AGENCY DIGESTS

1. RALLOS V YANGCO
FACTS:
* Yangco sent Rallos a letter
inviting the latter to be the consignor in
buying and selling leaf tobacco and other
native products. Terms and conditions
were also contained in the letter.
* Accepting the invitation, Rallos
proceeded to do a considerable business
with Yangco trhough the said Collantes,
as his factor, sending to him as agent for
Yangco a good deal of produce to be
sold on commission.
* Rallos sent to the said
Collantes, as agent for Yangco, 218
bundles of tobacco in the leaf to be sold
on commission, as had been other
produce previously.
* The said Collantes received
said tobacco and sold it for the sum of
P1,744. The charges for such sale were
P206.96, leaving in the hands of said
Collantes the sum of 1,537.08 belonging
to Rallos. This sum was, apparently,
converted to his own use by said agent.
* It appears, however, that prior
to the sending of said tobacco Yangco
had severed his relations with Collantes
and that the latter was no longer acting
as his factor. This fact was not known to
Rallos; and it is conceded in the case that
no notice of any kind was given by
Yangco of the termination of the
relations between Yangco and his agent,
Collantes.
* Yangco thus refused to pay the
said sum upon demand of Rallos,
placing such refusal upon the ground
that at the time the said tobacco was
received and sold by Collantes, he was

acting personally and not as agent of

Yangco.
ISSUE: W/N Collantes is an agent of
Yangco. If so, Yangco as principal must
refund to Rallos the said sum brought by
the sale of the produce
RULING: Yes
Yangco, as principal is liable.
Having advertised the fact that Collantes
was his agent and having given special
notice to Rallos of that fact, and having
given them a special invitation to deal
with such agent, it was the duty of
Yangco on the termination of the
relationship of the principal and agent to
give due and timely notice thereof to
Rallos.
Failing to do so, he is responsible
to them for whatever goods may been in
good faith and without negligence sent
to the agent without knowledge, actual
or constructive, of the termination of
such relationship
2. B. H. MACKE ET AL V JOSE
CAMPS
FACTS:
* B. H. Macke and W.H.
Chandler, partners doing business under
thee firm name of Macke, Chandler And
Company, allege that during the months
of February and March 1905, they sold
to Jose Camps and delivered at his place
of business, known as the :Washington
Caf, various bills of goods amounting
to P351.50; that Camps has only paid on
account of said goods the sum of P174;
that there is still due them on account of
said goods the sum of P177.50
* Plaintiffs made demand for the
payment from defendant and that the

latter failed and refused to pay the said

balance or any part of it
* Macke, one of the plaintiffs,
testified that on the order of one Ricardo
Flores, who represented himself to be
the agent of Jose Camps, he shipped the
said goods to the defendant at the
Washington Caf; that Flores (agent)
later acknowledged the receipt of the
said goods and made various payments
thereon amounting in all to P174; that
believes that Flores is still the agent of
Camps; and that when he went to the
Washington Caf for the purpose of
collecting his bill he found Flores, in the
absence of Camps, apparently in charge
of the business and claiming to be the
business manager of Camps, said
business being that of a hotel with a bar
and restaurant annexed.
* A written contract was
introduced as evidence, from which it
appears that one Galmes, the former of
Washington Caf subrented the
building wherein the business was
conducted, to Camps for 1 year for the
purpose of carrying on that business,
Camps obligating himself not to sublet
or subrent the building or the business
without the consent of the said Galmes.
*This contract was signed by
Camps and the name of Ricardo Flores
as a witness and attached thereon is an
inventory of the furniture and fittings
which also is signed by Camps with the
word sublessee below the name, and at
the foot of this inventory the word
received followed by the name
Ricardo Flores with the words
managing
agent
immediately
following his name.
ISSUE: W/N Ricardol Flores was the
agent of Camps

