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Theory
This book provides a forum for leading scholars in organization theory (OT) to engage in
meta-theoretical reflection on the historical development, present state, and future
prospects of OT. It explores the status of OT as a social science discipline. It aims at
reviewing and evaluating important epistemological developments in OT, especially issues
related to the kinds of knowledge claims put forward in OT and the controversies
surrounding the generation, validation, and utilization of such knowledge. This article
provides a few words to clarify the term ‘organization theory’. Organization theory is seen
as the academic field specializing in the study of organizational phenomena (both micro
and macro) and for this reason OT is used here as a synonym for Organization Studies.
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Although OT is a relatively new scientific field, in its sixty or so years of existence it has
reflected most of the major trends and shifts that have emerged in the social sciences at
large. All the major epistemological debates that have broken out in the social sciences
have also been played out in OT (Burrell and Morgan 1979; Deetz 1996; Morgan 1983;
Tsoukas 1994; Scherer and Steinmann 1999). The publication that undoubtedly, more
than any other, kicked off serious epistemological debate in OT has been Burrell and
Morgan's Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis, published in 1979.
Drawing on the most influential philosophical vocabularies of the time—notably, the
Kuhnian notion of ‘paradigm’ and the notion of ‘radical change’ inspired by Marxism—
Burrell and Morgan mapped out OT in terms of four paradigms. Other interesting
attempts to provide an epistemological route map to the field has been the work of Astley
and Van de Ven (1983), and Pfeffer (1982).
What is interesting to note from the early meta-theoretical attempts is their concern with
creating typologies: they aimed at providing a map of the main theories of the field,
teasing out their epistemological assumptions, rather than philosophically, historically,
and sociologically scrutinizing key categories implicated in organizational research.
Judged in their own terms, such attempts have been successful and furnished us with a
helpful vocabulary in terms of which we (p. 3) may comprehend theoretical developments
in the field. At the same time, it is interesting to note that some of the early controversies
concerning, for example, qualitative vs. quantitative approaches (Morgan and Smircich
1980) have somewhat faded. It is now broadly accepted that each one of these
approaches has its merits. Moreover, we do not seem to care very much about narrowly
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Other controversies, however, keep resurfacing from time to time. The notion of
‘paradigm’, for example, has not gone away, and how paradigms relate to one another, as
well as the validity of the competing knowledge claims they help generate, have
preoccupied several researchers until recently (Czarniawska 1998; Donaldson 1998;
Jackson and Carter 1991; Kaghan and Phillips 1998; McKinley and Mone 1998; Scherer
and Steinmann 1999; Scherer 1998; Willmott 1993). Similarly, the time-old questions
surrounding the applicability of OT knowledge has resurfaced as a result of new
philosophical developments in hermeneutics (such as the emergence of neo-
Aristotelianism—see Maclntyre 1985; Toulmin 1990; Tsoukas and Cummings 1997),
pragmatism (Wicks and Freeman 1998), critical theory and postmodern philosophy
(Alvesson and Deetz 1996; Gergen and Thatchenkery 1998; Alvesson and Willmott 1992).
Consequently, the very notion of ‘practical reason’ has undergone new definitions.
Meanwhile, new issues have cropped up, mainly as a result of fresh developments in the
philosophy, sociology, and history of science. The critique of representationalism and the
concomitant ‘linguistic turn’ in the philosophy of science have raised new questions about
the very idea of ‘knowledge’, its modes of justification, and its relation to action (Rorty
1989, 1991; Tsoukas 1998). Recent developments in the philosophy of science make it
possible to provide fresh insights into old controversies in OT, such as agency vs.
structure, voluntarism vs. determinism, and micro vs. macro approaches, and help us
refine our understanding of explanation. Similarly, recent research in the sociology and
history of science enables us to understand now, better than before, the broader socio-
cultural factors that are implicated in the production of OT knowledge (Knorr 1981;
Latour and Woolgar 1986; Mirowski 1989; Pickering 1992). Questions regarding the role
of gender, race, ethnicity, the state, and professional bodies in the production of OT
knowledge, as well as the rhetorical function of OT discourse to persuade particular
audiences, have come to the fore in a way that early meta-theoretical accounts had not
quite anticipated (Czarniawska 1999; Guillen 1994; Martin 1990, 1994; Nkomo 1992;
Shenhav 1999).
