ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF DIVISION

ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF DIVISION
Author(s): ANDREA FALCON

Source: Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement, No. 68, ARISTOTLE AND
AFTER (1997), pp. 127-146
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ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF DIVISION
ANDREA FALCON
1. INTRODUCTION
Aristotle's discussion of division is scattered over several texts. Aristotle's very w

dealing with division is a first reason for this. Each time Aristotle talks about divi
is content merely to deal with particular aspects of it as a method. In fact, either he
division insofar as a method of proof in APr B 31 and in APo B 5, or he documen
connections between division and the hunting out of a definition in APo B 13, or h
criticisms against a particular version of division in PA A 2-4. But Aristotle
confidence in division as a method is a second reason for this. It is often said that
Aristotle developed division as a method for the collection and the study of zoological
data. This is true only in part: Aristotle, in fact, deals with division in non-zoological
contexts and for non-zoological purposes as well. In Metaph. Z 12 Aristotle is concerned
with the unity of definition, and he appeals to division because this method can help him
to solve this particular definitional puzzle. In APo B 13 he exploits division and its
properties to offer a solution to another definitional puzzle which undermines the
possibility of giving any definition and which all extant Greek commentators ascribe to
Speusippus. 1
Even if Aristotle's discussion of division is so scattered, it provides us with a theory of
division. A brief summary of the major results Aristotle obtains helps to make this point
clear. In APo B 13 he focuses on the role that division plays in the search for a definition.
Whatever this role is, it cannot be that of proving a definition. Both in APr A 31 and in
APo B 5 Aristotle deals with the claim that division comes deductively to its conclusion,
or that division proves the definition it reaches. He does not agree with this claim and
explains why it cannot be. To argue that division has no inferential power Aristotle
undertakes a formal analysis of the procedure through which a definition is obtained by
division. On the other hand, PA A 2-4 is nothing but a presentation of his own method of
*1 use the following abbreviations: PA for Parts of Animals ; APr for Prior Analytics ; APo for
Posterior Analytics ů, Metaph. for Metaphysics.
1 APo B 13, 97a6-22. One might claim that the way Aristotle's extant work has come to us is a
third, external, reason which explains, at least in part, why Aristotle's discussion is scattered over
several texts. In fact, all today's editions of Aristotle's work ultimately go back to Andronicus of
Rhodes, who published the great edition of Aristotle in the 1st century BC, and he probably had to
make some arbitrary choices about where some of our texts were to be inserted. At least Metaph. Z
12 and PA A 2-4 seem to be relatively independent compositions. Metaph. Z 12 does not fit in the
plan of Book Zeta as a whole. See on this point M. Frede and G. Patzig, Aristoteles. Metaphysik.
Band II: Kommentar (München 1988) 221-223. On the other hand, PA A is clearly distinct from
the rest of PA. This book is a collection of at least three independent texts: PA A 1, PA A 2-4, and
PA A 5. On this point see in particular I. Düring, Aristotle's De Partibus Animalium. Critical and
Literary Commentaries (Göteborg 1943) 35-36, and D. Balme, Aristotle's De Partibus Animalium
I and De Generatione Animalium I with Passages from II, 1-3 (with a report on recent work and an
additional bibliography by A. Gotthelf) (Oxford 19902) v and 56.
ARISTOTLE AND AFTER 127
128 ARISTOTLE AND AFTER
division. It consists of two parts: a pa

dichotomous method (i.e. a particular versi
is inadequate), and a pars construens, whe
every division should be conducted. Arist
Z 12, where he deals with the issue of unit
an adequate method of definition should gu
these texts have one thing in common: her
view, the method of division is.
What we mean by a theory of division m

of division. It is not difficult to find instances of a mere use of division. Let us
focus briefly on the divisions we conventionally know as Aristotelian Divisions ?
Let us take, in particular, the divisions which have been numbered by
H. Mutschmann as Div. 2 and as Div. 3. They contain a division of virtues and
vices. Both virtue and vice are divided into four different kinds: Justice, Bravery,
Temperance and Phronesis. They have as their negative counterpart Injustice,
Cowardice, Intemperance and Aphrosune. Moreover, in Div. 2 and in Div. 3 a
correspondence is established between virtues and vices on the one hand and parts
of the soul on the other. There is no doubt that these divisions document the idea
that there is a connection between ethics and psychology, that it is possible to offer
a psychological model of ethics, and that whoever wrote these divisions wanted to
register this commonly held belief. There is also no doubt that whoever wrote
these divisions was not concerned with offering rules of division or with
discussing division. It is a matter of fact that these divisions tell us something
about ethics but nothing about division as a method. The reason for this is that
whoever wrote these divisions did not mean to offer a theory of division but just
contented himself with using it. This last example makes it clear that it is also
possible to use division without discussing division. But is it possible to make use
of division without accepting any particular theory of division? If use and theory
of division are really two different things, it cannot be excluded a priori that
someone may use division without committing himself to any particular theory of
division.
2. THEORY OF DIVISION AS METHOD OF DEFINITION OR

