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Transportation Digest - Special Laws in Transportation (B) A.M.+D.G. Transportation - Atty. Abaño
Transportation Digest - Special Laws in Transportation (B) A.M.+D.G. Transportation - Atty. Abaño
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discharge maritime liens create a lien on the vessel, and one advancing
money to discharge a valid lien gets a lien of equal dignity with the one
discharged.
Under these doctrines, a person who extends credit for the purpose of
discharging a maritime lien is not entitled to the said lien where the funds
were not furnished to the ship on the order of the master and there was
no evidence that the money was actually used to pay debts secured by the
lien. As applied in the instant case, it becomes necessary to prove that
the credit advanced by Citibank to PISC was actually utilized for the repair
and conversion of the vessel M/V Asean Liberty. Otherwise, Citibank
could not have acquired the maritime lien of Hongkong United Dockyards,
Ltd. over the vessel M/V Asean Liberty.
Contrary to the assertions of petitioners, the records are replete with
documents that show that the proceeds of the loans were used for the
repair and conversion of the vessel M/V Asean Liberty. It is clear that the
amount used for the repair of the vessel M/V Asean Liberty was
advanced by Citibank and was utilized for the purpose of paying off the
original maritime lienor, Hongkong United Dockyards, Ltd.
China Bank, as guarantor, was itself subrogated to all the rights of Citibank
as against PISC, the latters debtor.
(2) In the case at bench, petitioners mortgage lien arose on September
25, 1979 when the said mortgage was registered with the Philippine Coast
Guard Headquarters. As such, in order for the maritime lien of China Bank
to be preferred over the mortgage lien of petitioners, the same must have
arisen prior to the recording of the mortgage on September 25, 1979.
It is the contention of petitioners that China Banks maritime lien under its
Standby Letter of Credit arose only on March 30, 1983 when China Bank
actually paid off the outstanding obligation of PISC to Citibank.
Considering that its mortgage lien arose on September 25, 1979,
petitioners thus conclude that its lien is preferred as against China Banks
maritime lien.
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reporting for work a few days following the incident, the private
respondents filed the instant action for damages based on quasi-delict.
TC rendered judgment against petitioners. The court ordered them to pay,
jointly and severally, the amount of P49,954.86 in damages to
respondents. CA affirmed the decision.
Petitioners Contention: It was Abcede, Jr., driver of the Scout car, who
was at fault. He was also only 19-years old at the time of the incident and
did not have a driver's license. Also, the sketch made by the police
investigator showing the skid marks of the bus, is inadmissible as evidence
because it was prepared the day after the incident and the alleged "telltale" skid marks and other details had already been obliterated by the
heavy downpour which lasted for at least an hour after the accident
ISSUE
W/N there was enough proof to show liability of the petitioners YES
RULING
While it may be accepted that some of the skid marks may have been
erased by the "heavy downpour" on or about the time of the accident, it
remains a possibility that not all skid marks were washed away. The strong
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty erases, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, any suspicions that the police
investigator just invented the skid marks indicated in his report. Also, the
finding of the CA that the collision took place within the lane of the Scout
car was supported by other conclusive evidence. "Indeed, a trail of broken
glass which was scattered along the car's side of the road, whereas the
bus lane was entirely clear of debris
Furthermore, the fact that the Scout car was found after the impact at rest
against the guard railing shows that it must have been hit and thrown
backwards by the bus. The physical evidence do not show that the
Superlines Bus while traveling at high speed, usurped a portion of the lane
occupied by the Scout car before hitting it on its left side. On collision, the
impact due to the force exerted by a heavier and bigger passenger bus on
the smaller and lighter Scout car, heavily damaged the latter and threw it
against the guard railing.
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The evidence with respect to the issue that Fernando Abcede, Jr. who was
not duly licensed, was the one driving the Scout car at the time of the
accident, could not simply exempt petitioner's liability because they were
parties at fault for encroaching on the Scout car's lane
Be that as it may, this Court has followed a well-entrenched principle that
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are normally given great
weight, more so when the findings tally with the findings of the trial court
and are supported by the evidence
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Transportation
Commission
and
the
Board
of
Transportation under existing laws over such violations and
punishment thereof are hereby transferred to the
Metropolitan Manila Commission. When the proper penalty
to be imposed is suspension or revocation of driver's
license or certificate of public convenience, the
Metropolitan Manila Commission or its representatives shall
suspend or revoke such license or certificate. The
suspended or revoked driver's license or the report of
suspension or revocation of the certificate of public
convenience shall be sent to the Land Transportation
Commission or the Board of Transportation, as the case
may be, for their records update.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 3. Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and
regulations, committed within a twelve-month period,
reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee, shall
subject the violator to graduated fines as follows: P10.00
for the first offense, P20.00 for the second offense, P50.00
for the third offense, a one-year suspension of driver's
license for the fourth offense, and a revocation of the
driver' license for the fifth offense: Provided, That the
Metropolitan Manila Commission may impose higher
penalties as it may deem proper for violations of its
ordinances prohibiting or regulating the use of certain
public roads, streets or thoroughfares in Metropolitan
Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver's license
shall not be confiscated but the erring driver shall be
immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by
the Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall state the
violation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the
violation and an advice that he can make payment to the
city or municipal treasurer where the violation was
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ISSUE
1. Whether or not LOI 43 is valid.
2. Whether or not private respondents license can be confiscated.
RULING
1. Yes. The petitionerits insists that LOI 43 remains in force despite the
issuance of PD 1605. It contends that there is no inconsistency between
the two measures because the former deals with illegally parked vehicles
anywhere in the Philippines whereas the latter deals with the regulation of
the flow of traffic in the Metro Manila area only.
