Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Admin Law Case Digests
Admin Law Case Digests
FIRST SET
SUMMER 2015
National Traffic Commission recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30
p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street
to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of
the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic
National Traffic Commission recommended to the Director of Public Works the
adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution in pursuance of the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on
national roads;
that Director of Public Works, , recommended to the secretary of public works and
communcations the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to
traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street;
that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, approved the
recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to
traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above
indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic;
that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced the
rules and regulations thus adopted resulting to the prohibition of all animal-drawn
vehicles to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Contention of the petitioner: (issue of the case) Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the
Director of Public Works is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and
control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
" To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of
the Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate
and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the
approval of the President, may contain provisions controlling or regulating the construction of
buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from along the national roads. Such
roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works
and his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon
makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest, or for a
specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications."cralaw virtua1aw library
Ruling: NO.
The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer legislative power upon
the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and
regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to
carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote
safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by
acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to
close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or
the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience
and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law
shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the
application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use
of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed
to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements
of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be
directly discharged by the National Assembly . It must depend on the discretion of some
other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper
occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is
the
making
of
the
law.
The proper distinction the court said was this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to
make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of
things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would
be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful
legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore,
be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation."
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of
the theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by
permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of
discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also
in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest.
the system of deployment. The Secretary of Labor and Employment, subsequently issued
Department Order No. 28, creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC).
Pursuant to the EIAC's recommendations,[1] the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued
Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedures and requirements for screening
performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the
former. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and certification requirement
were to be issued an Artist's Record Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any
contract of employment by the POEA.
Thereafter, the Department of Labor, following the EIAC's recommendation, issued a series of
orders fine-tuning and implementing the new system. Prominent among these orders were the
following issuances:
1.
Department Order No. 3-A, providing for additional guidelines on the training, testing,
certification and deployment of performing artists.
2.
Department Order No. 3-B, pertaining to the Artist Record Book (ARB) requirement, which
could be processed only after the artist could show proof of academic and skills training and has
passed the required tests.
3.
Department Order No. 3-E, providing the minimum salary a performing artist ought to
receive (not less than US$600.00 for those bound for Japan) and the authorized deductions
therefrom.
4.
Department Order No. 3-F, providing for the guidelines on the issuance and use of the
ARB by returning performing artists who, unlike new artists, shall only undergo a Special
Orientation Program (shorter than the basic program) although they must pass the academic
test.
Petitioner's Contention:
These department orders, 1) violated the constitutional right to travel; 2) abridged existing
contracts for employment; and 3) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process
of law. Further, the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal
and "in gross violation of the constitutional right... to life liberty and property
Respondents Contention:
Respondent court concluded that the issuances constituted a valid exercise by the state of the
police power.
Issue: WON the department orders constitute a valid exercise of the states police powers.
(1) Lower Court:
(2) Appellate Court: YES
(3) Supreme Court: YES
a. Majority Decision:
The latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex embodies the character of the entire
spectrum of public laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people under the State's
police power. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually "extends to all public
needs," this "least limitable" of governmental powers grants a wide panoply of instruments
through which the state, as parens patriae gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.
The duty of a Municipal Mayor in issuing building permit is a ministerial duty, thus the
respondent has no right to withhold such issuance when all the requirements stipulated in the
ordinance were complied by the petitioner.
ARTICLE I, Ordinance No. 20, Series of 1941Every owner, tenant, manager or contrator,
shall, before beginning the construction or repair of any edifice, obtain the necessary permit
from the Municipal Mayor, stating in the application the name of the owner, location of the
building, kind of materials to be used, and the floor area. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents Contention:
The respondent alleged that the proper remedy to be availed by the petitioner is section 2188 of
the Administrative Code and not the writ of mandamus.
Issue: WON the duty of the Mayor to issue building permit is ministerial or discretionary.
Court Decisions:
(1) Lower Court:
(2) Appellate Court:
(3) Supreme Court:
a. Majority Decision:
The duty of the Mayor to issue building permit is ministerial in nature based on the
ordinance that mandates it. After the petitioner complied with all the necessary
requirements stipulated in the ordinance, the petitioner is entitled to it and the
respondent's duty became ministerial. Thus it is incumbent upon the respondent to issue
the permit to the petitioner. Likewise the ordinance did not provide any provisions
granting discretion to the Mayor to refuse issuance of the permit when all the
requirements were complied.
The writ of mandamus is the proper remedy rather than section 2188 of the
Administrative Code as assailed by the respondent, because the said provision gives
disciplinary actions for erring municipal officer, rather than to compel the performance of
a legal duty.
b. Dissenting Opinion:
Definition of Terms:
Ministerial Duty - is one which the officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts , in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
Discretionary Duty - If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed.
