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© 2009 The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation Ltd
Introduction © 1992 John G. Slater
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted
or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic,
mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter
invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without
permission in writing from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Russell, Bertrand, 1872–1970.
Human knowledge : its scope and limits / Bertrand Russell.
p. cm. – (Routledge classics)
Originally published: 1948
Includes index.
1. Knowledge, Theory of. I. Title.
BD161.R78 2009
121–dc22
2008049270
ISBN 0-203-87535-4 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN10: 0-415-47444-2 (pbk)
ISBN10: 0-203-87535-4 (ebk)
ISBN13: 978-0-415-47444-3 (pbk)
ISBN13: 978-0-203-87535-3 (ebk)
In the figure the two horizontal lines are parallel, but they look as if they approached each other
towards the right. This again is a law for which the evidence is purely introspective. In both cases there
are physiological explanations, but they do not invalidate the purely psychological laws.
I conclude that, while some psychological laws involve physiology, others do not. Psychology is a
science distinct from physics and physiology, and in part independent of them. All the data of physics
are also data of psychology, but not vice versa; data belonging to both are made the basis of quite
different inferences in the two sciences. Introspection is valid as a source of data, and is to a
considerable extent amenable to scientific controls.
There is much in psychology that is genuinely scientific although it lacks quantitative precision. Take, for
example, the analysis of our spatial percep-
We shall assume that the areas with which we are concerned are all either circles, or such shapes as
can result from circles by stretching or compressing in a manner which leaves them oval. In that case,
given three areas A, B, C which are copunctual, and a fourth area D such that A, B, D are copunctual
and also A, C, D and B, C, D, then A, B, C, D all have a common region.
We now define a group of any number of areas as “copunctual” if every triad chosen out of the group is
copunctual. A copunctual group of areas is a “point” if it cannot be enlarged without ceasing to be
copunctual, i.e. if, given any area X outside the group, there are in the group at least two areas A and B
such that A, B, X are not copunctual.
This definition is only applicable in two dimensions. In three dimensions, we must start with a relation of
copunctuality between four volumes, and the volumes concerned must all be either spheres or such oval
volumes as can result from spheres by continuous stretching in some directions and com-
This is called the “principle of inverse probability”. Its utility may be illustrated as follows. Let p be some
general theory, and q an experimental datum relevant to p. Then p/ h is the probability of the theory p
on the previously known data, q/ h is the probability of q on the previously known data, and q/( p and h)
is the probability of q if p is true. Thus the probability of the theory p after q has been ascertained is got
by multiplying the previous probability of p by the probability of q given p, and dividing by the previous
probability of q. In the most useful case, the theory p will be one which implies q, so that q/( p and h) =
1. In that case,
That is to say, the new datum q increases the probability of p in proportion to the antecedent
improbability of q. In other words, if our theory implies something very astonishing, and the astonishing
thing is then found to happen, that greatly increases the probability of our theory.
This principle may be illustrated by the discovery of Neptune regarded as a confirmation of the law of
gravitation. Here p = the law of gravitation, h = all relevant facts known before the discovery of
Neptune, q = the fact that Neptune was found in a certain position. Thus q/ h was the antecedent
probability that a hitherto unknown planet would be found in a certain small region of the heavens. Let
us take this to be m / n. Then after the discovery of
This proposition enables us, for example, to solve the following problem: We are given n + 1 bags, of
which the first contains n black balls and no white ones, the second contains n − 1 black balls and one
white one, the ( r + 1)th contains n − r black balls and r white ones. One bag is chosen, but we do not
know which; m balls are drawn from it, and are found to be all white; what is the probability that the
rth bag has been chosen? Historically, this problem is important in connection with Laplace’s pretended
proof of induction.
Take next Bernoulli’s law of large numbers. This states that if, on each of a number of occasions, the
chance of a certain event occurring is p, then, given any two numbers δ and ε , however small, the
chance that, from a certain number of occasions onward, the proportion of occasions on which the event
occurs will ever differ from p by more than ε , is less than δ.
Let us illustrate by the case of tossing a coin. We suppose that heads and tails are equally probable. I
say that, in all likelihood, after you have tossed often enough, the proportion of heads will never again
depart from 1/2 by more than ε , however small ε may be; I say further that, however small δ may be,
the chance of such a departure anywhere after the nth toss is less than δ, provided n is sufficiently
great.
