Acrefore 9780190846626 e 99

Inter-Organizational Relations: Five Theoretical Approaches

Ulrich Franke, University of Bremen, Institute for Intercultural and International Studies
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.99
Published online: 20 November 2017
Summary
The number of organizations involved in world politics has long been increasing and so has, consequently, the
number of relations among them. For scholars of international studies, it is of central importance to examine these
inter-organizational relations. The state-centrism in international relations, however, impeded the discipline’s
engagement with this phenomenon for some decades. It was only in the mid-2000s that this began to change. Since
then, the study of inter-organizational relations in world politics has mostly drawn on five theoretical approaches:
sociological neo-institutionalism, resource dependence, network accounts, regime complexity, and classical
pragmatism. These approaches will be introduced; for the sake of comparability, all five are presented in the same
way, by carving out their theoretical tradition and key concepts, their core argument and causal logic, as well as
their understandings of organizations and how they relate. Each presentation offers a brief look at how the
respective approach has been applied.
Keywords: interorganizational relations, world politics, international relations, sociological neo-institutionalism, resource
dependence, network accounts, regime complexity, classical pragmatism
Subjects: Organization
Introduction: Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics
Compared to neighboring disciplines, inquiries into inter-organizational relations have come a

long way in international studies. In sociology, psychology, and administration science, but also
in economics and business studies, sensitivity to the topic began to rise back in the 1960s and
1970s. While this sensitivity had emerged from an understanding of organizations as open
systems and a turn toward the environment of organizations (Aldrich, 1971), similar
developments in international relations (IR) were impeded by the discipline’s predominant state-
centrism. In line with the latter, international organizations—and thus the relations among them
—were treated as epiphenomena (or mere instruments and arenas) of state action (Mearsheimer,
1994; Grieco, 1988; Abbott & Snidal, 1998; Keohane & Martin, 1995). It was only after
international organizations and their subunits had increasingly been addressed as autonomous
(bureaucratic) actors (Finnemore, 1993; Pollack, 1997; Barnett & Finnemore, 1999) that IR’s path
was paved for the study of inter-organizational relations in the course of the 1990s. Since the
mid-2000s, this path has been well-trodden (for an early exception, see Jönsson, 1986).
Today, IR scholars interested in global order can choose among at least five theoretical
approaches for examining inter-organizational relations: sociological neo-institutionalism,
resource dependence, network accounts, regime complexity, and classical pragmatism. Only one
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of them, regime complexity, originates in political science or IR. The other four have been
imported from sociology. Sociological neo-institutionalism, as its name suggests, emanates from
sociology exclusively; resource dependence is rooted in economics and sociology, while network
accounts have their foundations in psychology and sociology. Finally, classical pragmatism is
considered as North America’s first contribution to the history of Western philosophy. Thus, the
corresponding approach to analyze inter-organizational relations has its source in (political and
social) philosophy as well as sociology.
The five approaches will be presented according to their position in the rationalism-
constructivism debate (Wæver, 1996, pp. 161–170)—regardless of the prominent warning not to
frame discussions in IR along philosophical issues (Fearon & Wendt, 2002, p. 53). Rationalist and
constructivist approaches can be roughly distinguished by their individualist and holist
ontologies. Proponents of predominantly rationalist accounts—resource dependence, network
accounts, and regime complexity—tend to conceive of organizations or organizational actors as
atoms (amid an environment of other atoms). In this view, contact between these atoms in a
world of scarcities always has to be established first at some cost. By contrast, adherents of
constructivist accounts for examining inter-organizational relations treat the social context
among organizations as always already there. Relations with others provide the conditions for
(organizational) self-constitution. Constructivist reasoning is exemplified by sociological neo-
institutionalism. These references hint at a slight tendency to transcend the rationalist-
constructivist divide among scholars of inter-organizational relations. Rationalists who resort to
resource dependence turn toward holist ontologies and assume a kind of mutually constitutive,
dialectical relationship between organizations and their environments (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999,
pp. 1475, 1482); and a few proponents of regime complexity even anchor their approach in a
constructivist framework (Struett, Nance, & Armstrong, 2013, p. 95). Against this background, the
inter-organizational account rooted in classical pragmatism also aims at transcending the
rationalist-constructivist divide.
Two qualifications must be made concerning the focus on theoretical approaches. First,
contributions that deal with inter-organizational relations from a decidedly empirical or policy
viewpoint are not included. The work of security experts, for instance, often falls into this
category (Kille & Hendrickson, 2011; Varwick & Koops, 2009). The disregard for these writings
might indicate that the gap (George, 1993) between scholars who address either an audience of
academics or one of practitioners still exists. For a more inclusive map of the inter-
organizational field, however, see Biermann and Koops (2017); for classifications by
representatives of other disciplines, see Oliver and Ebers (1998), Reitan (1998), Barringer and
Harrison (2000), as well as Rossignoli and Ricciardi (2015). As to the second concern, the focus on
theoretical approaches seems to downplay the relevance of those studies that combine two or
more of these accounts. Network approaches, for instance, are frequently fused with resource
dependence (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Biermann, 2008) or inspired by sociological neo-
institutionalism (Ebers & Maurer, 2014, pp. 397–399). Even resource dependence and
sociological neo-institutionalism appear together sometimes (Brosig, 2011). The present mode of
presentation, however, does not deny the originality of these writings. Instead, it helps both to
carve out their constitutive thoughts in “pure” form and to answer the question of whether they
really match.
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Five Theoretical Approaches for Examining Inter-Organizational Rela-

tions
Five theoretical approaches used in international relations (IR) to make sense of inter-
organizational relations are introduced: sociological neo-institutionalism, resource dependence,
network accounts, regime complexity, and classical pragmatism. For the sake of better
comparability, each exploration will be guided by the same questions and will address them in the
same order:
1. What is the (overarching) theoretical or intellectual tradition in which the approach is

rooted? What (further) key concepts are of relevance for the approach, and what do they
mean?
2. What is the core argument of the approach? What is its causal logic, or, what kinds of
ascriptions of causality are made?
3. How are organizations and their relations conceptualized?
4. What are the major empirical issues and fields to which the approach is applied?
Sociological Neo-Institutionalism
Theoretical Tradition and Key Concepts