FACTS:
After the1955 elections, Petitioner Senator Taada was the lone opposition
senator. The 23 other seats were filled up by the Nacionalista Party. Petitioner
Macapagal was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before
the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET).
The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956:
upon nomination of Senator CiprianoPrimicias, on behalf of the
Nacionalista Party, chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and
CiprianoPrimicias, as members of the SET.
upon nomination of petitioner Senator Taada, on behalf of the Citizens
Party, said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of said
Tribunal; then,
upon nomination of Senator Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules
of the Senate, and over the objections of Senators Taada and Sumulong,
the Senate chose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco
A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal.
Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter appointed:
o (1) Alfredo Cruz and Catalina Cayetano, as technical assistant and
private secretary, respectively, to Senator Cuenco, as supposed
member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon his recommendation
of said respondent; and
o (2) Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as technical assistant and
private secretary, respectively to Senator Delgado, as supposed
member of said Electoral Tribunal, and upon his recommendation.
Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, however reads:.
"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party
having the largest number of votes and three of the party
having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior
Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Emphasis
supplied.).
Both petitioners called for the disqualification of Cuenco and Delgado as members
of the SET for Cuenco and Delgado were not nominated by the minority party, as
provided for in the Constitution.
But, since Sen. Taada is the lone member of the minority, the respondents
contended that if the Constitution should be followed to the letter, that would leave
the SET with only 7 members.
regulations consistent with the purpose for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and for the
development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic Act No. 3512;(3) the declared national
policy to encourage, Promote and conserve our fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No.
3512), and(4) section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that "any other violation of" the
Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder "shall subject the
offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than six
months, or both, in the discretion of the court."
Lower Court :
- Municipal court :quashed the complaint.
-The Court of First Instance of Laguna :affirmed the order of dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-36).
The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an
obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and
that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances.
The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the
executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.
-The case is now before this Court on appeal by the prosecution.
Issue/s:
W/N Administrative order 84 and AO 84-1, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries,
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law valid?
Ruling :
-No.
Explanation for Ruling :
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries AdministrativeOrders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that
those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Lawdoes not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro
fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders
Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in
punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense falls within the category of
"other violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next
lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in
section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations
fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the powerto declare what acts
should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of
the penalty provided for in the law itself . (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur.
965 on p. 11 32).
the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law,
under which the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro
fishing.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could
have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
b. CONTENTION OF PETITIONERS
- The respondent Board has no authority. The provision of Act No.
2307 on which it based its order is invalid since it is an unlawful
delegation of legislative power to the board.
- Said requirements are also unnecessary and cumbersome.
3. ISSUES
a. W/N the authority exercised by the respondent Board has been validly
delegated by the Legislature.
4. RULING
OVERALL RULING: The order appealed from is SET ASIDE. The Board
Commissioners are ordered to DISMISS their proceedings.
a. NO, the respondent Board has no valid authority since the law does not
establish a valid form of delegation of legislative power.
IN RELATION TO THE TOPIC: Sec. 16 of Act No. 2306 provides that the
Board shll have power to require public utilities to furnish annual detailed
reports of finances and operations in prescribed forms.The provision is
very general. Leaving the nature of the reports, its contents, the
guidelines, and similar matters to the discretion of the board is not
an expression of the will of the State. The broad scope of the provision
indicates that the Legislature delegated to the Board all of its powers on a
given subject matter in a manner almost absolute without laying rules
on how the power is to be applied.
In delegating, the law must be complete in all its terms and
provisions and nothing must be left to the discretion of the delegate.
Congress must lay down the general rules for guidance. When the law
reaches the delegate, nothing must be left for it to do than to implement
and execute the law. However, leaving the caryring out of details to the
delegate is valid.
IN THIS CASE, the law does not lay down general rules of action by
failing to prescribe in detail what the reports must contain. Practically
everything is left to the Boards discretion.
People v. Vera
a. ANTECEDENT FACTS
- E.O. No. 626-A prohibits the interprovincial movement of
carabaos/carabeef and any transported in violation of said E.O. shall
be subject to confiscation/forfeiture by the government to be
distributed
1) to chartiable institutions and other similar organizations as the
Chariman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may
see fit (carabeef), or
2) to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry may
see fit (carabaos)
- On Jan. 13, 1984, the petitioner had transported six carabaos in a
pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo, which were confiscated by the
police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo.
b. CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER
- The E.O. is unconstitutional since it authorizes outright confiscation in
violation of due process (no right to be heard)
- The E.O. is also an improper exercise of the legislative power by the
former President (Marcos).
c. RULING OF THE LOWER COURTS:
- The RTC sustained the confiscation of the Carabaos and, since they
could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond of
P12,000.00 filed by the petitioner. It also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the EO for lack of authority and for presumed
validity.