As this proposition is of great importance in the applications of probability, for instance to statistics, let
us spend a little longer in familiarizing ourselves with exactly what it asserts in the above case of
tossing a coin. I assert first, let us say, that from some point onwards, the percentage of heads will
always remain between 49 and 51. You dispute my assertion, and we decide to test it empirically as far
as this is possible. The theorem then asserts that, the longer we go on, the more likely we are to find
my assertion borne
are white is
We now want to know the chance that the next ball will be white. After some further calculation, it
which again is obvious.
where N is a number much larger than any that we can reach in actual experiments. In that case, our
inductions would begin to be empirically falsified just as we were thinking they were firmly established.
Or again, it might happen, with any empirical series, that after a time it became utterly lawless, and
ceased in any sense to approach a limit. If, then, the above extension to infinite series is to be used in
empirical series, we shall have to invoke some kind of inductive axiom. Without this, there is no reason
for expecting the later parts of such a series to continue to exemplify some law which the earlier parts
obey.
In ordinary empirical judgments of probability, such, for example, as are contained in the weather
forecast, there is a mixture of different elements which it is important to separate. The simplest
hypothesis—unduly simplified for purposes of illustration—is that some symptom is observed which, in
(say) 90 per cent of the cases in which it has been previously observed, has been followed by rain. In
that case, if inductive arguments were as indubitable as deductive ones, we should say “there is a 90
per cent probability of rain”. That is to say, the present moment belongs to a certain class (that of
moments when the symptom in question is present) of which 90 per cent are moments preceding rain.
This is probability in the mathematical sense which we have been considering. But it is not this alone
that makes us uncertain whether it will rain. We are also uncertain as to the validity of the inference; we
do not feel sure that the symptom in question will, in the future, be followed by rain nine times out of
ten. And this doubt may be of two kinds, one scientific, the other philosophical. We may, while retaining
full confidence in scientific procedure in general, feel that, in this case, the data are too few to warrant
an induction, or that not sufficient care has been taken to eliminate other circumstances which may
have also been present and may be more invariable precursors of rain. Or, again, the records may be
doubtful: they may have been rendered nearly indecipherable by rain, or have been made by a man
who was shortly afterwards certified as insane. Such doubts are within scientific procedure, but there
are also the doubts raised by Hume: is inductive procedure valid, or is it merely a habit which makes us
comfortable? Any or all of those reasons may make us hesitant about the 90 per cent chance of rain
which our evidence inclines us to believe in.
We have, in cases of this sort, a hierarchy of probabilities. The primary level is: Probably it will rain. The
secondary level is: Probably the symptoms I
It is known that, when x is large, π ( x) and li ( x) are nearly equal. It is also known that, for every known
prime,
π ( x) < li ( x)
and the total number of ways of selecting n terms that are α’s is Therefore the
chance of a selection consisting wholly of α’s is
If pm is the a priori likelihood of m being the number of terms common to α and β, then the likelihood
after experience is
Let us call this qm .
If the number of members common to α and β is m , then after withdrawing n α’s that are β’s there
remain m − n β’s and N − n not – β’s. Therefore, from the hypothesis that α and β have m members in
next α being a β is If we assume that, a priori , each α is equally likely to be a β and not be a β,
we get the value 1/2. Even with Laplace’s hypothesis the general induction has only a probability
which is usually small.
We need therefore some hypothesis which makes pm large when m is nearly N. This will have to
depend upon the nature of the classes α and β if it is to have any chance of validity.
C. MATHEMATICAL TREATMENT OF INDUCTION
From the time of Laplace onward, various attempts have been made to show that the probable truth of
an inductive inference follows from the mathematical theory of probability. It is now generally agreed
that these attempts were all unsuccessful, and that, if inductive arguments are to be valid, it must be in
virtue of some extra-logical characteristic of the actual world, as opposed to the various logically
possible worlds that may be contemplated by the logician.
The first of such arguments is due to Laplace. In its valid, purely mathematical, form, it is as follows:
There are n + 1 bags, similar in external appearance, and each containing n balls. In the first, all the
balls are black; in the second, one is white and the rest black; in the ( r + 1)th, r are white and the rest
black. One of these, of which the composition is unknown, is selected, and m balls are withdrawn from
it. They prove to be all white. What is the probability ( a ) that the next ball drawn will be white, ( b) that
we have chosen the bag consisting wholly of white balls?