Sociological neo-institutionalism is known as the Stanford School approach, at least in
organization studies. Since 1966, Stanford University’s Department of Sociology has been the
academic home to John Meyer, a leading scholar of this approach, and many of his collaborators.
The term Stanford School helps distinguish this direction of thought from those followed by
scholars such as Robert K. Merton and Philip Selznick at Columbia University and those by the
Carnegie School in Pittsburgh (Herbert A. Simon, James G. March, Richard M. Cyert). Whereas the
latter focused on decision-making by individuals and organizations, bureaucratic functions and
roles were emphasized at Columbia, where Meyer received a PhD for his reflections on Some
Methodological Problems of Organizational Research in 1965 (Scott, 2004, pp. 3–4).
Sociological neo-institutionalism contests both new institutional economics and traditional

concepts of institutions in sociology. This makes it sociological and neo. New institutional
economics’ perspective on organizations such as firms in terms of efficiency, profit, and
transaction costs (Coase, 1960; Williamson, 1979) is considered too tight. Simultaneously,
sociology’s classical concept of institutions is considered too broad. This, for instance,
encompasses shaking hands between friends every time they meet. Sociological neo-
institutionalism operates with a notion of institution that is more closely connected to features of
organizations and their emergence. Correspondingly, institutionalization refers to societally
shared and taken-for-granted ideas of what is characterizing organizations (Walgenbach, 2014,
pp. 297–298). Members of society are held to see institutions both “as relative fixtures in a social
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environment” and as “functional elements of that environment” (Jepperson, 1991, p. 147), as

shaping as well as reflecting social order. More specifically, sociological neo-institutionalism
draws on both Max Weber’s thoughts about the power of bureaucracy and bureaucratization—the
“iron cage” (Weber, 2006b, p. 33)—and on his thesis of a rationalization of culture (Weber,
2006a, p. 101). Weber’s claim that Occidental (Western) rationality brought about cultural
phenomena of universal significance and validity can thus be seen as one of sociological neo-
institutionalism’s iron premises. However, this premise is modified in that the homogenizing
effects of bureaucratization and rationalization are not primarily attributed to “the need for
efficiency” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 147), but to structural effects of the environment in
which organizations operate.
Beyond the terms institution and institutionalization, the concepts of isomorphism, decoupling,
and world culture/polity/society are particularly significant. Isomorphism refers to a constraining
process of homogenization that brings about structural similarities among organizations in a
certain policy field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 149; Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 346). This process
of an organization’s response to and integration of environmental tendencies and influences is
driven not only by external pressures and emulation but also by scholars and other professionals.
Hence, coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change are—
conceptually rather than empirically—distinguished from each other (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983,
pp. 150–154). In the case of coercive isomorphism, the pressure to adapt “may be felt as force, as
persuasion, or as invitations to join in collusion” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 150). Mimetic
isomorphism describes situations of uncertainty and ambiguous goals in which successful and
legitimate organizations serve as models for mimesis. Finally, normative isomorphism grasps the
diffusion of organizational patterns by members of particular, professionalized occupations, for
instance. These are not only held to have a similar academic background but also, due to this
shared background, to be guided by similar norms.
However, organizations are not considered to give in to external demands per se. They are also
conceptualized as interested in defending their autonomy against inconsistent expectations. This
is where the notion of decoupling comes in, which draws upon a distinction between formal
structure and actual working activities. By decoupling the latter from the former, organizations
can deal with institutionalized requirements from the environment on a formal level without
affecting their day-to-day working activities. In this manner, organization managers maintain or
increase their room for maneuvering while organizations retain their societally accepted,
legitimated and legitimating formal structure (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 357).
On the macro-level, finally, the most comprehensive form of an environment is referred to as

world culture (world cultural models), world polity, or world society (Meyer, 1999; Meyer, Boli,
Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997). For sociological neo-institutionalists, organizations are embedded in
world society and shaped by its norms, values, and other institutionalized elements referred to as
“powerful myths” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), mostly through rationalized others of whom world
society is considered to be “mainly made up of” (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997, p. 162).
World society emerges from the institutionalization of rationalized world cultural models (the
world polity) which are held to be “organized in scientific, professional, and legal analyses of the
proper functioning of states, societies, and individuals” (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997,
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p. 149). Organizations are grasped as constructed by this (universal) culture because they adapt to
them for the sake of increasing their legitimacy and strengthening their capacities for survival. It
is of course this interplay between organizations and world society that leads to inter-
organizational similarities introduced as (variants of) isomorphism.
Core Argument and Causal Logic

Sociological neo-institutionalism, as exemplified by the work of Meyer and Rowan (1977) as well
as DiMaggio and Powell (1983), starts from the premise of a distinction between organizations
and their environment. Both stand in a relation of mutual constitution. The environment
constitutes organizations and vice versa (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). An organization’s
environment consists of other organizations. In formal terms, each organization thus is
surrounded by a distinct environment. The Stanford School’s core argument holds that
organizations orient themselves toward institutionalized, societally accepted environmental
elements such as formal or material characteristics of other organizations. By adopting these
externally legitimated elements, an organization becomes accepted and can “secure its
survival” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 349). An environment of organizations of the same kind is
referred to as an organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Across an organizational field, a
process of homogenization takes place. This process brings about structural similarities among
organizations—isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, pp. 150–154).
From the perspective of sociological neo-institutionalism, changes in the environment bring

about changes in an organization. Although organizations somehow have to adapt to these
changes, sociological neo-institutionalism does not subscribe to a functionalist logic. Changes in
the environment imply changes in the external expectations an organization faces. Nevertheless,
those who act on behalf of organizations are considered free to deal with these changing
expectations in the way they think is adequate. In this manner, contingency is built into the
approach. Keeping up with external expectations is held to ensure an organization’s legitimacy,
but this does not imply that all expectations are fulfilled by all organizations all the time. It is of
relevance in this context that the autonomy of organizational actors is conceptualized as being
restricted. Organizational actors rely on the advice of members of professional associations when
it comes to decisions on whether or not to respond to external expectations and how to deal with
them (Meyer & Jepperson, 2000, p. 107). As rationalized others, representatives of these
associations and the state “shape organizational life both directly by imposing constraints and
requirements and indirectly by creating and promulgating new rational myths” (Scott, 1987, p.
499). Examples of these myths are those institutionalized elements of an organization’s formal
structure that are adopted by others to become accepted (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, pp. 348–349).
Concept of Organizations and How They Relate