- The IAC upheld the trial court.
3. ISSUES
a. W/N the RTC has the power to examine the constitutionality of the E.O.
b. W/N due process of the petitioner has been violated
c. W/N the E.O. provides for a valid delegation of legislative power.
4. RULING
OVERALL RULING: E.O. 626-A is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The decision of the
CA is reversed.
a. YES, the jurisdiction of the SC provides that it may review the orders of
lower courts involving the constitutionality of certain measures (implying
that lower courts may pass judgment on the same, subject to review by
higher courts). The presumption of validity is also not conclusive.
b. YES. The minimum requirements of due process (notice ad hearing) were
not met. While the objective of protecting carabaos and their owners may
be a valid subject of police power, it fails to meet the requisite for the
exercise of police power (that the means be reasonably necessary to
achieve the lawful objective). E.O. 626-A prohibits the movement of
carabaos and the Court fails to see how this can prevent their needless
slaughter since carabaos may be unlawfully killed in any place. The
confiscation was also not justified by the immediacy of a problem.
c. YES.
- The assailed E.O. is actually a presidential decree (promulgating a
new rule instead of merely implementing existing law. It was issued by
case falls under the exception since what have been raised are
questions of law).
- Memorandum Circular No. 2 is violative of the principle of nondelegation of legislative power. Hence, POEA has no authority to
promulgate said regulation.
c. RULING OF LOWER COURTS: N/A
3. ISSUES
a. W/N the deceased was an overseas worker
b. W/N Memorandum Circular No. 2 violatyes the principle of non-delegation
of legislative power.
4. RULING
OVERALL RULING: The petition is DISMISSED. The TRO is LIFTED.
a. YES. The SC sees no reason not consider Vitaliano Saco as an overseas
employee at the time he met the fatal accident. Under the 1985 R&R,
overseas employment is defined as employment of a worker outside the
Philippines, including employment on board vessels plying international
waters. The petitioners actions also indicate acknowledgement of this,
such as indicating in the receipt of the burial benefits overseas contract
worker Vitaliano Saco and the submission of its shipping articles to
POEA for processing.
b. NO, the Memorandum Circular (MC) is a valid delegation of legislative
power.
IN RELATION TO THE TOPIC: The authority to issue said regulation is
provided in Sec. 4(a) of E.O. 797 (POEA shall promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions
of the Administration). What can be delegated is the discretion to
determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law should be.
To determine whether there is a valid delegation of legislative power, two
tests are applied: (1) the completeness test (the law must be complete
in all its terms and conditions so that when it reaches the delegate, he will
only have to implement it), (2) the sufficient standard test (adequate
guidelines to map the boundaries of the delegates authority).
The model contract in the MC is a valid administrative regulation. The
model contract prescribed therein There is a sufficient standard is present
in E.O. 797 mandating the POEA to protect the rights of OFWs to fair
and equitable employment practices.
2. FACTS
a. ANTECEDENT FACTS
- From Sept. 4 to Oct. 29, 1964, the President, claiming to act pursuant
to Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code (REC), issued E.O.
Nos 93-121, 124, 126-129, creating 33 municipalities.
- Petitioner, as Vice President and as a taxpayer, filed for a writ of
prohibition with preliminary injunction against respondent to restrain
him and his agents from using and/or allocating any public funds in
implementation of said EOs.
- Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 2370 provides that Barrios shall not be created or
their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the
provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress and Upon petition of a
majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be
createdupon the recommendation of the council of the
municipality..Provided, however, that no new barrio may be created
if its population is less than five hundred
- Sec. 68 of the RAC provides that the President may by EO define the
boundaries of any province, municipality, any other political
subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory therein, separate
political divisions other than a province as may be required, merge
such sudivisions with another, name any new subdivisionprovided
that the authorization of Conngress must be first obtained whenever
the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined/divided.
The President may also change the seat of the government in such
subdivisions to such place therein as public welfare may require.
b. CONTENTION OF PETITIONER
- The EOs are null and void since Sec. 68 has been impliedly repealed
by Act No. 2370 (Can the President create a municipality when he
cannot even create barrios, the units of municipalities)
- The EOs also constitute an undue delegation of legislative power
c. CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT
- The President can create a new municipality without creating new
barrios by allocating old barrrios under the jurisdiction of a new
municipality.
- The power of the President to create municipalities under Sec. 68 of
RAC does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power.
3. ISSUES
a. W/N the President has been duly delegated legislative power to create
municipalities.
4. RULING:
OVERALL RULING: The Executive Orders in question are declared NULL AND
VOID ab initio.
a. NO, Sec. 68 does not delegate legislative power to create munipalities
upon the President.
