76 T H E CLA SSICA L REV IEW

THE PO S T E R IOR A N A LY T IC S
L E S H E R (J.H.) (ed.) From Inquiry to Demonstrative Knowledge. New
Essays on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. Pp. xii + 211. Kelowna,
BC, Canada: Academic Printing & Publishing, 2010. Paper, Cdn$28.95
(Cased, Cdn$74.95). ISBN: 978-1-926598-01-7 (978-1-926598-02-4
hbk).
doi:10.1017/S0009840X11002976

This anthology collects papers and responses presented at the 2009 Duke-UNC-
Chapel Hill Conference on Ancient Philosophy. There are five pairs of paper and
commentary. The Editor provides a brief introduction, concisely summarising all
the contributions. Collectively, the essays attempt to answer three main questions
related to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (henceforth APo): ‘(1) “How does the APo
model of scientific knowledge, focused as it is on the construction of syllogisms,
relate to the scientific accounts Aristotle presents elsewhere, especially in the bio-
logical treatises?” (2) “How do the arguments and views presented in the APo
relate to other aspects of Aristotle’s philosophy?” and (3) “How do the remarks
in the concluding chapter of the APo concerning perception, memory, experience,
and the grasp of the universal add up to an explanation of how we come to know
first principles?”’ (pp. vii–viii). The papers by J.G. Lennox, M. Leunissen and R.
McKirahan are concerned with the first two questions, while those by M. Tuominen
and G. Salmieri deal with that touching on the well-known APo 2.19.
The first paper, by Lennox, examines the unity of the science of nature, raising
problems (without offering solutions) to the question whether there is one natural
science or many. Relying upon a distinction between science (epistêmê), which
refers primarily to the knowledge of a domain structured by causal demonstration
from fundamental principles, and inquiry or methods of investigation employed in
pursuit of science – with APo Book 1 devoted to science and Book 2 to inquiry –
Lennox argues that Aristotle at some point realised that the goal of a unified science
of nature would not be achieved by means of a single, undifferentiated method of
investigation. The problem arose when he turned from his study of eternal natural
entities, the celestial bodies and the elements, to that of animals, which are mortal.
In her response G. Striker takes the commonly-held view that a divergence between
Aristotle’s practice as a natural scientist and the ‘official account of science’ pre-
sented in the APo is to be expected. Furthermore, she claims the theory of the APo
is primarily focussed on explanatory proofs, definitions and scientific understanding
such that Lennox’s concern with the unity and relations between possibly different
natural sciences would not figure prominently in it.
In her paper Leunissen shows how the syllogistic model of knowledge can be
used to demonstrate natural processes. Leunissen accomplishes two things: first,
she shows that besides the paradigmatic demonstrative science of mathematics in
which demonstrations are of eternal matters of fact (i.e. certain attributes holding
always and of necessity of a subject), there are passages in the APo, especially
2.11–12, that manifest Aristotle’s attempts to incorporate time, change and proc-
esses into the syllogistic structure of demonstrations. These passages suggest that
the APo already contains the basis for a natural science model of demonstration
apart from the geometry model. Secondly, Leunissen applies the model to several
passages in the biological treatises in order to illuminate, first, a demonstration of
a ‘simultaneous process’, one in which cause and effect occur simultaneously, and