(1) What is the status of OT as science? What counts as valid knowledge in OT and
why? How do different paradigms view OT? (Part I)
(2) How has OT developed over time, and what structure has the field taken? What
assumptions does knowledge produced in OT incorporate, and what forms do its
knowledge claims take as they are put forward for public adoption? (Part II)
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No doubt the above questions do not exhaust the list of meta-theoretical issues that could
be explored in OT, although they are a good start. We are aware of certain omissions in
the present handbook which, ideally, we would not have allowed. The question of race in
OT, for example, is not covered, as is not the question of time. We would have liked to
have included more material on organizational economics and psychology, on theory
building, on comparative OT, and on the institutional influences on the formation of OT in
different societies. We would have done more in an ideal world. Alas, as we will argue
below, if knowledge production is viewed as a practical activity, it is never produced in
ideal-world conditions; we had to cope with all the uncertainty and incompleteness that
surrounds practical, real-world projects. We hope, however, that what is provided in this
handbook is stimulating enough to contribute to our collective learning as organizational
scholars and to pave the way for other similar books in the future.
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The moment such questions are raised, meta-theoretical reflection (i.e. reflexivity) begins.
What is valid knowledge and how is it to be generated? To whom exactly should it be
made relevant? For what purpose? What does ‘relevant’ mean anyway, and how is
‘relevant’ knowledge best produced? How should competing knowledge claims be
evaluated? Raising such questions implies taking a step back from ordinary theoretical
activity to reflect on what the latter should be aiming at and how it ought to be conducted
—it is for this reason that such reflection is called ‘meta-theoretical’. By raising those
‘meta’ questions the purpose is not to generate theory about particular organizational
topics but to make the generation of theory itself an object of analysis (see Figure 0.1).
Notice, however, the paradox here, a paradox intrinsic to all acts of reflexivity. Ordinarily
we go about doing our theoretical work (i.e. trying to make sense of a particular
organizational phenomenon) without too much concern for what theory is and how it is
best generated—as practitioners engaged in the generation of theoretical knowledge, we
normally take such things for granted. The moment, however, we step back to inquire
about theory—the moment, that is, we stop being practitioners and become, instead,
observers of our theoretical practice (our research)—we are faced with questions which
cannot be conclusively answered. Meta-theoretical questions have an air of undecidability
about them and this explains the inconclusive arguments concerning paradigm
incommensurability among organizational theorists.
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As researchers we are both participants in the field and observers of our actions. Echoing
Kierkegaard, Weick (2002) remarks that the way we live when we are engaged in our
research practice is different from the way we live when we subsequently reflect on it.
Acting in the world is necessarily somewhat opaque; we increase our awareness of what
our acting has involved when we reflect ex post facto on the way we habitually act.
Reflexivity enables us to detect the biases that (p. 7) creep into our research—biases
which constitute likely threats to the validity of our knowledge claims—and hopefully try
to overcome them next time we engage in research. As Weick (2002) remarks, ‘We are
reminded in no uncertain terms of the ways in which our culture, ideology, race, gender,
class, language, advocacy, and assumed basis of authority limit, if not destroy, any claim
our work has to validity in some interpretive community. These threats to validity are
treated as objects that can be labeled, separated, differentiated, and treated as decisive
flaws.’
It is the participant-observer duality that creates the paradox mentioned earlier: to carry
out our theoretical work effectively we cannot afford to wonder too much about its key
categories; but to improve it, to increase the validity of our knowledge claims, we need to
reflect on what we do and how we do it. But the more we do so, the more we risk
engaging in inconclusive meta-theoretical quandaries—we may end up infinitely
regressing in search of some Archimedean original point. Reflexivity can easily turn into
self-obsession and narcissism (Weick 2002). Indeed, most of the debate on
incommensurability in OT could be seen in that light—an excessive preoccupation with
our own practice rather than with the practice of those we study. It is perhaps for this
reason that Weick makes a plea for ‘disciplined reflexivity’ (Weick 1999). Polanyi would
certainly agree. ‘Unbridled speculation’ for him is detrimental to the effective carrying
out of science (Polanyi 1962). But how should we view our work in OT so that we do
justice to both its tacit component (the taken-for-granted assumptions which our research
practice necessarily incorporates) and the possibility of meaningfully elucidating our
research practice in order to reduce the likely threats to the validity of knowledge claims
we make? We will explore this question in the next section.