THEORY OF DIVISION AS METHOD OF CLASSIFICATION?
In the Sophist Plato describes division by using a metaphor: division, he says

to hunt out the entity x one is interested in. Immediately afterwards Plato cla
is thinking of: one hunts out x in order to establish what x is.3 Before intro
rules of division Aristotle appeals to the same metaphor at the beginning of
us now state, he says, how we should hunt out the items predicated in wha
the items which are predicated in what x is provide the definition of x , it
division plays a role in the hunt for the definition of x. In APo B 13 the li
division and definition comes up again more explicitly: I have stated
Aristotle, in what way divisions yield proofs, and I shall now show the only
2 H. Mutschmann, Divisiones quae vulgo dicuntur aristoteleae (Lipsiae 1906). A tr

commentary has recently been offered by C. Rossitto. See C. Rossitto, Aristotele ed a
Introduzione , traduzione e commento (Padova 1984).
3 Soph. 21 2c.
4 APo B 13, 96a22-23: kcûç Ôe Ôeî ůrjpeúeiv xá ¿v xcp tí ¿gti Kaxrļyopoi)ļieva vov keycojiev.
ANDREA FALCON: ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF DIVISION 129
useful for deducing definitions.5 In APo B 13, therefore, Aristotle co

already clear to Plato: the main goal of division is definition , and the
rules for the achievement of a definition.
One cannot be content with the thesis that division plays a role in the search for
definition (a thesis which is at the moment strongly favoured);6 one has to go a little
further by asking Aristotle what this role consists in. It should be clear that division alone
cannot reach definition and more particularly that any division presupposes the selection
of the defining items, i.e. the items which belong to the definition: the genus and the
differentiae. This selection has to be made before applying division because what belongs
and what does not belong to definition certainly cannot be established by division. But if
the genus and the differentiae are already at hand before the divisional procedure, the
question about the place of division in the search for definition becomes even more
pressing. What is, therefore, the peculiar role that division plays in the hunt for definition?
In APo B 13, after saying that division is useful for deducing definitions, Aristotle
makes the following comment: it makes a difference, he says, what comes first and what
comes later in a definition, and it is not the same to say Animal tame two-footed and Two-
footed animal tame.1 By this example Aristotle seems to suggest that one may know the
three items which the definition consists of ( Animal , Tame and Two-footed ), but one may
not be able to give the definition. In other words, the mere knowledge of the parts of a
definition does not guarantee by itself the knowledge of the definition. Definition, in fact,
is not only a complex formula, i.e. a formula which consists of a plurality of parts, but
also an ordered formula, i.e. each part holds its own place within the formula. This
explains why Animal , Tame and Two-footed can be combined in many ways ( Animal
tame two-footed, Animal two-footed tame , Tame animal two-footed , Two-footed animal
tame, Two-footed tame animal, Tame two-footed animal ), but only one of these
combinations, namely Animal tame two-footed , is the defining formula.
The peculiar role that division plays is that of arranging the defining items according to
a given ordering. Each definition is a formula which consists of n + 1 elements (where n
is, of course, * 0), i.e. a genus G and a number n of differentiae: Al, A2, ... , An-1, An.
More particularly, this number of differentiae must be equal to the number of steps
required to isolate in a division the species which has to be defined. In the example
offered by Aristotle himself, namely the definition of Man, the genus is Animal and the
differentiae which permit the isolation of Man are respectively Tame and Two-footed.
Diagram (i) helps to show how the combination Animal tame two-footed reflects the way
in which this definition is secured by division. In this case the species S, Man, is reached
through two steps: first of all the intermediate genus Gl is isolated by applying the
differentia Al, Tame, to the first genus GO, Animal; secondly the species S is isolated by
applying the differentia A2, Two-footed, to the intermediate genus Gl. From the
5 APo B 13, 96b26-28: <bç pivxoi ôeiKvúoDcnv, eipexai év toîç rcpóxepov. xpT|aip,oi ô'&v eîev
&ôe ļiovov rcpòç tò cru^Àx)yíaeGi5ai tò tí éaxiv.
6 See for instance P. Pellegrin, Aristotle's Classification of Animals. Biology and the Conceptual
Unity of the Aristotelian Corpus (Berkeley 1986), English translation from La classification des
animaux chez Aristote. Statut de la biologie et unite de Varistotelisme (Paris 1982); D. Balme,
Aristotle. De Partibus Animalium I and De Generatione Animalium I (Oxford 19923) 104-105, and
by the same author 'Aristotle's Use of Division and Differentia', in A. Gotthelf and G. Lennox
(eds.), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology (Cambridge 1987) 71-74.
7 APo B 13, 96b30-35: Siacpepei 8e xi tò rcpéorov Kai ftaxepov t&v raxriYopou^evcov
KocTTiTOpeiG-frai, otov elrceîv Çcpov fļ^epov ôítcodv f' ôítcodv fļ Ôítcodv Çópov Tļjiepov.
definition G0A1A2, namely Animal tame tw

divisional passages by which the definition
(i)
<30
¿2(<31) = A2(¿1(<30))= S
In APo B 13, 97a35-97b6 by exploiting the ordering of the defining items offered by division
Aristotle sketches an argument to demonstrate that the items of a given definition are all that we
need, i.e. nothing extra has been posited and nothing is missing. This argument may be illustrated
by using the example in diagram (i), and therefore by applying the argument to prove that G0A1A2
is really the definition of S. To understand this argument one has to bear in mind the notion of
indivisible species, namely a species which cannot become a genus in order to be further divided
into other species. S is such an indivisible species and therefore contains only individuals, e.g.
Plato, Socrates and so on. Moreover, in this argument Aristotle is tacitly assuming that one is able
to distinguish the genus from the differentiae among the defining elements.
G0A1A2 is not the definition of S only in two cases. The first is when one or more items posited
in the definition are not defining. In this case either GO or Al or finally A2 would be wrongly
chosen, and they would be accepted in the definition only by an error. Nevertheless, since the
definitional items are selected before applying the division and hence the person who divides
assumes that GO, Al and A2 are items of the definition of S, this first possibility is ruled out. The
second possibility is that one or more items which should have been posited in the definition are
missing: in this case GO, Al and A2 are not all the items which are required in order to define S, and
therefore at least another one, e.g. A*, is to be posited. If this is so, as the definition consists of a
genus and a sequence of differentiae, A* could only be either the genus or one of the differentiae.
8 For an introduction to this way of describing division see Longer Note 1.
ANDREA FALCON: ARISTOTLE' S THEORY OF DIVISION 1 3 1
Nevertheless, it is neither the genus (this is GO) nor a new differentia A3 to add bef
between Al and A2. This is excluded because Aristotle assumes that every div
correctely, namely withouth missing any intermediate passage. If this is so, than A
new differentia to add after Al and A2. But again, this is excluded because
individuals, and hence it cannot be further divided by applying A3. If also this poss
out, then it is clear that the GO, Al and A2 are all the items required to offer an ad
of S.
If at this point it should be clear that definition is the goal of division,

