Karl Marx on Secular and Social Development: A Study in the Sociology of Nineteenth

Century Social Science

Author(s): Bert F. Hoselitz
Source: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Jan., 1964), pp. 142-163
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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KARL MARX ON SECULAR AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT:

A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF NINETEENTH
CENTURY SOCIAL SCIENCE*

The purpose of this paper is to present briefly the theories of secular social
and economic development which can be found in the work of Karl Marx
and to place them within the context of general thought and theorizing on
these matters during the nineteenth century. I shall not present in this paper
any new interpretations of Marx's theories, but shall merely try to show
that Marx's views are related at many points to other theories on social and
economic development proposed during his life and that in many ways he
must be regarded as a typical thinker of that period of European social thought.
Since, especially in his later work, Marx was interested primarily in the
analysis of the laws of capitalist dynamics, rather than in the secular development of human societies, considerable reliance has been placed on some of
his earlier writings, particularly two manuscripts, both of which remained
unpublished until the 1930's.1 In these manuscripts many of the ideas, which
have been very influential in an abbreviated published form, are spelled out
in much more detail.
As I already have intimated, Marx was concerned, at different times of his
life, with two different problems of secular development. In his later work,
of which Capital is by far the most important and representative contribution,
* This paper was written while I was the holder of a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Fellowship. I wish to express my gratitude to the officers of the Foundation for
the leisure for reading and reflection which enabled me to write it.
1 These two manuscriptsare: (1) Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscriptsof
1844, Moscow, n.d. (ca. 1959); this is a translation of "Oekonomisch-philosophische
Manuskripte",which was first published in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Historischkritische Gesamtausgabe: Werke, Schriften, Briefe, Abteilung I, Vol. III, Berlin, 1932,
pp. 29-172. All references hereinafterwill be made to both the German and the English
edition of this work, the former will be cited as MEGA, III (since the customary abbreviation of this edition of the works of Marx and Engels is MEGA), and the latter
Manuscript of 1844. It should be noted that almost simultaneouslywith the publication
of this manuscriptin MEGA, HI, another somewhat differently arrangedversion of this
work appearedunder the title "Nationaloekonomieund Philosophie",in Karl Marx. Der
historische Materialismus:Die Friihschriften,ed. by S. Landshut and J. P. Mayer, Vol. I
(Leipzig, 1932), pp. 283-375. (2) The second manuscript appeared first in 1939-1941
under the title Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie (Rothentwurf, Moscow), 2 vols. It was reprintedphotomechanicallyin 1953, and brought out in
a single volume by the Dietz Verlag in Berlin. I have used the 1953 reprint. This work
hereinafter will be cited as Grundrisse.

MARX ON DEVELOPMENT

143

he studiedprimarilythe laws of economicdevelopmentundercapitalism,and

apartfrom some very general statements,did not concernhimself with the
problemof change of a socio-economicsystem. It is differentwith some of
his earlierwritings,especiallythose composedin the 1840's and early 1850's.
There Marx was still very much concernedwith the ratherdetailed analysis
of differentsocio-economicsystems,and in the Grundrisse,for example,he
devoted an entire chapter (pp. 375-413) to what he called "Progressive
Epochs of the EconomicFormationof Societies",i.e., socio-economicstructures of pre-capitalistsocial systems.
Why did Marxregardthis type of analysisof suchfundamentalimportance?
We may perhapsmost easilygain an answer,if we considerthat in his younger
yearshe came to the view that the "anatomyof civil societyis to be soughtin
politicaleconomy",and that he took up the study of the latter in Paris and
again in Brussels.2 For a considerabletime after Marx's death his earliest
studiesin politicaleconomywere unknown,but a manuscriptwhichhad been
composed in Paris probably between February and August, 1844, was
published in the early 1930's almost simultaneouslyin two places. This
manuscriptis probablythe firstwork of Marxdealingwith economics. It is a
work in which economic relations are not yet crystallizedinto a separate
study, but are discussedin close interrelationwith philosophical,political,
and socio-psychologicalquestions. Althoughhis other works on economic
problems also contain a wealth of non-economic,especiallyhistorical and
sociological, material,this manuscriptcovers probably the widest area in
the social sciencesand presentsa more integratedversionof his thoughtthan
any otherwork of Marx'swriting.
Before we enter into a more detaileddiscussionof the contributionmade
in the Economic and PhilosophicalManuscripta few words concerningits
generalposition in the life work of Marx is necessary. AlthoughI believe
that the study of this work is of importanceto a betterunderstandingof his
later writing,it wouldbe wrongto overestimateits significance.Many of the
propositionscontainedin it are immatureas compared,for example, with
Capital,and Marx'sthoroughstudy of the classicaleconomistsoccurredonly
a decadeafterthe Parismanuscriptwas completed.Moreover,the manuscript
still showsthe stronginfluenceof Hegelianphilosophy,as well as the influence
of a short essay by Engels on political economy in generaland a somewhat
longerone by Moses Hess on money.3 It is perhapsalso noteworthyfor the
place occupiedby the manuscriptin the intellectualdevelopmentof Marx,
that he designateshis philosophyin it not as materialism,but as realistic
2
See, Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Chicago, Charles H. Kerr Co., 1904), pp. 10-11.
3 See Auguste Cornu, Karl Marx, I'homme et l'oeuvre (Paris,
1934), pp. 324-327. This
indebtedness of Marx to the indicated writings is acknowledged by him; cf. MEGA, III,
p. 34, and Manuscript of 1844, pp. 16-17.

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BERT F. HOSELITZ

humanism,or developednaturalism,which showsthe influenceof Feuerbach.4

It would be impracticableto summarizethe entire Paris manuscripthere;
only a few crucial concepts and relationswill be discussed. This will be
enough to show that in spite of its fragmentarycharacterand its heavy
Hegelianterminology,none of the majorpropositionsoutlinedin it were, in
essence, ever rejectedby Marx in his later work.
Perhapsbetterthan any other of his earlywriting,it shows why he took the
path he did, what other possible paths he might have taken and why he
rejectedthem. It showsMarx at the cross-roadsof his intellectualcareerand
hence aids in understandingmore fully the complex of variableswhich he
consideredin arrivingat his theory of capitalism.
Anotherdifficultypresentedby the manuscriptmust be mentioned. Marx
operates throughouton three levels of abstractionand often intermingles
them. The purposeof the work is to solve the problemposed by Hegel of
findingthe mechanismby whichthe identityof subjectand object,of thinking
and being, is established. Hegel had placed this path in the realm of ideas
and therefore, in Marx's opinion, offered only a pseudo-solution. Marx
attemptsto find the real solutionin manandnature,i.e., in concrete"practical"
objects. But in orderto integratehis solutionwith his belief in the primacy
of abstracttheory Marx analyzesthe path leadingto the identityof subject
and object on the level of consciousness,on the level of man as a creatureof
nature, and on the level of man as a socializedbeing. The final solutionis
achievedonly on the thirdlevel and with it a solutionon the othertwo levels
is obtained. In the manuscriptthese three avenuesof attackon the problem
of the identityof subject and object are not strictlyseparated,but they will
be separatedhere. The avenues are those of the three great branchesof
scientific inquiry; philosophy (includingpsychology), natural science, and
social science (includinghistory).
On the philosophicallevel, the work constitutesa criticismof the Hegelian
view that the dialecticprocessleadingto the integrationof realityand thought
occurs purelyin the realm of the mind. Hegel's contribution,amongothers,
consistedin the demonstrationthat all developmentalprocesses are subject
to a dialectic which operatesthrough an alienationand a returnfrom the
alienationto producea synthesis. Thus the Idea realizesitself by alienating
its content and by returningfrom that alienationwith the result of attaining
thereby consciousnessof its essence. Hegel had acknowledgedthat in the
process of human evolution,man is the productof his labor, which in turn
constitutesan alienationof man'strue existence,and whichman againappropriatesby conceivingit to be the expressionof his activity. Marx criticizes
him for regardingthis entire process as taking place in the developmentof
the self-consciousnessof the Idea ratherthan as practical,realistic,concrete
4

MEGA, III, pp. 114, and 167; Manuscript of 1844, pp. 102 and 164.