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The point here is that, over time, OT practitioners will improve the validity of their
knowledge claims by systematically thinking about the way they habitually think about
their objects of study (Antonacopoulou and Tsoukas 2002). What sort of unreflective
biases (what phenomenologists and interpretive philosophers call ‘prejudgements’, see
Gadamer 1989) such as, for example, those concerning ‘gender’, ‘race’, and ‘class’, has
OT research manifested over time? What are the historically contingent institutional
arrangements and dominant societal and metaphysical understandings that have
influenced research in a particular direction? What forms of explanation have dominated
the field, and why? How have human agency and social structure—two time-old issues in
social theory—been treated in OT? What modes of arguing and what rhetorical forms
have been considered appropriate? What notions of ‘practicality’ and ‘usefulness’ have
been put forward or implied in OT? How have normative principles of ethics been
considered in relation to the descriptive-explanatory knowledge produced in OT? Most of
these questions are explored in the current handbook.
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The movement from initially rigid and limited assumptions to ever more realistic and
complex assumptions has been one of the most encouraging features of the field. While,
initially, organizations were viewed as rationally designed systems, it is now accepted
that organizations are historically constituted social collectivities, embedded in their
environments (Scott 1987). From this realization, now more or less taken for granted,
stem most new investigations, such as those exploring the social embeddedness of
organizations (Granovetter 1992; Granovetter and Swedberg 1992; Scott and Christensen
1995; Scott et al. 1994; Whitley 1992); the profoundly cultural aspects of organizations
(Kunda 1992; Frost et al. 1991); the social construction of organizational identity (Brown
1997; Whetten and Godfrey 1998); the irreducibly emergent texture of organizing (Stacey,
Griffin, and Shaw 2000; Taylor and Van Every 2000; Weick and Roberts 1993); the
importance of history in accounting for aspects of organizations (Dobbin 1995; Kieser
1998; Roe 1994; Zald 1996); the processes through which sensemaking in organizations
takes place (Weick 2001); the centrality of learning and knowledge to organizational
functioning (Cohen and Sproull 1996; Grant 1996; Spender 1996; Tsoukas 1996); the
importance of power and the significance of gender in organizational life (Calàs and
Smircich 1996; Gherardi 1995; Martin 1990); and the influence of unconscious processes
and psychic needs on organizational functioning (Gabriel 1999).
What all these admittedly diverse perspectives have in common is the assumption about
the profoundly social, historically shaped, and context-cum-time-dependent nature of
organizing, which they approach from different angles, focusing on different levels of
analysis. In other words, in the early steps of the field, individuals and organizational
environments were ‘given’ to organizations, with the latter being seen, in quasi-
algorithmic terms, as ‘abstract systems’ (Barnard 1968: 74) geared towards the
optimization of certain key variables (typically the maximization of performance, the
minimization of uncertainty or transaction costs) (Donaldson 2001; Thompson 1967;
Williamson 1998). Following the ‘Newtonian style’ of analysis (Cohen 1994: 76; Toulmin
1990), organization theorists were supposed to uncover the calculus of organization. As
Barnard (1976: p. xlvi) revealingly put it, ‘abstract principles of structure may be
discerned in organizations of great variety, and that ultimately it may be possible to state
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Over time, however, the limits of such an analysis became apparent. If nothing else, the
Newtonian style of inquiry hardly illuminated what common experience told practitioners
was important: organizations vary widely across time and space; history matters; extra-
organizational institutions matter too; gender, race, and ethnicity are hot issues at the
workplace; there are multiple rationalities in an organization; sensemaking is an
important part of action; decision-making and strategy-making do not quite happen as
formal theories prescribe. It is precisely the divergence between OT knowledge produced
by following the Newtonian style and the common experience of practitioners that
accounts, to a large extent, for the perception some practitioners have that OT is
‘irrelevant’ to their practice (Argyris 1980; Pfeffer 1993; Mowday 1997; Lawler et al 1999;
Webster and Starbuck 1988; cf. Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2001). Indeed, one of the
challenges for OT is to find ways in which practitioners’ lived experiences may be
incorporated, rather than ignored as ‘unscientific’, into OT accounts. This is where the
‘ecological’ style of analysis (to use Toulmin's (1990:193–4) apt term) comes in.