whether definition is the only goal of division. In other words, is definitio
or is classification another possible goal of Aristotle's division? This furth
goes to the core of the paradox' about Aristotle and zoological classi
'paradox' goes something like this: on the one hand it is agreed that Aristot
important influence on the modern system of zoological classification, on t
it is hard to find in Aristotle any classification which at all resembles thos
modern zoologists.9
With respect to the attitude scholars show toward Aristotle's interest in zoologica
it is possible to divide the scholars into two groups. The first group embrace
acknowledge that there is no classification in the zoological writings but argue th
mean that Aristotle is not interested in classification. In other words, the fact
classification by itself does not prove that Aristotle has no clear idea about
'classfication' means. I would count in this group both D. Balme10 and G. E. R
second group embraces scholars who infer that Aristotle has no classificatory go
from the fact that there is no classification in the zoological writings. Since the scep
classificatory goal of Aristotle's zoology is increasing and it is not easy to giv
scholars who agree on this point, I limit myself to recalling P. Pellegrin.12 F
discussion on the 'classification-problem' I have learned two things above all. First o
that in the zoological writings Aristotle did not attempt to classify by division from
of large genera down to the species which are visible in nature through middle
Secondly, it is also clear that one can limit oneself to ascertaining this fact or one c
this absence that Aristotle has no classificatory aim.
What division can teach us about the 'classification-problem' may be ma

the help of a diagram. If one divides in order to obtain a classification, th
know the whole tree in (ii), i.e. each element of the tree drawn in (ii), and
relations between this tree and other trees into which the domain, e
kingdom, is divided. On the other hand, if one divides in order to reach only
of a species at the bottom of the tree, then one does not have to know the
(ii), but only some of its elements. Suppose one divides in order to reach th
SI, then one only has to know the circled elements, i.e. GO and G2:
9 For a clarification of the notion of classification by division see Longer Note 2.

10 D. Balme, 4 GENOS and EIDOS in Aristotle's Biology' CQ 12 (1962) 81-98.
11 G. E. R. Lloyd, Methods and Problems in Greek Science (Cambridge 199
'Aristotle's Zoology and his Metaphysics: the Status Quaestionis. A Critical Review
Theories', in D. Devereux and P. Pellegrin (eds.), Biologie, Logique et Métaphysique
Séminaire CNRS-N.S.F. Oléron 1987 (Paris 1990) 7-9.
12 The distance between the two positions is made explicit by P. Pellegrin
Morfologie, Division. Réponses à G. E. R. Lloyd', in D. Devereux and P. Pellegrin
logique et métaphysique chez Aristote, (Paris 1990) 37-47.
(Ü)
Ö x.
From this point of view the distinction between definition and classification appears to
be basically a distinction of scope. Diagram (i) shows clearly that what distinguishes the
person who divides in order to define and the person who divides in order to classify is
only a different scope. From this point of view the distinction between classification and
definition is only an epistemological distinction, and division is a neutral instrument with
respect to the goal that may be chosen. Division, in fact, is an adequate instrument both of
classification and of definition.
Such neutrality of division with respect to the goal one can choose may cast doubt on
the legitimacy of inferring that classification is a notion which is alien to Aristotle's
zoological world. That in the biological writings (as well as in the logical writings)
division is used to reach definitions rather than classifications is an important fact, but by
itself it cannot be conclusive in order to decide whether, according to Aristotle, division is
only an instrument of definition. What can be inferred is that according to Aristotle
division is primarily an instrument of definition. If this is so, I do not also see any reason
to infer from the mere absence of classifications in the zoological writings that Aristotle's
zoology did not have any classificatory aim. Finally, such a neutrality of division with
respect to the goal may also help to explain why division (and the related notions of
genus, species and differentia) had an important influence^ in the development of
systematic practices among the early modern naturalists.
ANDREA FALCON: ARISTOTLE' S THEORY OF DIVISION 1 33
3. ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF DIVISION
In the preceding pages I have claimed that (a) Aristotle had a theory of division
had a theory of division as a method of definition , and finally (c) this theory i
with respect to a use of division as a method of classification. In the following
shall try to go a little further by asking what kind of division Aristotle's division
A basic intuition operates each time Aristotle talks about division as a
According to this intuition there are indivisible species (in Greek aTO|Lia eïSeï) t
be further analysed by division, and a division is adequate if it enables one to
definition of the indivisible species S one is interested in by marking off S in
number n * 0 of steps. This species S cannot be further divided because th
suitable differentia which can be taken and applied to it. Therefore, this item
and the result of division. Nevertheless, despite this commonly shared intuitio
indivisible species which has to be isolated in a finite number of steps by appl
equal number of differentiae, the texts where Aristotle talks about division as
can be gathered into three different groups: (1) APr A 31, APo B 5, APo B13; (
Z 12, and finally (3) PA A 2-4.
3.1 APr 31, APo B 5, APo B 13

