∗

Schrödinger Logics
Newton C. A. da Costa
Department of Philosophy
University of São Paulo

Décio Krause
Department of Mathematics
Federal University of Paraná

Abstract
Schrödinger logics are logical systems in which the principle of identity
is not true in general. The intuitive motivations for these logics are both
Erwin Schrödinger’s thesis (which has been advanced by other authors)
that identity lacks sense for elementary particles of modern physics, and
the way which physicists deal with this concept; normally, they under-
stand identity as meaning indistinguishability (agreemment with respect
to attributes). Observing that these concepts are equivalent in classi-
cal logic and mathematics, which underly the usual physical theories, we
present a higher-order logical system in which these concepts are system-
atically separated. A ‘classical’ semantics for the system is presented and
some philosophical related questions are mentioned. One of the main
characteristics of our system is that Leibniz’ Principle of the Identity of
Indiscernibles cannot be derived. This fact is in accordance with some
authors who maintain that quantum mechanics violates this principle.
Furthermore, our system may be viewed as a way of making sense some
of Schrödinger’s logical intuitions about the nature of elementary parti-
cles.

∗ The authors very much would like to thank the anonymous referee for his quite interesting

suggestions, which contributed significantly to improve the paper.

1
Schrödinger Logics 2

Contents
1 Introduction 2

2 First-Order Systems 6

3 Higher-Order Systems 7

4 The semantics of Sω 9

5 Related Philosophical Questions 12

5.1 The Manin Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

1 Introduction
It is well known that there are fundamental differences between the classical
and the quantal descriptions of the world, as for instance in the problem of
describing a system of ‘identical’ particles. Of course, if we admit a system
composed by two electrons then, according to classical mechanics, it is possible
to follow the trajectories of the electrons and to distinguish them in every instant
of time. But, according to quantum mechanics, if there is a superposition of the
wave functions associated to each particle, it becomes impossible to say which
electron is associated with what wave function (see for instance Eisberg 1961,
Chap. 12 and French 1989).
This situation, which occurs for instance in a helium atom in the fundamental
state, where the wave functions of the electrons are completely superposed, has
motivated some discussions not only about the meaning of concepts like identity
and indistinguishability in physics (see French 1989), but also about the nature
of semantics and the manner in which we ‘talk’ about this kind of entities
(Toraldo di Francia 1986, Dalla Chiara and Toraldo di Francia 1985). In fact,
entities like the electrons of an helium atom in the fundamental state suggest
that ‘classical’ concepts like identity apparently do not apply as they do in the
case of macroscopic bodies. Physicists, of course, use this concept (identity) in
the sense of indistinguishability; when they say that two electrons are ‘identical’,
they intend that the electrons are ‘indistinguishable’ in the sense that they have
all their ‘intrinsic’ properties in common (cf. Jauch 1968, 275. See below).
Of course, there is some confusion regarding the terms identity and indis-
tinguishability in the physical literature. The use of identity as agreement with
respect to attributes (that is, as indistinguishability) demands some qualifica-
tions. In fact, let us observe that since the usual underlying logic of the physical
theories is classical logic and mathematics, it would be natural to suppose that
the concept of identity is the one ascribed by classical logic and mathematics.
Then, to say that ‘a is identical with b’ (in symbols, ‘a = b’), simply means
Schrödinger Logics 3