The answer is: ( a ) the chance that the next ball will be white is ( b) the chance that we have
that if m A’s have been found to be B’s, the chance that the next A will be a B is and the chance
that all A’s are B’s is He gets this result by assuming that, given n objects of which we
Then
As n increases, this approaches 1 as a limit if
approaches zero as a limit; and this happens if there are finite quantities and η such that, for all
sufficiently great r’s,
Let us consider these two conditions. The first says that there is a quantity less than 1, such that,
if the generalization is false, the probability of the next instance being favourable will always, after a
certain number of favourable instances, be less than this. Consider, as an instance of its failure, the
generalization “all numbers are non-prime”. As we move up the number-series, primes become rarer,
and the chance of the next number after r
and the number of these that are contained in β is
Therefore the chance of “all α’s are β’s” is
which is finite. That is to say, every generalization as to which we have no evidence has a finite chance
of being true.
I fear, however, that, if N is as large as Eddington maintained, the number of favourable instances
required to make an inductive generalization probable in any high degree would be far in excess of what
is practically attainable. This way of escape, therefore, while excellent in theory, will not serve to justify
scientific practice.
Induction in the advanced sciences proceeds on a somewhat different system from that of simple
enumeration. There is first a body of observed facts, then a general theory consistent with them all, and
then inferences from the theory which subsequent observation confirms or confutes. The argument here
depends upon the principle of inverse probability. Let p be a general theory, h the previously known
data, and q a new experimental datum relevant to p. Then
In the most important case, q follows from p and h, so that q/ p h = 1. In this case, therefore,
It follows that, if q/ h is very small, the verification of q greatly increases the probability of p. This,
however, does not have quite the consequences one might hope. We have, putting for “not-p”,
because, given h, p implies q. Thus if
we have
This will be a high probability if y is small. Now two circumstances may make y small: (1) if p/ h is large,
(2) if is small, i.e. if q would be improbable if p were false. The difficulties in the way of estimating
these two factors are much the same as those that appear in Keynes’s discussion. To obtain an estimate
of p/ h, we shall need some way of evaluating the probability of p antecedently to the special evidence
that has suggested it, and it is not easy to see how this can be done. The only thing that seems clear is
that, if a suggested law is to have an appreciable probability antecedently to any evidence in its favour,
that must be in virtue of a principle to the effect that some fairly simple law is bound to be true. But
this is a difficult matter, to which I shall return at a later stage.
The probability of , in certain kinds of cases, is more possible to estimate approximately. Let us
take the case of the discovery of Neptune. In this case, p is the law of gravitation, h is the observations
of planetary motions before the discovery of Neptune, and q is the existence of Neptune at the place
where calculations showed that it should be. Thus is the probability that Neptune would be where
it was, given that the law of gravitation was false. Here we must make a proviso as to the sense in
which we should use the word “false”. It would not be right to take Einstein’s theory as showing
Newton’s to
Therefore if we suppose that p/ h = 1/36, we shall have y = 1/1000
and
Thus even if, before the discovery of Neptune, the law of gravitation was as improbable as double sixes
with dice, it had afterwards odds of 1000 to 1 in its favour.
This argument, extended to all the observed facts of planetary motions, apparently shows that, if the
law of gravitation had even a very small probability at the time when it was first enunciated, it soon
became virtually certain. But it does nothing to help us to gauge this initial probability, and therefore
would fail, even if valid, to give us a firm basis for the theoretical inference from observation to theory.
Moreover the above argument is open to objection, in view of the fact that the law of gravitation is not
the only law which would lead to the expectation of Neptune being where it was. Suppose the law of
gravitation to have been true until the time t , where t is any moment subsequent to the discovery of
Neptune; then we should still have q/ p′h = 1, where p′ is the hypothesis that the law was true only
until the time t . There was therefore better reason to
which may be expected to be zero. It would therefore seem that, in choosing the estimate which is most
probable at the first level, we are almost sure to be wrong; but in general it will remain the best
estimate open to us.