While the examples Aristotle himself offers in APr A 31, APo B 5 and AP
different, the procedure of division is the same. For this reason I limit m
discussing the example Aristotle reports in APr A 31. If in all three examples
division, namely the indivisible species division has to come to, is Man, the dif
by which the highest genus Animal is divided are different. In APr A 3 1 the di
which enable one to isolate Man are respectively Mortal and Two-footed
particularly, Man is reached through two steps: first of all the intermediate gen
animal is isolated by applying the differentia Mortal to the first genus Animal;
Man is isolated by applying the differentia Two-footed to the intermediate genu
animal. This division may be represented as follows:
13 That Aristotle offers different divisions of Man (and consequently different definitio
may be easily explained by appealing to the idea of a theory of division I introdu
beginning of the paper. In all three texts Aristotle is interested in describing the way in w
division has to be conducted, rather than in giving the particular division of Man. In othe
is giving us the scheme which every particular division has to follow to be an adequate d
this is so, it is clear why he does not care about the actual division of Man. The fact that
examples look like stock examples confirms the idea that Aristotle is distinguishing betw
and content of a division. Let us take the two examples Aristotle reports in APr A 3 1 an
13 again. In APr A 31 Man is described as an animal which is mortal and two-footed.
could Animal mortal two-footed be the definition of Man? Apart from any other cons
how could, in fact, this definition distinguish Man from birds, which are both morta
footed as well? On the other hand, in APo B 13 Man is described as an animal which is
two-footed. If this example is taken as the definition of Man, it is even more unsatisfacto
first of all the definition Animal tame two-footed cannot mark off men from the other anim
are both tame and two-footed. Secondly, the differentia Tame can hardly be a
definitional item.
1 34 ARISTOTLE AND AFTER
(iii)
<30
¿2(<31) = ¿2(¿1(<;0))= s
GO stands for the highest genus Animal, Al and A2 stand respectively for the
differentiae Mortal and Two-footed, and finally S stands for the indivisible species Man.
Diagram (iii) makes it clear that there are two ways of describing S. The first and shorter
way goes as follows: S is the result of the application of the differentia A2 to the
intermediate genus Gl, or also A2(G1) = S. On the other hand, since Gl is the result of
the application of the differentia Al to the genus GO, the longer way goes as follows: S is
the result of the application of A2 to the application of Al to GO, or also A2(A1(G0)) = S.
3.2 Metaph. Z 12
If this is the way a division has to be effected, then in Metaph. Z 12 Aristotle corrects, at
least in part, himself. According to Metaph. Z 12 the procedure which I have described
here above is correct but incomplete. One important rule is in fact missing. At every stage
of a division, says Aristotle, one must divide by a differentia of the previous differentia
(hereinafter rule R).14 He also offers an example to illustrate this rule. If Footed animal is
14 Metaph. Z 12, 1038a9-10: àXka ļiiļv Kai ôeî te Ôiaipeîaftai vr'' triç ôiacpopâç ôiacpopáv. The
Greek ôiaipeîaùai tt|v xrjç ôiacpopâç 8iacpopáv is a bit odd: it suggests that the differentia is the
result of the division of a genus rather than that by which the genus is divided into its species. For
this reason D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford 1924) II, 207, and the Londinenses, Aristotle's
Metaphysics , Notes on Zeta (Subfaculty of Philosophy, Oxford 1979) accepted H. Joachim's
emendation trj tt1ç ôiacpopâç ôiacpopâ. This emendation does not seem to be necessary. I prefer to
follow the Greek of the MSS as also do W. Jaeger, Aristotelis Metaphysica (Oxford 1957), and
M. Frede and G. Patzig, Aristoteles, Metaphysik Z (München 1988).
a species of the genus Animal, one must divide it qua footed.15 It would n
divide footed animals into winged and wingless animals because Wing
are not successive differentiations of Footed or rather, following Aristo
differentiae of the differentia Footed. One must divide footed animals i
forms of footedness, as for instance cloven-footed animals and uncloven
cloven-footedness is in fact a further determination of footedness.16
To understand rule R it is necessary to understand the meaning of the q
as-operator).17 Let G be a genus and let A be a differentia, 'G qua A' sign
to be considered as a A. Aristotle uses the gwa-operator to suggest that th
be taken in isolation from all its other features and it has to be taken so
gwa-operator, therefore, is nothing but a filter that selects the differen
applied in effecting a division: all these differentiae must be determinat
person who divides the genus of footed animals qua footed places h
perspective from which only some differentiae can be seen, namely the dif
are further determinations of the differentia Footed. There are two main
the introduction of rule R. First of all, it is clear that the range of different
who divides has to hand is restricted. To divide the footed animal qua fo
divide only with respect to the feet: there might be other features suita
division, but the #w<2-operator filters them out. Secondly, a special kind
holds between the differentiae of the series Al, A2, A3, ... , An-1, An: a
'analyticity'. The last differentia, An,* records all the information which is
predecessors. Let us suppose that Two-footed is the last differentia: it sh
to Aristotle, also contain the previous differentia Footed. In fact, when
animal is two-footed one says two things: first that it goes on feet, secon
feet.
Why does Aristotle introduce rule R in Metaph . Z 12? It is not difficult to find an
answer to this question. In Metaph. Z 12 Aristotle is primarily concerned with the unity of
definition and makes the assumption that an adequate method of defining should
guarantee that a definition is unitary. Relying on this new rule, and more particularly on
the idea that the last differentia records all prior differentiae, division becomes not only
an adequate method of defining, but it also offers a solution to the problem of the unity of
definition. A definition consists of a plurality of elements: a genus G and a series of
differentiae Al, A2, A3, ... , An-1, An. Since the last differentia An entails its predecessors
Al, A2, A3, ... , An-1, these can be reduced to An. The consequence is that a definition
consists only of the genus G and the differentia An. Moreover, at least in Metaph. Z 12,
Aristotle seems to think that the genus G is contained, in one way or another, in the first
differentia Al. Aristotle takes into account two possibilities: (a) the genus does not exist
apart from its differentiae; (b) the genus exists apart from its differentiae, but only as
matter with respect to form. In Metaph. Z 12 Aristotle does not choose one of the two
possibilities and he is content with the result that both guarantee. At any rate, however the
genus may be taken away, a definition can be reduced to the series of differentiae, and
consequently to the last differentia. One can infer this from lines 1038a8-9, where
15 Metaph. Z 12, 1038al0- 1 1 : nakiv toó) Çcpoi) toó) tjtcótcoÔoç tt|v ôioccpopav 8eí eiöeva fļ
VKÓKOW. I follow Jaeger and Frede-Patzig who printed elôévai, which is the lectio of E, Parisinus
1853, and J, Vindobonensis phil. gr. C. Ross, on the other hand, preferred to print eivai according
to Ab, Laurentianus 87,12.
16 Metaph. Z 12, 1038al5.
17 My discussion of the qua-operator owes much to J. Lear, 'Aristotle's Philosophy of
Mathematics' The Philosophical Review 41 (1982) 161-191.
Aristotle claims that a definition is consti

