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    Yashar Contesting

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    Aaron Eskenazi
    Yashar Contesting

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    Contesting Citizenship in Latin America eae eNOS THE RISE OF INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS AND THE POSTLIBERAL CHALLENGE DEBORAH J. YASHAR Princeton University CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS ‘CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS ‘Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Maid, Cape Town, Singapore, So Pao (Cambridge Universiy Pres 40 Wes: 20h Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA somcambridge org Information on this se: www cambridge org/978052182746 (© Deborsh J. Yishar 2005 ‘This book sin copyright. Subjeceo statutory exception snd the provisions ofreleranc oleae ceasing sgrements ‘no reproduesion of any part may take pice without ‘the written permission of Cambridge Universi Pres. First pablished 2005 Printed inthe United States of America A caaog rd for hs abet itil the Bri Library. Ltr of Congres Catargng in Plt Date YYoshar, Deborh [, 1963~ Coneing cizanship in Latin Ameria the rie of indigenous movements and the portibeal challenge / Deborah. Yathor can. (Cambaidge suds in contentions politi) Includes bibogrphical references and inden. ISBN 0-521-82746-9 (hardback al paper) ~TISBN 0-521-53490-1 (pb: alk. pape) |Tdines of Soni America ~ Polis and government. 2. Indians of South America ~ CGivilsights. 3-Tndians of South America “Government reasons. 4. Indigenods peoples — South America ~ Politics and government. 5. Indigenous peoples ~ Civil ght — South ‘America, 6. Indigenous peoples ~ South America ~ Goverament reasons. 7. Pltial ‘Fights Sout America. 8. Citizenship ~ South Ameria, 9. South America Polite and goverment. 10. South America ~ Race relations. South Ameiea~ Social poi. L Tile. I Sere. F2230LB65¥57 2005 325.1198-dex2 2009055293 ISBN-13,978-0521-52746-1 hardback ISBN-10 0-521-82746-9 hardback ISBN-13 978.0521-53480.2 paperback ISBN-10 0-521-53480-1 papertace (Cambridge Universiy Press has no responsi for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for extemal or {hie ary Tweet Web tes referred to in his ook and dows not guarantee tht ny content on sch ‘Wel stesso wl remain, accurte or appropriate For My Parents, Audrey and Jobn Yashar 3 SERENE eR The Argument INDIGENOUS MOBILIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA ‘The Latin American anomaly has yet to be explained. Why were ethnic cleavages weak in Latin America? Why dd they reverse course at century’s end, as indigenous mobilization proliferated throughout the region? And ‘why have significant regional and national movements emerged in all cases except Peru? This chapter addresses the contemporary and yet uneven emergence of indigenous movements in Latin America by analyzing the five cases outined in Chapter 1: Eevador, Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru. I compare these cases cross-temporally and cross-nationally. ‘This chapter highlights the role of citizenship regimes vis-i-vis existing social cleavages and uneven state penetration ~ as conceptualized and dis- cussed in Chapter 2. Langue here that different types of citizenship regimes fise diffused and then activated ethnic cleavages. Earlier citizenship regimes ‘unintentionally enabled indigenous communities to carve out spaces oflo- cal autonomy, with limited interference from the state in matters of local governance. Subsequent citizenship regimes, however, threatened the au- ‘onomy that had been secured and, consequently, politicized ethnic cleav- ages. Hence we must trace the comparative historical arc of citizenship regimes and the associated patterns of state formation to understand the politicization of these ethnic cleavages and the motive for organizing. Where autonomy was possible, ethnic cleavages were weak. Where autonomy was subsequently challenged, ethnic cleavages became more salient. ‘This comparative historical discussion of citizenship regimes explains why ethnic cleavages have become more politicized in the contemporary period but were comparatively weak in ealier periods. But this variable ‘alone does not explain when and where those cleavages translated into ‘This chapter isa revised and expanded version of Yasha (1998 and 199). s4 Indigenous Mobilization in Latin America indigenous organizations. For as theories of social movement and collec- tive action have made clear, alongside motives one must also consider the Some scholars working on social movements and oppsional costumes ave under- Scored theimporence of fe spaces” (en parla, Evan nd Boyt 1986), A more ‘eoent round of scholarship has emphasized, i parcel, hat physical segregation and ‘he capacity to talkin unmonitored spaces can ironically provide the fee spaces fo op- positional constiousnes and mobilization Gee Groch 2001 and Morris and Brine 2001 30-1), This general idea maps onto the argument devlopedin this book Indigenous people ‘were removed from che canter of power but were ls alienated rom i Asset, chey had {he spaces to mainain and develop ideatonal nd political otonony, While his argument brondly paraliels the ideas abou “tree spaces” Ihave chosen otto use this een hich vas developed for the United States and prerames a commitment to democracy (shich 1 Aid noe Sind rather than aatonomy (which bear describes the de facto presices found in ‘many indigenous communis) * See McClintock (1981: 61) and Bekstein (1983) for comparative land reform deta 60 Indigenous Mobilization in Latin America state-regulated corporatist lines, with many peasant communities joining peasant federations in hopes of gaining access to land and the state. These corporatist reforms brought with them the creation and expansion of so- cial services in the areas of agricultural suppor, infrastructure, education, and health. Access to land and these services were often gained through corporatist associations. In other words, the corporatst citizenship regime recognized Indians’ freedom from elite control, reatalogued Indians as peasants, and es such, sgranted them rights and access previously denied them. The state and union organizations imposed a peasant identity on Indians asthe ticket for polit ical incorporation and access to resources. With the distribution of land, ‘extension of agricultural credits, and provision of agricultural subsidies, peasants developed a new relationship with the state, one that subordinated ‘them into official channels in exchange for clientelistic rewards. While the actual implementation of these reforms was quite uneven within and across countries, they generated political ties with those rural sectors that had gained (or hoped to gain) access to land and the stat. ‘The registration of peasant communities and the growth of peasant fed- erations, in particular, fostered the fiction tha the stae had turned Indians {nto peasants and stripped indigenous ethnicity of ts salience. Official po- Tisical discourse promoted assimilation into mestizo culture aud exteuedd resources to rural citizens insofar as they identified and onganized as peas- ants. Until recently, studies of corporatism highlighted the strong reach of these corporatist institutions and their capacity to control and remake these social sectors, Latin American corporatist states presumably central- ized state-society relations Yer ths enterprise was compromised by the absence ofa rationalized bu- reaucracy, the failure to establish authority, and a lack of monopoly of the legitimate use of force. For in contrast to Weber’ classic definition of the state, many of Latin America’ central political institutions remain weak, commitment to those institutions remains questionable, andthe territorial scope of those institutions remains ambiguous.’ This is nowhere more ap- parent than from the vantage of the countryside. From that perspective, it is difficult to argue that there is a single human community (as opposed to 5 Weber (1946: 7) anguedin his asc definicon ofthe stat: “The statesman comm nity that (access ceims the manopoly of the legate wie of physical fore within sven territory” Tn Latin Ameria, however, atin most of Ac, Asn andthe Middle Eas, this senda is sil largely mes. 61 ‘Theoretical Framing ‘many), that the state claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of force, or that the terstory is clearly defined. National identities, borders, and legiti- ‘macy are all in question and often in fux* Indeed, Latin America remains ‘very much in the throes of state formation, where the identities, borders, and legitimacy of the stte are highly politicized and contested processes, Particularly in the countryside. Even in Guatemala, where the military stave of the 1970s and 1980s was presumed omnipotent and omnipresent, the state was unevenly institutionalized, thereby leaving spaces for autonomous action. Hence, despite official statements and institutions of corporatist con- trol, large areas of the country operated beyond the reach of the state Authoritarian enclaves were dominated by patronage and clientelist net- ‘works. Caudillos and landlords at times deployed their own paramilitary forces, created their own political rules, displayed greater allegiance to sub- national politics than to national politics, and/or deployed state institutions for their benefic® ‘The weak reach of the state had implications for both those areas that were targeted by corporatist citizenship regimes (the Andean and ‘Mesoamerican highlands) and those that were not (the Amazon). Studies of the Amazon have long noted the failure of states to govern the Amazon ~ leaving large swaths of territory and significant numbers of Indians beyond the political and military control of the state. States did not actively seek ‘to harness the Amazon region until the latter part of the twentieth cen- ‘tury. Prior to that they had mapped out boundaries that defacto included Indians as members, though not necessarily citizens, of the given state? With this de facto policy of disregard, Indians did not gain access to state resources but they did maintain substantial, ifnot complete, political auton- ‘omy from the state — leaving indigenous authorities and practices to govern social, political, economic, and cultural relations therein, And while colo- nization schemes beginning in the 1960s (which in some places coincided with land reforms) did pose a threat in some places, these schemes did not {initially change the circumstances for most indigenous communities in the State formation is «process of police mapping. Ae Seo (198) has argued it equres & station of mutual iteligibity. The state must be ale wo rad deny, and defend dhe ‘eritory it governs. Those governed should be able to sent (wit) and depend vn the seate for base Sanctions. 