An organization is distinguished from its environment by means of the formal criterion of
membership (March, Simon, & Guetzkow, 1958, pp. 9, 89–90). Members decide on an
organization’s structure and remit. They are counseled by rationalized others who represent the
environment (grasped as world society). Embedded in world society, organizations adapt to
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environmental expectations for the sake of increasing their legitimacy. In essence, this is how
sociological neo-institutionalism sees inter-organizational relations. They result from and can
be considered synonymous with interactions between organizations and their environments.
Given the assumed dynamics and variety of inter-organizational relations, this account might
appear over-generalized. However, the conceptual shift from environment to organizational
fields reduces this problem (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Whereas environments are introduced as
broad, given, or pre-established, the term organizational fields is used to denote those parts of
environments that consist of organizations with similar tasks. In this way, sociological neo-
institutionalism’s perspective on inter-organizational relations turns more specific but is
restricted to interaction among similar kinds.
Empirical Application
Empirically, sociological neo-institutionalism is applied to inter-organizational relations in the
fields of security, economy, and finance, as well as health and sustainability governance. Aspects
of external (military) intervention, for instance, are made sense of by means of the concept of
“decoupling” (Lipson, 2007; Hensell, 2015). State agencies, intergovernmental organizations,
and nongovernmental organizations involved in re-building the “failed state” of Albania in the
1990s and 2000s decoupled their rhetoric from their day-to-day activity. They all supported the
principle of coordination for reasons of legitimacy and to simultaneously continue pursuing their
own agendas. However, the principle of coordination turned out to be an “unmet goal” (Hensell,
2015, p. 13)—a rational myth invoked to gain acceptance. In a similar way, UN peacekeeping
operations are held to manage irreconcilable environmental demands. The United Nations
pretends to comply with cultural expectations such as the three traditional principles of
peacekeeping (consent, neutrality, use of force only in self-defense). However, its symbolical
compliance is decoupled from what is taking place on the ground: robust peacekeeping with less
restricted use of force (Lipson, 2007, pp. 7–8, 19–21).
Beyond the realm of security, the fight against infectious diseases attracts attention. Led by the
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria, the World Bank, and the World Health Organization (WHO), this fight
is found to be (rhetorically) oriented toward a meta-governance norm of harmonization
(Holzscheiter, 2015). This norm was stipulated by the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
resolved by ministers and heads of development institutions; its interpretation, however, is
contested in the organizational field of health governance and part of a discursive struggle about
defining a good order (Holzscheiter, 2015, pp. 332–340). The Stanford School’s concept of
organizational fields also figures prominently in attempts to explicate (rather costly) formal
similarities among organizations that govern transnational social and environmental
sustainability (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009). Their convergence is traced back to the assumed
effectiveness of a legitimized standard model of transnational rule-making organizations
(Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009, pp. 713–718, 726–727). Finally, sociological neo-institutionalism
is used to address the speed and scope of policy change brought about by the International
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Monetary Fund. Relevant factors are the organization’s position in the fields of financial sector
surveillance and poverty reduction as well as its openness, that is, the strength of its interactions
with other participants in these fields (Vetterlein & Moschella, 2014, pp. 150–152).
Resource Dependence

The resource dependence approach originates in social exchange theory, which was developed in
the late 1950s (Homans, 1958; Emerson, 1962). In the 1970s, amid increasing transfers of social
exchange theory to the study of organizations, the term resource dependence was coined (Aldrich,
1976; Cook, 1977, p. 63). Social exchange theory draws on assumptions from psychology,
sociology, and economics. It considers interpersonal interaction “an exchange of goods, material
and non-material” (Homans, 1958, p. 597). Exchange brings about dependency in which power
“implicitly” (Emerson, 1962, p. 32) resides. The power of an organization grows with “the scope
of the resources (or the number of different resources)” it brings into an exchange relation (Cook,
1977, p. 66). Hence, power is formally grasped as the ability to decrease the exchange ratio. In
broadest terms, this concept of power resembles Weber’s, as power is not considered the attribute
of individuals but “a property of the social relation” (Emerson, 1962, p. 32). Whereas Aldrich’s
focus is on “relations between organizations of equal power or control over resources,” other
authors such as Cook, referring to Blau and Emerson, are more concerned with “power
differentials,” dominance, and “vertical relations among organizations” (Cook, 1977, p. 77).
Beyond the notion of power, further key concepts are resources and dependence as well as
interdependence. The concept of resources upon which the approach rests is very broad. It
encompasses material as well as immaterial values—“monetary or physical resources,
information, or social legitimacy” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 43). The importance of a resource
is held to result from the relative magnitude of its exchange and from its criticality: a resource is
important either when it has a large share in the total amount of an organization’s resource
exchange or when an organization cannot function without it (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 46).
Moreover, the control over a resource is derived from a couple of factors in this context. These are
possession of resources, access to resources, control of the use of resources, as well as effective
regulation of the possession, allocation, and use of resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, pp. 48–
49).
The aspect of control over resources is closely connected to the second category in the name of
the approach: dependence. An organization’s dependence on others is determined by both the
importance that given resources have for it and by the level of control others have over these
resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 51). In formal terms, dependence varies both with the value
of the resources an organization receives from others and (inversely) “with the comparison level
for alternative exchange relations” (Cook, 1977, p. 66). The concept points to the presence of
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others in an organization’s environment and their role in or influence on that organization’s

decision-making; it is about power advantages that result from asymmetry in exchange relations
among organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, pp. 52–53).
Finally, interdependence “exists whenever one actor does not entirely control all of the conditions
necessary for the achievement of an action or for obtaining the outcome desired from the
action” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 40). In these instances, organizations face “problems of
uncertainty or unpredictability” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 42) so that their managers take
relations with other organizations into account. Interdependence between organizations is
reduced when the availability of the resources that these organizations need rises “relative to the
demands for them” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 42). At the same time, interdependence increases
when specialization and inter-organizational division of labor are on the rise (Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978, p. 43).

According to the resource dependence approach, organizations face at least two external
constraints: they are located in an insecure environment and in need of resources. Uncertainty in
the environment of organizations is held to result from “the lack of coordination of activities”
among them (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 42); scarcity of resources is considered a central
condition of life. It is in response to these constraints that organizations turn toward others for
the sake of resource exchange, that is, “voluntary transactions . . . for mutual benefit” (Cook,
1977, p. 64). Organizations thus begin and maintain relations with others mostly to procure
resources, as they seldom produce, control, or have available all the resources they need to
accomplish their tasks. In so doing, however, organizations run the risk of losing their autonomy
and becoming dependent on others. To prevent one-sided dependency, they strive for balanced
exchange ratios and to maintain interdependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 42).
The resource dependence approach operates in the rationalist style of economic logic and adheres
to a strategic notion of inter-organizational relations. Organizations exist in a realm of necessity
in which they compete for scarce resources. Concerned about their autonomy they get involved
with each other only when they must. Organizations turn to their environment for the sake of
exchanging resources and perpetuate this process only when they perceive it as effective (van de
Ven, 1976, p. 33). In this context, consensus and awareness matter. Consensus denotes internal
agreement about “an organization’s specific goals and services”; awareness refers to
organizations’ knowledge of “possible sources in other agencies where their needed resources
can be obtained” (van de Ven, 1976, p. 31).
In terms of ascriptions of causality, the resource dependence approach starts its explanation with
structure, that is, the environment. The latter is marked by uncertainty, scarce resources, and
interdependence among its units. These units are organizations. They are grasped as (collective)
actors (Cook, 1977, p. 69). Structure brings about the units’ action. This action aims at both
reducing an organization’s “environmental dependencies” and enhancing its power (Oliver &
Ebers, 1998, p. 575). It is guided by strategies such as specialization (Brosig, 2011), co-optation,
or using one’s ties (Mizruchi & Galaskiewicz, 1993, p. 47). In case that the strategic action by
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organizations has an effect on the (interdependent) structure surrounding them, some resource
dependence theorists tend to grasp this as bidirectional causality or even as dialectic relationship
(Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999, pp. 1475, 1482).

