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Contents
Acknowledgments IX
Introduction
PART ONE
THE STRUCTURE OF DEMONSTRATIONS
One: Demonstration, Division, and the Syllogism 15
Two: Demonstration and Definition 38
PART TWO
THE EXPLANATORY CONTENT OF
DEMONSTRATIONS
Three: The Character of Demonstrative Premises 65
Four: Type I Pcr Se Predication 75
Five : Type 2 Per Se Predication 92
Notes 139
Bibliography 165
Index 169
r vii
Acknowledgments
The first systematic work on this project was begun in 1981 -82, while J
held an Andrew W. Mellon Facu lty Fellowship in the Humaniti es at Har-
vard. I am grateful to the Mellon fOtlndation and Dr. Richard M. Hunt
for thcif sup port during tha t year, and to the H a rvard Philosophy De-
partment for its kind hospita lity. While there I benefited greatl y from dis-
cussions on germinal ideas of the present work with John Murdoch, Mar-
tha Nussbaum, and Steven Strange. Since then L h3ve received hel pfu l
comments and suggestion s on earlier ~e rsjons of variolls parts of the
book from Robert Bolton, Daniel Devereux, Michael Frede, Cy nthia
Freeland, Robert McKay, Philip Ro ln ick, and Thomas Upton. Specia l
thanks are due to David Charles and James Lennox, who read :lnt! com-
mented on the entire manuscript. I especially want to thank my lcachers,
John Kekes, Nelson Pike, and Gerasimos Sant:ls, for their unflagging ell-
co uragem en t and sup port during the difficult times, and G regory Vbstos
for showing me by his own example the close connection between good
phi losophy and good character. In the late stages of its preparntion, the
project has been facilitated by a number of Duke University Research
Council Grants, and a Juni or Faculty Research Leave in fall 1987.
Introduction
I 1 J
Introduction
I2 I
Introduction
I3I
illtrodtfctioll
tonism. For thi s reason, some of the prefiguring views to be discll ssed be-
low are positions simply taken over from PI am without visible demurrer,
while others are distinctively Ari stotelian in origin, and in some cases
even a nti -Platonic in spirit. A large part of my aim here, then, is to show
how Aristotle's theory of demonstrative knowledge is generated ou t of a
confluence of his own original thought with philosophical views inherited
from the Aca demy.
There is one final asp ect of the Posterior AnaJytics which should be
introdu ced as a preliminary matter. Given Aristotle's notoriou s promis-
cuou s movement between rile form al and material modes of speech, it
would be difficult to characterize his philosophical methodology as hav-
ing made what ha s been called in this centu ry "the linguistic turn." That
said, there is non etheless substa nti al point and profit in noticing that his
general theoretical approach in many of the so-called logica l works of the
Orga/lOIl has features in common with that of contemporary philosophi-
cal logic. To he sure, he never formulates exp licitly, nor does he reli -
giously o bserve, a ny hard and fast di stinction between sentences on the
one hand and the extralinguistic {acts or propositions they might be
thought to express on the other. All the same, he often finds it important
and usefu l to se lect and prefer what he evidently rega rds as the most
metaphysically perspicuous ways of expressing certain kinds of facts, and
to that extent he seems committed, at least implicitly, to something like a
doctrine of "logical form." What is even more to the present point, there
arc a number of passages in the early works (most especially, th e Catego-
ries, De 11lterpretatione, and rhe Posterior Analylics) that are best under-
stood as part of an ongoing effo rt on Aristotle's part to work out the de-
tails of a theory of predication. As it will apply here, t hi s means that most
or all of what Aristotle says about the nature of scientific knowl edge in
the Posterior Allalytics ca n be cast without intolerable di sto rtion into talk
about the requisite features of the kinds of state ments he thinks suitable
for expressing or conveying such knowledge. Acco rdi ngly, the formative
effe cts of his various philosophical commitments on his theory of demon-
strative knowledge will fall out below as a set of syntactic and se mantic
restrictions on what he w ill a llow as legitimate s~ ientific predications.
The broad context of part I of this book, "The Structure of Demon-
stration ," is dominated by the a rguments i.n Posterior Analytics, Book I,
Chapter 3, mentioned earlier for the following thesis:
[ 4 J
[litrod/letion
I 5I
llitroduct;oll
I call a framing stage, which will be rep resented as a nonsy ll ogistic proce-
dure descended from the Platonic method of "division" (5<aipeo-L<) in
which t he primary premi ses of a demonstrative sc ience a re generated out
of the epi stemologica l sta rting points pertinent to the science in qu estion.
T his is t hen fo ll owed by a syllogistic stage in which these p rim ary prem-
ises are depl oyed in the syllogistic deriva tion s of pa rticular facts to be ex-
plained by that sc ience.'
Of the va rious so rts of sta rting points actua lly discussed by Aristotle
in Posterior Analytics 1.2 and I. IO, some (fo r example, generic existence
assu mpti o ns, and the «logical" prin ciple of Noncontradiction) will be in-
terpreted in cbapte r I as nothing more than nonsubstantive background
assumption s that can be see n independently to be necessary for a ny divi -
siona l procedure, Pl atoni c, Aris totelia n, o r otherwise. C hap ter 2, " D em-
onstration and Definitio n," will then focus narrowly and exclusively on
the all -i mportant substantive assum ptions employed in th e framing stage,
namely the Aristote lian " definitions" (OpOL or opiap.ol) that convey imme-
d iate co nnect io ns betwee n terms . It will be a rgued thar Aristotle's com pl ex
attitude towa rds OPOL is precipitated by a desire to make hi s theory of
predication confo rm both to the Platon ic epis temological p ri nc iples:
[ 6 J
Il1trodllCtiolT
vo lve any reference to particu lars (a nd hence are not referential univer-
sals) , but are instead free-floating, or Platonistic, uni ve rsa l predications
that could be true even in a universe containing no mundan e partictdars
whatever. Along the way, I will also argue that this cru cial di stinction be-
tween Pl aton istic definition s and referential universa l immediate premises
is a cent ral element in Aristotle's subt le and co mpli cated final position in
Posterior Analyl;cs 2.7 - fO o n the question of whether, and in what
sense, definitions a re demons trab le.
By the end of part I it should be clear that Aristot le characterizes the
fin al products of demonstrati on as knowledge in the strictest sense pos-
sible for two complementary reasons, both of which stem ul timately from
features of the framin g sta ge of demonstration. In the first place, as has
already been remarked, unlike the OPOt that go in to this procedure, the
primary premises that come o ut of it, and therefore the exp lican da that
follow from those premises, are all refetential uni ve rsals, and so are
ab out the most real objects in Aristo tle's early ontology. But marc t h~ n
that} it will also be seen that th e framing sta ge ~Iso sys[c m ~ ti zes the suh-
ject-genus of a demonstrative science insofar ~s the se t of prim~ry prem-
ises it yields can be thought to represe nt iJ taxonomic orderi ng of that
genus by the immediate connections expressed by those premises. But
this means that the whole p rocedu re o f co nstructing nn Aristotel ~:ll1 dem-
onstration does not just ex pl ain facts indi v idll~lI y; it also locntes the ex-
plained fact within the appropriate st ructured lie ld of sc iencific in terest.
This bri ngs Ari stotle 's th eory into li ne with :In attra ctive episremo logical
pos ition prominent in the final part of Pl ato 's Theaetetus:
and its nearly immediate consequences thnt th e co nclu sions, and a for-
tiori, the premises, of sc ientific demonstrntions must in so me sense o r
other be necessary. Th is endorsement len ds Aristotle to require not onl y
[ 7 I
11!troductiOIl
that his th eory of predication provide co nditi ons of truth , but also that
it make a d isti nction between those statements whose tru th is a matter
of mere happenstance (which therefore, presumably, arc not sub ject to
scientific ex planation ) and othe rs whose truth is a matter of necessity
(a nd which therefore do fa ll properl y within the doma in of Aristo telian
science).
In fact, I shall argue that the Organon contains two distinct theories
of predicatio n which refl ect this di stinction, and that these two theories
differ d ra stica ll y in their overall sophistication and th eif sensitivi ty to sig-
nifica nt differences among the rypes of state ments they treat. One of
th ese, whi ch I claim is on ly im plicit in the first five chapters of the Cate-
gories, wi ll be ex posed in chapter 3 as a relatively simple theory that in
the end does no better than to provide a se t of necessary (but no t suffi-
cient) catego ria l con ditions for necessa ry truth. Agai nst this backgro und,
Aristotle will be portrayed in chapter 4 as making another, more subtle,
approach to the sa me topic in Book 1 , Chapter 4 of the Posterior Ana-
Iytics. In particular, he is there able to provide sz4ficie nt conditions for
necessa ry truth by bringi ng into play an idea that is barely embryonic in
the Categories (but that eventually blossoms into one of his most impor-
tant metaph ysica l doc trin es), namely that for every genera l (natural) kind
of thi ng, there co rresponds a unique cluster of cha racteristi cs essential to
(and in some sense even responsible for ) something's belongi ng to that
kind. In la ter works, such clusters are referred to var iously by the use of
such terms as " nature" (fj>vertt;), "essence" (TO Ti .ryil elvat ), and "sub-
stance" (overia), bll t Aristotle's preferred mean s of design atin g them in
the Organon is with the simple Ilom in alized in te rrogative, " the what-is-
it" (TO Ti eern). The fund amental distin ction between properties that are
within the what-is- it of a th in g and others that are not then forms the
co nceptua l basis fo r a th eory of predication in Posterior A llalytics 1.4
th at disringuishes necessary, " per se" (Ka(fov-ro), predications, which are
the proper conce rn of dem ons trative science, fr om merely contingent,
"per accideHs" (KoTa aW.L{3e{3"f/Ko<;), truths that li e outside its domain.
In chapter 5 it will be argued furth er that because Aristo tl e takes over
~ ce rtain Platon ic view about definition,
his new theo ry of predication gives a sepa rate anal ysis for another group
of necessary premises, nam ely those involving th e predication of differen-
tiae, which do not fit comfortably within the si mpler theory of the Gate-
(8I
Illtrotilfctioll
W ith this diagnosis, the so lution to the difficulty is obvious: simp ly make
sure your theory of predication does not permit the occlirrence of nega-
tive predicates except where their denotations arc suffic iently restricted.
I9I
Illtroduction
I 10 J
Introdu ction
I 11 I
ONE
It would perhaps not be too far wrong to describe the POStcri01- Allolytics
as an ugly stepchi ld in the Aristotelian corpus. Since :lllcicnr till1es the
work has suffered from a reputation for bein g unpolished in style, tCllt:l-
rive in tone, and even lacking in organiwt ion, judgments which ha ve
served theif makers as an excuse to pick and choose the P::1rts of the
treatise they find intelligible, interesting, <1l1d important, and to disrqprd
other parts as so much confused exposition on the part of Aristotle or his
transcribers. One particularly unfortunate outgrow th of this attitlJdc h ::15
been the idea that to look for a comprehensive fr'l1llcwork th:1t organizes
all the apparently diverse discussions occurring in the work is to c.:onduc.:t
a hopeless search for something that simp ly is nor there.
In the introduction to his 1949 edition of the Analyth"5, Sir David
Ross offered quite plausible mitigation for defects in the !-:tyle .1I1d tone of
the work, respectively, by pointing alit that there is a reasonahly wide
variation, having very little to do with contenr, in the degree to which
different Aris totelian treatises are "re.1Jy for press," and th:lt the intrinsic.:
difficulty of the topics treated by the Posterior Allalytics (c.:omp.1red, for
example, to the Prior Analytics) in any event makes it very C;lS Y to under-
stand why Aristotle should exp ress the views developed there ill ca utious
and tentative language. Here I propose to answer the remaining com-
plaint, that the work is disorganized, by :.uguing that th e Posterior Al1a-
[ 1S I
Structure of Demonstrations
iytics is in fact constructed around a quite powerful (if not always per·
fectly visible) organizational scheme. On the view I sha ll be advancing,
the treatise is not si mply a loosely connected set of local discussions on a
very broad and undefined group of topics. Instead, it can be understood
as a syste matic atrcmpt by Aristotle to give and defend answers to two
very closely related questions that naturally flow o ut of an investigatory
current stemming from Plato's Meno and running through his Republic
and Theaetetus: first, what are the essential features of "knowledge in the
unqualified se nse" (i7fl.rrri}p.1'j a7r'\ws-), that is, the very highest and most
secure form of knowledge available to humans, and second, how can
these features be secured within the context of Aristotle's own logic and
theory of predi cation?
More particul arly, I suggest that Aristotle treats the first of these two
questions in the opening three chap ters of the Posterior Analytics. thus
developing a set of desiderata which he believes any plausible theory of
i7rltrrTII.L7I a7r'\wc; must satisfy, and then spends virtually the rest of the
work showing that a theory of his own invention in fact does so. 1
I 16 J
Demollstratioll. Dil/isioll. !md tlu.' Syllogism
[ 17 [
Structure of Demonstrations
( 18 )
Demollstration, Divisioll. alld the Syllogism
Step N
(I) Every man is <1nimal, and
(2.) every animal is mortal or immortal, sO
C~) every man is mortal or immortal.
In parricular,
(4) Every man is mortal (an im al),
Step N + I
r 19 )
Structure of Demonstrations
and argues (a) thai the so-called concl usion of each step ([ 4J and [7J , the
state ment carried over to the succeeding step) is never actually proved
from earlier lines, but is instead simply introduced in each case as a new
and un sup ported assumption {46.bI2.. I8-19),'1 and (b) that even though
the disjunctive predications in each step ([)J and [6]) do follow logically
fro m prior statements ([lJ with [.1, and [5J with [41, respective ly), these
inferences cannot be cases of demonstration because they violate th e rule
that any dem onstration of a universal affirmative must be in Barbara, and
so must have a middle which is in cluded in its ma jor term (46a39-b4).'H
But whi le it is ge nerall y ack nowledged that Aristotle is hostile for
these reasons to fnaip&a-I.C; if and when it is proposed as a self-sufficient
method of proof, it is not always noti ced that in both A1talytics (espe-
cially in Posterior Allaiytics 2.13) he actua ll y advocates the use of some-
thing very much like this Platonic device, provided that ce rtain safeguards
are observed, for a very specific and limited purpose within his own ac-
count of the demonstrative generation of the highest form of knowledge.
Thus, at Posterior Analytics 2.13 .96bI 5 he says that when one is "making
a system atic study" (7TpaytL01Tf.:Vrl'Tm) of some subjec t (p resumably with
the aim of developing unqualified knowledge), it is " necessary " (xp'lj ) to
"divide" (B~ehe:i: I') the genus in to its primary, "atomic" (&TO,u.OV) species.
The same point is then made even mo re explicit at b25 when Aristotle
allows that "divisions according to differentiae" (ai 6& 8t.mpea-et.C; al
K(lTa Tar:; B~a4>op6s) are "useful" (xp-r,a-Lp.m) in such investigations. 11
Furthermore, Prior Analytics 1.27-31 sheds some light on the specific
function rbis procedure is supposed to serve within the demonstrative
process, since it is presented in those chapters as part of a wider di scus-
sion about how, as Aristotle 's foundationalism and logica l theory re-
quires, one can and should go about selecting appropriate premises of
syllogisms in ge nera l, and appropriate ultimate premises of demo nstrative
syllogisms in particu l ar. '~
It is importa nt, however, not to expect more of these chapters than
they are intended to acco mplish. A well -known passage in Posterior Ana-
Iytics 1.2 sets out six different co nditions that a demonstrative premise
must meet: "Now if know in g is as we have laid down, demonstrative
knowledge must come from [premises} which are (a) true, (b) primary,
(c) immediate, (d) better known rhan, (e) prior to, and (f) causative of,
I 20 )
Demoltstration, DiIJisiol1. tmd the Sylloglslll
( 21 I
Structure of Demonstrations
I 22 J
Demonstration, Division. a11d the Syllogism
In the next chapter we shall try to ascertain exactl y what it is about the
logical character of definitions generated by Platonic Division th M in -
clines Aristotle to deny them the status of knowledge in his sn' ictest se nse
of the term. However, the most immediate and st riking point of difference
between th e two meth ods is that Aristotle's version, unlike Plato's, is not
a meth od for generating definitions, but instead o ne whose li se presup-
poses that one has somehow already grasped an appropriate set of imme-
diate principles (some, but not all, of which are definitions I ~), and which
then deploys these principles over some field of scientific interest (i n
Aristotle's technical usage, a genus) in such a way as to coll ect the ulti -
mate sy llogistic premises requ ired to construct demonstrative sy llogisms,
and so to dev610p a syste matic und ersta ndin g (or knowl edge simpliciter)
concerning that field. Consequently, where Plato is able to co nceive of
definitions as the products of an entirely sel f-sufficient philosop hical
meth od (dia lectic), and so as spec im ens of the highest form of k nowledge,
for Aristotle they func ti o n as mere sta rting points: part of the preex iste nt
material, ca\led fo r by Posterior Ana/yties 1. 1 and 2., from which know l-
edge simpli citer- or demonstrative knowledge- is ultimatel y generated.
This diffe rence from Plato is so mewh<lt obscured hy the seco nd se n-
tence of Posterior Allalytics 2..13 (96a2.2. - 2.;, ), where Aristotl e S;]ys that
his concern in the upcomi ng chapter will be to explain how one shou ld
"hunt out" (OTJPBUBUJ) "attributes in the wha t-is- it" (TI;~ i v T(f.I Ti iun
KaTTrY0pov/J-B1'a). This certai nly makes it appear that what is to fo ll ow
will be a discussion of how the elements of de fini tions G ill be Jiscovered.
This appea rance proves to be deceptive, however, since the exact parallel
in language between this remark and 9 7 b7 - 1 1 entai ls that the subject of
Posterior Allaiytics 2.. I 3 as a whole cannot be how to di scover Ta /;1' np Ti
eun KctTrrYOpOV/LB1'O:. For as we have just seen, the later pJSs;1ge tells us
that a precondition of success for the meth od und er discussion is that olle
must already have the ability to grasp those very attributes. And in bet,
[ 2.l 1
Structure of DemOllstrations
I 24 J
Demonstration, Division. (lHd the S)'lIogisllt
I 25 I
Structure of Dem01lstra tions
rel ated by both incl usio n and excl usion relatio ns (so that the genus as a
wh ole has a branching stru cture). Now, as before, we first look fo r and
find the te rm, A, that is nonreciprocally enta il ed by all the o thers (which
again is th e ge nu s itself). However, when we now look for a single term
among the remainder that is nonrec iprocaJly enta il ed by all of the othe rs,
what we find instead is that there are in fact two (or perhaps more) terms,
Band C, each of whi ch is nonreciprocally enta il ed by a certain fam ily of
terms with in A, which is to say th at Band C represent branch ing nodes of
A. Moreover, the sa me sort of ci rcumsta nce ca n recur if we try to find
within th e fami ly o f terms that nonretip roca ll y entail B, a single te rm that
is nonreciproca ll y entail ed by all of the others: we might very well discover
that in fact there are two or more independent fa milies within B's exten-
sion , so that B itself is discovered to have a branching structure. And so th e
method would proceed unti l the o riginal co llec tion of terms is ex hausted.
With this com plicatio n installed, Ar istotle 's procedure for pl acing the
terms of a ge nus in co rrect o rd er begi ns to look even more like a Pl aton ic
Di vis ion, since it is now see n to involve a descent through the branching
stru cture of a given ge nu s, a descent which wo uld presumably culminate
at its in{imae species. But as it now stands, the procedure invo lves no way
to ensure that any or all of th e connections uncovered in this descent will
be " immediate" in the sense of 7 Ib2.2. Fo r th ere is nothing as yet to ru le
alit the case where B nonreciprocally entails A, but only because it non-
rec iprocally entails some third term, D, that itself non rec iprocally enta ils
A. And by the sa me token, the entailment relations linking D to bmh A
and B mi ght themselves in volve any (fi nite H ) number of furt her inter-
mediate tcr ms.
T he fundamental diffi culty that gives rise to this sort of case, acco rd-
ing to Aristotle's own diagnosi s at 96b35-7, is that the original co ll ec-
tion of terms subjected co the orderin g procedure described at 9732.8-35
could not in the first place have contained all of the esse nce-diffe rentiating
terms with in the gen us under division. (Clearly, in the schematic case just
described, if D had been incl ud ed, it wou ld have turn ed up before B in the
orderin g proced ure.) Consequently, he moves to block th is possibility by
building into th e version of division he is advocating a way of ensu ri ng
the third of the sa fegua rds mentioned at 97a2.3-2.6, namely th at "noth-
in g be left ou t" (J..l:YJ3ev 7fapa{3avew) of the division, as he puts it in a
num be r of places (for examp le, Prior AnaJytics 1.30.46a25, Posterior
Analytics 2.5 .9 I b3 I; 2 . I 3 ·96b 36). Notice that in the branching case de-
sc ri bed above, where term A has been d iscove red to be nonrecip rocally
entailed by two independent terms, Band C, the problem before us is th at
r 26 I
Demollstration. Dillisirm, (lml tbe Syllogism
these terms may each entail A only through the medi~ltion of other terms
(or ser ies of terms) that did not appear in the origina l co ll ection. At Pos-
terior Allaiytics 96b37-97a6, Aristotle actually describes such a case
and provides a way of detecting and correcting its defi ciency:
For when the primary genus is taken, if olle of the divisions lower
(than the immediate one] is then taken, everything lin the genus]
will not fall into this. For in sta nce, not every .mill1<l1 is either
whole-winged o r split-winged, but every w in ged rl.11imal is, for it is
the differentia of this. T he primary differentiation of a nim::·eJ is tlwt
into which all animal falls. And sim ilarly for each of the other divi -
sions, both those outside (3 given genu s], and those below it. For
instance, of bird, that into which all bird falls, ;lIld of fish, that into
which a ll fish falls. If you proceed thusly, you will know that noth -
ing has been left out; otherwise things necessaril y will be left Out
without [your] knowing so.
In the example described here, we can let A represent the genus al1i-
mal, and Band C the independent (a nd indeed mutually exclusive) terms,
whole-winged and split-winged, which presumably are the first remain -
ing terms of the origina l collection found to entail A nonrcciprocally dur-
ing the procedure for correct ordering desc ribed above. The central in-
sight behind the test given in this passage for detecting omissions is
contained in the fact that, because that procedure was presumed to oper-
ate only o n the essence-signifying term s within the genus, which is to say
terms denoting differentiae or species, then (assuming th :u Band C arc 011
the same divisional level ) we know that they must either ( I ) represent ;1
pair of differentiae (or spec ies H ) that together effect' nn immediate divi ·
sion of A itse lf, or (2) represent differentiae of some subdi visio n D of A,
which may be either immediate or mcdi:ued by so me finite series of divi·
sions. These two general poss ibili ties can he represe nted sc hcmntica ll y as
follows,
/A~
B C
I I
I I
I I
[ 27 J
Structure of Demonstratiolls
x,
/
n/
/~
B C
The test emp loyed in the quoted passage, then, effectively separates these
possibilities, for on ly in th e first case is it true not only that Band C indi-
vidually entail A, but also that A entails their disjunction, or in other
words, that they are jointly exhaustive of A. Thus, Aristo tle argues that
even though whole-willged and split-winged each entail animal, and so
come somewhere after it in the correct ordering of terms, they cannot be
next in order to A, sin ce (due to the existence of wingless anima ls) it is
not true that every ani mal is either one or the other. Furthermo re, a sec-
ond look at Posterior Allalytics 96b37-97a6 shows that what Aristotle
is proposing the re is not just a method for detecting omissions in the
proper order ing of terms, but also one for correcting omissions once
found. Suppose it has been discovered according to the above procedure
that Band C do not jointl y exhaust A, and thus that the re must be miss-
ing terms between them and it. Aristode's dis cuss ion suggests that onc
can set abo ut find ing those missing terms in the sp irit of hi s program by
now trying to find a te rm (ca ll it D) not appea ring in the original coll ec-
tion that is entailed both by Band C, and in turn entails A. In Aristotle's
example, the term meeting these conditions is winged. Now that we
know D is one of the o mitted te rm s between A and Band C, but not nec-
essaril y the on ly o ne, we can reapp ly the test for omissions given at
96b37 - 97a6 at twO levels: first by ascertaining whether D is itself jointly
exhausted hy Band C (if not, th ere must be missing terms between it and
them), and next by first identify ing D's cod iffere ntia,!" E (in Aristotle's,
example, wingless), and then determining whether D and E jointly ex-
haust A. If furt her omissions are discovered during either process, mi ss-
ing terms are added as before, and new tests fo r omissions are admin-
istered. So the process continues until, after some finite number of steps/]
a complete correct ordering of the terms within A is generated.
[ 28 I
Demol1stl'atiOll, Division, alld the Syllugism
To sum up, I have been arguing that because the Aristotelian version
of division advocated in Posterior Allalytics 2..IJ and Prior Analylics
1.27 -3 2 conta ins within itself pro ced ures for obtaining a correct and
complete ordering of terms {and because it is restricted to terms thnt sig~
nify essence}, it is reaso nable ro view the method as a whole ~s one by
which it is possib le to set out all of rhe immediate esse ntial connections
among the terms within a genus, and in lhat W:1y to systematize the genus
prior to construction of sy llogistic demonstrations pertinent to its con-
tents. This, I take it, is the rational e for Aristotl e's remark :1t Posterior
Al1alytics 1.13.96b15 that division of a ge nu s into atomic kinds is neces-
sary when one is "making a study" (rrpoy(.Lo!TelrrrTOt) of that genus.
However, we have not yet seen how this method figures in Aristotle's
vi ews about how one should go about actuall y co llecting the sy llogistic
premises of demonstration s relevant to the genus under study.