Gradually, individuals and environments have been ‘brought into’ organizational analysis,
and a whole new set of questions has opened up: how do individuals make sense of their
tasks, with what consequences? What exactly do people do when they work in
organizations? What makes a group of people working together an organization? How do
organizational members sustain a sense of community? How do gender and ethnicity
influence organizational politics? How are organizational objectives and policies set, by
whom, with what consequences? How does the environment, as it changes over time,
influence what is going on in organizations? What is the impact of history on key
organizational features? Such questions purport to explain organizations in a substantive
way by embracing the complexity of the issues involved, rather than abstracting them
away for the sake of analytical rigor.
Viewing research as a practical social activity makes us see more clearly than before that
researchers rarely are idealistic paradigm warriors but, more realistically, while they
certainly do have certain paradigmatic predilections, they remain open to borrowing from
other paradigms and perspectives as they see fit and are subjected to normative
institutional criteria regarding the evaluation of their work. In other words, in order to
get their work done, researchers are, to some extent, bricoleurs (Brown and Duguid
1991): they purposefully work with whatever conceptual resources are available. Their
work is shaped by their own paradigmatic preferences, the prevailing Zeitgeist, and the
institutional frameworks and norms within which their work takes place. Insofar as we
work with others within certain institutional and cultural contexts, our work rarely
adheres to idealized paradigms.
(p. 12)
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This should not be surprising. Insofar as interaction and dialogue goes on among
researchers, new syntheses are likely to come up. We learn more about new research
agendas and cross-paradigmatic exchange by looking at what OT practitioners do rather
than by hypostastizing paradigms and then getting ourselves caught into conceptual
traps regarding paradigmatic ‘incommensurability’. Paradigms appear incommensurable
only to an observer who, seeking in abstracto a neutral set of ‘translation rules’, cannot
find any and proclaims that, well, there aren't any (Burrell 1996: 650). Instead, paradigms
do provide challenges for thinking and learning to anyone engaged in research in
concreto.
For example, reflecting on his own work, Deetz (1996: 200) remarks as follows:
I often draw on conceptions from critical and dialogic writings. For me, critical
theory conceptions of ideology and distorted communication provide useful
sensitizing concepts and an analytic framework for looking for micro-practices of
control, discursive closure, conflict suppression, and skewed representation in
organizational sites. But rarely are these conceptions closely tied to the full
critical theory agenda. They require considerable reworking in specific sites, and
the results of my studies aim more at finding and giving suppressed positions a
means of expression than realizing an ideal speech situation or reaching a purer
consensus. What is important is not whether I am a late-modern critical theorist or
a dialogic post-modernist, but rather the meaning and implications of concepts
that I draw from these two competitive orientations. My degree of consistency is
of less interest than how I handle the tension and whether the two conceptual
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(p. 13)
In this passage Deetz draws attention to the fact that a researcher may have multiple
paradigmatic sympathies and, at any rate, subscribing to a paradigm means that one is
more likely to be inspired and sensitized by it, than to be buying wholesale into it. It is
surprising how often it is forgotten that paradigms are our own constructions—artifacts
we have invented ex post facto to make sense of competing sets of assumptions social
scientists habitually make—and, as such, they are somewhat idealized descriptions. When
we engage in research we do not necessarily buy into an entire paradigm; more
realistically, we are oriented by it to explore particular kinds of questions. Moreover, the
effective carrying out of research into particular topics of interest entails the ‘reworking’
of key paradigmatic assumptions in concreto (‘in specific sites’) and this reworking may
well bring about new concepts and syntheses (Moldoveanu and Baum 2002).
Like any other kind of work, empirical research is not a matter of mere ‘application’ of a
given set of paradigmatic assumptions, but of active determination of those assumptions
in practice (cf. Boden 1994: 19). Researchers do not so much ‘apply’ or ‘follow’ paradigms
in their work as they explore particular topics, in particular sites and, having to cope
coherently with all the puzzles and tensions stemming from the complexity of the
phenomena they investigate, they extend, synthesize, and/or invent concepts (cf. Rorty
1991: 93–110). Paradigmatic exchange occurs before our nose, but we do not recognize it
as such until well after such exchange has led to new concepts and conceptual syntheses.
Certain insights from Silverman's (1971) interpretive critique of positivist OT in the
1970s and Weick's (1979) phenomenological model of organizing have been ‘translated’
into other research traditions and have led to interesting developments in, for example,
the institutional school of OT and the cognitive perspective on organizations. Conceptual
translation ‘on the ground’ inevitably takes place, all the time, and this is what makes
intellectual developments so potentially interesting.