Organizations are portrayed as both interested in maintaining their autonomy and, to varying
degrees, dependent on their environment. This dependence stems from external commitments in
the wake of the need for scarce resources (van de Ven, 1976, pp. 28–30). It is in response to this
need that organizations engage with each other. Put differently, organizations face the following
trade-off: organizations want to accomplish their tasks and to maintain their autonomy. In doing
so, they depend on resources from the environment. As this puts their autonomy at risk,
organizations have to engage with their environment without becoming hooked on it. Inter-
organizational relations are, thus, about the achievement of goals that organizations cannot
accomplish alone (van de Ven, 1976, p. 25). They are grasped as “negotiated environments” to
reduce environmental uncertainty (Cook, 1977, p. 65) and “as an action system to solve complex
problems or attain joint goals” (van de Ven, 1976, p. 24). The concept of inter-organizational
relations supported by the resource dependence approach is compatible with competitive and
cooperative organizational strategies and mostly characterized by differences in power (Cook,
1977, p. 75).
The resource dependence approach has been applied to security issues and aspects of economic
development. NATO and the UN, for instance, are found to exchange military capabilities with
civilian expertise and legitimacy in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Winning coalitions of
member states within the two organizations perceived the respective partner’s resources
essential to realize one’s aims (Harsch, 2015, pp. 4, 155). In general, the Atlantic alliance gives its
“tangible hard security resources” such as the capacity to plan and execute “large-scale, high-
tech, sustainable long-distance operations”—and it receives legitimacy as well as access to other
“intangible soft security resources” (Biermann, 2014, pp. 223, 229) owned by the United Nations
or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Simultaneously, NATO shies
away from cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and other
organizations that allied representatives consider illegitimate. For the same reasons,
organizations favoring civilian instruments keep the alliance at distance (Biermann, 2014, pp.
220, 229). One of these (former) civilian powers, the European Union (EU), is regarded as
(interested in) pooling resources with the UN, at least as far as peacekeeping in Africa is
concerned (Brosig, 2014, pp. 75–77). To avoid competition and overlaps, the EU not only engages
in specific action (grasped as demarcated zones or functional niches) but also is expected to offer
support “tailored on the basis of UN needs” (Brosig, 2014, p. 87) in the future.
In addition to security issues, the resource dependence approach has prominently been applied to
explicate organizations’ openness for transnational actors (Liese, 2010) and cooperation in the
anti-corruption realm (Gest & Grigorescu, 2010). The Food and Agriculture Organization of the
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United Nations (FAO) opens to transnational actors because it needs the latter’s resources. Afraid
of losing autonomy, however, FAO managers forgo cooperation when they, as in the case of
agribusiness firms, do not see a chance to effectively control these actors. To cope with this, the
FAO’s strive for money and expertise—and thus its collaboration with transnational actors—is
held to be restrained by a risk-averse organizational culture (Liese, 2010, pp. 101–106). In a
similar way, intergovernmental organizations working together against corruption are found
highly concerned with their autonomy, too. Moreover, organizations’ demand for expertise
exceeds their demand for financial resources and prestige in this policy field (Gest & Grigorescu,
2010, pp. 65–67).
Network Accounts

Network accounts are connected to psychiatric studies on juvenile runaways in the 1930s (Ebers &
Maurer, 2014, p. 387) or even traced back to Simmel’s sociological and psychological writings
from the late 19th century (Cygler & Sroka, 2014, p. 52). At the same time, however, the term
inter-organizational network is disputed due its “metaphorical origin” (Bergenholtz & Waldstrøm,
2011, p. 540). Network accounts are even criticized for not being based on theory at all (for a brief
summary of this reproach, see Ebers & Maurer, 2014, p. 404). This might explain why network
accounts are often underpinned by other approaches. Among them are not only game theory, the
theory of transaction costs (Cygler & Sroka, 2014, p. 53), and role theory (Rese, Gemünden, &
Baier, 2013; Jönsson, 1986; Evan, 1965) but also sociological neo-institutionalism (Ebers &
Maurer, 2014, pp. 397–399) and—an elective affinity—the resource dependence approach (Gulati
& Gargiulo, 1999; Cook, 1977; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Biermann, 2008).
Among the key concepts used in network accounts are: nodes, edges, size and density of the
network structure, as well as (structural) positions. First of all, the term node denotes actors.
Actors—both individuals and collectives—are grasped as cornerstones of relations, as knotting
themselves to each other. Relations among these nodes or actors are formally referred to as the
edges of a network. The strength or weakness of an edge depends on factors such as the frequency
of interaction or the quality of the emotional ties among the nodes. Moreover, the term network
structure is defined in type of the concepts size and density. Whereas the first refers to the number
of nodes in a network, the latter is about the intensity of their relations. Finally, the concept of a
(structural) position is reserved for specifying a node’s place within a network. Such a position is
regarded as central if the actor who holds it is linked to many other actors (or nodes). Of
particular importance are bridge-building positions; they link those parts of a network that,
beyond this bridge, are connected to each other rather weakly (Ebers & Maurer, 2014, pp. 388–
391). Concepts like these make it possible to examine dynamic properties of inter-organizational
networks such as “an increase or decrease in dominance, shifts in alliances or coalitions, the
formation of mergers, the rise and fall of competitive activity, and the instigation of regulatory
practices” (Cook, 1977, p. 79).
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Network accounts that aim at seizing inter-organizational relations are built on the premise that
“the structure of interactions connecting political actors” (Knoke & Chen, 2008, p. 442) has a
significant impact on what these (organizational) actors do. Distinguishing among several kinds
of network relations, network structures, and positions within these networks, it is argued that
all these differences matter as they influence organizations directly. This influence is held to
concern the resources available for an organization, an organization’s power and control, as well
as its reputation and status (Ebers & Maurer, 2014, pp. 386–388). At the same time,
organizational action potentially transforms the network structure (Knoke & Chen, 2008, p. 442).
As specific constellations of inter-organizational relations (Whetten, 1981, pp. 5–10; Bergenholtz

