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INTHEMISSOURICOURTOFAPPEALS

EASTERNDISTRICT
STATEOFMISSOURI,exrel.
RYANREILLY
Relator,
v.
HON.CRAIGCONCANNON,
JUDGEOFTHEMUNICIPALCOURTOF
ST.LOUISCOUNTY,21STJUDICIALCIRCUIT,
Respondent.

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No._______________

FromtheMunicipalCourt
ofSaintLouisCounty
No.15247691

PETITIONFORAWRITOFPROHIBITIONOR,
ALTERNATIVELY,MANDAMUS
COMESNOWRelatorRyanReilly,pursuantto MO.SUP.CT.R.84.24,94,and97,
and requests that this Court issue a Writ of Prohibition or, Alternatively, Mandamus
orderingRespondenttodismisscountyordinanceviolationchargesbroughtagainsthim
in St. Louis County Municipal Court in connection with his work as a reporter for The
HuffingtonPostcoveringtheunrestinFergusonfollowingtheshootingdeathofMichael
Brown. Mr. Reilly has been charged with violating St. Louis County ordinances that
prohibittrespassingandinterferingwithanofficerinunincorporatedportionsofSt.Louis
County.TheseordinanceshavenoapplicationwithintheCityofFerguson,whichisthe
incorporated municipality where the alleged conduct giving rise to Mr. Reillys arrest
occurred.TheCountysprosecutionofMr.Reillyviolatesrestrictionsonthepowersof
county government embodied in the Missouri Constitution, basic due process rights

guaranteed by the Missouri and United States Constitutions, and the Countys own
charterandordinances.
TheCountyconcedesthatithasnolegislativeauthoritytoextendtheordinances
atissuetoconductthatisallegedtohaveoccurredintheCityofFerguson.Nonetheless,
the County argues that the St. Louis County Municipal Court may exercise jurisdiction
over alleged county ordinance violations based on conduct that occurred outside of its
jurisdiction.TheCountysattempttoassertextrajurisdictionalpowerstoprosecuteMr.
Reillyforconductrelatingtohisworkasareporterislawlessandunprecedented.The
County is prosecuting Mr. Reilly for conduct that it acknowledges occurred entirely
within the geographic borders of the City of Ferguson. In order to justify this
unconstitutional jurisdictional overreach, the County asserts it is acting pursuant to
emergencypowers.AsdiscussedbelowandinMr.ReillysSuggestionsinSupportof
His Petition for a Writ of Prohibition or, Alternatively, Mandamus, filed herewith, the
Countysmanufacturedemergencypowersjustificationhasnobasisinlaworfact.
I.
(1)

StatementoftheFacts

Ryan Reilly was arrested in a McDonalds restaurant in the City of

Ferguson on August 13, 2014 while performing duties as a news reporter for The
Huffington Post covering the unrest following the shooting death of Michael Brown.
These were events of national and international interest and raised important issues
regardingthemannerinwhichthegovernmentinteractswithitscitizensinademocracy.
(2)

Followinghisarrest,Mr.ReillywastransportedtotheFergusonJail,along

withWesleyLoweryofTheWashingtonPost,anotherreporterwhowasarrestedatthe

McDonalds.UponlearningofMr.ReillysandMr.Lowerysarrests,ThomasJackson,
who was then Fergusons Chief of Police, ordered that the reporters be immediately
released without any charges being filed. The City of Ferguson has never filed any
chargesagainstMr.ReillyorMr.Lowery.
(3)

The next day, both President Obama and thenAttorney General Eric

Holdercommentedontheseriousconstitutionalissuesraisedbythereportersarrests.
(4)

On August 5, 2015, nearly one year after Mr. Reillys arrest, St. Louis

County issued an information against Mr. Reilly charging him with one count of
trespassingonprivatepropertyinviolationofSt.LouisCountyRevisedOrdinanceNo.
8216,716.150,andonecountofinterferingwithapoliceofficerinperformanceofhis
duty in violation of St. Louis County Revised Ordinance No. 4866, 701.110. Ex. 1,
Information. These ordinances apply only in unincorporated areas of St. Louis County
andhavenoapplicationwithintheCityofFerguson,theincorporatedmunicipalitywhere
theallegedconductgivingrisetoMr.Reillysarrestoccurred.
(5)

On October 12, 2015, Mr. Reilly filed his Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

JurisdictionpursuanttoMo.Sup.Ct.R.37.51(b).Ex.2,MotiontoDismiss.Themotion
stated that because the alleged actions by Mr. Reilly occurred within the City of
Ferguson,theSt.LouisCountyMunicipalCourtlackedjurisdictionoverthechargesand
theinformationfailedtochargeaviolationofacountyordinance.
(6)

Mr.Reillysmotionarguedthatinfilingchargesbasedonconductthatwas

alleged to have occurred within the City of Ferguson, St. Louis County violated its
charter and ordinances, which expressly limit the Countys powers to enforce the

trespassingandinterferenceordinancestounincorporatedareasofSt.LouisCounty.Mr.
ReillysmotionfurtherarguedthattheCountyexceededitsauthorityundertheMissouri
Constitution, which restricts a countys power to regulate conduct in incorporated
municipalities.BecausethecountyordinancesthatMr.Reillyischargedwithviolating
have no application to alleged conduct that occurs within incorporated municipalities,
includingtheCityofFerguson,St.LouisCountyMunicipalCourthasnojurisdictionin
thepresentcase.
(7)

On November 18, 2015, the County filed its response to Mr. Reillys

motion to dismiss. The County conceded that it did not have legislative authority to
charge Mr. Reilly for alleged St. Louis County ordinance violations that are based on
conductthatoccurredintheCityofFerguson.TheCounty,however,contendsthatits
lack of any legislative authority to charge Mr. Reilly is irrelevant. Ex. 3, St. Louis
Countys Mem. in Opp. to Defs Mot. to Dismiss, at 3. The County argues that it has
emergencypowersthatgivetheCountyCounselortheauthoritytochargeindividuals
with St. Louis County ordinance violations even when the St. Louis County Municipal
Courthasnojurisdiction.Id.
(8)

OnNovember23,2015,Mr.Reillyfiledhisreplyinsupportofhismotion

to dismiss. Mr. Reillys reply argued that the Countys attempt to rely on emergency
powers to cloak the County Counselor with the power to prosecute Mr. Reilly in St.
Louis County Municipal Court should be rejected. The County Counselor has no
authoritytoconferjurisdictionupontheSt.LouisCountyMunicipalCourt.Ex.4,Reply
inSupp.ofRyanReillysMot.toDismissforLackofJurisdiction.