This final con nection is made in Prior Analytics L27, and Posterior
Analytics 2.14, both of which are hest understood as :1ssl1l1ling that the
prospective demonstrator ha s already empl oyed Aristotdi ..l11 division to
chart all of the immediate connections within the genus of interest. At
Prior Analytics I.27.43bI-5. Aristotl e says thilt in order to co ll ect ap-
propriate premises pertinent to a given subject, it is neceSS:1 ry, ~lfter first
setting down the subject itself, its definition, and its peculiar properties
(that is, all terms that are nonaccidentally coextensional with the suh-
ject!B), to proceed to identify the terms enta il ed by the subject, the terms
that the subject entails, and the terms th<lt are excluded by (and therefore
exclude) the subject. Then, at the opening of Prior AllaJytics l.28, he
makes it clear how, on the assumption that this h :1S been done for all of
the terms within a genus, it will be possib le to ohtain the premises ne ces-
sary to construct a demonstration (in Barbartl) of a universal affirmtltive,
"When we wish to establish that some pred icate belongs to some whole
[that is, to all of some subject), we mu st look at all the subjects o f which
the predicate we are establis hing is sa id [that is, th e terms whi ch entail the
predicate], and the terms which are entailed by the subject, for if there is
something the Same in these [two groups), the predicJte will necessarily
be long to the su bj ect" (4 3b3 9 - 44 ).
There a re two ways to understand Ar istotle's instruction to examine
th e terms entailed by the subject and the terms that entail the predi cate of
the universal affirmative one is trying to demonstrate. He could be think·
ing here of the field of terms in question prior to the ordering procedures
just discussed, in which case the relatively we:lk point of the passage
would certainly hold: if it is known th~t there is n term, B, that both (:11 -
[ 29 1
Structure of Demonstrations
c
then one has thereby not only discovered that {here mu st be a syllogistic
demonstratio n of "All C is A," but also connected A and C through a
series of immediate entailment relations, and in this way actually col-
lected all of immediate (uni versal affirmative) premises of the syllogisms
in Barbara needed to construct [hat demonstration. Aristotle makes a re-
stricted version of the same point in Posterior Analytics 2.14, after using
lan guage ve ry similar to that of 97a28-35 in Ch apter 13 to advocate
once morc his ow n ve rsion of division: "For example, if the genus animal
is what we should study, [we should discover) what belongs to all ani -
mals. Having grasped these, [we must identify] what follows upon all of
the first of the remaind er (e.g. if this is bird, what follows from all bird),
and proceed thusly, always taking the 'nearest' (eyy.ncxra) [d ivision]"
(98a4-7). Aristotle then explains how this point can prove useful in
demonstrating that certain attributes belong to certain subjects: "Let A
[ 30 [
Demollstration, Divisiolt, altd tbe Syllogism
stand for animal, B for the attributes belonging to every animal , and C,
D, and E for the so rts of animal. Now it is clear on accou nt of what B
belo ngs to D: on acco unt of A. And likew ise for the others [i, e., fo r C and
E]; and the same reaso ning always applies to the terms lower [than C, 0
and E]" (9 4a 7-12). Here aga in the poin t is that, since we have already
discovered that B is one of the (nonacc idental ) attributes belongin g imme-
diate ly to an;ma l and that D is an immediate subdivis ion of A (in other
words, that bo th "All A is 8" and "All 0 is A" are trtl e and imm edi ate) ,
we are in pos itio n to co nstru ct a single-syll ogis m demonstration in Bar-
bara of "All D is B,"
The sa me sort of interpretation can al so be given to th e para ll el po in t
Arisco tle makes at Prior Anaiytics 443 1-7 for rh e case where one wants
to prove a uni ve rsal nega tive: "Whenever it is required [to show} that
some predicate bel o ngs to none of some subj ect, it is necessary to COI1-
sider the terms whi ch a re entai led by th e su bj ect, nnd those whi ch C:l nn ot
belong to the predicate .. . for if any of these is the same the predica te
ca nn ot belong to any of the subject." Let li S suppose th:1t the universa l
negati ve to be proved in this case is "No C is A." Aristotl e's poi nt is th at if
one we re to discover in the correct and comp le te ordering given hy Ari s-
cotelia n division a ter m B th at is an ancestor of C and imm edia tely ex-
cludes either A o r some ancesror of A, or schematically, that th e foll owing
ordering ob tain s:
then one would possess all the imm edi ate un iversa l premises (on e nega -
tive, and the rest affir mative) need ed to comp lete a sy ll ogisti c dcmon st ra-
tion of "No C is A" (in Barbara and Celarcnt 1<1).
I have been argu ing that when Aristotel ian div ision is carried into th e
specialized co ntexts of Posterior Anaiytics where Aristotle is co nce rn ed
spec ifica ll y with the co nst ruction of demons trative sy llogisms, it heco mes
in effec t an abso lutely necessa ry and integral presyll ogisti c stage in thc
ove rall process of generati ng scientific know ledge. It is, mo reove r, thi s
(raming stage o f dem onstration thM proves to be th e locus of opera tions
I 31 I
Structure of Demonstrations
for the various types of apxai and "Aa/J.{3a l/o/J.6I/a cata logued in Posterior
Anafytics 1.10. H this two-stage interpretation of demonstration is cor-
rect, then it should be possible to understand each type of apxai in terms
of the structural features of rhe framing stage an d its place in the ove rall
theory of demonstration. The mOSt important of these types, the OpOL dis-
cussed at lengtb in Chapters 3 to 10 of Book 2, will be see n in the next
chapter to lie at the very heart of the framing procedure. But first, three
other types (generic existence assumptions, generic meaning assump-
tions, and rhe " logica l" comm011 axioms of Noncontradiction and Ex-
cluded Midd le) will be interpreted in the remainder of thi s chapter as
constituting various background assump tions necessar)' for the comple-
tion of the framing procedure p rior to the actual construction of syllo-
gistic demonstrarions.
A good place to start this procedure is with one of the most widely d is-
cussed and least understood passages in the entire Posterior Analytics.
Speaking of tbe lim itations his cheory places on what must be proved and
what ca n be assu med by a science, Aristotle iss ues the following seem-
in gly en igmatic remark: "Proper (tfha) to each science are the subjects
whose existence it assumes, and whose per se attributes (V7T<l Pxovra
KaO'uv.ra) it studies .... Of the subjects both the existence (TO elval.) and
the meaning (T08, ell/at) are assumed, but as for the per se attributes,
only the meaning (Ti (T~J1-aiv",) is assumed" (L IO. 76b5-7).
It will be conve ni ent to dissect this comp lex assertion (which echoes
76a31-7 and is itself echoed by 76 b12-16 ) into four discrete princip les
of restrict ion, which can then be discussed separately.
(R2) Every science must assume the mean ing of its sub-
ject-genus.
I 32 )
DemOIl5t rat;oll, D;I /;5;01l. and the ,,),/101:;5111
I 33 I
Structure of Demonstrations
[ 34 J
!
l
Demonstration, Divisioll, mId the Syllogislll
I 35 I
Structure of Demonstrations
could hardly escape Aristotle 's notice, and it is just th is, I believe, that he
means to exp ress by (R2).
Once th ese two precon ditions have been secured, the framing stage of
demonstration then proceeds along the li nes set out above. Beginning at
the to p, o ne moves downward through the genus by specifying finer and
finer sets of differentiae, taking ca re that the differentiae a re taken in the
right order, an d that at each level one takes the immediate, o r "proper,"
differentiae of th e kind being subd i vided.~' The epistemological effect of
thi s process is critical to the operation of Aristotelian science: whereas
I
prior to the framing procedure a given subject·genus might (for all th at is
known ) be no more than a mere aggregarory grouping with no interesting
in ternal stru cture, afterwards it is revea led to be a hierarchy whose co n·
I
stituent necess ary, immediare connections are exp ressed by (a nd so give
ri se to) the ultimate atomi c premises of the demonst rative syllogism-
r
chains within the sc ience whi ch studies that genu s.
Fin all y, the postu lation of a presyll ogistic framing stage provid es a
way of understa nding how the " lo gica l" axiom s 41 of Noncontradi ction
and Excluded Middle figure in demonstration , without casting them in
the un likely role of syll ogistic prem i ses.~1 For within that framewo rk,
both of these apxai are naturally presupposed by the sys tematization of a
ge nu s in to a hi era rchy of the so rt Aristotle envi sions. This hardly needs
showing in the case of Noncont radiction; cl ea rly no coherent cl ass i-
ficato ry scheme whatever will be poss ible if it is all owed th at one and th e
sa me item ca n be simu ltaneous ly included and excluded by another. This
point is recognized by Ari stotle at Metaphysics 4.4.1007a2. 1- 36, where
(a pparently relyin g on Categories S.}b2S-}3) he argues th at to say A is
both B and not B is in effect to make B an acc ident of A. Therefore, he
reasons, to deny Noncontradiction is to do away with the essential/acci·
de ntal di stinct ion, and thus to rule out the possibility of delineating es-
sential kinds by means of division or any other method.
Th e case for Excluded Middle, while no t qu ite so obv io us, is evidently
I
just as co mpelli ng for Aristotle, for he sees the prin ciple as required to I
secure th e requirement discussed ea rlier tha t the divi sion " leave nothing I
out." For suppose that in th e attempt to subdivide A, we succeed in dis· I
covering two (or more) d ifferentiae, Band C, which are know n to entail
A and to exclude each o ther. Still , even if we knew th at Band not· C we re
equivalent, it could not be in ferred from this that B and C exhausted A
(that is, that all noo- Cs in A were Bs) except by in vokin g Excluded
I
I
Midd le to assume th at every A either has or lacks C. As a matter of fact,
I 36 J
Demonstration, DirJisiOll, tllld tbe Syllogism
I 37 I
TWO
I
!
t
I 38 J f
r
Dell1011stratioll m,d Defillition
Let's now turn to yet another of the metascientific principles inrrodu ced
in chapter I:
The central work of part 2. will be to explore the vario us so rts of non -
accidenta l connections Aristotle means to include here LInder the hea ding
per se, and his variolls motivations for doing so, hur now we want to
fOl:uS on how the ass umptions mentioned in (R}) fUllction in the ove r;lll
process of demonstration. Besides this passage, there are many oebers (for
example Poster;or Analytics 1.10.76a32.-37, b6-rJ, b1 5) which ex-
press this restriction, and still others which indicate (w hat evidently
comes to the same thing) that " definiti o ns " (OpOl) are among the "first
I .19 I
Structure of Demonstrations
I
are demo nstra tive premises, this presents the enormous difficulty of show-
ing tha t OPOL do afte r all have a rightfu l place among th e prem ises of syl-
logistic demonstration, despite all the passages just menti o ned which
seem to deny them just th at. Hinrikka attemp ts to get around rhis diffi -
culty by pointing to Aristotle's well -documented tenden cy to equivocate
in hi s own key philosophical termi nol ogy. H e argues in effect that the r
tcrm opoS' takes on an extrao rdin arily narrow sense in Posterior Ana-
Iytics 1. 2. and 1.10 that picks o ut only so-called "nominal definitions"
I
(AOYOL TOU Ti OIJf.Laivet ra DvoMO'rO'),' which do indeed la ck existential
import, and that tbe above passages therefore need not be interpreted as
rulin g out all defini tions as premises, but o nly this special subclass of
them. By contrast, according to Hintikka, th ere are oth er passages in the
I
I 40 J
Demonstration and Defi1litio1l
[ 41 1
Structure of Demonstrations
are limited to those individual instances that are known by the subject to
be pairs, so that to say that a knows de re that every pair is even is just to
say that everything known by a to be a pair is also known by a to be even.
The problem with this construction, as Aristotle quite correctly deduces,
is that it improperly restricts the su bject matter of (I) itself only to pairs
whose existence ha s been apprehended by a, whereas the proper scope of
the sentence, and therefore of a's de rc knowledge of its truth (as Aristotle
puts it) is all pairs that have been proved to be even. These he insists are
not limited to pairs kn own by a, but include all pairs witham qualifica-
tion. Put positively and in the language of recent discussions of proposi-
tional attitudes, Aristotle's point is that de re knowledge contexts are
transparent in the sense that if a knows de re th at (I) is true, then it fol -
lows that for every pair b, a knows [hat b is even, whether o r not a knows
of b's existence.
In his notes [0 this passage, Jonath an Barnes has tried to capture this
feature by giving the fo llowing analysis of a's having de re knowledge
of (I),
This is very nearly correct, si nce it would in every case warrant the in-
ference from "b is a pair" to "a knows b is even." However. this univer-
[ 42 I
II,
Demollstratioll IIlId Defillitioll
which entai ls Barnes's analysis but at the same time is intended to carry
such existential presuppositions.
True to the general quasi-epistemological motif of the Posterior Ana-
lytics described in my introduction, Aristotle's proposed treatment of the
MenD paradox is based on an epistemological distinction between two
types of knowledge, or more accurately, between two ways of knowing
the truth of single universal sentences such as
Indeed, I have suggested that this serves to underscore the fact that he sees
his solution to the paradox as a direct and opposed response to Plato's
own. Nevertheless, it is possible to see behind this epistemologica l dis-
tinction a parallel semantic distinction between two very different ways
of understanding the logical character of (2) itself. On one hand, we
could understand it :IS a sentence abollt every single individual falling
under its subject term, that is, about every actually existent man, II so that
its truth would entail J conjunction of singular propositions. I! On th is
construction, the subject term of a universal sentence makes (distrihlltcd )
reference to everyone of its actual instances, and so, by virtue of this ref-
erential function, the sentence as:1 who le involves a presupposition of the
singular existence of each of those individuals.
Here it is important to see (hat one cannot capture the existential
force of (2) in modern predicate calculus by simply conjoining a univer-
sally quantified version of it with an existentially quantified statement be-
stowing general existence on its subject:
[ 4] [
Structure of Demonstrations
quantified stateme nts of general existence (that is, no nemptin ess of predi-
cate extensions), JI such as " Th ere are men ." On the other hand, in Aristo-
telian logic it is always ca rried by singular existential presuppositions
generatcd by th e fundamental idea that general subjec ts like "Every
man," no less than singular subjects like "Socrates," actua lly make refer-
(~ncc to the individuals to which they apply. 1" One way to see this di ffer-
ence is to norice that if the membership of the human species were (partly
or wholly) different from what it actually is, then the facts expressed by
(2) wo uld differ accordingly; that is, the sentence would be about a differ-
ent group of individuals. By contrast, the propositions expressed by (2 ' )
would remain unaltered in such a case. IS In order to rep resent th is distinc-
!f
t
tive fea ture of Aristotelian logi c, I shall hereafter refcr to universal sen-
tences under this interpretation as referential universals.
Alternatively, sentence (2) could also be understood as making no ref-
erence whatever to concrete individuals, but instead as expressing a (nec-
essa ry) relation between the universal kinds signified by its subject and
predicate terms. Viewed in this way, the sentence could be analyzed as the
second-order statement that the human spec ies is a spec ies of animal. 16
For reaso ns that J hope are obvious I shall ca ll universal sentences under
this seco nd style of interpretation Platonistic. With this distinction in
I
place, then, it is possible to understand the episte mological moral Aris-
totle claims in Posterior Analytics 1.1 to draw from his treatment of
Meno's Paradox as the conclusion that universal statements capable of
conveying the highest form of knowledge (demonstrative knowledge)
must be referential. whereas the preexistent substantive meaning assump-
tions from which this knowledge is generated are conveyed by Platonistic
universal state ments. Thi s then leaves two questions outstanding: how
does Aristotle think these Platonistic definitions are acquired in the first
place, and why does he relegate them to this inferior position?
[ 44 I
I
l
Demollstratioll alld Defillition
I 45 I
r
!
Structure of Demonstrations
whether it's th e same [as that of nonimmediatesJ o r not, and (2) wheth er
there is knowledge (em eT'ni!':'!) of both, or if kn owledge is [only] of
[nonimmediates] whil e [the cognitive i~t~, which apprehends immedi-
ates] is of a d iffe rent sort." U
It is important to recognize that even though neither Plato nor his
Meno are here mentioned by name. this fin al chap ter of the Posterior
Analytics, no less than the first. takes the famous paradox about learning
formulated in that di alogue as its primary point of departure. T his is
plain almost fro m its ope ning when, in [he conti nu ation of the passage
jusr quoted, Aristotle consciously mode ls his proposed approach on the
Meno pa radox by posing th e ancillary question of wheth er the sought-
after account of the preexistent apprehension of im mediate demonstra-
tive first principles will involve (a) postulating the emergence of enti rely
new cogni tive itet~ in the subject's soul, o r whether (as in the Platon ic
I
doctrine of Reco ll ection) it wi ll instead requi re (b) the postulation of
pre-existent etet~ of whi ch the subject is unaware: "{We mu st inqui re]
whether cogniti ve states not {already] in the subject co me into being, or
!
!
whether they had [sim pl y] not been noticed (AeA.-rjfhro-w) I" to be within
the su bject" (99bu-2.6 ).
From this point Aristotle proceeds to argu e that the seeming exhaus-
tiveness of the disju nction between (a) and (b) sets up an apparent di-
lemma, but that this dilemma is in fact only appa rent. He moves directly
against (a ) at bz.8 - 30 by reca llin g hi s co nclusion in Book I, Cha pter I
(which in rum looks back to the MellO) that it is not possible fo r knowl-
edge or learn ing to arise out of a complete lack of cognition on the su b-
ject's part. His rej ectio n of (b), on the other hand , is qualified : he claims
at b2.6-2.7 that it is absurd (a-ro7ToII) to think th at one cou ld happen to
possess a cognitive ۤ~~ that is "more accurate" (aKpt{3ea;6par:;) than
demonstration. while remain in g ignoran t that one possessed it. The quali-
fication here is sign ificant, for it turns out that Aristorle's subsequent pro-
posal fo r avoiding the dilemm a is [0 deny (a) by holdin g th at there is a
certain preexistent ettr:; fro m which the apprehension of first principles
(and a fortiori, all demo nst rative knowledge) ultimately arises) while at
the sa me time avoidi ng the absurd form of (b) by denying that th is e~tr:; is
an occurrent cogn itive state (in whi ch case, it would presumably have to
be more accurate than demonstrative knowledge, and co uld therefore not
be possessed inadvertently). Ralher. he maintains, the egt~ in question is
a certain kind of cognitive capacity, that is to say, a Svva,utr:;,2° for acq ui r-
in g such occurrent states. which is not more accurate than those occur-
[ 46 )
Demonstration and Derllitioll
[ 47 [
Structure of Demonstrations
[ 48 1
DemoJ/stration fllld DefinitioJI
There is, however, a second and equally important reason for Aristotle to
deny preexistent knowledge of OPOL the status of knowledge in his stri ct-
est sense of the tcrm, and there is more thall a li ttl e irony in the fact that
this reason also seems to be taken frolll P1:tto. On the basis of what has
been sa id so far, nothing in the theory of demonstration rules out the pos-
sibility that one could acquire any number of these (.~pxni and yet not
have the slightest idea how they (or any subgroups of them) could be
drawn together into some systematic and coherent scheme of scientific
explanation. Now it was mentioned earlier thar Plato rcgilrds definitions
generated by his method of division as objects of the highest form of
knowledge. Furth ermore, in ligh t of certain views ev idenced in the The-
aetetus (the one Platonic dialogue devoted exclusively to epistemologic;:ll
concerns), it is easy enough to understand the reason for this high regard.
This dialogue, like so many othe rs, ends in appa rent perplexity, but
nearly everyone agrees that it makes progress in the direction of establi sh-
ing that, whatever genuine knowledge should turn Ollt to be, it must
somehow involve having "true belief accompanied by a logos." The final
perplexity of the dialogue th en arises because the interlocutors cannot
seem to find a defensible understanding of wh;:lt should COll1H as the right
sort of logos. However, Myles BurnyeJt and others 27 have argued con -
vincingly that in the closing sect ions of the work, Plato expresses a defi -
nite attraction to (w ith out quite endorsing) what has been ca ll ed the "in-
terrelational model" of justification, according to which ;:I logos of lh e
right sort makes clear the place which the object of knowl edge occupies
within a su itably large and systematic field of interrebted ohjects. It
shou ld be apparent, however, how a definition of the sort genera ted by
the Platonic method of division exhibited in the Sophist might be thought
of in just this way, since it takes the form of a logos that spec ifi cs the exact
sequence of divisional nodes trJ versed between rhe original genll s sub-
jected to the division and the bottommost item finally defined by it. !~
However, as Burnyeat also points out/~ Aristotle's Posterior Ana-
lytics, no less than Plato's Theaetetr/s, is firm in its insistence that the titl e
of " knowledge in the unqualified se nse," (or, equivnlentiy, of " under-
standing" [hno-rrj,ulJ ,uETa )"'0),0<)]) cannot be conferred on a single belief
I 49 I
Structure of DemOllstrations r
taken in isolation (no matter how "real" its objects ), but must instead be I
presented in appreciation of the place that belief occupies in a sufficiently
wide and syste matic body of other beliefs. In other words, Aristotle, like
Plato, subscribes to the interrelational model. Hence, it would seem that f
so long as appre hensions of definitiona l dpXai are considered as isolated
I
bits and snatches of cognition, they will fall short o f being knowledge in
the unqualified sense.
If it is correct that Aristotle 's rationale for denying that "merely uni·
versa I" knowledge of OPOL is the highest form possible is not just failure of
ex istential import but also la ck of systematicity, then it should be possible
to see how, in the p rocess of moving from this state to the actua l produc·
tion of syll ogistic demonstrations, both failures are overcome. My cen tral
proposal is that the presyllogistic framing stage of demonstration is seen
by Aristotle as accomplish ing just that. It is a procedure wherein some set
of Platonistic OPOL that have been previously acquired (by the process de-
scribed in Posterior Analytics 2.19) are then superimposed upon some
scientifically in teresting genus of individuals whose existence and place in
th e broader scheme of things has already been recognized or assumed.
This procedure both organizes that genus into a branch ing explanatory
structure and simultaneously generates a set of immediate predications,
which are referential universals (a nd hence objects of de re knowledge)
and can therefore serve as the ultimate premises in syllogistic demonstra·
tions of nonimmediate connections within that genus.
Hen ce, when the immediate premises of a given science thar emerge
from the fra mi ng procedure are considered collectively, they can be seen
to reflcct a syste matizat ion of the basic truths about the subject·gcnus
into an organized body of sc ientific knowledge in which explanations
going all the way back to those fundamental premises can then be co n-
structed. And this, as Burnyeat correctly argues, is the only form of cogn i-
tion Ari stotle thinks worthy of being called knowledge in the str ictest
possible sense, or as Burnyeat puts it, scientific understanding. Thus, it is
possibl e to understand the remark at Posterior Anaiytics I.2.7IbI8-2.o,
that "knowledge in the unqualified sense comes from demonstration," as
a distin ctly Aristotelian spec ification of Plato's insight in the Theaetetus
that genuine knowledge requires the possession of an inrerrelational
I
logos. The differen ce, of course, is that whereas Plato simply identifies f
such logoi with the Platonistic definitions generated by division, for
Aristotle these logoi are nothing less th an the co mpl ete syllogistic demon-
strations that (to reinvoke the language of Posterior Analytics 2.1 and 2.)
r 50 I
DemollStratioll and Defillitioll
allow one to know not just that the fact in questio n is tru e, bu t also why
it is tru e. For on the presen t interpretation, the constru ction of such an
explanation (more speci fica lly, the acquisition of its ultimate prem ises)
req uires th at th e demonst rator have al ready come to app rehend in a
systema ti c ma nner all of the salien t necessary interco nn ections o htaining
within the field of study. In that sense, the demo nst rative procedure as a
whole can be sai d to reveal the systematic relations which the demon -
strated item bears to other proposi ti ons (most importantly, the ultimate
premises) within its app ropr iare science.
r 51 I
r,
Structure of Demonstrations
I 52 J
Demonstration nltd Definition
I 53 I
Structure of Demonstrations
neither includes the other (91a8- I 2), Aristotle then turns in Chapter 4 to
wh at he sees as the more interesting and diffi cult question of whethe r the
two classes even intersecr.J.I But as it is configured by the Platonic as-
sumption mentio ned above, th e question actually posed at 9ra13-14 is
"whether there is syllogism and demon st rati on of the 1"1, tun."
It is not always appreciated how well, from this point on, Aristotle's
procedure matches the ge nera l pattern of dialectical inquiry so bea utifully
exposited in G. E. L. Owen's landmark articl e, "Tithenai Ta Phaino-
mena." ·l. Acco rding to Owen's account, this sort of investigation charac-
teristi cally opens with an "aporetic survey," in which a number of pos-
sible (a nd in many cases, actually propounded) answers to some loosely
formulated qu es tion are subjected to close critica l scrutiny. At some point
after each of these tvBo~a has been shown in its turn to land in conceptual
difficulty, Aristotle begins to se t the stage for resolving these difficulties by
recasting the original question into his own d istin ctive semitechnical vo-
cabulary, in this way superimposing hi s own system of analytical con-
cepts on the iss ues he is treating.
Now even the casual reader of Aristo tle is aware that virtually every
one of his key phi losophical te rms is equivo ca ted upon as a matter of
co urse, not just from treatise to treatise, but often within a single work,
and sometimes even within a single chapter. This is nO{ at all to charge
him with sloppi ness or ind ifference in his terminological habits. On the
contrary, his patterns of equivocation are both systematic and deliberate,
and moreover are highly valued by him as an indispensa ble part of th e
philosophical method he emp loys to bring about dialectica l resolution of
the conceptual problems uncove red in his aporeric surveys. For by trans·
laring a question under study into his own systematically equivocal lan -
guage, he effectively disambiguates the question by separating out variou s
of its possible interpretations, one of which in the usu al case he identifies
as the "strict" (KtJpiw, ), "unqualified" (cX1r'\w,), or "primary" (1TPW'TOV)
interpretation. Armed with this disambiguation, he is then in a position
to produce what we might call the "full answer" to his question by giving
what he takes [0 be the correct answer on each interp retation (with spe-
cial emphasis, of course, on the primary interpretation). Finall y, different
parts of the "full answer" are deployed to show that each of the 8 vB6~a
dealt with earlier went wrong because of a failure to respect subtle differ-
ences among the meanings of terms, but also th at each is in fact a misfired
attempt to express some portion of the whole truth con tained in Aris-
totlc's ow n final , enlightened posi tion. Thus, in the end, all positions ex·
[ 54 I
Demol1stratio" alld Definitioll
cept Aristotle's are literally rejected. bur all ::tre nonetheless ilCcomodated,
and it is in this sense that he believes his method "s;tves the phenomena."