The endless regress in the very definition of “probable” is intolerable. We must, if we are to avoid it,
admit that each item in our original statistics is either true or false, and that the value m 1/ n1, obtained
for our first probability, is either right or wrong; in fact, we must apply the dichotomy of true-or-false as
absolutely to probability judgments as to others. Reichenbach’s position is, stated completely, as follows:
calculus
infinitesimal 21
of probability 301
Calderon 153
Carnap, Rudolf 71–3, 75, 217
causal ancestors, common 409
causal laws 270–8, 402
of change 271, 272
definition 270
and expectations 375
from generalizations 271, 278
meaning of 275–6
mental 49–50
and structure 406–18
causal lines 276, 399–405
and perception 403–4
separable, postulate of 430–2
causality, and scientific method 275
causation 398, 399
belief in, and language 401
and concomitance 400–1
and induction 399
intrinsic 419–20, 431
invariable sequence 431
and perception 401–2
physical and perception 175
causes 399
and effects 289, 399
independence of 177–8
primitive concept 401–2
and truth 108–9
centrality 231, 232, 267
certainty 345, 363
epistemological 348
kinds of 348
logical 348
psychological 348
subjective, and credibility 348
subjective, degrees of 348–9
chains
causal 175, 181, 185
change
causal laws of 271, 272
discontinuity of 178
intrinsic laws of 431
characters, specific 390
chemistry
relation to physics 177
Clarke, Dr. 22
class, enumeration 119, 120
classes 342, 343–4
fundamental 342, 344
manufactured 364
classification, words and 373, 374
Cleanthes 16
co-ordinates 22–3, 228
astronomical 285, 423
as substitutes for names 71–2, 73
coherence and knowledge 141–2
coincidences, improbability of complex 410
collisions 419–20
colours
boundaries 229
colour-likeness 230–1
definition of 219, 228, 229
and wave lengths 219, 229–30
commands and questions 57
common-sense
and perception 15, 175
and physics 280–2
compatibility, facts with hypothesis 423–4
complete enumeration 120, 126
compresence 258, 265–6
complexes of 258–9, 266–9
complete and incomplete 266–7
repetition 258
as ordering relation of space–time 287–8
conditioned reflexes 132, 382
conjunctions 110
conjunctive axioms 302, 303–4
connections between facts 371, 372, 374
general 379
knowledge and 378–9
conservation of energy 28
constant h 25, 27, 30
constants 29–30
cosmical 23
electronic 29
physical 21
‘Planck’s’ 25, 29, 30
and variables 70–1
Dante 15
Darwin, Charles 33, 35
data 149–53
credibility of 337, 337–8, 344–8
and degrees of credibility 336
independent of inference 153
and inferences 338
and inferences to ‘things’ 199–200
needed for causal laws 270–1
public and private 46–7, 57
remembered facts as 169
from sensations 152–3
and solipsism 157, 158
and truth of propositions 302
uncertainty of 344, 347
visual, qualities of 232, 261
dates 232, 233, 237
fixing 237–8
knowledge of 83–4
Decalogue, the 350
deduction 140
definitions
denotational 233, 242, 244
denotative and structural 228, 242
epistemological 71
logical 70–1
metaphysical 69–70
ostensive 61–8, 82, 397, 439, 441
conditions of 62
and interpretation 214
kinds of words learnt by 65–6
limits of 66
vagueness of 374
physical 71
syntactical 70
verbal and ostensive 10
degrees of credibility 295, 299–300, 330
and data 336
Democritus 22
denotational definitions 233, 242, 244
Descartes, René 141, 154–5
animals as automata 19
origin of solar system 16
soul-body duality 44
space 22
thought and extension 179
descriptions, as subsitutes for names 74–5
desires
expression and assertion of 89, 97
and ideas 89
determinism
and atoms 26
and free will 276
and human actions 19–20, 41
physical 19, 26
Dewey, John 141, 153, 347
discontinuity of change 178
disjunctive axioms 302, 303
disjunctive facts, elimination of 116
earth
age of 37
rotation of 22
echoes 413–14
Eddington, Sir A. 17–18, 29, 289, 360
egocentric particulars 66, 80–7
Einstein, Albert 22, 176, 239, 251, 361, 422
electronic constants 29
electrons 13, 24, 25
number in universe 254
elements 390
and atomic numbers 24
the four 19
emotion and information 56–7
emotional consequnces of beliefs, and signification 395
empirical statements, and probability 313–14
empiricism 153, 330
defined 437
inadequacy of 446
limits of 437–46
and perceptions 174, 175–6
and solipsism 161
energy
and atoms 286
conservation of 28