(9)

RespondentheardoralargumentonMr.ReillysmotiononNovember23,

(10)

In an order dated January 11, 2016, and received by mail by Mr. Reillys

2015.

counsel on January 19, 2016, Respondent denied Mr. Reillys Motion to Dismiss. The
order stated only that the motion to dismiss wasdenied for the reasons outlined in St.
LouisCountysMemoranduminOppositiontoDefendantsMotiontoDismiss.Ex.5,
January11,2016Order.
(11)

This matter is not currently set for trial, but Mr. Reilly has filed his jury

trialdemandandintendstoseekaspeedytrial.Ex.6,DemandforJuryTrial.
II.
(12)

ReliefSought

Mr. Reilly seeks an order: (1) directing Respondent to vacate the January

11, 2016 Order denying his Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (2) directing
RespondenttodismissthechargesagainstMr.Reillyand(3)barringRespondentfrom
takinganyfurtheractioninthiscase.
III.
(13)

ReasonsWhytheWritShouldIssue

TheCourtshouldissuearemedialwritbecauseRespondenthasabusedhis

discretionandactedinclearexcessofhisjurisdictionbyallowingtheCountytoproceed
withanunconstitutionalandextrajurisdictionalprosecutionofanewsreporterwhowas
exercisingFirstAmendmentrightsthatareattheverycoreofourdemocracy.Where,
ashere,thecourtiswhollywantinginjurisdictiontoproceedinthecase,appealisnotan
adequate remedy because any action by the court is without authority and causes

unwarrantedexpenseanddelaytothepartiesinvolved.Stateexrel.T.J.H.v.Bills,504
S.W.2d76,79(Mo.Banc1974).
(14)

ThetrespassingordinanceMr.Reillyischargedwithviolating,716.150,

appears within a chapter of the St. Louis County municipal code that explicitly states:
[t]heprovisionsofsections716.040through716.180shallapplytotheareaofSt.Louis
Countyoutsideincorporatedcities,towns,andvillages.Ex.7,ExcerptofChapter716
oftheRevisedOrdinancesofSt.LouisCounty,716.020(Scope)(emphasisadded)
id.,716.150.ThereisnodisputethatCountyschargesarebasedonconductallegedto
have occurred in the incorporated City of Ferguson, an area where the trespassing
ordinancedoesnotapply.
(15)

The interference with an officer ordinance, 710.110, does not contain a

provision specifically addressing its geographic scope because it was enacted at a time
when it was unconstitutional for the County to legislate within incorporated
municipalities. The Countys interference with an officer ordinance was enacted on
November 4, 1968, at which time Article VI, 18(c) of the Missouri Constitution
explicitly limited the Countys legislative power to the part of the county outside
incorporated cities. Ex. 8, Excerpt of Chapter 710 of the Revised Ordinances of St.
LouisCounty,710.110(emphasisadded)Ex.9, MO.CONST.art.VI,18(c)(pre1970
amendmentversion).BecausetheCountyhadnoauthoritytoenactlegislationapplicable
to incorporated municipalities when 701.110 was enacted, the application of that
provisionisnecessarilylimitedtounincorporatedareas.

(16)

Although Art. VI, 18(c) was amended in 1970 to allow a county to

exercise legislative power within incorporated areas, the amended Art. VI, 18(c)
provides that a County may enact legislation that applies within incorporated
municipalities only if it adopts a charter provision that provides for such power and
set[s] forth the limits within which the municipalities may exercise the same power
collaterallyandcoextensively. MO.CONST.art.VI,18(c).St.LouisCountyhasnever
amended701.110,andthecitizensofSt.LouisCountyhaveneveradoptedanycharter
provisionallowingtheCountytoenforceitsinterferencewithanofficerordinancewithin
incorporatedmunicipalities.Instead,theCountycharterprovidesthecountycouncilwith
the authority to [e]xercise legislative power pertaining to public health, police and
traffic,buildingconstruction,andplanningandzoninginthepartofthecountyoutside
incorporated cities. Ex. 10, St. Louis County Charter of 1979, 2.180.23 (emphasis
added).
(17)

The Countys argument that emergency powers provide the St. Louis

CountyMunicipalCourtwithjurisdictionhasnobasis.Therewasnodeclaredstateof
emergencyinFergusononthedateofMr.Reillysarrest.Therewasnocontinuingstate
ofemergencywhenSt.LouisCountyfiledthechargesagainstMr.Reillyandthereisno
emergencyastheSt.LouisCountyMunicipalCourtpresentlyexercisesjurisdictionover
this case. More fundamentally, the Countys cited statutory authority which allows
police officers, firefighters and agencies that have personnel with special skills or
trainingthatareneededtoprovideservicesduringanemergencytorespondtorequests
for mutual aid does not provide the County Counselor or the St. Louis County

Municipal Court with the authority to proceed with an extrajurisdictional prosecution.


R.S.Mo.44.090.
(18)

TheimplicationoftheCountysemergencypowersargumentisthatthe

County Counselor, through the unilateral exercise of emergency powers, has the
authority to expand and constrict a courts jurisdiction. This attempted distortion of
Missouri judicial authority in favor of expansive County Counselor powers should be
rejected.
(19)

The Countys unconstitutional prosecution of Mr. Reilly has broader

implications than the present case because Mr. Reilly was only one of a number of
citizensagainstwhomSt.LouisCountyfiledunconstitutionalchargesinAugust2015for
alleged conduct occurring within the incorporated City of Ferguson in August 2014.
Undersignedcounselrepresenttwoothersuchindividuals,WesleyLoweryandMatthew
Giles.Mr.LoweryhascontemporaneouslyfiledaPetitionforaWritofProhibitionor,
Alternatively,MandamusbasedonRespondentsdenialofhisownmotiontodismiss.
A. WritofProhibition
(20)

Awritofprohibitionwillliewherethereisausurpationofpowerbecause

thetrialcourtlackseitherpersonalorsubjectmatterjurisdictionortoremedyaclear
excessofjurisdictionorabuseofdiscretionsuchthatthelowercourtlacksthepowerto
actascontemplated.Stateexrel.Chassaingv.Mummert,887S.W.2d573,577(Mo.
1994)seealsoStateexrel.St.CharlesCty.v.Cunningham,401S.W.3d493,495(Mo.
2013), as modified (Apr. 30, 2013). In addition, the Missouri Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that prohibition may be appropriate to prevent unnecessary,

inconvenient, and expensive litigation. State ex rel. CocaCola Co. v. Nixon, 249
S.W.3d855,860(Mo.banc2008)(citationomitted).
(21)

A writ of prohibition is appropriate because Respondents denial of Mr.

Reillys motion to dismiss was an abuse of discretion in excess of Respondents


jurisdiction. When a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot take any other
actionbesidesitsinherentpowertodismiss.Baconv.Dir.ofRevenue,StateofMo.,
948 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) see also Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 37.51 (Lack of
jurisdiction or the failure of the information to charge an ordinance violation shall be
noticedbythecourtatanytimeduringthependencyoftheproceeding.).
(22)

The St. Louis County Municipal Court does not have jurisdiction to hear

countyordinanceviolationchargesbasedonconductallegedtohaveoccurredwithinthe
incorporatedCityofFerguson.ThejurisdictionoftheSt.LouisCountyMunicipalCourt
is limited to violations of [St. Louis County] ordinances. See R.S.Mo. 66.010.1
(Anycountymunicipalcourtestablishedpursuanttotheprovisionsofthissectionshall
have jurisdiction over violations of that countys ordinances . . . .). The County
ordinances at issue apply only within unincorporated areas of St. Louis County, and
therefore the information filed against Mr. Reilly fails to state a violation of a county
ordinance.
(23)