& Waldstrøm, 2011, p. 542), networks primarily provide “opportunities for transactions” (Cook,
1977, p. 68). Inter-organizational transaction within networks might concern everything of
importance for those involved, be it the flow of resources, information, and sentiments, or
otherwise (Cook, 1977, p. 79, referencing Mitchell). Even in terms of form, these trans- or
interactional flows cover a broad spectrum of possibilities. This spectrum “may at one extreme
include extensive, reciprocal exchanges of resources or intense hostility and conflict at the
other” (Benson, 1975, p. 230). Compared to the formal membership in an organization, relations
among organizations in networks are (formally, at least) non-hierarchical. They are less fixed
and stable but not unstable. Stability in networks is provided by reciprocity. Reciprocity
constitutes network relations. Moreover, networks are distinguished from dyadic relationships as
they consist of “three or more actors” (Cook, 1977, p. 68).
Network accounts are often fused with the resource dependence approach. In this case, the causal
chain sets in on the level of organizations’ dependence on each other. It is this mutual
dependence that is held to make organizations form and join networks. More specifically
(organizational) actors are assumed to respond to their environment and to change it: the macro-
structure of inter-organizational relations both emerges from organizational micro-decisions
and has an influence on them (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999, p. 1475). Network structures and what
(organizational) actors do thus influence each other (Ebers & Maurer, 2014, p. 388). This takes
place in “a dynamic process driven by exogenous interdependencies . . . and by endogenous
network embeddedness mechanisms” (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999, p. 1441).

Network accounts hold organizations to provide “boundary roles” (Jönsson, 1986, p. 42).
Boundary roles enable their occupants to form networks. They do so by transforming
organizations into linking-pins for integration (Jönsson, 1986, pp. 42–43). Some of the
occupants of boundary roles are grasped as key persons (Rese, Gemünden, & Baier, 2013) who
occupy distinct roles. Following Merton’s concept of role-set, the totality of these roles is
referred to as organization-set (Evan, 1965, pp. 219–220). Organizational actors are motivated by
several goals, such as the acquisition of money and authority (Benson, 1975, p. 231). Besides, they
Page 11 of 26
can pursue several cooperative and non-cooperative strategies vis-à-vis these goals (Cook, 1977,
p. 73; Benson, 1975, p. 247), among them sensitivity toward one’s position in a network (Brosig,
2011, p. 159).
Inter-organizational relations are conceptualized as loose, formally non-hierarchical networks

that differ in size, density, or other structural features. As it enables (organizational) action, the
structure of an inter-organizational network is considered an “opportunity structure” (Cook,
1977, p. 68, referencing Emerson). The constituents of inter-organizational networks range from
individuals, organizational units, and organizations to industrial sectors and regions (Ebers &
Maurer, 2014, p. 389). The environment in which networks are embedded comes in as structure,
too. This is the case when network accounts are based on theories that, like sociological neo-
institutionalism or resource dependence, distinguish between organizations and environments.
As “forces and conditions” these environments are also assumed to have an impact on network
relations (Benson, 1975, p. 247).
Network accounts have been applied to explicate trends in the realms of security as well as,
mostly, economic cooperation and development. Relations among NATO, the EU, the OSCE, the
Council of Europe, and the UN, for instance, are referred to as a Euro-Atlantic security network
that emerged from the Balkan crisis in the mid-1990s (Biermann, 2008, pp. 159–163). This
network is considered “one of the most mature networks among international governmental
organizations” so far. However, cooperation within it is mainly restricted to information sharing
and impeded by situational and structural factors such as conflicting political views or members’
concerns about preserving their autonomy (Biermann, 2008, pp. 154, 165–168).
Studies that focus on non-security networks come to more optimistic assessments. The Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) against money laundering established in 1989 on an initiative by the
G-7, to begin with, is described as a problem-oriented and flexible, influential and effective,
complex and legitimate network that successfully internationalizes U.S. legislation (Jakobi, 2012,
pp. 183, 190, 195–196, 200). Moreover, collaboration in the inter-organizational development
network is traced back to five factors. International governmental organizations specializing in
infrastructure development tend to work together not only with organizations a) of the same
type, b) with similar funding sources, or c) with reciprocal ties with them but also with
organizations that have been d) selected by others or that e) are related to a common other
(Atouba & Shumate, 2010, p. 306). Finally, the international aviation network linking
governments and airlines has been addressed in a pioneering study on transnational networking
in the mid-1980s (Jönsson, 1986). It shows that the Secretariat of the International Air Transport
Association, a nongovernmental organization of then 120 (and today 250) airlines mainly
concerned with negotiating international airfares, successfully used its “linking-pin” position to
mobilize the network against U.S. attempts to liberalize pricing (Jönsson, 1986, pp. 46–47, 50–
51, 55).
Page 12 of 26
Regime Complexity

The regime complexity approach relies on the theory of regimes. Composed of “principles,
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a
given issue-area” (Krasner, 1982, p. 185), regimes provide responses to problems of coordination
and collaboration in world politics (Stein, 1982) as well as to detrimental effects of the unilateral
pursuit of interests (Young, 1982, p. 281). Regimes are dynamic (Young, 2010, pp. 378–379) and
govern the activity of their members, that is, sovereign states, in stipulated regulatory areas
beyond these members’ jurisdiction (Young, 1982, p. 277). From this angle, the regime
complexity approach can also be grasped as a theoretical underpinning of global governance
accounts. Rooted in regime theory, too, the latter start from an understanding of global
governance as “systems of rule at all levels of human activity” (Rosenau, 1995, p. 13) that guide
the “analysis of political processes beyond the state” (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2006, p. 198).
In addition to the terms regime and (global) governance, other key concepts of the regime
complexity approach are: functional overlap, (regulative) competition, adaptation,
differentiation, and division of labor. These concepts can be grasped as moments or phases of the
inter-organizational process. This process begins with two or more organizations that are
involved in a particular policy field and share many members (functional overlap). This brings
about regulative competition among the organizations as each of them wants to be the one to make
the central rules of the field. The dynamics of competition result in adaptation and a differentiation
of rules: organizations adapt to the interests of their members either by specializing or by
adopting rules from others. In so doing, organizations create varieties of rules as well as a division
of labor (Faude, 2015).
Division of labor structures the relations between organizations and thus constitutes order
among them. Instead of considering this process to happen automatically, regime complexity
theorists refer to it as functional emergence. At the same time, however, they connect the
emergence of order to self-interested strategic choices of (organizational and state) actors
(Gehring & Faude, 2014, p. 472). Consequently, strategic action is another key concept of the
regime complexity approach. Intrinsically tied to rationality, strategic action is oriented toward
the attainment of one’s goals by making use of others in an instrumentally rational manner.
Strategic action might draw on neoclassical economy’s concept of rationality if it is modeled on
game theory (Gehring & Oberthür, 2009, pp. 126–127), but it can also be informed by Herbert
Simon’s concept of bounded rationality (Alter & Meunier, 2009, p. 18).