Evidence is sufficient to sustain a

finding that Flores is the agent of Camps
in the management of the bar of the
Washington Caf with authority to bind
Camps, his principal, for the payment of
the goods
The
contract
sufficiently
establishes the fact that Camps was the
owner of the business and of the bar, and
the title of managing agent attached to
the signature of Flores which appears on
that contract, together with the fact that
at the time the purchases were made,
Flores was apparently in charge of the
business performing the duties usually
intrusted to a managing agent leave little
room for doubt that he was there as the
authorized agent of Camps.
Agency by Estoppel --- One who
clothes another with apparent authority
as his agent, and holds him out to the
public as such, can not be permitted to
deny the authority of such person to act
as his agent, to the prejudice of innocent
third persons dealing with such person in
good faith and in the honest belief that
he is what he appears to be.
Estopple---- Whenever a party
has, by his own declaration, act or
omission, intentionally and deliberately
led another to believe a particular thing
true, and to act upon such belief, he can
not, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act, or omission be
permitted to falsify; and unless the
contrary appears, the authority of the
agent must be presumed to include all
the necessary and usual means of
carrying his agency into effect.
3. RIO Y OLABARRIETA AND
MOLINA V YU TEC & CO.
FACTS:

Ruling: Yes

*Plaintiff,
Rio
is
a
copartnernership organized and existing
under the laws of the Phil Islands. The
defendant, Yu Tec and Co is a domestic
corporation and the defendant, Calvin is
of age and a resident of Manila
* Rio alleges that Yu Tec & Co,
which was then a limited partnership,
authorized its agent, J.V. Molina to find
a purchaser or a lessee of a tract of land
belonging to it located on Calle
Velasquez, Tondo, Manila.
* Within the time given the agent
found a purchaser in the name of
plaintiff (Rio) which offered to purchase
the land for the sum of P 40,000 and that
Mollina, its agent, made known its offer
to the respondent company which
refused to accept it
* Yu Tec offered to sell the land
for P42,000 instead, of which P7,000
was to be paid on the signing of the
contract, and the balance Riwithin two
years, with interest of 8% and the
remaining P25,000 at the end of the
second year, all to be secured by a first
mortgage
* Rio accepted the offer but Yu
Tec company made several excuses and
refused to carry out the agreement
* That defendant, Calvin, with
full knowledge of the facts and within
the specified period, fraudulently
conspiring with Yu Tec, entered into a
contract by which he purchased the
property from the company.
* By reason thereof, Rio suffered
damages in the sum of P12,000 and
prays that the sale to Calvin be declared
null and void, and ordering company to
comply with the contract and to execute
a deed to Rio and to pay damages of
P12,000
ISSUE: W/N the contract of purchase
and sale of real property is void unless

the authority of the agent be in writing

and subscribed by the party sought to be
charged
RULING: Yes
Molina, the agent, could not
enforce the specific performance of
Exhibit B. There is no evidence in the
record of any written contract between
Rio and Yu Tec for the sale and purchase
of the real property
Exhibit B (letter giving authority
to J. Molina as agent of Yu Tec and if the
latter shall not take advantage of selling
it within the time given, the authority
given shall be cancelled) is nothing more
than an authority to sell
While Exhibit B might be
construed as fixing the price of the sale
of the parcel of land, it does not specify
the terms and conditions upon which the
sale was to be made
Since Exhibit B already expired,
that fact would destroy the legal force
and effect of Exhibit C (specified and
defined the terms and conditions of any
sale made by Molina
In the absence of a renewal or
extension in writing signed by the party
to be charged or its agent, Molina had no
authority to sell the property upon any
terms and conditions after the stipulated
period.
4. GUTIERREZ
ORENSE

