Meillassoux's alternative Speculative Realism (SR) to Phenomenological Naivet

Paul Anthony di Georgio

Meillassoux is going to take for granted these two definitions, which he notes are in Descartes and
Locke (with a few differences):
defn. Primary property = property of something which is not separable from the thing
defn. Secondary property = sensible/perceptible property of something which is experienced by you
but also somehow caused by the thing (we'll consider it separable from the thing)

Theses:
1. We cannot know the physical object itself, as such, by way of secondary qualities.
2. However, it can be said of a physical object that we can know it, in itself, at least in part, by its
primary qualities.
3. The primary qualities of the physical object, or at least those accessible to us, are ones which are
mathematically formulated (e.g. atomic weight of H, its electron configuration, etc)
4. If our knowledge of the primary qualities of physical objects is mathematically formulated, then
ontology is no more than mathematics (although it is not the case that mathematics is no more than
ontology).
Questions to think about:
Question: Is (admittedly limited) knowledge of the primary quality of a physical object knowledge of
what philosophers call "being"? Does "hydrogen" "exist"? What is hydrogen? What does it mean to
"exist"?
How meaningful is it, and how limited is it, to claim that "a physical object exists such that it has the
specific atomic weight of 1.008, and a melting point of -259.16 C"? If you come across a random
person in the street and ask of them this question, will they have any idea what you have in mind when
you ask them to tell you what this means?
What kind of existence is it, what kind of Being is it, to exist in such a way that the only description we
currently have is mathematical? Isn't math also separate somehow, or at the very least separable, from
things? Why does Meillassoux want to argue that this description isn't really much of a description at
all, insofar as a description is separate from the thing itself, but is rather equivalent with the very thing?
Helpful texts:
Aristotle's critique of Platonic mathematics in Metaphysica Book XIII; Meillassoux's 2012 refinements,
Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition: A Speculative Analysis of the Meaningless Sign; Vinolo's defense of
phenomenological givenness Le ralisme spculatif l'preuve de la donation