True to this genera l form, Aristotle's full answer to the question of
whether there are any demonstrable definitions is that on some inter-
pretations of the question there are, and on others not. Funhermore,
it is not surpr ising that his specification of the various in terp retations
involved turns on exploiting amb iguities ill the terlllS definition and
demonstratimt. since these are conspicuous ly the only two <lvai lable ca n-
didates for this role. To begin with, the "strict" or "primary" interpreta-
tion of the question and its associated answer are quite easy to spot. At
9IaISff. he argues in effect that while definitions are expres5iofls of im -
mediate connections between terms, the construction of a demonstration
r
always proceeds by "finding the middle [term (~7)rr1crL~ ToD f.L&croD) that
links th e twO terms of the prospective concl usion (90a 10). Hence, since,
in the strier sense of the te rm, somethi ng ca n be s:1id to hc demonstrated
on ly if it is the concl usion of :1 legitimate demonstrative sy llogism, it fol -
lows straightforwardly that, si nce defi nitions express immediate connec-
tions! stri ctly speaking no definition can be demonstrated. I I
The presence of this little argument in Chapter 4 is geilcrally acknowl-
edged among writers on the Posterior Allolytics, but it is importa nt to
notice that it applies equally against the strict demoll str::lbility of merely
universal defin itional apxai and that of the immediate primMY premisc$
to whi ch they give rise in the framing stage of demonstration. What is not
so well known is that Aristotle gives an :1ltogcther different argument in
Posterior Analytics 2-.7, which goes on to distingui$h between these two
ways of expressing definitional connections by showing that only th e
latter are demonstrable in another, weake r, sense of that term. One in -
tended purpose of Chapter 7 is to cancel, or rather to qualify, the Plntonic
assumption that had gone un chall enged in Chapters 3 and 4, namely that
a definition always gives the Ti ecrn of its su bject. Now1 however, it
emerges that Aristotle's actual, more com plicated view of the matter is
th at although the re is a sense of opo~ for whi ch this is so, in anot her sense
(indeed the primary one employed in Posterior Allolytics 1.2- :1nd TO) a
definition is simply a "statement o f what the n:lme me:1ns" ( AO'YO~ 'TOV TL
Crr}f.LaiVEt TO OVOf.Lcx).
The argument for separating these two senses, lik e so mllch of th e
Posterior Allalytics. is conduc ted within the episrelllologic:11 substructure
of the th eory of demonstration. Aristotle's concern at 92b4 - 34 is to rec-
oncile twO seemingly incompati ble views he holds ahout the relative pri-
I 55 )
Structure of DemoltStratio1ts
I
I
ority of definitional and existential knowledge. On the one hand, he in-
sists repeatedly that (a) one cannot come to know what X is without
knowing (e ither befo rehand or concurrently) that X is, (in other words,
that X exists; 89b33, 92.bS , 9334). But on the other hand, it is both a
feature of his own theory of demonstration and an observation he makes
independentl y abou t "actual scientific practice" that (b) a science mu st
assume the meanings of its non primitive terms and prove the existence of
their significa ta.
There is of course th e genera l question, which will be deferred for the
tim e being, of whether th ere is any way at all to incorporate these two
ideas harmoniollsly in to a si ngl e coherent theory, but Aristotle's concern
at 92.b4- 34 is much narrower. His questio n there is whether (a) is consis-
tent with a ve ry special understanding of (b) according to which the as-
su mptions of meaning it mentions are Pl atonic defini tions (that is, logoi f
obtained by the method of 8LUipe(;nr:; that give both the n Bern an d the Ti
UTjJ.Luivet TO OVOJ.Lu) that also fun ction as ultimate sy llogistic premises.
Aristotle's answer to this question is negative, and although his reason-
ing in Posterior Analytics 2..7 is highly suppressed, it is possible to recon-
I
stru ct in the light of his earlier assertion at Posterior Analytics 1.2.. 72.a2.6-
bS that (c) the premises of a demonstrative syllogism must be "better
known than" (yvwptJ.Lwn;pov) and "prior to" (npo'Tspov) its conclusion .
He now observes at 92b19-20 that according to "current manners" of
defining (and here I believe he is referring to Platonic Division as well as
the inductive manner of apprehending definitional connections descr ibed
in Posterior A1Wlytics 2.19), one who defines does not thereby prove the
existence of the defin iendum. Hence, if a product of such a method were
allowed to occur as a better known pre mise in a syllogism that proved the
ex istence of its objects, it would after all be possible to know (prior to the
demonstration) the Tt BUTI. of those objects without knowing that they
existed. Bur this is precisely what is ruled out by (a) .
How then does Aristotl e him self propose to reconcile (a) and (b) in
the face of (c)? As I have suggested, his crucial pl oy is to insist on a sepa-
racion of two senses of the term opo<;: the primary one (employed in 1.2
and 10) in which it is merely a statement·of what a name means, and a
secondary (Platonic) sense in which it is also a statement of the what-is-it
of whatever answers to the name. He is then ab le to claim that only the
second so rt of definition can fu nction as a premise in demonstration,
which in turn allows him to mainta in (as part of his "full answer" in
2..10) th at there is an attenuated sense of the verb "to demonstrate" (ar.o-
8eiKVVJ.L~) in which these definitions can be said to be demonstrated by
I S6 J
Demollstratioll d1ld Dc(illiric)11
[ 57 [
Structure of Derno1l5tratiol1S
plain and from the perceptual experiences that are sa id in Posterior Ana·
lytics 2..19 to generate them.
Let us address the second aspect of this charge first. The criticism here is
that a Plaronistic construal of the character of definitional apxai is some·
how at odds with the empiricist account given at looal 5(£. of 61Taywyrj,
the process by which these starting points co me to be known in the first
place. hs obscure martial imagery as id e. this passage does seem to say
quite clearly that knowledge of definitional apxai is derived ultimately
from multiple " perceptions" (aiuO-rycreL'» of sensible particulars of the
relevant kinds. But it is then to be wondered how the truth of ana lytic
statements could possib ly be apprehended by a ny such empirical process.
More spec ifically. the worry is that because perception is in its essential
nature a co nfrontation with a fully pa rticular sensible object, no single
perceptual experience could ever produce a cognitive state with universal
content, nor could any mere ly combinatory operations upon any finire
collection of such experiences.
I
The general argument that any necess ary truth is a nalyti c, and there· f
fore known a priori, stems from an empi ricist tradition (reachin g back at
least to Locke), which has tended to take an extremely narrow view of the
nature of necessary truth . According to thi s view. if a sentence (a) does
r
not express a contingent matter of fact about the actual individua ls fall-
ing under its subject. then (no matter whether it is a logical tautology or a
conceptual truth) it is (b) true solely by vi rtue of the meaning of its terms.
As such , it is construed as (c) having no existential force with respect to
I
individuals and as (d) making no factual assertions whatever, but merely
as (e) expressing relations between ideas or meanings. But since. on this
view, the ,truth of such a sentence is grounded, not in any ob jective fea -
tures of the ex perienced world, but rather in the structural characteristics
of so me artifactual, conceptual, or linguistic sys tem, it is reasoned that
I
such a sentence (f) cou ld not possibly be justified by appeal to perceptual
experience.
Despite its long·stan ding popu larity, this line of argument is a rather
blatant non seq uicur. For unless one begins with the extremely dubious
I
assumption, presupposed by (e), that universal kinds are nothing but
meanings residing in heads or lexicons, it sim ply does not follow that a f
sentence satisfying (a) will hav e any of characteristics (b) through (el . Tn
particu lar. there seems to be nothing whatever improper in believing (as
Aristotle in fact does) both that a sentence such as
[ 58 J
Demonstration mId De{illitioll
I 59 I
Structu re of DemOl1stra tiOlts
niti on .. 1starti ng po ints of demonstrati on are indeed analytic (that is, Pla-
ton is tic) statemen ts that can be known at best in the " merely universal"
manner of Posterior Analytics 1.1, then they are logicall y incapable of
en ta iling de re knowledge of particulars.
This objection, li ke the one cons idered above, rests on a failure to sec
th at Aristotle's immanent realism cuts across the false dich otomies repre-
se nted by desc riptions (a)-(f) above. Again, on the ul tra-empiric ist atti-
tude toward necessary truth, a true sentence is either about indiv iduals
(in which case it is co mingent), o r (taken ex clusiv ely ) it is "merely ana-
lytic," in whi ch case it does not reflect o bjective features of the world) and
so must be known a prio ri. We already saw that the defi nitional apxai
discussed in Posterior Ana/yttcs 2.19 constitute violations of this alleged
divi sion si nce they are not about ind ividuals, yet they do represent objec-
tive features of the wo rld (relations among kinds), and moreover do co me
to be known through perceptual ex perience. Now we can see in addition
th at the immediate premises of demonstratio n also violate the empiricist
dichotomy, though for a different reason. Since they are referential uni -
versals, th ey are statements abo ut the actual individuals which come
under their sub ject terms, and so they obviously have factua l content, and
refl ec t objective features of th e physical world. For as we saw above, the y
would be false if thei r subjects failed to refe r, and would ex press different
fac ts if their subj eC[s referred to different individuals. Yet Ari stotle would
see no ne of this as reason to classify the m as merely conti ngent. In fact,
wh en a sentence like (2) is construed as a referenti al uni ve rsal, it refl ects
esse ntiall y th e sa me metaphysica l circumstance, that is, the same necessary
re lation between immanent kinds, as does its Platonistic counte rpart.
Once th is last point is recognized, then it becomes clear exactly where
the all eged unbridgea ble schi sm between analytic first principles and th e
ex istentiall y "loaded" explananda of scientific demonstration is traversed
in Aristotle's theory. My proposal is th at the presy llogistic fr aming stage
of demonstration is seen by him as a procedure for transforming me rely
universal knowledge of necessa ry connections among kinds into de re
knowledge of these very sa me co nnections (a nd others as we ll ). This is
achieved by deployin g a set of definitional apxai (prev iously acq uired in
the manner d iscussed in Posterior AnaJytics 2..19 ) upo n a field of scientifi-
cally interesting objects (w hose existence and place in the w ider sche me
have also been previously apprehended ) so as to gene rate a set of existen-
tiall y loaded prem ises express in g immediate and necessary co nnections
within th at field.
[ 60 )
,.
DemO/lst ra tioll alld Defillithm
There is, then, a very impo rtant sense in which the qu es tion of wheth er
the necessity operative in Ari stotle's theory of demo nstration sho uld be
construed as essentialistic or merely analyric is misconceived. The fa ct is
that what he regards as the ve ry highes t form o f knowl edge possib le is
typ ically conveyed by a special so rt of general sentence (the referenti al
un iversal) th at is about indi viduals and yet at th e same time exp resses
necessary relation s am ong the natu ral kinds to which those in divid uals
belong. One way to put this is to say that such selHences ex press ana lytic
(and a posteriori ) truths abo ut actu al indi viduals, qua members of th e
natural kinds to which they belong. Hence, their necessity can he sa id to
reside both in the analytic connections among those ki nds an d in th e esse n·
tialistic connecti ons between substantial 1M kinds and their actu al mem·
bers.Jq In epistemo logica l tcrms, this mea ns that knowled ge of such neces·
sary truths will req uire both prev ious ap pre hension of necessary relati ons
among th e kinds in question (that is, immediate defi niti ol1:l1 apxai). and
th e recogni tio n (implicit in the framing procedure) that certain aC Cl131 in·
dividuals fall un der those kind s. To return fu ll circl e to the p:lss:lge dis·
cussed at the ve ry begi nning of this chap ter, thi s is eX:lctly what is co n·
veyed by rhe description of de re kn ow ledge in Posterior Al1aiytics I. T <I S
"knowledge o f what was known previously, and at the same time .. . of
the things whi ch happe n to fall un der the universa l of whi ch there is
kn owledge."
[ 61 I
THREE
Premises
on the grou nds th at even jf its premises are both imm cdiate, it revc rses the
co rrect explanatory order between failure to twinkle and llC:1rneSS ex hi b-
ited in the genuine dem o nstration,
[ 65 I
Explanatory Content of Demonstrations
and so can not be said to reveal the "reason" (TO 8"on) for its conclusion .
Moreover, inasm uch as he regularly eq uates showi ng the reason for a
proposition with find ing, nO[ jusr any middle between irs te rms, but one
that co nsti tutes a "cause" (ai'novj Posterior Analytics I.2.7Ib9-16;
2.2.90a5-24), the problem Ari stotle finds with the first syllogism, in the
la nguagc of 7Ib20-26, is that althou gh (we may assume) both of its
premises arc true, immediate, and therefore primary, it is nonetheless not
a good demonstration because its minor premise, is not prior to, (objec·
tively) better known than, or causative of its conclusion.
As I hope to show, Aristotle's strategy for ensuring satisfaction of
these three re mai ning conditions, all of which pertain to the exp lanatory
co ntent of de mons trations, is re (] ected in his broad programmatic re·
marks in Posterior Analytics 1.10 when he ind icates that a demonstrative
science should confine itself exclusively to "per se" (KaO'aVro) attributes:
"Proper (tala) to each sc ience are the subjects whose existence it as-
sumes, and whose per se attributes ({mlr.Pxovra KaO'atira) it stud ies ....
Of these subj ec ts both the existence (ro dven) and the meaning (r06 i
d vm) are assumed, but as for the per se attributes, only the mean ing (Ti
CT71J.Lai vt t ) is assumed" (l.I O.76 b5-7). The central task of this and the
following three chapters, then, will be to develop a detailed interpretation
of Aristotle's doctrine of per se attributes, with the ultimate aim of show-
in g how it provides the basis of hi s views about the explanatory force of
demon stra tio ns.
T hroughout the Organon Aris totle gives numero us exa mples of sentences
co ntaining the modal-ad verbia l exp ressions O:VO:YK71 and ee O:l.IO:YK71.
What is mo re, he has quite a bit to say in those works about the logical
behavior of those expressions. For instan ce, in the twelfth and thirteenth
chapters of De Interpretatione, he co nsiders th e in te rd efi nability between
" necessaril y" a nd its correlative upossibly" (tv8exo ,uevov); in the ninth
cha pte r of the same work he points out differences in the sco pe of the
" necessarily" operator between co rrect and incorrect versions of the Law
of Excluded Midd le; and in the eighth through the twelfth chap ters o f
[ 66 I
The Cbaracter of DemOllstrafivl! Premises
I 67 1
Explanatory Content of DemoflStratiolls
CATHOLIC PREDICATION
I
First of ail, although this is not stated outright, it is clear enough th at the
background se t from which Aristotle distinguishes [he sorts of sentences I
he is interested in consists of true, indicative, present tense, declarative,
affirmative, and simple subject·predi cate se nten ces. For these are the only I
[ 68 J
I
I
The Character of DemOllStratil'e Premises
r 69 1
Explanatory Co,ltellt of Demonstrations
serve as a sc ientific premise, it must tru ly asse rt something abo ut the en- I
,I
tire extension of its subject tc rm.
By subcond ition (iii), wh ich requires th at th e p redicate of a K0'8oAOlJ
pred icatio n must be truly p redicated of its subject "q ua itself" (n
miro),
Aristotle means to insist that not o nl y must the predicate of such a state-
ment apply truly (and per se, as will be exp licated late r) over the en tire
I
exte nsio n of th e subjec t, but th ere must also be no class wider than the I
exte nsion of th e sub ject te rm (except possib ly that of the pred icate itself)
to all of whose membcrs th at pred icate also belo ngs (agai n, per se). In
other words , it is n ot enough that the predicate of a true KaOOAOlJ sen-
tence app lies both Ka1'Cx -rrO'V'TOS- and pe r se to its subjectj it is also neces-
sa ry that the subject of the se ntence have the wides t ex tens io n of any
I
terms for which this is the case, with the possible except ion of the predi-
cate itsel f.
A good way to ill us trate what this thi rd subconditio n of the condition
co mes to is the o ne chosen by Aristotle himse lf at 73b33-74a7. T he re he
cons iders a sente nce that meets both of th e other subcond itions but not
th e thi rd. The exa mp le given is
I 70 I
The Character of DelJlOl1stmtit e Premises
J
I 71 I
Exp/Oltatory Content of Demo11strations
[ 72 J
The Character of Demonstrative Prcmises
[ 73 1
Explanatory Content of Demonstrations
I 74 )
FOUR
I 7S I
Explanatory Content of Demonstrations
[ 76 J
Type 1 Per Se Predicatioll
fying "thin gs said withou t comb ination ," which were id enrined ahove as
terms, Aristotle makes 110 mention at all of th eir syntac tica l or gr:l m-
matical properties. Rather, his sole way of distinguishin g them is by refer-
ence to the d ifferent so rts of nonlinguistic entiti es they signify. In effec t,
then, the lingu istic ent iti es are classi fied vica rio usly und er such hCildings
as " things sa id witho ut combinati on that signify substmrccs." " things
said with out combina tion that signify qualities," :lnd so forth. As such,
the ostens ive classification of lin guistic items is but a thin ve il for a more
fundamental class ifi cation of their nonlinguistic significat:l, and this more
fundamental di vision is the ontologica l doctrine of the catego ri es.
One major reason this point is not always not iced, I think , stems from
Aristotl e's reli ance on linguisti c obse rvations in const rl1 ctin g his list of
categories. Whil e the ontol ogical divisio n is logic111 y prior to the lin-
guistic classifi cati on of "things said without combi nati on" (in the se nse
that each division in the fo rmer is wholly specified by reference to some
division in the latter), Ar istotl e also see ms to think, as Ackri ll puts it, that
"the identificat ion and classification of these [non linguisticl thin gs could
. . . only be achieved by attention to what we say.'" Thlls it is easy to sec
how confusio n about Ar istotle's in tentions can occur. For even th o ugh
the immed iate o bjects of the anno unced classification in the chapte r are
indeed expressions, and even though Aristotle's method of performing
the classification ce ntrall y involves linguistic observatio ns, the importa nt
work accom plished in the chapte r is nonetheless metaphys ical : the class i-
fication of non linguis tic enti ties into ultimate onto logical categories.
But let us now dig deeper into Aristotle 's genef:11 purposes in wri tin g
Categories 4. We have just seen th at hi s prim ary concern is to class ify
"things that are" ('TO: o/)'Ta) inro their ultimate genera. Bur docs rhi s mea n
th at his interes ts at that point are purely :111d simpl y in mctn ph ys ics for its
own sa ke? Some doubt abollt this view arises from the co ncurrent in ter-
est in language in the same chapter, which has alread y been noted. If all
Aristotle is doing there is classificatory metaphysics, then what is the
point of his mcnrion in g that there are si mple ex pressio ns th olt signify
items in each of the various catego ries, olnd that these simple express ions
are ca pable of hei ng inte rwoven together into scntl'nccs, whidl he says
are the only things that can be true o r tllse?
When Chapter 4 is ra ken by itself, th ese peculia rities do little more
th an raise th e suspic io n that Aristotle is not merely engaged in classi-
fi catory metap hysit·s as an end in itself. But when this cha pte r is pur be:
side Categories 2., th ere emerges the pos iti ve view th;H the ontological
doctrine of th e categories in Chapter 4 is actually p;.1tt of a !.trAer effo rt to
[ 77 1
Explanatory Content of Demoltstrations
provide what might be descri bed as an informal semantics for simple af-
firmative subject-predicate sente nces. In the first place, notice that Chap-
ter 2 presents none of the di ffic ulties of Chapter 4 in trying to decide
whether Aristotle is t<ll king about wo rds or things. It comes in two neatly
divided sections, the first of which is plainly about expressions, or "thin gs
sa id" ('TWV t..e-yoILivwlJj [aI6), and the second just as plainly about oon-
li nguisti c entities, or "things that are" (nv v OVTWV; la2.o ). Mo reover, if
we co nsider the sequence of the remarks made under these rwo headings,
the semantic interpreta tion just suggested is strongly ind icated. First, at
J a 1 S -20, Aristo tle introduces and gives examp les of the operation he
ca lls "combinat io n" (-r, CTVP:TfAOK-ry), which we saw above involves on ly
lin gui stic expressio ns. T hen at laz.o- bz.o, he introduces and discusses
two relations- the said-of and the inherence rel ations-whi ch are said
to hold betwee n nonlinguis tic items exclusively. Furthermore, from the
actua l examples prov id ed, we ca n also infer that some (and probably all)
of the things that ca n stand in these rel ations are the very things said in
C hapter 4 to be signified by expressions that undergo combination. If thi s
informat ion is put together with what was extracted earlier from Chapter
4, it is th en possible to identify a set of Aristotelian principles that may
q uite plausibly be rega rded as the rough outli ne of a semantical system:
All that is needed to make these principles into a fully explicit seman-
tic for atomic se ntences - is a statement t11at re lates the truth of ttue
atomic sentences to the two ontological relations memioned in (54). Al -
though th ere is no such truth analysis actually expressed in Ca tegories
1-4, Montgome ry Fu rth has plaus ibly reconstructed a partia l one on th e
basis of Aristotle's discussi on of exa mples there. K According to this recon -
stru ction, the analysis proceeds in two ste ps, which can be seen by con-
sid ering any true atomic sentence, say one about Socrates. Such a sen-
[ 78 J
Type J Per Se Predicatio/t
te nee will have th e general form "Socrates is F" (or perhaps just "Soc rates
F," since in Greek the copula is dispensa ble), w here F is some suitable
simple predicate ex press ion. Th e im portant thi ng to notice here is that
substituends for F in thi s schema can include prcdicarive (th at is, verba l
o r adjec tiva l) express ions such as "walks" an d "( is) mi l," ;lS well ;l S sorta!
nom ina l expressions such as "(is a) n1.1Il." According to Furth , no matter
what F signifies (a nd so, whe ther it is predicarivc or no mi na l), S tl Ch '1 sen-
tence ca n first be " thrown in to a sta nd ard and ca non ica l for m, technica l-
ese: 'Fness is predicated of "Karrryopc'iTal." of Socrates."' ~ Thi s ca noni-
ca l translatio n, on the Furth reco nstruction, Gill then be further ana lyzed
as expressi ng o ne or the Olher of two "deep st ructures": its truth will be
ex plai ned, dependi ng on what the o rigi nal prcdk atc F was, either by the
fact that Fness is said of Socrates, or by the bc t tilM rness illheres in
Socrates. t!l
It sho uld be men tioned here thM there are se ri ous lise-mentio n con fu-
sions involved in Aristotle's use of the verb "to pred ica te" (KCX'17r yop£:iv)
in Ca tegories. He uses this te rm ill such a w id e~o pe n sense rh<1t se ntences
contain in g it mayor may nO[ have sub ject ter ms th:n refer to lingui stic
expressions. Fo r instance, at 2a8 he all ows that white (w hich is said to he
presen t in body, an d is th erefore non li ngu ist ic) is <1l so predi cated of body,
whe reas 2a20 cl ea rl y indicates the possi bility that :I "n;111lC" (i.ivo,uo:) (a ll
also be predicated of a subject. In the ;lbsellce of quot:lt ioll dev ices, this
d ual use of the ve rb often produces great con fusion in atte mpts to unde r-
stand particular occurrences. For exa mple, the sentence "A"imal is prcdi-
cated of man" at 2a38 co uld mean ei ther th:l t the ge nus ani mal is predi-
cated of the species man, or that the term animal is pred icated of m::l.I1 .
Fortu nately, the verb to predicate occurs only in th e intcrmediate stJge
of the sema n tica l analysis we have been di scussi ng, so its pro hl ems do not
reach the cri ti cal aspect of that analysis, the d isjul1l:rive npp iicario n of the
said-of and inhere nce tel atio ns over the entire dJSS of truc momic sen-
tences. For Aristotle makes it clea r tha t these are o ntological rcl atio ns
that always stand between extralingui stic thi ngs signified hy se nten tia l
elemen ts, neve r between sentential elemen ts th emselves, and so h is refe r·
ences to these rel atio ns a re not infec ted by the ambi gl1iry observed in hi s
use of the verb to predicate. T herefo re, the p robl ems ;lhovc with the ve rb
KaTTrYopei.v can be circumvented by sim ply co llapsi ng the two steps into a
single truth analysis from which the offending idiom has hee n el iminated:
(55 ) If "A is B" is true, then (where "A" sign ifies 1\, ;mt!
"B" sign il1es B) either B is said of A or R in heres
in A.
[ 79 1
Explanatory Content of Demonstrations
I 80 )
Type J Per Se Predic,/tioll
Category of Substance, such things::ts "the particular man " (0 Ti.S- av()pw-
1TOS') and "the particular horse" (6 Ti., l7T7rOS'; la' .~-14).
(ii ) Secondary substances (oc: vn:pcu ovo-ien). These are wh::tt Aristotle
also so metimes refers to as genera (yiv.,,) and species (f:~o.,,) in the Cate-
gory of Substance, and are app.uen tly said of both the individuals they
contain and the subo rdin ate species they incilld e.l~ Th e examples given
are "man" (6 aIlOpw7ro<;) and "animal" (TO ~~Oll; 2.<1 T R).
(iii ) NOllsubstantial particulars. These are the an:llogues of primary sub-
sta nces in the nonsubstanti:d categories, because they can ollly stand 011
the right side of the said-of relation. Th ey ::1lso inhere in primary suh-
stances. The examples given are "the particuhlr [piecel of gra ml11::tti c::t1
knowledge" (7j TI.<; 'Ypap..J.l.,anKr,), which inheres in rhe (particuhu ) so ul,
and "the particular white" (TO Ti. A6VKOII) which inheres in the (particu-
lar) body (1327-,8 ).