HERMANOS

FACTS:
* Orense had been the owner of a
parcel of land, with the building and
improvements thereon situated in the
pueblo of Albay, and had been registered
under his name
* Jose Duran, a nephew of
Orense, with the latters knowledge and
consent, executed before a notary a

public instrument whereby he sold and

conveyed to Gutierrez Hermanos, for P
1,500 the aforementioned property with
Duran having the right to repurchase for
the same price within 4 years
* Plaintiff had not entered into
possession of the land since it is being
occupied by Orense and Duran, by virtue
of a contract of lease executed by
plaintiff to Duran
* Said instrument of sale of
property, executed by Duran was
publicly and freely confirmed and
ratified by Orense in a verbal declaration
made by him to the effect that the
instrument was executed by his nephew
with his knowledge and consent
* In order to perfect the title to
said property, plaintiff had to demand
Orense that he execute in legal form a
deed of conveyance of the parcel of land
but the latter refused to do so, without
any justifiable cause or reason, and he
should be compelled to execute said
deed because his nephew is notoriously
insolvent and cannot reimburse plaintiff
company for the price of sale which he
received
* Duran failed to exercise his
right of repurchase and Orense also
refused to deliver the property and to
pay rental thereof
ISSUE: 1. W/N the sale executed by
Duran, nephew of Orense, in favor of
that Orense publicly ratified and
confirmed the said sale
2. W/N a contract of agency,
express or implied was present in this
case
RULING: YES TO BOTH
Evidence shows that Orense did
give his consent in order that his
nephew, Duran might sell the property to
plaintiff company and that he did

confirm and ratify the sale by means of

public instrument executed before a
notary
It follows that Orense conferred
verbal, or at least implied, power of
agency upon his nephew Duran, who
accepted it in the same way by selling
the said property
The principal must fulfill all the
obligations contracted by the agent, who
acted within the scope of his authority
Even if said consent was granted
subsequently to the sale, it is
questionable that Orense, the owner of
the property, approved the action of his
nephew, who in this case acted as the
manager of his uncles business and
Orenses ratification produced the effects
of an express authorization to make the
said sale
A contract executed in the name
of another by one who has neither his
authorization nor legal representation
shall be void, unless it should be ratified
by the person in whose name it was
executed before being revoked by the
other contracting party
The sale of the said property
made by Duran to Gutierrez Hermanos
was indeed null and void from the
beginning, but afterwards became
perfectly valid and cured of the defect of
nullity it bore at its execution by the
confirmation solemnly made by the said
owner upon his stating under oath to the
judge that he himself consented to his
nephews making the said sale
5. JIMENEZ V RABOT
FACTS:
* Gregorio Jimenez filed this
action to recover from Rabot, a parcel of
land situated in Alaminos, Pangasinan

* The property in question,

together with two other parcels in the
same locality originally belonged to
Jimenez, having been assigned to him as
one of the heirs in the division of the
estate of his father
* It further appears that while
Gregorio Jimenez was staying at Vigan,
Ilocos Sur, his property in Alaminos was
confided by him to the care of his elder
sister Nicolasa Jimenez.
* He wrote his sister a letter from
Vigan in which he informed her that he
was pressed for money and requested her
to sell one of his parcels of land and
send him the money in order that he
might pay his debts. The letter contains
no description of the land to be sold
other than is indicated in the words one
of my parcels of land.
* Acting upon this letter,
Nicolasa approached Rabot and the latter
agreed to buy the property for the sum of
P500. P250 was paid at once, with the
understanding that a deed of conveyance
would be executed when the balance
should be paid.
* Nicolasa admits having
received this payment but there is no
evidence that she sent it to her brother
* After one year, Gregorio
Jimenez went back to Alaminos and
demanded that his sister surrender the
piece of land to him, it being then in her
possession.
* She refused upon some pretext
or other to do so and as a result, plaintiff
instituted an action to recover the land
from her control
* Meanwhile, Nicolasa executed
and delivered to Rabot a deed purporting
to convey to him the parcel of land
ISSUE: W/N the authority conferred on
Nicolasa by the letter was sufficient to

