90 + FERNANDO TELXEIRA DA SILVA
de Santos" (PRD diss, Universidade de S20 Paulo, 2007).
cHarre!
Whitened and Enlightened
The Ford Motor Company and Racial
Engineering in the Brazilian Amazon
ELIZABETH ESCH
‘Shades of Tarzan! Youll never guess these bright, happy; healthy school
ile lve in a jungle ity that didnt even exis few years ago
—"The Ford Rubber Plantations”
‘A look atthe world of the Ford Motor Company in the decades after World
‘War I reveals jst how thoroughly the company had been able to create what it
described as an “empire” The war had, of cours, played a massive role in this,
spreading not just Ford’s products and production methods across the globe,
but also those of the United States. As Ford workplaces appeared around the
assembly shops, manufacturing plans, and car dealers—so too did
fantasized would one day inchude all
ame to be called first in Michigan,
hey were increasingly part of a global
geography. By the mi te 19308 an expanding and border-crossing net-
‘work linked Ford City, California, to Ford City, Tennessee, both “Ford towns";
Pequaming, in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan and purchased by Ford in 1933,
igan, where Ford owned and ran a timber
jst advanced sawmills; further south but
‘a country to the north of the United States was Ford City, Ontario, Canada,
I geography and company schemes to Port Elizabeth,
-knamed the “Detroit of South Africa” where would-92 + BLIZABETH ESCH
Pethaps the most startling example of the international “Ford town” is to
bbe found at Fordlindia, the first of two plantations the Ford Motor
‘operated inthe state of Ps
‘grow and process rubbi
that, by the middle of Fo
‘ompany
Brazil, Here the company linked the imperative to
the imperative to create new people, urged by state
tenure in Brazil, had linked its ideas of modernity
and progress to those promoted by the company in the Northern Amazon and
across the globe. While the history of Fordlandia can be used to reveal narra
tives of many kinds, some more fantastic than others, itis particularly useful for
thinking about the relationship of racial engineering to social engineering and
the relationship ofeach to the built environment of the plantation?
In his wonderful reflection on the relationship(s) between social and spatial
engineering included inthis volume, Andrew Herod skilfully directs us o con-
sider the — perhaps obvious but nevertheless often overlooked — significance
of built environments to relations of power. Most importantly, Herod draws
attention to the dialectic tha links workers and their struggles tothe landscapes
they inhabit, considering company towns in the continuum of housing and lv-
ing arrangements that are both imposed on workers and created by them. He
‘writes, “The physicality of landscapes is a reflection of the social interests of
those who construct them but also... [the way in which landscapes are made
shapes how socal relations subsequently unfold (the social and the spatial, in
other words, are mutually constituted and co 5 To Heroxts
essay adds a further consid tis the desire for and commitment to
racial improvement that allowed the Ford Motor Company to build common
cause with modernizersin Brazil. In pursuit of what Ann Laura Stoler has called
ization” company men and Brazilian elites saw in the very ma
teriality of plantation living possibilities for social engineering.”
DIEGO RIVERA'S DREAM
Institute of Arts to cover the four
In 1932, when he was invited by the Det
walls ofits courtyard with frescoes ofhi
River Rouge plant as the ce
sent the idea that industry’ “development” of the natural world would provide
Whitened and Enlightened + 93
the basis for human liberation. These two large and detailed frescoes of the
work process are surrounded by twenty-five other, smaller frescoes depicting
the bounty and beauty of the natural world, the worlds of science and inven-
tion, and several characters who represent what Rivera called the “four elements
of the world” These elements formed the basic ingredi
Rivera was the key to modern manufacturing poss ly as repre
sented by skyscrapers and cars. Of these differently colored figures Rivera ssi:
“The yellow race represents the sand, because is most numerous. And
‘ace, the first in this country, is like the iron or, the first thing necessary for the
steel. The black race islike the coal, because ithas a great native aesthetic sense,
a real flame of feeling and beauty in ts ancient sculpture, its native rhythm and
‘music. So its aesthetic sens is lke the ire, and its labor furnished the hardness
Which the carbon in the coal gives to steel. The white race is like the lime, not
only because itis white, but because lime isthe organizing age making
of steel. It binds together the other elements and so you see the white race asthe
great organizer ofthe world”*
‘The explicit link between race and in roduction that Rivera
ticulated verbally and through his art was Henry Ford made as
‘Writing in his first memoir that his company’s product was not so much cars
asimen, Heney Ford had gained notoriety through his multifaceted attemps to
“rebuild” human beings. Most was his five-dolla
duced in 1914, which required immigrant workers to prove the
to becoming American through a range of behaviors they pr
of the workplace. Sobriety, cleanliness,
ing in
‘wage. Though it lasted only about a decade,
of behaviors and norms as those to the regime of pro
duction practiced in his factories would soon be applied not jus
‘of the world as they came to Ford but also to the peoples ofthe
came to them. By 1925, the company had expanded to more than twenty coun-
tries, and its particular involvement in Latin America was seen by Rivera as
having significance other than as an imperial power in the region. The future
of the Americas —its modernity —for Rivera was found in the unique eom-
ing together of the technoculture of the hyperdeveloped north, or the United
States, with the resilience of traditional indigenous cultural production across
the Americas,
‘Though the enormity of Ford impact on the in Rivera's
{rescoes, in speaking about them he emphasized not the troubling emergence
‘of US. industrial dominance but instead the emergence of a new world, The94 + ELIZABETH esc
red from trees, smoothly
‘Ocean up the Rouge
Rouge plant by water, rubber on one side b
transported from the Amazon River across
River, where it would be transformed into tr
pers represent the process Rivera wished to celebrate in which human labor
to goods whose use would be
ionalism, learned in the sur-
‘movements, which saw industry as bringing liberation
restingly, however, the rubber tappers find no place
of the Brazilian state and its homegrown commitment to turn
“savages” and other “substandard” people into real Ford men. We cann
derstand the decision to build the; if we do not understand the world
economic circumstances that led to it. This chapter describes how techniques
that are often described as “Americanizing” were used in Brazil in order to
‘of new men?