(iv) Nmlsubstantialulliuersals. These, fil1<l lly, ::tre the cou nterparts of sec-
ondary substa nces within the nonsubstantial cMcgories. They <lrc said-of
type (iii) entities, as well as their OWJl suhordin::lIc types, and they inhere
in entities of both types (i) and (iil . Aristotle gives as an example of this
division "color" (TO xpwJ.l.,a), whi ch he S:lys inheres both " in hody" (iv
o-Wj..LaTL) a nd "in a particu lar body" (iv nvi. <Twp.an) ::tnc! whit.:h presum -
ably is also said of a particula r co lor (21H -6) . (I
However, even though it is easy enough to iden tify p:u:1digm ex-
amples of each of these c1assific:ltions, Categories 2. leaves quite :1 lot un-
sa id about rhe metaphysical na ture of the four types of entities that make
up (he tetrachotomy. In the case of type (il. prima ry substances. we 1.::111 at
lea st get so me cl ue by ostension, si nce the (presumahly parndigm:uic) ex-
amples given of this type, a particular man and a particllbr horse, arc
quite easily recognized as concrete, individual, livin g things. Eve n ill this
case, however, there is no more than it glimmering of the met:lphysical
analysis to which AristOtle evcnrually subjects primary substance in t he
Metaphysics. I .. And he tell s us even less about the natures of the clltit ies in
his t hree remaining divisions. 17 We may be prerty sure, given his repeated
railings against the Academy, that Aristotle docs not regard universa ls
(that is, entiti es of types [iiJ and [iv ]) I ~ ill a Platonic m:1llllcr as separate
and self-suffic ient existen ts, but the re still remains a phlrality of charac-
terizations of universals that are equally compatible with what littl e he
says about them in the ea rl y works"~
The most prudent course in th e face of SlH.:h paucity of information is
one of restraint. The fac t is that Aristotle is nor overly concerned in the
I 81 )
Explanatory ColttelTt of Demomtratiolls
early works w ith metaphysics, and it is diffi cult if not imposs ible to im-
port sll ch concerns into them withou t relying on ass umptions and con-
cepts they do not actually discuss. For all we kn ow, Aristotle si mply did
not confront the problem of de termining the exact nature of universa ls
(or for that matter, the exact nature of ind ividuals) unti l later in his ca-
reer. In accordance with these observations , I sha ll adopt a po li cy of evad-
ing these issues throughout this work, by sim ply underlining references to
the entities of types (ii )-(iv) an d leaving open the question abou t th e na-
tures of their referents.
However, eve n witho ut knowi ng the exact natu re of all of the types of
enti lies divided by th e tetrachoto my, we ca n discern in Aristorle's p resen-
tation of it the intended dependence of the said-of and inheren ce relations
on his doctrin e of tbe catego ries. Simply put, the said-of relation is such
that its left ter m is always so me hi ghe r kind in some category, and its
right term is some kind or particular wi thin the same category, whereas
th e inherence relation always has a primary o r second ary substa nce as its
right term, and some item in one of the non substa nti al categories as its
left term, These dependences can be d istill ed in to the followin g two addi-
tional principles of the sys tem S.,:
To be sure, the di sti nction hetween necessary and contin gent truth is
not one of the explic it subjects of Catego ries 1-5. and I have no t been
meaning to clai m otherwise. On th e interpretation I have been defending,
the sa le fun ct ion of the semantical theory (5.,) con tain ed in those chapters
is to spec ify the ontological conditions underlying the truth of all true
atomic se nten ces. Even so, it wou ld be hard to deny that some sem itivity
on Ari stotle's part to the distinction betwee n necessity and contin gency is
re flected by the fact that 5., docs afte r a ll emp loy two different on tol ogica l
relatio ns (i n contra st, fo r instance, to Pl ato's single partic ipatio n relation)
in orde r to accomplis h this fun ction.!' For it is reasonab ly clear that the
distinction between sentences whose truth is ex plained by the sa id -of and
inherence rel ati o ns co incides ~t le ast roughly with th at between necessary
and co ntin gent truth . Fo r insta nce. such "definitiona l" tru ths as "Man is
an im al," "Soc rates is man," and "Wh ite is a color," will be analyzed in Su
as expressi ng in stan ces of the sai dvo f relation , whil e merel y accidenta l
truth s sll ch as "Socrates is pale," will be expla in ed in terms of th e inher-
ence of paleness in th e subject. For this reason, it is not surprising that
[ 82 J
Type 1 Per Se Predicdlioll
I 8.1 J
Explanatory Contell! of DelnO flstratiolls
th emselves are sim ply too coarse to expla in t he truth of atomic sentences,
a nd so mu st be augmented by fine r intraca tegoria l distin ctions.
Aristotle never gives a genera l systematic treatment of the inherence
rel ation, nor eve n attempts to do so.l! T hi s is pro babl y beca use he saw a
great many (if not a ll ) ins tances of the in herence relation as the resu lts of
the ope rat ions of " ch a nce" (r, rox 7) ). And in view of the disparaging
th in gs Aris totle says about the prospects of a ny scientific study of the for-
I
I
tuito us (for exampl e, at Posterior Ana fytics I. 30. 87hI 9 - 28), it is ha rdly
surp ris in g tha t he never attem pted to give a co mpletely ge neral accoun t of
tru ths th at he th ought to be th e res ults of its operati on .
O n the o th er hand, Aristo tle does even t ua ll y say quite a bit mo re
abo ut th e nat ure of sa id -of predica ti ons tha n what is given by (56). In
b ct, I w ill now develop a n inte rpretatio n of Aristotl e's discuss ion of type 1
per se predica tion at 73a35 -3 8 o n whi ch it ide ntifies furth er conditio ns
fo r the said -.of rela tion. O n th e aCCQuO[ I p ropose, these further condi-
ti ons a re not exp ressed in te rms of th e coarse onto log ica l di vis io ns of
Categories 4. but rath er in term s of finer, in tracategoria l dis tinctions that
I sha ll a rgue a re a lready imp li cit in the methodo logy Aristotle emp loys to
develop his li st of categor ies in the fi rst pl ace . As waS mentioned earl ier in
con nectio n w ith Ackri ll , this methodo logy centrall y in volves Ari stotl e's
explo itatio n of lin guistic obse rvations. It will now be useful to examine in
more deta il exactly how he uses such obse rva tions to a rri ve at his list of
categories. Alth ough there is not m uch ind icat ion in rhe Categories itself
of how Aristot le does this, Ac krill l.! has fou nd ev id ence in Chapter 9 of !
Topics I tha t he acru a ll y employs two distinct procedures t hat he a ppar-
en tly th inks yield identica l res ults. Both ca n be t hought of as lingu istic in
i
the sense that they invo lve conside ring the range of intui tively appropri- I
ate answers to certain ques tions, the main d ifference betwee n th em be ing
that in one proced ure d iffe rent q uestions a re asked abo ut a sin gle thing,
while in the other a single quest ion is as ked a bout diffe rent t hi ngs. H ence, I
sha ll refer [Q th e two p roced ures res pective ly as the multiple-question
an d the single-question methods. T he nat ur e of the two methods, a nd the
differences between them, will come into view as I present each as an an-
notated se t of directions for the constructio n of catego ries of being.
Ii
I
TH E MU LT IPLE-QUESTION METH O D ..!
Step J: Take before your mind a single primary sub-
stance,S (fo r examp le, a pa rticula r man or a
pa rticular ho rse).
[ 84 J
Type f Per Se Predicatioll
It will be observed that this initiJI step presupposes the ability to distill·
guish between subst<lnces (more p~rticl1larl y. pril1l~ry substances) and
other types of entity. Apparently Aristotle is thinking of the cJtcgories as
constructed by this method in his discussion of the tetr<lcbotomy in Cate-
gories 2, since in that di scussio n 31so he see ms to take the substance ver-
sus non substance di st incti on as an ungucsrionnhlc :lI1d unanalyz~hle fact.
Step 2.: List the most hnsic (most gencr;ll) qll ~st i Clns th;1t
ca n be as ked ahullt S.
The actua l li st of such basic qu es tion s Aristo tle thinks will be pro-
duced in t hi s step are: "What is it ?" (Tl. i(TTi;), " How is it?" (7TOtOIj: ),
"How much is it?" (1T()(TOIj:), "What relation docs it stand ill ?" (7rp0<; Ti:),
"Where is it?" (7TOV:), "When is it?" (miTe:), "'n w h ~lt :1ttitud e is it?" (TI.
KttTat:), " In what state is it?" (TL ix eL: ), "What is it doing?" (Tl. 1Tou:i:),
and "Wha t is being done to it?" (TL mY<rxet:). There is ~ minor prohl em
at thi s point with Ackrill's description of the method. It see ms that if steps
I and 2 are to yield a comp lete list of such basic ques tions, th en the initial
cho ice of the substance to ask about will be cru cial to the method. For if
the in iti al choice of S were, say, <l boulder, then presumably the ninth
question would not appear beca use rocks do not do anything. Or if S
were one of the numbers (which Aristotle sometimes thinks of ;lS sub-
sta nces), then the fifth question (Where is it?) would nor appear.
There are two different WJYS to get .Hound thi s diffi culty without
drastically alterin g Ackrill 's reconstruction. We: might simply reg~lfd th e
method as an ideali zmion in which steps I and 2. arc perfurmcd for every
substance, thus in surin g a complete list. Alternatively, it Illay he that th e
initia l choice of 5 really is crucial to the method, :lnd t hat wh;lt is to be
chosen is not just ;lny substance, but a p;lrmligm;nic suhstance. This sec-
ond alternative is at least hinted at by the fa c t thm th e suhstnllce Aristotl e
himself seems to choose is a particular man, the SO rt of thing which he
generally regards as the most importa nt :md intercsting kind of primary
s ub sta n ce.!~
[ 85 [
Explanatory Content of Demonstrations
in it, o rdered so th at the last term to occur is topmost, a nd let LIS refer to
the ch ain which is ini t iated by as king abou t so me ent ity X :1S X'S Chai n.
Ir might occur to th e reade r here that in some c~scs th is ste p C:1 llnot he
co mpl eted (th at is, th at so me ch ai ns mi ght be in fi nite). This app:1relH ros~
sibil ity al so occurs to Aristo tl e (in a slightl y d iffere llt co ntext), a nd he
constructs a proof in Posterior Analytics 1.19-22.(8 rln9 - 84 b 2..o) t o
elim inate it. 27 Furth er, the possi bili ry of pe rfo rm in g thi s step in a way
that produ ces consiste nt resu lts presu pposes th at fo r eac h e nt ity th ere is
exactly o ne a ppropriate answer (or, as Aris[Qtlc puts it at Categories
5 .2b7- I 3, o ne " most infor mative" [yvetJptJ.LCoTaTovl a nswer) (Q the q u es ~
tion "What is it ?" W hil e thi s might seem to liS q uite d ubio ll s, Aristotle
ap parenrly endo rses so me doctrin e of na t ura l kin ds w hich he beli eves wi ll
ins ure thi s res ul t.
Step 3: When step 2. has been perfo rmed for each melll -
be r of the original co llectio n, co nsr ru ct an 011 -
tological classifica tion (a category) A for every
exp ression "A" which occurs topmost in ono.! or
more chai ns.
Th us, for in stance, if YO ll fin d (as Aristotl e ap pare ntl y docs) thM th e
chain init iated hy asking "What is it?" of a p:l rt icul ar co lor ends with the
same q uesti on bein g asked (but not a nswe red) :lbollt q ua lity in general.
you the n constru ct a category of Qua lity.
Some exa mp les sho ul d show how this met ho d is intended to opera te.
Sup pose t hat a mo ng your o rigin al co ll ection there arc the fo ll ow ing
items: (i) Socrarcs, (ii) a particula r ho rse (say, Swa ps), (iii ) the species
man, (iv) a parti cul ar co lor (say, w hite!!!), (v) a pa rri cui:lr t:lste (say,
so urness 11l~)' an d (vi ) the general color wh i t e.!~
Let us then imag ine that th e cha in s generated by pe rfo rming step 2.. on
these ite ms are represe nted as follows: ! ~
[ 87 [
Explanatory Content of Demonstrations
Now since the topmost expressions in chains (i)-( iii) are "substance,"
and the topmost exp ressions in chains (iv) - (vi) are "quality," in order to
perform step 4 you pu t all of the items signified by expressions in (i)- (iii)
in the category of Substance, and a ll those signified by expressions in
chains (iv)- {vi) in to the category of Quality.
It will be observed that there arc some item s, such as footed animal,
which get put into the sa me category more than once, as it were. This is
because certain segments of different chains arc identical. In fact, more
can be sa id: if a single item ever appears in any two cha in s, the Aristo-
teli a n assumption that there is always a unique answe r to the "what is
it?" question entai ls that the two chains in question will be identical from
the shared item up, This is the fa ct on which the medievals traded when
they constructed what ca me to be known as the "tree of Porphyry" out of
this Aris(Qtelian doctrine. Although there is no evidence that Aristotle
himself actually con nated chains in this manner, it is easy enough [0 sec
how he could h~ve. If we simply regard any two Iike·membered cha in seg-
ments as (I single segment, we will in effect construct a hierarchica l, or
inverted tree stru cture out of Aristotle's classification. Moreover, the re-
quirement of step 3 that all cha in s whose contents are included in a
given category possess a common topmost member, plus the Aristotelian
uniqueness assumption just mentioned, and the additio nal assumption
that each uncombined signifying express ion signifies exactly one entity,
together insure that the Aristotelian catego ries are arranged into mutu-
ally independent stri ct hierarchies. \ U
[ 88 J
Type 1 Pcr Se Predicatio/l
I 89 I
Explanatory COlltellt of Demollstrations
question is asked about eve ry sort of entity, and so can properly evoke
answers that signify items in any of the c3tegories ..I.I
Against this background, I want now to suggest that if the exp li cation
of type I per se predication at Posterior Analytics 73a35-38 is recog-
nized as a place where the expression "what-is-it" is used in the wider
sense of Topics 1.9. and hence as an allusion to the si ngle-question
method, then Aristotle ca n be seen in that passage to have elaborated
upon the rudimenta ry semantical system So of the Categories by supply-
ing the finer, intracategorial, di stinction s necessary to give sufficiem con-
ditions for the said-of relation.
Let us first get a more precise understa nding of this wider use of the
what-is-it. Ackrill himself does not say anything on th is subject beyond
lhe remark quoted above. However, by exp loiting the above description
of that method, it will be possible to provide a clearer explication. In the
occurrence at Topics I03b28, as well as its many occurrences in Pos-
terior Analytics 73a35-br6, the expression "what-is-i t" is pan of defi-
nite nOlln phrase formed by putting a neuter singular article in front of it.
The who le phrase is then a nominalization of the "what-is-it?" question
that plays the title role in the single-question method. Now on the basis of
what we know about that method, we can make a pretty fair guess what
meaning Aristotle intends the noun-phrase to have. When he refers to the
what-is- it of so me item Y. he is us ing a very natural shorthand for refer-
ring to the entire class of entities signified during the course of completing
the entire seq uence of questions and answers initiated in step 3 of the
single-question method by asking "What is it?" about Y. In other words,
in this shorthand, X is in the what-is-it of Y just in case X is signified by
one of the expressions that occur in Y's chain.
We also saw earlier that th e items contained in each Aristotel ian cate-
gory are ordered in a strict hierarch y, and now we know the idencity of
the relation that so orders them. It is the relation (w hich I shall refer to as
re lation E) ex pressed by sentences of the form: X is in the what-is-it of Y.
If, now, the occurrence of "what·is-i t" in our postoperative ve rsio n of the
explication of type 1 per se predication at Posterior Analytics 73 a35-38
is taken as an instance of thi s wider lise, the first glimpse of Aristotle's
refinements on the theory Sn emerges.
In our initial discu ssion of Sn we saw that homocategoriality of subjec t
and predicate by itself does nor distinguish false homocategotial sen-
tences from genuine said-of predications, and that finer, intracaregorial
distinctions were therefore needed. Now we can sec that in the Posterior
Analytics Ari stotle ha s such finer distinctions in hand in the form of the
I 90 )
Type 1 Per Se Predicatioll
I 91 I
FIVE
1921
Typ e 2 Per Se Predicatioll
(55) If " A is a" is true, lhell (where "A" sign ifies A, ;lnt!
"B" signifies B) either B is sa id of A or B inheres
in A.
( I ) Man is (a n) an im al,
or
is t ypically a nom inal form (o r, as we mi ght spec ify further, a so rtal ex-
pression, thoug h thi s classifica tion is not so obviolls in a la nguage lacking
the indefinite article). Coll oquia l inheren ce predi c:ltiolls, on the othe r
ha nd, have as t heir predicate parts adjectiv~l or verha l form s.
But why does Ari stotle e1ecl' to exp ress thi s gr;llllmatical distinction by
means of th e pa rtici pation cond ition given at 2;1 19? The :-tllswer to thi s, I
believe, lies in the fac t th at in the OrgtlJ/ol1 only nom in al form s (roughly,
QVDf..LCXTa) are what may be legitim a tely repb ced by defining /ogoi . Thi s is
apparently a consequence of Ari stotle's tendency to think of the ohjects of
defin ition as things rather than ex prcssions .~ In the case of;l ty pi c:d snid -
of predication, the predicate is a lready in nom inal fo rm, :md therefore the
Clpplicability of the defining logos to what is signi fied by th e subject fol -
lows unproblema t icall y from Aristotle's o ft-re peated insistence that an
adequate definitory logos is always sub stitutahl e for the nam e of what it
defines. \
But now co nside r the case of a typic<ll inh erence predication,
Here things are not so simple. If subst itutivity of definitional equi valents
were allowabl e for adjectival exp ression s as well as t>IJ()p.o:ra, th en this
sente nce would satisfy the parti cipa tion condition, sin ce the phrase that
would be the definition a l equivalen t of " (is) ge nerous" ( rc rh~ps, " tends
I 93 1
Expfmtatory Content of DemollStratiolls
to give freely of himse lf ") is true of Socrates if (3) is true. But this is not
Aristotelian. For him the fact that the phrase "(is) generous" is adjectival
means that it is not a name and therefore has no definitionally eq uivalent
logos. What can be defined, on the other hand, is the entity signified by
"(is) generous," namely the igL'i generosity; a nd its defining logos (say,
"the propensity to give freely of oneself") is itse lf a nom ina l form, and as
stlch is intersubstitutable with the name "ge neros ity." Thus, Aristotle's
point in saying at 2.a2.8 that in rhe case of a predication such as (3), «nei-
th er the name nor the logos is predicated of the subject" is that both
To be more precise, [here are actually two distinct, though closely related,
diffi cu lti es occasioned by the evident meaningfulness of such sentences.
Onc is the semant ical problem o f providing an adequate explanation of
th eir [ruth cond ition s. The other, whose eventual solution w ill have a di -
rect bearing on the first, is the ontologica l problem of sayi ng where differ-
entiae fit into the classi ficat ory metaphysical scheme of the Categories.
Even before conside rin g his reactions to. them, it is not hard to guess
how Aristotle coul d have found himself in the midst of these difficulties.
In tbe Topics and elsewhere, his favorite manner of definition is per genus
et differentia. Moreover, inasmuch as this style of defi ning is the heart of
th e method of division practiced by Plato in the Sophist and Statesman, it
must surely be counted as part of the baggage Aristotle carried away from
the Academy. But it often happens that there is a price attached to Aris-
[ 94 I
Type 2 Per Se Pret/i,'afion
I 95 I
Explanatory COllteflt of Demollstrat;ollS
and then arguing that the logos of generosity is subst itutable for its name
in (3 ') without loss of truth. At base, the difficulty is this: since differentia
predications are like inherence predications (and unlike sa id-of predica-
tions) in the respect that their predicates are typica lly not sorta ls, then
Aristotle's heroic efforts norwithstanding, the fact is that differentia predi -
cations will satisfy the participation condition only if inherence predica-
tions sa tis fy it also. Hence, insofar as Aristotle is unwilling to give up the
participation condition as a means of di stinguishing tbe two types of sen-
tence tteated by theory So. he cannot legi timately treat differenti a predi-
cations as expressing the said-of relation .
The prin ci pal contention of this chapter is that Aristotle was somewhat
more sllccessful in treating differentiae in the Posterior Analytics, and
that his explication of type 2 per se predication at 73a38-b4 can plausi-
bly be interpreted as a place where this better treatment occurs. Admit-
tedl y, this passage does not co nta in anything more about the relation be-
tween differentia and differentiated species-indeed, discussion of that
mat te r is put off until the Metaphysics"- but it does at least go some way
toward spec ifyin g the relation between a differentia and the genus whose
species it differentiates.
Aristotle speci fies the larter relation by invoking an obse rvation he
makes in rhe Topics about differentiae that has been largely misunder-
stood. At Topics 4.6.12.8a26, Aristotle states that differentiae (o r more
accurate ly. terms that pick our differentiae) always signify a "q ualifi ca-
tion of a ge nu s" (1TOtOT17TO:' TOU yivolJl)). This point is then illustrated by
the observation that a person who uses the expression "footed," which
signifies a differentia, thereby signifies "some: qualification" (1TOt.OIl n ) of
the ge nus animal.
Because of rhe occurrence of the expression 1TOtOIl (as well as its proper
nominal form 1TOUYr"fjTO:') here. and the fact that this is the same exp res-
sio n lIsed in the Categories to designate the'category of Quality, this pas-
sage has understandably led some to the mistaken view that Aristotle
puts all differentiae into th at category, HI which would unhappily suggest
that they must inhere in their respective differentiated species. BU[ despite
this so mewhat unfortunate choice of terminology, Aristotle's point here
in fa ct bas nothing at all to do with his theory of catego ries." Rather, it is
[ 96 )
Type 2 Per .'ole Predicatioll
simply a n obse rva ti on of th e preth eo re tieal bet about la ngu;1ge that ex-
press ions signifying differenti ae are always defin;lble by expressions of
the fo rm, "3 qua lifiGuion of <l> ," where til stands for the na me of th e
genus whose sub species the different!<1 in question differentiates.
It appea rs th at in the expl ica ti o n of type 2. per se predication, Aristotl e
incorporates thi s o bservation into hi s co nception of neccss;try definiti ona l
truth by expanding th e no tion of a w hat-Is-it for differentiae. Thi s expan -
sion comes naturally if o ne thinks of the w ha t-is-it of X quite ge nerall y as
the set of thin gs referred to in giving <111 exha ust ive answer to the ques-
tion, "What is X?" For whil e, on thi s understanding, th e w hat-is-it of a n
individ ual o r a kind will co ntain eve ryth in g of w hi ch it is a me mher or n
sub kind (that is, everythi ng signified in the chain gc nerated for it in the
single-question method exposi ted in th e last ch<1pter), the wh.n-is-it of a
differentia , on the o th er ha nd, will cont~i n not hing more than th e ge nus
which it divides. To lise Aristotle's eX;1mple, if one were to ask "What is
footedness?" the com pl ete <1I1SWer, ";1 qual ifi..:arioll upon th e genus ani -
mal," wo uld make re fe rence to just a sin gle enti ty, the ge nus allimn!. O f
course, one could 3sk the further, obvio usly relevant, question , "What is
anima l?" but in so doing olle woul d, strict ly speaking. have moved ;lW;:ly
from the ori gin al question abo ut footcdness :llld taken up in stead th e
new question : "What is th at of which foo tedncss is ..1 qualifi cati on?" Now
since the wbat-is- it of a differentia is always single- memh ered in this way,
its logos will always comain just one Ilalll e: that of the gen us of which it is
a qualifica tion . I !
It will be reca ll ed that the probl em detected in th e Categories was that
diffe rentia- predi cntio ll s did not fall cl eanly 011 either side of th e said-o f
versus inheren ce distin ction presupposed by (SJ). Aristotle there wanted
to regard them :!.s definition:!.1 and necessary truths, but they hl iled to sat·
isfy an essentia l condition of th e o nl y definitiOiKl 1truths cou ntenan ced by
his theory of predication $" . We can now see that in Posterim· Allalytics
1.4 he gets aro un d this difficulty by repudiating the si mple dicho tomy of
the Categories and ma king room for anothcr defin itiona l rclation hesides
the said-of (type 1 per se) rclati on, one rh:1t holds bcrwee ll ;l differentia
a nd th e gen us it d ivides. II Th at he is nh le to describe [h ese two rebtions
in a way that makes them appe~r to be rhe in ve rses of O ll l' another, and so
to give the doctrine of per se predication the appea ran ce of h:1ving more
un ity than it actua ll y possesses, ca ll be credited to ;1 com bination o f lu ck
and in gen uity.
It might well be interjected <1t this poim that th e solminn just Olltlined
I 97 I
Explanatory Content of Demonstratiolls
I 98 J
Type 2 Per Se Predicatio/l
definition (S5) with one that recognizes three distinct types of ontological
configuration th at might underl ie <l tme predic:ltion:
(55') If "A is B" is true. then (where "An sig,nifles A, ilild " W' signifies B) eithcr
(i) B is in the what-is-it of A (th;l! is, II belongs per se, to A), or
(ii ) A is in the what-is-it of B (that is B bclong,s per St.'! to Al, or
(i ii) B inheres in A (tha t is, B helolJ~s borh per ;lo.:idens I and per a>.:ddclls!
roA).