Awritofprohibitionisalsorequiredtopreventunnecessary,inconvenient,

andexpensivelitigation.Thiscasehasbeenpendingforsevenmonths.Mr.Reillyfiled
hisjurytrialdemandfivemonthsagoandhasbeentoldthatanytrialdateremainsatleast

severalmonthsaway.Hewillthenbesubjectedtoajurytrialinwhichhewillfaceupto
oneyearinjailonunconstitutionalchargesinacourtthathasnojurisdiction.
(24)

Prohibition is also appropriate to remedy violations of Mr. Reillys due

processrightsundertheMissouriandUnitedStatesConstitutions.Elementarynotions
offairnessenshrinedinourconstitutionaljurisprudencedictatethatapersonreceivefair
notice...oftheconductthatwillsubjecthimtopunishment....CityofSt.Petersv.
Roeder,466S.W.3d538,548(Mo.2015),quotingBMWofN.Am.,Inc.v.Gore,517
U.S.559,574(1996).Mr.Reillycouldnothavepossiblyhadfairnoticethatanyalleged
conduct within the City of Ferguson would subject him to punishment under St. Louis
County Ordinances, as the County itself admits the ordinances (absent the County
Counselors selfproclaimed emergency powers) do not apply within incorporated
municipalities. Allowing a prosecutor and court to selectively determine that an
ordinancehasapplicationinageographicareawhereitdoesnotisaviolationofthefair
noticerequiredbythedueprocessclauseoftheMissouriandUnitedStatesConstitutions.
(25)

In addition, because the County took the unprecedented step of filing

chargesagainstMr.ReillyinSt.LouisCountyMunicipalCourt,Mr.Reillyfacesgreater
penalties and has fewer due process rights than he would have in state court, where
chargesinconnectionwitharrestsbycountyofficerswithinincorporatedmunicipalities
should be filed. The Countys trespassing ordinance charge against Mr. Reilly is
punishablebyuptooneyearimprisonmentwhilethecomparablechargeunderstatelaw
ispunishablebyuptosixmonthsimprisonment.CompareEx.7,716.180(providing
penalties for violation of 716.150) with R.S.Mo. 569.140.2 (trespass in the first

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degree) R.S.Mo. 558.011.1 (sentence of imprisonment, terms). Even more


significantly,thereisnochargeunderstatelawthatcriminalizesthesameconductasthe
countys overbroad interference with an officer ordinance, which makes it unlawful to
interfere in any manner with a police officer . . . or to obstruct him in any manner
whatsoever while performing any duty.1 Ex. 8, 701.110. Mr. Reilly has also been
refused basic discovery, such as depositions of the officers who arrested him, that he
would be entitled to in state court. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 25.12 State v. Scott, 647 S.W.2d
601,606(Mo.App.W.D.1983)(Rightsofdiscoveryprovidedcriminaldefendantsby
Rule25haveconstitutionalunderpinningrootedindueprocess.).
B. WritofMandamus
(26)

A writ of mandamus is appropriate where a court has exceeded its

jurisdictionorauthorityandthereisnoremedythroughappeal.Stateexrel.Poucherv.
Vincent,258S.W.3d62,64(Mo.Banc2008)(internalquotationomitted).
(27)

For the reasons stated above, the St. Louis County Municipal Court has

clearlyexceededitsjurisdiction.AstheCountyconcedes,itscountyordinancesdonot
reachconductthatisallegedtohaveoccurredwithinincorporatedmunicipalities.
(28)

In addition, as stated above, appeal is not an adequate remedy where, as

here, the municipal court wholly lacks jurisdiction. In addition, Mr. Reilly is being

AtthesametimeMr.Reillyfiledhisjurisdictionalmotion,hefiledamotiontodismiss

theinterferencechargebecausetheCountysinterferenceordinanceisunconstitutionally
vagueandoverbroad.Thatmotionremainspending.

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subjectedtoprotractedandexpensivelitigationonchargesthatviolatebasicprinciplesof
dueprocessandcouldresultinoneyearofimprisonment.

WHEREFORE, Mr. Reilly prays that this Court issue its preliminary order in
prohibition, or, alternatively, mandamus grant an immediate stay of all proceedings in
thisactionforsolongasthiswritproceedingispendingand,ultimately,thattheCourt
issue a permanent writ directing Respondent to vacate the January 11, 2016 Order
denying Mr. Reillys Motion to Dismiss and to dismiss the charges against Mr. Reilly,
andbarringRespondentfromtakinganyfurtheractioninthiscaseandgrantsuchother
reliefastheCourtdeemsjustandproper.

March24,2016

Respectfullysubmitted,
DOWDBENNETTLLP
By:/s/GabrielE.Gore
EdwardL.Dowd,Jr.,MO#28785
GabrielE.Gore,MO#45416
LisaS.Hoppenjans,MO#63890
7733ForsythBlvd.,Suite1900
St.Louis,Missouri63105
(314)8897300(telephone)
(314)8632111(facsimile)
edowd@dowdbennett.com
ggore@dowdbennett.com
lhoppenjans@dowdbennett.com
CounselforDefendantRyanReilly

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INTHEMISSOURICOURTOFAPPEALS
EASTERNDISTRICT
STATEOFMISSOURI,exrel.
RYANREILLY
Relator,
v.
HON.CRAIGCONCANNON,
JUDGEOFTHEMUNICIPALCOURTOF
ST.LOUISCOUNTY,21STJUDICIALCIRCUIT,
Respondent.

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No._______________

FromtheMunicipalCourt
ofSaintLouisCounty
No.15247691

RELATORSSUGGESTIONSINSUPPORTOFHISPETITIONFOR
AWRITOFPROHIBITIONOR,ALTERNATIVELY,MANDAMUS
Relator, Ryan Reilly, a reporter for The Huffington Post, seeks relief from St.
LouisCountysunconstitutionalandlawlessprosecutionofhimbasedonconductalleged
tohaveoccurredintheCityofFergusoninAugust2014,whileMr.Reillywascovering
protestsrelatedtothedeathofMichaelBrown.Mr.ReillyseeksaWritofProhibitionor,
alternatively,aWritofMandamusfromthisCourtpursuanttoMo.R.Civ.P.94and97
to require Respondent, the Honorable Craig Concannon, to dismiss the charges filed
againstMr.ReillyinSt.LouisCountyMunicipalCourt.
ThesechargesshouldbedismissedbecausetheSt.LouisCountyMunicipalCourt
has no jurisdiction over county ordinance charges that are based on conduct that is
alleged to have occurred in the City of Ferguson, and the information fails to state an
ordinanceviolation.TheCountysinformationchargesMr.Reillywithviolatingcounty
ordinances that prohibit trespassing and interference with an officer in unincorporated