enable her to bind her brother of the sale

made in favor of Rabot
RULING: Yes
As a matter of formality, a power
of attorney to convey real property ought
to appear in a public document, just as
any other instrument intended to
transmit or convey an interest in such
property ought to appear in a public
document
Art. 1713 of the Civil Code
requires that the authority to alienate
land shall be contained in an express
mandate
Subsection 5 of section 335 of
Code of Civil Procedure say that the
authority of the agent must be in writing
and subscribed by the party to be
charged
SC: the authority expressed in
the letter is a sufficient compliancw tih
both requirements
The purpose in giving a power of
attorney is to substitute the mind and
hand of the agent for the mind and hand
of the principal; and if the character and
extent of the power is so defined as to
leave no doubt as to the limits within
which the agent is authorized to act, and
he acts within those limits, the principal
cannot question the validity of his act
The general rule here applicable
is that the description must be
sufficiently definite to identify the land
either from the recitals of the contract or
deed or from external facts referred to in
the document, thereby enabling one to
determine the identity of the land and if
the description is uncertain on its face or
is shown to be applicable with equal
plausibility to more than one tract, it is
insufficient.

6.
COSMIC
CORPORATION V CA

LUMBER

FACTS
* Cosmic Corporation, through
its General Manager executed a Special
Power of Attorney appointing Paz G.
Villamil-Estrada as attorney-in-fact to
initiate, institute and file any court action
for the ejectment of third persons and/or
squatters of the entire lot 9127 and 443
for the said squatters to remove their
houses and vacate the premises in order
that the corporation may take material
possession of the entire lot
* Paz G. Villamil Estrada, by
virtue of her power of attorney, instituted
an action for the ejectment of private
respondent Isidro Perez and recover the
possession of a portion of lot 443 before
the RTC
* Estrada entered into a
Compromise Agreement with Perez, the
terms and conditions such as:
In order for Perez to buy the
said lot he is presently occupying, he has
to pay to plaintiff through Estada the
sum of P26,640 computed at P80/square
meter and that Cosmic Lumber
recognizes ownership and possession of
Perez by virtue of this compromise
agreement over said portion of 333 sqm
of lot 443 and whatever expenses of
subdivision, registration and other
incidental expenses shall be shouldered
by Perez
* although the agreement was
approved by the trial court and the
decision became final and executory it
was not executed within the 5 year
period from date of its finality allegedly
due to the failure of Cosmic Lumber to
produce the owners duplicate copy of
title needed to segregate from lot 443 the
portion sold by the attorney-in-fact, Paz

Estrada to Perez under the compromise

agreement
ISSUE: W/N there is a contract of
agency between Cosmic Lumber,
principal and Paz Estrada, agent thus
binding the principal over the
compromise agreement made by the
agent to a third person, Perez in selling
the portion of the said property
RULING: No
The authority granted VillamilEstrada under the special power of
attorney was explicit and exclusionary:
for her to institute any action in court to
eject all persons found on lots number
9127 and 443 so that Cosmic Lumber
could take material possession thereof
and for this purpose, to appear at the pretrial and enter into any stipulation of
facts and/or compromise agreement but
only insofar as this was protective of the
rights and interests of Cosmic Lumber in
the property
Nowhere in this authorization
was Villamil-Estrada granted expressly
or impliedly any power to sell the
subject property nor a portion thereof
Neither can a conferment of the
power to sell be validly inferred from the
specific authority to enter into a
compromise agreement because of the
explicit limitation fixed by the grantor
that the compromise entered into shall
only be so far as it shall protect the
rights and interest of the corporation in
the aforementioned lots.
In the context of special
investiture of powers to VillamilEstrada, alienation by sale of an
immovable certainly cannot be deemed
protective of the right of Cosmic Lumber
to physically possess the same, more so
when the land was being sold for a price

