek, 'The Non-Identity Problem', in his Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1986), pp. 351-81. Also available online at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019824908X.003.0016.
PARFIT, Derek, 'The Repugnant Conclusion', in his Reasons and Persons (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 128-31. Also available online at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019824908X.003.0017.

Consent

Poverty

*KORSGAARD, Christine, 'Kants Formula of Humanity', Kant Studien, 77 (1986): 183202. Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kant.1986.77.1-4.183.
Reprinted in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996).
*O'NEILL, Onora, 'Between Consenting Adults', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 14, no. 3
(1985): 252-77.
*PALLIKKATYAYIL, Japa, 'Deriving Morality from Politics: Rethinking the Formula of
Humanity', Ethics, 121, no. 1 (2010): 116-47.
ARCHARD, David, 'The Wrong of Rape', Philosophical Quarterly, 57, no. 228 (2007):
374-93.
BEAUCHAMP, Tom, 'Autonomy and Consent', in F.G. Miller and A. Wertheimer, eds.,
The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010), pp. 55-78. Also available online at www.dawsonera.com.
CONLY, Sarah, 'Seduction, Rape, and Coercion', Ethics, 115, no. 1 (2004): 96-121.
DOUGHERTY, Tom, 'Sex, Lies, and Consent', Ethics, 123, no. 4 (2013): 717-44.
EYAL, Nir, 'Informed Consent', in E.N. Zalta, ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Fall 2012 Edition) [Online]. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/informedconsent (Accessed: 24 September 2014).
MANSON, Neil, and Onora ONEILL, Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Also available online at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511814600.

*O'NEILL, Onora, 'A Kantian Approach to World Hunger', in M. Timmons, ed., Disputed
Moral Issues: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Also available on
Camtools.
*OTSUKA, Michael, and Alex VOORHOEVE, 'Why it Matters That Some Are Worse Off
Than Others: An Argument against the Priority View', Philosophy & Public Affairs,
37, no. 2 (2009): 171-99.
*PARFIT, Derek, 'Equality and Priority', Ratio, 10, no. 3 (1997): 202-21.
*TEMKIN, Larry, 'Illuminating Egalitarianism', in T. Christiano and J. Christman, eds.,
Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2009), pp.
153-78. Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444310399.ch9
ONEILL, Onora, 'Lifeboat Earth', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 4, no. 3 (1975): 273-92.
POGGE, Thomas, 'Real World Justice', Journal of Ethics, 9 (2005): 29-53.
SWIFT, Adam, Political Philosophy: A Beginners' Guide for Students and Politicians
(Cambridge: Polity, 2006).

Collective Harms

Climate Change
* SCHEFFLER, Samuel S., 'Individual Responsibility in a Global Age', in his Boundaries
and Allegiances (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Also available online at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199257671.003.0003.
BROOME, John, Climate Matters (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 2014).
4

GARDINER, Stephen M., 'Ethics and Global Climate Change', Ethics, 114, no. 3 (2004):
555-600.
GARDINER, Stephen M., 'The Real Tragedy of the Commons', Philosophy & Public
Affairs, 30, no. 4 (2001): 387-416.
GARDINER, Stephen M., et al., Climate Ethics: Essential Readings (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010). [Particularly the readings by Shue, Sinnott-Armstrong,
Parfit]
SINGER, Peter, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chs. 9
& 10.

Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198249926.001.0001.

HUSI, Stan, 'Is Promising a Practice and Nothing More?' in H. Sheinman, ed., Promises
and Agreements: Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.
OWENS, David, Shaping the Normative Landscape (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012), ch.
5: The Problem with Promising. Reprinted in H. Sheinman, ed., Promises and
Agreements: Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 5879. Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.
SHIFFRIN, Seana, 'Promising, Intimate Relationships and Conventionalism',
Philosophical Review, 177, no. 4 (2008): 481-524.

Abortion

Contractualism

*THOMSON, Judith Jarvis, 'A Defense of Abortion', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1, no. 1
(1971): 47-66. Reprinted in H. Kuhse and P. Singer, eds., Bioethics: an Anthology
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 40-50.
BRAKES, Elizabeth, 'Fatherhood and Child Support: Do Men Have a Right to Choose?',
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 22, no. 1 (2005): 55-73.
FOOT, Philippa, 'The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect', in her
Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), pp. 19-32. Also available online at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199252866.003.0002. Reprinted in B. Steinbock and A.
Norcross, eds., Killing and Letting Die. 2nd ed. (New York: Fordham University
Press, 1994), pp. 266-79.
HARMAN, Elizabeth, 'Creation Ethics: The Moral Status of Early Fetuses and the Ethics
of Abortion', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 28, no. 4 (1999): 310-24.
LITTLE, Margaret O., 'Abortion, Intimacy, and the Duty to Gestate', Ethical Theory and
Moral Practice, 2, no. 3 (1999): 295-312.
MARQUIS, Don, 'Why Abortion Is Immoral', The Journal of Philosophy, 86 (1989): 183202. Reprinted in H. Kuhse and P. Singer, eds., Bioethics: an Anthology (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2006), pp. 51-62.
SHIFFRIN, Seana, 'Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of
Harm', Legal Theory, 5, no. 2 (1999): 117-48.
TOOLEY, Michael, 'Abortion and Infanticide', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2, no. 1 (1972):
37-65. Reprinted in H. Kuhse & P. Singer, eds., Bioethics: an Anthology (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2006), pp. 2540.