that there are not two distinct items, but only one, which can be referred to as
either a or b (see Krause 1990a).
From the technical point of view, in a second-order language with identity,
the definition of this concept (Leibniz’ Law) may be written as
x = y := ∀F (F (x) ↔ F (y))
where x and y are individual terms and F is a variable ranging over the set of
attributes of these individuals. Thus, the ‘traditional’ theory of identity may be
said to be the theory of absolute identity, since according to it, if two objects are
identical, they are absolutely identical , that is, they are the very same object.
The above definition does not permit treating identity and indistinguisha-
bility (agreement with respect to attributes) as distinct concepts: if two entities
are indistinguishable, that is, if they share all their attributes, then they must
be the same entity, and that is all. As it is well known, from the philosophical
point of view this characterization is attributed to Leibniz, who said that there
are no two objects which differ solo numero (see the references).
But, apparently, in the field of quantum mechanics the concepts of identity
and of indistinguishability are not equivalent in this sense. Physicists use the
term indistinguishability to mean that entites agree with respect to attributes,
and not to express the idea that they are the same object. This point will be
analysed below. But there are more radical opinions which we want to consider.
For instance, according to Erwin Schrödinger, we can talk about the indistin-
guishability of elementary particles, but the concept of identity simply has no
meaning with respect to them. In fact, in his book Science and Humanism
(1952, 16-8), he said that
When you observe a particle of a certain type, say an electron, now
and here, this is to be regarded in principle as an isolated event.
Even if you observe a similar particle a very short time at a spot
very near to the first, and even if you have every reason to assume
a causal connection between the first and the second observation,
there is no true, unambiguous meaning in the assertion that it is the
same particle you have observed in the two cases. The circumstances
may be such that they render it highly convenient and desirable to
express oneself so, but it is only an abbreviation of speech; for there
are other cases where the ‘sameness’ becomes entirely meaningless;
and there is no sharp boundary, no clear-cut distinction between
them, there is a gradual transition over intermediate cases. And
I beg to emphasize this and I beg you to believe it: It is not a
question of being able to ascertain the identity in some instances
and not being able to do so in others. It is beyond doubt that the
question of ‘sameness’, of identity, really and truly has no meaning.
The most plausible interpretation of the above quotation is that Schrödinger
referred to the impossibility one has of recognizing a particle, once observed in
Schrödinger Logics 4

a neighborhood of another one of similar species, in a time later than the first
observation. According to this view, we should be faced with the problem of
re-identifying the electrons, that is to say, with the problem of transtemporal
identity, a concept which has been widely discussed in the literature (see Quin-
ton 1973, Chap.3). But we think that the last part of the quotation suggests
that Schrödinger’s view is not only related to the case where physicists are in-
capable of individuating an electron once observed. Schrödinger suggested that
there is a circumstance in which it has no meaning to affirm that an electron
is identical or different from another. This view is in a certain sense supported
by Toraldo di Francia, who emphasized that our use of common languages to
talk about the entities of microphysics lacks, in general, adequate foundation.
In particular, he said (1986, 192-3) that

[usually] it is possible to talk about an electron with certain char-

acteristics, but when we refer to an electron, we can do so only by
approximation. Our manner of using the language lacks of adequate
foundations. Of course (...) ‘an electron’ is not a singular term in
the ordinary sense of the word. Then, although we can say that for
all ‘x’ it is true that ‘x = x’, there is no sense in saying that ‘an
electron = an electron’. [Microphysics] Is truly a new and different
world.’

Of course this problem leads to interesting questions concerning ontology,

but we will not discuss this point here (but see Toraldo di Francia op. cit.
and Dalla Chiara and Toraldo di Francia 1993). In what concerns physics,
it is important to note that, at the level of the first quantization, physicists
express the indistinguishability of ‘identical’ particles by an adequate choice
of the solutions of the Schrödinger’s equation (the symmetric and the anti-
symmetric ones) which do not affect the measurement of every observable if
the labels initially attached to the particles are exchanged. Physicists say that
permutations of identical particles cannot be observed, a result that can be
expressed by means of the so-called Indistinguishability Postulate: for all P
and Q,
hP ψ|Q|P ψi = hψ|Q|ψi
where |ψi is an arbitrary N-particle state, Q a possible observable on the N-fold
tensor product space of states, |P ψi is an abbreviation for P |ψi where P is
associated with an arbitrary permutation of the particle labels (see French and
Redhead 1988).
In Quantum Field Theory (QFT), particles are considered as mere excita-
tions of a field, and particle labels do not enter into the discussion (ibid.). Thus,
the problem of individuation does not arise, since QFT does not refer to indi-
vidual particles at all. But, as H. Post noted, in this case we are faced with a
situation where “there is no substance left in physics, only form” (Post 1973, 20).
That is, the problem concerning ‘individuals’ remains. In our opinion, by means
Schrödinger Logics 5

of a suitable change in the logical basis, it is possible to preserve the intuitive