of P80/sqm , very much less than its

assessed value of P250/sqm and
considering further that plaintiff never
received the proceeds of the sale
When the sale of a piece of land
or any interest thereon is through an
agent, the authority of the latter shall be
in writing; otherwise, the sale should be
void. Thus, the authority of an agent to
execute a contract for the sale of real
estate must be conferred in writing and
must give him specific authority, either
to conduct the general business of the
principal or to execute a binding contract
containing terms and conditions which
are in the contract he did execute
For the principal to confer the
right upon an agent to sell real estate, a
power of attorney must so express the
powers of the agent in clear and
unmistakable language
It is therefore clear that by selling
to Perez a portion of Cosmic Lumbers
land through a compromise agreement,
Villamil-Estrada acted without or in
obvious authority. The sale ipso jure is
consequently void and so is the
compromise agreement. This being the
case, the judgment based thereon is
necessarily void
When an agent is engaged in the
perpetration of a fraud upon his principal
for his own exclusive benefit, he is not
really acting for the principal but is
really acting for himself, entirely outside
the scope of his agency
7. RAET V CA
FACTS:
* Petitioners Cesar and Elviira
Raet (the spouses Raet) and petitioners
Rex and Edna Mitra (Spouses Mitra)
negotiated
with
Amparo
Gatus
concerning the possibility of bu*ying the

rights of the latter to certain units at the

Las Villas de Sto. Nino Subdivision in
Meycauyan, Bulacan.
* This subdivision ws developed
by private respondent Phil Ville
Development and Housing Corporation
(PVDHC) primarily for parties qualified
to obtain loans from the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS).
* Spouses Raet and Spouses
Mira paid Gatus the total amounts of
P40,000 and P35,000 respectively for
which they were issued receipts by
Gatus in her own name
* Both spouses applied directly
with PVDHC for the purchase of units in
the said subdivision. As they were not
GSIS members, they looked for
members
who
could
act
as
accommodation parties by allowing
them to use their policies. PVDHC
would process the applications for the
purchase of the units upon the approval
by the GSIS of petitioners loan
application
* Spouses Raet presented GSIS
policy of Ernesto Casidsid, while the
spouses Mitra that of Dena Lim. The
former paid P32,653 while the latter paid
P27,000
to
PVDHC
on
the
understanding that these accounts would
be credited to the purchase prices of the
units which will be determined after the
approval of their loan applications with
the GSIS.
*Spouses Raet were allowed to
occupy the unit built on Lot 4, Block 67,
Phase 4A of the subdivision while
Spouses Mitra were given the unit on
Lot 7, Block 61, Phase 4A thereof
* GSIS, however, disapproved
the loan applications of both spouses.
They were advised by PVDHC to seek
other sources of financing but were still
allowed to remain in the said premises

* Failure of both spouses to raise

money, PVDHC demanded them to
vacate the units they were occupying and
ejectment cases were filed against them
ISSUE: W/N there were perfected
contracts of sale between petitioners and
private respondent PVDHC involving
the units in question
RULING: No
SC: Parties in this case had not
reached any agreement with regard to
the sale of the units in question
Records do not show the total
costs of the units in question and the
payment schemes therefore. The figures
referred to by both spouses were mere
estimates given to them by Gatus. The
parties transactions thus, lacked the
requisites ressential for the perfection of
contracts
Both spouses dealt with Gatus
who was not the agent of PVDHC. The
criminal case for estafa against her was
dismissed because it was found out that
she never represeneted herself to be an
agent of PVDHC
Both spouses knew from the
beginning that Gatus was negotiating
with them in her own behalf and not as
an agent of PVDHC
There is thus no basis for the
finding of HLURB Arbiter that Gatus
was the agent of PVDHC with respect to
the transactions in question
Since PVDHC had no knowledge
of the figures Gatus gave to both spouses
as estimates of the costs of the units, it
could not have ratified the same at the
time the latter applied for the purchase
of the units. PVDHC was to enter into
agreements concerning subject units
with both spouses only upon approval of
their loan applications with GSIS which
failed to materialize