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 T H E CLA SSICA L REV IEW 77
next, a demonstration of ‘same-type processes’, where cause and effect do not
occur simultaneously but are of the same type. Her examination of the latter case
contains insightful analysis of conditional necessity and teleological demonstrations.
A. Gotthelf rightly praises Leunissen’s paper, merely taking issue with certain
particular claims made in her reading of APo 2.11 and with minor points in her
application of the model of demonstration.
McKirahan’s contribution may be divided into two main parts. In the first part
he describes two phases of scientific work: the research phase and the organisa-
tional phase. McKirahan claims the APo outlines the features of the second phase,
during which the form of a finished science is constructed; and he directs particular
attention to the forming of definitions. In the second part McKirahan examines the
Poetics and shows how the definition of tragedy, both in the forming of it and the
consequences deduced from it once formed, follow in the main the APo (and the
revised model of definition in the Parts of Animals). By means of this case study,
McKirahan demonstrates (successfully, I think) how the APo, an early work, was
not abandoned by Aristotle; some of its ‘leading ideas influenced his scientific work,
even though he did not arrange his scientific works in the form described there’
(p. 76). C.D.C. Reeve strongly objects to claims made in the first part. He disagrees
with the characterisation of the APo as dealing solely with the organisational phase
of science; and related to this, he disagrees with McKirahan’s characterisation of
the role of dialectic in science. Moreover, he claims that McKirahan’s account of
definition fails to explain the unity of a definition, which Reeve believes is crucial.
Turning to the papers on APo 2.19, Tuominen’s aim is to illuminate this chap-
ter’s account of how we come to know the principles in the context of the whole
treatise, arguing that 2.19 is congruent with the APo, especially Book 2. Her claim
is that the explanation in 2.19 is from the point of view of the capacities the human
soul necessarily requires in order to be able to acquire knowledge at all, more
specifically, how our reason is developed from perceptual experience and how we
come to know the premises of proofs. Though Lesher agrees with the general claim
regarding the congruence of 2.19 and the rest of the APo, he disagrees with her
on four points in particular: (1) the simile of the rout is not meant to shed light
on how our nous recognises the real principles (those better known by nature); (2)
saphôs (at 100a 14–15) does not refer to degrees of clarity but rather means ‘not
sufficiently detailed’; (3) in 2.19 nous does not refer to a capacity by which we
know but rather the knowledge we can have of universal principles; and (4) 2.19
is not merely a description but also an argument justifying the conclusion that we
do actually have some kind of knowledge of first principles.
As for Salmieri’s paper, he sees the fit of 2.19 with the rest of the APo by
understanding the concluding chapter ‘in the context of the Analytics’ doctrine that
demonstrations must be conducted at the maximal level of universality’ (p. 155).
The chapter re-characterises in descriptive language prescriptions given throughout
Book 2 for reaching this level of universality. To that end, Salmieri examines the
structure and project of 2.19, the meaning of aisthêsis, the nature of empeiria, and
finally, the advent of universals. D. Bronstein agrees with much of Salmieri’s paper
and limits his comments to three criticisms. The first is that Salmieri is not clear
regarding the chapter’s aim: on the issue of the knowledge of nous emerging from
aisthêsis, is it knowing those things that are principles or knowing principles as
principles? The second concerns Salmieri’s reference to phantasia in his analysis
of aisthêsis. Bronstein astutely raises several problems with it. The third criticism
deals with Salmieri’s examination of empeiria and the advent of the universal,

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 78 T H E CLA SSICA L REV IEW

which Bronstein thinks is confusing because at times there seems to be a stage

between empeiria and nous, whereas at other times Salmieri suggests there is not.
In sum, Lesher claims ‘[…] the essays in this volume collectively make a
strong case for the systematic character of Aristotle’s thought’ (p. xii). As such, the
anthology makes a worthwhile contribution to the debate regarding whether and,
if so, to what extent Aristotle’s views on demonstration and scientific knowledge
guided his philosophical and scientific work. This volume successfully shows that
in fact they do, and to a greater extent than many contemporary scholars have
been willing to acknowledge.
University of Sudbury, Laurentian University PAOLO C. BIONDI
pbiondi@usudbury.ca

DEFINITION
C H A R L E S (D.) (ed.) Definition in Greek Philosophy. Pp. x + 556.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Cased, £60. ISBN: 978-0-19-
956445-3.
doi:10.1017/S0009840X11002988

In fifth-century Athens definition became of central importance in philosophy when

Socrates introduced the ‘What is F?’ question. According to Aristotle, this was
Socrates’ most important contribution to the discipline (Metaphysics, 1078b22).
This book seeks to ‘reawaken interest’ in a set of central and relatively unexplored
issues surrounding ancient Greek theories of definition. The volume is divided
into three sections covering Plato/Socrates, Aristotle and Post-Aristotelians (Stoics,
Galen, Sceptics, Plotinus, Ancient Commentators). In the Introduction, C. attempts
to thread these thinkers together by framing the discussion in terms of three central
questions: What is the object of definition? What counts as a good definition? Is
there a variety of different types of definition? Plato1 and Aristotle took the objects
of definition to be essences, which pick out some causally basic feature(s) belonging
to real entities in the world. However, they differed over what counts as a good
definition. Drawing on the Meno, C. formulates a reasonably clear account of what
Plato thinks counts as a good definition or a good answer to the Socratic ‘What is
F?’ question (pp. 3–7). The account is familiar enough to Plato scholars. A definition
(1) must identify that one thing in virtue of which all F-things are F. (2) It must
be graspable by an intelligent interlocutor without specialised knowledge. It must
be such that (3) if one does not know it, one cannot know any other features of
F, and (4) if one does know it, one can distinguish on its basis cases of F from
those that are not F. Aristotle’s requirements on good definitions connect definition
with explanation: ‘In answering the definitional “What is it?” question, one should,
in his [Aristotle’s] view, also answer the further question, “Why is it as it is?”’
(p. 11) In Aristotle’s account, scientific definitions should pick out those features
that make a kind what it is and explain why it has the other non-accidental proper-
ties that it does. In this way definition and explanation ‘are two sides of the same
coin’. Post-Aristotelian views on definition are taken up from the perspective of
how they compare with the views of Plato and Aristotle. Galen followed Aristotle
in drawing a distinction between real definitions that specify the essential nature
1
In this review I take ‘Plato’ to stand also for the views in the so-called Socratic dialogues
written by Plato. Occasionally I shall follow C. by referring to ‘(Plato’s) Socrates’.
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