*KOLODNY, Niko, and Jay WALLACE, 'Promises and Practices Revisited', Philosophy &
Public Affairs, 31, no. 2 (2003): 119-54.
*SCANLON, T.M., 'Promises and Practices', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 19, no. 3 (1990):
199-226.
GILBERT, Margaret, 'Scanlon on Promissory Obligation: The Problem of Promisees
Rights', Journal of Philosophy, 101, no. 2 (2004): 83-109.
RAWLS, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), ch.
6.
SCANLON, T.M., What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1998), ch. 5 & 7.
SOUTHWOOD, Nicholas, and Daniel FREIDERICH, 'Promises and Trust', in H.
Sheinman, ed., Promises and Agreements: Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011), pp. 277-94. Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.

REASONS FOR ACTION

Humean Theories and Intellectualist Accounts

*OWENS, David, 'A Simple Theory of Promising', Philosophical Review, 115, no. 1
(2006): 51-77.
*RAWLS, John, 'Two Concepts of Rules', Philosophical Review, 64, no. 1 (1955): 3-32.
DARWALL, Stephen, 'Authority and Second Personal Reasons for Acting', in D. Sobel
and S. Wall, eds., Reasons for Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009). Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511720185.007.
GAUTHIER, David, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chs. 1 & 6.

*COHON, Rachel, 'Hume's Moral Philosophy', in E.N. Zalta, ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Fall 2010 edition) [Online]. Available at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/hume-moral/ (Accessed: 24
September 2014).
*KORSGAARD, Christine, 'Skepticism About Practical Reason', Journal of Philosophy, 83
(1986): 5-26. Reprinted in S. Darwall, A. Gibbard and P. Railton, eds., Moral
Discourse and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 373-87.
*NORTON, David F., 'Hume, Human Nature, and the Foundations of Morality', in D.F.
Norton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), pp. 148-81. Also available online at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521382734.
*SCHNEEWIND, J. B., ed., Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 156 - 82, 293 - 312, 22 - 29, 545 - 66, 86 603, 30 - 50.
*SCHROEDER, Mark, Slaves of the Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

PROMISING
Conventionalism

Also available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com. [Especially chs. 1 & 11]

*WILLIAMS, Bernard, 'Internal and External Reasons', in T.R. Harrison, ed., Rational
Action: Studies in Philosophy and Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979), pp. 17-28. Reprinted in B. Williams, Moral Luck
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 101-13. Also available online
at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139165860. Also in P.K. Moser, ed.,
Rationality in Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 387-97.
COHON, Rachel, Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008). Also available online at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268443.001.0001.
DREIER, James, 'Humean Doubts About the Practical Justification of Morality', in G.
Cullity and B. Gaut, eds., Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1997), pp. 81-100.
IRWIN, Terence, The Development of Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),
chs. 42, 46, 47, 58, 61 & 63.
KEARNS, Stephen, and Daniel STAR, 'Reasons: Explanations or Evidence?', Ethics, 119,
no. 1 (2011): 31-56.
MARKOVITS, Julia, 'Why Be an Internalist About Reasons?', Oxford Studies in
Metaethics, 6 (2011): 255-79.
MCDOWELL, John, 'Might There Be External Reasons?' in J.E.J. Altham and T.R.
Harrison, eds., World, Mind and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of
Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 68-85.
Reprinted in his Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge MA: Harvard University
Press, 1998), pp. 95-111.
NAGEL, Thomas, Possibility of Altruism (Princeon: Princeton University Press, 1970).
[Especially chs. 1 & 11]
PARFIT, Derek, 'Reasons and Motivation', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Suppl.
Vol., 71, no. 1 (1997): 99-130.
RAWLS, John, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2000).
SCHNEEWIND, J. B., The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), chs. 7, 15, 16, 17 & 18.
SETIYA, Kieron, 'Against Internalism', Nos, 38 (2004): 266-98.
SMITH, Michael, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), chs. 3 & 4.
STREET, Sharon, 'Constructivism About Reasons', Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 3
(2008): 207-45.
STREET, Sharon, 'In Defense of Future Tuesday Indifference: Ideally Coherent
Eccentrics and the Contingency of What Matters', Philosophical Issues, 19, no. 1
(2009): 273-98.
VELLEMAN, J. David, 'The Possibility of Practical Reason', Ethics, 106, no. 4 (1996):
694-726.
WALLACE, R. Jay, 'How to Argue About Practical Reason', Mind, 99, no. 395 (1990):
355-85.