MARX ON DEVELOPMENT

145

activity. But as Hegel himself had acknowledged,the process of alienation,

labor, producedan object externalto man which can be consideredas the
negationof man. Now if Hegel had interpretedman as a living,naturalbeing
equippedwith tangible,that is, materialpowers,his alienationwouldproduce
a real object, a tangibleproductof humanlabor. But since Hegel conceives
of man merely as his self-consciousness,as abstractman, it follows that a
"self-consciousness
can produceby its alienationonly the conceptof thingness
(Dingheit)and not a real object. Hence it is clear that this thingnessis not
independentof self-consciousness,but merelyits creature,somethingposited
(gesetzt)by it." Thus the Idea is isolatedfrom the real world, is an empty
shell, and is devoidof all concreteproperties,and in consequencethe alienation as well as the self-realizationof the Idea is a purely formal pseudoprocess.5
Marxthus arrivesat the conclusionthat the synthesisof thoughtand being
cannotbe achievedon the level of speculative"idealistic"philosophy. But in
spite of its shortcomingshe has derived an importantinsight from Hegel's
analysis:a method of investigation.And even more important,the concept
of alienation,especially if it is concretized,embodies the rudimentsof an
importantaspectof social psychology. Marxwas not the firstwho recognized
the impotenceof Hegelianphilosophyto solve the problemof the identityof
subjectand object;as he himself acknowledges,Feuerbachhad alreadydone
so. In his attemptto come closer to a solution Feuerbachhad abandoned
Hegelianidealismby rejectingHegel'sbeginningwith an infinite,an abstract
generalization- religion - and choosing as his startingpoint the real,
sensual, specific, finite: man as a creatureof nature.6 On the basis of the
philosophyof Feuerbach,therefore,the process of human activity,labor, is
to be conceivednot as an act of the mind, but as real living activity. Alienation is representedby the objectthat man createsthroughhis interactionwith
nature. Man as an integralpart of natureexercisesa concreteactivity,and
the subject, instead of being conceived of as abstract activity as in the
Hegelianscheme,is representedby a humanindividualwhose activityyields
a concreteobject in the form of the productof the "subject's"labor. Hence,
the oppositionbetween subject and object is resolved in the mutual interdependenceof man and nature:man is seen as a productof natureandnature
as a productof man. The dialecticprocess of alienationand realizationis
seen as the physicalinteractionof man and the sensualreal objectsof nature.7
But althoughthe identityof subjectandobjectcouldbe shownby this trend
5 MEGA, III, pp. 158-161. The passage quoted is on pp. 159-160. Manuscriptof 1844,
p. 155. (The translation in this, as in other instances, is my own and not that of M.
Milligan, the translator of the English edition of the Manuscriptof 1844.)
6 See MEGA, III, pp. 151-152; Manuscript of 1844, p. 145.
7 See MEGA, III, pp. 155-156, 169-171, and 116-117. See also, on the Marxian
analysis of the interrelationbetween man and nature, Vernon Venable, Human Nature:
The Marxian View (New York, 1946), pp. 66 ff.

146

BERT F. HOSELITZ

of thought,it did not provide a similar solution to the dichotomybetween

thinkingand being. If man is thoughtof as actingonly instinctively,like an
animal,for example,the objects of his activityexist outside of him and are
at the same time necessarilytied to his being since they are the means of
supportinghis life. Yet an animal,actingpurelyon the impulseof instinctive
drives, takes nature as given and does not try to understandor change it.
Hence, on the purely organic level, self-consciousnessand with it rational
thought are absent. The significantcharacteristicof man is his capacityto
gain consciousnessof himselfand to interactwith naturein such a way as to
adaptit to his purposesand ends. This adaptationtakes place by means of
labor, the practicalactivityof man throughwhich he acquiresknowledgeof
the naturewith which he interacts. This process is explainedby Engels in
more concrete language:"If we are able to prove the correctnessof our
conceptionof a naturalprocessby makingit ourselves,bringingit into being
out of its conditionsand using it for our own purposesinto the bargain,then
The chemical
thereis an end of the Kantianincomprehensible
'thing-in-itself'.
substancesproducedin the bodies of plants and animalsremainedjust such
until organic chemistrybegan to produce them one
'things-in-themselves'
after another,whereuponthe 'thing-in-itself'became a thing for us..."8
This illustrationof Engels exhibits the nature of Marxian thought on
achievingthe identity of thinkingand being by means of knowledge. The
growth of human knowledgeis a consequenceof human practicalactivity,
of humanlabor. Labor is spent in orderto obtainproductswhich represent
the alienationof man,but the consciousexaminationof the propertiesof these
theirinneressence,in otherwords
productsand the processof understanding
the process of "knowing"them representsthe returnof the alienation,the
negation of negation. Knowledgeis thus both the subject and the object.
On the one hand it is the object as that which is known, but althoughthis
object which is known is externalto men it is penetratedby the subject,the
knowingitself. In this processthe subject-knowing,thinking,reasoningman
is consciousof the fact that the object is part of himself, that its properties
can only be fully appropriatedby completelyknowingit and that in this way
the object as an alienatedentity is abolishedand reintegratedin the subject.9
On the purely abstract level of philosophy Marx has thus attained a
method, on the naturalscience level he has attainedan epistemology. The
first was the Hegeliandialectic,the second a materialistic(or Feuerbachian
naturalistic)ontology,which togetherconstitutethe basis of Marxiandialectical materialism.
Thus the problemof discoveringthe path to the identitybetween subject
and object would appearto be solved, were it not for one furtherstep: the
8

Friedrich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy (New York, 1941), pp. 22-23.
9 MEGA, III, pp. 163-164, and 166-167; Manuscript of 1844, pp. 158-161.