- IN RELATION TO THE TOPIC: The power to fix common boundaries
in order to settle conflicts of jurisdiction may be administrative in
nature since it involves adopting mean to put the law creating
municipalities into effect. The authority to create municipal
corporations is legislative. While Congress may delegate the power to
fill in the details of its executions, the law must pass the
completeness test and sufficient standard test so that there be no
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Sec. 68 of the RAC does not meet these requirements of a valid
delegation. It does not identify a policy to be carried out by the
President, does not provide sufficient standards. The last part
provides as the public welfare may require. While it has been held in
previous cases that public interest/welfare are sufficient standards for
valid delegation, they must be construed in relation to the facts
involved (i.e. the public interest must be related to the
function/purpose of the administrative agency, such the power of the
Director of Public Works to issue rules and regulations to promote
safe transit on roads). NOTE: In other words, the public interest
involved must be related to the specific purpose for which the agency
was made.
In this case, the creation of municipalities is not an
administrative function but legislative. Public interest becomes a
purely legislative/political question and no longer a question of fact.
Sec. 68 does not prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to
particular states of fact.
Sec. 10(1) of Art. VII of the Constitution provides that the President
shall have control over executive departments and offices, and
exercise general supervision over all local governments. The
President has only limited authority over local governments and
cannot interfere as long as they act within their authority. Therefore,
Sec. 68 of the RAC (approved March 1917) must be deemed
REPEALED by the subsequent adoption of the 1935 Constitution
(incompatible).
Respondents Contention:
The Reflector Law is unconstitutional because it is an invalid exercise of police power for being
violation of the due process clause, thus the issuance of the Administrative Order is an undue
exercise of the legislative power by the Petitioner-Commissioner.
Issue: WON the Administrative Order issued by the Petitioner confirms as a valid delegation of
Legislative Power.
Court Decisions:
(1) Lower Court:
(2) Appellate Court:
(3) Supreme Court:
a. Majority Decision:
Yes, the Administrative Order confirms as a valid delegation of Legislative Power,
because what cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws
and to alter and repeal them. To test the validity of the delegated power, two test must be
done, 1. Completeness Test - that the statute is complete in all its terms and provisions
when it leaves the hands of the legislature, and 2.Standard Test - there must be a
standard which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lays down fundamental policy.
The Court ruled, all that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law, that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but
conform to the standards that the law prescribes.
The Reflector Law which provided the authority of the petitioner to issue the order
as an implementing rules and regulations is constitutional. Galo and others who filed a
writ of preliminary injunction for the implementation of the law and the order erred in
their contention, the law and administrative order did not violate the due process clause
of the Constitution since the main purpose of the law is for public safety, which is a valid
exercise of police power.
Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of
Fatima Blood Bank, et. al., vs. The Secretary of Health
Topic: Delegation of Legislative Power
Facts:
Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Association of Blood Banks, a duly registered non-stock and non-profit association
composed of free standing blood banks. Petitioners prays for a writ of prohibitory
injunction enjoining the Secretary of Health from implementing and enforcing the
National Blood Services Act of 1994 and Administrative Order No. 9 series of 1995
as its implementing rules and regulation. Also petitioned for mandatory injunction
ordering and commanding the Secretary of Health to grant their renewal of license
to operate free standing blood banks.
The law steamed from the report of an institution tasked to evaluate the safety of
the Philippine Blood Banking System, the report shows that the country relied
heavily on commercial blood banks, and the blood sold by the persons to such
establishment are more likely to have any of the 4 tested infections or blood
transfusion transmissible diseases such as AIDS, Malaria, syphilis and Hepatitis B.
As a solution, the legislature enacted the statute in questioned which provides the
phase outing of commercial blood banks within 2 years from the effectivity of the
law, which can be extended for a maximum of 2 years by the Secretary of Health. In
relation to the said statute, the Secretary executed an Administrative Order as
implementing rules and regulations, which also provides the process of phase
outing the commercial blood blanks reiterating sec.7 of the statute authorizing the
same, also with a statement that the decision to extend shall be based on a result
of careful study and review of the blood supply, demand and public safety.
Petitioner's Contention:
Petitioners alleged that the law constitutes undue delegation because
section 7 of the law constrained the Secretary of Health to legislate
whether or not to extend the license of the commercial blood banks for a
maximum period of 2 years.
Respondents Contention:
The respondent contend that the blood from commercial blood banks are unsafe
and in the exercise of police power can close down such establishments to protect
the public.
Issue:
WON Section 7 of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 constitutes
undue delegation of Legislative Power
Court Decisions:
(1) Lower Court:
(2) Appellate Court:
(3) Supreme Court:
a. Majority Decision:
No, it does not constitutes undue delegation because the law is
complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the
Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and
has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is
the phase out of commercial blood banks, the law has sufficiently provided
a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying
out its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a
safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By
its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of