[ 99 1
E:rplallatory COl/tent of DemOl1stratiOIlS
attribute belongs to its subject with one of two kinds of necessity: such
predications arc said to be necessary "either absolutely or [i n the manner
of} opposites" (71 c:t1TAWS- 71 Ta a/lTtKeiJu;/la). H Moreover, it ctppears that
Aristotle does not intend the distinction between these two types of ne-
cessity to cut across that between the two kinds of predications. All four
of the aHributes he uses for illustration in the last sentence of the passage
are genera ll y regarded by him as examples of "opposites" (al)'nKeip.6I)a),
in fact, odd and eve11 are explicirly mentioned as such at Categories
12a7, while at the same time each of them is also among rhe exa mples of
type 2 per se attributes given at Posterior Anaiytics 73a40. This by itself
shows that th e class of type 2 per se art ributes at least intersects the class
of opposites and is perhaps included in it. Put beside th e additional fact
that none of Aris totle's examples of type I per se attributes is ever re-
ferred to by him as an opposite, rhis gives us enough reason to surmi se
that the two distinctions in question are perfectly juxtaposed - th at Aris-
totle thinks of type I per se attributes as "absolutely" necessary, and type
2 per se attrihutes as necessa ry "in the manller of opposites." Ih
But what exac tl y are these two kinds of necessi ty? To my knowledge,
there is no passage in the Anaiytics, or for th at matter anywhere in the
Organon, where he elaborates to the least degree on his bareboned re-
ma rk at 74b22 that type 1 per se predications are "absolutely neces-
sary." r- Perhaps this is because he thi nks th is type of necessity is so famil-
iar thm it should be readily un derstood without explanation, or perhaps
his references to it are meant to reflect some manner of speaking curren t
among his contemporaries. A more likely hypothesis, however, is that
even if he realizes in these ea rly writings that much more can (and must)
be s:lid o n this topic, he simply has not yet reached the point of formulat-
ing the pertinen t questions , let alone working out his an swers [Q them. r ~
It was suggested in chapter 2 that in the Posterior Al1alytics he sees the
necessity thar attaches to definitional truths as grounded both in analytic
rel ations among gene ral (natural) kinds, and in essentialistic connec tions
between primary substances and their proximate species, but that he does
not clearly recogni7.e at that point that there are two different rela tions
involved. This stands in marked contrast to Books Z-8 of rh e Metaphys-
ics, which distinguish between the genus-species and kind-member rela-
tions, and foc us on the lane r (conceived there as the relation between a
"composite" individual and its "substantial form," o r "essence"). Hen ce,
there is reason ro suspect that this issue is so intertwi ned with the genera l
problem of giving a satisfa cto ry accou nt of Aristotle's essentialism that its
I 100 J
Type 2 Pc/" Se Predication
resolution must awa it a sorting our of the comp lex tangle of rhilosophi ~
cal doctrines tha t comprise the centra l books of th e MetalJhysics.
But wh atever the reaso n for the virW:11 lack of edification from Ar i s ~
rotle on the nature of the absoll1 tc necess ity of type I per se pred ica tions,
th e prospect of apprehending the rC';1 sons be hind hi s insiste ncr thai type z
per se attrib utes belong to thei r su bjects necessarily "in tlu.' manner of
oppos ites" is initi a ll y much more promi si ng. In the lill es that follow illl -
mediately upon the articl1lation of the gener•.ll thesis at 73 bI9 -ZZ., he
offers the foll owing explanation, which is c1C:Hly supposed to <.lP ply o nl y
to type 2 per se attributes : "For [the opposite of a given attrilm tel is the
contrary, or the pri va tion, or th e co ntra dic tory lof th t' ,ltrrillllle ! within
the sa me genus. For instance, not~ oddlless is evenness within fthe ge nlls]
numb er, in asmuch as the fi rst entails th e seco nd. So, ~ ill ce it is necessa ry
that eve rythin g be affirm ed or denied, Itype 2] per ~c attr ihutes ;He IlC C ~
essa ry" (T\l122 -24) .
Even thou gh this expbnation is mystify ing in some respec ts, at least
its initial assu mption s are fairl y eviden t. To begi n w it h, if the f:i at hZ.4 is
pl ausib ly read as "since" instea d of "if!" then it is fa irl y clear that Ari s~
ro de's conclusion depends ultimately on wh;lt sec ms to bc sOlne Illodal ~
ized version of the Law ot" Excluded Middle (l.EM) emhedd ed in that
clause, "sin ce it is necessary that eve rything be affi rmed or denied" (h2.4).
Now it was seell in chapter I t ha t this law is one of til l' h'l ckg roll nd
assumptio ns required both by Pbroni c Division ,lnd by t he ;1llaptatioll of
that method which Aristotle incorporates into his own t heory of demoll ~
stration . In deed, it is plausihle to unde rs tand the main sl1hj ect of Po s ~
terior Anaiytics 73bZ.2 - 24 ::IS a special sort of neccss iry rhnt he takes to
be uncovered by sHch divis iona l procedures. However, it w ill emerge in
chapter 7 tha t bo th Pbro a nd Aristotle h:lVe serio ll s doubts ;lhollt th e
mea ningful ness of the law ill an unrest ri cted for m whe re it ~lppl i cs to
every subjec t and eve ry attributc wh:usoever. '" Co nseque ntl y, Aristotle
for his pan tends always to unde rstan d and ;l pply the pri nciple onl y in
restricted form. In fact, hi s <lp pl icatioll of the law at" 7 .;112:>.. - :>..4 appea rs
to be doub ly restric ted . In t he first place, it conform s to his gelle ral posi ~
tion, annou nced at Posterior Allalytics r. r 1, 77:12. 2- 26, that t he law is
mea ningful o nl y w hen restricted to subjects within some spec ified gelllls,
in th is case the genus Humber. But mo rt' than that, in thi s p<lrti cuiar con ~
text it is also a pplied to a very s pe c i ~ll sort of attrihu te, w hich Aristotle
refers to as "o pposi tes," among which we ha ve aln:a d y seen he includes
type 2 per se attri butes. Wh eneve r he prese nts CX;llllPies of orposites,
I 10 1 I
Explallatory Coment of Demoltstratiolls
they are invariably given in pairs (which I shall call "A-pairs") such as
(odd, even). (straight, cUrl/ed), a nd (healthy, diseased), each of which ex-
haustively divides up the members of some ge nus. Let us say that a given
A-pair is appropriate to the genus it so divides. Furthermo re, the lan -
guage of this passage indicates that Aristotle is interested here in pairs of
attributes rhat carve out natura l and necessary partitions within th eir re-
spect ive genera. 1t1 For this reason it appears that he is relying not on the
relatively weak modal form of the LEM:
whi ch would hold gene rall y for any attribute that could be mea nin gfully
applied within G, but rather on the considerab ly stronger thesis:
The evidence for this is to be found in a nother feature of opposi res that
Aristotle invokes at 7Jb2j: "E.g. Not-oddness is evenness within [the
ge nus J number, inasmuch as the second is entailed by (€7Tercu) the first."
T hi s sugges ts th at he sees the division effected by A-pairs as sufficiently
nonaccidental to support th e very stro ng intensional relations of property-
idelltity and property-entailment. That is, tbe possess ion of one opposite
in an A-pair by a member of the appropriate genus is said here to be en-
tai led by, and even tantamount to , th at individual's lacking its partner.
Hence, the modal character of the divisions effected by oppos ites is ap-
parently seen by Aristotle as sufficient to underwrite his lise at 73b23 of a
restricted substitutional premise which I wi ll refer to as the Principle of
Opposites:
[ 102 J
Type 2 Per Se Predicatioll
trans ient state of affairs wo ul d not justify connaring the propenies of sit·
t;ng and not·stm/dillg within the hum~m spec ies, nor wo uld it even justify
the assertion that these properties enta iled aile a nothe r.
Aristotle's argument, then, is that STRO NG MLEM and (PO) together
with the implicit assumption that any pair of type 2. per se attributes form
an A·pa ir of opposites. yield the conclusio n th at such attributes belo ng
necessaril y to the mem bers of the genus to w hi ch that A ~ pa ir is appropri .
ate. As it applies to the pair odd and el'en, Aristorle's actua l exa mple at
73b2.2.-24, it purports to show that beca use these two attr ibutes for m a n
A· pair appropriate to the gen us I1Im/ber, it follows t hat they belo ng nec·
essaril y to numbers.
But which numbers in particular? It is nor yet dear what exac tl y the
argument is supposed to show. In the passages quo red ahove (7.~ hI(, -19,
2.4 , 74 b6-7), Aristo tl e's conclus ion is represented as t he thesis that a cer·
tain group of attributes belong necessJrily to thei r subjects. Howeve r, ill
view of the fac t that the anno unced primary purpose of Posterior A,I1l·
Iytics 1.4 is to isolate a class of necessa ry statements that can fUllct ion as
syllogistic prem ises in demonstration (73 a2 T- .'i), we still mll st <:lsce rtain
precise ly which statements comprise the sort of predic<1rion argued to be
necessary at 73b2 2 -24. Virtu ally all of the exa mples of type 2 per se
predication in Posterior Al1aiytics 1.4 are g ive n in the fOrtn of indefinite
o r unql1antified sentences such as:
[ 103 I
Explanatory Colltent of Demonstrations
This view claims some initial credibility from the fact that the necessity of
sentences like (9) is in fact entailed straightforwardly by the premises of
the argument. On this reconstruction, the argument presumably com-
mences with a va lid application of WEAK MLEM!l to the attribute odd and
the genus l1umber,
to which (PO ) is then applied to yield the necessity of (9). Barnes's view
also accords well with Categories 12.a7, where Aristotle express ly affirms
the necessity of (9). But despite its prim a facie plausibility, there are twO
independently conclusive reasons why Barnes's interpretatio n of the argu-
ment canno t stand.
The first of these is th at sentences like (9), involving as they do disjunc-
tive predication, sim ply do not have the requisite form to serve as syllogis-
tic (and hence demonstrative) premises. Thi s difficu lty apparently worri es
Barnes himself, judging from what he says in hi s notes to 73a35-b4 di-
rectly after proposing to read (7) and (8) as equivalent to (9): "Neverthe-
less, such disjunctive examples are not easily read into 73<l37-40 .. . :
they do not seem to 'say one thing of another' (d. 72a9); and they arc
likely to be, at best, rare in the scie nces" ( J .J 5). But eve n this modest
cla im with which Barnes closes his discllssion is not in fact supported by
the texts. The use of sentences like (9) in Aris[Qtclian scientific reasoning
is not just rare ; such sente nces never occur as premises in demonstrative
sy llogisms. Not onc of Barnes's purported examples of this allegedly rare
occurrence proves on close reading to inhabit a genuine syllogistic con-
I 104 J
Type 2 Per Se Predicatioll
text.!4 And this total hlCk of textual support for Barnes's view c.lI1nor be
explained away by hypothes izing some eccentric narrowness in Aris-
totle's choice of examp les. There are a numher of passages in the Alla-
lytics (for example, Prior Al1aiytics 24a16, and Posterior Anaiytics 72<19)
that explicitly prohibit the lise of anything but simple two-rerm (that is,
single-predicate) sentences as syllogistic premises. Barnes's view the refore
requires us to understand Posterior Al1aiytics I.4 as containing a rMhcr
blatant case of ig1loratio elenchi, because it has Aristotle at 73b2.2 - 24
endeavoring to support his thesis that certain demonstrat ive pre mi ses are
necessary (73a21-25) by arguing for thc necessity of a grou p of sen -
tences that do not and cannot function as prcmises in demonstration .
Any proposal that assigns such a blunder to Aristotle shou ld be regarded
as an absolutely last resort.
There is another equally compel ling reason that Barnes's interpreta-
tion of the argument cannot be right. It represellts Aristotle as helieving
that his conclusion, that all numbers are necessarily odd or even, is some-
how expressible by his statement (73bl9, 24, 7 4b7) to the effect that
each of these attributes, taken separately, is necess •.lrily possessed by
numbers. This would involve Aristotle in some v..uiant of the mmbl fal-
lacy of supposing that the necessity of a disjunction somehow distributes
to its disjuncts. Yet he explicitly identifies and rejects this fallacious form
of inference in his discussion of the future sea battle at De Jllfcrpretdtiolle
9.19a2.9 - 33: "I say, for example, a sea battle must either take place to-
mOrrOw or not . No necessity is there, however, that it should come to
pass or that it should not. What is necessary is that eithe r it should hap-
pen tomorrow or not." Barnes is evidently aware of these d ifficulties, for
he seems in the end ro regard his proposal as no better than the best in a
bad lot. Consider his final words on the subject: "Rcfl.1ining rhe simple
predicate 'odd,' we might try taking not number, but a kind of number as
subject- e.g.: 'Every product of [two ] odds is odd.' But there is no smell
of this in the text" ( 11 5) .
Let us pause now and identify the adequacy l:onditions for the task at
hand: an altogether satisfactory interpretation of Posterior AlItllytics 1-4
should specify a class of Aristoteli<1n sentences that both (a) involve the
simp le and separate predication of type 2. per se attributes such as odd
and ellen so that they are well formed for syllogistic purposes, <1nd (h ) 'He
shown to be necessary by the premises of the argument at 7.1h2.2. - 24.
Barnes eviden tly believes that there are no sentences that satisfy both of
these conditions, and then reasons that his <1CColint should prevail by
[ 105 I
Explanatory Conten t of Demonstrations
I 106 )
Type 2 Per Se PrediClltioll
from any form of MLEM (w hich is <l universa l statement :thoU[ the logical
structure of the field of numbers, :tlld s:tys nothin g abo llt whether ..lilY
parts of tbat field arc fill ed) togethe r with some suhstitution rule. But this
ha s little to do with Ari sto tle ) for hi s particul;lr statements arc not exis-
tentially quantified.
Reca ll that I argued in chapter 2. that eve n {"hough "Every S is P" en -
ta ils "So me $ is P" in Aristotle's logic. one cannot represe llt thi s by simpl y
pa raphrasi ng an ex iste nti rc ll y "loaded" Aristmei ian uni versa l st<1tem ellt
as a co njunc tion of its universally q ll ~\Ilti(jed cou nrc rp ;u t with an ex isten -
ti ally quantified statem ent asserting the Iloll emptiness of its subject term.
Rath er, it was suggested, such a sentence should be understood as ex -
pressing (l multitude of singui:lr propositions, and so, ~lS ca rryin g corre-
spond ing presupp os iti o ns of sin gular existence for each o f the indi vid uals
involved in chose propositions. The key element in that ;1I1alysis was th:n
Ari stote lian universa l premises <I re to be treated, like singul ar sta tements,
as having di sc rete subject terms with referentia l functions. Now a parallel
po int can be made fo r the Aristotelia n pa rtic\llar statement. On this gen -
eral way of understa ndin g the relation hetween existence a nd predi cation,
just as "every $" is a term that purports to refer to every 011(' of rhe ;1ctl1al
S5, so "some S" should be rega rded likewise as ,1 discrete referring term
wh ose purported reference is some subset of a ll the actual 5s.!-:- Hell ce, it
is plausib le to surmise that in addition to the sort of sen tence that was
described as the "rcfcrenrial un iversa l" in chapte r 2., Aristotle's logic al so
recognizes a category of statemen t that we might call the referel1tial
particular.! g
However, if (7 b) and (S b ) are now understood ;1S rcfncnti:11 particu-
lars, it rhen becomes very easy to undersr:lI1d how Aristotle could see
them as the statements whose necess ity is ;It issue at Posterior Auolytics
73 b2. 2-2.4. For STRONG MLEM and (PO ) together impl y:
I 107 I
ExplmlOtory Content of DemonstratioflS
numbers . But these two distinct sets of singular propositions can also be
expressed respectively by
and
I 108 I
SIX
Per Se Predication
For each of the two senses of per se Aristorle explicates at Posterior Ana·
iytics I.4.73335 - b4, he also introduces and defines derivatively a com ~
plemcntary sense of "per accidens" (Kara CTvp,{3f:{3YjKOC; ). Th~lt is, some-
thing is said to be per accidens in a given sense, just in case it is not per se
in the corresponding sense. I shall now argue that Aristotle's disclIssion of
the third sense of these two expressions at n b6 - H differs from those of
the other three in that the recalcitrant senrences he is concerned to fit into
his theory in that passage are not, as in the surrounding passages, a cer-
tain type of per se predication, but rather a certain type of per accidens
predication. I shall first identify the trouhlesomc "accidental" prcdica·
tions involved, and then show how 73b6 - 8 Gill be viewed as an attempt
to deal with them.
An examination of SUl and especially of (57),
reveals that the theory sets very definite limits on the possibi lities of inter·
categorial predication. The on ly such sentences cOllntenanced are those
in which a nonsubstantial entity is predicated of a prilll;]ry or secondary
I 109 J
Explanatory Content of Demonstratiolls
su bstance. In particular, there is no poss ibi lity within that th eory of a true
intercategorial pred ication whose subject signifies a nonsubstance. How-
ever, there is co nclu sive evidence in the Posterior Analytics (a nd in the
Metaphysics) that Aristotle recognizes the ex istence of such sentences,
and thar he thinks them to be in so me se nse (to be explained below) pe r
accidens. For example, at Posterior Anaiytics I. [9.8] b2.4 he says that the
sen tence
Notice thM sente nces like (I), (3), and (4) pose no great difficulties for
modern phi loso phi ca l theo ries of language because such theories invari-
ab ly make use of two distinct types of semantical relations. One of these
types, which I shall ca ll context-independent, consists of those that hold
simply between expl'ession-types and extra linguistic enrities. 1 Fa miliar
examp les of this SOft of relation are the naming, denoting, and meaning
relations. T he other ty pe, which I shall ca ll context-dependent, consists
of th ose that hold between exp ress ion -to kens and extralingu istic entities.
Context-dependent relations, of which the most familiar is th e reference
re lation , can be described either stra ightforwardly as two-place relations
between tokens and the extralinguistic relata, or in a more complex man-
ner by spec ifying an expression-type, the extralinguistic relata, and vari-
ous other contextual factors such as the occasion of usc, speaker's intent,
ostensive gestures, and so fort h, that collectively fix a definite spatial and
I tempo ral location of a ce rtain employme nt of an express ion -type and
thereby indirec tly pick out an expression-token of that type. So, for in-
stance, the very same circumstance may be described either by saying:
Smith is the referent of the expression-token " my friend here" (which
token emerged frornJones's mouth while he was gesticul ati ng in a certain
manner at 3 :00 p.m., August 5, 1988, at the end of th e Newport Pier), or
by saying: Jones used the expression-type "my friend here" in conjunc-
tion with a certain gestu re at 3:00 p.m., August 5, 1988 , at th e end of the
[ 110 1
Type 3 Per Accidells alld Type 4 Per .lie Predic!lfioll
Newport Pier, to refer to Smith, even though the first describes;] two-
place relation between token and referenr, and the second a six -pbce re-
lation among an expression-type, a referent, a speaker, a gesture, a phlce,
and a time.
Now, if Aristotle's semantical aplKlrJtus contained the distinction he-
tween context-independent and context-dependent relarions, he could
dispose of sentences like ( r ), (3), and (4 ) without much trounle. He could,
for example, explain the truth of (T) by first noting that the exprcssion-
type white, when it occurs as subject in a true token of that sentence, does
not refer to its own llsual denotation, which is of course the nonsubstan-
tial entity whiteness, but rather to some p;uricubr (primJry) substance,
and then explaining the truth of that token as due to the bct t'h'lt the
substance so referred to is in fact a mall.
It is quite apparent, however, thm Aristotle does not have this distinc-
tion availa bl e to him either in the Categories or in the Posterior AlIa-
Iytics. The sale semantica l relation he recognizes in these works is the sig-
nification relation, and this, without a doubt, is context-independent. 1
According to the semantics of Categories 4, the expression white there-
fore can stand in only one semantica! relati on: it signifies th e nOllsubstan -
tial quality wh iteness and nothin g else, it signifies it once and for all, Jnd in
a way that is independent of features of any particular oCGlsions of its use.
But even though Aristotle does nOt havc the conceptua l gcar necessary
to perform modern treatments of sentences li ke (1) , C~) , and (4) , he pllts
what resources he does possess to ingeniou s usc in exp lainin g their truth.
This explanation, which is accomp li shed solely in tcrms of the contexr-
independent signification relation and the Gttegorial scheme, is perhJPs
most exp licit in the Metaphysics r pass.lge where he trc;;l ts scntences (:~)
and (4) : "1 say, for instance, that 'The white is Cll ltllfCll ; and 'The cul -
tured is white' [are trueJ because both [whiteness and culturedl arc JCci -
dents of a man" (roo7b4- 5). Here we have in effrct :111 existentially
quantified statement of the truth conJitions for C,) llnd (4 ), which !TIny be
generalized to all intercategorial predications whose grammaticJI sub -
jects and predicates are both nonsllbstantial:
But sentences like (3) and (4) are not the only type of true intercatc-
go rial predication that were seen ro have no place in S" . Then. . an: also
[ III [
Explanatory Conte/It of Demonstrations
sentences like (I), whose subject signifies a nonsubsrance but whose pred-
icate signifies a secondary substance, recognized at Posterior Analytics
8Ib24_ Hence, the solu tion found in Metaphysics r can be generalized
further so that it includes these and provides truth conditions for all inter-
carego ria l predication with nonsubstant ial subjects no matter what the
categorial status of their pred icates:
If 'A is B' is true (where 'A' signifies A, 'B' sign ifies B,
and A is not a substance), there is a primary substance
5 such that A belongs per accidens [0 S, and B belongs
(eithe r per se or per accidens) to s.
I suggest that it is this genera l trea tment of such sentences that Aristotle is
reco mmending, albeit in overly terse langu age, when he says at Posterior
Allalytics 8 Jb2.4 th at the rcason (I) is tru e is sim ply that whiteness is an
accident of the man.
With this understanding of Aristotle 's method of dealing with these
sentences in mind, we are now in a suitable position to address two dis ~
turbing little puzzles concerning hi s discussion of per se and per accidens
predication in Posterior Analytics 1.4 . The first of these is actually so me~
thin g of an anomaly: the passage where Ari stotle di scusses his third sense
of per se and per accideflS does nor fit well with its su rrounding context.
Each of th e other senses of these terms discussed in Posterior Analytics
1.4 properly apply to sort of predication (or predicative relation), which
is in keeping with tbc general aim of the cha pter to specify the requisite
features of scienrific premises. Yet, as Aristotle exp li cates the third sense
of these terms, th ey apply not to sen tences but to terms, or what j have
called in chap ter 3 sen tenti al elements. To say the leas t, it would be pecu~
liar fo r a systematic writer like Aristotle in (he middle of a prot ra cted dis ~
cussion about predications suddenl y to sw itch tracks for three lines and
concern himself with anothcr subject and then to sw itch back again with-
out the slightest warning. ~ Furthermore, th ere is no other location in the
Organon where the terms per se and per accidens are used to appl y to
terms rather than connections between terms.
The other puzz.le concerns the interpr!!tation of Aristotle's remarks at
Posterior Analytics 8 Ib24. He says there that sentence (1) is a case of per
acc.:idens predication, yet an examination of his discussion earlier at
73a35-b16 seems to ind icate that thi s sentence does not fit neatly into
any of the three types of per accidens (namely, types I, 2, and 4) explidtly
discussed there. Evidently, he must think that there is anorher type of per
[ 112 1
Type 3 Per Accidel1s alld Type 4 Per Se Predicatio/l
accidens predication besides th ese three. But how is the om ission of any
mention of th is further type to be explained? Shou ld we S::lY that it is a
simp le oversight, and that he simply forgot to indude this type in his list
in C hapter 4, even tbough its existence is dearly recognized in Char~
re r I9? Or shou ld we say that Aristotle didn't discover the new type ulltil
he wrote C haptcr 19, a nd for reasons now hidd en from us was unwillin g
or unabl e to revise the list he had already dr:lfted? Or should we bl:lllle
the omission on his ancient ed ito rs?
Such explanatio ns, being more on the order of hiogrnphy and psy -
chology [han history of philosophy, arc, for lack of di scovcwole criteria
of correctness, inherently ul1s:ltisfying. They shollid be suppbntcd wher-
ever possib le by more detached accollnts that aim at making sense of the
text as it stands witham the a id of such speculative hypotheses. In the
present case, 1 shall offe r an aCCO llnt that disso lves thc 3ppe3r;1I1CC of
strain between 7Ja3 5- b1 6 and R1b2.4-7 wh il e at the S:l mc time ac-
counting for what appea rs to be an anomalous inrroducrion of th e third
sense of per se and per accidens at 7 J h6 - 8.
The key to this account is contained in th e single illsight that at
73b6-8, just as in the pa ssages immediately sLltro lindin g it , Ari stotle is
primarily concerned with a certain type of predi cation, despite his supe r-
ficial interest there in terms. What is more, the type of per ,lccidcns prcdiGl-
tion he discusses there is prec isely the type he rep rese nts hy ( 1) at 81l12.4,
and al so by (3) and (4) at M etaphysics I007h4 -5 .lll oroer [0 sec eX:lctly
how these passages are related, it 1l1:1 Y first be noted th :lt the two terms
w hi ch Ari stotle labels " per accidens" at 73 b6 - 8, TO f3aoi~oll ::lnd TO
A6VKOII, are both nominal phra ses formed with a neuter singul ar adj ec-
tival form signifying a nonsubstallce and a marching article. Such expres-
sions, as we noticed above, are exac tly the type whose occurrence :lS sub-
jects charac terizes sente nces like ( I ), (3) , and (4). 111 bct, th e second of
the two is the sub ject of sentences (1) and L~).