constancy 219
definition of 211, 218–19, 254
kinetic and potential 28
and mass 28, 218, 254
physical laws and 286
and time 27
enumeration
complete 120, 126, 357, 384
simple 358
enumerative empirical judgments 125
epistemological certainty 348
epistemological definitions 71
equations, differential, and causal laws 402
equilibrium, unstable, possible explanation of mental process 42
equiprobability 313
Eratosthenes 14
errors 166
absolute and quantitative 348–9
of memory 189
ethics
and probability 350
theories of 349–50
Euclid 23, 209, 210
events
as bundle of compresent qualities 78
and causal ancestors 409
and causal lines 404, 430–1
and contiguous causal chains 432
definition 190–1
evidence for others 436
and instants 211, 237, 238, 239
meaning 245
mental, connections between 49
mental, as data 153, 155
‘mental’ and ‘physical’ 175, 202
ordered by space–time relation 211, 253, 285
overlapping 237–8
as particulars 257
physical, definition 202–4
and mental, differences 202–4
in physical space–time 203
recurrence of 77–8
and structural postulate 433–4
facts 130–1
adaptation to 131
and beliefs 135–6
connections between 371, 372, 374, 378–9, 435
general 122, 138–9
particular
knowledge of 371–2
unimaginable 138
‘faith’ of science 275
Fall, the, and biology 32
falling bodies, law of 422
falsehood 102–4, 105–6, 139
Fichte, J.G. 44
fictiveness, degrees of 210–11
field, structural 223–4
finite-frequency theory 307–17
and induction 310, 314–16
forces 178
formulae in logic 212
fossils 32–3, 35
four-dimensional manifold 178, 211, 253, 279
Franklin, Mrs. C.L. 161
free will and determinism 276
frequency 286
and credibility 338–44
levels of 365
Freud, S. 46
fundamental properties 389
galaxies 17
Galileo 16, 271, 335, 422
law of inertia 20
parallelogram law 20
Gauss, C.F. 355
general knowledge 119–29
general propositions, how arrived at 120
generalizations
animal inferences and 166
inductive 120
Keynes and probability of 382–5
and probability 382–3
generator properties 388
genes 34–5, 389
geodesics 250, 272
habits
animal, and beliefs 377, 380, 436
and beliefs 51, 52, 92–3
and perception 51, 151–2
Hartley 49
hearing 181
and echoes 183, 413–14
heat 28
expansion of bodies 248
meaning of 219
heavenly bodies:
permanent ‘things’ 423
Hegel, G.W.F. 36, 44, 141, 347
Heisenberg 26–7
helium 25, 28–9
Heraclides 14
Heraclitus 423
‘here’ 232
‘here’ and ‘now’ 11–12, 84, 85
heredity 34–5
Hubble, Edwin:
Realm of the Nebulae 17
human actions and determinism 19–20, 41
Hume, David 44, 101, 136, 166, 314, 337, 353, 400, 401
impressions 401
scepticism 155
Huxley, Julian 37n
Huygens, Christian 26
hydrogen 24, 28–9
hypotheses 94
choice between, and observation 395, 423–4
hypothetical induction 367
‘I-now’ 263–4
idealist theory of perceptions 174–5
ideas
‘believed’ and ‘entertained’ 166
definition 88–9
and desire 89
external reference of 105
and impressions 64–5, 164
indicative 97–8
pre-linguistic 88
identity
and memory 403
and recognition 403
illusions 107
images 100, 101
impact 420–1
imperative words 56, 66, 67
impressions 401
and ideas 64–5, 164
incompatibility 121–2
independence of causes 177–8
indicative words 66–7, 88
indifference, principle of 329, 333, 339, 340, 342
individuation, principle of 256–69
indivisibility 332–3, 342
induction 120, 127, 140, 170–1
animal 382
by simple enumeration 353–8
and causation 399
and finite-frequency theory 314–16
general and particular 353
hypothetical 367
invalid as logical principle 355–6
justification of 273–4
mathematical 273, 358–62
and probability of genralizations 359–60
Reichenbach’s theory 363–7
relation of concepts 364
role of 381–5
language
acquiring 10, 61–3, 170
active and passive 61–3
autonomy of 60
dangers of 59–60
dependence on physics 57
exclamatory use 56
externalising experiences 57–8, 94–5
merits of 57
purposes of 56
in science 81, 87
social character 9–10
symbols giving permanence 58–9
and thought 57–8, 67
understnding of, and animal inference 167–8
uses of 55–60
Laplace 16, 20
degrees of credibility 340–1
justification of induction 310
probability and induction 357–8
law of inertia 20–1
laws
approximations 421
causal 166
distribution of energy 254
limit of compexity 286
natural, postulate of existence of 421
necessity of, for inference 294
of persistence 271
physical 254
scientific
approximate character 274, 277