7 Yasha (19976) 8 Fox (19% and 1994) Joseph and Nugen (19%; Nickon (1995), and Hagopian (1996, ° See Rie (1993) Santow-Granero (1996); and Smith (1990, a Indigenous Mobilization in Latin America Amazon, which remained beyond the reach of the colonists or who reset- ted in areas not yet claimed by them. In short, while corporatst citizenship regimes granted access to the state and social rights, the uneven reach of the state de facto undermined the centralizing program and allowed for local authorities—indigenous and otherwise—to act with relative autonomy in the Amazon, The uneven reach ofthe state also had an impact on the capacity of Latin American countries to incorporate those areas most affected by the corpo- ratist citizenship regimes. In the agriculeural highlands of Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador aswell asthe rural areas in Mexico and Guateiala, the state could not assert the pervasive control that the overwhelming majority of stadies of corporatism have tended to assume.!” To the contrary, indigenous com- ‘munities managed to carve out a degree of local autonomy that remained beyond the reach of corporatist institutions. Indeed, due to labor laws, land reform, and credit programs (fundamental components ofthe corpo” ‘atist citizenship regimes in the countryside) Indians secored the spaces in which they could institutionalize indigenous community practice atthe lo- cal level! Tn more ways than one, the distribution of inviolable communal lands to registered peasant communities provided Indians with the physical space not only for farming but also for securing governance by traditional indigenous authorities aud te public expression of cultural tes. in this way the legal registration of communities and granting of community-based Property created a legally defined, state-sanctioned, geographic area that allowed for the growth and/or maintenance of poltcaly autonomous local enclaves, indigenous oulture, and political practices. Otherwise stated, land reforms (which extended socal rights inthe countryside) masked the main- tenance of indigenous autonomy and in some cases even engendered the (e)emergence of indigenous leaders, the (re)eonsttation of communities, and the expression of (evolving) indigenous identities at the community level In Mexico, for example, the land reform accompanied the creation of e national peasant federation, the Confederacién Nacional Campesina ° Rabin (1997), for example, highlights how corporatsm in Mexico is mach more porous ‘han commonly portrayed and that alternative spaces for organizing were therefor fear for soil movement farmason and politi contestation, In Eugen Weber’ clasic (1976) stay of mation balding, he illuminates how the French state cumed peasants into Frenchman. I sgest here that Latin Ameren efor to arn Indians wo pessansin fc rested the space in which they could defend and develop + Toc indigenous densi, 6 ‘Theoretical Framing (CNO, and distributed property in many forms. Of these, the distribu- tion of gids (communally owned land) unwittingly provided the greatest lativude for local indigenous autonomy ~ they were community based, in- alienable, and, while regulated, often beyond state control!” In Bolivia the National Revolutionary governments of the 1950s and the subsequent military governments between 1964 and 1974 also incorporated Indians into the state as peasants. As in Mexico, they depended on alliances and pacts with peasant federations, which were expected both to deliver votes to the government and to control the local communities. Contrary to the hopes of politicians and military officers, Bolivia witnessed the mainte- nance of ayllr (kinship groups governed by a set of local-level indigenous authorities) in several regions in the Andean countyside.! In Ecuador the 1937 community law and later the 1964 and 1973 land reforms de- fined indigenous men and women as peasants and gave them access to the state insofar as they represented themselves as peasant communities and/or unions. Greater state penetration, land reforms, and freedom of ‘movement often increased indigenous peasant independence from local landlords and, moreover, enabled indigenous communities to strengthen and (re)eoastruct local public spaces for community authority structures and customary law.'* Indeed, the number of registered peasant commu- nities skyrocketed in the 1960s and 1970s.!¥ However, atthe local level, ‘many indigenous communities continued to maintain some form of indige- ‘nous practices and institutions. These cientelst and corporatist arrange~ ‘ments were most advanced in Mexico and Bolivia, followed by Ecuador; the broad outlines ofthese arrangements endured in these tre countries until the 1980s. Short-lived state efforts to incorporate the peasantry and pass Jand reform programs also occurred in Guatemala (1944-1954) and Pera (1968-1975). Corporatist citizenship regimes, therefore, created a dynamic dualism, with identities shifting according to the locale. Before the state, Indians assumed identities as peasants ~ thereby gaining access to the social ser- vices and goods (in other words, socal rights). Within the community, peas- ants assumed their identities as Indians ~ thereby securing local cultural " Fox (19943); Matace (1997); Rubin (1997; Harvey (1998) and Napolitano and Leyva Solan (1998), River Csiangiuy Equipo THOAS (1992); Ticons, Rojs, and Alb (1995) and Suébele~ Gregor (996), 1 Guerrero (1995). ¥ amos (1995. “a Indigenous Mobilization in Latin America enclaves.'® Location mattered for the expression of identity. Where the state incompletely penetrated local communities (nowhere more evident ‘han inthe Amazon), Indians sustsined and asserted varying degrees of po- litical autonomy by retaining authority systems and customs.” For even if states did not respect indigenous jurisdiction in these communities, indige- ‘nous communities often did, Sbifting Citizenship Regimes and Challenging Local Autonomy ‘This particolar balance in state-society relations, however, would not sur- vive the century. Military and economic elites did not necessarily accept the rising power of class (including peasant) federations, and economic constraints made it difficult for states to sustain social programs that had extended the host of social programs associated with the corporatstcit- izenship regimes. Moreover, states increasingly responded to economic pressures to open up markets that had protected or ignored indigenous lands. As elites started to erade corporatist citizenship reyimes and to try 0 sain command of national territories, they politicized ethnic clesvages by challenging the two types of autonomy that had developed 1) among the peasantized and comporatitized areas ofthe Andes and Mesoamerica and 2) within the Amazgn. ‘The erosion of corporatist citizenship regimes began as early as 1954 in (Guatemala and culminated throughout the region with the replacement of corporatist citizenship regimes with neoliberal citizenship regimes in the 1980s and 1990s, Indged, by the end of the twentieth century, citizenship regimes had changed radically as neoliberal ideas came to define the rights of citizens and the predominant mode of interest intermediation. With the third wave of democracy and the economie crises ofthe 1980s and 1990s, in particular politicians throughout the region started to advocate individ ual autonomy and responsibilty, a program based on granting individual Political and civil rights (but not necessarily social rights), che emasculation "6 This dulcis capmed by leplnay dferences inthe sci scenes Poli sieasins ‘working on this petiod hae highlghted the enealiy olay, the pesanry, and corporstist, oxgaizaons aif they displaced commonity autonomy and ethaic denies. Authropa logins have hisorically focused onthe loa lee nd in ar, hae highlighted comity ‘atonomy and ethnic ofien athe expense of roar pats of state society relations ° Corporat citizenship regimes barely penetrated the Amazon. Amazonian Laden rarely formed pare of peasant federations, and states dd not ave the resources to contol them. ‘Consequently Amazonian Indians had even more atonomy than Andean snd Mesomner: sean Indian 65 ‘Theoretical Framing of comporatist organizations, and the promotion of free markets in and and labor. The lst ofthese amplified the challenge to local autonomy that had ‘begun in earlier periods and provided the language that movements would use to challenge neoliberalism and to articulate a postberal challenge.’The zest ofthis section lays out how changing citizenship regimes politicized cthnic cleavages and provided the motive for organizing in two regions differentially affected by the state. Eroding Corporatis Citizenship Regimes and Politiczing Ethnic Cleav- ‘ages in the Andes and Mesomerica One wave of ethic politicization o- curred inthe very areas that had been explicitly targeted bythe corporatist citizenship