There are no written contracts to

evidence the alleged sales. If both
spouses and PVDHC had indeed entered
into contracts involving said units, it is
rather strange that contracts of such
importance have not been reduced in
writing
8.
CITY-LITE
CORPORATION V CA

REALTY

FACTS
* Private Respondent F.P.
Holdings and Realty Corporation (F.P.
Holdings), formerly the Sparta Holdings
Inc, was the registered owner of a parcel
of land situated along E. Rodriguez
Avenue, Quezon City also known as the
Violago Property or the San Lorenzo
Ruiz Commercial Center, with an area
of 71,754 sqm
* The property was offered for
sale to the general public through the
circulation of a sales brochure
containing the description of the
property and the asking price of
P6,250/sqm with terms of payment
negotiable. In addition, brokers
commission was 2% of selling price, net
of withholding taxes and other charges.
Contact person was Meldin Al G. Roy,
Metro Drug Inc.
* The front portion consisting of
9,192 sqm is the subject of this litigation
* Al G. Roy sent a sales
brochure, together with the location plan
and copy of the TCT to Atty. Gelacio
Mamaril, a practicing lawyer and a
licensed real estate broker. Mamaril
passed in turn passed on these
documents to Antonio Teng, Executive
Vice President, and Atty Victor
Villanueva, Legal Counsel of City-Lite

* City-Lite conveyed its interest

to purchase a portion or one-half (1/2) of
the front lot of the Violago Property
Apparently, Roy subsequently informed
City-Lites representative that it would
take time to subdivide the lot and F.P.
HOLDINGS was not receptive to the
purchase of only half of the front lot
* Atty. Mamaril wrote Metro
Drug (Al G. Roy) expressing City-Lites
desire to buy the entire front lot of the
subject property instead of only half
thereof provided the asking price of
P6,250/sqm was reduced and that
payment be in installment for a certain
period
* The parties reached an
agreement and Roy agreed to sell the
property to City-Lite provided only the
latter submit its acceptance in writing to
the terms and conditions of the sale
* For some reason or another and
despite demand, F.P. HOLDINGS
refused to execute the corresponding
deed of sale in favor of City-Lite of the
front lot of the property
* Trial court ruled in favor of
City-Lite ordering F.P. HOLDINGS to
execute a deed of sale of the property in
favor of the former for the total
consideration of P55,056,250 payable as
follows: P15 M as downpayment to be
payable immediately upon execution of
the deed of sale and the balance within 6
months from downpayment without
interest
* CA reversed TCs decision
ISSUE: W/N there was a perfected
contract of sale between City-Lite and
respondent F.P. HOLDINGS because of
a lack of definite agreement on the
manner of paying the purchase price and
that Metro Drug and Meldin Al G. Roy
were not authorized to sell the property
to City-Lite, and that the authority of

Roy was only limited to that of mere

liaison or contact person
RULING: No, Roy mere contact person
Art. 1874 of NCC: When the
sale of a piece of land or any interest
therein is through an agent, the authority
of the latter shall be in writing,
otherwise, the sale shal be void.
The absence of authority to sell
can be determined from the written
memorandum issued by respondent F.P.
HOLDINGS President requesting Metro
Drugs assistance in finding buyers for
the property
Memorandum indicates that
Meldin G. Roy and/or Metro Drug was
only to assist F.P. Holdings in looking
for buyers and referring to them possible
prospects whom they were supposed to
endorse to F.P. Holdings.
But
the
final
evaluation,
appraisal and acceptance of the
transaction could be made only by F.P.
Holdings. In other words, Roy and/or
Metro Drug was only a contact person
with no authority to conclude a sale of
the property
Roy and/or Metro Drug was a
mere broker and Roy/s only job was to
bring parties the parties together for a
possible transaction
SC: for lack of a written
authority to sell the Violago Property
on the part of Roy and/or Metro Drug,
the sale should be as it is declared null
and void
9. SIMMIE V H. BRODEK
FACTS:
* Simmie filed an action against
Brodek to recover the sum of 1,350
pesos for services performed by the
former for Brodek in the purchase of a

interest in the launch called Fred L.

