Week 3/Steven J.

Davis/Reflection Paper
In the early days of the Kosovo conflict, many new technologies of war
were being employed for the first time. One of those technologies was the B2 Stealth Bomber. During this time, I was fortunate enough to be stationed at
Whiteman AFB, the home of the B-2 for my first assignment. Anytime a new
technology with associated new procedures are used, there are bound to be
hiccups. This essay will address a failure in leadership that lead to a sortie
delay, which almost lead to a complete mission failure.
On the first night of the B-2s involvement in the Kosovo bombing
campaign, two sorties were planned and the decision was made to only
inform those personnel required for operations and direct support of the
actual sorties to be informed that they were actually happening. To everyone
else it was supposed to appear that the aircraft were going on regular
training sorties. One of the inherited responsibilities of aircrew life support
were to drive the crew to the aircraft if transportation was running late or
ignored a call (this is an entirely separate issue that was addressed later).
The event happened while I was driving a crew to the aircraft. We
headed off to the Entry Control Point (ECP) that was scheduled to be open
that night. Once we arrived I hopped out of the vehicle with my restricted
area badge and the badges of everyone else in the truck. I approached the
window and nobody was there, so I hopped back in the truck and headed it
back to the other ECP. We were already running late since we had to turn

around, but I wasnt speeding so it was a huge surprise when I saw a

Security Forces (SFS) car with its lights flashing pulling me over. I stopped
and suddenly three other SFS vehicles were there. The moment escalated
very rapidly when a young SFS lieutenant ordered everyone (an O-6, three O5s and an A1C) out of the truck. Many things happened that evening,
including the Ops Group commander driving up to the flight line fence and
screaming at the SFS lieutenant, ordering him to let us go. Even after the SFS
on scene had positively identified who we were and let us all up off of the
ground (the O-6 included), they delayed longer. When we finally made it to
the aircraft, the sorties almost had to cancel because of the timing that
would have had them on target at an inopportune time. They ultimately took
off and had a successful mission.
These event illustrate to me the importance of decision making,
problem solving and communication. Since I (a 19 year old airman at the
time) could only see what was happening from my perspective, it seemed
like SFS just fouled the whole situation up in an unbelievable way, and I still
feel that way about it. The SFS lieutenant could have called the command
post to verify our story immediately, but he didnt. He could have let us go
immediately once the O-6 identified himself and vouched for the rest of us,
but the lieutenant didnt. He could have let us go when the Ops Group
commander arrived and ordered him to, but he didnt. He waited for his
chain of command to verify the information.

The incident concluded and we were on our way, but the necessity of
critical thinking, problem solving, decision making and communication, all
concepts presented in this course, were demonstrated in a negative way that
night. Searching for ways to conclude issues that arise without waiting for
someone else to act was one major takeaway that I was able to apply to my
job from that night. Those events stuck with me and I vowed that I would
never let a situation stall like that while I waited for someone else to act.