regimes: the Andes and Mesomerica. In these areas ~ which had ‘been formally granted labor freedoms, socal rights in the form of land and social services, and peasant-based representation — Indians eventually con- fronted the erosion of corporatst citizenship regimes and a corresponding challenge to local autonomy. In some cases this was a slow process (as in Eouador, Bolivia, and Mexico); in others it was a sudden reversal (as in Guatemala and Pero) Buti all cases it eventually resulted in the politcal project and economic “imperative” associated with the neoliberal citizen- ship regimes ofthe 1980s and 1990s. In Ecuador, Bolivia, and Mexico the weakening ofrural peasant programs ‘was aslow and steady process. The military governmentin Ecuador initially emtended these corporatist rights but subsequently backpediled on their promises. In Mexico, it was a slow process that occurred over decades as the state decreased its commitment othe land reform prograt initially passed in the 1930s, In Bolivia, the military governments of the 1960s sought to reassere control over the peasantry in the “Military-Peasant Pact” which ‘essentially imposed leaderson peasant federations and imposed stabilization packages during the 1970s, In each of these cases, there was a steady erosion of corporatistcitizen- ship regimes ~ which resulted in the steady weakening of state-sanctioned peasant federations, the slowing down of land reform commitments, and increasing effort by the state to contol local pois. In each case, Indians started to organize along ethnic-based lines ~ with paricolarly important ‘organizing effort in each case in the 1970s.* "© Indigenoas movements didnot emerge immediately following the mative provided by the changing cizenship regimes, As argued here, eo other raiables (necwork and po lial asocsioal space) were alo neccesary a they provided capaci an pony, respecte 66 Indigenous Mobilization in Latin America ‘Neoliberal citizenship regimes were implemented in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s and delivered the final coup de grace against corporatist citizenship regimes, in general, and local autonomy, in particulaz. While neoliberal citizenship regimes did not cause indigenous ‘mobilization in the first place, they did subsequently catalyze additional ‘aobilization (and shaped the political agendas that emerged). Neoliberal citizenship tegimes resulted in reduced ministerial budgets for ministries of agriculture; socal services; and economic programs, including protection ‘of peasant lands, access to credit, and agricultural subsidies. Real wages in the agricultural sector steadily declined from the 1980s and by 1992 had declined by 30 percent in Latin America as a whole."? By the mid-1990s, Jand reforms had been proposed to privatize land markets in Mexico (1991 - ‘with the decision to dismantle the constitutional protection of communal held lands, jidos), Ecuador (1994 - with the land reform proposal), and Bolivia (1996 — with the land reform proposal). All of these were designed to make previously inalienable lands open for sale. In short, indigenous ‘communities definitively lost theirinterlocutors withthe state, land security, and social esourees, Under these circumstances the ability to maintain Local autonomy and secureastable relationship withthe state seemed increasingly remote In Guatemalo~and Peru (in contrast to Ecuador, Bolivia antl Mexico), the overthrow of corporatist citizenship regimes did not occur slowly but took place suddenly in counterreform coups in 1954 and 1975, respectively. In post-1954 Guatemala and post-1975 Peru, militaries repressed peasant unions, weakened and even reversed land reform distribution, and weak- ened socal programs that had granted social rights to this sector. In other ‘words, they reversed the corporatist citizenship regimes that had incorpo- rated Indians into the polity and promised to support indigenous communi- ties as economically viable entities. With the tar to civilian rule (an uneven and torturous process in both cases), states neither recognized social rights from earlier periods nor supported the formation of corporaist peasant fed- ‘rations. To the contrary, they enacted reforms that further cut state-run social programs — except for targeted safety net programs ~ and delimited the spaces for class-based organizing. Neoliberal reforms, in particular in Peru, further inserted instability into the countryside as poverty and in- ‘equality rates soared in the 1980s and 1990s, In Guatemala and Pera, local " Urioste (1992); Cnaghan and Malloy (1994 de Jnr eal. (1994); Lug (19954 Morley (0905) and Witkie, Conmers and Kemisaru (1995 Table 3107, 990. o ‘Theoretical Framing autonomy was challenged not only by the reversal of state reforms in the 1950s and 1970s, respectively, butalso by subsequent civil wars that ravaged the countryside in both countries through the 1980s and part of the 1990s. Both the slow (Ecuador, Bolivia, and Mexico) and sudden (Peru and Guatemala) reversal of corporatist citizenship regimes have had significant consequences - not least for indigenous peoples. In sum, class-based fed- erations have lost political and socal leverage throughout the region, and consequently Indians have lost their formal ies and access to the state. “Most dramatically for Indians, states have slowed down (in some cases re- versed) land reforms, privatized land markers, iberalized agricultural prices, climinated agricultural subsidies, and diminished credit programs. The xeforms threaten a communal land base that the state had once made in- violabl.* In other words, they have threatened the socal rights that had been extended with the earlier corporatist citizenship regimes, In all five cases, the weakening of corporatist modes of interest inter- ‘mediation and the dismanting of rural programs (including land reforms, credit programs, and the like) have further increased uncertainty about property regimes among peasants in Mesoamerica and the Andes. Liber- alizing states have made it clear that they will not maintain (in Mexico, Ecuador, and Bolivia) or reestablish Gin Gustemala and Peru) special forms of property rights, credit, and subsidies for peasants. Consequently, the contemporary period challenges the poor’ access to the state and its re~ sources. Ina five countries, one’s status 2s a peasant now provides limited Political purchase — as peasant programs ae dismantled and peasant orga- nizations weakened. Rural organizing and protest respond to this material ‘uncertainty, as peasants fear indebtedness, declining incomes, and the loss ofland. The indigenous character of he contemporary movements, however, extends beyond inaterial concerns for land as a productive resource. The potential loss of land also affects the viability and autonomy of local indige- xnows political insttations that had operated in, and assumed, a relatively well-defined and stable geographic space. In this context of reduced spaces for local autonomy and access 10 the state, ethnic cleavages have been politicized. Indigenous movements ~ particularly those that mobilize in the countryside have protested the state 2 Conaghan and Malloy (1994) de Janey eal. (1994} Morley (1995jand Uriaste Ferinder Cédov (1995. 2 These reforms (parila effores to privatize land markets and wo privilege the indivi ‘over the compote uni echo late-ninerenth-century Liberal reforms that were incontto- ‘verubly desman o indigenous poops, 6 Indigenous Mobilization in Latin America reforms thathave placed restrictions onthe inalienable community righisand de facto local autnomy that they had secured earlier with corporatist citizen ship regimes. Indigenous movements, in short, have come to demand that the state officially recognize indigenous communities. In Mexico as well as Guatemala, we find separate efforts to negotiate autonomy for the Mayan populations residing on either side of the border? In Bolivia, indigenous activists have worked to recognize, reconstitute, and/or register the aylus (communal organizations) that have dotted the Andean countryside? through the Ley Inra, this became legally possible. In Ecuador, indige- ‘nous movements and NGOs have starred to dialogue and initiate projects to strengthen and/or reconstitute systems of elders that have receded in importance over the years.2° Promoting Development and Politcizing Ethnic Cleawagesin the Amazon A second type of indigenous movement occurred in areas that had fallen beyond the scope of corporatst citizenship regimes. In the Amazon, as noted previously, the state has historically been weak — with limited impact ‘on policy, socal services, infrastructure, government access, or institution building. Corporatist citizenship regimes did not find significant instia- tional expression in the Amazon. While the state expanded in the three ‘decades after World War IT in the Andes, the Amazon remained relatively ‘marginalized from contemporary politics, the market, and the state role ineach. Colonization programs did develop, starting in the 1960s, but they affected pockets ofthe Amazon, not the region asa whole. As uch, incidents of colonization were'interpreted as isolated events, rather than collective slights, ® or discussions of autonomy debatsin Mec, se Ojarsc (1995); Day Polanco (1997) ‘Maziace (1997) and Stephen (1997), Ayllsofen chim sovereigney over dicontinaous land bates. This geographical spread poses challenge to Wester ea fst formation, which generally sme tat cone ‘vous ares coincide wth a ingle politcal dminstton. Several interviews with each ofthe following people between May-Angus 1997: Con- stantino Lima, Aymaran nacional acs sine the 1970s, Carks Manan, Mara Eugenia ‘Choque Quis, and Ramin Conde, resarchr-asiviss Teer de Hiri Oral nding (THOA); and Ricardo Call, former directo of Tle de py «Ay y Puc fdigene (TAYPD. Alo see Molin and Arias (1996, Alb and Ayla