Dorr.
* Evidence shows that Brodek
was the owner of interest in the said
launch prior to the time of the alleged
contract and that one A.J. Washburn was
the owner of the other half.
* Simmie claims that he entered
into a contract with Brodek by the terms
of which he was to purchase the half
interest owned by said Washburn for a
sum not to exceed 3,500 pesos.
*He further claims that he was to
receive for such services a sum equal to
the difference between 3,500 pesos and
whatever sum less than that amount for
which he could purchase the said launch
*He further claims that by virtue
of this agreement he entered into a
contract with the said Washburn to pay
to the latter the sum of 2,150 pesos and
that there was due from Brodek to him
the difference between 3,500 pesos and
2,150 pesos, or the sum of 1,350 pesos
*Inferior court ruled in favor the
plaintiff, Simmie
ISSUE: W/N there was a contract of
agency between Brodek and Simmie, the
latter to purchase the said launch for the
principal, Brodek
RULING: YES
Where Brodek enters into a
contract through his authorized agent
Dorr, with Simmie to purchase property,
agreeing to pay a fixed price for such
property, allowing Simmie, a sum equal
to the difference between this fixed price
and whatever sum less than that for
which Simmie is able to purchase the
property, and Simmie has completed the
contract of sale and there is nothing left
to be done except the payment of the
said property, and then Brodek closes
said contract without the intervention of

Simmie, the former is liable to the latter

for an amount equal to the difference
between the actual purchase price of said
property and the which Brodek agreed to
pay for the same
10. AGUNA V. LARENA
FACTS:
* This action is brought to
recover the sum of P29,600 on two
causes against the administrator of the
estate of the deceased Mariano Larena
* Upon his first cause of action,
plaintiff claims the sum of P9,600, the
alleged value of services rendered by
him to said deceased as his agent in
charge of the deceaseds houses situated
in Manila
* Under the second cause of
action, plaintiff alleges that one of the
buildings belonging to the deceased and
described in his complaint was built by
him with the consent of the deceased,
and for that reason he is entitled to
recover the sum disbursed by him in its
construction, amounting to P20,000
* Evidence shows that plaintiff
rendered services to the deceased,
consisting in the collection of the rents
due from the tenants occupying the
deceaseds houses in Manila and
attending to the repair of said houses
when necessary. He also took such steps
as were necessary to enforce the
payment of rents and all that was
required to protect the interests of the
deceased in connection with said houses
* Evidence also shows that at the
time he rendered his services, he did not
receive any compensation, however it is
a fact that during said period, plaintiff
occupied a house belonging to the
deceased without paying any rent at all

* Upon the first cause of action,

the trial court held that the compensation
for services of plaintiff was the
gratuitous use and occupation of some of
the houses of the deceased by the
plaintiff and his family
* As to the second cause, the
court held that the plaintiff did not have
any source of income that could produce
him such a large sum of money as that
invested in the construction of the house;
and the fact that the deceased had more
than the necessary amount to build the
house
ISSUE: W/N there was a contract of
agency between plaintiff and respondent
entitling the former compensation for
services rendered in favor of the latter
RULING: NO
Plaintiff insists that, as his
services as agent of the deceased M
Larena having been rendered, an
obligaton to compensate them must
necessarily arise.
The trial court held that the
compensation for the services of the
plaintiff was the gratuitous use and
occupation of some of the houses of said
deceased by plaintiff and his family
If it were true that the plaintiff
and the deceased had an understanding
to the effect that plaintiff was to receive
compensation aside from the use and
occupation of the houses of the
deceased, it cannot be explained how the
plaintiff could have rendered services as
he did for 8 years without receiving and
claiming any compensation from the
deceased.