PROGRESS IN SCIENCE VIS A VIS THOMAS KUHN’S

STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS

By ẸHIMWẸNMA, Ẹwaẹnsẹtin Joseph

INTRODUCTION

The advancement of science in recent times has greatly influenced human society in a
way that is unprecedented when compared with other epochs of human history. Scientific
advancement follows a historical progression that some have described as revolutionary, even as
some others see it as a cumulative process. Thomas Kuhn in his Structure of Scientific
Revolutions elaborates on this distinction between the cumulative and revolutionary phases in the
development of science. According to him, the development of science is not uniform but has
alternating ‘normal’ and ‘revolutionary’ (or ‘extraordinary’) phases. 1 Further discussion on the
ideas of Thomas Kuhn would follow subsequently, but suffice it to say at this point that his work
has reverberated in the philosophy of science ever since its publication, 2 so much so that it held
the most important implications about the rationality of science. In what way does scientific
revolution as identified and described by Kuhn, alter our understanding of the rationality of
science? And what are the overall implications for science and philosophy of the revolutionary
ideas of Thomas Kuhn?

In this paper, I attempt to explore the idea of progress in science and how Thomas
Kuhn’s conception of scientific change occurring through revolutions summarily upturned the
notion of science as truth-seeking, where in place of scientific realism, a non-continuous model
of scientific progress is proposed, one having efficient problem solving as its goal. We would
also look at what scientific rationality is all about and how it is affected by Kuhn’s critic of the
traditional views of science, after which I would offer some thoughts by way of an evaluation,
followed by a conclusion.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

1
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962/1970), 35-
42.
2
Alan Chalmers, What Is This Thing Called Science? (Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1976), 100.

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 In order to embark on this enquiry, it is important to begin with a proper clarification of
terms. The most obvious terms to be clarified here are Science, Paradigm, Revolution and
Rationality.

SCIENCE

Science has been defined as a particular discipline or branch of learning, especially one
dealing with measurable or systematic principles rather than intuition or natural ability, it is the
collective discipline of study or learning acquired through the scientific method and the sum of
knowledge gained from such methods and discipline. 3 The scientific method itself is a method of
discovering knowledge about the natural world based on making falsifiable predictions known as
hypotheses. These hypotheses are subjected to empirical testing which leads to a development of
theories that match known data gathered from repeatable physical experimentation. 4 Science
gives us information that enable us to interact successfully with reality and make meaning of the
world, and so we can easily deduce a necessary practicability of science since it gets its meaning
because of its ability to help us solve problems, otherwise science remains a plain concept.
Perhaps it is also necessary to state here that it is inevitable to have science without philosophy,
as science comes to life with human reasoning in philosophy.

PARADIGM

Kuhn speaks of scientific revolution as occurring with a change in paradigm. 5 To

appreciate Kuhn’s application of the term revolution in his work, it is necessary to understand
first his use of this other key term, namely: a paradigm. A paradigm refers to the common
terminology and basic theories of a scientific community and that community’s fundamental
assumptions about methodology and what questions a scientist can legitimately ask. Scientific
research takes place within a paradigm because nature is both huge and complex to be explored

3
http://wiktionary.org
4
http://wiktionary.org
5
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 90.

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randomly.6 The paradigm sets the standards for legitimate work within the science
it governs.7

REVOLUTION

Kuhn’s usage of the term revolution is largely different from a political usage or
understanding of the same term, though there is a bit of similarity. According to him, scientific
revolutions are taken to be those non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an older
paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one. 8 Kuhn explains that just as
a political revolution stems from a growing sense within a segment of the political community,
that existing structures can no longer adequately meet environmental problems which they
created in part, so also a scientific revolution is inaugurated from a growing sense restricted to a
segment of the scientific community, that an existing paradigm has become inadequate in the
exploration of an aspect of nature to which that paradigm was once at the forefront. Hence in
scientific and political progress and development, this sense of malfunction leads to a crisis
which is a prerequisite to revolution.9

RATIONALITY

In what does rationality consist? And more specifically, in what sense is science
considered rational as used in this discourse? This can be answered in three possible ways: first,
science is rational insofar as it evolves and develops in a way that can be understood and
explained (i.e. the explicability of scientific change); second, science is rational insofar as it can
be deduced that the changes it undergoes are changes for the better (i.e. the provability of
scientific progress); and thirdly, science is considered rational insofar as it is the result of
individuals thinking reasonably and acting with good reasons (i.e. the rationality of scientists).10

THOMAS KUHN’S NOTION OF REVOLUTION AS AGAINST SCIENTIFIC REALISM

6
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 102.
7
Chalmers, What Is This Thing Called Science?, 101.
8
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 92.
9
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 92.
10
Maurice A. Finocchiaro, “The Rationality of Science and the Science of Rationality: Critique of Subjectivism” in
Galileo and the Art of Reasoning. Boston studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 61 (Springer, Dordrecht, 1980):
244, http://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9017-3_8