arta (4), Based on several interviews with José Maria Cbascang of ECUARUNAR, sve i ‘eres with Lis Maldonado of Coeo de Exudor Prius (CEPCU), toe inter views with Femando Rosero, Director of the United Nasions Vokes (Match 11,1997, March 18, 1997, and May 7, 1997) and one interview with Congressman Luis Macss (ay 6, 1997), al interviews condoced between Febrary 1997 and May 197 o “Theoretical Framing ‘These colonization programs and the expansion into the Amazon, how- ever, have become increasingly consequential. Development programs have encouraged colonization by Andean peasants (indigenous and nonindige- ‘nous) and the expansion of cattle ranching, logging operations, and oil exploration, In many cases, foreign companies took advantage of these de- velopment schemes alongside domestic migrants and domestic companies. ‘Whether international or national in origin, these developments have chal- lenged indigenous communities in the Amazon that had remained relatively independent from the state and had sustained politcal and economic con- ‘tol over vast land areas. Indigenous movements have emerged to oppose these developments and, in the proces, have demanded thatthe state rec- ‘ognize indigenous territories. In Peuador, for example, the fist indigenous ‘organization formed in the 19605 among the Shuar in order to protect, their lands against colonization plans. This pattern was replicated through ‘out the Ecuadorian and Bolivian Amazon as colonizers, oil companies, cat- tle grazers, and loggers started to penetrate the region. These Amazonian ‘movements assumed particular visibility in the 1980s and 1990s when states accelerated programs to promote more open land markets in the Amazon ~ culminating in significant marches in Eeuador (1992) and Bolivia (1990). ‘Throughout Latin America (inchnding Pern), therefore, the contemporary period has challenged the space for indigenous local sutonomay that was secured during the prior corporatist citizenship regimes and its associated ddevelopmentalist state. In Mesoamerica and the Andes, the state has sup- ported the dismantling of corporatist forms of representation, agricultural subsidies, and protection of communally and individually held lands. In the Amazon, the state has increased its presence and promoted colonization by ‘Andean nationals and foreign companies. In both cases, the state’ challenge to land tenure and use has threatened material livelihoods and indigenous forms of autonomous local governance ~ both of which had depended on ‘more stable property relations. In this context, indigenous movements are asserting the right to new administrative spheres with a certain degree of political autonomy at the local level. This is not just cal for more land, al- though that is certainlya core componentofthe demands. Iisalsoa demand thatthe state recognize and respect autonomous indigenous political juris- diction and authority over the communities that inhabit that geographic space. ‘These movements gained momentum in the context of neoliberal citi- zenship regimes. They were not caused by them but they were spurred on. oy Indigenous Mobilization in Latin America by them, Foras Richard Chase Smith wrote, in the years prior to neoliberal hegemony: ‘The issues of land and ethnic identity coalesced the ethnic federations. In each ase, particular group fee its collective land base and identity threatened by both state polices of colonization and integration and by the expanding capitalist mar ket economy. Virtually every ethnic federation began as 4 meeting of headmen ‘or representatives of different settlements of particular ethnic group who were Jooking for common strategies to defend the land and their nationality (Smith 1985: 17, ‘Smith was insightful and prescient, While he was talking about the Amazon in 1985, his observations resonate throughout Latin America as a whole. ‘The Capacity: Transcommunity Networks Movements, however, do not emerge mechanicslly as new needs and mo- tives present themselves. They must build (upon) organizational capacity to initiate and sustain a movement. Organizational eapacty must be demon- strated (eather than assumed), particularly for indigenous communities, ‘which are often separated by great distances, and for indigenous identi- ties, which have historically been more clearly defined by and embedded in ‘uu conus. In the absence of es between and among communities, itis extremely diffcale to scale up demands, to organize, and to launch protests. ‘Networks provide this organizational capacity. They fostered the com- ‘munication and cooperation that was essential for transcending geographic dispersion, language barriers, and culearal unfamiliarity (and in soine cases hostility. In doing so, networks provided che forum for future indigenous leaders to meet, share common experiences, develop a common language, identify common problems, and articulate common goals. In turn, indige- nous men developed ethnic identities that referred not only to ther local Indian communities but also to a tanseommunity indigenous identifica- tion. This “indigenous” identity was a product more than a cause of the fist generation networks that were in place. Ie did not necessarily include 4 close national identification with al indigenous communities. Indeed, as elaborated in Part Il, Andean and Amazonian indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia (and even Peru) formed separately and did not 2 dank Arang Keshovarzan for his insight ano nerworks and suggestions for improving my argument otal af which Thave been ale to incorporate n ‘Theoretical Framing necessarily or easly translate those regional ties into national ones. Indeed, different historical experiences had resulted in very different culearalnorms, ‘understandings of autonomy and land, and styles of negotiation. Without networks, it was impossible to bridge these divides. Networks, therefore, constitute a second part of the explanation about indigenous movement formation in Latin America insofar as they provided the organizational capacity necessary to build indigenous movements. I take networks to refer to the repeated exchanges and resulting relation- ships that are constructed among individuals of social units by formal and {informal institutions. Networks can take many forms. The one distinguish- ing feature that proved essential for indigenous movement formation was geography. Only where sranscommunity networks were in place could and did indigenous communities possess the organizational capacity to forge broad indigenous movements. The existence ofthese networks more than their organizational features (vertical or horizontal; coercive or cooperative; social, political, economic, cultural, and/or religious; ete), proved key to explaining whore indigenous leaders possessed the organizational capacity to build indigenous movements” This argument builds on the vast literature on networks (and its kin- dred literature on social capital and civil society). Granoverter (1995) ar- tzued that the capacity to secure jobs is hest explained hy personal contacts ‘and networks, rather than by education, training, or skill. Social move- ‘ments theorists have also made similar arguments about movementbuilding (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarsow 1998). MeAdam, for exam ple, found that churches played this role in the development of the civil rights movement in the United States and that personal contacts played this role in explaining who joined Freedom Summer (MeAdam 1982 and 1988). Putnam (1993) has looked at the civie networks that have engen- dered more effective governance. And Varshney (2002) analyzes how net- ‘works of civic engagement shape trajectories of ethnie violence. In gen- ‘eral, networks enable people (or communities) to interact, to exchange information, to build social capital, and to mobilize for change. They help to overcome distances that otherwise might appear insurmountable. And in so doing, they provide the basis for building movements. In Ecuador, ¥ These other oraniational feaares of networks do not explain movement emergence, slthough they probably do provide insghe into the prof movement that id emerge, Farther worcis needed o explain why oun etworks lead to unifed morementsin agen sea and why others ead to compettive oes. In this regard, the dcusion of networks Sal requies farther analy ar alo noted by Podolny and Page (1998: 79), n Indigenous Mobilization in Latin America Bolivia, Mexico, and Guatemala, networks provided the spaces within which indigenous leaders built ties, developed trust, gained leadership skills, and forged new idess. ‘These networks allowed for “brokerage,” which McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) discuss asa relational mechanism that connects sites, creates new collective actors, and/or speaks on their be- half. The very social interaction that occurs through and by brokers can create autonomous spheres in which actors can identify their shared cir- cumstances, scale up their reference group to transcend local geography, and recastidentitis (c.g, assuming an identity a8 Indians rather than solely as distinct indigenous communities) Networks and movements, therefore, are analytically and temporally distinct. They cannot be reduced to one another. Indigenous activists drew on existing networks to build new movements. These movements, in turn, had very diferent organizational identities and goals than the networks on which they built, Indeed, indigenous movements often severed tiesto the prior networks and, in some cases, critiqued these networks for subordi- nating indigenous peoples. Consequently, the existence of prior networks does not equal the formation of new ones; rather, older networks provided the basis for generating new ones. ‘The state, unions, churches, and NGOs have played a crucial role in this rogard.?