of the definition can be reduced to the la
thing and the definition itself.19 In conclusi
of the last differentia and hence, finally, o
are recorded in the last one, i.e. in An.
3.3 PA A 2-4
By discussing the dichotomous method of division in PA A 2-4 Aristotle appears t

correct all the procedures of division which I described. In particular, he makes it clear
that the introduction of rule R does not by itself guarantee correct divisions. In addition to
this rule in PA A 2-4 Aristotle contemplates at least one other rule, which I shall call
hereinafter 'the rule of multiple differentiae'. According to PA A 2-4 an adequate
division has to be carried out by applying at least rule R along with this new rule which i
introduced in PA A 2-4. The starting point of a division is one of the genera which are
marked off in the folk classifications, e.g. the genus of fishes or that of birds. A division
of these genera has to be conducted by many differentiae which are applied
simultaneously.20 An example can be of some help to explain how rule R and the 'rule o
multiple differentiae' work together. Each species of bird must be defined by applying
simultaneously the differentiae that all together mark off the genus of birds from other
animals. Among these differentiae there are probably those which describe the beak, the
wings, the feathers and the feet. Each of them must be further divided according to rule
R, namely by applying a differentia that is a differentia of the previous differentia. The
definition of each bird is the combination (in Greek <xó|LL7iXeÍ;iç21) of one of the
differentiae that are obtained at the bottom of each line of division. The following
diagram illustrates the division of the genus of birds:
18 Metaph. Z 12, 1038a8-9: ó ópiajióç éaxiv ó ¿k tôv ôiacpopcov tafyoę.

19 Metaph. Z 12, 1038a 18-20: ei 8t| Tama omcoç ë%£i cpavepòv öxi f) xete-uraia ôiacpopá f|
ovaia to"ü 7rpá7jicxToç èaxai rai ópiajióç.
20 PA A 3, 643b 10- 14: àXXa ôeí mi pâcrikxi taxjißaveiv raia tevt| ia Çcpa, <bç 'xpnyr1vi!} 'o
KoXXoi ôiopíoavieç ôpvitfoç yévoç mi ixúúoç. xoirccov 5 ' ëraaxov noXXalq fopiaxai Ôiacpopaíç,
ov raia TTļv ôixoxojiíav.
21 PA A 3, 644a5.
(iv)
B«&k Legs leathers Wings
A A A A
Bl B2 ii 12 n 72 W1 W2
A /K
Li, i 11,2 rip n,4 njs
According to this diagram the bird A, for example, is to be defined by saying that i
a broad, straight beak, webbed feet, and small wings; the bird B, on the other hand,
be defined by saying that it has a crooked beak like all raptorials, feathered feet prov
with strong claws, wide wings like all good flyers. Each species therefore is isolated b
multiple division, and the subject of each line of division is a part of the bird. Not jus
part may be the subject of division, but only the peculiar ones, namely the parts th
distinguish the group of birds from other animals.
Sometimes a single line of division may not be enough to describe a single p
adequately. At the end of PA A 3 Aristotle seems to realize that to describe the feet
man it is necessary to draw two lines of division rather than only one. The first lin
divides the feet of man according to number (man is a two-footed animal) and the sec
line divides the feet according to their form (man has toed feet).22 This remark seem
be a consequence of a strict interpretation of rule R according to which every differ
must be a determination of its predecessors. As I have already said, Aristotle thinks
the last differentia records all the information which is conveyed from its predecess
Suppose now that in the case of man the last differentia is Five-toed. Five-toed tells u
think, three things about man: (a) that man is a footed animal, (b) that man is a clo
footed animal, and finally (c) that man is a cloven-footed animal whose foot is articul
into five toes. Five-toed, nevertheless, tells us nothing about the fact that man is a t
footed animal. On the other hand, it could not be otherwise. Number and form of the
are features that are not always associated. Birds and men, for example, have the sa
22 PA A 3, 644a5-6.
1 38 ARISTOTLE AND AFTER
number of feet -they are both two-footed - b