idea of indistinguishability. In particular, we will be able of treating elementary
particles while preserving Schrödinger’s idea that the concept of identity lacks
sense with respect to them.
The logical system we present in this paper permits us to treat identity
and indistinguishability as non equivalent concepts for a class of objects of the
domain of discourse (the so-called m–objects, or m–atoms). Obviously Leibniz’
Law cannot be valid in this case.
Apparently, the most natural way to ‘separate’ the concepts of identity and
indistinguishability, that is, to violate Leibniz’ Law mentioned above, is to ad-
mit a concept of ‘substance’; in this sense, the entities, despite having all their
attributes in common, are distinguished by some kind of substractum, in which
the attributes are ‘anchored’. According to Post, classical ‘identical’ particles
exhibit a ‘Transcendental Individuality’ in this sense, since permutations of
‘identical’ particles are counted as giving distinct arrangements. Then, individ-
uation must be provided by something ‘transcending’ the attributes of a thing
(quantal particles do not exhibit this transcendental individuality; they are, ac-
cording to Post, ‘identical’ in a strong sense – Post op. cit.; see Krause and
French 1992). But we intend to show that it is also possible to violate Leibniz’
Law within the scope of the so-called ‘negative’ theories concerning substance
(Quinton 1973); the trick is to admit that x = y is not a well-formed formula if
x and y denote m-atoms. In this way, we simply cannot talk about the identity
or the diversity of these entities. Leibniz’ Law is obviously violated, and the
concept of identity (that is, the predicate ‘=’) does not apply to this kind of
objects, in conformity with Schrödinger’s view. The interesting point is that
the logical system we can built by means of such an (apparently) simple device
is stronger than classical logic; as we will show, it ‘contains’ the usual theory
of types as a particular case. In addition, by means of such a system, it can be
shown that Schrödinger’s intuitions cannot be criticized, at least from the logi-
cal point of view (but in the last section we relate the topic with other questions
in the philosophy of quantum mechanics).
In the next section we describe, without the details, a first-order Schrödin-
ger logic proposed by da Costa (1980, 117ff) and we mention some problems
regarding its semantics. In the following one, we consider a similar higher-order
logic. The final sections are concerned with the semantics for the higher-order
system and with philosophical questions.
It is convenient to observe that, despite the fact that we (tentatively) describe
some problems in the foundations of quantum mechanics, this paper aims only at
showing the possibility of building strong logical systems in which the Leibnizian
concept of identity is violated in the above sense. Obviously it is necessary to
show how Schrödinger logics can be applied to physics. Despite the discussion
provided in the last sections, the detailed work in doing so will be postponed
to other papers. We also are conscious that we could relate our system for
instance with free logics, and perhaps also to use it in discussions of the validity
Schrödinger Logics 6

of Leibniz’ Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, in the sense of Cortes

1976, Barnette 1978, Teller 1983, French and Redhead 1988 and other papers
in this direction. Despite the importance of these topics, we emphasize that
quantum mechanics is used here mainly to provide heuristic arguments for the
development of mathematical systems; in this sense, we are working in the
directions pointed out by Yu. I. Manin, as we mention in the last section.

2 First-Order Systems
The system we will call S has the following categories of primitive symbols: (a)
connectives: ¬ (not) and ∨ (or) (the other ones are defined as usual); (b) the
universal quantifier: ∀ (for all) (the existential quantifier is defined as usual);
(c) parentheses and comma; (d) a denumerably infinite set of individual vari-
ables of first species x1 , x2 , . . . and a set of individual constants of that species:
a1 , a2 , . . .; (e) a denumerably infinite set of individual variables of second species:
X1 , X2 , . . . and a set of individual constants of second species: A1 , A2 , . . .; (f )
the symbol of equality: =; (g) for each natural number n > 0, a non-empty col-
lection of n-ary predicate symbols. We utilize x, y, etc. as syntactical variables
for any terms.
By a term, we understand a variable or a constant; hence, we have terms
of first species (which we call m-terms) and of second species (called M -terms).
Intuitively, the m-terms may be thought of as denoting the microscopic objects
of our environment, while the M -terms denote the macroscopic ones. To this last
category, we suppose that classical logic is valid in all its aspects. The formulas
of S are defined in the standard way (see Wang 1952), but it is convenient to
observe that x = y will be considered as a formula if and only if x and y are
terms of second species.
Since the expression x = y is not a formula if x or y are not terms of
second species, the language of S does not permit us to talk about either the
identity or the diversity of the m-objects. This concept (of identity) simply
does not apply to them, as Schrödinger’s above quotation suggests. The other
syntactical concepts are the usual ones. The propositional postulates (schemes
of axioms and inference rules) for S are also standard, based on the primitive
connectives we selected (for instance, the system of Hilbert and Ackermann
1950); concerning quantification and identity, we use the following postulates:
1. ∀xA(x) → A(t), where x is a variable and t a term of the same species of
x which is free for x in A(x).
2. C → A(x)/C → ∀xA(x) where x does not occur free in C.
3. ∀x(x = x) where x is a variable of second species
4. t = u → (A(t) ↔ A(u)) with the usual resctrictions, provide that t and u
are both terms of second species.
Schrödinger Logics 7