least action, principle of 272
Leibniz, G.W. 22, 44, 84, 113, 142
idealist theory of perception 174
monadology 232
particulars defined by qualities 256
space as relations 243
subject and predicate 262
thought and extension 179
life
distinguishing marks of 33–4
physico-chemical basis of 34
rarity of 36–7
light
and reflections 414
velocity of 239–40, 251
waves or particles 25–6, 154, 176, 183
limited variety 278, 386–91
limits of empiricism 437–46
Littlewood 355
living bodies and dead matter 426–7
Locke, John 153
logic
and probability 322
and psychology 116
and structure of sentences 222
logical certainty 348
logical definitions 70–1
names
of occurrences 77–8
as permanent symbols 58–9
proper 69–79, 263–5
as co-ordinates 71–2, 73, 73–4, 75–6
definition of 69–70
descriptions for 74–5
and identity 81–2
need for, and method of acquiring knowledge 227, 265, 269
substitutes for 71–6, 81–2
syntactical definitions 70
of qualities 66, 76–7
of relations 66, 70
of species 65
and structural definitions 244
of substances 65–6, 70
for what is experienced 77
nature, uniformity of 277
nebulae 17
extra galactic 17
nebular hypothesis 16
negative facts 114–15
negative judgments 115, 119–20, 121, 124–5
negative sentences 111–12
negatives
attempted elimination of 114
universal 121, 124, 443
Neptune 303–4
argument re probability of discovery 361–2
nerve fibres
afferent and efferent 39, 42
response to stimulus 39–40
neutrons 24–5
Newton, Isaac 16, 176
Bible and evolution 32
diversity of points 256
gravitation 21, 361, 422
laws of motion 20, 271–2
and space 22, 243
time 210, 234–5
Nicod 388
noises, animal, function of 55–6, 57–8
non-verbal beliefs 91, 92, 131–2
non-verbal memory 92, 100
nonsense 102–3
‘not’ 111, 112, 114, 440
‘now’ 232
nuclei of atoms 24
numbers
interpretation 209
and mathematical theory of probability 297
natural, and induction 355
numerical diversity 256
observation
appeal to, and scientific truth 217, 236
in astronomy 216–17
development from, to law 421–2, 423–4
and non-observation 434
observer 12, 408
normal 184
occurrence, representational 105–6
occurrences, experiences of 77
‘of’ 99
omniscience, first order 122–3
‘or’ 115–17, 440
order, space–time 231
organism, concept of 36
Origen 55
ostensive definitions 61–8, 82, 397, 439, 441
overlapping, spatial 245
overlapping, temporal 237–8
qualities
analysis 227
definitions of 228–9
and particulars 257–8, 261
quantum constant 25
quantum equations 27, 29
quantum theory 25–9, 178, 272, 390
quantum transitions 288–9
quasi-permanence
and causal laws 402, 403
postulate of 429–30
t 236, 241–2
tautologies 126, 127, 329
Tennyson, Alfred 33
testimony
as premiss of knowledge 169
primitive credulity and 170
public character 171
why accepted 169–70
theories, physical 176–7
thermometer, ideal 248
thing-in-itself 202
‘things’ 403, 430
and matter 281, 282
‘thinking of’ 89
‘this’ 74, 77, 80–1, 86, 230–1, 232, 262–3, 264
Thomas Aquinas 256
thought and extension 179
thought and language 57–8, 67
thoughts
as events in the brain 179, 203
as a region of the brain 203
time 77, 210–11
absolute 234–6
cosmic 239, 240
and energy 27
and events 77
local, differing estimates 239–40
mathematical 235, 239
‘my’ 240, 255
Newton’s 234–5
objective and subjective 231
past and present 191
and perception 154
public and private 234–42
quantitive measurement 239
and relativity 235
sources of belief in 186
subjective 187–8, 190
time-series 241
touch:
hardness 434–5
transubstantiation 44
true and false beliefs 51, 105, 134, 135–6, 440
‘true’, significance of 134
truth 99, 102–9, 135–9
and causes 108–9
and data 302
definition 134
and expectations 137, 151
and experience 138
and falsehood 102–4, 105–6, 139
of physics 176–7
and signification 102–3
wave frequencies 25
wave lengths and colours 219, 229–30
waves and particles 25–6, 225
Wittgenstein, L. 106
words
ambiguity 417–18
and classification 373, 374
egocentric particulars 66, 80–7
elementary uses 88
general 69–70
indicative and non-indicative 66, 67, 98
learning 10–11, 170
logical 70, 98, 110–18, 437, 440–1
meaning 221
object and syntax 439, 440
and ostensive definition 61–8
personal element in significance 10–11
with primary meaning 106
scientifically impersonal 84
as signs 64
substitutes for ideas 89
syncategorematic 70
syntax, definition of 439
understanding of 439
use as sentences 66, 88, 98