® While pursuing their vespective missions, these institutions (unwittingly) provided links that have become a basis for forging translo- cal (and subsequently transnational) indigenous identities and movements, ‘The state, for example, attempted to mobilize support and control rebel- lions within peasant-eommunities, as part of the corporatst and populist developmental policies previously discussed. With the passage of land re- forms, states attempted to construct a loyal national peasantry, to weaken smote localized ethnic identities, and to forge a nation-state. In Mexico and Bolivia, where these processes were mast advanced, peasant unions were linked to corporatist state-parties that promised access to land, eco- nomic support, and social services. In Ecuador, the state agrarian reform program promoted rural organizing, resulting in a significant increase in the registering of rural comunas, cooperatives, and associations, This state- sanctioned rural organizing in Mexico, Bolivia, and Ecuador engendered cross-comamanity networks that were later used in these countries to or- sganize indigenous movements in some places tied to and in some places autonomous from the peasant unions. 2 See Brys (2000) for discussion ofthe transnational dimensions of these networks B ‘Theoretical Framing ‘Guatemala's democratic regime (19441954) and Peru’ military reform government (1968-1975) also passed land reforms and encouraged peas- ant organizing, but subsequent counterreform governments in Guatemala (1954) and in Peru (1975) undermined this process. As a consequence, the ‘Guatemalan and Peruvian pessantry of the 1980s and 1990s has not sus- tained transcommunity peasant networks as a result of patron-client ties with the state, as in Mexico, Bolivia, and Ecuador. The Guatemalan and ‘Peruvian states have been hostile to peasant demands and have attempted to localize, disarticulate, and repress rural organizing efforts. Consequently, ‘Pert has never really achieved and sustained a national peasant network — except brefiy (if then) during the Velasco government (1968-1975). In the absence of sustained political liberalization and a more sustained de- vvelopmentalist state in the Peruvian countryside, it has been difficult to construct a national peasant movement. And in the absence of these kinds of networks, it has been difficult to construct an indigenous identity and ‘organization that transcends its more localized referent. Guatemala, unlike Peru, did subsequently organize an opposition peasant movermenton the ba- sis of networks constructed by the Catholic Church.” In Guatemala, many ppost-Vatican I cleris and lay persons organized Christian Base Commani- ‘ties (CEBs) in the countryside. Many CEB members subsequently forged 4 new peasant movement and used the base commonities to reconstruct intercommunity networks that had bech repressed by the military. In Latin America, more broadly, churches have helped to construct and strengthen rural networks between communities not only in Guatemala but alsoin Mexico, Bolivia, and Ecuador." Churches often provided the means Cf communication, the locus of interaction, and literacy skills that linked ‘one community to another. So too, church leaders inspired by liberation theology created CEBs that encouraged activism and created lay leaders ‘that could travel between communities to address local and national prob- lems. Catholic and Protestant churches played a crucial role in constructing ‘networks in Chiapas, Mexico. Bishop Samuel Ruiz, for example, organized indigenous fora, brought resources to indigenous communities, and encour- aged more active forms of localized organizing. In Bolivia and Ecuador, @ more heterogenous church presence ~ Salesian, Franciscans, Protestants, 2 Cotes and Portcasero (1969); Handelman (1975), McClintock (1981); and Seligman 9995), > Linke hs been writen on he impact ofliberatio theclogy and theologians on the Perevian countrys. See Pes (1999) 31 See Brown (1993) Chojac (1995; Ploy (1995; and Santana (1995: chs. 6-7). " Indigenous Mobilization in Latin America ‘Summer Instivute for Linguistics (SIL), ete. — also played a particularly important role inthe Amazon in bridging significant differences between communities, addressing literacy, providing radio services, and organizing against land invasions.” Again, while churches were active in Peru, they never managed to sustain transcommunity ties ~ in large part, as we shall see, because of the repression that ensued in the countryside. In short, states, unions, churches, and, more recently, NGOs (particu larly in Bolivia) have provided networks that enabled indigenous comma nities to transcend localized identities and to identify commonly trusted leaders. In some cases these networks were internationally inspired and supported (Brysk 2000); in many they were not. In all eases, however, these networks built literacy skills and cross-commsnity social capital that en- abled indigenous leaders to move between communities, build support, and develop frames that resonated within and across communities. In turn, indigenous leaders gained access to information and resources that en- abled them to communicate with the state. When confronted with changing srural-state relations that threatened property relations and local autonomy, these networks provided the organizational bases for coordinating signifi ‘eant indigenous mobilizing from the 1970s on. ‘The Political Opportunity: Political Associational Space If state reforms politicized indigenous identity and networks provided the organizational capacity, indigenous movement organizing would still See Casro Manta (1996: 20) fora char on the SIL in Latin America —ineuding where began orig conc and itn In Bolivia chorch influence largely ocxuredcenures ear trough misonethat crested clear setdements these selements became the centers of ndigenows orancing in the 19705 and 1980s. In Ecuador and Peru, church influence ocourredunuch more leary through boarding school, where fotre indigenous leaders mec one another and acquired leadership and communication sis hat wee later wed to organize regional indigenous ‘oxgenizstons in the Amazon. In both cases, churches along with NGOs provided the networks, resources, and ski for indigenous arganicing in the region. I tank Diego Iraldeand Sergio Delgado or rebringing these pattern tomy attenson nan ntervew hed in La Pa, Bolivia on Orober 20,1995. 2 See McAdam (199627. MeAdam eon fou dimensions that onsite poical oppor ‘nity stroceares: the degree of piel opening; elt alignments presence of elite aie sand the state capacity and propensity to use repression. In the ase of Latin Ameren indigenous movernens, ele alignment and aces to elite allies do aoe uniformly playa role in movement formation ~ even ifthey do ater pli ace. Consequently, Lely ore fon Meda fist and fourth dimension o analyze movement emergence. 15 ‘Theoretical Framing only emerge in the presence of one more variable: political associational space. The need for associational space is painflly obvious (particularly for scholars of social movements) but often overlooked in discussions of ethnic politics, as itis all too common to assume tha ethnic cleavages natu- rally translate into political organizations and protest. Political associational space (in conjunction with changing citizenship regimes and transcommu- nity networks) however, proved crucial to the emergence and growth of indigenous movements. Sowhatis political associational space? Political associational space refers to the de facto existence of freedom of association and expression. Ieis not reducible to regime type; itis not equal to democracy. To the contrary, politcal associational space can exist (to varying degrees) in different polit- ical contexts, including the following: where states are virally or largely absent (asin the Amazon); in democratic regimes where states protect civil rights x practice; and in transitional regimes where euthorites initiate a ‘proces of political liberalization that includes a decline in repression and a corresponding increase in respect for civil rights. The common denomina- torin these three contentsis that the state doesnot trample on the capacity to associate and to speak out. 25 Ce might pinout were olla socatonl pus ve bmn cloned of ano- ‘ate cite ben knw cre hem ee Rack end Sink 1998, Nero 198; Throw 1998, and Tily 200). They have tect “nonpolioa” fy to eguge poll sce anor they have bk allances with der lis snore ‘Sonal acer o overcome pla cbc. Thi xcponal beam cathe ort of {ome sivas incontveile: Howrey the ramp ee noteworthy pede ecuse ‘hey have ben the ezeptn, In gener, cose pola socetonal pcs have worked sues movement building ~ purely in fedgenos el ees whee acs could ‘ororpnizn peskoos and mobile witht ncingreprenion ait he and it ‘commonly noted poise iberiaon noc ynonymou with demaerattion, De- ‘mosratzan can etn with pol econ atin Pen and Guntemals i the {Sat Morir, pl rslaton can oc indopeneny of democracy ~ ein Baal during the stende peed and Meno nthe 1980s Empl Speaking, wile pala iberaacon has prided he ple opportaiy er ovement onpersg i the Andes and Meant, de sane cannot secur be td of decor ofl decry, per. Se Eager (0973 fr dacsion of tb covlnear ans be tween decency and prove Enger ned hat poet ic at Wy where moray is och rele and fly achieved isn the sur in bowen, where democracy fl only pe of promi that scl group ar moet aly vo rss See Drei and Armutong @002 fora aa anys of he elaonp beeen desc ad reson 16 Indigenous Mobilization in Latin America Ikisalsoimportanctomake clear that associational space is northe sameas networks, The former refers to the political opportunity to organize while the latter refers to the existing capacity to do so, These two variables can affect one another but do not necessarily covary: During times of political closure networks can persist (as with miliary-dominated corporatist ss0- ciations