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DOLORES B. GUICO, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants

vs. PABLO G. BAUTISTA, ET. AL., defendants and
appellees.
Facts:

The petitioner in this case filed a case of partition

despite the existence of debts of the decedent.

Issue:
The petitioner urges that their action for partition and
liquidation may be maintained, notwithstanding that there
are pending obligations of the estate, subject to the taking of
adequate measures either for the payment or the security of
its creditors. Is his contention correct?
Held:
No.
There is no question that the law allows the partition of the
estate of a deceased person by the heirs, extrajudicially or
through an ordinary action for partition, without the filing of a
special proceeding and the appointment of an administrator
for the purpose of the settlement of said estate, but this they
may do only "if the decedent left no debts and the heirs and
legatees are all of age or the minors are represented by their
judicial guardians". The reason is that where the deceased
dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the
appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for
them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to
which they are immediately entitled
The situation is different, however, where the deceased left
pending obligations. In such cases, such obligations must be
first paid or compounded with the creditors before the estate
can be divided among the heirs; and unless they reach an
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amicable settlement as to how such obligations should be

settled, the estate would inevitably be submitted to
administration for the payment of such debts. As compared
to ordinary partition, the regular estate proceedings offer the
advantage of requiring all creditors of the deceased to
disclose themselves and submit their respective claims
within a comparatively short period (12 months under Rule
87, unless claims are contingent), otherwise, they are forever
barred; while in ordinary judicial partitions the creditors'
claims are only extinguished by the expiration of the period
of extinctive prescription. An heir, therefore, may have an
interest in making sure that the share allocated to him will be
freed from invisible claims, so that creditors may not later
appear and initiate the very estate proceedings sought to be
avoided, and he may properly object to an action for partition
on this ground. Unless, therefore, all the heirs are
agreeable to assuming personal liability for all the
decedent's obligations, those known as well as those
undisclosed, regular estate proceedings can not be
avoided.
Appellants claim that there is nothing that would prevent the
trial court from directing and ordering that the pending
obligations of the estate be paid first, or that they should
constitute as liens on the respective shares to be received by
the heirs. In other words, appellants propose that the
administration of the estate for the purpose of paying off its
debts be accomplished right in this partition suit, with either
the Court performing the duties of the administrator, or an
administrator appointed to take care of such debts, as prayed
for in their complaint. Obviously, an ordinary action for
partition can not be converted into a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased, without compliance
with the procedure outlined by Rules 79-90 of the Rules of
Court, especially the provisions on publication and notice to
creditors.

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PEREGRINA REBONG, petitioner vs. FIDEL IBAEZ,
Judge of First Instance of Laguna, respondent.
(A very short case. Need not be digested.
Following is a reproduction of the original case)

The

This is a petition for certiorari against the respondent judge

of the Court of First Instance of Laguna on the ground that
the latter acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion in denying the petition for cancellation of the
lien or annotation on the certificate of title issued to the
petitioner, of a land extrajudicially inherited by him as the
only heir of her predecessors in interest to the effect that the
property described in the title is subject to the claims of the
creditors and other heirs of the deceased Jose Rebong and
Maria Rebong within two years from July 9, 1947, in
accordance with sections 1 and 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court.
The petitioner based her petition on section 112 of Act No.
496 and offered to file a bond of P5,000, the estimated value
of the above mentioned property to answer for such
contingent claims.
The pertinent part of said section 112 of Act No. 496
provides:
"SEC. 112. * * * Any registered owner or other person in
interest may at any time apply by petition to the court, upon
the ground that registered interests of any description,
whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have
terminated and ceased; or that new interests have arisen or
been created which do not appear upon the certificate; * * *
and the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine
the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may
order the entry of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation
of a memorandum upon a certificate or grant any other relief
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upon such terms and conditions, requiring security if

