Lecture 21: 19 May

The changing image of the scientific self

Scientists didn't always look like this. Not all scientists look like this now, either.
Wikimedia Commons
Abstract
In the 1950s and 60s the Hungarian physical chemist Michael Polanyi argued that the
prevailing view of science had failed to recognize the crucial role that skill or "tacit
knowledge" plays in scientific practice. Tacit knowledge, for Polanyi, comprises the
know-how that can never be fully articulated, but nonetheless must be acquired, by
every practicing scientist. While Polanyis ideas remained on the margins of
philosophy for many years, they were taken up by Kuhn and by a later generation of
philosophers, sociologists and historians, in exploring the role that particular forms of
cognitive skill or judgment, play in scientific reasoning. The ability to exercise
scientific judgment cannot be understood as following some prescribed set of rules of
logical inference, turning the traditional idea of reason on its head. In this lecture I
draw on much of this work in tracing the changing image of the scientific self, which
emerged since the 1970s, by focusing on the ways in which scientific observation,
experimentation through the use of scientific instruments, and reasoning all depend
on forms of "trained judgment". Such forms of judgment may reflect the
idiosyncrasies of the individual scientist in cases where the scientist must choose

between competing theories. As Kuhn explained, in these cases, empirical evidence is

often not decisive, and other values like simplicity and coherence must come into
play.
Readings
Brown, "Judgment, Role in Science". A Companion to the Philosophy of Science, ed.
W. H. Newton-Smith, Blackwell: Oxford, 2000. 194-202. Print [pdf]
Kuhn, Thomas. "Objectivity, Value Judgment and Theory Choice". The Essential
Tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. 320-339. Print [pdf]