The regime complexity approach starts from the assumption that inter-organizational relations
significantly contribute to global order by intended and unintended effects of strategic state
action (Faude, 2015, p. 297). Inter-organizational relations are referred to as institutional or
regime complexes, that is, “systems of functionally overlapping international institutions that
Page 13 of 26
continuously affect each other’s operations” (Gehring & Faude, 2013, p. 120; see also Young,
1996, p. 6). Regime complexes or functional overlaps among international organizations are
considered non-hierarchical networks that govern “a particular issue-area” (Raustiala & Victor,
2004, p. 279) or “relate to a common subject matter” (Orsini, Morin, & Young, 2013, p. 29). They
are held to result from a rise of complex interdependence (Alter & Meunier, 2009, p. 14; Young,
1996, p. 20; see also Keohane & Nye, 1974) and institutional density in the context of “increasing
legalization in world politics” (Raustiala & Victor, 2004, p. 295).
Regime complexes generate undesired regulatory competition among organizations (Gehring &
Faude, 2014, p. 480; Alter & Meunier, 2009, p. 20) and—as states can pick those organizations
that fit their interests best—new opportunities for strategic action (Gehring & Faude, 2013, p.
126; Raustiala & Victor, 2004, p. 299). These opportunities or cross-institutional strategies
include forum-shopping, regime-shifting, and strategic inconsistency (Alter & Meunier, 2009, p.
17; Hafner-Burton, 2009, p. 34; Helfer, 2009, pp. 39, 42; Margulis, 2013, p. 59). They are also
discussed as à la carte behavior (Hafner-Burton, 2009, p. 35) and chessboard politics (Alter &
Meunier, 2009, p. 16). As a consequence, organizations come under strong pressure to adapt to
the interests of their members. This is why regime complexes are seen as both enabling and
constraining cooperation (Orsini, Morin, & Young, 2013, p. 34).
Among the inhibitive consequences of functional overlaps are “turf battles” over the functional
and geographic scope of institutions (Hofmann, 2009, p. 49), lack of hierarchy, and increasing
costs of changing strategies over time (Struett, Nance, & Armstrong, 2013, p. 95). At the same
time, however, functional overlaps also contribute to a division of labor and thus alleviate
cooperation: organizations unilaterally give in to the pressure to adapt to their members’
interests when they are confronted with intensifying inter-organizational competition about
regulative competencies. They do so either by specializing or by integrating rules from other
organizations into their own rule-sets. Such an adaptation process is considered to result in both
a differentiation of organizational rule-making and an inter-organizational division of labor that
facilitates state gains from cooperation (Faude, 2015, pp. 301–306).
Cooperation is alleviated by a stabilization or convergence of expectations (Young, 1982, p. 277;

Morin & Orsini, 2013, p. 48) and a renewal of state actors’ self-binding (Faude, 2015, p. 316). The
emerging division of labor among organizations is even held to replace conflict (Gehring & Faude,
2013, p. 124) and to bring about patterns of structural order. In contrast and as an alternative to
forum shopping, this kind of order involves a coordination of (state and organizational) action. It
is said to be rather stable and to consist in procedural rules, a principle of order (the division of
labor), and organizational components (grasped as both substantial rules and institutional
apparatuses). State actors are considered to turn against this order only when the constellation of
power and interests has changed or when governance functions are redistributed (Faude, 2015,
pp. 305–306).
The premises of these core arguments are manifold and touch upon macro- and micro-level
assumptions. One assumption is that order spontaneously emerges from state action. Unlike
negotiated and imposed orders (Young, 1982, pp. 283–285), this happens in a functional and
non-intended way. In addition, the regime complexity approach is built upon the premise that
Page 14 of 26
state actors are strategic actors that rationally engage in regimes to realize their own goals and
preferences (Betts, 2013, p. 78; Keohane & Victor, 2011, p. 8). However, interest-based actors are
also held to have “their own norms and belief systems” (Orsini, Morin, & Young, 2013, p. 36).
Regime complexity theorists thus conceive of action as guided by a triad of interests, institutional
dynamics, and norms (Zelli, Gupta, & Van Asselt, 2013, p. 106).
As far as ascriptions of causality are concerned, regime complexes have an impact on states,
organizations, and (in terms of global governance arrangements) world order (Gehring & Faude,
2014, p. 472). International organizations are said to exert causal influence on each other’s
normative development, performance, and effectiveness (Gehring & Oberthür, 2009, p. 126; Alter
& Meunier, 2009, p. 20). The organizational macro-level influences individuals at the micro-
level. The individuals’ adaptation to these influences contains interactions that have an impact on
the macro-level of organizational outcome (Gehring & Oberthür, 2009, p. 129). This bidirectional
mode of influence is also grasped as follows: organizations or regimes, as normative structures,
define norms of appropriate action, while actors shape and change the underlying norms
(Struett, Nance, & Armstrong, 2013, p. 95). In greater detail, a) the knowledge and ideas of an
organization, b) its norms and obligations, c) its output, as well as d) the functional
interdependence among organizations are conceptualized as four kinds of triggers with the
potential to bring about changes. These changes become manifest either in targets, in negotiation
processes, in the effectiveness, or in staff behavior (Gehring & Oberthür, 2009, pp. 132–144;
Gehring & Faude, 2014, pp. 477–478).

Organizations are grasped as both substantive rules and institutional apparatuses (Faude, 2015, p.
306). From this perspective, they stand for structures influencing and being influenced by
(individual) actors. In line with a sharper distinction between institutions such as regimes or
regime complexes and their organizational components, however, organizations are also referred
to as actors. As strategic actors, they strive for substantial and organizational goals and (have to)
adapt to the interests of their member states to maintain their function (Faude, 2015, p. 302). At
the same time, inter-organizational relations are conceived as a (mostly) non-intentional,
functional consequence of overlapping rules among organizations. As regime complexes, inter-
organizational relations are involved in a process that brings about structures of order that are
constituted by organizations and procedural rules (Faude, 2015).
The regime complexity approach has been applied to a very broad spectrum of policy fields (and
their interlinkages). It encompasses environmental issues (Young, 2010; Keohane & Victor, 2011;
Zelli, Gupta, & Van Asselt, 2013), consumer protection and trade (Raustiala & Victor, 2004;
Hafner-Burton, 2009; Helfer, 2009; Gehring & Faude, 2014; Faude, 2015) as well as security and
human rights (Betts, 2013; Hofmann, 2009; Margulis, 2013; Struett, Nance, & Armstrong, 2013;
for an attempt to combine regime complexity with resource dependence in reference to
peacekeeping in Africa, see Brosig, 2015). Scholars drawing on regime complexity can, roughly,
Page 15 of 26
be classified as optimists or pessimists regarding the question of whether or not state