The notions of theorem, of syntactic consequence of a set of formulas, etc.

are also the standard ones. A ‘classical’ semantics for this system (that is, a
semantics founded in the usual theory of sets) can be outlined as follows: we
interpret the language of S in a structure whose domain is a set D = D1 ∪ D2 ,
with D1 ∩ D2 = ∅; as it is usual, to the n-ary predicates we associate subsets of
Dn . The constants of first species are associated with the elements of D1 and the
constants of second species with the elements of D2 . With the equality symbol
we associate the diagonal of D2 . The semantical results are obtained without
difficulty (they are particular cases of the results presented in the Section 3).
Now, let us consider a problem which occurs with this semantics (da Costa
1980, 119). Strictly speaking, D1 would not be considered as a set in the usual
sense, since according to the S canons the relation of identity should not be ap-
plied to its elements. It would have sense only in connection with the elements
of D2 . In other words, the metamathematics employed to build the structure
where the language of S is interpreted does not agree with the underlying mo-
tivation of this logic. Da Costa proposed that a theory of quasi-sets should be
created so that the initial motivations are preserved. This theory was deleloped
in Krause 1990 (see Krause 1992). Independently of da Costa’s ideas, and mo-
tived by quite similar problems, but more concerned with real applications in
the physical domains, M. L. Dalla Chiara and G. Toraldo di Francia (1985)
developed a theory of quasi-sets in order to discuss the semantics for certain
languages of microphysics (the use of the same terminology is a coincidence).
We will not discuss these two theories here, but we mention that both provide
mathematical frameworks for dealing with collections of indistinguishable ob-
jects (see the last section and also Dalla Chiara and Toraldo di Francia, 1993).

3 Higher-Order Systems
The system we will construct here, denoted Sω , is a natural extension of the first
order logic S to the simple theory of types (STT); therefore, we will not describe
all the details concerning its language, which contains the same connectives, the
equality symbol and auxiliary symbols as in S. With respect to variables and
constants, we observe firstly that the set Π of types is defined as the smalest
set such that: (a) i ∈ Π (i is the type of the individuals) and (b) if k1 , . . . , kn
belong to Π, then hk1 , . . . , kn i ∈ Π.
Then, for each type k ∈ Π and k 6= i, there exists a denumerable infinite
set of variables X1k , X2k , . . . of type k and a set of constants Ak1 , Ak2 , . . . of that
type. When k = i, there are two sorts of terms: the M -terms and the m-terms.
The former are the variables X1i , X2i , . . . and the constants Ai1 , Ai2 , . . ., called M -
variables and M -constants respectively, whereas the latter are the m-variables
xi1 , xi2 , . . . and the m-constants ai1 , ai2 , . . .. In other words, we have a two sorted
language at the level of the individuals. We use U k , V k , . . . and u, v, . . . as
syntactic variables for terms of type k (including the M -terms of type i) and
Schrödinger Logics 8

for m-terms respectively; U, V, . . . are used as syntactic variables for any terms
in general.
The definition terms of type k and of atomic formulas are the standard ones
(see Hilbert and Ackermann 1950, Chap. 4) but, with respect to the predicate
of identity, we require that only expressions of the form U k = V k are atomic
formulas; hence, expressions like U k = u, or like u = v etc., are meaningless.
Consequently, we cannot talk either about the identity or about the diversity
of the objects denoted by the m–terms. The postulates of this logic are similar
to those of the standard higher-order systems (Ibid.), including the axioms of
Extensionality, Separation and Infinity. The case of the Axiom of Choice will
be discussed below. With respect to equality, we introduce the following axiom:

U k = V k ↔ ∀F (F (U k ) ↔ F (V k ))
where U k and V k are terms of type k, but not m-terms, and F is a variable of
type hki.

Definition 3.1 (Absolute Indistinguishability) If U and V are any terms

of type k (including m-terms of type i) and F is a variable of type hki, then

U ≡ V := ∀F (F (U ) ↔ F (V ))

If U ≡ V , we say that U and V are (absolutely) indistinguishable. Note that

the definition is valid with respect to the m-terms, since it does not exclude
the possibility that k = i. Hence, by the definition of the atomic formulas just
mentioned, there is a sense in which according to the Sω canons the entities
denoted by the m-terms (which we call m-atoms) may be (absolutely) indistin-
guishable without being identical. As a consequence, Leibniz’ Law is not valid
in general. In addition, let us observe that from the axiom and the definition
above, it follows that if U and V are terms of type hki, but not m-terms, then
U ≡ V is equivalent to U = V , that is to say, identity and indistinguishability
are equivalent for those entities which are not m-terms. In other words, the
traditional theory of identity remains valid in the ‘macroscopic world’.