and churches). Moreover, associational space does not necessarily translate into the existence or growth of social nerworks. Empirically speaking we can see how political associational space has ‘mattered in both its de facto and de ure forms. In the Amazon, where the state as historically been weak (in many places relatively absent), a gen- elized associational space existed independent of changes inthe national political regimes. Even when national governments deployed repression in other areas, this violence rarely affected the Amazon in a direct way. In this zegard, associational space existed de futo and was relatively constant in the Amazonian regions.” Amazonian indigenous communities had the ‘opportunity to organize transcommanity movements absent state regula- ‘ion, contol, and repression (although they often confronted local forms cof oppression from landlords and churches) In the Andean and Mesoamerican regions, where the sate had incor- porated and penetrated the highlands toa greater degree than that found in the lowland ateas uf die Amazon, political associational space has been ‘more variable, Ie fluctuated in tandem with periods of national political closure and political liberalization. During periods of political closure and ailitarization, states restricted freedom of association in these regions and, therefore, closed off oppormnities for lege organizing among communi ‘ies, This type of closure occurred in Bolivia inthe 1970s; Guatemala from 1954 dhrough the mid-1980s and sporadically again in the 1990s; Pera from the mid-1970s through much of the 190s (with a brief opening atthe end of the 1970s and carly 1980s). During these periods of political closure, indigenous organizing didnot emerge o simply dissipated. Indeed, Jenaro Flores of Bolivia and Demetri Cojti of Guatemala, both prominent in- digenous leaders who helped to cofound indigenous movements in their respective countries, commented on separate occasions that political clo- sare preempted incipient efforts to organize indigenous movements and ‘weakened those that hed started organizing during earlier and more open gain, Pero is «partial exception in thi regard and is discussed ot greater length in Pace ” ‘Theoretical Framing times.* Where, however, political liberalization legally and practically resulted in the freedom to organize, there was greater opportunity to mo- bilize along indigenous lines. In the Andean and Mesoamerican regions, a strong correlation exists between indigenous organizing and the extension of political associational space, National political associational space was extended the furthest in Bolivia (late 1970s and early 1980s) and Ecuador (late 1970s); and it sin ‘these two countries that we find the first two and strongest movements in the region. National political associational space was extended the lest in Peru (with an ongoing and violent civil war for much of the 1980s and 1990s) and it is here that indigenous movement organizing was largely foreclosed, Guatemala and Mexico pose intermediate cases of indigenous ‘movement organizing, with indigenous movements emerging in a context of rather uneven processes of political liberalization and political essocia- tional space. In Guatemal, a staggering history of repression in the 1970s and early 1980s gave way to the extension of some Political associational space in the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, Indigenous movements emerged in these periods of relative political opening, although their growth and strength was hampered by arse in politial violence in the late 1980s and again the late 1990s, Mexico also extended political associational space in the 1990s, alshongh it did en aguins less repressive hackgrond than in Gratemala. During 1995, 1996, and 1997 research trips, indigenous leaders generally stated that political liberalization had created a more propitious environment for organizing. And indeed, the establishment and growth of indigenous movements largely coincides with or follows the increased respect for civil liberties. ‘Only where associational space was in evidence did national indige- nous movements emerge, including CONAIE in Eeuados, CSUTCB and CIDOB in Bolivia, COMG in Guatemala, and the EZLN in Mexico. Each ‘of these movements built on preexisting dense social networks that allowed for both the construction of srancomeuniy ties and the creation of paneth- nic movements (illustrated by quadrants II and IV in Table 3.3). Where these networks did not exis, it was close to impossible to organize beyond the local community level ~ particularly when combined with nonexis- ‘tent or limited associational space. Where, however, widespread repression. 2 Several incerviensin 1995 and 1997 with JenaroFloresin La Pez, Bolivia end oneintevew in Febroary 1996 with Demetri Coin Gustmal City, Guatemala, 8 Indigenous Mobilization in Latin America “Table 3.3. Lesin American Indigenous Movements in tbe Contetof Contemporary Challenges 1 Leal Autonomy : es a Preesiting Neworks Associational Space Leeda’ ‘High Ne: ‘No indigenous ‘Pancthnic movements but Closure/Miltarization mobilization, asin politically constrained in Peruvian Andes Bolivia 1970s Andes); auador 1970s (Andes); Guatemala 19705-19805, and Mexico 19705-1980s Localized and mono-_Panethaie regional and/or ‘ethnic mobilization national mobilization ‘occu in isolated in Bolivia and Beusdor cass everywhere, ‘Andes and Amazon); including the Peruvian Guatemala 1990s; and Amazon. Mexico 1990 Se Mas be apesad tol pola Rion w acl aw GRO, fiend emt de e p SSocatoml spc oe snl andro! fee) an eae ‘political closure at some local levels. > ‘continued and freedom of association was foreclosed, politcal closure pre- ‘empted indigenous movement formation. Peru fills into this later category. Several anonymous 1997 interviews in Peru also commented on the insurmountable obstacles that authori- tarian role and civil war, in particular, posed for indigenous and peasant organizing. ‘The violent civil war closed off avenues for freedom of orga- nization and expression. Moreover, it destroyed existing organizations and obstructed the formation of trans-commonity networks that have proved so important elsewhere, In this context, sustained regional and national in- digenous organizing has proved elusive in all but some isolated locations in ‘the Peruvian Amazon, as discussed in Chapter 6. Inshore, shifting citizenship regimes challenged local autonomy and politi- cized ethnic cleavages. Socal networks provided the capacity to organize beyond local communities and to scale up efforts into regional and national indigenous organizations, And political associational space provided the necessary political opportunity for doing so. For these reasons, the existence p ‘Theoretical Framing and interplay among these three causal factors best explain the contempo- rary and uneven emergence of Latin America’s indigenous movements Concluding with Second-Generation Movements: Learning, Modularity, and Strategy (One could end the story here. Challenges to local autonomy politicized cthnic cleavages. Movements emerged where activists could draw on exist- {ng resources in a context of political spaces for association. This outline explains the first wave of organizing that occurred in Ecuador, Bolivia, “Mexico, and Guatemala. Were these conditions to extend to Peru, then we ‘would forecast that significant indigenous organizing would occur there as ‘well. The findings in this book lead to these conclusions. Butitis important ‘to note that the emergence ofthese movements (and the political successes that they subsequently have had) have also shifted the circumstances within which other social movements operate and the shape of the movements themselves. For the first generation of indigenous movements gained a degree of secs that no one predicted. They have at times successfully pressured states to engage in poli discussions about democratic representation, land reforms, territorial autonomy, constitutional reforms, peace accords bicul- tural education, and international loans, among others, In several ofthese cases, these discussions have translated into legislation and, in a smaller subsc, into the implementation phase. In other words, these movements have become new interlocutors with the state, have gained national and international notoriety, and have delivered goods to their commanity “These successes have not gone unnoticed. Indeed, the successes ofthese ‘early movements have actually contributed tothe growth of second genér- ation of indigenous movements that have fllomed, earned from, and replicated the language adopted by the first round. This second generation has not necessarily mobilized to defend local autonomy, as in the first-generation cases. Rather they have observed the successes of indigenous movements Sefore them, nthe fares of many herpes of meverents and ste decided to use ethnic identities as the marker for mobilization, ‘her word idignos movements et were nce mo re bse prototype for madularity and a duplication of sorts. These second-generation ‘movements have started to label their movements as ethnic or indigenous ~ to gain a tochold into national and international debates. 