Private respondent argues that LOI 43 has been repealed by PD 1605,
which specifies all the sanctions available against the various traffic
violations, including illegal parking. He stresses that removal and
confiscation of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles is not one of
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them, the penalties being limited in the decree to imposition of fine and
suspension or revocation of driver's licenses or certificates of public
convenience, etc. He claims that removal and confiscation of the license
plate without notice and hearing violates due process because such license
plate is a form of property protected by the Bill of Rights against unlawful
deprivation.
The Court holds that LOI 43 is valid but may be applied only against motor
vehicles that have stalled in the public streets due to some involuntary
cause and not those that have been intentionally parked in violation of the
traffic laws. A careful reading of the above decree will show that removal
and confiscation of the license plate of any illegally parked vehicle is not
among the specified penalties. Moreover, although the Metropolitan Manila
Commission is authorized by the decree to "otherwise discipline" and
"impose higher penalties" on traffic violators, whatever sanctions it may
impose must be "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein
prescribed."
It would appear that what the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but a
traffic obstruction, which is an altogether different offense. A violation
imports an intentional breach or disregard of a rule, as where a driver
leaves his vehicle in a no-parking area against a known and usually visible
prohibition. Contrary to the common impression, LOI 43 does not punish
illegal parking per se but parking of stalled vehicles, i.e., those that
involuntarily stop on the road due to some unexpected trouble such as
engine defect, lack of gasoline, punctured tires, or other similar cause. The
vehicle is deemed illegally parked because it obstructs the flow of traffic,
but only because it has stalled. The obstruction is not deliberate. In fact,
even the petitioner recognizes that "there is a world of difference between
a stalled vehicle and an illegally parked and unattended one" and suggests
a different treatment for either. "The first means one which stopped
unnecessarily or broke down while the second means one which stopped to
accomplish something, including temporary rest.
2. No. It is not covered by LOI 43 thus subject to a different penalty. As it
has not been shown that the private respondent's motor vehicle had
stalled because of an engine defect or some other accidental cause and, no
less importantly, that it had stalled on the road for a second or subsequent
time, confiscation of the license plate cannot be justified under LOI 43.
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And neither can that sanction be sustained under PD 1605, which clearly
provides that "in case of traffic violations, (even) the driver's license shall
not be confiscated," let alone the license plate of the motor vehicle. If at
all, the private respondent may be held liable for illegal parking only and
subjected to any of the specific penalties mentioned in Section 3 of the
decree.
MALLARI vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS
On 14 October 1987, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, the passenger
jeepney driven by petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. and owned by his copetitioner Alfredo Mallari Sr. collided with the delivery van of respondent
Bulletin Publishing Corp. (BULLETIN, for brevity) along the National
Highway in Barangay San Pablo, Dinalupihan, Bataan.
Petitioner Mallari Jr. testified that he went to the left lane of the highway
and overtook a Fiera which had stopped on the right lane. Before he
passed by the Fiera, he saw the van of respondent BULLETIN coming from
the opposite direction.
It was driven by one Felix Angeles. The sketch of the accident showed that
the collision occurred after Mallari Jr. overtook the Fiera while negotiating a
curve in the highway.
The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side
resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who
eventually died due to the gravity of his injuries.
Claudia G. Reyes, the widow of Israel M. Reyes, filed a complaint for
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City against Alfredo
Mallari Sr. and Alfredo Mallari Jr., and also against BULLETIN, its driver
Felix Angeles, and the N.V. Netherlands Insurance Company.
trial court found that the proximate cause of the collision was the
negligence of Felix Angeles, driver of the Bulletin delivery van, considering
the fact that the left front portion of the delivery truck driven by Felix
Angeles hit and bumped the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney
driven by Alfredo Mallari Jr. Hence, the trial court ordered BULLETIN, the
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insurance company and Felix Angeles to pay jointly and severally Claudia
G. Reyes.
It also dismissed the complaint against the other defendants Alfredo
Mallari Sr. and Alfredo Mallari Jr.
The appellate court ruled that the collision was caused by the sole
negligence of petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. who admitted that immediately
before the collision and after he rounded a curve on the highway, he
overtook a Fiera which had stopped on his lane and that he had seen the
van driven by Angeles before overtaking the Fiera. The Court of Appeals
ordered petitioners Mallari Jr. and Mallari Sr. to compensate Claudia G.
Reyes.
It absolved from any liability respondent BULLETIN, Felix Angeles and N.V.
Netherlands Insurance Company.