MARX ON DEVELOPMENT

147

fact that man is a socializedbeing. On the level of naturalscience pure and

simple the solution of our problem, althoughcouched in naturalisticterms,
is also basicallyabstractand not immediatelypractical. For the interaction
betweenman and natureis not a process affectingan isolatedindividualbut
is a social or cultural process. Alienation of human labor finds its most
concrete expressionin civil society. Here the product of human labor is
alienatedaltogetherin the form of privateproperty:the laborer'sproductis
not his own but that of the capitalistwho employs him. The institutionof
privatepropertyis thus the resultof alienatedlabor. Privatepropertyin turn
forces man to alienate his labor, notably in a social system of developed
industrialism,in the higherstages of capitalism. In the words of Marx:"All
wealth has become industrialwealth, wealth of labor; and industryis the
perfectedlabor, just as the factory system is the perfectedtype of industry,
i.e., of labor; and just as industrialcapitalis the perfectedobjectiveform of
privateproperty. Only now do we see how privatepropertycan perfect its
dominationover man and can become, in the most generalform, the world
historicpower."10
But althoughunder a system of privateproperty,and even more sharply
under private enterprisecapitalism,the alienationof the laborer from his
productis obviouseven to a superficialobserver,other less obviousformsof
alienationare also present. Thus Marxfinds that the laboreris alienatednot
only from his productbut also from his very activityin labor, and that the
process of alienationeven affects the capitalist. Hence under a system of
privatepropertyman is alienatedfromman. In otherwords,capitalistsociety
exhibitstraitsof serioussocialdysfunctionandcleavage,whichmakeimpossible
the attainmentof the true social natureof man. It is the elevationof commodity productionand of the accumulationof capital to apparentends in
themselvesthat makes the true social nature of man disappear. Instead of
being the essence of life the activityof laborer and capitalistalike becomes
merely a means to existence. Man's consciousness of being a member of his

speciesis reduced,his life as a memberof a groupbecomingmerelya means

to his ends as a producerof objects. Free cooperationin the transformation
of naturefor universalhuman ends is prevented. The social life of men is
destroyedbecausethe needs pursuedare purelyindividualistic.They are not
the ends of mankindas a whole; they are not the ends of man as a member
of the genus of men, but the ends of man as alienatedfrom and opposedto
other men. Men confront each other, separatedand estranged. Far from
making possible the free unfoldingof man as a social creature,capitalist
individuationnegates the true social nature of man. It representshuman
alienationin allforms:man'salienationfromhis product,fromhis life activity,
from his genericsocial existence,that is, his alienationfrom man.
My purpose in thus summarizingthe Paris manuscriptof 1844 is not
10 MEGA, III, p. 110; Manuscript of 1844, pp. 69-71.

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BERT F. HOSELITZ

merely"to descendto the origins". Anyone who has studiedthe later works
of Marx will find in it many valuableclues for the fuller understandingof
obscure passages in these. If reorganizedin a more logical sequence, it
further provides the most general sociological analysis of capitalismthat
Marx ever wrote. It also revealswhy he concentratedin his later work on
the studyof politicaleconomyand why he regardedthe economicanalysisof
capitalismas virtuallyidenticalwith the study of the physiologyof capitalist
society. Startingwith the question of the identity of thinking and being,
whichin the Hegeliansystemoccupiesa paramountposition,Marx discovers
that its real solution cannot be found in the realm of abstractphilosophy,
but only in the materialfield, that is, in the concrete,practical,socialrelations
of man. It is to be found in the study of human history. In the realm of
humanhistory,the civil society of the system of capitalismis not the final
synthesis,but only a passingstage in the dialecticprocess towardthis. The
presentis a state of necessity,whereasonly the resolutionof the dichotomy
betweenthinkingand being will constitutethe state of freedom. The present
is a negationof the true natureof free man, as may be seen in the fact that
the very life activityof man, the social nexus of men to each other, and the
objects confrontingman, are alienatedfrom him. The concrete, practical
form of this alienationis seen in the relationsin which men stand to one
anotherwith regardto the productionof theirlivelihood. Historicalmaterialism is an outflowof the recognitionof this stateof alienation;and the analysis
of economic relations provides the most general theoreticaldescriptionof
social relationsunder capitalism.
In the social productionof their livelihood men enter into definite and
necessaryrelationsthat are independentof their will. Therefore,Marx says,
the social existenceof man determineshis consciousness.He is sayinghere in
a perhapstoo abbreviatedform that the fact of human alienationsubjects
relationsbetween men to the impersonalstricturesof an exchange system
in whichall humanvaluesare measuredin moneyandtreatedas commodities;
that it transcendseven the thinkingand reasoningprocess of man, and that
undera regimeof capitalismthe apparentlyspontaneous,creativeactivityof
man, even scientific or philosophicalspeculation or creative art, is also
affectedby the prevailingstate of alienation. For any man as a memberof
societyis affectedby the alienationof man from man, even thoughhe spends
his life as a criticin an ivory towerof his own. In otherwords,genuine,free,
spontaneoushuman activity, in the true sense of the word, is impossible
becausethe social (i.e., generic)natureof man is thwarted. This implies an
essentiallyutopian, teleologicaloutlook. If man is not true to his genuine
natureunder a system of alienation,it must be possibleto stipulatea social
system beyond capitalismin which the true humanityof mankindbecomes
realized.1But since it is not the intrinsicnatural(biologicalandpsychological)
11 Marx's treatment of the concept and the circumstance of alienation has been dis-

MARX ON DEVELOPMENT

149

makeup of man which is responsible for alienation, - and here is a fundamental contrast between Marx and later Freudian theory, according to
which any human society must exhibit noticeable symptoms of repression it must be the pattern of social relations which may make possible the ultimate
complete freedom of man. We now turn to this aspect of Marx's thought.
Marx's position on this problem is summed up in a passage near the end
of the third volume of Capital, which runs as follows:
The actual wealth of a society, and the possibilityof a continual expansionof its
processof reproduction,do not dependupon the durationof the surpluslabor, but
upon its productivityand upon the more or less fertile conditions of production,
under which it is performed. In fact, the realm of freedom does not commence
until the point is passed where labor under the compulsion of necessity and of
externalutility is required. In the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere
of materialproductionin the strict meaning of the term. Just as the savage must
wrestle with nature,in order to satisfy his wants, in order to maintainhis life and
reproduceit, so civilizedman has to do it, and he must do it in all forms of society
and under all possible modes of production. With his developmentthe realm of
natural necessity expands, because his wants increase; but at the same time the
forces of productionincrease,by which these wants are satisfied. The freedom in
this field cannot consist of anything else but of the fact that socialized man, the
associated producers, regulate their interchange with nature rationally, bring it
under the common control, instead of being ruled by it as by some blind power;
that they accomplish their task with the least expenditureof energy and under
conditions most adequate to their human nature and most worthy of it. But it
always remainsa realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that developmentof human
power, which is its own end, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can
flourish only upon that realm of necessityas its basis.12
There has been a good deal of uncertainty as to the meaning of the passage.
Yet a full explanation is not difficult, and may be found by a careful reading
of the Grundrisse. Scattered passages in this work relate to Marx's theory
of the transition from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. By
comparing these we are able to penetrate into Marx's Utopia. We find here
also a more detailed description of the mechanism of the secular evolution of
human society which he thought he had discovered.
Marx's interpretation of the process of secular evolution is best presented
in the form of his own dialectical method. As J. L. Gray points out, Marx's
cussed in several places. Perhaps the two most satisfactory analyses are found in the
following works: Auguste Cornu. Karl Marx. Die okonimisch-philosophischenManuskripte, Berlin, 1955; and Heinrich Popitz, Der entfremdete Mensch: Zeitkritik und Geschichtsphilosophie des jungen Marx, Basel, 1953. See also Konrad Bekker, Marx's
philosophische Entwicklung,sein Verhdltniszu Hegel, Zurich, 1940. The interpretation

of Marx'steleology,expressedin this paragraphis sharedby Popitz,op. cit., pp. 155ff.

12

Karl Marx, Capital, vol. III (Chicago, Charles H. Kerr Co., 1906), pp. 954-955

(Italicsadded). For the originalGermantext of this passage,see Das Kapital(Volks-

ausgabe, Vienna - Berlin, 1932), vol. III, pp. 873, 874. For a French text of the crucial
part of this passage see Karl Marx, Pages choisis pour une ethique socialiste, ed. by

MaximilienRubel(Paris,1948),pp. 313-314.