areasofSt.LouisCounty.Thesetwoordinanceshavenoapplicationtoconductalleged
tohaveoccurredwithintheCityofFerguson,whichisanincorporatedmunicipality.The
trespassing ordinance states in unambiguous language that it does not apply within
incorporatedmunicipalities,andtheinterferencewithanofficerordinancewasenactedat
atimewhentheMissouriConstitutiondidnotpermitacountytoenactordinancesthat
appliedwithinincorporatedmunicipalities.
TheCountyadmitsthatthetrespassingandinterferencewithanofficerordinances
that it has charged Mr. Reilly with violating have no application within the City of
Ferguson. The County also concedes that it lacks the legislative authority to enact a
trespassingorinterferencewithanofficerordinancethatwouldapplywithintheCityof
Ferguson.TheCounty,however,arguesthattheSt.LouisCountyMunicipalCourtmay
exercise jurisdiction over alleged county ordinance violations based on conduct that
occurredoutsideofitsjurisdictionunderpurportedemergencypowers.TheCountys
unprecedented assertion of emergency powers to expand the municipal courts
jurisdictioninfurtheranceofitsmisguidedpursuittoprosecuteMr.Reillyhasnobasisin
law. It also contravenes the St. Louis County Charter and ordinances, the Missouri
Constitutions restrictions on counties powers to regulate conduct within incorporated
municipalities,andbasicprinciplesofdueprocess.
Respondents denial of Mr. Reillys Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
subjects Mr. Reilly to potential imprisonment on unconstitutional and lawless charges
pending in a court without jurisdiction and violates his fundamental due process rights
that are guaranteed by the Missouri and United States Constitutions. Mr. Reilly

respectfully submits that Respondents failure to dismiss the Countys ordinance


violation charges is an exercise of extrajurisdictional power that should be corrected
throughanextraordinarywrit.
FACTUALANDPROCEDURALBACKGROUND
Relator,RyanReilly,isareporterforTheHuffingtonPostwhowasinFerguson,
Missouri on August 13, 2014, to cover the protests following the shooting death of
Michael Brown. Mr. Reilly was engaged in constitutionally protected newsgathering
activities when he was arrested by St. Louis County and Ferguson police officers in a
McDonalds restaurant at 9131 West Florissant Avenue, in the City of Ferguson. Mr.
Reillyandanotherreporterarrestedintherestaurant,WesleyLoweryofTheWashington
Post,1wereturnedovertothecustodyoftheFergusonPoliceDepartmentandtransported
totheFergusonjail.Shortlythereafter,theFergusonChiefofPolice,ThomasJackson,
orderedthatMr.ReillyandMr.Lowerybereleasedwithoutcharges.Thenextday,both
President Obama and thenAttorney General Eric Holder commented on the serious
constitutional issues raised by the reporters arrests. The City of Ferguson never filed
anychargesagainstMr.Reilly.
Nearly one year later, on August 5, 2015, St. Louis County filed an information
against Mr.Reilly, charging him with one count of trespassing in violation of St. Louis
County Revised Ordinance No. 8216, 716.150, and one count of interfering with an

Mr. Lowery has contemporaneously filed a Petition for a Writ of Prohibition or,

Alternatively,MandamusonthesamegroundsasthoseassertedinMr.Reillyspetition.

officer in performance of his duty in violation of St. Louis County Revised Ordinance
No.4866,701.110.Ex.1,Information.
OnOctober12,2015,Mr.Reillyfiledhismotiontodismissonthebasisthatthe
ordinances at issue have no application to conduct occurring within incorporated
municipalities, such as the City of Ferguson. Ex. 2, Motion to Dismiss. Mr. Reillys
motionarguedthatbecausetheordinancesthatMr.Reillywaschargedwithviolatingdo
not apply to conduct alleged to have occurred in the City of Ferguson, the St. Louis
CountyMunicipalCourtlackedjurisdictionandtheCountysinformationfailedtostate
an ordinance violation. The motion explained that application of county ordinances to
incorporated areas violated the Missouri Constitution, which restricts the manner in
whichacountymayexercisepowerwithinanincorporatedmunicipality.Id.
OnNovember18,2015,theCountyfileditsresponse.Ex.3,St.LouisCountys
Mem.inOpp.toDefsMot.toDismiss.TheCountyconcededthatthetrespassingand
interferencewithanofficerordinancesdonotapplywithinincorporatedmunicipalities.
ItalsoconcededthatSt.LouisCountyscharterlimitedtheCountyslegislativepowerto
enforceitstrespassingandinterferencewithanofficerordinancestounincorporatedareas
of the county. Id. at 3. The County instead argued that its purported emergency
powersjustifieditsunprecedentedjurisdictionaloverreach.Id.at6.TheCountyclaims
thatitcanawarditselfjurisdictionovernonoffenseswhereveritchoosestodoso.
Mr.ReillyfiledhisreplyonNovember23,2015.Ex.4,ReplyinSupp.ofRyan
Reillys Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. The reply reasoned that the legal
authority the County relied on to support its emergency powers argument does not

providetheCountyCounselorortheSt.LouisCountyMunicipalCourtwiththepowerto
alterthetermsoftheCountysordinancesorpursueanextrajurisdictionalprosecution.
The reply further explained that the Countys emergency powers argument fails
because there was no declared state of emergency in Ferguson when Mr. Reilly was
arrested on August 13, 2014, and there was no continuing emergency when Mr. Reilly
waschargednearlyoneyearlater.Eveniftherehadbeenadeclaredstateofemergency,
theCountycannotsimplydeclarenewcriminaloffenseswithoutnotice.
RespondentheardoralargumentonMr.ReillysmotiononNovember23,2015.
In an order dated January 11, 2016, and received by mail by Mr. Reillys counsel on
January 19, 2016, Respondent denied Mr. Reillys Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
JurisdictionforthereasonsoutlinedinSt.LouisCountysMemoranduminOpposition
toDefendantsMotiontoDismiss.Ex.5,January11,2016Order.
STANDARDOFREVIEW
The standard of review for writs of prohibition and mandamus is abuse of
discretion.Stateexrel.CollectorofWinchesterv.Jamison,357S.W.3d589,592(Mo.
banc 2012). An extraordinary writ is appropriate to prevent an abuse of judicial
discretion, to avoid irreparable harm to a party, or to prevent the exercise of extra
jurisdictionalpower.Stateexrel.UnionElec.Co.v.Dolan,256S.W.3d77,81(Mo.
banc2008).Where,ashere,thecourtiswhollywantinginjurisdictiontoproceedinthe
case, appeal is not an adequate remedy because any action by the court is without
authority and causes unwarranted expense and delay to the parties involved. State ex
rel.T.J.H.v.Bills,504S.W.2d76,79(Mo.Banc1974).

A writ of prohibition will lie where there is a usurpation of power because the
trial court lacks either personal or subject matter jurisdiction or to remedy a clear
excessofjurisdictionorabuseofdiscretionsuchthatthelowercourtlacksthepowerto
actascontemplated.Stateexrel.Chassaingv.Mummert,887S.W.2d573,577(Mo.
1994)seealsoStateexrel.St.CharlesCty.v.Cunningham,401S.W.3d493,495(Mo.
2013), as modified (Apr. 30, 2013). In addition, the Missouri Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that prohibition may be appropriate to prevent unnecessary,
inconvenient, and expensive litigation. State ex rel. CocaCola Co. v. Nixon, 249
S.W.3d855,860(Mo.banc2008)(citationomitted).Awritofmandamusisappropriate
whereacourthasexceededitsjurisdictionorauthorityandthereisnoremedythrough
appeal.Stateexrel.Poucherv.Vincent,258S.W.3d62,64(Mo.Banc2008)(internal
quotationomitted).
When a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot take any other action
besides its inherent power to dismiss. Bacon v. Dir. of Revenue, State of Mo., 948
S.W.2d 266, 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). Lack of jurisdiction or the failure of the
information to charge an ordinance violation shall be noticed by the court at any time
during the pendency of the proceeding. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 37.51 see also R.S.Mo.
66.010.1(limitingacountymunicipalcourtsjurisdictiontojurisdictionoverviolations
ofthatcountysordinances).