representatives’ increasing options to choose among available institutions brings about order.
The rather optimistic stance holds that short-term orientations of state representatives do not
capture the whole picture. Mostly unintentionally, a division of labor among the organizational
constituents of regime complexes emerges instead—and in the wake of it: social order (Gehring &
Faude, 2014; Faude, 2015). Other optimists stress the “flexibility and adaptability” of regime
complexes (Keohane & Victor, 2011, p. 7).
The pessimists among regime complexity theorists point to the detrimental effects of inter-
organizational competition or rather the strategies by means of which the representatives of
states and international governmental organizations deal with it. Negatively affected in a global
perspective are, for instance, refugees (Betts, 2013) and those who suffer from hunger (Margulis,
2013). In addition, a third position is provided by scholars who come to a rather ambivalent
evaluation of the effects of regime complexity. They stress the simultaneity of both cooperation
(if only achieved by muddling through) and inefficiency through competition. An example of this
position points to relations between NATO and the European Union (Hofmann, 2009).
Classical Pragmatism: Structures of Corporate Practice

Key thinkers of classical pragmatism include philosophers Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914),
William James (1842–1910), John Dewey (1859–1952), and George Herbert Mead (1863–1931).
They share a view of the social world that, unlike Descartes, starts from belief and not from
doubt. As “belief is a rule for action” (Peirce, 1992, p. 129), pragmatism’s focus is on what
humans do, and this is held to be genuinely creative (Joas, 1996). Moreover, pragmatists share a
concept of truth that puts emphasis on what is believed to be true. They are not seeking
correspondence between propositions and facts. Since the early 2000s, pragmatist ideas have
increasingly been brought to IR (Hellmann, 2002; Bauer & Brighi, 2009; Friedrichs & Kratochwil,
2009; but see also Deibert, 1997).
The classical pragmatist attempt to examine inter-organizational relations draws on the concept
of structures of corporate practice (Roos, 2010; Franke & Roos, 2010). This is modeled on Dewey’s
notion of public. For Dewey (1984), public emerges from collective attempts to regulate those
consequences that some people’s action have upon others. The concept of structures of corporate
practice tends to universalize this pragmatist idea. It denotes collective attempts to cope with
social problems. Structures of corporate practice are not restricted to a particular kind of
collectivity. All phenomena usually taken as “collective actors” are considered structures of
corporate practice—whether they are states, national or international as well as governmental or
nongovernmental organizations, business enterprises, families, formal and informal groups,
relations among two or more of these entities, or something else.
Page 16 of 26
Two further key concepts of the classical pragmatist approach are universe of meaning and
spaces of possibilities. The term universe of meaning refers to classical pragmatism’s
understanding of meaning or meaning-making as a social endeavor. For Peirce (1992, p. 132), the
meaning of something lies in its consequences. This maxim implies that speakers, for instance,
do not have the meaning of what they say at their own disposal just as sculptors do not have the
meaning of their sculptures at theirs. Meaning is socially mediated; it is negotiated in social,
intersubjective processes. Against this background, the universe of meaning can be grasped as the
meaning of everything that concerns human beings. It is a kind of meta-structure that is
embedding all human beings and binds them together.
The term space of possibilities refers to what single human beings can and cannot do. On the one
hand, this space is constrained by the beliefs that guide a human being’s action. On the other
hand, it is constrained by the opportunities to act provided by the structures of corporate practice
in which a person is involved. From this angle, the universe of meaning can also be grasped as the
space of possibility of humankind: it encompasses the meaning of everything that concerns
human beings and, thus, stands for everything that humankind can and cannot do.

Inter-organizational relations are conceptualized in the same way as their constituents: as
structures of corporate practice (Franke & Koch, 2013; Franke, 2015). These refer to problems of
action that human beings cannot solve alone—and are considered materialized ideas of how to
cope with these problems in a common endeavor. Structures of corporate practice can also be
understood as rules or, in case they prove their worth, routines. They are held to stand in a
dialectical relationship with human beings, or more precisely: with those human beings who act
in and for them. Correspondingly, human beings are grasped as the only actors. The dialectical
relationship between structures of corporate practice and human beings as the only actors is
referred to as process. It is oriented toward Mead’s stance of “I” and “me” as two phases of the
self. Along with the concept of the universe of meaning, this prevents the approach from falling
prey to individualism (Mead, 1974; Franke & Roos, 2010, pp. 1070–1072).
The pragmatist approach is built on Peirce’s premise that beliefs guide human action, mostly as
routines. When, in times of crisis, these routines do not work any longer, human beings have to
find new ways to cope with critical situations or problems of action. They do so by means of their
(socially constituted) potential for creative action (Joas, 1996). In case these new ways turn out to
be helpful, they become new routines. In this manner, a new belief is established. Beliefs are
construed as rules. Like every rule, they can be seen as socially constituted, since “it is not
possible to obey a rule ‘privately’” (Wittgenstein, 1958, §202). Whether or not human beings
formulate or follow their beliefs consciously or unconsciously, these rules for action do not
represent idiosyncrasies or solipsistic products. They are social creations per se.
Rules that guide inter-organizational relations are considered contributions to global order.
Their examination starts from the following assumption: both structures of corporate practice
and what is brought about by those who operate in and for them can be conceived as ideas to
Page 17 of 26
which human beings are loyal (Roos, 2015, pp. 183–185). These ideas materialize in the process of
world politics and represent (potential) contributions to global order. Due to its focus on beliefs
that guide human beings’ interaction, the pragmatist account thus addresses the contributions
that these beliefs make to global order. Moreover, it highlights how these beliefs and
contributions to global order evolve over time. According to Roos (2015), evolvements like these
reveal shifts in loyalty.
In terms of the Aristotelian differentiation between active (efficient and final) as well as
constitutive (material and formal) causes (Kurki, 2006), the pragmatist approach operates on the
following ascriptions of causality: what human actors bring about due to their competence to act
is referred to as efficient causes. Beliefs as rules for action are conceived as final causes. The
universe of meaning and every tangible object are grasped as material causes; and possible
actions, spaces of possibilities, come in as formal causes. Combined, the process of life or politics
makes up a dialectic relationship between actors and structures. It is conceptualized as a double
mutual constitution of beliefs (rules for action) and spaces of possibilities on the one hand and of
the universe of meaning (plus all tangible objects) and the competence to act on the other hand.
Human beings are primed to make a difference (active causes) due to their competence to act and
their beliefs. However, they can do so only as a result of their social embeddedness (Franke &
Roos, 2010, pp. 1070–1072).