Definition 3.2 (Relative Indistinguishability) If U and V are terms of

type k, F is a variable of type hki and Pk is a constant of type hhkii, then

U ≡Pk V := ∀F (Pk (F ) → (F (U ) ↔ F (V )))

If U ≡Pk V , we say that U and V are indistinguishable with respect to, or

relative to the attributes ‘characterized’ by Pk . U and V being relatively indis-
tinguishable means only that they agree with respect to some class of attributes.
It is interesting to observe that the concept of relative indistinguishability can
be formulated within classical higher-order logic. This concept can be related
to absolute indistinguishablity by means of the following result, which can be
easily stablished: the predicates Pk which can be used to characterize relative
Schrödinger Logics 9

indistinguishability are those which make distinctions between its arguments.

In symbols, ∀F (Pk (F ) → (U ≡Pk V ↔ U ≡ V ).
Employing the Definition 3.2, we can express the concept of ‘identical’ parti-
cles as used in quantum mechanics. According to J. M. Jauch, “two elementary
particles are identical if they agree in all their intrinsic properties” (Jauch 1968,
275) and this is taken to be the ‘definition’ of identity for elementary parti-
cles. Of course, Jauch is only saying that ‘identical’ elementary particles are
indistinguishable relative to intrinsic properties, and not that they are the very
same object; this notion can be expressed in our formalism by using the above
definition and considering a predicate I of type hhiii such that I(F ) says intu-
itively that F is an intrinsic property. Then, to say that U and V are ‘identical
particles’ in quantum mechanics simply means U ≡I V , and not U = V . Of
course this is what physicists intend to say, but they do not do it. Notwith-
standing, the problem regarding the indistinguishability of elementary particles
is of course not only a problem of terminology (see van Fraassen 1991, Chaps.
11 and 12).
The usual axiom of choice (see Hilbert and Ackermann 1950, 156) can eas-
ily be adapted to our case by using the relation of absolute indistinguishability
instead of equality. Then, if F and F 0 are variables of type k1 , G and L are vari-
ables of type k2 , A and H are variables of type hk1 , k2 i, the following expression
is an axiom of Sω (Axiom of Choice):

∀A∃H(∀F (∃GA(F, G) → ∃G(H(F, G) ∧ A(F, G))) →

→ ∀F ∀F 0 ∀G∀L(H(F, G) ∧ H(F 0 , L) ∧ F ≡ F 0 → G ≡ L))

In other words, H ‘selects’ indistinguishable objects from the collection of
the images (by A) of indistinguishable objects (the F ’s). It is obvious that if we
are not considering m-terms, the symbols ≡ can be replaced by = (by the above
results) and the above expression turns to be equivalent to the axiom used by
Hilbert and Ackermann.
It is possible to define a translation from the language of STT to the lan-
guage of our system by an elimination of the m-terms. Then, we can prove the
following theorem, which states that all the results which can be obtained in
STT can also be obtained in Sω ; in other words, Sω ‘contains’ STT.

Theorem 3.1 Let A be a formula of STT and Aω its translation in the language
of Sω . Then, if A is a theorem of STT, Aω is a theorem of Sω . In particular,
all the mathematics developed in STT can be developed in Sω .

We will stop here with the development of Sω . We hope that what was said
is sufficient to provide an idea of the nature of Schrödinger logics.
Schrödinger Logics 10

4 The semantics of Sω
In this section, we outline a proof of a ‘weak’ completeness theorem for Sω in
the sense of Henkin (1950) (cf. Church 1956, Section 54). In what follows, the
language of Sω will be denoted by L.
If D is an infinite set such that D = m ∪ M and m ∩ M = ∅, then a frame for
L based on D is a function M whose domain in the set Π of types such that M(i)
= D and, for each type k = hk1 , . . . , kn i ∈ Π, M(k) ⊆ P(Mk1 , × . . . × Mkn ).
If the inclusion in this last expression is replaced by the equality symbol, than
the frame is standard .
If we write Mk instead of M(k), then the frame can be viewed as a family
(Mα )α∈Π of sets satisfying the above conditions. In what follows, we will refer
to both this family and the set F = {X : ∃k ∈ Π ∧ X = M(k)} indiferently as
the frame for L based on D.
A denotation for L based on D is a function φ whose domain is the set of
constants of L, defined as follows:

1. φ(a) ∈ m
2. φ(Ai ) ∈ M
3. φ(Ak ) ∈ Mk for every k 6= i

In particular, φ(=) ∈ Mhk,ki . By means of this definition, we introduce the

notion of an interpretation for L based on D as being an ordered pair A =
h(Mα )α∈Π , φi, where (Mα )α∈Π is a frame for L and φ a denotation as above.
The interpretation is principal is the frame is standard and φ(=) = ∆Mk , the
diagonal of Mk .
A valuation for L (based on D) is a function ψ whose domain is the set of
terms of L such that ψ is an extension to the set of terms of L of the denotation
φ. In other words, ψ is defined as follows:

1. ψ(t) = φ(t) if t is a constant

2. ψ(x) ∈ m
3. ψ(X i ) ∈ M
4. ψ(X k ) ∈ Mk for k 6= i

The definition of satisfatibility, that is, the concept of A, ψ |= A, is defined

by recursion on the formula A as in the standard case: If A is an interpretation
of L based on D, then:

1. A, ψ |= F (X1k , . . . , Xnk ) iff hψ(X1k ), . . . , ψ(Xik )i ∈ ψ(F ), where F is a term

of type hk1 , . . . , kn i and the Xnk are terms of type ki (i = 1, ... , n).
Schrödinger Logics 11

2. A, ψ |= U = V iff hψ(U ), ψ(V )i ∈ ψ(=), where U and V are terms of type

k.
3. The satisfaction clauses for ¬, ∨ and ∀ are introduced as usual.

If A is an instance of the axioms of Extensionality, Separation, Choice or

Infinity and A is an interpretation for L based on D, then A is an appropri-
ate interpretation for L iff A, ψ |= A. In what follows, we will consider only
appropriate interpretations.
An (appropriate) interpretation is normal iff A, ψ |= A where A is either
an axiom of Sω or is derived by means of the inference rules from formulas
B1 , . . . , Bn of L, and A, ψ |= Bj , j = 1, ..., n. A normal interpretation for L
which is not a principal interpretation is said to be a secondary interpretation.
A formula A is true on an interpretation A iff A, ψ |= A for every valuation
ψ with respect to A. A is valid iff it is true with respect to all principal
interpretations: A is satisfiable iff there exists a valuation ψ and a principal
interpretation A such that A, ψ |= A. A is secondarily valid iff it is true under
all normal interpretations. Finally, A is secondarily satisfiable iff there is a
valuation ψ with respect to a normal interpretation A such that A, ψ |= A.
The following results can be proved without difficulty by adapting the proofs
of Church 1956: (1) A is valid iff ¬A is not satisfiable; (2) A is secondarily valid
iff ¬A is not secondarily satisfiable; (3) A is satisfiable iff ¬A is not valid; (4) A is
secondarily satisfiable iff ¬A is not secondarily valid and (5) A is valid (respect.
secondarily valid) with respect to a normal interpretation iff its universal closure
is valid (respect. secondarily valid) with respect to this interpretation.
If Γ is a set of formulas of L, then a model of Γ is a normal interpretation A
such that A, ψ |= A for every formula A ∈ Γ. If A is a principal interpretation,
we will talk of principal models, or of secondary models if A is a secondary
interpretation. The following terminology will be used below: Γ |= A means
that A holds in every model of Γ, and |= A means that A is secondarily valid.
Then, the following results can be proved (by adapting Church op. cit.):

Theorem 4.1 (Soundness) All theorems of Sω are secondarily valid. Hence,

they are valid.

That is, ` A implies |= A; it is not difficult to generalize this result: Γ ` A

implies Γ |= A.

Theorem 4.2 (Lindenbaum) Every consistent set Γ of closed formulas of L

can be extended to a maximal consistent class Γ of closed formulas of L ( the
concepts introduced here are the usual ones).

With these results at hand, we can prove the following theorem (see Church
op. cit., 314; for the proof of this particular case, see Krause 1990):
Schrödinger Logics 12

Theorem 4.3 If A is a closed formula of L which is not a theorem, then there

exists a normal interpretation whose domains Mα are denumerably infinite,
with respect to which ¬A is valid.