LEGALARGUMENT
RespondentabusedhisdiscretionindenyingMr.Reillysmotiontodismissandin
continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the county ordinance charges filed against Mr.
Reilly in St. Louis County Municipal Court. Respondents order denying Mr. Reillys
motion stated only that the motion was denied for the reasons outlined in St. Louis
Countys Memorandum in opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss. Ex. 5. In
adopting wholesale the Countys arguments, Respondents order authorized an
unconstitutionalandlawlessprosecutioninacourtthatlacksjurisdiction.
In order for conduct to constitute a violation of the Countys trespassing or
interferencewithanofficerordinance,theconductmustoccurinanunincorporatedarea
ofSt.LouisCounty.ThisrequirementissetforthintheplainlanguageoftheCountys
trespassing ordinance. The same limitation implicitly applies to the Countys
interference with an officer ordinance, which was adopted at a time when it was
unconstitutional for the County to enact an ordinance that applied to conduct within an
incorporatedmunicipality.Itisundisputedthattheallegedconductthatformsthebasis
for the charges against Mr. Reilly is alleged to have occurred in the City of Ferguson,
which is an incorporated municipality. The Countys information fails to charge an
ordinanceviolation,andtheSt.LouisCountyMunicipalCourtlacksjurisdiction.
Further, the Countys extrajurisdictional prosecution of Mr. Reilly violates the
Missouri Constitution. Article VI, 18(c) prohibits St. Louis County from enforcing
county ordinances within incorporated municipalities, like the City of Ferguson. St.
Louis County has not taken the constitutionally required legislative action necessary to

extend its jurisdictional reach to conduct that occurs in an incorporated municipality.


Accordingly, its attempt to prosecute Mr. Reilly for ordinance violations premised on
conduct that occurred entirely within the City of Ferguson violates the Missouri
Constitution.
NoneoftheargumentsintheCountysbriefing,whichRespondentadoptedasthe
basis for his order, overcomes the fundamental defects in the Countys charges against
Mr. Reilly. The Countys reliance on purported emergency powers does not confer
jurisdictionontheSt.LouisCountyMunicipalCourt.AlthoughtheCountypointstoa
statutethatrelatestotheabilityofemergencyresponders,suchaspoliceandfirefighters,
torespondtorequestsformutualaidassistance,itisirrelevant.Noemergencyhadbeen
declared in Ferguson when Mr. Reilly was arrested, nor a year later when he was
charged.NothingintheemergencyresponderstatuteauthorizestheCountyCounselorto
confer jurisdiction on the St. Louis County Municipal Court. The Countys argument
that McDonalds location along a countyowned arterial road somehow confers
jurisdiction within the municipality also fails. There is simply no basis for such an
extensionoftheCountysjurisdictionalreach.
AnextraordinarywritiswarrantedbecausetheSt.LouisCountyMunicipalCourt
lacks jurisdiction over the charges against Mr. Reilly and should have dismissed them.
Themunicipalcourthasacted,andcontinuestoact,inclearexcessofitsjurisdictionand
has allowed the County to proceed with a prosecution that violates its own charter and
ordinances, as well as the Missouri Constitution. Mr. Reillys continued prosecution
violates his fundamental due process rights and subjects him to expensive and

inconvenient litigation in a court without jurisdiction. A writ of prohibition or,


alternatively, a writ of mandamus, is warranted to correct Respondents abuse of
discretion.
I. TheSt.LouisCountyMunicipalCourtHasNoJurisdictionOverSt.Louis
CountyTrespassingandInterferencewithanOfficerChargesBasedon
ConductAllegedtoHaveOccurredWithintheCityofFerguson.
Mr. Reillys prosecution is unconstitutional and has no basis in law because the
ordinanceshehasbeenchargedwithviolatingdonotapplytoconductoccurringwithin
incorporatedmunicipalities.Thetrespassingandinterferencewithanofficerordinances
applyonlyinunincorporatedareasofSt.Louisandhavenoapplicationtoconductwithin
theCityofFerguson.TheCountysattempttoapplytheordinancestoconductallegedto
have occurred in the City of Ferguson also violates Article VI, 18(c) of the Missouri
Constitution,whichspecificallylimitsthepowersoftheCountytoadoptordinancesthat
purporttoapplywithinincorporatedmunicipalities.
A. TheOrdinancesatIssueDoNotApplytoConductAllegedtoHaveOccurred
inFerguson.
TheCountyordinancesMr.Reillyhasbeenchargedwithviolatingapplyonlyin
the unincorporated areas of St. Louis County. The County admits it has no legislative
authoritytoapplyitstrespassingandinterferencewithanofficerordinancestoconductin
theCityofFerguson.Thisconclusionisevidentfromtheordinancesthemselves.
The St. Louis County trespassing ordinance is set forth in 716.150. Ex. 7,
Excerpt of Chapter 716 of the Revised Ordinances of St. Louis County. Chapter 716

expresslyprovidesthat[t]heprovisionsofSections716.040through716.180shallapply
totheareaofSt.LouisCountyoutsideincorporatedcities,towns,andvillages.Id.,
716.020 (Scope) (emphasis added). In charging Mr. Reilly with a violation of the
countytrespassingordinance,theCountyhasignoredthejurisdictionalrestrictionthatthe
unambiguouslanguageofitsownordinanceimposes.
Theinterferencewithanofficerordinance,setforthin701.110,alsoisrestricted
to conduct in unincorporated areas. Ex. 8, Excerpt of Chapter 710 of the Revised
Ordinances of St. Louis County, 710.110. When that ordinance was adopted on
November 4, 1968, the County was prohibited from enacting legislation applicable to
incorporatedcities.InNovember1968,ArticleVI,18(c)oftheMissouriConstitution
explicitly limited the Countys ability to exercise legislative power to the part of the
county outside incorporated cities. Ex. 9, MO. CONST. art. VI, 18(c) (pre1970
amendment version) (emphasis added).2 It follows therefore that 701.110, which has
neverbeenamended,isnecessarilylimitedtounincorporatedareasofSt.LouisCounty.
Thechapterofthecountycodeinwhichtheinterferencewithanofficerordinance
issetforthconfirmsthattheordinanceonlyappliestoconductinunincorporatedareasof
St. Louis County. The ordinance appears in Chapter 701, which relates to the

ItwasnotuntiltwoyearslaterthattheMissouriConstitutionwasamendedtoallowfor

the possibility that a county charter could vest the county council with the ability to
exerciselegislativepowerwithinincorporatedmunicipalitieswhencertainrequirements
aremet.SeeMO.CONST.art.VI,18(c).