Now at 73b6 Aristotle gives as the re;)son th ;lI so me terms ~lre per se
th at they a re " not said of an yt hing el se as subject" (J..L-ry KnffinTOKf;tJ..Lf:"OlJ
AeyeTQt iiAAOV Ttvo'»), a nd from t hi s it may be inferred that he thinks 7'0
J3aai~oll and TO At=:.lJKOV are per accidens precise ly hl'c;lll se they (or more
accurately, their significata) are said of somethin g 1.'1se :lS subjecr. But
what exactly does thi s mean? It is import~nt not to be mis led here by the
unfortunate intrusion of Catego ries termino logy, for here the expression
"said of" is evidently used with (I meaning different from what it ha s in
the Categories. Here it refers not to what we called in ch~lp rn J the "said-
[ 113 1
Explallatory COlltellt of Demonstrations
of" relation, but to inherence, rhe very relation it is contrasted with in the
Categories. This can be seen clearly in Aristotle's choice of examples. At
73b7 he gives as an examp le of something being "said of some thin g else
as subject" the case of something (presumably an ani mal) walking, and in
the Categories scheme this is patently not a case of the said-of relation,
but of inherence. Furthermo re, the characte rization given in the same
place of terms that 3rc per sc (that is, whose significata a rc not said of
anything else as subj ect) is "substance and such terms as signify particu-
lars" (71 (j'ovO"ia Kat o(Ja TO.s~ Tt (JT}/LaiV6t). Apparently, the former are
secondary substa nce-terms such as man and horse, and the latter a rc
proper names of particular substances, such as Socrates. Now since the
sign ifi cata of such terms, being in Substance, are precluded by (57) from
inhering in anything, these examples re info rce the view that the expres-
sion "said of" at Posterior Allalytics 73b6 refers not to the said-of rela-
tion of the Categories but to the inherence relation instead.
So Aristotle's exp li cit point, which pertains to terms, is that expres~
sions like 'TO {3aSi.r,p/l and 'TO A6lJKOIJ are per accidens because their sig-
nificata inh ere in something else. Now comes the crucial step. At Meta-
physics Io07b4 - 5 (and with less clarity at Posterior Analytics SIb24-7)
Aristotle makes precisely the same point about [he very same expressions,
and he does so in language that is nearly identical (except that he replaces
the mi sleading exp ression "said of" with the more perspicuous phrase " is
an accidenr of"). However, in the Metaphysics passage (and in Posterior
Analytics 1.19), Aristotle is no longer talkin g about such terms in iso la-
tion, as he does in Posterior Analytics 1.4, but rather as they occur as
.... ,
subjects in such per accidens predication as (1), (3), and (4). It is therefore
reasonable to surmi se that Aristotle's grou nds for cl assifying these predi-
cations as per accidens is that their subject terms are per acc idens in the
se nse expounded at 7., b6-8, and thar the se nse of per accidens emp loyed
at Metaphysics l007b4 - 5 and Posterior Analyhcs 81 b24 is derivative of
that sense. Hen ce, wh ile the superficial point of 73b6-8 is again that cec-
tain terms arc per accidens, the important submerged poim that connects
this passage with its surrounding conlext is that predications having such
terms as subjects are consequently themselves per accidens (in a derivative
sense), and hence do not qualify as scientific premises.
I said at the beginning of this discussi on that according to the inter-
pretation of Posterior Allalytics 73b6-8 I am defending, Aristotle's main
concern in that passage is not with a type of per se predication, but with a
type of per accidens predication. Now a stronger point can be put: it ap-
[ 114 J
Type 3 Per Accidens and Type 4 Per Se Predication
pears that there is no independent class of type -' per se predic~ti()ns idell ~
tified in Posterior Allalytics 1.4. If there were, then since Ari stotle hold s
that per se a nd per {lccidells are com plement~ry in meaning, this would
mean that all that is needed to count ~ sentence ~s type -' per se is fhM it
not be an intercategorial predi cation with :1 llonsuhst:lI1ti:tI suhjec t. Even
if we assume that 73b6-8 is concerned exclusively with sentences whose
subjects, no mauer what the catego ry of their sigllificata , refer ro sub·
stances (though I have argued that Aristotle himself h~ s no way of nwking
this distinction ), rhat would srill leave rhe class of type 3 per sc prcdi ci.l -
tions so wide as ro include both per se and per <lcc id cns predi cation of all
of the other types,
Now since, as we sa w at the beginning of ch:lpter 4, the overall pur ~
pose of the discussio n of per se predicmion in Posterior Auolytics 1.4 is to
ident ify a group of sentences thar are suitable scientifi c premi ses ( pro ~
n
vided they are also K(X'ro. 1TClVT()o;;' and awo), it wou ld seem th::lt if Aris-
totle recogn izes a class of type -' per se predicJtions, he wou ld be giving
them this elevated Status. It is hard ly likely, howeve r, that hi s intention is
to make such obviously cont in gent sen tences as
which he categorizes as per accidens in all other se nses of that term, into
suitable candidates for scientifi c premises. A much morc plausible view,
in light of the fact that 73 b6-8 is concerned explicitly with term s, :ll1d
only indirectly with sentences, is thut Aristotle there recognizes 11 0 jl1dc ~
pendent classification of per sc predications parallel to the sc nse of pCI'
accidens he employs at Posterior A110lyl;cs 8 I h24 and Metaphysics
I007b4. Hen ce, the re is an important difference ill cmphasis between
73b6-8 and its surrounding passages. While in each of those othe r pas ~
sages Aristotle is concerned to characterize J type of pCI' sc predicarion to
include in hi s theory of science, here his concern is solely {() identify a
certain type of per accidens predica tion he wis hes to excl ude.
According to the Categories sema ntics, and (55) in parti cula r, there <Ire
on ly two types of true predication: those thar express insta nces of the
said~o( relation, and those that express inherence rchltiolls . Now Aris~
totle 's remarks at De Illterpretahone 9.18b5ff. make it dea r rh:u he
thinks many t ypica l examples of inherence~senrcl1ces, jf nor all of them,
[ 11 5 I
Explanatory Content of Demonstrations
are foftuirously true, that is, true by virtue of the opera tio ns of "chance"
(Tj TVXr,). There he cites as an un desirable feature of a doct rin e under ca n·
sideration its consequ ence that th e tru th of predications that veridically
attribute (o r deny), the predicate "(is) white" to "particul ar things" (pre-
su mabl y primary substances) wou ld be a matte r of necessity. This, he de-
clares, in turn implies that nothing comes about from chance, a conse-
quence he evidently takes to be false. Clearly, this reasoni ng relies on the
assumption that such predications, which we saw in ch apter 3 to be
among Aristot le's favorite exa mples of inherence-sen tences, a re also para-
di gmatic ex amples of sentences he th inks are fortuitous ly true. This is
why he ca n so read il y endo rse the co nd itional th at if they aren' t £ortui~
tou S th en no predications are.
fu rth er, sin ce Aris totle here and elsewhere co ntra sts what comes
about "from chance" (d1TO TVXi1~) with what comes about "out of neces~
sity" (ig & lJa'YK7J~)" and since we have already see n th at he makes the
latte r cond ition a requ irem ent for scien tifi c premises, we shou ld expec t
he would not a ll ow fort ui to us truths to fun ction in demon srratjons. And
ind eed, he ex pli ci tly deni es both that th ere ca n be scientific kn ow ledge of
such truth s, and that they can occur, in dem onstrative syllogisms in Pos~
terior Analytics I.30, and in somewhat more obscure language at Prior
Analytics 1 . I 3. 3 2b I 8. These passages prompt th e view th at th e only type
of true predications recognized in Catego ries that wo uld be appropriate
for demo nstrations in the Analytics a re those ex pressi ng the sa id-of
rel ation :
For all thi s, there are two very com pell ing reasons fo r thinking that
th e simpl e twofold divisi on of p redi cations in the Categories is inade-
quate for isolating rh e scientifi c propos itions with which Aristotle is co n-
cerned in the Posterior Analytics. Fo r as we noticed earlier, he argu es at
consi dera ble len gth in Posterior Analytics 2.3-10 (espec ially at 90b28-
91a12) that propositions that are true as a matter of definition cannot,
excep t in a distended sense, be the objects or products of demonstration. 1I
In resrat in g this view at 93b r 6 after havin g just argued for it, Aristotle
makes it clear that the reason such statements are no t demonstrable in the
str ict se nse is that th ey can not function as concl usions of demonstrative
syll ogisms. But si nce he sees all type I per se predica ri ons as defi nitionally
tru e, and sin ce tbere is no recogniti on in the Categories of any other non-
fortuitous tru ths besides type I per se predications, it appea rs th at if Aris-
totl e were to stick with the crude division of the Categories, the class of
sta teme nts th at could function as co nclusions in demonstra tions in the
Posterior Analytics wo uld effectively be empty.
[ 116 )
Type 3 Per Accidens a"d Type 4 Per Se Predication
But of course we already know that Aristotle does not confine himself
to the crude Categories division of predications when he comes to outline
his theory of demonstration in the Posterior Al1a{ytics. In fact, what has
already been noticed about his more refined semantical views in the Ana-
{ytics implies a partial so lution to the problem just formulated. We S;IW in
chap ter 5 that he recogn izes in the Posterior Analytics an additional class
of non fortuitous truths besides type 1 per se predications, namely type 2
per se predi cations, which connect a divided ge nus to its dividing differ-
ent iae. But even with the class of scientific propos itions en larged to in-
clude both types I a nd 2 per se predications, that still leaves the subj ect
matter of Aristotelian science severely restricted to what we might now
call analytic truths. This is because the truth of both these sorts of per se
predication is insured by th e netwo rk of wh<lt-is-it relations that were
seen in chap ter 3 to underlie the doctrine of the categories. Thus, a divi-
sion that limits the interests of science exclusively to sllch definitional
truths consigns to the operations of chance the whole range of predica-
tions whose truth is not so insured.
From the standpoint of modern philosophers of sc ience, a theory of
scientifi c explanation that took such a narrow view of the scienti fi c do-
main would be utterly into lerable, since it would exclude precisely the
sort of sta tement with which scientists are most co ncerned: those logi -
ca lly contingent, but highly probable, generalizntions thought to express
natural causal connections. Ind eed, the only kind of premise co unte-
nanced by such a theory, those whose trmh follows from the definitions
of the terms (hey co main , are th e concerns of slich exact disciplines as
mathematics and logic, which are generally classified as sciences only in a
very special sense of that' term.
To be sure, Aristotle's displeasure with any wholesale exclusion of
nonanalytic truths from the compass of science would not be so acute as
this, since his numerous mathematical examples of scientific reasoning
throughout the first book of the Posterior AHalytics ind icate that he re-
gards the mathematical disciplines as impo rtant, and pe rhops even para -
digmatic, sc iences." On the other hand, it is eq ually evident, both from his
frequent use of nonmathematical examples of scientific reosoning in
Book 2 and from the directions of his own scientific interes ts that he in -
tends his theory to cove r not just th e derivation of lll<lthemaricn i proposi-
tions but also the explanation of highly probab le propositions of natural
science that one cannot reasonably disrega rd as merely fortuitous. In fa ct,
I shall now go on to argue that the latter do in fact make up .111 imporram
subclass of Aristotelian per se predications.
[ 117 I
Explanatory COli tent of Demonstrations
,!
POSTER IOR ANALYTICS 7Jb,O-,6,
TYPE 4 PER SE PREDlCATlON
However, it is not the example itsel f but the exp lanatio n of its truth
, offered at b I5 th at provides th e ke y to understa nding Aristotle's use of
at'aUTO, and ul timately to und erstand ing t he nature of his type 4 per se
predications. The reason that (6) is a type 4 per se truth , he says, is that an
ani ma l does not o nl y die when it is slaughtered; it a lso di es because it is
slaughtered . As my emph as is suggests, th e cru cial expression in this ex·
pla nation is the word "because," w hi ch translates the G reek ~ ,a. Now it
is we ll kn own to modern philosophical log icians that "beca use" con·
strucrions ca n be used to express a vasespectrum of con nections ranging
from enta ilm ent (or logical consequence) a mong proposit ions to the ten-
uous connection betwee n an a ll but ca pri cious act and a wh im th at pre-
cedes it. Moreover, an exactly anal ogous elastic ity has recentl y been ob·
served in th e anc ient usage of ISLa. 11
What type of connection l then, does Aristotle mean to express by hi s
use of this pre posicion at 73b1 5 ? There a re two initial ly plausible a nswers
[ 118 I
Typ e 3 Per Accidells (lIId Type 4 Per Se Prediwtioll
DEMONSTRATION AND
"FOR-THE-MOST-PART" PREDI CATIONS
Since both of these meanings of cnt>a'fwl [Ire well within the range of the
actual ancient usage of that term, how are we to decide between whac
appear to be two equillly plausible intt'fprewtions? The way our of this
quandary is again to be found in Aristotle's rel11arb.ble knack for prov id -
ing just the right example at just the right tim e. In this case his choice of
exa mples constit utes stron g evidence that the class of type 4 per se predi-
cations d iscussed at Posterior AlInlytics 7 3h 10- 16 is IllC;]l1t to indude a
type of statement he elsewhere describes as "generally true," or "true for
the most part" (i7Tl. TO 7TOAV) . And since 1 shn ll also argue that these last
are patently the type of causn l general izations Arisrotlc includ es within
the scope of his theory of demonstmtion, this will support the callsal jn ~
terprctation of senten ce (6).
It must first be noticed thai Aristotle's F.7T1. 'TO 7TOAU predications typi-
cally have very general subjects, chat is, suhj ects th :lt apply to a great
many cases. II Wh<lt he evidently means when he says that sllch a sentence
is "truc for the most part" is thnt its predic:ne :lPplies to most (or more
plausibly, a preponderance) of the cases to which its su bj ect applies. So,
for instance, when he says at Posterio r A1talytics 96:110 that even though
it is not "always" (ciei) the case thar ;l man grows chill whiskers, it is
nonetheless generally tru e thar he docs, Aristorle is assl"fting that Illost (or
by far most) men do have whiskers, even though so mc do not.
The distinctly quantitative nature of the ex prcss ion 1-:1Tt 'TO 7TOAV can
I 11 9 I
Explaltatory Con tent of Demonstrations
make it seem initiall y plausible that in singling out this type of predica~
tion Aristode is si mply pointing to the purely statisti ca l fact that there are
some instances of high but imperfect correlation between event-types in
the natural universe. But this statistical view of thrL 'TO 7TOAV predication is
easily d ispelled by the observation that th ere is a conspicuous absence of
examp les of predications expressing correlations that could be called
purely coincidenta l. Any reasonably perceptive observer-and Aristotle
certainly was that- would certainly be aware of some freak statistical
regulariti es due to nothing but chance, such as every member of a certain
dinner party being born in the same month. Yet virtually eve ryone of his
actual examp les of ent TO 7TOAV predication falls cleanly within the class
of what we would now identify as causa l genera li zations (for example,
Prior A,zalytics 1. I 3.3 2.b7; Posterior Analytics 2.. I 2.96a 10; Metaphysics
6.2.1026bJ4 )·
The absence of examples of purely statistical regu larities might be ex-
plained by the hypothesis that Aristotle simply does not recognize their
practical possibility, but only if it could be established that he requires
a relatively high level of generality for the subject terms of £1Tl. 'TO 7TOAV
statements. For certainly, as the number of cases examined becomes
larger the actual statistical frequenc ies of events converge upon their
theoretical probabilities. So if it co uld be show n that Aristotle insists
every bTL 'TO 1TOAV predication must have a subject that is extremely gen·
eral, and that he regards the threshold of 87Tt. TO1TOAV truth as quite high,
then it might be possib le to argue that the e7TL TO 1TOAV classification really
is stati stical in nature and he simp ly deni es the practical poss ibili ty of
there being any freak corre lation of a sufficj entl y high degree to pass the
threshold. However, to my knowledge Aristotle never says or implies that
there is any minimum generality requirement on the subject terms of e1Tl.
'TO 1TOXU predications. Hence, if what he ha s in mind is just a statisti cal
category, then it is hard to see how he could fail to notice that there are
some general (though, of course, not very general) sentences whose truth
is purely a matter of coincidence.
In any case, there is ev idence that his restri ction of examples to ca usal
truths is not due sim ply to a lack of imagination on Aristotle's part. He
repeatedly contrasts what is 81Tl. 'TO 1TOAV with what "comes about from
chan ce" (Ct7TO TtJxf]S') , both directly (De Generatione et Corruptione
2..6·333b7i De Caelo 2.8.2.83a33; Posterior Analytics 1.30.87b19i Eu·
demian Ethics 14.124 7a 32; Problemata 9 J b 31) and indirectly, by equat-
ing what is t1TL 'TO 1TOAV with what is true " by nature" (K(l'TO: rjlvG"illj De
Gen. Animalium 4.8.777aI9-21), and by co ntrasting the latter with for-
I 120 I
Type 3 Per Accidem alld T ype 4 Per S~ Predicatioll
I 12 1 I
Explanatory Content of Demonstratiol/s
ises by Aristote li an d ivis ion, he clearly admits the possibi lity of finding
and using e7Tt. TO 7TOAti premises. In particular, at Posterior Analytics
2. I 2.96a I 6- I 7 he merel y insists that the immediate premises of 67Tt. TO
1TOAV conclusions must themselves be e1Tt. TO 1TOAU, and at Prior Analytics
1.27 .43 b3 3 - 37 he makes the same point, and says that for th is reason it
is necessary, in the process of collecting syllogis tic premises, to identify
those terms that follow "for the most pa rt," or arc "for the most part"
followed upon by, a given subject.
Yet despite Aristotle's apparently fixed view that e1Tt. TO 1TOAtI con-
nections belong within the field of scientific inqu iry, he seems to ignore
th em in Posterior Analytics 1.4, the very chapter where he explicitly
id enti fies the statements that can function as demonstrative premises
and conclusions. The expla na tion for th is apparent omission, I suggest,
is that it is o nly apparent; 61Tt. TO 7TOAti predications are discussed in rhat
chapter, though under the heading of type 4 per se predications. T he
main evidence for this view, as I indicated above, is derived primarily
.'
"
from Aristotle's choice of examples. We noted earlier th at on one plausi-
ble interpretation of Aristotle's explanation of the truth of sentence (6),
Death happens to some slaughtered lthing] (n CTc/>arrO/LBVov), which is
hi s lone example of a type 4 per se predication, the sentence can be read
as expressing a causal relation between the two event-types mentioned
in it. An examination of examples of 67Tt. TO 1TOAti predications else-
r
where shows them to be of exactly the same type: general statements
expressing causal connections between event-types. Among those ex-
amples are:
The similarity between these exa mples a nd (6), tOgether with the fact that
Aristotle ha s reaso n to make e7Tt. TO 7TO~V resp ec table, provide good
grounds for reading his explanation of the truth of (6) in a causal man ner
and for assim ilating e7Tt TO 1TOAV predications into his type 4 per se class i-
fication. This assimilation is giye n further su ppor t by the even more strik -
ing si mila ri ty between the accidental predication Aristotle co ntrasts with
sente nce (7) at Prio r Analytics LI3.32.bI3 :
( 122 I
Type 3 Per Accidells and Type 4 Pcr Se Predh"atioll
and the examp le he gives of type 4 per accidens predi c;'ltion at Posterior
Analytics 73br6:
( I I) The sky lightens while so mething walks.
This interpretative matter is comp li cated by the bet [hM th ere is ~lIl orhcr
type of statement that seems to be quite unl ikc IhT~ TO 7TO>..ti truths hut
th at Aristotle ev idently also places under the heading of type 4 per se
predication . T hese are sen ten ces that :.lttrihute to so me subject ;1 cert:lin
subtype of wh en he refers to as "propria" (Ulter ). Such predicntions receive
their fu ll est treatment in the To/);cs (especia lly;'lt (02aI8, 12ob2}, and
throughout Book 5), but they nre menrion ed by n;'illle in th e Posterior
Allalytics at 73a7, and again at 96t126. What's more. Aristotlc's most fre-
quent examp le of a scientific explicandum in the latter work,
(12.) Triangles have [interior ] angles equal ro two righ t
angles,
invo lves one of his favo rite examp les of an i:8wv. Accord in g to Aristotle 's
intit al introduction of propria at Topics 1.5.102:118, they arc distin -
guished by two conditions: if one thing is a propriulll of a noth er, then the
express ion that signifies the first mu st not sta te anything in the essence, or
"the what it was to be" ("TO Ti T,V eil1at) II. of the second, ;lIld the first mll st
belong only to the second. T hi s second condit ion is then redcscrihed as
the requirement that propria mu st he "convertible" with their subjects,
which mea ns that (or every tru e propriul1l predicatioll there is ;] corre-
sponding trlle universal bicondirio l1;'1l comnin ing th e same terms.
The example Aristotle provides in this p;lSS;lgC shows de:lI"ly wh;'lt he
has in mind:
Since none of the various defin itions of Illall presented in the Corpus
makes reference to the capacity mentioned in (l3), ;'Ind since (accord ing
to Topics 101b]8) a definition sta tes the TO Tt Tjv t:i'1nL o( its definien-
dum, we may assume th;'lt ( I .,) does meet thc first condition givcn ~lt., f R.
Moreover, in Aristotle's own words, " if [;1 thing] is a 111;111, it is capahle of
learning grammar, and if [a thing1 is capab lc of learni ll~ gr;ullllwr, then it
is a man" (Topics 102a2.1 - 2.3). T hi s is qu ite dearly what is mca nt hy the
second condition, sin ce it simpl y mean s that rhe Glp;'l c ity for learning
grammar belongs to all men and to men alonc.l ~
I 12.1 I
Explanatory Content of Demonstrations
I 124 )
Type 3 Per Accidens and Type 4 Per Se Predication
[ lZS [
Explanatory Content of Demollstrations
ceed by first identifyi ng certain charac teristics of anim als th at always ac-
company possess ion of horn s, such as having a third stomach or h aving a
sin gle row of teeth, and then arguing (sy ll ogisticall y) that any subtype of
horned animals mu st necessarily displa y these same cha racterist ics. Now
if, as see ms plausible, we take thi s as a description of an approved form o f
demo nstration , and also assume that the attri butes in question are neces-
sary [lila of horned animal, we ca n understand Aristotle here as certify-
ing de monstrati ons such as th e follow in g:
W3S a type in wh ich the rclati o ns among its co ntai ned te rm s may be rep-
resented by the fo ll ow ing vertical sc hema:
I 126 I
Type 3 Pcr Accidens alld Type 4 Pel' Sr Predicatioll
/
B --A
/
c
/
whe re the late ra l co nnec tion between A and B is meant to represe nt th e
relatio n of mutual entai lment (that is. convertihili ty) betwec n a kind (B)
and one of its per se prop ria (A). Bur now, thi s opens the furth e r poss ih i l ~
ity of an exclusively lateral form of demo nstratio n, represented hy the
schema, .
A- - c/ n
/
/
in w hi ch o ne exp lains the possess io n of one per se proprilllll (A) of a
given kind (C) by reference to the possession of anothcr of its per se rro~
pria (B). W hat is striking about this form of demonstration is t hat it
accomp lis hes all of its ex pblnatory work at :l s ingle divi sio nal nod e. As
applied to Aristotle's exa m ple at 98:l 17- 2.0, this Jl1i~h t invo lve, say, CX ~
pla in ing the presen ce of a third stomach in horned animal s by means of
dental configuration:
(i) All (:t nd only) things wit h :t single row of teeth have
a third stomach, and
(i i) ~dl (:tnd o nl y) horned anill1:l1s haw ,1 singlt· row of
teeth. so
(ii i) all (and only) horned anim a ls have;l third stol1l.u.:h.
I 127 I
Explanatory Content of Demonstrations
A UNIFIED ACCOUNT
[ 128 J
Type 3 Per Accidells alld Type 4 Per Se Predicatioll
I have already argu ed t1uJ.[ Ari stotle do esn't interpret thi s as a mere sta te-
men t of statistical frequency but rather und erstand s it as ex press ing some
so rt of causa l necessity betwee n aging and th e cmerge nce of w hi ske rs.
However, a number of recent st udies suggest that Aristotle's basic model
for understa nding ca usa lity is not as a relation between events (whethcr
construed types or wkens), but rath er as the opcrations of " causa l pow-
ers" residing in [il e " natures" o f the subject-subst:'lil ces in whi ch th e
ca usa l effects in qu es ti on obtain. l " On thi s understand ing, We can under-
sta nd th e emergence of ch in wh iskers in p:Jrticui:.1 r ns th e exerc ise of so me
causal power, P, invo lved or co ntai ned in th e na tu re of mall. This is where
M ignu cc i's suggestion co mes inro play. For it is now plausible 10 interpret
Aristotle as ho lding th at P is possessed hy every single specimc n of ma n
wi th out excep tion, and accordingly to describe those occ;:lsio nal spec i-
mens without whiskers nor as lacking P, out as instances where P, though
possessed, fails to be manifested. On thi s suggestion then, co rrespondin g
to thc b Tl. 'TO 7TOAU truth of
Aristotle also recogni zes the morc fund a menta l truth of some such sen·
tence as
I 129 I
Explanatory Content of Demonstrations
(8') Every man has P (which for the most part is mani-
fes ted hy the grow rh of chin whiskers at the appro-
ptiate time).
What is more, even though this power might be regarded in some weaker
sense as esse ntial to the kind man, Aristotle wou ld certainly not see it as
in the what-is-it of that kind as that narrower notion was interpreted in
chapter 3. Therefore, on the additional assumption that the power to
grow chin whiskers is special to man,2s it would follow that (8') predi-
cates a per se proprjum of its s ubj ect.l~
Having now examined each sense of per se and per accidens exp li -
cated in Posterior Analytics 1.4 separately, we ca n take a final overview of
the whole co mplex doctrine by classifying the various kinds o f true predi-
cat ion we have encountered in the last three chapters according to their
suitabi lity to se rve in demonstrations. Among those state ments that can
occur as demonstrative premises, but not as demonstrative conclusions,
we have placed "definitional" predications,!? that is, type I per se predi-
cations (whi ch may either place their subjects in their superordinate gen-
era or constitute "constructive" definitions); whereas among sentences
that can occur as demonstrative conclusions are both type 2. per se predica-
tions (predications of differentiae to subsets of their sub jects), and type 4
per se predications (p red ications of per se propr ia, and also &1T1. 'TO 1TOAV
truths), On the other hand, the two types of predication that can not have
any place in demonstrations are type 3 per accidens (that is, intercate-
go rial predications with nonsubstantia l subjec ts) and predications that
are not per accidens in that sense but arc per accidens in all three other
se nses of that term (that is, genuine inherence predications).