HENRY FORD'S DREAM
‘When Ford launched the project that would result in two rubber plantations
being carved out of the Amazon region of Brazil, only one part ofits ideal was
to grow and process rubber. Company records reveal an intense interest—and
belief —in racial progress, which it relied on as it attempted to “prolet ”
they also did not function merely as
smma. These two towns should be seen
as attempts by Ford to accomplish
in an extractive industry —not
‘economy — while bringing to bear a peculiar com
supremacy in making workers.
Whitened and Enlightened » 95
In the summer of 1928 the Ford-owned Lake Or
the newly founded Fordlindia in the state of Par, Bra
a barge carrying
to two years and
for laying its own rail the company brought wit dock
construction equipment ... medical supplies ... power house engine room
saw mill equipment... road machinery... tugs and workboats”” Though the
‘Ormoc's cargo suggests an extraordinary degree of foresight, subsequent events
inthe Amazon reveal that the company was absurdly ill-prepared forthe project
itwas undertaking.
Approaching Brazil with the same commitment to social engineering it
sanage both
in Para seem all too often like a prequel to Werner Herzog classic
study of colonial overreach in Brazil, Fitzcarraldo.
Carl LaRue, a botanist who scouted plantations for Ford, recommended
Brazil because, although “labor is somewhat more expensive than in the East
labor is also more intelligent than the average labor in the East” LaRue
spelled out a solution to the problem of expenses for the company, arguing
that the use of machines on a modern pla
offset any advantage thatthe plantations
of the Amazon Valley are
= -admixture has gone on so long that is dificult to distinguish the different
types. The mixture isnot a particularly good one from a racial standpoint but
itis by no means a bad one... the fate ofthese people is more tragic because
they are not possessed of the stliity of the oriental, but have enough of the
white race in them to suffer keenly and long intensely forthe beter things. Asit
is, their condition is worse than that of any of the coolies in the East far worse
‘even than that ofthe average lave in the old days”96 + eLIzanErH esc.
slightly less draconian model
‘would lead to the degradation of those whites who participated in
different expressions of white supremacy that Ford embraced in differen
lenge the company’s overrii
hierarchies. Indeed the idea that the company believed it could tap the desire
for consumer goods they believed flowed in the veins of “Amazonian people”
res in the region and the labor of
rategy by the United States to gain
control from the British ofthe rubber market. As the overwhelming consumer
‘of the world’s rubber, US. industry had a par
te when he received in 1923 a letter from H. F
the development of
mn.” Revealing of the globality of the most nation-based
realities, low world prices for rubber would matter in a new way to those who,
consumed cars in the United States. The halting democratization of consump-
tion of automobiles thus could undergird calls for low world market prices of
the commodities from which they were
Within five years of Firestone’ appeal, US. firms had acquired land for rub-
ber production across the globe: Firestone launched the Liberian plantations
to remake the ecology, society, economy, and people of
ed an industrial presence in Brazil through its as-
[sembly plant in Sao Paulo, built to supply the steadily growing Latin American
Whitened and Enlightened + 97
‘market. Ford’ expansion into the North Amazon occurred alongside a social |
debate that was underway in Brazil about the relat
agement and social progress In her examination of iio Paulo, |
Barbara Weinstein demonstrates how this debate had been developing, “per
colating among indu ial hygienists and educators
essary to understand
engineers, and educators claimed for themselves the professional author-
ity and technical expertise necessary to modernize Brazilian society” These
professionals were highly interested in Fordist process: “advocates of Fordism,
while
transformation of the workplace required attention to aspects of industri
beyond the production process."*
Ford’ arrival in the Amazon could not have been more well-timed from the
point of view ofthese reformers. As modernizers who seemed to have tech
sy and science on their side, Ford's “American staff” was welcomed by Bra
elites who hoped to use the company’s commitments to men-making to fur-
ther their own goals and to address the wreckage in the countryside caused by
the changing rubber market. The experiment in the Amazon reveals the inner
workings of the corporation, and the connection between the economic and
social, the natural and the global, realms it sought to dominate. i
‘As part of its agreement with the state government in Pard, the company was
required to plant at least a thousand trees within one month ofthe start ofthe
‘operations. Ford managers had arranged to have these rubber seedlings planted_|
along the river so that production would be underway before the construction ~
ofthe plantation began. After their arrival, however, the crew was informed
the seedlings had actually been-p the state of Amazonas,
where Ford had been given permission to cukvate rubber. Loc a
prevented the transport ofthe trees from one state to the next. Although they
to reverse this decision in court, the company filed to secure release of
the trees.
So they began again, The frst manager of the plantations was replaced, atthe
Lrging of Henry Ford, whose hands-on attention bespoke the symbolic import
45 well asthe economic potential ofthe experiment, by Einard Oxholm, Though
Oxholm, captain ofthe Lake Ormec, knew literally nothing about growing rub-
ber, Fords arrogant belief that “anyone could learn anything” led to his being
put in charge of Fordlindlia. Oxholm remained at Fordlandia until the end of
1929; his tenure there reflected the swagger of @ company intent on absolutely98» ELIZABETH ESCH
he very ecology that had nurtured the trees it was there to exploit.
ignorance in the face of decades of local knowledge of rubber
7 the indigenous people Ford
Ford had selected was compl
toa mono-