KANTIAN CONSTRUCTIVISM
*KORSGAARD, Christine, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996). [Especially chs. 3 & 4]
*RAWLS, John, 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', Journal of Philosophy, 77
(1980): 515-72.
DARWALL, Stephen, The Second-Person Standpoint (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2006). [Especially chs. 1 & 11]
ENOCH, David, 'Can There Be a Global, Interesting, Coherent Constructivism About
Practical Reason?', Philosophical Explorations, 12 (2009): 319-39.
MILO, Ronald, 'Contractarian Constructivism', Journal of Philosophy, 92 (1966): 181-204.
Reprinted in R. Shafer-Landau and T. Cuneo, eds., Foundations of Ethics (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2007), pp. 120-31.
SCANLON, T.M, 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', in A. Sen and B. Williams, eds.,
Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp.
103-29. Reprinted in R. Shafer-Landau, ed., Ethical Theory (Oxford: Blackwell,
2007), pp. 644-60.
SCANLON, T.M., What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2000), Introduction and ch. 5.

MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
Moral Motivation
*SMITH, Michael, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), chs. 3 & 4.
*SVAVARSDTTIR, Sigrn, 'Moral Cognitivism and Motivation', Philosophical Review,
108 (1999): 161-219.
ARPALY, Nomy , and Timothy SCHROEDER, 'Deliberation and Acting for Reasons',
Philosophical Review, 121 (2012): 209-39.
HAIDT, Jonathan, 'The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail', Psychological Review, 108,
no. 4 (2001): 814-34.
KENNETT, Jeanette, 'Autism, Empathy and Moral Agency', Philosophical Quarterly, 52,
no. 208 (2002): 340-57.
RAILTON, Peter, 'The Affective Dog and Its Rational Tale', Ethics, 124, no. 4 (2014): 81359.
ROSKIES, Adina, 'Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons From
"Acquired Sociopathy"', Philosophical Psychology, 16, no. 1 (2003): 51-66.
SCHROEDER, Timothy, Adina L. ROSKIES, and Shaun NICHOLS, 'Moral Motivation', in
J.M. Doris, ed., Moral Psychology Handbook (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010), pp. 72-110. Also available online at: http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=260071.
VELLEMAN, J. David, 'The Guise of the Good', Nos, 26, no. 1 (1992): 3-26.

Virtues, Vices, Moral Learning

*ANNAS, Julia Intelligent Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
*ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, edited by R. Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000), bk. 1; bk. 2, chs. 1-7; bk. 6, chs. 9-11; bk. 7, chs. 1-10.
*HARMAN, Gilbert, 'Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the
Fundamental Attribution Error', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99 (1999):
315-31.
*MCDOWELL, John, 'Virtue and Reason', Monist, 62 (1979): 331-50.
ANNAS, Julia, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), ch.1.
Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195096525.001.0001.
BADHWAR, Neera K., 'The Limited Unity of Virtue', Nos, 30, no. 3 (1996): 306-29.
DORIS, John M., 'Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics', Nos, 32, no. 5 (1998): 504-30.
DRIVER, Julia, Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Also
available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498770.
FOOT, Philippa, 'Virtues and Vices', in her Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral
Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 1-18. Also available online
at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199252866.003.0001. Reprinted in R. Crisp and M.
Slote, eds., Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 163-77.
HAYBRON, Daniel, The Pursuit of Unhappiness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008),
chs. 8 & 9.
HURKA, Thomas, Virtue, Vice, and Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Also
available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195137167.001.0001.
HURSTHOUSE, Rosalind, 'The Central Doctrine of the Mean', in R. Kraut, ed., The
Blackwell Guide to Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp.
96-115. Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470776513.ch4.
HURSTHOUSE, Rosalind, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999). Also
available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199247994.001.0001.
KAMTEKAR, Rachana, 'Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character',
Ethics, 114, no. 3 (2004): 458-91.
NUSSBAUM, Martha C. , 'Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach', in M.
Nussbaum and A. Sen, eds., The Quality of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1993), pp. 242-70. Also available online at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198287976.001.0001.
PAKALUK, Michael, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: An Introduction (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005).
RAILTON, Peter, 'Two Cheers for Virtue: Or, Might Virtue Be Habit Forming?', Oxford
Studies in Normative Ethics, 1 (2004): 295-330.
RORTY, Amlie O., ed., Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1980). [Particularly articles by Wiggins, Sorabji, Irwin and
Burnyeat Kosman]
SREENIVASAN, Gopal, 'Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution', Mind,
111, no. 441 (2002): 47-68.