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BERT F. HOSELITZ

great world-historical triad starts from a thesis that corresponds to the period
of simple property when no exploitation and no social classes exist, i.e., the
stage of primitive communism. The antithesis then is the introduction of
private property in the means of production, made possible by the greater
productivity of human labor. In the most developed stage of this antithetical
phase we encounter capitalism. Here the working class, as the exploited
social group, forms the negation of the negation. Through its action it brings
about the synthesis, in which the element of communism in the thesis (the
absence of private property in the means of production) is combined with
high productivity of labor, i.e., the principal element of the antithesis. In the
synthesis, wealth is a product of society as a whole and "labor" as free
creative human activity has become a rule.13 This triad differs only slightly
from that presented by Marx himself, when he says:
"The first social forms are based on (at first quite naturally)evolved personalrelations of dependence, in which human productivityis developed only in small
measure and in isolated spots. Personal independence, associated with material
mutual dependenceis the second stage, upon which is based a system of general
social intercourse, generalized relationships, many-sided needs, and universal
wealth. The third stage is a stystem of free individuality,based upon the all-sided
developmentof the individuals,and the subordinationof their common socialized
wealth. The second phase createsthe conditionsfor the third. But patriarchal,as
well as ancient (and feudal)relationshipsdecline at the same rate at which modern
society grows with the developmentof commerce, luxury, money and exchange
value."14
Both statements come to the same result. Human history is characterized by
the social nexus existing between individuals which, in turn, is based on the
development of human productivity. In the most primitive forms of human
existence productivity is so little developed that dependence of one person
upon another is either impossible (and unprofitable), or based purely upon
personal subjugation in a quarrel, a struggle, or battle. The subordinated
person is dependent in his status, he is a slave or serf, or in some other way
not enjoying full personal freedom. This phase of social organisation tends
again to become replaced by a phase (capitalism) in which individuals are
personally free, but in which the condition creating the nexus of dependence
is material, i.e., based upon material objects, in this case, capital. Finally,
with the development of productivity to an even higher level, man's dependence on materially conditioned social relations ceases, and human beings can
- in conformity with their true nature - form associations in which they
subjugate material objects instead of being dominated by them. We see in
this triadic schema of human evolution a more highly developed form of the
13 See J. L. Gray, "Karl Marx and Social Philosophy", in F. J. C. Hearnshaw, ed., The
Social and Political Ideas of Some Representative Thinkers of the Victorian Age (London, 1933), p. 126.
14 Grundrisse,pp. 75-76. (Italics in original).

MARX ON DEVELOPMENT

151

schema implied already in the Paris Manuscript of 1844. All that can be said
in further analysis of this model may be found in the Grundrisse and later
writings, and consists primarily in a more detailed description of the various
phases and their conditions of becoming and passing away. Unfortunately,
Marx has not seen fit to discuss these matters in extenso in any one place.
The only exception is a discussion of pre-capitalist forms of social-economic
organization in a long chapter in the Grundrisse, entitled "Progressive Epochs
of the Economic Formation of Societies".15 I shall not discuss this part of
Marx's thought in detail, since we are interested rather in the further evolution
of these forms into a new form of socio-economic organization, i.e., in the
transformation of the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom.
Since we are concerned with this transition, it is important to show in
what form Marx considers the present socio-economic system to be one of
necessity, even though he admits that individuals are personally free, i.e.,
non-dependent, and that whatever dependence exists is on things and only
through them upon men. But this makes it necessary also to explain why he
thinks, in contrast to Adam Smith, that a system based upon exchange values
as they come to be established in a capitalist system, is not instituted by an
invisible hand, but is rather the outcome of man's subordination to material
objects created by him. In one form Marx shows this by contrasting the
system of personal independence coupled with material dependence, with
the system of "natural" personal dependence. In another form, he shows it
by a discussion of money as the generalized object of wealth.
The first point is best dealt with by a citation from Marx himself. In
describing the impersonal "world-wide" market he says:
"It has been said... that its beauty and grandeurconsists just in its naturally
developedmaterialand intellectualintercourse,which is independentof the wishes
and knowledgeof individuals,and which presupposesa relationshipbetweenthem
based upon mutual independence and indifference. And this personal nexus is
certainlypreferableto an absenceof socal relationsaltogetheror to social relations
confined to a narrow local context founded on natural blood-lines and on domination and submission... But it is absurdto regardthis merely materialnexus as
the naturalone, as a relationshipinseparablefrom the nature of individualityand
immanentin it. This nexus is a historicalproduct which pertainsto a particular
phase of development...
If we considersocial relationswhich are producedby an underdevelopedsystem
of exchange... it is clear from the beginningthat the variousindividuals- though
their intercourseappearsto take place on a more personallevel - only are related
in their individualroles, e.g., as feudal lord and vassal, manorial lord and serf,
etc.... or as members of given castes, or estates, etc.... In a developed system
of exchange, all ties of personal dependencebased on kinship, educationaldifferences, etc. are, indeed, broken;... and the individualsappearto be independentof
one another,to meet each other freely and to enter into exchangeswithin this condition of freedom... But the specificity of a role which in the first case appears
15 Ibid., pp. 375-413.

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BERT F. HOSELITZ

as a personal restrictionof one individualby another,appearsin the second case

as a materiallimitation of the individualimposed by independentexternalconditions posited by themselves... These external conditionsrepresentby no means
a removal of the "relationsof dependence",but merely their dissolution into a
more general form... The materialrelationsof dependence- in contrastto the
personalones, make it appearthat individualsare now dominatedby abstractions,
whereas earlier they were dependentupon one another."'1
The contrast between pre-capitalist socio-economic systems and capitalism is
clear, and so is the fact that Marx considers the objective, material dependence upon things or ideas to be less desirable than the very specific dependence
upon other individuals. This becomes even plainer in his discussion of free
competition. He argues that under such a system it is not the individuals
who have been freed, but only capital, because competition is that system of
socio-economic organization in which the productive method based upon
capital is best served. He sums up his view by arguing that the development
under a system of free competition is "merely the free development on a
limited basis - the basis of the domination of capital. This kind of individual
freedom is therefore at the same time the most complete abolition of all
individual freedom, and the full subjection of individuality under social
conditions, which take on the form of material powers, in fact, overpowering
things - that is things which are independent of the individuals related to
one another." 7
This view of the limitations and restrictions imposed by man's subjugation
to objects is set out both by Marx and by Engels, in several contexts. It
appears in Capital, it had appeared in The German Ideology, and Engels
took it up in the Anti-Diihring.18 It may be considered one of the fundamental
ideas in Marx's system.
Should we regard the socialist countries as being still within the realm of
necessity or as having already attained the realm of freedom? This is not the
place to discuss the precise nature of the socio-economic structure of these
countries. Yet, by general admission, they have not reached a level of
productivity, nor a form of free human association, which could allow us to
argue that the realm of genuine human freedom as contemplated by Marx
has been effectively established. In these countries economic activity is centrally planned, and capital is not "owned" by society, but by the state
apparatus. For "ownership" must be interpreted not as a legal category, but
as a relationship between persons and objects, and this means that regardless
of formal legal and constitutional rules, a person "owns" an object - in
particular a piece of capital - if he has effective control over it, i.e., if he
16 Ibid., pp. 79-82.

Ibid., pp. 543-545. The passage quoted is on p. 545.