necessary, as it may deem proper; * * *."
According to the above quoted provisions, the court "may
order the entry of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation
of a memorandum upon a certificate or grant any other relief
upon such terms and conditions, requiring security if
necessary," upon application of a registered owner on "the
ground that registered interests of any description, whether
vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated
and ceased, or that new interests have arisen or been
created which do not appear upon the certificate." Applying
these provisions to the present case, it is evident that, since
the registered or annotated contingent interest of the
creditors or other heirs of the petitioner's predecessors in
interest, established by section 4 of Rule 74, has not yet
terminated or ceased, for the period of two years from July 9,
1947, have not yet elapsed, the respondent judge had no
jurisdiction or power to order the cancellation of said lien or
annotation as prayed by the petitioner. Neither section 4,
Rule 74, of the Rules of Court, nor section 112 of Act No. 496
authorizes the substitution of a bond for a lien or registered
interest of any description, whether vested, expedient,
inchoate or contingent, which have not yet terminated or
ceased.
In view of the foregoing, it is plain that the respondent judge
has not acted in excess of jurisdiction nor with grave abuse
of discretion, but in conformity with the law, in denying the
petitioner's petition, and the petition for certiorari is therefore
denied.
Intestate estate of the deceased LUZ Garcia PABLO G.
UTULO, applicant and appellee, vs. LEONA PASION
VIUDA DE GARCIA, oppositor and appellant.
Facts:

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Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, Leona Pasion Vda.

de Garcia, the surviving spouse and the herein
oppositor, was appointed judicial administratrix.
The said deceased left legitimate children, named Juan
Garcia, jr., Patrocinio Garcia and Luz Garcia who, with
the widow, are the presumptive forced heirs.
Luz Garcia married the applicant Pablo G. Utulo and
during the pendency of the administration proceedings
of the said deceased, she died in the said province
without any legitimate descendants, her only forced
heirs being her mother and her husband.
The latter commenced in the same court the judicial
administration of the property of his deceased wife,
stating in his petition that her only heirs were he
himself and his mother-in-law, the oppositor, and that
the only property left by the deceased consisted in the
share due her from the intestate of her father, Juan
Garcia Sanchez, and asking that he be named
administrator of the property of said deceased.
The oppositor (mother of the decdent) objected to the
petition, opposing the judicial administration of the
property of her daughter and the appointment of the
applicant as administrator. She alleged that inasmuch
as the said deceased left no indebtedness, there was
no occasion for the said judicial administration; but she
stated that should the court grant the administration
of the property, she should be appointed the
administratrix thereof inasmuch as she had a better
right than the applicant.

Issues:
1. Is judicial administration is proper in this case?
2. Who has the better right to be the administrator, the
husband or the mother?
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Held:
1. As to the first question, we have section 642 of the Code of
Civil Procedure providing in part that "if no executor is named
in the will, or if a person dies intestate, administration shall
be granted" etc. This provision enunciates the general rule
that when a person dies leaving property in the Philippine
Islands, his property should be judicially administered and
the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator,
in the order established in the section, in case the deceased
left no will, or in case he had left one should he fail to name
an executor therein. This rule, however, is subject to the
exceptions established by sections 596 and 597 of the same
Code, as finally amended. According to the first, when all the
heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the
estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property
without instituting the judicial administration or applying for
the appointment of an administrator. According to the
second, if the property left does not exceed six thousand
pesos, the heirs may apply to the competent court, after the
required publications, to proceed with the summary partition
and, after paying all the known obligations, to partition all the
property constituting the inheritance among themselves
pursuant to law, without instituting the judicial administration
and the appointment of an administrator.
Construing the scope of section 596, this court repeatedly
held that when a person dies without leaving pending
obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are
not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration,
which is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the court. It has been
uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration
and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and
unnecessary proceedings.

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There is no weight in the argument adduced by the appellee
to the effect that his appointment as judicial administrator is
necessary so that he may have legal, capacity to appear in
the intestate of the deceased Juan Garcia Sanchez. As he
would appear in the said intestate by the right of
representation, it would suffice for him to allege in proof of
his interest that he is a usufructuary forced heir of his
deceased wife who, in turn, would be a forced heir and an
interested and necessary party if she were living. In order to
intervene in said intestate and to take part in the distribution
of the property it is not necessary that the administration of
the property of his deceased wife be instituted-an
administration which will take up time and occasion
inconveniences and unnecessary expenses.
2. Since there is no need for judicial administration, there is
no need to determine who has the better right to administer
the estate of the decedent.