3
 Before Thomas Kuhn, the predominant view among scientific circles was that scientific
progress was a cumulative process which involved an evolutionary process of discovering truth
in the physical world. Underlying this acceptance of the evolutionary progress of science was
scientific realism: a term which denotes a family of philosophical positions which take the
general view that a real world exists, external to the human mind, which the human mind can
encounter, understand, and represent, if only in part.11 Further, scientific realism is understood as
the thesis which holds that the objects of scientific knowledge exist and act independently of
knowledge of them, and scientific concepts correspond to actual physical entities and processes,
thus, scientific realism is in part, an empirical thesis, where its plausibility and confirmation
arises from a direct engagement with the real world through repeated observation and
experiment. 12

However, in his book The Theory of Scientific Revolution, which was published in 1962,
Thomas Kuhn proposed a new historiography of science when he argued that progress in science
is neither cumulative nor linear, but that scientific progress and change occurred in a
revolutionary way which involved two stages, the first is known as normal science and the
second: a paradigm shift.13 Normal science is scientific research that occurs within a particular
paradigm, where scientists busy themselves with what Kuhn describes as puzzle-solving.14 Here,
the scientific research is like solving a puzzle because the scientists operate within a paradigm
and are guided by it. The scientist asks questions that can be answered and which have an easily
recognizable solution, thus, the paradigm determines both the questions and the answers raised
within it.15

By this description, normal science is cumulative and new knowledge fills a gap of
ignorance. However, Kuhn argues that normal science does not permit for advancement by
means of revolutionary theories and hence it lacks novelties of facts and theories. 16 This apparent
anomaly which normal science possesses, somewhat carries a level of potentially positive
outcome because the discovery of this anomaly in a paradigm makes scientists find a way to

11
Alister E.McGrath, Science and Religion: An Introduction 2nd ed. (West Susex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 77.
12
McGrath, Science and Religion: An Introduction, 78.
13
Cf. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 5-9.
14
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 35.
15
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 35-37.
16
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 65.

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resolve the inconsistency. Normal science has precision as its goal and so it focuses on details,
and when those details arise which appear to be at odds with the current paradigm, the scientist is
moved to make one of two decisions: to resolve it or to ignore it. When such inconsistencies pose
a significant threat to the paradigm, a crisis occurs, bringing normal science to a halt and leading
to a novel theory and a new paradigm as the only possible response to the crisis. 17 When this
new paradigm which is able to give clarity more than the old paradigm develops, a scientific
revolution is said to have taken place.

THE IMPLICATION OF KUHN’S SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION ON SCIENTIFIC

RATIONALITY

The theory of Scientific Revolution as proposed by Kuhn has a number of implications

on the rationality of science. Scientific rationality holds that scientific progress occurred through
rational and incremental improvements either because science evolves and develops in a way
that can be understood and explained (i.e. the explicability of scientific change);or because the
changes science undergo are changes for the better (i.e. the provability of scientific progress); or
because scientific rationality is the result of individuals thinking reasonably and acting with good
reasons (i.e. the rationality of scientists).18 By proposing a revolutionary theory of scientific
progress, Kuhn does not elaborate by means of a detailed and systematic discussion, how
rationality comes into play, therefore his model of scientific development is often interpreted as
one which relegates rationality to a second plane, easily yielding to irrationalist positions. 19

In one instant, Kuhn alludes that choice of a paradigm depends on an act of persuasion by
adhering scientists,20 which when successful leads to conversion of opposing scientists, at which
point a paradigm shift occurs.21Such a view indicates that the superiority of one theory over
another cannot be proved in a debate for instance, and the only option is for one party is to
convert the other by persuasion.22 Consequently, if the occurrence of a paradigm shift is based on

17
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 75.
18
Maurice A. Finocchiaro, “The Rationality of Science and the Science of Rationality: Critique of Subjectivism” in
Galileo and the Art of Reasoning. Boston studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 61 (Springer, Dordrecht, 1980):
244, http://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9017-3_8
19
Paolo Pirozelli, “Thomas Kuhn’s Theory of Rationality,” Manuscripto, Volume: 42, Issue: 3, (2019): 1-46,
https://doi.org./10.1590/0100-6045.2019.V42N3.PP
20
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 198.
21
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 150.
22
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 198.

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persuasion and conversion, it seems far from a rational choice, 23 and this raises a question as to
how scientists can rationally choose between paradigms.