ISSUE
Was the Court of Appeals correct in reversing the decision of the TC? Yes
(petitioners contend there was no evidence showing their negligence)
Is the owner of the jeepney liable? Yes
RULING
The Court of Appeals correctly found, based on the sketch and spot report
of the police authorities which were not disputed by petitioners, that the
collision occurred immediately after petitioner Mallari Jr. overtook a vehicle
in front of it while traversing a curve on the highway. This act of overtaking
was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a) and (b), of RA 4136 as
amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code
which provides:
Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. - (a) The
driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the
center line of a highway in overtaking or passing another
vehicle proceeding in the same direction, unless such left
side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a
sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking or
passing to be made in safety.
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the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the
circumstances. Moreover, under Art. 1756 of the Civil Code, in case of
death or injuries to passengers, a common carrier is presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed
extraordinary diligence. Further, pursuant to Art. 1759 of the same Code,
it is liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence
or willful acts of the formers employees.
Clearly, by the contract of carriage, the carrier jeepney owned by Mallari
Sr. assumed the express obligation to transport the passengers to their
destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard
for all the circumstances, and any injury or death that might be suffered
by its passengers is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of
the carrier.
AMERICAN AIRLINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
*SEE COGSA DIGESTS, IT IS THERE
By his own admission, petitioner Mallari Jr. already saw that the BULLETIN
delivery van was coming from the opposite direction and failing to consider
the speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 o'clock in the morning
mindlessly occupied the left lane and overtook two (2) vehicles in front of
it at a curve in the highway. Clearly, the proximate cause of the collision
resulting in the death of Israel Reyes, a passenger of the jeepney, was the
sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, petitioner Alfredo
Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where
overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of the Civil
Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he
was violating a traffic regulation.
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FACTS
On 1970, the late Jose G. Gana and his family, numbering nine (the
GANAS), purchased from AIR FRANCE through Imperial Travels,
Incorporated, a duly authorized travel agent, nine (9) "open-dated" air
passage tickets for the Manila/Osaka/Tokyo/Manila route. The GANAS were
booked for the Manila/Osaka segment on AIR FRANCE Flight 184 for 8 May
1970, and for the Tokyo/Manila return trip on AIR FRANCE Flight 187 on
22 May 1970. The aforesaid tickets were valid until 8 May 1971, the date
written under the printed words "Non valuable apres de (meaning, "not
valid after the"). The GANAS did not depart on 8 May 1970.
increase of the exchange rate of the US dollar to the Philippine peso and
the increased travel tax were first paid. Ella then returned the tickets to
Teresita and informed her of the impossibility of extension.
In the meantime, the GANAS had scheduled their departure on 7 May
1971 or one day before the expiry date. In the morning of the very day of
their scheduled departure on the first leg of their trip, Teresita requested
travel agent Ella to arrange the revalidation of the tickets. Ella gave the
same negative answer and warned her that although the tickets could be
used by the GANAS if they left on 7 May 1971, the tickets would no longer
be valid for the rest of their trip because the tickets would then have
expired on 8 May 1971. Teresita replied that it will be up to the GANAS to
make the arrangements. With that assurance, Ella on his own, attached to
the tickets validating stickers for the Osaka/Tokyo flight, one a JAL. sticker
and the other an SAS (Scandinavian Airways System) sticker.
Notwithstanding the warnings, the GANAS departed from Manila in the
afternoon of 7 May 1971 on board AIR FRANCE Flight 184 for Osaka,
Japan. There is no question with respect to this leg of the trip. However,
for the Osaka/Tokyo flight on 17 May 1971, Japan Airlines refused to honor
the tickets because of their expiration, and the GANAS had to purchase
new tickets. They encountered the same difficulty with respect to their
return trip to Manila as AIR FRANCE also refused to honor their tickets.
They were able to return only after pre-payment in Manila, through their
relatives, of the readjusted rates. They finally flew back to Manila on
separate Air France Frights on 19 May 1971 for Jose Gana and 26 May
1971 for the rest of the family.
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the passenger must purchase a new ticket for the remaining portion of the
journey" From the foregoing rules, it is clear that AIR FRANCE cannot be
faulted for breach of contract when it dishonored the tickets of the GANAS
after 8 May 1971 since those tickets expired on said date; nor when it
required the GANAS to buy new tickets or have their tickets re-issued for
the Tokyo/Manila segment of their trip. Neither can it be said that, when
upon sale of the new tickets, it imposed additional charges representing
fare differentials, it was motivated by self-interest or unjust enrichment
considering that an increase of fares took effect, as authorized by the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) in April, 1971.
RULING
NO. Pursuant to tariff rules and regulations of the International Air
Transportation Association (IATA), an airplane ticket is valid for one year.
"The passenger must undertake the final portion of his journey by
departing from the last point at which he has made a voluntary stop before
the expiry of this limit. That is the time allowed a passenger to begin and
to complete his trip. A ticket can no longer be used for travel if its validity
has expired before the passenger completes his trip. To complete the trip,
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ISSUE
Whether or not AIR FRANCE is liable to the GANAS for breach of Contract
of Carriage?