By using this theorem, we can prove the main result:

Theorem 4.4 (Henkin Completeness) Every formula of Sω which is secon-

darily valid is a theorem.

That is, |= A implies ` A. In general, if Γ is a set of closed formulas of L

which is not inconsistent, then Γ |= A implies Γ ` A, that is, if A holds in every
model of Γ, then A is derivable from the formulas of Γ.

5 Related Philosophical Questions

As we have mentioned in the introduction, the fundamental aim of this paper is
to present a logical system in which we impose some kind of ‘deviance’ on the
traditional notion of identity of classical logic and mathematics. We also have
mentioned that there are connections between the developments of this kind
of system and some philosophical discussions on the foundations of quantum
mechanics. In this section, we will consider some questions on this topic from
another point of view. We will proceed without the details.
Firstly, let us make an additional point concerning the semantics, as dis-
cussed above. When we take D to be a set, the same problems pointed out with
respect to the first-order systems arise. Of course, from the point of view of Sω ,
m must be not considered as a set, since in principle the relation of equality
should not be applied for its elements. We said that the theories of quasi-sets
were proposed, among other things, to provide a mathematical framework for
dealing with collections of indistinguishable (but non identical) objects (Dalla
Chiara and Toraldo di Francia 1992, Krause 1992). But there remains the
problem of founding a ‘quasi-set’ semantics for Schrödinger logics. It would be
interesting to check the semantical results and to see in what sense they depend
(for this kind of logics) on the theory used in the metalanguage.
Let us return now to the ‘transcendental individuality’ mentioned in the first
section. In classical mechanics, permutations of indistinguishable particles are
counted as giving rise to a new complex, which must be counted as distinct from
the unpermuted one. “This is taken as justification for regarding particles as
labelled and for those labels to have meaning in the sense that they ‘stand for’ or
‘designate’ that which confers individuality upon particles” (French 1989, 435).
If we think of labels of some kind (the nature of them is not a logical problem),
we would reason in the following way: an ‘elementary particle’ would be thought
of as an ordered pair hE, Li, where E denotes a predicate which in some way
‘characterizes’ the particle (for instance, an electron may be characterized by
the conjunction of the expressions ‘to have mass 9.01 × 10−28 g’, ‘to have electric
Schrödinger Logics 13

charge 4.8 × 10−10 e.s.u.’ and ‘to have spin 1/2’ –see Toraldo di Francia 1981),
while L would stands for an appropriate label (for instance, spatio-temporal
location).
Even in the case when the particles have the same E, as in the case of
the electrons in the above considerations, they might be distinguished by their
labels. That is, if hE, Li i, i = 1, . . . , n, with Li 6= Lj , classical mathematics
applies to such ordered pairs, and there is a sense in which the particles can be
counted. We observe that in this case we are not dealing with the ‘particles’
directly, but with a ‘classical’ representation of them (the ordered pairs –see
below).
But, when the labels are the same, that is, when Li = Lj , the tools of
classical mathematics cannot be applied to count the pairs as representing dif-
ferent particles, since hE, Li i = hE, Lj i and the particles denoted by them must
be identified. But in quantum mechanics, at least in the case of bosons (van
Fraassen argues that in certain circumstances Leibniz’ Principle of the Identity
of Indiscernibles may be ‘saved’ –see van Fraassen 1991, 422–3), this is the case
when even the labels are the same (technically, the wave functions representing
the particles are completelly superposed) but the particles are not counted as
distinct. In this case, physicists cannot count them, but they use other kinds
of procedures to say that there are a certain number (say n) of particles in a
particular state. The quantity of them may be ascribed (in some instances) by
the measurement of some observables, the occupation number operators (it is
important to note that some cautionary remaks are needed in using the occu-
pation numbers to count the quantity of particles in a state –see van Fraassen
1991, 441). From the mathematical point of view, the aggregates of such parti-
cles have a cardinal number, but not an ordinal (this fact was observed firstly
by Dalla Chiara and Toraldo di Francia 1985). But there remains the problem:
employing our above terminology, we have n entities instanciated in just one
ordered pair.
Hermann Weyl also pointed out the importance, in various fields of knowl-
edge, of considering such collections of indistinguishable objects. But his ap-
proach to the subject used classical mathematics. In the symbolism introduced
above, Weyl’s ideas can be adapted as follows (for more details concerning Weyl
on this topic, see Weyl 1949, App. B, Krause 1990, 1991): let us call E the
collection of the pairs hE, Li i, i = 1, . . . n. Suppose now that there is an equiv-
alence relation R defined on E such that the elements of each equivalence class
of the quotient set E/R are the pairs having the same labels (in reality, there
would be just one pair in each class, but we will proceed with the argument).
If we call Ci , i = 1, . . . n these equivalence classes, and call them states, as did
Weyl, then if the elements of each class are absolutely indistinguishable, the
most information we may have is the decomposition n1 + . . . + nk = n, where
n is the number of elements of E and the ni are the quantity of elements in the
respective class. Weyl called this the effective state of an aggregate of individ-
uals. But, as is easy to see, this procedure translates the problem to another
Schrödinger Logics 14