Again, when Kuhn proposed his idea of a paradigm shift where the problems created in
normal science are corrected in a scientific revolution, he states that scientists are not restricted
to what theories can accomplish at the moment of decision; rather they are also concerned with
the results their theories might produce in subsequent research. 24 This idea of a future ability of
theories to produce knowledge indicates a notion of “faith,” which many have argued that like
the word conversion, imposes a mystical-religious, irrational character to decision-making. 25

CRITICISM AND DEFENCE OF KUHN’S WORK

Kuhn’s work was met with a significant amount of criticism especially among
philosophers. Apart from the fact that his theory on the progress of science has been criticized
for being too revolutionary, and for somewhat underestimating the role of rationality in scientific
progress, it has also been criticized because it implies that scientific progress only occurs through
radical revolution, rather than through rational and incremental improvements. Again, since in
accordance with Kuhn’s theory science is characterized by two levels, one within and one
between paradigms, critics have argued that the problem of Kuhnian rationality concerns the
choice between paradigms, where no rational basis appears to exist, since the choice is inevitably
circular to some extent.26 In Kuhn’s model, there are no paradigm-independent set of rules to
decide between rival paradigms. Many commentators took this absence of paradigm-independent
rules to indicate that according to Kuhn, the paradigm choice must necessarily be irrational. 27

For his part, Kuhn maintained that paradigm-choice is rational even though he never
developed a specific account of rationality. According to him, the idea of incommensurability
between the paradigms is not so much one of concepts (taxonomic incommensurability) but one
of values (methodological incommensurability). Scientists from different paradigms disagree
about the problems, solution, the definition and weighing of the values used to evaluate theories,

23
Roger De Langhe, “The Problem of Kuhnian Rationality,” Philosophica, 86 (2012): 11-31.
24
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 157.
25
Paolo Pirozelli, “Thomas Kuhn’s Theory of Rationality,” Manuscripto, Volume: 42, Issue: 3, (2019): 1-46,
https://doi.org./10.1590/0100-6045.2019.V42N3.PP
26
Langhe, “The Problem of Kuhnian Rationality,” 12.
27
Langhe, “The Problem of Kuhnian Rationality,” 13.

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all of which render communication partial but not impossible.28 A number of scientists have also
agreed with Kuhn in this regard, explaining that his model does not go against rationality if the
rationality is here understood to be one based on satisficing a goal rather than optimizing it. 29 An
elaboration of these notions would not be possible here as it is outside the scope of this work, but
suffice it to say that the idea of satisficing has been accepted by a good number of commentators
as a better way of understanding how Kuhn’s ideas relate with rationality, because the notion of
satisficing rationality was designed specifically to handle the kind of circularity inherent in
paradigm choice, and thus consistent with Kuhn’s account of scientific change.30

EVALUATION

From our discussion so far, we have seen that progress in science had been understood to
occur through a cumulative process, one that featured an evolutionary process of uncovering
truth in the physical world. With his Structure of Scientific Revolution, Thomas Kuhn
relinquished the notion of science as truth-seeking, and proposed a non-continuous model of
scientific progress that had efficient puzzle solving as its goal. It is true that Kuhn’s work has
been quite influential not only within philosophy, but outside it. Kuhn's theory has also been
praised for highlighting the importance of scientific revolutions in driving progress in science,
since without scientific revolutions, scientific progress would be slow and incremental.
Admittedly, scientific revolutions have led to major breakthroughs and advances in science, and
have allowed for new fields of study to emerge.

The major weakness of Kuhn’s theory lies in the fact that his account of the development
of science is considered not entirely accurate, and his inability to offer clarity on his notion of
rationality makes it easy for critics to misinterpret what the implications of his theory would be
for scientific rationality.

CONCLUSION

We have seen Thomas Kuhn’s idea of progress in science and how his conception of
scientific change occurring through revolutions inaugurated a new understanding of how
scientific change occurs, where in place of scientific realism, a non-continuous model of
28
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 198.
29
Langhe, “The Problem of Kuhnian Rationality,” 18.
30
Langhe, “The Problem of Kuhnian Rationality,” 29.

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scientific progress is proposed, one having efficient problem solving as its goal. We also look at
scientific rationality and saw how a lack of clarity on Kuhn’s model made it easy for critics to
conclude that his theory tilted more to indicate some kind of irrationality in science. However, I
agree that if his notion of rationality is understood as one based on satisficing, then the danger of
his work being misconstrued to imply scientific irrationality can be avoided.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chalmers, Alan. What Is This Thing Called Science? Queensland: University of Queensland
Press, 1976.

De Langhe, Roger . “The Problem of Kuhnian Rationality,” Philosophica, 86 (2012).

Finocchiaro, Maurice A. “The Rationality of Science and the Science of Rationality: Critique of
Subjectivism” in Galileo and the Art of Reasoning. Boston studies in the Philosophy of Science,
Vol. 61 (Springer, Dordrecht, 1980): 244, http://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9017-3_8.

Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1962/1970.

McGrath, Alister E. Science and Religion: An Introduction 2nd ed. West Susex: Wiley-Blackwell,
2010.

Pirozelli, Paolo. “Thomas Kuhn’s Theory of Rationality,” Manuscripto, Volume: 42, Issue: 3,
(2019): 1-46, https://doi.org./10.1590/0100-6045.2019.V42N3.PP

Science, accessed 19 April, 2023. http://wiktionary.org