[ 130 I
SEVEN
I 131 J
Explallatory Content of Demollstratiolls
But if Aristo de thus has theo retical need to include some nega ti ve predi -
cat ions as legitimate demonstrative premises, he also has good reason to
be trouh led by th eir presence. This is because he inheri ts from Plato an
appreciation of certai n cons iderations th at seem, p rima facie at least, to
in fect the ve ry idea of negative p redicatio n with conceptu al difficul ty. No~
tice first that th e method of di vision practiced in Plato's Sophist. States~
m an, and Philebus presupposes th e coherence of negative predica tion. At
th e very heart of the method stands a characteristic step in which the di ~
vider comes to apprehend that a " kin d" (yi: vo~) that might have appeared
to be monolithi c, or "sound" (v'Y ~'Y/ 'i'), in fac t has a "seam" (8L77'A O'ryV or
G'VXII'r}v ), by which is metapho ri cally conveyed th at there is so me pai r of
differentiati ng properties or cha racteris tics each of which is had by some,
but not all , members of th e ki nd LInder divi sion.
Howeve r, th ere is at leas t one passage in the Sophis t where Pl ato
see ms to see a potent ial problem wi th the use of negation in division :'
This occurs at 22. SB- C, where he has the Stranger and Theaetetus agree
th at the art of "anti logic" is d ivided in to two parts, o ne of which, eristic,
is described as "techni ca l" (e IJu:XIJoIJ; by which is presumably meant that
it is governed by ru les or guidelines) whi le the othe r, wh ich is left narn e~
less, is chara cterized onl y by the essentially privative adverbs "pu rpose~
less ly" (&iK'r, ) and " non techni cally" (ch"i:x vws-). It is the " nameless" part
of this divisio n that gets singled ou t for dep recato ry co mment by the
[ 132 J
Demonstratiol1 ami Negatioll
Stranger at BIl -C4: "This must be posited ~S::l kind, since om ilCCOUIlf
has indeed discerned it as a distincr thing, hut it did not receive ::I llilll1C
from those who came befo re, no r is it worthy of getting one fro m LI S now."
If we ca n assume th~t Plato's own thought is expressed by Thc;lerc-
tus's un chall enged diagnosis of thi s bck of llameworthiness :It Cs - 6-
"True [nontechnical antilogic does not deserve i1 name j. for it is divided
into parts which are too small and diverse (Knn'l: <IJ)..I.KP(f yap ALa" Kat
7Tall7'OSam:x SI.71P'l'17'w)"- then it is reasonable to sur mise tl1M he sees this
defect as rooted in the fact that the group of activities falling under the
essentially negative terms ei'.K'D and aTixvw'i are insufficiently like one i1!l -
other to count coll ectively as a genuine unity. Of course, what is con -
spicuously left unsaid is just why slich excessive diversity should h..wc
failure of nameworthiness as a result. Therefore, if we arc to understand
Theaetetus's remark as at ~dl responsive, it will be neCCSS:1ry to supply ~,
link between observed symptom and profferred ca use. I suggest that the
best candidate for this role is a species of mei1ning deficiency I will (;1 11
semantic fragmentation. Accord in g to this suggestion, Pi:Jto is drawing
on the insight that even if a common term , S<1Y f, were somehow to he-
come associated with a group of suffi ciently disparate c1emellts, say all
and only the items presently on my desktop, this would nor cons titute ~t
genuine instance of common predication. PrcslIlll;1bly, thi s is hCC:lUse
even someone w ho had surveyed everyo ne of the Fs could not therehy be
taken to have discove red anything about the naturc of Fll ess-abollt
what it is to be an F- for the si mple reason th a t there is no uniform na-
ture there to discover. Ex hyporhesi, [he field of Fs r<1ngcs across a multi -
plicity of diverse natures. Where thi s is so, PI:uo will say, the group in
question may in fact receive a common name, but they do so lI11d cscrvcd ly.
As the examp le contri ved in the bst pnragraph illl1strntcs, not .. II in -
stances of semantic fragmentation are Ci1SCS involvin g negative differ-
entiae. Howeve r Sophist 2.25B - D does seem to consritlltl! ('videI1Cl! of ~l
recognition on Plato's part that at lC'ast one possible cause of SC111:l11tic
fragmentation (and so of failure of namcworthiness ) docs in vo lve the il11 -
proper use of negative differentiae in the process of di vision. further cor-
roboration for this view comes fro m Statesman 2.62.A - 26., S, a passage
re markabl y paral lel to Sophist 225B-C in which the Stranger complains
to the young Socrates aboll t th e li se of neg:ltive differentiae sllch as " non -
Hellene" or "not-ten thollsa nd " in making divisions:
[ 133 [
Explanatory COltte1tt of Demonstrations
I 134 J
Demonstratio1l and Negd/ioll
Nevertheless, such unmista kable para llels between th ese Platonic and Ar-
istoteli an passages make it practically certain that th e two writers agree
that semantic fragmentatio n is at least one of th e diffi culties that must be
overcome by any satisfactory account of negative predication. For even
though Plato and Ari stotle both sec se mantic fragm entation ~l S ;l potential
hazard inherent in the use of negative predi cates, there is no evidence th oU
either of them is prepared to foll ow what well may have heen Panneni-
des's own drastic recommendation , that terms co nstructed out of negative
particles should be banished altogether. It rath er appears that both writ-
ers recognize an important distinction between cases of negative predica-
tion that do ex hi bit semantic fragmentation and oth ers that are quite in -
nocent of this defect, and they both attempt to immuni ze their respective
theories of predicatio n again st this donger.
In order to appreci ate the nature of Ar istotle 's proposal {() ~H.: hi eve thi s
immunization, it will be helpful to co nsider nrst what he perceives as di s-
tinguishing the defective occurrences of negative predi c'ltcS. As the ex-
ample given above from Al exander (8L 3- 4 ) illusrrates, Aristotle's view
is that se mantic fragme ntatio n occurs specifically when some negative
term , lI ot-F, is lI sed in such a way that if purportedly denotes the co mpl e-
men t of rhe denotation of F within some insuffi cicnri y restri cted hac~
ground fiel d. Thus, not-horse is said not to signify nn "idea" (i8i: a )- th~t
is, nO[ to pick ou t a genuine property- on the ground thar the class of
objects of which it is tru e (eve l)!thil/g that is not ~l horse- the comple-
ment of the class of horses within the doma in of existents of every sort) is
so wide and diverse (that is, so fragmented) as to include slIch unlikely
co ha bitants as men and alphabetical lencrs.- Again, Aristorle's (;md
Plato's) objection to such uses, according to the prese nt interprt!t3tion, is
ultimately that th e negati ve predic~[e in such contexts lac ks definite mean -
in g. The argu ment is th at if there are virtu.lll y no limirs 011 wlwt call sat-
isfy th e predicate Hot-horse, th en it does not appear that anything de-
terminate could be attribllted to a suhj ect hy appl yin g that predicate to
it. The point, th en, is that Ari sto tl e does not sec semami L: Fragmentation
as a prob lem attached to the use of negative terms per se, but rather as
one limited to cases where sllch ex press ions are meant to signify ullder-
res rri cted complements. R
I US I
Explanatory Content of Demonstrations
r 136 J
Demonstration a/nl Negatioll
With this reduction, the gist of Aristotle's complaint at byo that "the
middle stands too far away" (TO 7TXiOIJ C('1TO(T'T7WCtIITCt TO /J-l-:crOl/) is thM
the negative connection (between anima l and wall ) expressed by B(i) (or
its contraposition) is too remote to explain why walls do not breathe. II
By parity of reasoning, however, it is likely that he would make exactly
the same complaint abollt the following syllogism in Barh;.lr3 containing
negative predicates as opposed to negative predications,11
[ 137 1
Explanatory Content of Demonstratiolls
[ 138 )
Notes
INTRODUCTION
1. Sec Ross (1949) and Barnes (I97.,)). Hintikkn (1972.) promises a full -length
study of AristOtelian demonstration, bur that work h<1s yet [() nppc'lr.
2. It is not meant to sugges t on ly th<lt; on the other side of the double enten-
dre, this is also a book abou t the relation hetween an Aristotelian dcmonslrntive
system an d its ultim ate epistemol ogica l "origins" (tha t is 10 say, s tart ing points) .
J. Compa re Ferejohn (J98o).
4. This understa nding is confirmed to a large ex tellt hy Posterior AII(1{ytics 2..\
and 2..2, whi ch make the po im that provid ing [t syllogi8 tic dCll1ol1str;Hion of 3
previously known fact (thar is, a TO on) is ta ntamount to elucidating that on ac-
count of wh ich it obta ins (its TO SLon); see especially 2..1.89h3 0-3 I; 2..2..89h35-
9035. H ere I mean to oppose not o nly the view tha t the theo ry of demonstr:nion
is an attempt to fo rm alize the proper methods of sc ientific inquiry, b ut a lso the
curren tly popu lar position advocated in Barnes (1969) and (19~h ) that it is
offered as 3 theory of scientific pedagogy that sets o m the mosr effect ive mea ns hy
which a fini shed science can be imparted to stude nts. For criti cisms of this latter
positi on, d. chap ter x, note 4.
5. According [0 this complex pattern, the term exhihits a peculiar three-wa y
I 139 I
Notes to Pages 4-18
how Aristotle argues in Posterior Allalytics (.3 agai nst various nonfoundation -
al ist theories of justi ficati on; Smith also offers some interesting conjectures about
who might actually have advocated such views.
3. Ea rlier in this century, this con troversy w:as intertwi ned with a historical
debate over the correct chronol ogical ordering of the two Analyttcs. Solmsen
(1929) argues on textual grounds fo r reversing the traditional ordering of these
I 140 J
Notes to Page 19
[ 141 I
Notes to Pages 19-21
15. Th ese incl ude, but are not limited to, the suhject's esselltial a.trrihutes. See
part 2 below.
1 6. See cha pter t , no re I I ahove.
17· Sophist 2 18B-E and 2.J5A-C.
18. Th e fu l! range of these imm edi ate co nnec tions will he surveyed in pa n 2.
19. Agai n, as we shall see in parr 2, Aristotle's full t heo ry allows the range of
the nonacc idental (n nd hence tbe scientitl ca ll y interesti ng) to exceed by fa r what
might be thought of quite nnrrow ly ;1S essential conn ections berween term s.
2.0. Posterior AI/alyties 1.8.75b2.1-24.
2. 1. The main b urden of chapter 7 helow will he to investigiu t: the ra mifica -
tions for Arisrotle's theory o f al lowing the premises of demonst ration to include
sta tements ex press ing immed iate neg.nive connections .tt Posterior AI/illylics
I.IS·79 a 3.l- b S·
2.2.. It also follow s t hat th e p ossibility of finite d emonstr;nioll (that is, (Inl' co n-
taining a fi nite numoer of syllogistic inferences) req uires t hat there be at most a
fin ite number of middle terms between the suhject :"Ind preJi C:lte of the demon-
strated sta tement. Aristotle unde rtakes to estab lish t his pos!'ib ility as ;1 gener:1 1
theorem (fo r any stn tement wh atever) in the su-ca lled compactness proof of I'o s-
terior Ana{ytics I. t 9-2. .1 (o n which see nlso Le;lr 119HO]).
2.3. T h ere is some myste ry <lhout why Aristotle sho uld he so confidcnt of [his
uniqueness conditi on, given t hat he rec.:ognizes the ex isten cc of propri a terms,
which he d efines in Topics 1.S (IS convertihle (th;lt is to S:ly. coextensive) with
their subjects ( 102.aI8 - 19). T he most likely solut ion is thar in Pusterior Al1a-
Iylics 2..1) he is rest ricting his attent ion to essence sign ifying t(·fms .
2.4. Com pare cha p te r I, nore 22 above.
25. These rep resentations a tc equ ivalent in the light of Aristotle's view in
Metaphysics ZIZ. that the spec ies w ithin a genlls out' "cq u<ll to" (t{TU ; rh nt is, one-
to-One with ) the differentiae t hat dis ti ngllish t hem.
26. If the independent assumpti o n that divisions must he dichotomous is
dropped, this will be the un io n of D's codifferentiae.
27. Here aga in we see impli cit relian ce by Aristotle on th e l:o lllpa ct n cs.~ result
of Posterior Alfalyti(s I . J 9 - 2. ., .
I 14.1 I
Notes to Pages 29 - 36
[ 144 [
Notes to Pages 36-40
traction and addition (76;qo-b2), into a syllogistic model of proof is rCOllly one
aspect of the general problem of how math elll :ltica l proof and syllogistic demon -
stration are related.
43. Perhaps the most obvious (and mOSI emharrassing) difficulties for sttkt
syll ogisticism involve these "common axioms" (KOLII(r (ygt<l.IM('~-rO') sllch as the
Laws of Noncontrtldiction an d Exduded Middle, or the principle th.1t cqu;"tls
taken from equals yield equtl ls. The difficulty is th'lt such principles (or restri cted
vers ions of them) are unambiguously placed among the apxai of demonstration
by passages in group B (Posterior Allalytics I. I o. 76:14 I -4 2; 7701 10- ."\ 5), and yet
as a matter of simple synwx they man ifestly do not match any of the fom general
propos itional forms out of which the Prior AllalJIlics in sists ,, 11 (nonmod;11) sy l-
logisms must be constructed (Prior AI/{/lytics 1.1.24<117 -20) . Indeed , it appears
that neither Ross (1949) nor Hintikb (1972) is ready to s;"tddle Aristodewith th e
highly dubiolls contenti on that the common nxioills nrc 11ltimnte sy llogistic prem-
ises. Acco rding to Ross, they are "not premises bur the principles nccording to
which we reason" (56), and according to Hintikb they are "those and only those
assumptions on which the whole stmcture of Aristoreli.lIl syl logisms is b'lsed"
(59). This is why I said earlier that th ere probably are no actu.11 cases of pure
strict syllogisticism.
44. The details of this peculiar little argument w ill be taken up in chapter 5.
I 145 I
Notes to Pages 40-44
to con fuse the obvious truth that [or anything to exist it must have at least one
property with the controversial proposal that the statement that X exists is logi-
ca ll y equivalent to (perhaps even synonymous with) the statement that X has at
least one property. This same objection is developed independently in Roberts
(1982).
6. The inference may not be imm ediate. Jacobs (1979) contains a plausible
argument that the existentia l import of genuine premises is thought by Aristotle
to follow from a more fundamental requirement that they always either affirm
"something of someth ing" (Ti KaTa TWOS') or deny "something to something" (Tl
ci1ro nvos-). whe re the use of the indefinite pronouns imports presuppositions of
existence.
7. Compa re Posterior !\lIalylics 2.3 - JO.
8. Hintikka (1972.) correctly observes that the term "fLecroS- is some times also
used to denote these statements of immed iate conneelion berween terms, but that
in its normal usage (as for instance, at Posterior A1talytics r.2. 72.a8) it picks out
propositions that arc "immed iate" in the sense that they are underived.
9· Barnes (1975), 94-95·
TO. Moreover, for reasons to be discussed shortly, this problem cannot be over-
come by simply add in g a statemenr of general ex istence ro Barnes's analysis, so that
it reads, If anything is a pair, then a knows that it is even, and there are pairs.
) 11 . These will certainly include all past and present men, though there may be
1. some question a bout whether Aristotle's pU7..zle in De lnterpretalione 9 regarding
singula r statements about the future rules Ollt the possibility that (2) cou ld also
involve reference to alt future men.
(" t 2.. Notice th at this is not to say that under this interpretation sentence (2.) is
synonymous with a conjunction of singula r sentences. In fact, another way to
i; characterize the transparency feature discussed above is to say that one could on
( this in terpretati on know that all of the singular propositions exp ressed by (2)
were true without having any idea of which propositions those were.
13. Even singu lar statements like "a is F" are thought to introduce existential
import only insofar as rhey entail starements of genera l existence (by Existential
Genera1i7.ation). Inciden tally, I can find no evidence whatever that Aristvtle has
any such theoretical notion of general existence, though he of course uses sen-
tences that we might analyze as expressi ng it. For this reason (among others) I
cannot agree with the proposa l in Hintikka ( 1972) to inrerpret the existence as-
Sllmpti ons of Aristotelian science (e.g. at Posterior Altalytics 76332 -7. 76bI - 23,
93b29-33) as expressible by statements of the form "There are fs" (6 2.-63 ). In
chapter 5 I sha ll argue that Aris to tl e even rega rds the ex istentia l import of par-
ticular statements, such as "Some numbers are even," as singular in nature and as
stemming likewise from the referential funct ion of their grammatical subjects.
14 · On this di sti nction see Kneale (1936) and Moore (1936) .
I 5. This of course is not to deny that the truth-values of the sentences are per-
(ectly correlated. Both sentences will be true in all (and only ) those worlds where
I 146 I
Notes to Pages 44-49
there are men (i.e., some referents of "Every man"), and all of those are also
animals.
16. This may be equivalent, though it certainly would not be recognizable to
Aristotle as such, to a Fregean -style statement expressillg a certain con:-;rraint on
the possibilities of predicate-sa tisfaction (or kind-membership ) among all (actual
or possible) individuals within some domain of discourse: If anything is a man,
then (necessarily) it is an animal.
17. Tredennick (1938 ) translates i§t'> here as "facnlty," which is normally re-
served fot the Greek SVVCl:p.,t,\. However, in view of the fact that Aristotle goes on
at 99b26-34 to argue that this preexistent condition must be some sort of Svva-
ILL!:;, (that is, an episte mic proclivity, as opposed to an occurrent cognitive state), it
is better to understand him as dcliberntc1y employing the wider term f.§t'\ at hI R
in a sense that includes, but is not limited to, SlIVO:/.LfW;.
18. On this see Kahn (T981).
19. It is plausible that this use of AQI)OO:I)W is meant to pick up Pbto's use of
alJCllJ,.tlJ,.vijuKw at MellO 85E and R6B .
20. The deployment of the potentiality versus actuality distinction to steer be-
tween the horns of an apparent dilem1ll:l is of course vintage Aristotle (d., for
example, his definition of KtVrjm'\ in Physics .l. I , and his trcatments of growth
and perception in De Anima 2.4 and 5 respectively ), which t<lises the question of
whether its occurrence in this early work might he a hner intrusion. This hypnthe ~
sis is weakened by the fact that the term iWTf';Ai:Xf';U'r, with which fiV/lHp,t'> is regu -
larly contrasted in later works, does not OCWf at n!l in rhis chnptcr.
21. This would have the unfortunate consequence th:lt in some sense any ani-
mal, qua sentient, has the capacity to apprehend slIch principles.
2.2. Compare I00<114-bT7. The interdependence between Aristotle's meta-
physics and epistemology on this point will he discl1ssed shortly.
23· The role of intuition in E1TClywy1j is discllssed in derail in Kahn (1 9R 1),
Kosman (1973), and Lesher (1973).
24. For an interesting and comprehensive study o( this more elev:lted cOllcep -
tion of atO'e",cn'\, see Modrak (1987)'
25· Notice that this intensional interpretation of the results of Platonic Divi -
sion is not affected by the bct that the ellidel1ce the method employs seems to be
constituted by more or less empirical observations that certain c\ilsses of individu -
al s are subdivided into "natural" subkinds (but it[ the S<1me time, my LIse of the
adjective natural here cert(linly bears much metaphysica l weight).
26. Aristotle's immanent rea lism and its effect on his epistemology will he dis-
cussed at length later in this chapter.
27· Burnyeat (1970), Fine (1979), and Neha1llns ( 19H .~ ) .
28 . There is a close Aristotelian parallel to this Platonic notion of :In inrerreJa-
tiona I logos in Metaphysics Z I 2, where it is asserted th;n an adequate definition,
by containing the final differentia of the deftniendum, can be thought to make
implicit reference to all the differentiae of which that i,~ a specine;ltion. Of course,
I 147 1
Notes to Pages 49-67
Aristotle never says that such a logos itself conveys knowledge of the highest sort.
29. Burnyeat (1981).
30. See chapter I.
3 I. See chapter 2, note 5 above.
32. Posterior Analytics 2.3.90bH.
33. Actually, this question is first raised and treated dialectically in Chapter 3
at 90b.z.8 - 9Ia12., but Aristotle does not begin to develop his own answer to it
until the beginning of Chapter 4.
34· Owen (r9 61 ).
35. The argument is actually a bit more complicated than I have represented
it. Aristotle argues that an "immediate" statement can sometimes occur as a syl-
logistic concl usion, but only if both premises of the syllogism are biconditional,
or, as he puts ir, they can both be converted (aJl1"LI'TTpeljlew), in which case there
is a petitio principii, and hence no genuine demonstration (9 Ia2 s-b ro).
36. The attenuation requires a play on the terms 8etKIJVJ,LL (" to show or dis-
play") and d:7ro8l::iKVVJ.LL (" to demonstrate or prove"), so that a "definition" can
be said to be "demonstrated" in the sense that the TL E(]"7'L it expresses is "re-
vealed" or "displayed" by the arrangement of the premises of a demonstrative
syllogism.
37. This view, which originated in Lukasiewicz (1957), is propounded in
Mansion (1976), mode rated somewhat in Mansion (I981 ), and criticized m
Chapter 12 of Sorabii (1980).
38. Of cou rse, the restriction to substantia l, or natural, kinds here is crucial,
si nce Aristotle certainly does not think one could gain scientific knowledge of an
individual by studying necessary relations among its nonessential properties (Pos-
terior Analytics 1.6.75318-2.7). This is not to say that he believes knowledge of
systematic relations among accidents (i.e., nonsubstances) is impossib le (on which,
see his discussion of the possibility of sciences of nonsubstantial accidents in
Metaphysics r 4), but only that the objects of such knowledge would not be the
subjects of those accidents.
39. Unfortunately, the significance of this is obscured even from Aristotle him -
self in the Organon by the fact that he regularly co ll apses these two very different
types of metaphysical connection into a single relation (the said·of relation in the
Categories, or type 1 per se belonging in Posterior Analytics). On the other hand,
the Metaphysics distinguishes sharp ly between the two relations and focuses es-
pecially on the relation between individual and proximate kind.
[ 148 J
Notes to Pages 67 -72
ogy are quire co mmon in Aristotle's works. For insta nce, the Topics is an inves-
tigation of dialectical knowledge, the Nicomacbeall Ethics :lI1alyzes the nature of
practical know ledge, and (as suggested in my introdu ction ) the I'osterior Allo-
Iytics presents a theory of dem01lStrative (or scientific) knowledge.
2.. White (1972.), 60, Panig (1969).
3. I argue in Fereiohn (1976) that Aristotle's cu ri ous views about the validity
of mixed modal syllogisms in the Prior Altolytics (c.g. , at 30:12. 1-2.4 and .W b7-
10) cannot be explained satisfactorily by the suggestion thnt hc is in sensitive to
subtle differences in the scope of modal operators. The fact;s that there :.lre other
places (c.g., De l11terp,.etatiolle 9.19'12.9 -.U) where he shows himself (l) he quitc
sensitive to such mane rs. Mo reover, I argue rhere is a high degree of systema ticiry
in Arisrotle's results, which is not accounted for hy the hypothesis that they rest
on co nfusion.
4· Hintikka (1957)·
5. This last inference presents some prahl ems in interpretation. On its face,
the Aristotelian sentence at 73a2.4, since it conta ins a plural form, t:~ Ql/cryKU'iwv,
t"O denote the premises of a demonstration, seems to assert that the necessity of
the conclusion of a demonstration requires the necessity of bo th premises. How-
ever, Alexander of Aphrodisias tell s us th:lt the modal pri nciple th:a requires th is
(namely, the so-ca lled peiorem rule that the concl usion of a modal syllogism can
be no stronger than its weakest premise) was developed by Aristotle's successor,
Theophrastus. Moreover, it is violated by Aristotle himself at Prior Allofytics
30a15. Hence, either Aristotle has chosen an unfortl1nate W:ly of expressing:J. re-
sult that is consistent with his logical theory (ni.1 111 ely tha t the necessity of the co n-
clusion requires the necessity of at le:lst one premise), or he is here importing
some extra logical (perhaps epistemological) re:.lson th,It hath premises of :l de-
monstrative syllogism must be necessary. Evidence for the latter hypothesis is to
be found at Posterior Analytics 74b13ff.
6. Even though Aristotle's discussion in Posterior Allolytics 1.4 - 10 appears to
restrict the immediate premises of demonstration only to affirm:ltive stat emen ts,
he makes it quite clear in Chapler 15 that his fu ll theory also allows negative
premises expressing immediate exclusion relations (79 a.13- _16). The place of
such negative predications in the theory of demonstration will he the principal
topic of chapter 7.
7. In fact, Aristotle attaches th ese sllhconditiolls to the :.lttrihmes ascribed by
such sentences. I represent them as conditions 011 th e relation between subject and
predicate for convenience of exposition, since his remarks arc always meant to
apply to an atrri bute as apphed to a certa;" slIbjed.