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CRESENCIA HERNANDEZ, plaintiff and appellee, VS.

ZACARIAS ANDAL, defendant and appellant. QUIRINO
DIMASACAT, MARIA HERNANDEZ and AQUILINA
HERNANDEZ, intervenors and appellants.
Facts:

Plaintiff and the intervenors were siblings. They

inherited a parcel of land from their father.

The intervenors sold their share to Andal, allegedly for

P150

The plaintiff now sought to repurchase the said parts

of the land. However, Andal refused, even when she
offered a higher price which is P860.

Then, Andal allegedly made a simulated sale back to

the intervenors.

Now, plaintiff sought brought the action to repurchase

the land from Andal.

The intervenors and Andals defense: They said that

there was already partition between the siblings.
According to the facts there was a document of
partition, however it was not presented in trial. (I think
they invoked this defense in order to show that there
was already a termination of the co-ownership,
therefore plaintiffs right to redeem was already
extinguished)

During trial, when the defendant and intervenors tried

to present witnesses to prove such partition, the
counsel of the plaintiff objected invoking the best
evidence rule. The document of partition is the best
evidence of the terms of partition.

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Issues:

ORAL PARTITION ENFORCED IN EQUITY WHEN PERFORMED

The defendant and intervenors now assail that the trial court
was in error in denying the admissibility of their evidence
proving the existence of the partition due to the fact that the
partition should be put into writing. Are their contentions
correct?

On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute

of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when
it has been completely or partly performed.

Held:
Yes.
There is a conflict of authority as to whether an agreement of
partition is such a contract as is required to be in writing
under the statute of frauds. One line of authorities holds the
affirmative view, other authorities say no. The reason for the
rule that excludes partition from the operation of the statute
of frauds is that partition is not a conveyance but simply a
separation and designation of that part of the land which
belongs to each tenant in common. (27 C. J., 206.) The
differences in the conclusions reached are "due perhaps to
varied phraseology of the statutes" in the several states. (40
Amer. Jur., 15.)
APPLICABLE ONLY TO EXECUTORY CONTRACTS.
As enacted in the Philippines, first in section 335 of the
former Code of Civil Procedure, and now in Rule 123, section
21, of the Rules of Court, the law has been uniformly
interpreted in a long line of cases to be applicable to
executory and not to completed or executed contracts. (27 C.
J., 206.) In this jurisdiction performance of the contract takes
it out of the operation of the statute. (Gomez vs. Salcedo, 26
Phil., 485; Almirol and Cario vs. Monserrat, 48 Phil., 67.) The
statute of frauds does not declare the contracts therein
enumerated void and of no legal effect, but only makes
ineffective the action for specific performance. (Almirol and
Cario vs. Monserrat, supra.)
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As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect

the parties, are required to be reduced to writing either as a
condition of jural validity or as a means of providing evidence
to prove the transactions. Written form exacted by the
statute of frauds, for example, "is for evidential purposes
only." (Domalagan vs. Bolifer, 33 Phil., 471.) The Civil Code,
too, requires the accomplishment of acts or contracts in a
public instrument, not in order to validate the act or contract
but only to insure its efficacy so that after the existence of
the acts or contracts has been admitted, the party bound
may be compelled to execute the document. (Hawaiian
Philippine Co. vs. Hernaez, 45 Phil., 746.)
SECTION 1 OF RULE 74, NOT CONSTITUTIVE BUT MERELY
EVIDENTIAL OF PARTITION.
Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no express or clear declaration
that the public instrument therein required is to be
constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent element
of its effectiveness as between the parties. And this Court
had no apparent reason, in adopting this rule, to make the
efficacy of a partition as between the parties de-pendent on
the execution of a public instrument and its registration. The
requirement that a partition be put in a public document and
registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and
at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves
against tardy claims. Note that the last sentence of the
section speaks of debts and creditors. The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice, and this means
notice to others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of
partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does