10

Department of Police. Ex. 8. This is a subject matter area for which the Countys
charterexpresslylimitsitspowertoenactordinancestothepartofthecountyoutside
incorporatedcities.Ex.10,St.LouisCountyCharterof1979,2.180.23.
Because the two ordinances at issue do not apply to alleged conduct within the
incorporated City of Ferguson, the Countys information fails to state an ordinance
violation,andtheSt.LouisMunicipalCourthasnojurisdictionoverthecharges.
B. TheCountysAttempttoApplyTheseOrdinancestoConductAllegedto
HaveOccurredinFergusonViolatestheMissouriConstitution.
TheCountysprosecutionofMr.ReillyviolatestheMissouriConstitution.Under
theMissouriConstitution,acountychartermayprovideforthevestingandexerciseof
county legislative power pertaining to services and functions in the part of the county
outside incorporated cities. MO. CONST. art. VI, 18(c) (Provisions authorized in
countychartersparticipationbycountyingovernmentofotherlocalunits).Undera
1970amendmenttoArticleVI,18(c)oftheMissouriConstitution,thecountycharter
may also vest the county with legislative power over matters throughout the entire
countyaswellasoutsideincorporatedmunicipalities,butonlyprovidedthatanysuch
charterprovisionshallsetforththelimitswithinwhichthemunicipalitiesmayexercise
thesamepowercollaterallyandextensively.Id.seealsoChesterfieldFireProtection
Dist.v.St.LouisCty,645S.W.2d367,372(Mo.banc1983)(Thisprovisionisdesigned
to eliminate confusion when the County begins providing a service or function which
mayalsobeprovidedbyamunicipality.).

11

TheSt.LouisCountyCharterdoesnotpurporttoextendtheCountyslegislative
powers throughout the entire county such that the County and incorporated
municipalities exercise the same power coextensively. Rather, consistent with the
constitutional limitations described above, the St. Louis County Charter provides the
county council with the authority to [e]xercise legislative power pertaining to public
health,policeandtraffic,buildingconstruction,andplanningandzoning,inthepartof
the county outside incorporated cities. Ex. 10, 2.180.23 (emphasis added). Notably,
thislanguageistakendirectlyfromthepreamendmentversionofArticleVI,18(c)of
theMissouriConstitution.Ex.9.Thecharterdoesnotvestthecountycouncilwiththe
authoritytoexerciselegislativepowerpertainingtothesetopicswithinincorporatedareas
ofthecounty.Thosemattersarereservedforeachincorporatedmunicipalitytoaddress.
InMr.Reillyscase,therelevantmunicipality,theCityofFerguson,hasitsown
police force and has enacted ordinances regulating trespassing and interference with
police officers. See Ex. 11, Excerpt of Code of Ordinances of the City of Ferguson,
Missouri,2963(trespassinthefirstdegree)2964(trespassintheseconddegree)
2916(failuretocomplywithorderofpoliceofficer)2919(obstructinggovernment
operations). Ferguson has created its own municipal court to hear and determine all
casesinvolvingviolationsof[its]Charter,thisCodeandtheotherordinancesofthecity.
Id.,2214.TheCityofFergusondeterminedthatnoordinanceviolationchargeswould
befiledagainstMr.Reilly.TheCountyhasnoauthoritytosecondguessthatdecision.
TheCountyhasneveramendeditschartertoprovideforlegislativepowertoenact
policeordinancesthatwouldapplywithinincorporatedmunicipalitiesortosetforththe

12

limits within which the municipalities may exercise the same power to regulate the
conductthatthetrespassingandinterferencewithanofficerordinancestarget.St.Louis
Countys failure to enact such a charter amendment makes clear that the application of
theCountystrespassingandinterferencewithanofficerordinancestoconductallegedto
haveoccurredintheCityofFergusonviolatestheMissouriConstitution.
II. NoneoftheCountysCitedAuthoritiesProvideaBasisforJurisdiction.
The County concedes that the trespassing and interference with an officer
ordinancesdonotapplywithintheCityofFerguson.Ex.3at3.TheCounty,however,
arguesthattheCountyslegislativepowerunderMissourilawisirrelevanttothepresent
case. Id. Recognizing that its own charter and ordinances fail to provide the County
withthepowertoenforcethetwoordinancesatissuewithinincorporatedmunicipalities,
theCountyinsteadpointstoanassortmentofauthoritiesinanattempttoidentifysome
basis for the St. Louis County Municipal Courts jurisdiction. All of the Countys
argumentsfail.
A. TheCountysClaimedEmergencyResponsePowersDoNotProvidea
BasisforJurisdiction.
The County contends that the County Counselor may unilaterally confer
jurisdiction on the St. Louis County Municipal Court through his exercise of imagined
emergency powers. The Countys view that the County Counselor may create
jurisdiction where there is none has no support and violates the Missouri Constitution,
ArticleVI,18(c).Italsoviolatesthebasicrequirementsofdueprocess.

13

The Countys emergency powers argument has no basis in fact or law. The
CountyreliesonR.S.Mo.44.090toarguethattheSt.LouisCountyMunicipalCourt
mayexercisejurisdictionhere.Thestatuteplainlystatesthatitappliesonlyatthetime
ofsignificantemergency.R.S.Mo.44.090.3seealsoR.S.Mo.44.090.1(Intimeof
emergencyitshallbethedutyofeachlocalorganizationforemergencymanagementto
renderassistance....)44.090.4(Whenrespondingtomutualaidoremergencyaid
requests . . . .) R.S.Mo. 44.010.6 (defining emergency as any state of emergency
declared by proclamation of the governor, or by resolution of the legislature). There
wasnodeclaredstateofemergencyintheCityofFergusononAugust13,2014,when
Mr.Reillywasarrested.Butevenif,astheCountyhasargued,adeclaredemergency
isnotrequiredtoinvokepowersunder44.090,therecanbenoquestionthattherewas
noemergencywhentheCountyfileditsbaselesschargesagainstMr.Reillynearlyayear
after the conduct at issue is alleged to have occurred. Likewise, there is no current
emergencyasthecaseremainspendinginSt.LouisCountyMunicipalCourt.
Inaddition,44.090doesnotapplytotheCountyCounselorsOfficeortheSt.
LouisCountyMunicipalCourt.Section44.090addresses[m]utualaidagreementsand
its provisions relate to actions taken by certain public safety agencies. The public
safety agencies included within the statute are fire service organizations, law
enforcement agencies, emergency medical service organizations, public health and
medical personnel, emergency management officials, infrastructure departments, public
works agencies and those other agencies, organizations, departments, and specialized
emergency response teams that have personnel with special skills or training that are

14

needed to provide services during an emergency, public safety need, or disaster . . . .


R.S.Mo. 44.090.7. The statute plainly applies to emergency responders, not to St.
Louis County attorneys or the municipal court. There is simply no such thing as an
emergencyprosecutionoranemergencyexpansionofacourtsjurisdiction.
The emergency responder statute that the County relies on does not apply to the
CountyCounselorsdecisiontochargeMr.Reillywithordinanceviolationsmorethan11
months after any state of emergency had ended. Similarly, the emergency responder
statutedoesnotapplytoaSt.LouisCountyMunicipalCourtJudgesdecisiontopreside
overanordinanceviolationcaseayearandahalfaftertheFergusonprotestsconcluded.
B. A County Police Officers Authority to Arrest Does Not Confer
JurisdictionontheSt.LouisCountyMunicipalCourt.
The County contends that that it would be illogical to conclude that its
municipalcourtlacksjurisdictionoverallegedcountyordinanceviolationsthatarebased
onconductallegedtohaveoccurredintheCityofFergusonbecause[l]awenforcement
necessarilyincludesbotharrestandprosecution.Ex.3at5.EvenifMr.Reillysarrest
was lawful which Mr. Reilly denies3 it does not follow that St. Louis County may
chargeMr.Reillywithcountyordinanceviolations.TheissueofwhereSt.LouisCounty

Mr. Reilly does not dispute the general proposition that St. Louis County Police may

makearrestsinthecourseofprovidingassistancepursuanttoamutualaidagreement,but
deniesthathisarrestwaslawfulunderthecircumstancesatissueinthiscase.