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Acts of probing are acts of construction: they bring forth aspects of the object under
investigation. There are several vocabularies, conceptual frameworks, and modes of
thinking to be used, and which ones are chosen is bound, to some extent, to depend on
contingent institutional arrangements, the material and symbolic resources available, and
the historical and cultural context. While an object of study is often independent of the
researcher and his/her vocabulary, the moment it is framed in a particular language it
acquires a contingent existence—systems of representation contain particular distinctions
of worth, they are loaded with particular values, and approach the study object from only
certain angles. In that sense, theories in OT, and in the social sciences in general, are
generative of meaning (Gergen 1994: ch.3): they provide practitioners with certain
symbolic resources for making sense of their situation.
The social relationship between the OT research community and its object of study
implies that knowledge produced is fed back to its users, altering their beliefs and
understandings. This is profoundly important for two reasons. First, because it shows that
practitioners may change their behavior in a non-instrumental manner: simply by
changing the vocabulary in terms of which they think of themselves and of what they do,
they may alter their practice. Think, for example, how the notions of ‘Total Quality
Management’, ‘Business Process Reengineering’, ‘organizational competences’, ‘strategic
learning’, and ‘chaos’, as well as the rhetoric of ‘business excellence’, have influenced
how practitioners view organizations and their role in them (Abrahamson and Fairchild
1999). In this sense academic knowledge is profoundly political and rhetorical (Astley
1985; Astley and Zammuto 1992; Czarniawska 1999). As van Maanen (1995: 135)
remarks, ‘the discourse we produce as (p. 15) organization theory has an action
component which seeks to induce belief among our readers. Our writing is then
something of a performance with a persuasive aim. In this sense, when our theories are
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Secondly, an intrinsic relationship between theory and action implies that any regularities
organization theorists uncover are bound to be perishable, since, as soon as they are
announced to practitioners, the latter will probably modify their beliefs and expectations,
thus altering those very regularities (Bhaskar 1978; Tsoukas 1992). As Numagami (1998:
10) has persuasively shown in his game-theoretical models of OT knowledge
dissemination, provided we accept that practitioners are reflective agents, the search for
invariant laws in OT is futile in most cases (the only exception is when a game with a
dominant strategy can be established). This is far from denying the presence of
observable regularities, but to merely point out that such regularities do not rest upon
invariant social laws, but upon the stability of the beliefs and expectations of the actors
involved.
What we must not forget, however, is that stable macro patterns in social
phenomena are stable not because they are supported by inhuman forces, but
because they are reproduced by human conduct. Most observable stability and
universality are not generated by invariant and universal laws, but are supported
by the stability of knowledge and beliefs shared steadily and universally…. If
practitioners and researchers are able to predict the future course of events, it
may not be because they know any invariant laws but because they have a good
understanding of what the agents involved would expect in a specific situation and
excellent skills in synthesizing the actions, and/or because they are powerful
enough to redefine the original situation into a game structure that has a
dominant equilibrium. That is, for a person to predict the future course of events,
he or she should at least have either knowledge or power.
If the search for invariant laws in OT is futile, what should OT be aiming at? It should be
aiming at generating ‘reflective dialogue’, says Numagami (1998: 11–12) (see also
Flyvbjerg 2001; Gergen and Thatchenkery 1998; Tsoukas and Knudsen 2002). Espousing
a hermeneutical model of knowledge, Numagami points out that OT knowledge should
aim at producing explanations (re-descriptions) of organizational phenomena which must
include references to actors’ meanings and conceptual schemata, for it is only then that
we as researchers understand what generates the regularities we have noticed.
Moreover, such explanations will be, in principle, useful to practitioners, since they invite
them to engage in ‘sympathetic emulation’ (p. 11) of the situation described in the
explanandum, thus stimulating their thinking. In other words, a hermeneutical model of
knowledge does not pretend to be able to offer practitioners universal generalizations
and invariant laws, since such knowledge is logically impossible to be attained. It does,
however, empower practitioners by enabling them to make links with and reflect on
others’ experiences (i.e. the explananda organizational theorists re-describe), thus
leading (p. 16) practitioners to undertake potentially novel forms of action. By re-entering
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Neither positivism nor interpretivism are good enough, argues Hugh Willmott, since none
of them deals with the power relationships within which knowledge and forms of
understanding develop. In Chapter 3 (‘Organization Theory as a Critical Science?: Forms
of Analysis and “New Organizational Forms”’) Willmott describes what are the distinctive
features of a ‘critical OT’. The adjective ‘critical’ has been used in all sorts of ways in the
social sciences and philosophy, ranging from Popper's ‘critical rationalism’, through
Bhaskar's ‘critical realism’, to the ‘critique’ employed by neo-Marxist students of the
labour process. Willmott, however, uses the term in a particular way drawing on ‘critical
theory’ developed by the German philosophers of the Frankfurt School, especially Jiirgen
Habermas.