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not come into play when there are no creditors or the rights
of creditors are not affected. No rights of creditors being
involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter
into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a
plan different from those provided by law.
MARIA VDA. DE REYES, EFREN REYES, ELVIRA REYES,
TIMBOL, ERLINDA REYES-VALERIO, ERNESTO REYES,
ELIZABETH REYES, ALEX, RAFAEL II, EMELINA and
EVELYN, all surnamed REYES, represented by their
mother,MARIA VDA. DE REYES, petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES DALMACIO
GARDIOLA and ROSARTO MARTILLANO, respondents.
Facts:

During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel

of land of approximately 70 hectares, more or less,
located at Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He
sought to bring said land under the operation of the
Torrens
System
of
registration
of
property.
Unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the title having
been issued to him. The application was prosecuted by
his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the administrator of
his property.
In 1936 the above property was surveyed and
subdivided by Gavino's heirs (Exh. "6"). In the
subdivision plan, each resultant lot was earmarked,
indicated for and assigned to a specific heir. It appears
therein that two lots, one of which is Lot No. 1A-14
(Exh. "6-A"), were allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of
Gavino's children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete, the
children thereafter secured tax declarations for their
respective shares.
In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of
Gavino, the original certificate of title for the whole
property-OCT No. 255-was issued. It was, however,

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kept by Juan Poblete, son-inlaw of Marcelo Reyes, who

was by then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino
were not aware of this fact.
On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of
land with an area of 23,431 square meters, more or
less, to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh.
"5"). According to the vendee, this parcel corresponds
to Lot No.1-A-14 of the subdivision plan aforestated.
The deed of sale, however, did not specifically mention
Lot No. I-A-14. The vendee immediately took
possession of the property and started paying the land
taxes therein.
In 1967, the surviving heirs gave effect to the
subdivision plan created on 1936. They formally
partitioned the property. Therefore, the heirs received
their share of this land. Including Rafael Reyes, Jr. Son
of Rafael Sr. TCTs were issued to him representing the
land which should have been received by his father.
Now, the heirs of Rafael Jr. sued Gardiola, saying that
they are the true owners of the land, as shown by the
torrens title over the land.
Gardiolas defense was that he bought the land from
Rafael Sr. and that Rafael Jr. could not have inherited
this land for it was disposed of by his father way
before he inherited it.
The trial court ruled in favor of Rafael Jr.s heirs.
Stating that there was no evidence that the Gavinos
children had a written partition agreement. CA
reversed.
Issue:
Is the CA correct in reversing the trial court?
Held:
No.

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The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made
by the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936, although oral, was
valid and binding. There is no law that requires partition
among heirs to be in writing to be valid.24 In Hernandez vs.
Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court, held that the requirement that a partition
be put in a public document and registered has for its
purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the
protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The
object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to
others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition
not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come
into play when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors
are not affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is
competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an
agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan
different from those provided by law. There is nothing in said
section from which it can be inferred that a writing or other
formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the
partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid. Barcelona, et
al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral
partition is valid and why it is not covered by the Statute of
Frauds: partition among heirs or renunciation of an
inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of
real property for the reason that it does not involve transfer
of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation
or ratification of title or right of property by the heir
renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving
the inheritance. Additionally, the validity of such oral
partition in 1936 has been expressly sustained by this Court
in the Resolution of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811.25
But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partitio
executed in 1936 was not valid for some reason or another,
we would still arrive at the same conclusion for upon the
death of Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs automatically
became co-own, era of his 70-hectare parcel of land. The
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rights to the succession. are transmitted horn the moment of