See Capital, Vol. I, pp. 81 ff; Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie,
in MEGA, Vol. V., pp. 351-355; and Friedrich Engels, Herrn Eugen Diihring's Umwalzung der Wissenschaft, 11th ed. (Berlin, 1928), pp. 112ff. and passim.
17
18

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153

can effectively exclude others from disposing of it or interferingwith his

disposalof it. Hence, all the basic social and socio-psychologicalcategories
which Marx applied to the later stages of capitalistsocieties also apply to
these societies. They still present manifold patterns of alienation,human
activityis still dominatedby wage labor,they still have humansocialrelations
subjectedto dominationby objects,productionis commodityproduction,and
their economiesare based on exchangevalue and on money as a generalized
meansof wealthand income.
Let us now turn to the second crucialtopic in Marx's analysisof socioeconomicsystemssubjectto necessity:the discussionof money as a generalized means of exchangeand a generalized,abstractrepresentativeof wealth
and property,and, therefore,also the generalizedform of capital.
The connectionbetweenthe acquisitionof wealth as a generalizedobject
of social action and the availabilityof a generalizedmeans of exchangeand
acquisition,is easy to see. Its universalimpactis emphasizedby Marx when
he comparesthe way in which wealth was regardedin antiquitywith views
on wealthin modernindustrializedsocieties. He says that amongthe writers
of the ancientworld we never find an investigationof which form of landed
propertycreatesthe most wealth,but alwayswhich form of propertycreates
the best citizens. Of course, greed and the personalwill for acquisitionwas
not foreignto the ancients. Therewere misersin ancientGreece and Rome,
as there are misers today. But, just as Max Weber maintainedlater that
personalgreed was easily reconcilablewith the otherworldlyreligiousethic
of India,19so Marx could show that under a system of capitalism,money
becomes a generalequivalent,the general"powerof purchasing",and hence
all can be convertedinto money. As a consequence,"thereare no absolute
values, since for money all values are only relative. There remainsnothing
that is higheror holier, etc., since all can be acquiredby means of money.
The 'res sacrae et religiosae'...

which are exempted from the 'commercio

hominum'do not exist in the face of money, just as all are equal before
God." 20

Private property representsthe full negation of man's true individuality.

Appropriation,insteadof being a spontaneousrelationbetweenman and his
environment,is an act of attainingpossessionof objects,andthe purposeof this
possessionis for man to appearto be the oppositeof what he is. The desire
to acquirepropertyis thus not a naturalor instinctualhumandrive, it is not
an element of the basic nature of man, but is the outcome of a state of
alienation,of the negationof man'srelationto objectsexternalto him.
Marx's reasoningon the subjectof acquisitivenesswas not developedby
him independentlybut owes much to the views of Moses Hess. Marx had
19 See Max Weber, The Religion of India (Glencoe, Ill., 1958), p. 337.
20 See Grundrisse,
pp. 387 and 722-723. The passage cited is on p. 723.

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BERTF. HOSELITZ

become acquainted with some of Hess's published writings and had also
seen some of his manuscripts which were submitted for publication in the
Deutsch-franz6sische Jahrbiicher, of which Marx was co-editor. Although
there developed later profound differences between Marx and Hess, the
influence of Hess's ideas on the young Marx is unmistakable. A notable
essay by Hess on money which had been written in 1843 or early 1844 and
which Marx saw soon after its composition contains many of the ideas on
the impact of the institution of private property upon man's acquisitiveness
in a somewhat loose form. Marx tightened the argument and brought out the
contrasts more clearly, but his indebtedness to Hess on the level of sociopsychological analysis must be acknowledged.21
Even more clearly than in his discussion of acquisitiveness Marx appears
to be influenced by Hess in his views on the psychological aspects of man's
alienation from his productive activity. Thus, before we return to Marx's
own elaboration of this problem, Hess's statement of it may serve as a
convenient starting point. Stripped to its barest outline, Hess's argument
runs as follows:
The curse of all past human history lies in the fact that man does not
regard his activity as an end in itself, but contrasts labor with enjoyment.
Labor and enjoyment are opposed under the rule of private property because
under it labor is alienated from the workers. The rule of private property
constitutes on the one hand the practical realization of egotism, which negates
free activity and debases it to the labor of a slave. On the other hand it
makes animal enjoyment the paramount end of this dehumanized labor.
Only the achievement of communism can bring about the abolition of this
dehumanized form of activity.
"Only through the attainmentof absolute freedom, not only of 'labor'in the narrow, limited sense of the term, but of any human inclinationand activity whatever,
absolute equality and community of all conceivable 'goods' is possible. And at
the same time only in this absolute communityis that absolutefreedom thinkable.
Labor, society in general,cannot be organizedbut it organizesitself in that everyone does what he cannot help but do, and fails to do what he cannot do. Every
man is inclined to engage in some activity, even in manifold activities. This multiplicity of free human inclinationsand activities makes up not the dead artificial,
but the free, living, eternallyyouthful organismof a free human society, of free
human activities,which now cease to be 'labor'and are, on the contrary,thoroughly
identicalwith 'happiness'."22
In this view of Moses Hess, communism, i.e., the future society, involves the
21 See Moses
Hess, "Ueber das Geldwesen",reprintedin Sozialistische Aufsitze, ed. by
Th. Zlocisti (Berlin, 1921), pp. 158-187, especially pp. 179-180. In a later work, first
published in 1845, Hess discusses the same theme with greater clarity and precision.
See, ibid, pp. 140-141.
22
Moses Hess, "Sozialismusund Kommunismus"(first publishes in G. Herwegh, ed.,
Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz, 1843), reprinted in Sozialistische Aufsdtze, op.
cit., pp. 51, 70-74. The words cited are on page 74, and italics have been added.

MARX ON DEVELOPMENT

155

abolition of alienation and with it the abolition of labor. Labor is replaced

by free and spontaneous human activity, which is an end in itself, or as Marx
puts it, the function of human life. The prime purpose of society is not the
production of material objects, but the unfolding human personality, the
attainment of happiness. This view is fully shared by Marx. Labor in the
strict sense, therefore, is not identical with all forms of creative human
activity, but is a phenomenon which exists only within the realm of necessity
and under conditions of alienation and the estrangement of man from his
activity.23 Although the Manuscript of 1844 provides only implicit evidence
for this view, it is more clearly expressed later, for example, in The German
Ideology and Grundrisse. In a well-known passage in the former work Marx
and Engels wrote:
"The modern state, the rule of the bourgeoisie,is based on the freedom of labor.
Freedom of labor is the free competitionamong workers. Saint Max is very unlucky; as in all other subjects, so also in economics. Labor is free in all civilized
countries. The task is not to free labor but to abolish it."24
In other words, Marx quite explicitly expressed himself as early as 1846 that
only the abolition of labor (in the sense in which it is common in a society
fraught with alienation) can lead to genuine freedom. And in the Grundrisse
which were written after several more years of reading and reflection and
confrontation with related ideas in the works of Ricardo and post-Ricardian
British economic writers, Marx gives a more detailed explanation of his view
of the abolition of labor. Whereas in the earlier writings Marx derived the
eventual abolition of labor chiefly from the generic nature of man, he now
shows carefully in what form rising productivity of labor plays the major role
in this process. Yet he holds to his earlier view in that the rise of productivity
is mainly due to the growth of human knowledge. If it is possible that in a
smaller amount of actual labor time the same output can be produced on a
higher level of technology, as with a larger amount of labor time on a more
23
this trend
Many studentsof Marx'sworkshave overlookedor even misinterpreted
of thought. VernonVenable,whose otherwiseexcellentbook on Marx'sviews on human nature,was cited above(n. 7), neithermentionsthe alienationnor the abolitionof
labor. The reasonwhy this point could be so easily misunderstood
is, in my opinion,
principallysemantic,i.e., it turnsaroundthe doublemeaningof the word,"labor".In
somecontextsthis meansthe expenditureof physicalor mentalenergyunderconditions
of alienation.In others,it meansthe manifestation
of a humanneed,i.e., the need for
creativeactivity.Hence,we can only give qualifiedassentto AbramL. Harriswhenhe
says in his paper,"UtopianElementsin Marx'sThought",Ethics,LX, (January,1950),
p. 90, that in Marx'sdefinitionlabor is an abstractuniversalwhich, in the historical
process,symbolizesman's creativepowers, and that "man'snature as a human or
social animalis expressedin labor".A moreextendeddiscussionof whatappearsto be
Marx'scompleteresolutionof labor in a state of necessityand "labor"in a state of
freedomis presentedin the text above.
24 Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels,Die deutscheIdeologie,in MEGA, Vol. V, pp.
184-185.