level, since instead of the distinguishability of particles, we are now discussing

the distinguishability of ordered pairs.
One way of ‘counting’ the pairs within classical mathematics, would be to
consider 3-uples instead of the pairs above. That is to say, we would have
hE, L, ni, where E and L are as above and n denotes the quantity of elements of
E with the same E and L. This can be mapped into the language of multisets by
considering E as a multiset whose elements are the pairs hE, Li1 i, ... , hE, Lik i
with multiplicities n1 , . . . , nk respectively (Blizard 1989). In this case, there is a
precise sense in saying that there are n1 , . . . , nk particles with exactly the same
E and L, but, it is important to note, we are again exchanging the problem,
and not considering the particles themselves.
Multiset theory and classical mathematical language in fact cannot help us
in preserving the intuitive idea of indistinguishable but non identical objects.
We recall that in a multiset, if an element has cardinality n 6= 1, then this
means that the same element appears n times as an element of the multiset
(see Blizard op. cit. and Krause 1991). Perhaps quasi-set theories and their
equivalent higher-order logics (that is, the systems like Sω ) can be used for these
purposes.

5.1 The Manin Problems

What we learn from the above discussion is that physics present us with situ-
ations where the tools of classical mathematics are insufficient to treat them.
In particular, it seems to us that if we intend to preserve the basic ontology of
physical indistinguishable individuals of some kind, new mathematical devices
must be developed (the analysis of the concept of physical object is of course
one of the fundamental problems in the foundations of physics –see Toraldo di
Francia 1978, 1981, 1986, Dalla Chiara and Toraldo di Francia 1993).
The fact is that we apparently need to look outside of classical formalisms.
In certain sense, we are searching for new axioms and mathematical systems
which may help us in treating mathematically those entities which are pre-
sented to us by modern physics. This ‘search for new axioms’ was considered
by Yu. I. Manin as one of the main problems in present researches on founda-
tions of mathematics. In his list of Problems of Present Day Mathematics I:
Foundations, presented at the 1974 AMS Symposium on the Hilbert Problems
(Manin 1976), Manin proposed two basic lines of research; the second one may
be summarized as follows:

We should consider possibilities of developing a totally new language

to speak about infinity [that is, axioms for set theory]. Classical
critics of Cantor (Brouwer et al.) argued that, say, the general choice
is an illicit extrapolation of the finite case.
I would like to point out that it is rather an extrapolation of common-
place physics, were we can distinguish things, count them, put them
Schrödinger Logics 15

in some order, etc.. New quantum physics has shown us models

of entities with quite different behaviour. Even sets of photons in
a looking–glass box, or of electrons in a nickel piece are much less
cantorian that the sets of grains of sand (...).
The twentieth century return to Middle Age scholastics taught us
a lot about formalisms. Probably it is time to look outside again.
Meaning is what really matters. (Manin 1976, 36)

Physics is still motivating mathematics. Perhaps the quasi–set theories and

Schrödinger logics can offer alternative frameworks for investigations of mathe-
matical systems of entities which differ solo numero.
Finally, we would like to mention the possibility of connecting the topic of
this paper with the concept of pragmatic truth in the sense of da Costa 1986,
da Costa and Chuaqui 1985, Mikenberg et al. 1986. In fact, some authors have
proposed that perhaps Schrödinger’s philosophy led him to the conclusion that
we are unable to describe the world as it ‘objectively’ is, independently of our
observations and experiences (Ben-Menahen 1992). For our purposes, perhaps
we can reason as if elementary particles were individuatable; roughly speaking,
we could think that in Nature all occurs as if all entities behave classically. In
this sense, to distinguish things, to talk about the identity or the diversity of
things would only save the apparences, in the sense of the pragmatic conception
of truth. This topic also deserves further attention but will be postponed to
future works.

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This paper was published in Studia Logica 53, 1994, 533–550