8. Topics I 0 3b8, 109n1o, 12.5<\6, 149b12, 16):1.12.
9. It has been suggested by some writers, e.g. Code (1986) and Lennox (1987 ),
that since as a general rule. rhe expression "qua" en) is used hy Aristotle as an
imen$ional idiom, the "qua itself" C{"Illdition on c:nholic predications therefore
pertains to an intensional rel<! tion between subjecr and prctiic,ltt'. perhaps rhat
I 149 1
Notes to Pages 72 -75
the predicate applies to a certain class of things when they are conceived of or
described as falling under the subject term. On such a view, Aristotle might allow
that there cou ld be two sciences that study exactly the same genus of things but
are nonetheless distinct sciences because one studies them qua Fs and the other
stud ies them qua Gs. I certainly do not deny there are many occurrences of 11 in
Aristotle that do carry this inten sional mean ing (as, for instance, in his "defini-
tion" of KillTjCTt'i at Physics 3.1); and there are dear p recedents for th is use in
Plato (e.g., in Reptfblic 1 and 4). What I do deny is that the expression is always
used this wa y, and that it is so used in Posterior Analytics 1.4 in particular. For
th e intensional reading is at odds with the fact that the rest Aristotle proposes for
the cond iti on is given there in exrensional terms: he speaks of the "first subject"
(going downward) to possess the attribute, or the "las t differentia" (going up-
ward), whose remova l also removes the attribute, and these ordinals are evidently
connected to some sequence of inclusion relations. A key passage on this issue is
74a38- b4 . There Aristotle co ntorts himself so far as ro make bronze a peculiar
SO rt of differentia of isosceles triangle just so that he ca n extend the inclusion -
sequence, plane figure --+ triangle --+ isosceles triangle, one more step to bronze
isosceles triangle in order to apply this extensional test. (Hence, I think this pas-
sage should be contrasted with Metaphysics Z.8.Io33a2.4-bS, where virtually
the same example is emp loyed, but the qua must be taken intensionally.)
10. It is rema rkable that despite the relative clarity of these pronouncements,
there are some who would still den y that Aristotle is committed to th e view that
all per se predications are necessary. 1 am referring here to views expressed in
White (1972.) and Hintikka (1957).
I t. The passage also introduces a use of the expression "per accidens" (Karer
CTlJI.J..{3e!3r/Ko'i) corresponding to each of the four uses of per se presented and dis-
cussed. These uses, which Aristotle says at 73b4,5 and 11 ,1 2. are strictly comple-
mentary to the correspondi ng uses of per se, can be igno red unti l chapter 6.
[ 150 [
Notes to Pages 76-79
[ 15 1 J
Notes to Pages 80- 81
to separate these two alternative views, since Aristotle observes no clear distinc-
tion between object language and meta language.
11. Ackri ll (1963 ).
12.. See Owen (1965a).
13. Especially 2al 1-14, 2a2.7-b6, and 3a7-21-
14. Here again we see Aristotle conflating class membe rship and class inclu-
sion; they appear in the Categories as undifferentiated subtypes of the said-of reo
la tion. On this, see Frede (1978).
15. Obviously, the overall intelligibility of the tetrachoromy depends in large
part on the proposition that there is a real distinction between Aristotelian sub-
stances (entit ies of type [iJ and [iil) and the types of entities that fall into the third
and fourth divisions. Whi le this might seem so obvious from a modern point of
view th<lt we wou ld be inclined to excuse a writer for simply assuming its truth
and intelli gibility, the problem of making out the exact nature of this distinction
between substance and nonsubstance was apparently both cru cial and difficult
for Aris('otle, for he expends considerable effort working on it in Categories 5,
and returns to it with a vengeance later in the middle books of the Metaphysics.
This preoccupation has led many writers to the opinion that understanding Aris-
to tle's views on this matter is an important key to understa nding his metaph ysics.
Furth (1988 ), for one, seems to be of this opinion, and accordingly he devotes
considerable space to supporting and developing the suggestion that the distinc-
tion in question ultimately rests in the Categories on Aristotle's observation that
substance-terms are ittdividuative, more o r less as that term is explicated by
Quine (1960), wh il e nonsubstance terms are not. This is an extremely important
matter that must eventually be sorted our, but it fa lls outside the scope of the
present work. I sha ll return to it briefly below in order to suggest {hat Aristotle's
emphasis on the substa nce versus nonsubstance distinction is evidently reinforced
by the methodology he employs in the Categories to ar rive at his list of categories.
16. Furth (1988), w ho is inclined toward the view that the Ca tegories was
written in full view of the doctrines of the Metaphysics, and consequently that
such matters are alread y on Aristotle's mind in the Categories, composes a fic-
tional "essenrializing addendum" to Chap ter 5 of the Categories that takes up the
distinction between substance and nonsubstance. While I admit that such ques-
tions follow naturally from Aristotle's discussion in Chapter 5, I can find no evi-
dence lhal Aristotle himself is aware of them in the Categories.
'7. In fact, he says so little about type (iii ) (non -substantial p;uriculars ) that
there has been a considerable amount of disagreement among some of the best
modern Aristotelian scholars about whether they should be taken as maximally
specific universals (that is, things necessarily ca pable of being shared by more
than one subject; cf. Owen [l 96p] and Frede 11978]), or whether they are in·
stead some so rt of abstract individuals (things that necessarily can inhere only in a
single subject; cf. Ackrill [1963J).
18. And perhaps also type (iii ) entities, if the "maximally specific universa l"
view of them discussed in the preceding note is co rrect.
[ 152 J
Notes fo rages 8 J - 90
19. In particular, there a ppears no way of telling from what he says in the
Orgalloll whether he thinks of the higher kinds within his caregorialnetwork in a
purely extensional way (as classes of primary suhstances or nonsuhsta nrial par-
ticulars), or whether he thinks of them rather as some sort of illlc"siolls (what
modern philosophi ca l logicians call " properties") , or whether he th in ks of them
in some other way altogether different from both of these.
2.0. Compare Furth (1988), 14.
2. 1. Compa re Owen (196 5b) fo r an intriguing ex planation of how L1lt: " biha r-
cared" semanti cs of the Categories represents at least on c Aristotelian a ttempt to
construct a th eory of predi ca tion immune from defects ch::lrged against Platonic
predication in the "Thi rd Man argum ent. "
2.2.. Aristotle did not give up entirely on the project of giving some fu rther ex-
plication of inherence relations. I shall argue in chapter Six that th e type 4 per se
predi cations discussed at Posterior Alla/ytics IA. 73 b 10- a6, which would have
to be classified as exp ress ing the inherence relation in the Categories, are not
thought by Aristotle to be fortuitou s.
23. Ackrill (196,), 79-80.
2.4· Co mpare Grene (1963), 58.
25. Notice that this single question is also th e first in the list of most basic
questions posed in the mul tiple-questio n method. I shall argue presently that its
presence in both methods ha s a n im pact on Ari stotle's choice of term ino logy in
Posterior Anoiytics 1. 4.
26. As in my accollnt of the multiple-qu estion medlOd , I alll here preseming
an English versi on of the procedure. As before, in Greek a cor rect a nswer co uld
very naturally take th e fo rm of a one· or two-word sentence fragment.
2. 7. Th e detail s of this "compa ctness" proof <lre reco nstructed in chapter 2. of
Lear ( 1980).
2.8. Th is asso rtmenr ill ustrates once Illore that the requiremen ts for member·
ship in the initial collection of the single-qllestion method a rc indeed qu ite liheral .
It is not even limited to particu lars, as is shown hy the indus ion of items (iii ) and
(vi ). In fact each of the di visions in dlC tetrachofO lllY of Ca tegories 2. is repre-
sented here.
29. I am not claiming that these are the very chains Ari stotle would havc gen-
erated if he had perfo rmed step 2 of the single-questioll method Oil items (i )-(vi),
or even that they a rc very close. Th ese ex amples nrc offered merel y to show the
formal operation of the method, and not to reOe'er an y suhsta ntive Ari s£Otei ian
assumptions about natura l kinds.
30. On the oth er hand, these assumpti ons entail noth ing :l hout the numher of
such hi erarchi es required to categorize " everything there is" (7faJl'fu TCr OVTU),
and this may be why Aristotle evidently feels free to experiment with his list of
categories.
} 1. Ackrill (t9 63), 80.
,32.. Ibi d.
33. Ackrill's account, while appealing, does not expla in why this ,alleged shift
[ 153 J
Notes to Pages 91-92
that the definition of any predicate th:lt belongs in the what-is-it of given suhject
will itself belong-in fact, belong pcr sc-to that subject. This las t is not to impl y
that the other so rt of type 1 per se predications (those:: that correspond to the
constructive d efinition s menri o ned in cha pter 4, note 34 ) satisfy either of these
condi tions.
4. On thi s, see cha pter I above.
5. PriorAllalytics 21a26, 49b5, Top ics I Olh39-102:1I, 1.',oa'l9, 14 2.112.- 6,
147bJ 3- 15, 1 4 9 al -2 ,b.~-5·
6. This is fo llowed immediately (at 1 a2.8- 34) by the ohse rvation thnt there a re
some special cases, e.g., that of wh iteness (TO Af:tn<ol'), where the n:l me of the in -
herent is appli cable to what it inheres in , hut th at even in those cascs the lo gos
fail s to apply. As Furth (1 988 ) ha s pointed out ( 19 ), this records Aristotle 's appre-
ciation of the linguisti c happenstance that the adjecti val form AIWKOV performed
extra duty in Greek by occasio na lly stan ding in for the noun form Af-:VK0"1S' as
the name of whiteness .
7. If thi s is co rren, and Aristotle can be interpreted as doing bener 011 thi s
issue in, say, the Metaph),sics, that shou ld cOllnt ns some ev idence. though it is
certainly not conclusi ve, for the view that the Categories is nn earlier wo rk . Cf.
chapter 4, no te I above. Again st thi s, Frede ( 1978) maintains that Aristotle's
"la ter" treatment of differentiae in tbe Metaphysics is nlrcndy in view ill the
Categories.
8. Ack rill (196)), 85 - 87.
9. Metaph ysics 7.1 2. I03 7 b8 - I038aJ5 .
10 . Dancy (1975) and Kung (r9 77).
I I. Thi s is reinforced by the usual placement of the ToPics:1s earli er th;'ln Cate-
gories, for that wou ld make it very easy to underSf<l. nd how Ariswde could here in-
nocently make use of the term in ignornnce of its lnler philosophical si!;l1ihc;m ce.
12. This cont raStS w ith Metaphysics Z. 12, where Aristotl e is open to tht· pos-
sibili ty that differentiae can be c1nssi fied by the differcntine kinds ro which they
belong. For instance, at 1038a14 - 15 he sll~gests thM "do vf!/I -rootedness" (l'j
(TXt~o1foOio:) is "a certa in (subtype of) rootedn ess" (1foiliiT1J<;" HS-), which suggests
that one could construct hierarchical c1a ssificntions o f d iffcrcn tinc as well as rhe
kinds they divide. 1 thank Allan Go tthelf for th is point.
13. This second defin itional relation ta kes on a n even greater import.m ce: in
later works . For in addition to its a pplication to the case of differenti;l :lIld ~ell tls
(whi ch emerge out of the late PlatOnic conception of definition ), Aristotl e even-
tu all y co mes in Metaphysics Z.5 (I o .~oh J 7- 22.) to beli eve th M essentia ll y the
sa me definitiona l rehnio n ho lds between w hal ht' c:\ lI s th e: " per se affection "
(KerO'erm-a 1fa6oS') sllublless, and its p roper mau!rinl sll h jecr (lIose), nlld in Meta-
ph ysics Z.10 a nd I I he goes all to exploit wh at he sees as importnnt affinities
between this ho mely exam ple and the crucia l philosophic11 issue of chnr:lcteriz-
in g the relation between a composite su bst;'lnce (t'.g., :1 p:trticu1:tr m :lIl) ;Hld its
apprupriate (proximate) material (blood , flesh, bOllc, etc.). The d etail:; of this
latter procedure a re taken up in Fereiohn (u np ublished).
I 155 1
Notes to Pages 99-105
[ 156 J
Notes to rages 106-107
directly from, say, (i) All men are either mortal o r im mo rta l, to (ii) All men are
mortal. The mi stake here, accord ing to Aristot le, li es in the f;'lct that the choke of
mortality ove r im morta lity (or neith er) as a d istin guishing fe;lture of Illen is left
unsupported, so th at this reasonin g simp ly assu mes th e truth of (ii) and therefo re
begs the question (46b l 2.. 18, 33), whereas (ii ) C:l n and sho uld he proved by syl-
logistic means (46a .16 - 39 ). Whar Aristo tl e docs /lot say, a nd w hoa Ba rnes tri es LO
rcad into thesc passages, is that these means will necess:l rily incorpor:lte th e use of
(i) o r some other disjunctive predi cation :IS a sy ll ogistic premise. Sim il :l rl y, the
schematic arguments in Prio r Analytics 1.46 and 2..2.2. to which Barnes po ints
(5 Ib39-4 I , 52.334 - 37, 68a3- 16) arc ce rtain ly not presented in exp licit syllo-
gis tic form and seem to be among the inference p:atterns that Aristotle regards as
genuinely deductive but nor syllogistic in char:H.:ter (eL 4 7;l2. .l - 2. .'i ).
2.5· Compare Bonin (r870), 9bS 3 - 5 5. On e interesting seconda ry result of the
extremely compellin g argument in Frede ( 1978) in slippon of Owen's " m:l ximal ly
specific" interpretation of nonsubstnnti:l l pnrticlIlars (d. Owen ( 1965:11 " nd
chapter 4, note I 7 above) is that even the indefin ite sentences of the Catego ries,
where Aristotle is not co ncerned with th e genera l sentence forms of the sy llo-
gistic, should be interpreted as pani cul" f statements. In pani cul;lr, rrede's main
argumem relies pardy on the co rrect observatiun that th e indefini te scntt!'llce,
"White inheres in body," a t CAtegories s.2.rq 1-3 2.lll llst he understood as :lsse r(-
in g that some bod ies ue white.
2.6. This mistake is di scussed in chapter 2. in co nnecrion with the interpreta -
tio n of w hat 1 ca ll "referential universal s."
2.7. Of course, this need not be a prope r suhset, since w here " Every S is P" is
true, th e singula r propositio ns th"t make its consequence, "Some S is P" trlle are
the very ones that underli e the truth of the universal statement itself. This is the rea -
son onc ca nnot move fro m "Some S is P" to "SomeS is not P" in Aristoteliilll iogic.
Geach ( 1962.) attempts ro un dermine the intel ligibilit y ()f rhis mode of inter-
pretation by as king how it would treat a falsI' statement of th e for m "Some S is
P," and rejecting ou t of hand the response that it would then Ilot he abollt ;l ll Y S at
all. Th e reason behi nd this rejecti o n is presllm:l bl y the Russclli a n ide;l (pressed
again st Frcge in "On Denoting") that determining rhe referelHs o( the terms in :I
sentence shou ld properly be prior to, :1n d certai nl y not dependen t upon ,;l deter-
mination of the sentence's truth-value. If so, it is cl1rious th ;tt Ceacl! sho uld rely
o n this cons ideration. gi ven that he himself takes p:lins to po int out that th e sort
of " reference" involved is nor il1tel1ded (or spc:l ker) rderence, but a I1lllch "thin -
ner," who ll y semanti c relario n (7, 8). Accord ing to Geach, indeed, it iS:ln ent irely
nonpsycho logica l notion acco rding to which the refe rents of thc sl1bject of:l sen-
tence are just those thin gs rhe facts abou t whi ch l1l:lkc th e sentence true. Only by
slipping back into th ink ing about intended reference does one fi nd it probl ematic
that reference sho uld be posterio r to tru th-va lue.
2.8. It is important here to record a poin t that precisely In "tches o ne made in
the earli er di scussio n of the referentia l un ive rsal in chapter 2., namely that the
( 157 (
Notes to Pages 108 - 110
transparency of the referential particular versions of (7b) and (8 b) does not entail
that they ate each synonymous with conjunctions of singular statements (about
the odd a nd even numbers respectively). To recall th at earlier discussion (espe-
cia ll y chapter 2, note 12), it would be entirely possible to know that a referential
particular was true without knowing exactly which singul ar propositions made it
true, even though the replacement of any of those proposi tions with different ones
would result in the sentence being about a different group of individual s. So, for
exampl e, various covert departmental com ings and goings could alter the refer-
ence of my uttera nce of "Some o( my coll eagues are in," through different occa-
sions, and these altera tions would change the content of my knowledge of its
truth , even though its truth-value would remain unch anged so long as th e depart-
menl was not empty. I think it is failure to recognize this possibility that ulti-
matel y leads Geach to deny the intelligibility of referentia l pa rticulars.
29. Since the rea son ing at 73b 22 - 24 involves equating the properties signified
by not odd and eve" , it also is concerned wit h the necessity of such sentences as
(7C) So me numbers are not odd, an d (8c) Some numbers are not even. How ex-
actly such predications fi gure in Aristotle's theory of dem onstration is the main
topic of chapter 7.
[ 158 [
Notes to Pages 110-121
r 15 9 J
Notes to Pages 12 1- 12 7
lytics 1. ) I (where hi s general aim is to show how expl anations involving all three
of the Physics' four "causes" that are present in the Analytics ca n be cast into the
fo rm of demonstrati ve syll ogisms) leads him for the first time to think of hi s highly
related concepts of cause an d explanation primaril y in terms of causal (in the
modern sense) relations between events, instead of logica l relations between
terms. Th is in turn leads him in Posterior Analytics 2. T T to begin asking " Hu-
mean" questions abom the temporal relations between causes and their effects.
16. On this pecul iar exp ression, whi ch is evidenrly a counterparr [Q the ex-
pression the what-is- it in the Posterior Allaiytics, see Kosman (forthcoming).
17. I believe the same point would be expressed in the language of Posterior
Allalytics ) .4 by sayi ng th at grammatica l ca pacity belongs to man not only KaTer
n
1TctJJ rO~, bur also auro (on which see chapter 3 above). Thi s point is co ntested
by Code ('98 6).
18. Perhaps these are connected through the concept of rationality.
19_ Aristotle actuall y lists and discusses three types of pro pria besides the per
se variety at Topics 128b' 5[f. These he descri bes as " tempo rary" (1TOTe), " rela-
rive" (7TP0>; i repov), and "permanent" (ae l ). The special characteristics that dis-
tinguish these three types have no relevance to the present di scussion, and wi ll be
ignored here.
2 0. Th is passage is discussed at length in chapter I above.
2. 1. See also De Anima 1.1,4°2.38 - 13.
22. Lennox (1987) does an excellent job of distinguish ing this late ral form of
demonstration (which he labels " A-expl anations") from the two vertica l types set
out above (which Lenn ox does not distinguish from each other, but refers to in -
differentl y as " B-explanations"). However, I believe he miSinterprets Ari stotle's
arguments in Posterior Analytics 1.24 , that demonstrations tha r are " universa l"
(ril>; Ka8oAov) are "better" (/Jehi wII; 85a15 ), or " mo re compelling" (KVptW-
ripa; 86323), than those th at arc "particul ar" (rils- /-LSp0s-), to imply some prefer-
ence on Aristotle's part for A-explanations over B-explana tions. In fact, the main
poim of this chapter is really no more th em an echo of Posterior Analytics 1.4 and
5: proving that a given attribute (in Aristotl e's ex·ample having angles equal to
two right angles) belongs to a certai n kind (isosceles triangle) , when the attribute
in question also belongs necessarily to a wider kind (in this case, triangle), is epis-
temologi calty inferior to (an d indeed depends upon) a "universa l" proof that th e
attribute belongs to the whole of th at wider kind. Thi s, I take it, is just a restate-
ment of the requirement of Posterior Alfafytics 1. 4 that i:l complete demonstration
n
must rest exclusively on prem ises that are extensiona lly immediate (or aliTo, as
[ 160 J
Notes to Pages 128 - 132
thal express ion was exp lained in chapter 3 above). This does not affect wh.\[ I see
as Lennox's correct and very important insight that Aristotle's Iolter hiologica l
works (most especially, the Historia Anillltllillll1) display (I pronounced prefer-
ence for lateral explanations involving coextensive properties and toliiffercnriae.
2.3. Mute (192.8 ).
2.4. This modei is appl ied to Aristotle's Physics in chapter, of Waterlow (I 9g2.).
2.5. This assumprion is entailed by a principle adhered to in the Orgallml
(e.g., at Topics 1.15.I07b I 9 - z6), bur perhaps dropped in the biological works,
that differemiating characteristics can apply only hnmonYlllously (usll,llly analo-
gously) across natural kinds.
2.6. If this is substantially correc t, there remains the question of why Aristotle
himself does no t draw this connec ti on expl ici tly, and why for that matter he does
virtually nothing to indi cate he is even aware that the two types of st~ltements are
superficially unlike one another. This I believe is just one of many symptoms of
the fact that the theory of demonstration as a whole is intended to app ly eql13lly
well both to natural sciences like biology and exact sciences like geometry (where
by "equa lly" I mean that Aristotle is not willing to treat one of these types as
paradigmatically demonstrluive, and the other as a ticgencrMe type). For R1Ti 1'0
1TO.\V truths, wh ile quite freque nt in natlltai sl.:ienccs, ha ve no place at all in
mathematics, whereas Aristotle's usual examples indicate th'lt predi cations of per
se propria are closely associated in his mind with mathematical proofs. Hence. I
suggest' that because his general policy is to stress the similarities between rhe two
kinds of science (if, indeed, he even recognizes them as two distinct kinds in any
important sense) and to underplay their differen ces, he is reluctant to att,lCh Illu ch
importance to what he regards as a stlpern.c i:ll difference between the two sorts of
predica tion.
27. As was argued in chapter 2, these must be gelluine I}r(·dictltio/ls. i.e., refer-
ential universals. and not just Platonistic mean ing assumptions.
I 161 I
Notes to Pages 132 - 135
3. Plato's views about this problem and his ways of dealing with it in the So~
phist are discussed in some deta il in Ferejohn (1989)·
4. Moravcsik (1962 and 1973 ) tries to resi st understanding Plato's objections
to such divisions as having any essentia l connection with the use of negative con~
cepts or expressions, insisting instead that the distinction relied lipan in these pas~
sages is simply that between natural and artificial delineations. This view, which
is compelled by Moravcsik's wider interpretation of the Sophist, is undermined
by his own admission (1962,72) that the mOSt natural interpretation of States~
man 262D-E is the one be rejects.
5. Alexander, ;'1 Metaphysic.a 8r, .~-4. Though Aristotle's worries about the
meaning of negative predicates arise during a critical discussion of the Platonic
Ideas, one may assume they apply mutatis mutandi to his own theory of predica-
tion on which Aristotelian universals arc taken as the denotations of general terms.
6. There is some evidence to suggest that this view is shared by Alexander:
"For 'not-man' is true of the horse and the dog, and of everything else besides the
man, both existent and non-existent (i5VTWV Te Kat /.LTJ OVTWV). For it applies to
both wood and stone, to both centaur and chimera, to what is utterly insubstan-
tial, to what nowise nohow is (TOi) /.LT/Sa/.Lf} ILT/Sa/-Lw,> OVTO'»" (In Metaphysica
80.17ff. alt.).
7. The absolute extreme of this sort of case is one where the background field
is taken as all subjects of discourse, including nonexistents; d. De Il1terpretatione
2, and Peri [deon 80. 17ft
8. Lee (1972) incorrectly assumes thar all varieties of meaning deficiency are
"infectious" in th e sense that any such defect of a part of a compound expression
will necessarily be visited upon the whole. Hence: "each determinate Part of Oth -
erness is opposed to some determinate Form and ... its determinacy really is that
of the Form to which it is directed .. ," (284-85, note 25, emphasis in original).
In fact, given a constant background set, the determinacy of a negative term is
inversely related to that of its affirmative com ponent. I believe this confusion is
ultimately rooted in Lee's overplaying of the knowledge analogy at 257C- D to
the extent that he has Plato holding that each part of difference derives not just its
determinate nature (and consequently its name worthiness) but also its very exis-
tence from its correlated Form together with the Form of Difference (much as one
might hold that arithmeric owes its existence to the faculty of knowledge and the
field of numbers). This leads Lee to construe the not-beautiful as a sort of second-
order intension which is somehow constructed out of, or as Lee puts it, "consti-
tuted by," the interweaving of Beauty and Difference (286) . To the contrary, I
maintain that the not-beautiful is simply the class of independently existing Forms
that share the distinction of be ing different from and opposed to Beauty. If asked
whether this interpretation of Plato is intensional or extensional, I would reply
that the question is misdirected. It is most certainly not intensional in the sense
employed by Lee (293) ; it insists that every term (positive or negative) signifies
some Form or class of Forms and not some mysterious "specific negative inten·
sian" (293) . Yet my interpretation is intensional insofar as Forms themselves are
[ 162 I
Notes to Pages 136 -137
class ified as intensiona l entities, and insofar as it recogn izes th at Pl ato wou ld
never endorse a nomi nal istic ana lysis of "Socrates is not heautiful," on wh ich the
sentence merely places Socrates outside the class of beautiful things.
9. De Il1 terpretariol1e 2. , 6a."\0-.13 , and ~.16b12-T6. Compnre alst) D(' 111 -
terpretatioue 1 0, 12., and 14, passim, with Prior Analyties 1.46, pnssi m.
10. The specific co ndi ti on fo r termhood mention ed at De /Ilt erl"ctarion<'
2.16a28 -30 is that an expression must " become a [genu in el sy mhol" (yr. V'11Ta t
uVJL{3o'Aov), that is, something more than the " in articul ate noi ses" (aypaJLI.taTOt
.parbot) of beasts (329 ), and this seems quite clearly to he a condi tion on mean -
ingfulness. Conseq uently, it is a reasonable in ference that Aristo tle 's grounds for
disquali fy ing indefinite expressions as nouns <lnd verbs in th e strict se llse is tha t
they do not fully satisfy this condition, and we ll1:1y specul ate that he sees thi s
sho rtcoming as due to their se mantic fr agmentntion.
I I. For Aristotle's advice on how this defect may be avoided, see hi s discus-
[ 163 1
Notes to Page 135
hibiting app li cations of so-ca lled non logica l axioms across different genera, even
though these principles do nor generally involve negative predication. For ex-
ample, his insistence that the principle "Equa ls taken from equa ls yield equals,"
can only be used in restrined demonstrative contexts (e.g., as perta ining to equal
numbers, or to lines of equal length) ca n be seen to reflect a concern that, if the
term equal were taken to denote anything whatever in the ca tegory of Quantity, it
would be too wide to possess a determ inate meaning.
I 164 I
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I 168 J
Index
I 169 1
Index
I 170 I
Index
I 17 1 I
Index
I 172 J
Jlldex
[ 173 [
Index
I 174 J