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BERT F. HOSELITZ

primitive technological level, it is because the productivity of labor has risen

due to the advance of human knowledge.
"Nature does not build machines, locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs,selfacting mules, etc.... They are organs of the human brain created by human
hands; they are reified power of knowledge. The developmentof fixed capital
shows to what degree the general level of social knowledge and informationhas
become an immediateproductivepower, and hence to what extent the conditions
of the process of social life have come to be subject to the general intellect and
become transformedin accordancewith it."25
The main result of the application of science to production processes is the
achievement of more leisure. But under capitalism, this added leisure does
not accrue to everyone, but only to a few; not to the capitalists themselves,
for these - as we shall see - are also engaged in feverish activity in the
process of accumulation, but to some aristocrats, rentiers, and others with
inherited wealth. However, since capital is created out of the surplus which
is left over after the subsistence and other current needs of the society to
maintain its stock of goods have been filled, the process of capital formation
in itself is instrumental in creating the means of disposable time. Marx has
described this process in a very enlightening passage in these words:
"The great historical aspect of capital is to have created this surpluslabor, a surplus from the standpointof mere use value, mere subsistence. The historicaldestiny of capital is fulfilled when, on the one hand, needs have become so highly
developedthat surpluslabor above what is essentialhas become a generalrequirement, and on the other, general industriousness... has become developed as a
generalcharacteristicof the new generation. Finally, the productivityof labor which, in turn is spurredon by capital in its unlimited striving for riches - has
advanced to such a level that the maintenanceand preservationof all wealth requires an increasinglysmaller amount of labor for the whole society, and, at the
same time, society entertainsa scientificrelationshipto its process of reproduction
on an ever fuller scale. This is a species of labor where man has ceased to do
what he can have things do for him ... But the ceaselessstrivingfor a generalized
form of wealth makes capital drive labor beyond the limits of natural necessity
and, in this way, creates the material elements for the developmentof a rich individuality,which is equally all-embracingin productionand consumption. Hence,
in such a situationlabor does not appearany more as labor, but as full unfolding
of pure human activity, in which the naturalnecessity of its immediateform has
disappeared,because in the place of natural needs have stepped those created by
history."26
Marx here makes explicit what he had expressed on a more intuitive level
in The German Ideology: with Hess and others, he saw the replacement of
labor by free human activity as the major characteristic of the communist
Utopia. Marx clearly recognizes the psychological need for men to be active,
and to create things and ideas, works of art and works of industry. This is
25
26

Grundrisse, p. 594.
Ibid., p. 231 (italics added).

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157

why he counters the view of Adam Smith, who regarded labor invariably as
pain and who, therefore, saw rest as identical with freedom and happiness.
Though Marx admits that labor under specific conditions, i.e., in a system
of slavery, serfdom, or under a wage contract may be considered in this
manner, he points out that man "in his normal state... also has the need
for a normal amount of labor, for elimination of rest". He points out, moreover, that in the most ideal situation, labor is self-realization - and this,
of course, is closely related to, if not identical with, what we called earlier
free human activity. More sophisticated than Smith was Fourier who conceived of "travail attractif", but who regarded it essentially as fun or amusement. On the contrary, Marx maintains that
"reallyfree labor, e.g., composingmusic, is damnedserious,requiringmost intense
effort. Labor in the field of materialproductioncan attain this characteronly if
(1) its social characteris realized, and (2) its scientific charactercomes forth, ...
i.e., when it is not human effort consistingin specially trainedexertionof physical
force, ... but activitywhich appearsrulingsupremelyover the forces of nature."27
Thus, here again, though he actually uses the term "labor", Marx distinguishes
between "labor" in the realm of necessity and "activity" in a state of freedom.
This spontaneous, creative activity is, however, an aspect of human nature
which was regarded by Marx as a universal; that is, true, generic human
existence requires that individuals should have the opportunity - because
they have the intrinsic need - to engage in some creative activity. Labor in
the narrow sense is not the same thing as free creative activity, but is the
typical characteristic of alienated man. And when he tries to show the
frustration of the laborer with his "life activity" Marx writes perhaps more
eloquently than on any other topic.
It is not necessary to present here a detailed description of Marx's views
of alienation under capitalism subject to more heavily growing industrial
development, since this matter has been discussed extensively in a series of
rather recent books and essays.28Alienation, partly based on Marx's extensive
exposition of it in his Paris manuscript of 1844, has in fact become a widespread problem of discussion in current socio-psychological theories. Similarly,
Marx's own views on alienation may be considered to express, in a somewhat
fumbling manner, his interpretation of the psychological needs and attitudes
of the industrial workers of his day.
It should be noted that Marx has primarily in mind laborers in English
and French industrial centers of the 1840's. While a student at German
universities, he had little contact with members of the working class. But as
an exile in Paris, living in financial stringency and thrown together with
27

Ibid., p. 505.
See on this problem, above all, Bekker, op. cit.; Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology
(Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1960), pp. 335 ff; Erich Fromm, Marx Concept of Man
(New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1961), pp. 43 ff; and Georg Lukacz, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein(Berlin: Malik-Verlag, 1923), esp. pp. 57 ff.
28