80 Indigenous Mobilization in Latin America ‘These second-generation movements do not necessarily have common gosls: They include coea growers who initially lost their jobs in the na- ‘ional mines and have turned to coca production for their livelihood; youth who want to increase their professional opportunities and help their ‘community; and scholars who have traveled to international conferences and gained increased knowledge, contacts, and resources, etc All of these movements mobilize Indians. Most mobilize for noteworthy causes. But the rationale for mobilizing as Indians appears to be tied to the kmowledge gained by learning what others have done and how they have succeeded. Ik is strategic behavior not because itis inauthentic but because the ac- tivists could have chosen to do otherwise. Their choice to mobilize along «nic lines is a consequence of the successes of those that have preceded them. ‘Hence timing and sequence matter. The first generation of movements set the stage forthe second. And the second generation of movements has jn turn emerged according to a different logic and with a different set of, demands, In other words, they are modular, in the sense highlighted by ‘Tarrow (1998) and borrowed from Anderson (1991). Their identity is no less authentic. But the process of politicization and the adoption of that identity are different — in many ways because these movements could have mobilized along different Lines. For many ofthese activits, their ties to the comomssity are less clear; their migratory context appeats more prevalent; and their discourse more calculated and strategic. So too, once indigenous movements became prevalent, international fanding agencies, NGOs, and the like developed important programs that aided existing movements where they existed, and occasionally catalyzed ‘movements where they did not. Movements borrowed strategies from one ‘another and examined comparative successes/fulures. Brysk (2000) high- lights the various linkages that exist between indigenous movements and ‘transnational forces and the ways in which these ties have increased the chances of success in one campaign after another, She also highlights (2000: 21) how indigenous movements across borders have mimicked sue- cessful protests. Apparent, Ecuadorian activists examined videos of the 1990 Bolivian indigenous march before launching a protest later that same year, The first generation of indigenous organizing was therefore conse- ‘quential for those movements that followed — opening the door for more cvoss-movement and cross-border interaction. In short, we cannot look at indigenous movements in Latin America outside of a comparative histori- cal context. Historical changes in state-society relations politicized ethnic 81 ‘Theoretical Framing cleavages. And the emergence of these movements in turn has become a reference for new rounds of movement formation and agenda setting. Viewed together these first- and second-generation indigenous move- ‘ments pose fundamental challenges that Latin America’s democracies are beginning (or will need) to tackle. They are forcing Latin America’s new regimes to confront the limited reach of prior rounds of state formation, to address the indeterminacy of the current round of democratic institution building, and to consider how new democracies might reform stares more effectively to accommodate plural identities, politcal units, and adminis- trative heterogeneity, Part II elaborates on why and how these movements have emerged. Part III elaborates om the implications of these movements for democracy and the postliberal challenge. 82 PART II eR A The Cases ‘The Cases predicament vis-i-vis the Peruvian nation-state was to be separate in their integration, outside in their belonging.” ‘This predicament remains as true today in Peru as in the rest of the Andean region, Given the parallel chal- lenge to local autonomy (plus the incomplete terms of democratization), why then did indigenous movements not also emerge in Peru? Part Il: No National Indigenous Movements: Explaining the Peruvian Anomaly Given these similarities, itis particularly striking that national indige- nous movements have not emerged in Peru alongside those in Bolivia and Ecuador. Indeed, Julio Cantalicio, the leader of the largest peasant confed- eration, the CNA, indicated in no uncertain terms that the association does not prioritize mobilization at all. Cantalicio stated that they were fighting to defend peasants and their right to the land. However, whereas before they would mobilize to promote their cause, he observed that now they do not Instead they meet with other organizations to come up with alternative proposals. They started to adopr this strategy once Alan Garcia assumed office. “Leaders have adopted a new role; they need to be more pragmatic. Now we do not enter in partisan poites.... What has not changed is our ‘opposition vis-a-vis the government. But our opposition now takes the forzn of argument and proposals.”” How does one explain why Peru bas failed to mobilize along ethnic-based lines? This section explains the obstacles to building an indigenous movement in Peru, Tivo factors are highlighted: the wealmess of rransommicitynet- ‘works and the lack of politcal asocatonal space. To explain these develop- ments, this section analyzes two successive periods. First, we revisit the corporatist citizenship regime and its impact. This section highlights that corporatist policies and organizations inserted distrust and tensions within and between communities rather than the cooperation and collaboration suggested by official rhetoric. While these developments did not foreclose possibilities for indigenous organizing, they certainly raised significant bat- riers to doing so. Second, and more importantly, the civil war inthe 1980s and carly 1990s had a devastating impact on both transcommunity networks and politcal associational space. Political violence essentially destroyed these elements, foreclosing opportunities for grand-scale organizing by and across indigenous communities, 2 Jalio Cantal, intersiw,Angust 2, 1997. 240 Peru Revisiting Perw’s Corporatot Citizenship Regime Peru’ corporatist citizenship regime fundamentally changed class relations inthe Peruvian countryside — decimating the landed elit, distributing land in record numbers to peasants and rural workers, and actively organizing the countryside into corporatist organizations. This section enumerates these developments in light of the ensuing conflicts within and between communities. Rather than foster community ties and corporatist solidarity, 2s in Ecuador nd Boia, Perv corpratst plies afen had the op Posite impact ~ generating greater tension, distrust, and competition. As such, the corporatist citizenship regime did not substantially strengthen ‘eanscommunity networks or by extension substantially increase the epar- dry of indigenous people to organize, in marked contrast tothe experiences in Ecuador and Bolivia, General Velasco forged the corporatist citizenship regime in the coun- ‘uyside withthe goal of building worker-owned enterprises and of fostering ‘cooperative sprit. He hoped to construct series oflocal cooperatives that would be connected and coordinated by regional and national associations (Manrique 1996). Accordingly Velasco’ land reform primarily distributed Jand to collective unit such as cooperatives, agrarian societies, and peasant communities (see Table 6.3)* The scfueu, howevéh, did not distribute lands in a uniform way. Rather, the land reform provided fortwo different types of associations: CAP and SAIS. Both the CAPs and SAISs turned former workers into shareholders, workers, and managers (McClintock 1981: 34-5). However, the two types of cooperatives differed in important ways. The CAPs were most prevalenton, the coast (where indigenous and peasant communities were scarce) and con- verted more modern sugar and cotton enterprises into cooperatives where the workers were the sole members of the enterprise. The SAlSs, by con- trast, were most prevalentin the highlands, where more feudal relations had been dominant and where indigenous communities were most numerous, ‘The SAISs operated on lands expropriated fromatleast one ex-hacienda and were owned and managed by the ex-hacienda workers, surrounding peasant communities and tecinicians, As such, its membership was more divers. ® ot dcin ofthe and fr Cer (173 Hag (97) Bae snd Wren (87 Meine (8) ay 80 Comes de Ose C98, Ho Ty snd Stataa m7, ° Sgn 19955 nde th SAS were or pein th nahi and the coast than in the southern highlands. sheds 21 ‘The Cases ‘Table 63. Buimated Disituton of Pervian Peasants by Type of Agricultural Work (1977) Percentage Families of Total ‘Thousands ‘Toul Farm Benefiting Raral Farm N __offHecares Families fromReform Families CaP 578 2,295 107,087 107877 Peasnt Groups! 798 1,586 BOS OES Sas 60 2,802 60.930 609304 Peasant 4000 191 500,000 110971 31 ‘Communities Private Forms NA 8,000 600,000 31,918 37 Evenwales = 250,000 — 16 oral = 23,500 1,600,000 356,276" TiS the CAs pena pon nd HS he pres ded Sum cn nro at nab cal * Thy edo ot neon is xen wih i ety dc a Minos {id and Sign (995s ceed n 96ers erenow) 6 ‘commas Sans fa cnn of ean to, ry fay totale prefs peur comm » gpl rr ts am re rr 0 heres bat der 10 bec nd Foecerne andr D0 eae «pn 1 prs Bd Proper eee Ser Men.) ‘The SAISs, however, did not assuage tensions in the highlands but, in fact, exacerbated some and created others. First, the SAISs did not prove to be productive enterprises. Situated on former haciendas that often lacked modern equipment and appropriate infrastructure, they proved to be much less productive than the CAPs on the coast, which inherited modern en- texprises in fertile lands. Consequently, while the situation of CAP workers tended to improve, that of the SAIS workers did not.” In other words, the ‘SAISs did not change two basic and widespread problems: low productiv- ity and poverty (Gonzales de Olarte 1994: 36). Manrique (1996) therefore » Gone de Ol (194.39; Manign (199 nd Sheahan (199: 6). 