death of the decedent,26 The estate of the decedent would
then be held in co-ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or coowner may validly dispose of his share or interest in the
property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of
is eventually allotted to him in the division upon termination
of the co-ownership.
In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private
respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is his share in the estate of his
deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the same property which
was eventually adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael Reyes,
Jr., represented in turn by his heirs-petitioners herein-in the
extrajudicial settlement of 1967.
The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share
of Rafael Reyes, Sr. in the estate of Gavino. Petitioners, as
mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael
Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that which Rafael, Jr. could
transmit to them upon his death. The latter never became
the owner of Lot No. 1-A-14 because it was sold by his father
in 1943. The issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of
Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is concerned, was
clearly erroneous because he never became its owner. An
extrajudicial settlement does not create a right in favor of an
heir. As this Court stated in the Barcelona case, 28 it is but a
confirmation or ratification of title or right to property. Thus,
since he never had any title of right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the
mere execution of the settlement did not improve his
condition, and the subsequent registration of the deed did
not create any right or vest any title over the property in
favor of the petitioners as heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr, The latter
cannot give them what he never had before. Nemo dare
potest quod non habet.
There is one more point that should be stressed here.
Petitioners' immediate predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Reyes,

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Jr., never took any action against private respondents from
the time his father sold the lot to the latter. Neither did
petitioners bring any action to recover from private
respondents the owner. ship and possession of the lot from
the time Rafael Reyes, Jr. died. As categorically admitted by
petitioners in their complaint and amended complaint, it was
only in or about September 1969 when, after the delivery of
TCT No. 27257 by Candido Hebron to them, that they
definitely discovered that they were the owners of the
property in question. And yet, despite full knowledge that
private respondents were in actual physical possession of the
property, it was only about thirteen and onehalf (13 1/2)
years later that they decided to file an action for recovery of
possession. As stated earlier, the original complaint was filed
in the trial court on 14 March 1983. There was then
absolutely no basis for the trial court to place the burden on
private respondents to bring an action for reconveyance
within four (4) years from their discovery of the issuance of
the transfer certificate of title in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.
In the matter of the INTESTATE ESTATE of PAZ E.
SIGUION TORRES, Deceased, ALBERTO S. TORRES,
petitioner and appellant vs. CONCHITA TORRES and
ANGEL S. TORRES, oppositors and appellees.
Facts:

Alberto Torres prayed for the issuance of letters of

administration in his favor, for the administration of
Paz Siguion Torres, his father, estate.
Conchita Torres opposed this saying that there was
already an extrajudicial partition between the heirs
pursuant to the rules of court.
Then Alberto then averred that the attempts actually
designate their respective shares had failed, and
properties of considerable value were not included in
the partition.

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He also then averred that there was a P50,000 debt of

the estate
The trial court dismissed Albertos petition.

Issue:
Is the trial court correct in ruling that the judicial settlement
of the estate of the deceased is not necessary in this case?
Held:
Yes.
It appears from the pleadings filed herein that the petition to
place the estate under administration was predicated mainly
on the alleged inability of the heirs to agree on a physical
division of the properties. The alleged existence of an
indebtedness and noninclusion in the list incorporated in the
deed of extrajudicial partition, of certain properties that form
part of the estate, seemed to be merely an afterthought as
the reference to them was made only in the answer to the
opposition and motion for dismissal of the petition, and is riot
made under oath. There is also no allegation as to the
particulars of the debt and the omitted properties sufficient
to identify them. In the circumstances, we agree with the
lower court that a special proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased is not here necessary.
This is not to overlook the allegation that the estate has an
outstanding obligation of P50,000.00. It is to be noted,
however, that appellant, as heretofore observed, did not
specify from whom and in what manner the said debt was
contracted. Indeed, the bare allegation that "the estate has
an existing debt of P50,000.00 from third persons" cannot be
considered a concise statement to constitute a cause of
action. It must be for this reason that the lower court,
notwithstanding the existence of such averment in