The problem with positivism, argues Willmott, is that it lacks an appreciation of the
conditions within which knowledge is produced: rather than scientific knowledge
mirroring objectively and value-neutrally the world, it is inescapably produced,
transmitted, and legitimized within power-laden contexts. There is no value-free
knowledge, because there are no value-free social contexts of knowledge production and
transmission. While interpretivism is right in highlighting the importance of meanings
embedded in artifacts, practices, and institutions, it fails, according to Willmott, to deal
with the power relationships within which forms of understanding are developed and,
thus, in unmasking ‘unnecessary oppression’.
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A postmodern OT does not get fixated on organizations as distinct, bounded entities, but
is determined to show, more broadly, how the process of organizing is enacted.
Organizing is a world-making activity, argues Chia, in the sense that it involves the
regularization of human exchanges and the development of predictable patterns of
interactions. Through the process of organization—‘the will to order’—objects of
knowledge acquire distinctive identities and are located in systems of representations,
thus enabling us to treat them as entities existing independently of our perceptions.
Consequently, a postmodern OT should be concerned with how systems of representation
are produced and causality is imputed; how the flux and (p. 20) variability of social life
are tamed; how systems of signification are used to carve up reality with what
consequences; how individual identities are established and social entities created; the
effects of tacit and often unpresentable forms of knowledge; how stability is generated
out of endless change. What, in other words, is so distinctive of postmodern OT is the
second-order concern with how we know and order (the two are intimately linked).
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While Starbuck's chapter gives the grand view of how theorizing about organizations
emerged in the western world, Shenhav's contribution in Chapter 6 (‘The Historical and
Epistemological Foundations of Organization Theory: Fusing Sociological Theory with
Engineering Discourse’) focuses on an explanation of (p. 21) how OT was institutionalized
as a separate scientific field in the United States. In his influential book Organizations:
Rational, Natural and Open Systems, Scott (1987) argued that OT emerged as a scientific
field in the mid-1940s, shortly after the translation of Weber's work in English. A few
years later, some of Robert Merton's students were involved in the development and
testing of generalizations dealing with organizations as separate social systems, and
earlier contributions by Taylor, Barnard, and Mayo were rediscovered by the emerging
academic community. It was these efforts that, according to Scott, gave rise to the
identification of OT as a separate intellectual field of study.
It is this genealogy of OT that Shenhav sets out to criticize and replace with an
alternative genealogy. First, he argues that OT as a scientific field emerged earlier than
postulated by Scott, since a comprehensive engineering/managerial discourse about
organizations existed much earlier. Second, Shenhav argues that Weber's work was not
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(p. 22)
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Knudsen suggests that Whitley's static framework of how different fields are organized
should be extended in order to be able to analyze how different structures of a
reputational organization either restricts or promotes scientific progress. Inspired by the
organizational learning literature, Knudsen argues that intellectual fields (like other kinds
of organizations) need to find a reasonable balance between innovation and tradition, or
avoid falling into either a ‘fragmentation trap’ or a ‘specialization tap’. Finally, he argues
that the structure that is best suited to uphold a balance between innovation and
tradition and, therefore, to avoid the fragmentation and specialization traps is the
polycentric oligarchy.
Part III consists of five chapters, each one of which addresses a different meta-theoretical
controversy in OT. In Chapter 10 (‘The Agency/Structure Dilemma in Organization
Theory: Open Doors and Brick Walls’) Mike Reed discusses one of the oldest meta-
theoretical questions in social and organization theory: how are agency and structure
related? Organizations are commonly thought of as structures, while agency is
increasingly recognized as being extremely important for accounting for creative
organizational action. At a time in which innovation and creativity are highly valued as
key features of effective organizations, clearly agency acquires renewed significance. But
how is agency exercised? What are the conditions within which it is realized and how
much, if at all, is it influenced by structure? Or, to put it differently, to what extent, and in
what ways, is structure influenceable and changeable by actors?
