In a series of essays published in a volume entitled The Logic of

Perfection, Charles Hartshorne has argued for what he calls a

neoclassical conception of divinity. Central to this conception is the
complete modal coincidence of God with all potentiality and actuality.
The ontological argument for God presented by Descartes in his
Meditations on First Philosophy fails to recognize God as complete
modal coincidence. By making God an absolute other, Descartes
reveals his confused notion of divine perfection. This paper aims to
point out contradictory notions in Descartes argument in light of the
neoclassical conception of divinity. It will also attempt to deal with the
question of determinism that seems to follow from Descartes
conception of God.
That divine uniqueness is modal is exactly what we should except from the fact
that modality appears in its (neoclassical) definition, writes Hartshorne, i.e., as
coincidence or co extensiveness of the individuals actuality with all actuality, and of its
possibility with all possibility (85). Hence, God is all that is, and all that may be. For
Hartshorne, every particular state of affairs is God in his contingent actuality. Any
particular, actual state of affairs entails contingency because of the arbitrariness of its
parameters. At a given location in space, for example, the possibility of someone
occupying the exact space that I occupy cannot be realized. Where there is this-and-notthat arbitrarily, argues Hartshorne, there is contingency. However, because God is
complete modal coincidence with all actuality and all potentiality, his contingent actuality
is not an imperfection, nor is it incompatible with His absolute and necessary existence.

For Descartes, on the other hand, God is not such complete modal coincidence,
but rather is an absolute other. To begin with, Descartes fails to recognize his own
essential properties before moving on to consider God, which may explain his
misconceived notion of the latter. Descartes fails to separate his modes of thought from
the abstract existence of his thought like he fails to recognize Gods concrete actuality
from his abstract existence. Is there any one of these attributes [doubt, understanding,
etc] which can be distinguished from my thinking or which can be said to be separable
from my nature? (23), asks Descartes. He responds negatively. However, the naked
cogito is absolute, necessary, infinite, eternal existence, whereas the various modes of
thought are concrete and contingent. Those who do not know by experience must take
the substantiation for this claim of the nature of the cogito on faith, but it can shortly be
summarized as follows. When the soul (the knowledge of which emerges after proper
examination of the cogito) contemplates God not in His contingent actuality but as
Perfect Love, it is carried by His grace into Himself and finds its true existence in Him.
Therefore, the true self of the soul is the true self of God.
Returning to the Cartesian misconception of divinity, let us notice how he limits
his idea of God, and thus does not genuinely have God as an idea:

Though it be true that my knowledge is gradually increasing, and that there are
many things in me potentially which are not yet actual, still none of these things
pertains to the idea of God, in which nothing at all is potential; indeed this very
thing, to be gradually increasing is a most certain mark of imperfection. (47,
italics mine)
Descartes writes this after wondering if possibly I am something more than I suppose
myself to be. It is still possible to the meditator that the perfections which I attribute to
the nature of a God are somehow potentially in me. This idea, as we see, Descartes
quickly refutes because in the idea of God, nothing at all is potential. However, if God is
conceived only as pure actuality, pure Being, this denies Him creativity, it negates
teleology, falls into a morally reprehensible determinism, and ignores the fact that the
Almighty, greater than which none can be conceived, must be the Author of all possible
worlds, all possible states of being, all potentiality, and not just rest contented as an
impersonal absolute other. Gradually increasing is far from being a most certain mark
of imperfection as Descartes so authoritatively assumed. Here, as elsewhere, Descartes
fails to make the distinction between God in his necessary existence and in his contingent
actuality. Certainly God, Perfection, cannot be called imperfect in his concreteness.
If everything that exists requires a cause for its existence, then I need merely
argue backwards from any substance to its cause, reasons Descartes in establishing the
existence of God. The objection here is that I, as a necessary being, indubitable (as
Descartes has shown but perhaps not appreciated) am not just another instance of a thing
that exists. Whereas everything else is contingent in its existence, I am essentially,
necessarily existent. My necessary existence constitutes the existence of all other things
that appear to me as existent. Descartes argued that if a substance X contains the idea of
God, then X couldnt be self caused, unless it is God. At this point, we can either say
with Descartes that the cogito must be caused by God, thus making God an object of
knowledge to the cogito, thus limiting the Almighty as object-to or creator-of, or we can,
with the mystics, recognize the cogito (the naked cogito: the transcendental ego) as one
with God and retain a coherent picture of divine perfection, as defined by Hartshorne and
others.
Descartes often contradicts his own epistemological claims. From Menns
Descartes and Augustine we read that when Descartes has established that I have some
self-caused cause, and then wishes to argue that this cause is God, he says that it must
have the power of possessing in actuality all the perfections of which it has an idea (296,
italics mine). For God to have the power of possessing all perfections of which He has an
idea, that is, of all positive content, He must possess these all potentially, since actuality
excludes some potentiality. Modal coincidence with concrete actuality is necessarily
contingent on the things that actually exist at any given moment. Therefore, coincidence
with all potentiality precedes coincidence with actuality. Necessary existence precedes
contingent actuality. I quote from Hartshorne: If all possibility is a things own potential
possession, then, whatever possibility is actualized, the thing must exist to possess this
actualization. Complete modal coincidence entails necessary existence; partial co
extensiveness with modality entails contingency (my italics). Nevertheless Descartes

