ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, EUGENIO LOPEZ, JR.

, AUGUSTO
ALMEDA-LOPEZ, and OSCAR M. LOPEZ, Petitioners, versus OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO,* EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA, MIGUEL V.
GONZALES, and SALVADOR (BUDDY) TAN,* Respondents.
2008-10-15 | G.R. No.
133347
FACTS: The day after the declaration of martial law, or on September 22, 1972, just before
midnight, military troops arrived at the ABS-CBN Broadcast Center ordering the closure of
all radio and television stations in the country.
Corollary thereto, sometime in November 1972, Eugenio Lopez, Jr., then president of ABSCBN, wrote then Secretary of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile, of their desire to sell
ABS-CBN to the government. In that same month, however, Eugenio Lopez, Jr. was arrested
by the military, and detained at Fort Bonifacio for almost five (5) years until his escape
therefrom on September 30, 1977.
Subsequently, after the proposal to sell ABS-CBN to the Marcos government did not
materialize,
On even date, both Benedicto and Alfredo Montelibano, relaying his plan to temporarily use
ABS-CBN's broadcast studios in Quezon City, from which to operate TV Channel 9, for such
period of time as may be necessary to rebuild KBS' burned studios.
In June 1986, President Corazon Aquino, acting on the request of ABS-CBN through Senator
Taada, returned to ABS-CBN these radio and TV stations on a gradual and scheduled basis.
As required by the Ombudsman, the respondents, except for Garcia, filed their respective
counter-affidavits, with Benedicto adopting that of Gonzales', denying petitioners' charges.
Thereafter, with the issues having been joined, the Ombudsman issued the herein assailed
Joint Resolution dismissing petitioners' complaints. To the Ombudsman, the following
circumstances did not give rise to probable cause necessary to indict respondents for the
various felonies charged.
ISSUE: whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioners' complaint against the respondents.
RULING: We rule in the negative and, accordingly, dismiss the petition.
We cannot overemphasize the fact that the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty bound
to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,

improper, or inefficient." The raison d 'etre for its creation and endowment of broad
investigative authority is to insulate it from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to
penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public
officials, and through the execution of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or
dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers.
Indeed, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exist reasonable grounds
to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof
and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. The
Ombudsman may thus conduct an investigation if the complaint filed is found to be in the
proper form and substance. Conversely, the Ombudsman may also dismiss the complaint
should it be found insufficient in form or substance.
Unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the Court will refrain from interfering
with the exercise of the Ombudsman's powers, and respect the initiative and independence
inherent in the latter who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the
preserver of the integrity of public service.
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted
by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise,
the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing
the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with
regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely
swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the
fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or
dismiss a complaint by private complainants.
As petitioners have ratified the letter-agreement, even after the lifting of martial law and the
toppling of the Marcos government, and advanced the validity of the letter-agreement in their
claim against the estate of Benedicto, they cannot, in the same breath, aver that respondents'
actuations in the execution of the letter-agreement were criminal in nature, or that the letteragreement was more ostensible than real and to insist on the prosecution of respondents for
felonies supposedly committed in connection with this ubiquitous letter-agreement.[30]
In fine, the Ombudsman did not abuse his discretion in determining that the allegations of
petitioners against respondents are civil in nature, bereft of criminal character. Perforce, he
was correct in dismissing petitioners' complaint-affidavits.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Roberto S.
Benedicto and Salvador Tan are dropped as private respondents without prejudice to the
filing of separate civil actions against their respective estates. The assailed Joint Resolution
and Order of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-94-1109 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.