15

PoliceOfficersmaymakearrestsisentirelydistinctfromwhetheracourthasjurisdiction
overachargedordinanceviolation.
According to the County, the St. Louis County Police officers who arrested Mr.
ReillywereactinginresponsetoarequestformutualaidfromtheCityofFerguson.The
investigative report that St. Louis County Police prepared identifies Ferguson as the
jurisdiction for whom the report was prepared. Ex. 4 (St. Louis County Police
Department Investigative Report noting the report is For Jurisdiction: Ferguson,
attached as Exhibit 2 thereto). Following Mr. Reillys arrest, St. Louis County police
remanded him to an officer of the Ferguson Police Department. Id. (Excerpt of
InvestigativeReport,attachedasExhibit3thereto).Mr.ReillywastakentotheFerguson
jail, and the Ferguson Police Chief gave the order to release him from custody without
charges. These facts make clear that the officers involved understood that the City of
FergusonhadjurisdictiontochargeMr.Reilly.ItisonlytheCountysdispleasurewith
theCityofFergusonsdecisionnottofilechargesagainstMr.Reillythathasgivenrise
totheCountysmisguidedpursuittoprosecuteMr.Reillydespiteitslackofjurisdiction.4

More than 50 law enforcement agencies were involved in the police response in

FergusonbetweenAugust9,2014throughAugust25,2014.SeeEx.4(U.S.Department
of Justice, AfterAction Assessment of the Police Response to the August 2014
Demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri at p. XIII, attached as Exhibit 1 thereto). The
Countyapparentlybelievesanyofthese50citiesorcountieswouldbefreetoprosecute
individualsarrestedwithintheCityofFergusonbytheirofficersunderthatjurisdictions

16

Thereisnoabsenceofpowertoprosecutehere.Rather,thepartywiththepower
tobringchargesformunicipalordinanceviolationsrelatingtoconductwithintheCityof
Ferguson the Ferguson Municipal Prosecutor has declined to bring charges against
Mr. Reilly. Mr. Reilly was released from the Ferguson Police Department at the
direction of the Ferguson Police Chief without ever being booked. Any charging
decision related to a municipal ordinance violation belonged to the City of Ferguson.
TheSt.LouisCountyCounselorhasnoauthoritytosubstitutehisjudgmentforthatofthe
Fergusonprosecutororapplythecountysordinancestoconductthatoccurredwithinthe
CityofFerguson.
C. The Location of the McDonalds on an Arterial Roadway Does Not
ProvideaBasisforJurisdiction.
The County alternatively argues that the St. Louis County Municipal Court has
jurisdictionbecausetheallegedconductoccurredwithinaMcDonaldsrestaurantthatis
located along a countyowned arterial road. The County does not claim that either the
trespassing or interference with an officer ordinance applies within buildings located
along arterial roadways within the City of Ferguson. Instead, it vaguely asserts that to
findnojurisdictionherewouldpreventtheprotectionoflivesandpropertyonanything
buttheCountyarterialroaditself.Ex.3,at6.Thisargumentfails.

ownmunicipalordinancesintheirowncourt.Sucharesultwouldbeabsurd,aswellas
unconstitutional.

17

AstheCountyundoubtedlyknows,statelawvestslawenforcementofficerswith
the authority to respond to an emergency situation5 outside the boundaries of the
politicalsubdivisionfromwhichsuchpeaceofficersauthorityisderived,andSt.Louis
Countypoliceofficersmayarrestpersonswhoviolateanyprovisionofstatelawwithin
theboundariesofanycountyofthefirstclassificationorofanycitynotwithinacounty.
R.S. Mo. 70.820.1, 70.820.5. Jurisdictional limitations placed on county and
municipal ordinances do nothing to prevent the Countys officers from protecting lives
andpropertyormakingarrestsforviolationsofstatelaw.Asexplainedabove,theissue
ofwheretheCountysofficersmaymakearrestsisirrelevanttothequestionofwhomay
prosecutethosearrestsunderwhichlawsandinwhichcourt.
D. The County Charter Does Not Provide a Blanket Grant of Authority to
theCountyCounselortoExpandtheSt.LouisCountyMunicipalCourts
Jurisdiction.
Finally, the County argues that Article I, 1.030 of the county charter, which
relatesgenerallytothepowersoftheCounty,providesabasisforjurisdictionbecauseit

An emergency situation is defined as any situation in which the law enforcement

officerhasareasonablebeliefthatacrimeisabouttobecommitted,isbeingcommitted,
or has been committed involving injury or threat of injury to any person, property, or
governmental interest and such officers response is reasonably necessary to prevent or
end such emergency situation or mitigate the likelihood of injury involved in such
emergencysituation.R.S.Mo.70.820.3.

18

gives the County all powers possible for a county to have under the constitution and
laws of Missouri. Ex. 3 at 4. Section 1.030 is not a blanket grant of authority that
individualcountydepartmentsmayusetoseizewhateverpowerstheydeemexpedientat
aparticularmoment.Instead,itspecifies,[a]llpowersshallbecarriedintoexecutionas
providedbythischarterorbylaw,butifnosuchprovisionismadethenbyordinance.
Ex.10,1.030.TheCountyidentifiesnoprovisioninthecharter,law,orordinancesthat
allows the County Counselor to engage in extrajurisdictional prosecutions or that
provides the St. Louis County Municipal Court with the authority to act outside of its
definedjurisdiction.
TheMissouriConstitutionspecifiesthatacountymaynotexerciseitslegislative
power within any incorporated municipality unless its charter contains a specific
provision that set[s] forth the limits within which the municipalities may exercise the
samepowercollaterallyandcoextensively.MO.CONST.Art.VI,18(c).Itisundisputed
that the St. Louis County Charter contains no provision setting forth the limits within
whichtheCountyanditsincorporatedmunicipalitiesmaycollaterallyandcoextensively
regulatetheconductthatwouldsupportchargesoftrespassingandinterferencewithan
officer.
III.

AWritofProhibitionorMandamusisWarranted.