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BERT F. HOSELITZ

radicalleadersand writers,he learnedto know firsthandwhat the life of the

poorestclasseswas like.29This experiencewas a shock. The low standardof
living of many proletarianswas, of course, too obvious to be overlooked.
ParliamentaryCommittees,charitableorganizations,social workers,churchmen, and journalistswere fully aware of the deplorablematerialconditions
under which many workerslived. But Marx was concernednot only with
their physical misery and poverty; he asked, in addition, what were the
consequencesof this type of existence for the psyche of these men? He
regardedactivity,which was felt to be creative,as an indispensablefacet of
human life. If one cannot work creatively,then life has lost its purpose.80
Now amongindustriallaborersMarx found that althoughthey worked,they
really had lost all sense of being active creatively. He saw that they consideredworkingonly as a dull, hated drudgerywhich one had to submitto
in order to keep one's belly filled; and even this was not guaranteed,since
accidents,sickness, and old age were perennialthreats to a worker'svery
existence. Here then were men, humanindividualswhose life had no human
meaning and content. Here was the epitome of frustrationof true human
existence. This is what Marx, in his eloquent discussionof alienation,was
tryingto explain.38
The passageis at the sametime a criticismof most of the politicaleconomy
of Marx'sday. By regardingthe laborermerelyas a supplierof a productive
29 On Marx's life experiences in Paris in 1843 to 1844, see Marx-Engels-LeninInstitute,
Karl Marx: Chronik seines Lebens (Moscow, 1934), pp. 19-25 and the additional sources
cited there.
30 Marx is reported to have said late in his life: "To be incapable of work is to any
human being who does not wish to be simply an animal the equivalent of a death sentence." See D. Riazanov, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (New York, 1927), p. 206.
31 Adam Smith also expressed serious concern over the highly unsatisfactory human
conditions of workers under capitalism. Though he regarded the development of a
modern "commercial society" as a necessary and desirable end product of historical
evolution, he maintained, nevertheless, that under this system "the employment of the
far greater part of those who live by labour... comes to be confined to a few very
simple operations, frequently to one or two. But the understandingsof the greater part
of men are necessarily formed by their employments. The man whose whole life is
spent in performing a few simple operations... becomes as stupid and ignorant as is
possible for a human creature to become. The torpor of his mind renders him, not only
incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving
any generous, noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many of even the ordinary duties of private life. Of the great and
extensive interests of his country he is altogether incapable of judging; and unless very
particular pains have been taken to render him otherwise, he is equally incapable of
defending his country in war... His dexterity at his own particular trade seems, in
this manner, to be acquiredat the expense of his intellectual, social, and martial virtues."
See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (New
York, The Modern Library, 1937), pp. 734-735. We note that the distress, low living
levels, and intellectual limitations of the proletariat in the early phases of the industrial
revolution gave rise to very similar evaluations on the part of different students of the
economy. In fact, it was this degradation of a large part of human beings which gave
economics the title of a dismal science.

MARX ON DEVELOPMENT

159

service rather than as a human being, political economy surrenders any claim
it may have to be reckoned among the human sciences. Classical, especially
post-Ricardian, economics reduces human life and existence to propositions
by which the most paltry standard of subsistence becomes the yardstick for
determining the typical needs of the mass of men. Political economy makes
workers virtually into senseless and needless beings. Any luxury on the part
of a laborer appears reprehensible and any activity going beyond the mere
satisfaction of animal needs is regarded as luxury.
"This science of the wonderful industryis therefore at the same time the science
of asceticism;its true ideal is the ascetic, yet usurious miser and the ascetic yet
productive slave... Self-renunciation,renunciationof life and all human needs
is its chief theorem. The less you eat, drink,buy books, go to the theater,to dances, to the tavern;the less you think, love, argue, sing, do feel, etc., the more you
save, the largerbecomes your treasure,your capital, which neithermoths nor robbery can take away. The less you are, the less you live, the more you have, the
larger is your alienated life, the more you store up of your alienatedessence...
All passion and all activity thus must perish in avarice. The laborer must have
just enough to make him wish to live, and he may only live in order to have."32
Here the circle is closed. The alienation of the laborer from his productive
work, and contrasted with it the alienation of the wealthy capitalist from his
activity, is seen as an outflow of the category of private property, of the
paramount place assigned to the accumulation of wealth under capitalism.
But at the same time the role of political economy as the branch of scientific
inquiry best capable of laying bare the physiology of modern society is
established. For political economy, although disregarding the totality of man
as an individual, is concerned with that aspect of his activity which appears
most clearly in an alienated form. The modern laborer, though personally
free, surrenders most of life activity to the control of another, the capitalist,
but in truth to an impersonal force beyond this latter, capital. The analysis
of the relations of capital, which constitutes what Marx called a "critique of
political economy", is a procedure by means of which the key to the abolition
of alienated labor and to the abolition of labor (in the narrow sense of the
term) is to be found.
The main character in the drama of socio-economic progress, at a certain
historical stage, is thus an objective material category: capital. It dominates
not only the workers but the capitalists, even though the latter control the
means of production. But the capitalist mode of production - herein lies
its intrinsic "necessity" - imposes certain behavior patterns upon all, at the
penalty of proletarianization for the capitalist and starvation for the proletarian. Capitalism as a social system has a compulsive character: though
people make decisions on the basis of their free will and in full consciousness
of their implications, the socio-economic framework sets limits within which
32

MEGA, III, pp. 129-130; Manuscript of 1844, pp. 118-119.

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BERTF. HOSELITZ

thesedecisionscan be maderationally,i.e., in pursuitof the impliedor openly

expressedobjectivesof each decision-makingindividual. As Marx puts it,
the capitalistshareswith the miser a passionfor wealthand its accumulation,
but that "whichin the miseris a mere idiosyncrasyis, in the capitalist,the
effect of the social mechanism,of which he is but one of the wheels." The
capitalistis undercompulsion:"Accumulate,accumulate!That is Moses and
the prophets! ...

Save, save, i.e., reconvert the greatest possible portion of

surplus-valueor surplus-productinto capital!"33

We find here againthe emphasison asceticism,the refrainingfrom enjoyment and luxuryconsumptionby the capitalistwhich is imposed upon him
by the system, and which he disregardsat his peril. In spite of the great
differencesin their social philosophyand in their methodologicalapproach
to the study of capitalism,there is a great deal of similaritybetween this
explanationof capitalist progress and its substratumand the explanation
given by Max Weber. Both the Marxianand the Weberiansystemsstipulate
compulsivemechanisms. In the Marxian system the dominationof things
over men results in alienation. In the system of Weber, the dominationis
that of an anxiety-inducingideology, i.e., the doctrineof predestinationand
the concern on the part of each individualto insure his salvation. The
behavioral consequences are the same for workers and capitalists alike:
emphasison savingand the curtailmentof consumption,on the one side, and,
on the other, frugality and glorificationof labor as an end in itself. The
differencebetween the theories lies not so much in the identificationof
mechanismsresponsiblefor the dynamismof a capitalistsystem, but in the
principalsourcesettingin motion the mechanismitself: in one case it is the
growth of productiveforces, in the other a new ethic based on religious
innovation. There are even closer similaritiesin the predictionof the outcome of the capitalistsystem in the two theoreticalstreams. Marx, as we
have seen, regardedcapitalismas an indispensablestage in the comingof the
communist society. The Weberian view led also to the prediction that
socialismwould follow, thoughthis predictionwas not made by Weberhimself, but by WernerSombartandJosephSchumpeter,who wereboth indebted
to the theories of Max Weber for their own hypotheseson the originsand
developmentof capitalism.34Both Sombartand Schumpetersaw the principal
innovatingactivityof entredynamismin capitalistsociety in the "irrational"
preneurs,restingon a broad-basedsystemin whichrational,asceticindividuals
workedwithin a highlydevelopedexchangeeconomy,reproducingagain and
againthe conditionsfor progressbeyondthe level of the self-containedcircular
flow. WernerSombartably characterizedthis viewpointin a lecturedelivered
33 Capital, Vol. I, pp. 649 and 652.
Schumpeter'sviews are expressed at length in his work, Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy (New York, 1942), especially chapters 12-14. On the views of Sombart see
below.
34