argues for the priority of the idea of the actual to the idea of the potential (Menn, 297),
and we are forced to notice and forgive his honest mistake.
Although Descartes gives to God the honor of Supremely Perfect Being, he
claims it is the nature of his finite understanding not to comprehend many things (48),
implying that God, the Greatest and All-in-All, cannot be comprehended. However,
since I conceive nothing except by means of this power which God has given me in
order to conceive, no doubt everything I conceive I conceive properly, and it is not
possible for me to be deceived in that respect (47). Which of these two statements best
describes the relation between our thought and God? Either God is so great and our
understanding is so limited that he cannot be comprehended, or the idea of God is so
clear, so logical and so fundamental that, with His grace, we can conceive it properly by
the clear light of nature. Descartes seems to hold both views simultaneously.
In Stephen Menns book Descartes and Augustine, the reader finds the following
scholarly definition of Gods knowledge: God can know X essentially either if X is
identical with God or if X depends essentially on Gods will: in the latter case God knows
X just by knowing his own will to produce it, and so he does not become dependant for
his knowledge on anything outside himself. Gods knowledge of me, according to this
conception, is knowledge of his will to produce me. In this case, unless Gods will
included the course of my entire life, my choices and desires, etc, he would have, at best,
incomplete knowledge of me knowledge only of his will to create me but not
knowledge of my particular concrete actuality. This we cannot accept, for God knows all
and loves all. The other option, within this framework, is that Gods will in fact includes
everything I attribute to my own free will, and thus we fall into a strict determinism.
However, should we invoke the neoclassical conception of God as modal co incidence
with all actuality and all potentiality, God becomes the worthiest object of devotion for
He would know every actual state of affairs and every possible state of affairs would no
longer be an impersonal object of knowledge and his love would rightly be conceived
of as infinite i.e., complete participation in all mind and all being, possible and actual.
Furthermore, such a conception brings to light the creative aspect of God, the relative
indeterminism inherent in the process of becoming. I quote again from Hartshorne:
An individual capable of somehow possessing any finite qualities and quantities
can exist no matter what selection of these is effected. It is particular and
essential finitude that makes ordinary things contingent. Partiality with respect to
quantity and quality explains contingency, not bare finitude or definiteness. Here
again tradition made a huge error of careless analysis. In consequence it
identified God with the wholly indefinite, which means in aesthetic terms wholly
devoid of definite contrast, hence of beauty. Formless, all lovely forms thy
loveliness declare. But God must not merely declare or manifest Himself in
definite forms, He must possess them actually in His own actuality; He must be
the God of this actual total creation. (78)
We see, then, that Descartes was guilty of a huge error of careless analysis which
identified God with the wholly indefinite. The neoclassical metaphysics carefully

argued by Hartshorne makes coherent divine perfection and our relation to it.
Recognizing God as all-potentiality, all-actuality gives meaning to the dictum God is
Love, and gives meaning to the all-encompassing God of worship that an impersonal,
objective conception of God cannot coherently sustain.

[1] Or Supra-Existence
I refer the reader to my essay entitled The Unveiling of the Divine
Poetic, which deals with the consequences of this realization, or
recollection, in more detail (www.uwinnipeg.ca/~mmillerm). See also
the summary of Bonaventures Journey of the Mind Into God at the
above given site for theoretical and methodological considerations.
The important thing is that Descartes failed completely to explore the
transcendental realm he had discovered. The major concern of my
essays is that we do not make the same mistake.
See William Earle; Mystical Reason, Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1981.
I am well aware of the far-reaching and seemingly unbelievable
consequences of such thought. The Nature of God and the knowledge
of Self are, to be sure, sacred matters worthy only of the purest and
most honest contemplation. I trust the reader will approach the topic
with the required humility, in recognition of the Ultimate and Holy
Mystery that lies at the heart of existence.