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The main point McKinley and Mone make, in this highly readable chapter, is that each
school is founded on ambiguous theoretical constructs, which, while fostering creativity
in empirical research, also preclude conclusive empirical testing and make the schools
incommensurable with one another. For example, the concept of ‘fit’, a key concept in
Page 22 of 37
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If McKinley and Mone are right, knowledge generation in OT lacks the secure foundations
to make it a cumulative enterprise, since, on the one hand, OT theories are founded on
ambiguous constructs and, on the other hand, their hard core is protected by theorists
who compete in the academic market for reputations and resources. Lack of cumulative
progress, however, should not stop us from trying to learn from different paradigms and
perspectives, and drawing new distinctions, which resolve old conflicts and permit
selective borrowing. In other words, there are, indeed, several competing ways for
looking at organizations and it is precisely because of such conceptual diversity that
learning and conceptual innovation are possible.
By contrast, for sociologists, especially Weberian ones, business organizations are seen as
the carriers of the modernization process, incorporating structures of meaning from the
societies within which they are embedded. Typically, whereas for economists economic
interests and instrumental action are taken for granted and form the foundational
assumption of elegant formal modeling, for sociologists instrumental action and economic
interests are social constructions in need of historical elucidation. While economists focus
on the single firm, sociologists, typically, place the firm in larger contexts, be they
business groups and systems, networks, populations, or fields. Economic theories of
organization tend to be rigorous over highly stylized and delimited areas of economic
behaviour, while sociological theories are more descriptive (lacking the precision and
analytical rigor of economic models) over larger areas of economic behavior. Swedberg is
not particularly optimistic that both camps will find a common language, although he
points at entrepreneurship as an area over which supporters of both camps could stand
and converse. At any rate, a comprehensive theory of firms will have to unite the two key
ideas in economics and sociology, respectively: economic interests and social structures.
That will not be easy, but that is the way to go, remarks Swedberg.
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Her empathic writing style and her willingness to draw on and learn from a variety of
perspectives are indicative of the stance Martin takes towards the meta-theoretical
controversies in organizational culture research: we should always try to enhance our
understanding of different viewpoints; looks for ways in which conceptual oppositions
may be reconciled without denying differences (for example, culture is both an objective
and subjective construction; the boundaries (p. 26) between etic and emic research are
blurred; context-specific knowledge cannot escape abstraction, etc). In short, we should
try to learn to enrich our ideas by engaging with those of others. Building consensus is
not realistic, while enforcing conformity to elite preferences is undesirable; but learning
may be possible.
Part IV consists of four chapters, all of which deal with the relationship between theory
and practice in OT and, more broadly, the nature of practical reason. In Chapter 15
(‘Actionable Knowledge’), Chris Argyris, summarizes, with his customary lucidity and
directness, his lifetime's work regarding the prerequisites for OT to produce actionable
knowledge. Being a policy science, says Argyris, OT is in the business of generating
propositions that are actionable. Actionable knowledge is knowledge that actors can use
to implement effectively their intentions. Such knowledge is important not only to
practitioners, but to researchers too, since actionable knowledge required for
intervention mandates that we specify causal propositions about how to bring change
about. A strong and passionate believer in Lewin's dictum that unless you try to change
something, you do not really understand it, Argyris makes the important point that when
we try to change the organizations we allow data to surface which otherwise would not
have surfaced.
Before setting out to describe Models I and II, for which Argyris has been best known, he
sets out to survey the fundamental norms and rules about producing knowledge in OT
(and in the policy sciences in general) that tend to inhibit the production of valid
actionable knowledge. These are: (a) the importance traditionally attached to description
and explanation; (b) the unintended gaps and inconsistencies that the emphasis to
description and explanation produces; (c) the misplaced importance given to
Page 24 of 37
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While Argyris is concerned with showing how actionable knowledge may be produced, in
Chapter 16 (‘Theory and Practice in the Real World’), Karl Weick (p. 27) undertakes a
broader task: to examine how theory and practice are related in the real world. ‘Theory’
and ‘practice’ are qualitatively different, argues Weick in his thoughtful and stimulating
paper. The central question he addresses relates to how theory and practice may be
reconciled. The whole chapter can be seen as Weick's attempt to elucidate Kierkegaard's
remark that life is understood backwards but it must be lived forwards. Reviewing eight
different ways in which organizational theorists have tried to reconcile theory with
practice, Weick draws on Heidegger to distinguish three different modes of living: the
‘ready-to-hand’ mode in which individuals find themselves ‘thrown’ at the world, are
immersed in particular tasks, and are aware of the world holistically, contextually, and
unre-flectively; the ‘unready-to-hand’ mode, in which problematic aspects of a task that
produced an interruption stand out, although individuals still do not become aware of
context-free objects; and the ‘present-at-hand’ mode in which individuals step back from
their involvement in a task to reflect on it. This is the mode of theoretical reflection.