of a man are articulated into five toes, wh
toes. Some birds, furthermore, have webbed
3.4 Different Divisional Models
If the end and the result of every division is the definition of an indivisible species S
which one obtains by applying the suitable differentiae to a given genus, the foregoin
pages have shown that Aristotle sketches different ways of reaching S. The claim that
plurality of divisional models is available in Aristotle's discussion of division is not new
in his authoritative study of Aristotle's use of division and differentiae the late D. Balm
came to the same conclusion.23 At any rate, in this section I shall try to reduce th
plurality of divisional models by claiming that they depend on different ideas o
definition.
A first, tentative way of reducing these divisional models might go as follows. All the
ways of obtaining the indivisible species S Aristotle sketches are working on the basis
one of the following two basic models of division: (a) division by a single tree, an
(b) division by several, simultaneous trees. The first model of division consists of a singl
tree which has the highest genus GO at the vertex and the indivisible species S at the
bottom. This is present in all the texts where Aristotle discusses division apart from PA
2-4. On the other hand, division by several trees that simultaneously divide a given genu
at work only in PA A 2-4. If this way of presenting Aristotle's discussion of division as
whole is not wrong, it is nevertheless misleading. To understand this point let us go bac
to my diagram (iv), which is meant to represent the simultaneous division of the genus
birds. If this diagram describes the divisional model Aristotle reports in PA A 2-
adequately, it is difficult to resist objecting that each of the trees which divide the genu
of birds is not different from a single tree constructed in the way which is required by
Metaph. Z 12. The tree which divides the feet of birds illustrates this objection very wel
In this case the feet are divided according to number and form in the same way
Aristotle himself illustrates in Metaph. Z 12 by taking as an example the feet of man. B
if this is so, division by several, simultaneous trees can hardly represent a distinct, basic
model of division. On the contrary, it can easily be reduced to the first one. A division
several, simultaneous trees is just the conjunction of the number of single trees which a
needed to define the species S one is interested in.
By presenting the division by several, simultaneous trees as a basic model of division
one fails to grasp the very reason for its introduction in PA A 2-4. The division based on
the 'rule of the multiple differentiae' ultimately depends on a particular idea o
definition , rather than on a particular idea of division. In PA A 2-4 the notion o
definition is tied up with the notion of part. Each animal species is analysable into
certain number of properties, which are correlated to corresponding constituent parts o
the animal, and division is consequentely adequate if it enables one to reach the definitio
of the species S one is interested in by marking off these properities of S in a finite
number of steps. Therefore, the definition of S consists of the first genus and
combination of differentiae which are selected from among the last differentiae of ea
23 D. Balme, 'Aristotle's Use of Division and Differentia' in A. Gotthelf and J. Lennox (eds
Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology (Cambridge 1987) 69-89.
divisional tree, where each divisional tree represents the division of one of
parts of the animal.24
The thesis according to which the subject of the division that is described in
parts of an animal but the aim is the definition of the whole animal has been recen
P. Pellegrin.25 According to Pellegrin both the subject and the aim of the multiple
division which is described in PA A 2-4 is the definition of the parts of animals. I
PA A 3, 644a5-6 Aristotle is not dividing the feet of man because he is interested
of man, but because he is interested in the definition of the feet of man. The majo
this interpretation concerns the sense in which the notion of definition is taken. In
is only given of ousiai , it is difficult to understand how it is possible to give a de
feet. In the Metaphysics Aristotle does not contemplate the parts of the ousiai.
1040b5-16 Aristotle raises explicitly the question about whether the parts of a
His reply is negative. The parts of animals do not satisfy the two basic requir
established for being an ousia in Metaph. Z: (1) the requirement of separab
requirement of unity. To turn again to the example Aristotle offers in PA A 3, 644
ousia and his feet are not so, it is clear that a definition can be given only of man a
In PA A 3, 644a5-6, furthermore, Aristotle seems to make it explicit that divis
within the wider context of the definition of man.26
If division by several, simultaneous trees can hardly be described as a b

division (it can be described as the result of the conjunction of sever
single tree), perhaps it is not wrong to present PA A 2-4 as a refinemen
Aristotle reports in Metaph. Z 12. It is not difficult to see why a refineme
a single tree is needed once it is applied to the study of the animal kingd
A 2-4. If an animal is a complex of properties which cannot be presented
of division as Aristotle himself suggests, then division by a single tree i
characterize any but the simplest animal. Only by conducting a division si
many trees can one manage to collect and to order the information
description of the animal kingdom.
24 It is worth pointing out an important difference which distinguishes Metaph.