Both organizations and inter-organizational relations are conceived as structures of corporate
practice. They epitomize responses to problems of action in which rules for action addressing
these problems become manifest. Three types of rules for action are distinguished. The first type
refers to the constitutive problem of a structure of corporate practice (and its substructures) as well
as to its relations with other structures of corporate practice. The second type of rules is linked to
the configuration of a structure of corporate practice. It concerns structural positions within this
structure and its substructures as well as the relations among these positions. Finally, a third rule
type addresses what those who hold a distinct structural position can or cannot do according to
the structural potential of or incorporated in this position (Franke & Roos, 2010, pp. 1065–1068).
At the same time, the pragmatist approach portrays human beings as the only actors. For this
purpose, a triad of characteristics is assumed from which their competence to act is derived:
corporeality, reflexivity, and creativity (denoted as the aptitude for abduction). Corporeality refers
to pre-reflexive strivings of the body that strongly influence a human being’s perception of social
situations. Reflexivity, in terms of Mead, stands for a human being’s capability to think of oneself
as of an object. Abduction, finally and following Peirce, is linked to creative problem-solving and
the capacity to control these processes (Franke & Roos, 2010, pp. 1068–1070).
When applied to inter-organizational relations, the pragmatist approach focuses on security and
humanitarian issues. However, research is still in the early stages. One example is the analysis of
the German government’s position toward the relationship between NATO and the (pre-Lisbon)
Page 18 of 26
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It established the following policy aims: to
emancipate ESDP from U.S. hegemony, to set up autonomous European security instruments
beyond NATO, and to strengthen EU influence on NATO’s design and operations (Roos, 2010, pp.
247–258). Another pragmatist study briefly referred to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee
(IASC) for the coordination of humanitarian assistance. Created by the UN General Assembly in
1992, the IASC is a striking example of inter-organizational relations. It is constituted by several
intergovernmental organizations of the UN system and open to representatives from coalitions of
nongovernmental organizations. The self-understanding of IASC participants is, less
surprisingly, guided by the belief in strengthening coordination in the humanitarian field
(Franke, 2015, pp. 279–287). Similar beliefs might have led the UN Secretary-General to join
meetings of the Group of Twenty (G-20) and to assign the head of the UN Department of
Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) as the UN’s G-20 Sherpa (Franke & Koch, 2013, pp. 98–99).
Implications for Further Research
International Relations (IR) scholars began to engage in the study of inter-organizational

relations later than their colleagues in neighboring disciplines such as sociology and economics.
Several accounts are now available, however, for those who want to inquire into why and how
relations among international organizations and other constituents of world politics take place
and what they bring about. Against this background, a further consolidation of the study of inter-
organizational relations is expected to be achieved in the years to come. Common endeavors to
check the content, compatibility, and plausibility of what is driving the approaches already out
there promise to be helpful on this track. In particular, this holds true for the broader
philosophical or socio-theoretical assumptions and for the political and societal implications of
these accounts. Pressing questions to be addressed in this context are: what is currently
restricting research on inter-organizational relations and how is it possible to overcome these
obstacles?
First answers to these questions indicate that research is restricted by a focus on dyadic relations,
the same policy field, or organizations of the same type, say intergovernmental organizations. In
addition, a full realization of the potentials of research on inter-organizational relations is
prevented by a deep divide in the discipline. This splits researchers inspired by one or more of the
well-established paradigms from those colleagues who, by dint of their worldviews or
procedures, are located at the margins of the discipline. Simultaneously, these two groups of
rather theory-driven researchers are split from those colleagues who are endued with vast field
knowledge but engage their research object in a more or less non-theoretical, empiricist way.
Attempts to overcome these (traditional) splits might be suited to advance the study of inter-
organizational relations in IR.
Finally, current research is restricted by the still dominant equation of (inter-organizational)

relations with cooperation, coordination, or collaboration. Examinations of competition and
conflict already take place but should be strongly encouraged and expanded. In this context,
however, it is important to engage the research object in an open and reconstructive manner
instead of subsuming it under pre-established categories. The empirical relevance and richness
Page 19 of 26
of inter-organizational relations cannot be overlooked. It is manifest not only in relations among

governments but also, to name but a few, in relations between the World Health Organization
(WHO), pharmaceutical companies, and private foundations, in the Holy See’s relations with
representatives of other world religions, or in those kinds of relations that the Fédération
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), maintains with the International Olympic
Committee (IOC) and various multinational corporations. Inquiries into these kinds of inter-
organizational relations and the patterns of world order they bring about will surely bear much
fruit. The five approaches presented here are ready for this endeavor.
Acknowledgments
For helpful comments on former versions of this article I’d kindly like to thank Peter Mayer, Sebastian Mayer,
Sebastian Streb, an anonymous reviewer, and the editors.
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Inter-Organizational Relations: Five Theoretical Approaches

Inter-Organizational Relations: Five Theoretical Approaches

Introduction: Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics

Compared to neighboring disciplines, inquiries into inter-organizational relations have come a

Five Theoretical Approaches for Examining Inter-Organizational Rela-

1. What is the (overarching) theoretical or intellectual tradition in which the approach is

3. How are organizations and their relations conceptualized?

Theoretical Tradition and Key Concepts

Sociological neo-institutionalism contests both new institutional economics and traditional

environment” and as “functional elements of that environment” (Jepperson, 1991, p. 147), as

On the macro-level, finally, the most comprehensive form of an environment is referred to as

Core Argument and Causal Logic

From the perspective of sociological neo-institutionalism, changes in the environment bring

Concept of Organizations and How They Relate

Theoretical Tradition and Key Concepts

others in an organization’s environment and their role in or influence on that organization’s

Core Argument and Causal Logic

Concept of Organizations and How They Relate

Theoretical Tradition and Key Concepts

Core Argument and Causal Logic

As specific constellations of inter-organizational relations (Whetten, 1981, pp. 5–10; Bergenholtz

Concept of Organizations and How They Relate

Inter-organizational relations are conceptualized as loose, formally non-hierarchical networks

Theoretical Tradition and Key Concepts

Core Argument and Causal Logic

Cooperation is alleviated by a stabilization or convergence of expectations (Young, 1982, p. 277;

Concept of Organizations and How They Relate

be classified as optimists or pessimists regarding the question of whether or not state

Classical Pragmatism: Structures of Corporate Practice

Theoretical Tradition and Key Concepts

Core Argument and Causal Logic

Concept of Organizations and How They Relate

Implications for Further Research

International Relations (IR) scholars began to engage in the study of inter-organizational

Finally, current research is restricted by the still dominant equation of (inter-organizational)

of inter-organizational relations cannot be overlooked. It is manifest not only in relations among

Emerson, R. M. (1962). Power-dependence relations. American Sociological Review, 27(1), 31–41.

Galaskiewicz, J. (1985). Interorganizational relations. Annual Review of Sociology, 11, 281–304.

Joas, H. (1996). The creativity of action. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wittgenstein, L. (1958). Philosophical investigations (2d ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.

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