TheordinancesMr.Reillyhasbeenchargedwithviolatingdonotapplywithinthe
City of Ferguson, and the St. Louis County Municipal Court has no jurisdiction over
these lawless charges. Mr. Reillys continued prosecution violates the Missouri
Constitutions restrictions on the manner in which counties may exercise power within

19

incorporated municipalities, violates the due process guarantees of the Missouri and
United States Constitutions, and subjects Mr. Reilly to expensive and inconvenient
litigation in a court without jurisdiction. Respondents denial of Mr.Reillys motion to
dismisswasanabuseofdiscretionandanunconstitutionalexerciseofextrajurisdictional
powerthatrequirestheissuanceofanextraordinaryremedialwrit.
A. AWritShouldIssueBecausetheMunicipalCourtLacksJurisdiction.
Appealisnotanadequateremedy[w]here,ashere,thecourtiswhollywantingin
jurisdictiontoproceedwiththecase.T.J.H.,504S.W.2dat79.Asexplainedindetail
above, the county ordinances Mr. Reilly has been charged with violating have no
applicationtoconductallegedtohaveoccurredwithintheCityofFerguson.Neitherthe
County charter nor its ordinances provide the County with the authority to apply the
trespassing and interference with an officer ordinances to conduct within the City of
Ferguson. The County admits this, but claims that the unambiguous terms of its
ordinances are irrelevant. The authorities the County cites, however, have no
applicationhereandprovidenobasisfortheCountyCounselortoexpandthejurisdiction
of the St. Louis County Municipal Court. Further, Mr. Reillys continued prosecution
violates not only the Countys ordinances and charter, but also the Missouri
Constitutions restrictions on the manner in which counties may exercise power within
incorporatedmunicipalities.

20

B. A Writ Should Issue Because the Countys Continued Prosecution


ViolatesMr.ReillysDueProcessRights.
The charges in this case have been filed in clear violation of Mr. Reillys due
process rights under the Missouri Constitution, Article I, 10, and under the United
States Constitution. Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional
jurisprudencedictatethatapersonreceivefairnotice...oftheconductthatwillsubject
himtopunishment....CityofSt.Petersv.Roeder,466S.W.3d538,548(Mo.2015)
quotingBMWofN.Am.,Inc.v.Gore,517U.S.559,574(1996).Mr.Reillycouldnot
havehadfairnoticethatanyconductthattookplacewithintheCityofFergusonwould
subjecthimtopunishmentunderSt.LouisCountyordinances,astheCountyitselfadmits
theordinancesdonotapplywithinincorporatedmunicipalities.Allowingaprosecutorto
selectivelydeterminethatanordinancehasapplicationinageographicareawhereitdoes
notisaviolationofthefairnoticerequiredbythedueprocessclauseoftheMissouriand
UnitedStatesConstitutions.
The Countys unprecedented decision to file charges against Mr. Reilly in St.
LouisCountyMunicipalCourtalsoviolatesMr.Reillysproceduraldueprocessrightsby
exposinghimtogreaterpenaltiesthanavailableunderstatelawchargeswhileatthesame
time depriving him of basic rights to conduct discovery. The St. Louis County
trespassingordinanceviolationchargeagainstMr.Reillyispunishablebyuptooneyear
imprisonment, but a violation of the parallel state trespassing statute is a class B
misdemeanorpunishableonlybyamaximumofsixmonthsimprisonment.CompareSt.
Louis County Ordinances, 716.180 (providing penalties for violation of 716.150)

21

withR.S.Mo.569.140(trespassinthefirstdegree)R.S.Mo.558.011.1(sentenceof
imprisonment,terms)seealsoEx.11,292(Fergusonordinanceviolationspunishable
by a maximum of three months imprisonment). Even more significantly, there is no
charge under state law that criminalizes the same conduct as the countys broad
interference with an officer ordinance, which makes it unlawful to interfere in any
manner with a police officer . . . or to obstruct him in any manner whatsoever while
performinganyduty.6Ex.8,701.110.
Atthesametime,thefactthatthismatterwasfiledinmunicipalcourtratherthan
statecourthasdeprivedMr.Reillyofcriticaldiscoverytowhichhewouldotherwisebe
entitled.RespondenthasrefusedtopermitMr.Reillytoengageinbasicdiscovery,such
as taking the depositions of the officers who arrested him. The right of criminal
defendants to depose the governments witnesses against them is wellestablished in
Missouri law. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 25.12 State v. Scott, 647 S.W.2d 601, 606 (Mo. App.
W.D. 1983) (Rights of discovery provided criminal defendants by Rule 25 have
constitutionalunderpinningrootedindueprocess.).Mr.Reillysoughttodeposethe6
individualstheCountyhadidentifiedaspotentialwitnessesattrial.TheCountyoffered
toallowfourdepositions.OnOctober6,2015,however,Respondentheldthatdiscovery
inmunicipalcourtwassolelyinthecourtsdiscretionanddeniedMr.Reillysrequestfor

AtthesametimeMr.Reillyfiledhisjurisdictionalmotion,hefiledamotiontodismiss

theinterferencechargebecausethecountysinterferenceordinanceisunconstitutionally
vagueandoverbroad.Thatmotionremainspending.

22

depositions in its entirety. Ex. 12, October 6, 2015 Order. This abuse of discretion
compounds the abuse of discretion that Respondent committed in denying Mr. Reillys
motiontodismiss.
C. AWritShouldIssuetoPreventUnnecessary,Expensive,andInconvenient
Litigation.
Mr.Reillyhasbeenlitigatingthiscaseformorethansevenmonths,withnoendin
sight. He filed his demand for a jury trial on October 12, 2015, Ex. 6, but has been
providednodateforatrialandhasbeentoldthatnotrialwillbepossiblewithinthenext
several months. He faces an inconvenient and costly jury trial, and the County has
opposed his efforts to save resources by joining his matter for trial with that of Mr.
Lowery,who:(1)wasarrestedatthesametimeandinthesamelocation(2)hasbeen
provided a witness list and police report by the County that is identical to the list
providedforMr.Reillysmatterand(3)sharesthesamecounsel.Ex.13,Mot.forJoint
Trial and Mem. In Supp. Ex. 14, Resp. in Opp. to Def.s Mot. for Joint Trial. In
addition, just this month, the municipal court erroneously issued a warrant for Mr.
Reillysarrestbasedonapurportedfailuretoappear,placingMr.Reillyatriskofarrest
and requiring intervention of counsel to have the warrant recalled and withdrawn. Ex.
15,WarrantNotice.
Conclusion
Appealisnotanadequateremedy[w]here,ashere,thecourtiswhollywantingin
jurisdiction to proceed with the case. T.J.H., 504 S.W.2d at 79. Mr. Reilly has been
charged with violating county ordinances that have no application within the City of

23

Ferguson. The Countys unconstitutional and lawless prosecution of Mr. Reilly in


municipalcourthadnolegalbasisfromitsinceptionandhasdraggedonformorethan
seven months in a court with no jurisdiction. Mr. Reilly is not alone in facing extra
jurisdictional charges brought in St. Louis County Municipal Court in connection with
arrestsmadeinCityofFerguson.
Respondents denial of Mr. Reillys Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
was an abuse of discretion and constitutes an unconstitutional exercise of extra
jurisdictionalpower.Anextraordinarywritiswarrantedtocorrectthisclearusurpation
ofjudicialpower.

March24,2016

Respectfullysubmitted,
DOWDBENNETTLLP
By:/s/GabrielE.Gore
EdwardL.Dowd,Jr.,MO#28785
GabrielE.Gore,MO#45416
LisaS.Hoppenjans,MO#63890
7733ForsythBlvd.,Suite1900
St.Louis,Missouri63105
(314)8897300(telephone)
(314)8632111(facsimile)
edowd@dowdbennett.com
ggore@dowdbennett.com
lhoppenjans@dowdbennett.com
CounselforDefendantRyanReilly

24