2-4. According to the example of man's feet Aristotle reports in Metaph. Z 12
only one suitable part of the animal enables one to reach the definition of the speci
an indivisible species of animal and PI, P2, P 3 stand for constituent parts of S, th
represent this claim as follows: S = def PI. On the contrary, according to PA A 2-4
enough to define the animal as a whole, but a plurality of parts is always required
S = def PI A P2 a P3. On the other hand, if I read PA A 3, 643a 1-6 correctly, ever
be enough to guarantee the identifiability of the species S. In other words, S = PI
25 See P. Pellegrin, Aristotle's Classification of Animals: Biology and the Concep
Aristotelian Corpus (Berkeley 1986). See also P. Pellegrin, 'Zoology withou
A. Gotthelf (ed.), Aristotle on Nature and Living Things (Pittsburgh 1985) 95-1
and Biological Difference: the Unity of Aristotle's Thought', in A Gotthelf and
Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology , (Cambridge 1987) 313-338, and fin
Morfologie, Division. Réponses à G. E. R. Lloyd' in P. Pellegrin and D. Devereux
Logique et Métaphysique chez Aristote (Paris 1990) 37-47.
26 The Greek in PA A 3 3 644a5-6 is not easy. Nevertheless, 644a5 seems
Siaipfļiai &vùpcû7coç, says Aristotle; where Siaipīļiai is a synonym for ópíÇrix
usage see APo B 13, 97a7, where to divide and to define are linked by an ep
metaphysical consequences which come from Pellegrin' s thesis have been extens
G. E. R. Lloyd, 'Aristotle's Zoology and his Metaphysics: the Status Quaest
Review of Some Recent Theories' in P. Pellegrin and D. Devereux (eds.), Bio
Métaphysique chez Aristote (Paris 1991) 7-35. This paper has also been publ
Lloyd, Methods and Problems in Greek Sciences (Cambridge 1991).
The division by a single tree which is rep

basic model for the division by several
A 2-4. But there is a third, remaining
account. In the Analytics Aristotle relies o
which he describes in Metaph. Z 12. If bot
nevertheless they are conducted in a substa
never requires that the special relationship
Z 12 holds between the differentiae within the same line of division. In APr A 31 and
APo B 13 the highest genus Animal is divided by applying first the differentiae Tame or
Mortal and then the differentia Two-footed, and no relation of analyticity holds between
Two-footed and Tame or Two-footed and Mortal. If this is so, Aristotle's discussion of
division offers two different models of division by a single tree: division by a single tree
with rule R ( Metaph . Z 12), and division by a single tree without rule R ( Analytics ). No
one of these models can be reduced to the other, and in the light of this fact they can be
described as basic models of division. Furthermore, since the definitions which are
reached on the basis of one are different from the definitions which are reached on the
basis of the other, these two models are inconsistent with each other. There cannot be two
definitions of the same indivisible species S: if the definition of S is the definition of the
ousia of S, and there is only one ousia of S, then there must also be only one definition
of S.27
In the preceding pages I claimed that Aristotle has a theory of division because he
provides us with a discussion of division as a method to reach definitions. Nevertheless, if
three divisional models are available in Aristotle's discussion of division, and they can be
reduced to two basic, inconsistent models of division, one has to conclude that Aristotle's
theory of division is inconsistent. A tentative way of resisting this conclusion may go
something like this. If the two basic, inconsistent models of division are adapted to
different objects, it is not necessary to ascribe an inconsistent theory of division to
Aristotle. Aristole may well have sketched different ways of reaching the indivisible
species S because S represents different objects to be defined. But in that way Aristotle's
theory of division is not inconsistent. Unfortunately this defence of Aristotle's theory of
division does not work. Aristotle never presents his rules of division as rules to reach
definitions in some relatively independent domain of objects; on the contrary, he presents
his rules as rules of division simpliciter , namely without any further qualification or
restriction. Another move is nevertheless available. This move does not solve the
inconsistency which is present in Aristotle's theory of division but could offer
explanation for it. The two basic, inconsistent models of division depend on two differe
ideas of definition, or more precisely on two different ideas of the requirement
definition has to satisfy in order to be an adequate definition. Nowhere else is Aristotle
concerned with the unity of defintion as in Metaph. Z 12. Only here does he make th
assumption that a definition should be at the same time simple and complex. T
introduction of rule R is meant to satisfy such a strong assumption. Relying in fact on r
R the last differentia An records all prior differentiae and, somehow, also the genus
and a definition may hence be, at the same time, a complex formula (i.e. GA1A2, A3,
An-1, An) and a simple formula (i.e An).
If this is really so, it turns out that Aristotle's discussion of division depends on a
particular idea of definition not only in PA A 2-4 but also in Metaph. Z 12. In t
preceding pages I claimed that Aristotle's method of division is primarily a method o
27 On this point see, for instance, Metaph. B 3, 998b 12- 14.
definition. Now I would like to suggest that (a) Aristotle spells out di
division on the basis of different ideas of definition, and consequently
divisional models Aristotle sketches depend on the different definitiona
Aristotle states respectively in PA A 2-4, Metaph. Z 12, and the Analyt
that Aristotle changed his mind about division, but, if I am right, it
more correct to say that he changed his mind about definition.
4 Conclusion
If in PA A 2-4 Aristotle clearly claims that division plays a role in the collection of
zoological data, from the Analytics and Metaph. Z 12 one learns that division plays a role
in the search for definition in general, and not just in zoology. Aristotle shows full
confidence in division as a method, and he deals with it for different purposes. In Metaph.
Z 12, for example, Aristotle is concerned with the unity of definition, and he appeals to
division because this method can help him to solve this particular definitional puzzle.
Moreover, Aristotle deals with division on the basis of rather different ideas of definition.
A major consequence of this fact is that he spells out different rules of division, and
finally sketches rather different divisional models. Despite the different ideas of definition
which are working in Aristotle's discussion of division, division as a method may be
described as something unitarian. Division, in fact, is, at least primarily, a method of
definition which enables one to give the definition of the indivisible species S one is
interested in by isolating it in a finite numbers of steps.
University of Padua
Longer Note 1
There are several ways of describing Aristotle's method of division. I have chosen what seems to
be the best in the light of the purposes of the paper. I shall call any set of points (hereinafter nodes)
which satisfies the following four requirements a Divisional Tree (DT):
(i) there is an initial node a;