G Ricasata|SpecPro|Arroyo
appellant's supplemental answer to the opposition, dismissed
the petition filed by said appellant.
Nor does the unverified statement that there are other
properties, not included in the deed of extrajudicial partition
in the possession of one of the heirs, justify the institution of
an administration proceeding because the same questions
that may arise as to them, viz. the title thereto, and their
partition, if proven to belong to the intestate, can be properly
and expeditiously litigated in an ordinary action of partition.
PEDRO ERMAC, and his children, ELENA, CARLOS,
ANTONIO, LUCIANO', HILARIO, INDALECIO and
FRANCISCA, all surnamed ERMAC, petitioners, vs.
CENON MEDELO and JUDGE HERNANDO PINEDA as
presiding judge of Branch II of the LANAO DEL NORTE
Court of First Instance, respondents.
Facts:

Potenciano Ermac and Anastacia Mariquit died leaving

a parcel of land.
Their heirs filed for the summary settlement of the
estate. They presented a plan of partition.
Pedro Ermac sought to exclude Lot 1327 from the
estate as it belongs to him and his wife. The court
denied it saying that they should file a separate suit.
They filed a separate suit. The probate court approved
the partition despite the objection of Pedro saying that
the court should await the outcome of their separate
suit.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court should have waited for the
outcome of the separate suit?

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Held:
No.
The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons with the least
loss of time. This is specially true with small estates for which
the rules provide precisely a summary procedure dispensing
with the appointment of an administrator together with the
other involved and cumbersome steps ordinarily required in
tha determination of the assets of the deceased and the
persons entitled to inherit therefrom and the payment of his
obligations. Definitely, the probate court is not the best
forum for the resolution of adverse claims of ownership of
any property ostensibly belonging to the decedent's estate.1
While there are settled exceptions to this rule as applied to
regular administration proceedings,2 it is not proper to delay
the summary settlement of a deceased person just because
an heir or a third person claims that certain properties do not
belong to the estate but to him.3 Such claim must be
ventilated in an independent action, and the probate court
should proceed to the distribution of the estate, if there are
no other legal obstacles to it, for after all, such distribution
must always be subject to the results of the suit. For the
protection of the claimant, the appropriate step is to have the
proper annotation of lis pendens entered.
BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA
respondents.
Facts:

Teodoro Tolete died, leaving his wife and nephews and

nieces who are children of his deceased brothers and
sisters.

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His wife executed an affidavit of self-adjudicating

saying that Teodoro had no children or dependents,
neither ascendants or acknowledged natural children,
neither brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces..

Then, his wife sold the property to Sampilo, then

Sampilo sold it to Salacup.

Sinopera instituted estate proceedings asking for

letters of administration. She alleged that Teodoros
wife, Leonicia de Leon has no right to execute the
affidavit of self adjudication for there are other heirs
aside from her.

The trial court ruled in favor of Sinopera. The CA

modified the ruling stating that the affidavit of Leonicia
is null and void, but the subsequent sales are valid
insofar as it is not above Leonicias share from
Teodoros estate.

Issues:
The petitioners now argue that Sinoperas cause of action
has already prescribed because according to the rules of
court, persons deprived of their right due to the partition or
self adjudication must bring their action within two years
from the date of partition or self-adjudication. Is their
contention correct?
Held:
No. The said rule applies only to persons who participated in
the said proceedings and does not prejudice those who did
not have the chance to participate.
We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of
Rule 74. in Section 1, it is required that if there are two or
more heirs, both or all of them should take part in the
10 | P a g e

extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is made more

imperative in the old law (Section 596, Act No. 190) by the
addition of the clause "and not otherwise." By the title of
Section 4, the "distributees and estate" are Indicated was the
persons to answer for right violated by the extrajudicial
settlement. On the other hand, it is also significant that no
mention is made expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial
settlement on persons who did not take part therein or had
no notice or knowledge thereof. There cannot be any doubt
that those who took part or bad knowledge of the
extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to them the
law is clear that if they claim to have been in any manner
,deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the
extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or
interest within the period of two years, and both "the
distributees and estate would be liable to them for such
rights or interest. Evidently, they are the persons who, in
accordance with the provision, may seek to remedy the
prejudice to their rights within, the two-year Period. But as to
those who did not take part in the settlement or had no
notice of the death of the decedent or of the setlement, there
is no direct or express provision, and it is unreasonable and
unjust that they also be required to assert their claims within
the period extend the effects of the settlement to the two
years. To to them, to those who did no t take part or had no
knowledge thereof, without any express legal provision to
that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right to
due Process law.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of exrajudicial
settlement or by affidavit, is ail ex parte proceeding. It
cannot by any reason or logic be contended that such
settlement or distribution would affect third persons who had
no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the
extrajudicialy settlement or affidavit, especially as no
mention of such effect is made, either directly or by
implication. We have examined the two cases cited by

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appellants and there is no similarity at all between the
circumstances on which the ruling therein had been
predicated and those of the case at bar.
The two year rule is applicable only:
(1) to persons who have participated or taken part or
had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in
addition,
(2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have
been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons
or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the
extrajudicial settlement or are represented by
themselves or through guardians.
The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements
because not all the heirs interested have participated in the
extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals having found
that the decedent left, aside from his widow, nephews and
nieces living at the time of his death.
GENOVEVA BELTRAN, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellees,
vs. CORAZON AYSON and FABIAN JIMENEZ, defendants
and appellants.
Facts:

Macario Beltran died. Then, his wife, Corazon Ayson

and Jose de la Cruz executed an deed of partition
apportioning the estate amongst themselves.

Thereafter, nephews and nieces of the deceased

appeared sought to set aside the extra-judicial
partition.

The defendants-appellants now are saying that the

plaintiffs rights has already prescribed because the

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case was filed beyond two years from the date of the
partition.
Issues:
Whether or not the cause of action of the plaintiffs already
prescribed?
Held:
No.
This Court has previously ruled out such contention in the
similar case of Sampilo, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 103
Phil., 70; 55 Off. Gaz., 5772., wherein the case of McMicking
vs.. Sy Con Bieng, supra, was also cited by the appellants
therein:
"* * *the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring
distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial
partition is applicable only (1) to persons who have
participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial
partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section
1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the
persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the
extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or
through guardians.
"The next contention of appellants is that plaintiffs action is
barred by the statute of limitations. The origin of the
provision (Section 4, Rule 74), upon which this contention is
predicated, which is Section 596 of Act No. 190, fails to
support the contention. In the first place, there is nothing
therein, or in its sources, which shows clearly a statute of
limitations and a bar of action against third persons. It is only
a bar against the parties who had taken part in the
extrajudicial proceedings, but not against third persons not
parties thereto. In the second place, the statute of limitations

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is contained in a different chapter of Act No. 190, Chapter XL,
and if Section 596 of the Act had been meant to be a statute
of limitations, it would naturally have been included in the
chapter which defines the statute."
In the instant case, both requirements were not complied
with, because not all the interested heirs have participated in
the extrajudicial settlement, it being admitted that the
deceased left, aside from his widow, appellant Corazon
Ayson, and his half-brother, Jose de la Cruz, nephews, nieces
and a sister living at the time of his death, and that the latter
heirs were not aware of the deed of extrajudicial partition
until shortly before the filing of their complaint (pars. 4 and
6, Stipulation of Facts).
Neither is Section 43, par. 3, of Act 190 (now Article 1146,
New Civil Code), also invoked by appellants, applicable to the
facts of the case. Assuming that there was fraud as the
widow and half-brother of the deceased had declared in the
deed of extrajudicial partition that they are the sole surviving
and exclusive heirs of the late Macario Beltran, it does not
appear that the fouryear period have elapsed when the
action was instituted. It is interesting to note that the court a
quo rejected the contention of appellees that appellant
Corazon Ayson executed the deed of extrajudicial partition
fraudulently and in bad faith, while the parties stipulated that
the appellees were not aware of the deed of extrajudicial
partition until shortly before the filing of their complaint.
LIWALUG AMEROL, MACATANTO AMEROL, TAIB
AMEROL, DIBARATUN AMEROL, DIBARATUN
MATABALAO, MINDALANO DIBARATUN, DIPUNDUGUN
MORO, and MANUCAO MORO, petitioners, vs. MOLOK
BAGUMBARAN, respondent.
Facts:

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Bagumabaran sought to eject the petitioners from the

parcel land registered to his name. He got it through a
free patent and subsequently registered it in his name
obtaining a Torrens title.
The petitioners interposed a counterclaim stating that
Bagumbaran applied for a free patent through fraud,
knowing that the said land was already subject to a
previous application for free patent.
The trial court said that indeed there was fraud,
however, it dismissed the counterclaim of the
petitioners because, according to the trial court, their
action has prescribed. For 4 four years has already
lapsed from the date of the issuance of the Torrens
title. Even though Bagumbaran acquired the property
through fraud, it was adjudicated to him due to
prescription.

Issue:
The petitioners contend that the prescriptive period is 10
years and not 4 years. Therefore, if it is 10 years, their action
can still prosper because they brought the same 9 years after
the issuance of the Torrens title. Is their contention correct?
Held:
Yes.
Indubitably, the act of respondent in misrepresenting that he
was in actual possession and occupation of the property in
question, obtaining a patent and Original Certificate of Title
No. P-466 in his name, created an implied trust in favor of the
actual possessor of the said property.
In this case, the land in question was patented and titled in
respondent's name by and through his false pretenses. Molok
Bagumbaran fraudulently misrepresented that he was the

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occupant and actual possessor of the land in question when
he was not because it was Liwalug Datomanong.
Bagumbaran falsely Pretended that there was no prior
applicant for a free patent over the land but there wasLiwalug Datomanong. By such fraudulent acts, Molok
Bagumbaran is deemed to hold the title of the property in
trust and for the benefit of petitioner Liwalug Datomanong.
Notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title already
issued in the name of respondent, he, even being already the
registered owner under the Torrens system, may still be
compelled under the law to reconvey the subject property to
Liwalug Datomanong. After all, the Torrens system was not
designed to shield and protect one who had committed fraud
or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith. Further,
contrary to the erroneous claim of the respondent,9
reconveyance does not work to set aside and put under
review anew the findings of facts of the Bureau of Lands. In
an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the
transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person's name, to its rightful and legal owner,10 or to one
with a better right. That is what reconveyance is all about.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and
not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of
very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly,
it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based
on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years
from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.16
The only discordant note, it seems, is Balbin vs. Medalla,17
which states that the prescriptive period for a reconveyance
action is four years. However, this variance can be explained
by the erroneous reliance on Gerona vs. de Guzman.18 But in
Gerona, the fraud was discovered on June 25, 1948, hence
Section 43(3) of Act No. 190, was applied, the new Civil Code
13 | P a g e

not coming into effect until August 30,1950 as mentioned

earlier. It must be stressed, at this juncture, that Article 1144
and Article 1456, are new provisions. They have no
counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil
Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis of
the four-year prescriptive period for an action for
reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false
pretenses.
Regarding
the
jurisprudence
invoked
by
the
respondent to support its claim that the 4 year period
applies:
Significantly, the three cases cited by the respondent to
buttress his position and support the ruling of the trial court
have a common denominator, so to speak. The cause of
action assailing the frauds committed and impugning the
Torrens titles issued in those cases, all accrued prior to the
effectivity of the present Civil Code. The accrual of the cause
of action in Fabian was in 1928, in Miguel, February, 1950,
and in Ramirez, 1944. It must be remembered that before
August 30, 1950, the date of the effectivity of the new Civil
Code, the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) governed
prescription. It provided:
SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how limited.-Civil actions other
than for the recovery of real property can only be brought
within the following periods after the right of action accrues:
x x xx x x x x x
3. Within four years: x x x An action for relief on the ground
of fraud, but the right of action in such case shall not be
deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud;
x x xx x x x x x

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In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just as
an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art.
1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation to
reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the
true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Article
1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment.

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