27 The land reform coincided with oter polices that weakened the productive capaci of agiceare. Kay (1982 162) observes the Veco inuedace foreign exchange pic that wene farther than before wo encourage aria impor (hi in ear dsaan- tage agrcakaralexpora) he ended pice controls on agricul produces —bencSing ‘consumers over produce, Moreover, he inwodoced agricul ube for pore rode 2a Peru observes that while some of the CAPs survived into the 1990s, the SAISs and other highland cooperatives “filed miserably.” These economic fail- ures exacerbated the problems outlined next. second critical issue revolved around who benefited from the land re~ {orm distribution. The land reform significandy restructured property re- lations but was less beneficial for indigenous communities than one might at first expect. This was so for several reasons. In the Andes, land was dis teibured as SAIS and, as such, included various sectors such as ex-hacienda workers and communities. The ex-hacienda workers, however, were the primary beneficiaries. They received individual share-outs while the con nities did nor; the latter benefited from infrastructural investments alone (Harding 1975:247-6), As Bourque and Palmer (1975: 188) anticipated, and others confirmed, this created a host of tensions between the ex-hacienda ‘workers and the comuneros. Not only did comuneros feel disadvantaged ‘economically, but many also felt thatthe distribution of lands as SATS had Dreempred communities from reclaiming lands that many had lost to ha ciendas over the years (Gonzales de Olarte 1994: 42). Writing in 1975, Harding observed: ‘Under he SAIS arrangement the few pemanen wae bores form seri co- erste and ae ropreentd onthe adminanive counels slong with neato ofthe nejghboring comunidades, which are made members ofthe SAS callecely ‘athe than individually Any profs ae shared between the labors” coopers and the comunidades, which recive ir part in the forts ofinbuamactral ‘esonens rather than individea hee-onts Ths source of resentment ort cxmamers ad th wealthier one, who own the mos sheep, object tote echaien of tei animals from the pastes ofthe former hacienda, whi ae inva alloted wo the SAIS forthe production of improved bess by scenic anc ca agement. I fit commas have at thir bates for lnd ea the as SE eer fend ihr ke ne Sie we ofthe pastes by the SAIS are not assy accepted by comune sd argument for the exhson of thes sheep Simi, former nar telscant to ncat her parcel. Cmeguenty the SAIS be abot very ses ie inciting al enfin lak of persion fom mendes br made on iy emai ec fo pring SAS ang 9S 278 ‘The comuneros came to resist the SAISs notonly because they differentially benefited them but also because they represented state efforts to encroach ‘on community autonomy: “Few peasant communities have been restrue- tured because of the comuneros’ hostility to the prospect of losing their 3 ‘The Cases ssotonomy by becoming integrated into the State co-operative model” (Kay 1982: 163). Tf the SAISs differentially benefited those who formed part of tit also differentially benefited the countryside a a whole. Infact, the SATS model largely excloded the highland communities of the Andes because land was distsibutedfirstand foremost to permanent workers on the hacienda. “Ne- tionaly, only 6 percent of all legally recognized peasant communities par- ‘icipated as members in SAISs” (Hunefeldt 1997: 123).¥ Moreover, the Jand reform excluded temporary workers, many of whom heralded from various communities.®® The land reform therefore served to further frag- ment the Peruvian peasantry, with tensions emerging between these diverse ‘members. In this context nonbeneficiares started to target other peasants rather than the state.” A third conflict revolved around state efforts to control community or- ganizations. The 1970 Peasant Statute, for example, set out to impose comaunal forms of governance (or communal cooperatives) on peasant ‘comutunities not incorporated or restructured by the SAISs."! The statute was to create communal harmony through the establishment of coop- cratives. The statute, however, gave birth to new political divisions. It created internal divisions over authority structures, favoring younger co- smuneros who could speak Spanish. In addition, by demareating community Boundaries, treated confets among communities ve those bounds Communities also protested the terms ofthe inital proposal, which sought to restrict community membership by residency (despite the fact that many ‘omuneros migrated during part ofthe year) and to restrict the holding of ‘noncontiguous land plots (Bourque and Palmer 1975: 204-5). While some of these restrictions were relaxed, itishard to gauge ifcommunity suspicions ° pte mide 19705 the land lo hd bei 10-15 percent offi faite (Gong and Puna 1018 205 a MeCswe 8 2) Waly Coane ‘tare G45 nnd a get? een of ming ni 385 poe of thee tees wer comer lth toy ded ene es has hese = tay >» Sec Kay (OR: 151-4) nd Grindl(986 148 fora dasion ofhow began efor, fered rental scr“ ce formers vrs aig ot the bea weks eg ened cn commas resingtomevha eee ‘ener pending te cama ‘© Bougo and Wats (01) MeClaek (961 3-6 ch pnd Grind 86 be * Boag sn ale (197) Sena (195 6a’ Masige (995 244 Peru Subsided as well. Regardless, these government plans fueled oppextion to ‘unwanted state intervention, ‘These community -sate tensions were not necessarily expressedas com- tana chins bt wee ofen ariculted wind Setar bee and Warren 1978b) observed three highland peasant communities in which, there was resistance to (inadequate and attimesincompetent)stateeffortere Limpose cooperatives and communal-based enterprises individualnie prac, {ces were more pervasive and communal practices less prevalent than hed often been assumed. Consequently, “the ‘new Peruvian man’ with a oo. deotvist perspective and a corporatist solution to inequality never emerged inthe peasant communities” Bourque and Warren 1978b; 15) In this com text, nonbeneficiares started to call for the breakup of the cooperatives (Grindle 1986: 158-5, Bnei ofthe soca eaters ta te the same (Eumefeldt 1997: 116-19). Finally, the corporatist modes of interest intermediation (CNA and SINAMOS) did not successfully link communities and the state. The CNA was created by lefibt advocates in the state who realized thatthe agrarian reform had not benefited the comuneros as much as exchacienda workers {tie CNA failed, however, to mobilize in great numbers, eventhough i favored comunero representation over that of cooperative member and even thongh hoth the GNA and SINAMOS supported land invasions of ‘waexpropriated haciendas (MoClintock 1981: 262-8), Peasants viewed the CNA and ia Agen Leagucs 8 they bad... previous federations... Even a of 197, mores or neat majo bet not Pee the CNA (ech the pinate ofthe fleron, sew bd et most had head of the Agrarian Lesgun the senile! ee pene aa fern... Pesan erie the leg for doing sling in ee ore or cooperative oo nly pling (MeClinnoc 981 a8 Us other word he new federations eth unr Vlico iled mo provide safc incnces for solidarigy among Penvin penunts Neto peed federation, the CNA with its Agratin League, sor the lage ae ee srganizaions, the cental copertves, were she (0 molly ae Cane skepticism of peasants toward institutions beyond theit own enterprise or come ‘munity (McClintock 1981; 284). Tndeed, because the CNA was launched at the end of Velasco’ gov- emment, it did not succeed in mobilizing the peasant communities into a “ Rese ad Wren 97g he here ess ad xls es othe oss they wee ls Hey t sappor sat inte or coopernive anki ge ‘community boundaries, a 245 ‘The Cases nied orgmniatonl tract orin channeling thr demands tothe state Communities tended to sek ox eis own autonomy fom te satetnd re. sented outside efforts to seglt their internal factions. And bees exch cooperative vas in competion withthe nex, there was lite shorter incentive to join forces with other SAIS and CAPs (MeClintok 1981: cs S10; Ray 198: 158-5, in hor, “tation! peat depen toward ‘he naonal goverment ended. [Cooperative] [members tarned thei sew poieal solidarity into a weapon agenst what they considered gor tenmencencroachment onthe self-managed cooperaures” MeClinteck 1981319) Over then, the corporat cizensip regime lef legacy of weak srancommunity network, thereby making i unikely that indigenous communes n Peru woud have the eapacty to forge a regional or e- Sonal indigenous movement. The uneven dsaibuion of benefits rm the land reform served to rete tensions among those who took pert in the cooperative sasctone and between benefiaries and nonbene- Scie. Rather than fostering a desir to promote and defend coma nig igi often served to weaken soil exit, to cate land in vaio, and to engender demands for the prrazaen of commanaly held ands Lae ffs to reongaize the internal orgonizaon of the commnies and tote them into broader modes of intrest inten ton were reed ae unwanted efor ats intervention, In tis corporat organization fled to construct song networks among Commies. Consequently Peru aed the organo cpecy tha cranscomimunity networks had provided indigenes people in Bodo and Bolivia. The Civil War: Destroying Political Asacavonal Space sand Transcorenunity Networks Ifthe corporatist citizenship regime failed to provide the networks on which indigenous people could mobilize in Peru, the subsequent civil war actually destroyed networks and closed off political social pas ® The wat cw ke up arms in ‘was primarily fought against Sendero Luminoso (which took up 1980) but was also fought against the smaller MRTA (which took up arms © sSceMctnsk 198 aloe (199}; Bar 199 Degen (197 som 1995 Degg (9) dt Pio (99 Hon (9904 Malo 1998, Manga 9 Sema 246 Peru in 1984) (Obando 1998: 386) The civil war thereby posed insurmount- able obstacles fr widespread organizing in the countryside and ultimately foreclosed the possibilty altogether of organizing an indigenous movemeny in Peru Sendero Luninoso emerged as an all-consuming kind of military orga nization. Iedid not tolerate alternative forms of ganization and set outta destroy independent associations and networks, Even community setvicts were assassinated by Sendero. In this context, existing organizations were snuffed outand leaders were often silenced. In other words, Sendero Lummi. noso essentially destroyed potential frameworks fr legl organising along

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