(ii) the number of nodes is finite;
(iii) every node which is * a is below a'
(iv) every node which is * a is immediately below just one node.
According to this definition a DT is, for instance, the following structure:
(iLNl)
c 8
In a DT
node a r
species,
in mind
highest
DT if n
one of t
mind th
fall und
a DT. A node n is a terminal node if there is no differentia which is associated with n.
Instead of distinguishing between nodes and what nodes represent, namely

in the paper I just speak of genera and species. Consequently, instead of pres
(ļLNl) i have presented it as follows:
(üLNl)
<3
A-
si / ' S2 S3 / ^ S4
Of course this is a minimal DT, which I h

complexity of a DT depends on the number o
At any rate this number has to be 2. In Top.
species and Gisa genus of S 1 , then there must
of S2. The generous reading of this passage is
words, SI and S2 are not to be taken in the n
loose sense of species which result from the div
is not a DT:
(iüLNl)
<3
<32
SI / ' S2 S3
ANDREA FALCON: ARISTOTLE' S THEORY OF DIVISION 145
Longer Note 2
In §2 I have claimed that definition is the main goal of Aristotle's division and that the rules of
division he established are rules for the achievement of a definition. Thereafter I have tried to go a
little further by asking whether definition is the only goal of Aristotle's division, and in particular
whether Aristotle's division may be a method of classification as well as a method of definition.
Any entry into this issue should, I think, begin with a preliminary clarification of what is meant by
classification by division. In other words: what is a classification by division expected to look like?
I am able to pick out at least two requirements which any classification by division should satisfy to
be an adequate classification: (i) the requirement of consistency and (ii) the requirement of
completeness.
If X is an entity to be classified and 'to be classified' may be replaced by 'to have a place within
a DT', then it is possible to illustrate the two requirements with something like this:
(i) the classification must be consistent: x cannot have two or more places within a DT which
conflict with each other.
(ii) the classification must be complete: x must have a place within a DT.
If the requirement of completeness is, I think, fairly clear, I need to be more precise about the
requirement of consistency. The important thing is to adapt the notion of consistency to the tree
structure of any division. In order to do so I shall introduce the three following notions: node,
accessibility and branch. Node. If a tree is any structure of the kind drawn in diagram (iLN2), then
a node is either genus G or the result of the application to genus G or to the preceding node of one
of the differences which are associated with G or with the preceding node. Nodes are, for instance,
h, i, j, k, /. In any structure of the kind drawn in diagram (iLN2) a fixed number of differences are
associated with each node.
(iLN2)
<3
ç / ' 1 m / ' Ł r/'5 t' 'u
Starting from the initial node G, and apply

associated differences, one comes to the termin
nodes because no difference is associated with them. Accessibility. Node a is accessible to node b
if there is a path back to a from b. In diagram (iLN2) node j is accessible both to node m and node n ,
and node h is accessible both to node j and node i. The relation of accessibility is transitive. It is
clear that if node h is accessible to node j and node j is accessible to node then node h is
accessible to node n. In the same way, if node h is accessible to node i and node i is accessible to
node Ķ then node h is accessible to node k. On the other hand, nodes k and n are not accessible.
There is no path back to k from n or vice versa (in both cases once one has gone back to node h one
has to go down again, respectively to k or to n). Branch. Branch is every path back to the initial
node G. Branch B1 is, for instance, k-i-h-G; branch B2 is l-i-h-G' Branch B3 is m-j-h-G , and so on.
It is worth pointing out that B 1 , namely branch k-i-h-G , is distinct from B4, namely branch i-h-G ,
as also B5, namely branch h-G , is distinct from B4 and B3. Once the notion of node, accessibility
and branch are introduced in this way, it is easy to establish when a classification by division is
consistent. A classification by division is consistent when the same entity x is not in. two branches
whose nodes are not accessible. To conclude, in the particular case of the zoological classification,
ą classification by division is consistent when the same animal is not in. two branches whose nodes
are not accessible.

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Aristotle's discussion of division is scattered over several texts. Aristotle's very w

ARISTOTLE AND AFTER 127

division. It consists of two parts: a pa

What we mean by a theory of division m

2. THEORY OF DIVISION AS METHOD OF DEFINITION OR

In the Sophist Plato describes division by using a metaphor: division, he says

2 H. Mutschmann, Divisiones quae vulgo dicuntur aristoteleae (Lipsiae 1906). A tr

useful for deducing definitions.5 In APo B 13, therefore, Aristotle co

definition G0A1A2, namely Animal tame tw

8 For an introduction to this way of describing division see Longer Note 1.

If at this point it should be clear that definition is the goal of division,

What division can teach us about the 'classification-problem' may be ma

9 For a clarification of the notion of classification by division see Longer Note 2.

3. ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF DIVISION

3.1 APr 31, APo B 5, APo B 13

Aristotle claims that a definition is consti

By discussing the dichotomous method of division in PA A 2-4 Aristotle appears t

18 Metaph. Z 12, 1038a8-9: ó ópiajióç éaxiv ó ¿k tôv ôiacpopcov tafyoę.

B«&k Legs leathers Wings

number of feet -they are both two-footed - b

3.4 Different Divisional Models

If division by several, simultaneous trees can hardly be described as a b

24 It is worth pointing out an important difference which distinguishes Metaph.

The division by a single tree which is rep

27 On this point see, for instance, Metaph. B 3, 998b 12- 14.

(i) there is an initial node a;

Instead of distinguishing between nodes and what nodes represent, namely

Of course this is a minimal DT, which I h

ç / ' 1 m / ' Ł r/'5 t' 'u

Starting from the initial node G, and apply

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ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF DIVISION - Andrea Falcon

ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF DIVISION - Andrea Falcon