MARX ON DEVELOPMENT

161

in 1932, in which he also outlined the factors within the capitalist system
which tended to bring about its destruction. The crucial passage in that lecture
is as follows:
"The economic ethic peculiar to capitalismis customarilydesignatedas 'spiritof
capitalism'. During the last decades this spirit has undergone quite substantial
changeswhich are apt to alter its essence. This essence lay in the tension between
rationalism and irrationalism,between calculation and speculation, between the
bourgeoisspirit and the robberspirit, betweenprudenceand venturesomeness.But
this tension has decreased. The rational factor has been given a strong impetus
and even a rationalizationof entrepreneurshiphas taken place, so to speak. We
can pursue this change in detail. We see how the 'sixth sense' diminishes. The
number of knowable, predictablecircumstancesconstantly increases and the inclination of business leaders grows to base their enterpriseson a foundation of
information and scientific knowledge. Enterprisesthus attain the character of
administrations,their leadersthe characterof bureaucrats,and the giganticsize of
the apparatuscontributesto this development."35
The growth of rationality, of the application of science to economic processes
(both on the production and the organizational level), and the predictability
of their outcome, tend to change the nature of capitalist socio-economic
structure and to bring about the gradual or abrupt development of socialism
or at least of a quasi-socialist structure. Contemporary capitalism, composed
primarily of these vast business bureaucracies, endowed with large numbers
of automatic or almost automatic machines, characterized by the routinization of innovation and scientific methods in production, administration and
financial control, is a very different kind of animal from that described by
Karl Marx. In many of its features it resembles the socialist society of either
the stage of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" or even the next step, the
stage of incipient socialism. Hence in many essentials the socio-economic
structures of modern capitalist societies and contemporary socialist societies
both resemble each other and differ from the primitive capitalism of the late
18th and early 19th centuries. As we have already seen, they still exist under
the principle of alienation, they are based on exchange value and money,
they have accepted science and technical progress as values applicable to
productive activity, and they have instituted routinized procedures for economic growth and technological advance. Because of its technical superiority,
capitalism has even outstripped the socialist countries in some features which
Marx considered important: the working day and the working week have been
shortened, the standard of living of the workers has risen substantially, in fact
so much that in some capitalist countries they live much better than the
average bourgeois of Marx's days. Moreover, the social distance between
classes has narrowed and individuals have become freer, since the strictures
of necessity have been mitigated and the scope of equality has been widened.
Capitalist development has taken a turn which Marx apparently did not
35

Werner Sombart, Die Zukunft des Kapitalismus, Berlin, 1932, pp. 8-9.

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BERT F. HOSELITZ

foresee and althoughwe have not yet reachedthe somewhatutopian stage

of perfect human freedom,it appearsthat the transitionto it would be no
more difficultfrom the rule of moderncapitalismthanfrom that of socialism.
But we shall not engage in prophecyor even long-rangeprediction. The
purposeof thischapteris not to elevatethe presentandfutureof capitalismand
socialism,but ratherto examinethe contributionof KarlMarxto the theoryof
secular,socialand economicprogressand the extentto whichthis contribution
can be explainedin termsof the generalintellectualtrendsin socialscienceand
philosophyduringthe nineteenthcentury. In orderto do so, we have examined, in some detail, that part of Marx's work which has special relevance
to the study of long-rangesocio-economicchange. Though, as we have
shown, quite extensive hints of his views on these problems appearedin
widely read works, two extensive manuscriptswhich remainedunpublished
until the 1930's containmaterialwhich deals much more explicitlywith these
mattersthanthe earlierpublishedworks,hence we are now able to delineate
with greater certaintythan before what his thoughts were on long-term
economicand social development.
It cannot be denied that in this field, as in many others, Marx has made
importantcontributions.But it would be wrongto regardthese as unrelated
to similar attempts at theory-buildingbefore him, or to believe that the
general trend of reasoningwhich we can follow in his work has not been
pursuedoutside socialist circles. For this reason modern social theories on
long-rangesocio-economicgrowth can easily incorporatecertain elements
of Marxianthoughtwithout abandoningtheir non-Marxianroots. We also
have seen that in discussingthe trends of probablefuture developments,
Marx places principalemphasison the growth of science and knowledge,
expectingthat ultimatelyall processesof productionand social organization
will become subject to scientific principles. In fact, the growth of human
knowledgeand the increasein productivitycreatedby it, plays a many-sided
role. It enables us to have more goods for the same expenditureof labor
time, it adds to the amount of each individual'sdisposable time, and it
eliminatesall labor which is either drudgeryor hard physical exertion, replacingit with regulatoryand supervisory(i.e., intellectuallysatisfying)labor
combinedwith automaticor quasi-automaticmachines.
In all these aspectsof Marxianreasoningthere repeatedlycrop up several
views that were generallyheld in Europeansocial science and socialphilosophy of the late eighteenthand the nineteenthcenturies. They appearin a
sharply disguised form sometimes, since they are clad in the somewhat
abstruselanguageof Germanpost-Hegelianphilosophy. But it is, in fact,
the combinationof post-Hegelianphilosophy,the materialismof the French
enlightenment,and the economictheory of Ricardo and his successorsthat
finds a syntheticexpressionin Marx. A dash of socialist thought derived
from the French"utopian"socialistsis also mixed in, though it almostdis-

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163

appears in the much thicker gravy of German philosophy and the sharp
sauce of British economics. But all this is a truism. That Marx learned
muchfromthese predecessorshas neverbeen denied. Whathas been asserted
is that this criticalmind achieveda completeemancipationfromthe teachings
of these "ideologues"and that there is a sharp gap betweentheir biased or
utopianthoughtand Marx'sstrictlyscientifictheories.
Hence the most importantresultof our enquiry,as concernsthe sociology
of Marxiantheory,is that Marx still keeps essentiallywithin the very broad
stream of the theory of progress,which was so characteristicof European
thoughtduringthe eighteenthand up to the end of the nineteenthcentury.
Thoughmore emphasisis placed on empiricaldata by Marx than by almost
any of his predecessorswho wrote on the grand, secularevolutionof mankind, and though Marx'sviews were intendedto stand the test of searching
critical analysisfrom the standpointof acid post-Hegelianphilosophy,the
underlyingtrend of ideas is virtually identical with that of many of his
predecessors.Progressconsistsin the gradualemancipationof man through
knowledgeand science. The end of this evolution is the realm of perfect
human freedom and the full realizationof virtue, since all petty, selfish
antagonismswill disappear. There will be full equality,though in a system
of abundance of goods, disposable time, and scientific information,the
conceptof equalitywill have little meaning. All these thoughtscan be found
in utopianwritingsfrom ThomasMore to Fourierand in works expounding
the theoryof progressand humanperfectibilityfrom SaintPierreto William
Godwin and AugusteComte.36There is much in Marx which is new and I
have pointed to the profoundinsightswhich he developedon the theory of
secular developmentof human socio-economicsystems. But underlyingall
this innovationis a core of thoughtwhichhas deep roots in the traditionsof
Europeansocial science of the last 200 years.
BERT F. HOSELITZ

University of Chicago
36

It should be scarcely necessary to mention that the gradual developmentof the theory
of progress from its early beginnings to the period contemporary with Marx has been
admirably analysed in the work by J. B. Bury, The Idea of Progress, London, 1920. As
an example of the profound belief in the all-powerful effects of science, one may cite
a prophetic statement of William Godwin, which he regarded as the clinching argument
in his controversy with T. R. Malthus. In his final reply to Malthus's demographiceconomic theory, Godwin writes in On Population, London, 1820: "Of all the sciences,
natural or mechanical, which within the last half century have proceded with such
gigantic strides, chemistry is that which has advanced most rapidly. All the substances
that nature presents, all that proceeds from earth or air, is analysed by us into its
original elements... And it is surely no great stretch of the faculty of anticipation to
say that whatever man can decompose, man will be able to compound. The food that
nourishes us, is composed of certain elements; and wherever these elements can be
found, there human art may hereafter produce nourishment;and thus we are presented
with a real infinite series of increase in the means of subsistenceto match Mr. Malthus's
geometrical ratio for the multiplication of mankind."(pp. 499-501).