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(p. 28)
While Nielsen traces the ethical commitments implied by particular organizational forms,
Iain Mangham explores, in Chapter 18 (‘Character and Virtue in an Era of Turbulent
Capitalism’), the impact of unregulated (‘turbo’) capitalism on the ethical climate, both
within and beyond organizations, by focusing on the Aristotelian notions of ‘character’
and ‘virtue’. Prompted by Richard Sennett's (1998) widely acclaimed The Corrosion of
Character, Mangham draws his empirical material from two ethnographies of life in the
City of London, before and after the Big Bang. His argument in this provocative essay is
that the greatest influence on the ethical climate of our times is not so much exerted by
particular forms of organization as by particular forms of capitalism. Unregulated
capitalism produces a different ethical climate from regulated capitalism. Moreover,
while the concepts of character and virtue, says Mangham, are helpful for understanding
what occurred in the era of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’, they are less so in the era of
‘impatient capitalism’. Mangham draws attention to the strong links between morality
and social context arguing, in a Maclntyrian fashion, that character is not idiosyncratic,
nor a matter of merely ‘individual’ choice, but is irreducibly social and emerges from
ritualized habituation.
Page 26 of 37
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(p. 30)
The authors share with critical organization theorists the belief that OT (and social
science at large) needs to engage in emancipatory theorizing, but they are more inclined
to take their cues from Foucauldian-inspired historical analyses of ‘subjugated
knowledges’ rather than Habermasian arguments concerning ‘ideal speech’, although the
two are not necessarily at odds with one another. Drawing on Latour, the prospect of OT,
argue Calàs and Smircich, should be to rethink modern institutions as ‘hybrid forums’
and ‘space for co-researching’ Dismissing the distinction between experts and non-
experts, the authors side with Latour in their claim that all people are ‘co-researchers’
and, one way or another, we are all engaged into the collective experiments that make up
our lives on the planet. Although Calàs and Smircich do not specify what exactly this ‘co-
researching’ is and how it is to be achieved—is it, for example, different from the
collaborative vision of science offered by Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons (2001)?—they do
imply that what is important for organization theorists is to escape the modernist
conceptual and institutional limits of western science, which have come to historically
privilege certain forms of life and conceptions of rationality over others, and open up
towards the Other.
Finally, in Chapter 23 (‘New Times, Fresh Challenges: Reflections on the Past and the
Future of Organization Theory’), Haridimos Tsoukas adopts a Wittgensteinian perspective
on OT, and puts forward four claims: First, OT has, over time, become more complex in
some of its assumptions, seeking to incorporate real-world complexity in its models.
However, it has been limited in its focus by being heavily concerned with the study of
formal organizations as opposed to the broader phenomenon of organization. Second,
along with the rest of social sciences, the mode of inquiry that has mainly underpinned
OT is intellectualism and ontological atomism, which have prevented OT from fully
grasping the inherent sociality of organizational phenomena. Third, the main task of OT
has tended to be the causal, especially contingency, explanation of organizational
behavior, whereas it should be the elucidation of reasons for organizational behavior. And
Page 28 of 37
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As you will see in the chapters that follow, there is no shortage of debate or controversy
in this handbook, and that is a sign of the vitality of OT as a social science discipline. At
the same time, for the debate to be stimulating and productive it must be, to paraphrase
Weick (1999), a ‘disciplined debate’—organization theorists, we suggest, are not in the
business of arguing for the sake of it, but only insofar as they want to make clearer sense
of the activity they are engaged in. We would like (p. 31) to think of the present handbook
as providing a coherent rationale and structure so that such a meta-theoretical debate
may be lucid in its conduct and fruitful in its outcomes. No, we do not believe that a
consensus will emerge, nor do we necessarily desire one. But we do want to help enhance
collective learning, and hope this handbook will contribute to such a process. We keep
learning by keeping conversing, and reflecting on how we do so. The present handbook is
a modest contribution to the ongoing meta-theoretical conversation in our field.
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Haridimos Tsoukas
Christian Knudsen
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