Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Legal Ethicsjj Review Complete Case Digest
Legal Ethicsjj Review Complete Case Digest
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CASE TITLE
GUARIN v. ATTY. LIMPIN
CAYETANO v. MONSOD
PAGUIA vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
ULEP v. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
SPOUSES UMAGUING v. ATTY. DE VERA
GARRIDO vs. GARRIDO
BENGCO vs. BERNARDO
BUNAGAN-BANSIG vs. ATTY. CELERA
AREOLA vs. ATTY. MENDOZA
Dr. VILLAHERMOSA, Sr. vs. Atty. Caracol
FIGUERAS vs. ATTY. JIMENEZ
ATTY. CATALAN JR., vs. ATTY. SILVOSA
OCA vs. ATTY. DANIEL LIANGCO
IN RE: ATTY. RODOLFO D. PACTOLIN
MANIEGO v. DE DIOS
ALVIN FELICIANO v. ATTY. CARMELITA LOZADA.
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO
IN RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS (ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN)
RE: PETITION OF MACARUBBO
IN RE: LETTER OF AUGUSTUS C. DIAZ.
VELEZ v. DE VERA.
PETITION OF DACANAY
IN RE: PETITION EPIFANIO B. MUNESES.
CHU v. ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO, JR.,
ANDRES v. ATTY. NAMBI.
SOSA v. ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZ
GARCIA, v. ATTY. SESBREO
PEREZ v. ATTY. CATINDIG AND ATTY. BAYDO
TIONG v. FLORENDO
GARRIDO vs. GARRIDO
BUENO v. RANESES
NAVARRO vs. ATTY. SOLIDUM
LISANGAN v. TOLENTINO
RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRAC
PITOGO v. ATTY. SUELLO
ESPINOSA., vs. ATTY. OMAA
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY v. ARGUELLES
TENOSO VS. ATTY. ECHANEZ.
JANDOQUILE v. REVILLA
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PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
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FACTS: Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating
Officer and thereafter as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of
the Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned from his post.
Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another
corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI for
updating purposes. The GIS identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of
Directors (BOD) and President.
We thus find that in filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty. Limpin
committed an infraction which did not conform to her oath as a lawyer in
accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
CAYETANO v. MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991
Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a
stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI. She averred that
the GIS was made and submitted in good faith and that her certification served
to attest to the information from the last BOD meeting.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1 Rule 1.01 and Rule
1.02 of the CPR.
HELD: YES. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of
the CPR.
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the
rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes.19 A lawyer who
PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
It was established that after graduating from the College of Law and hurdling
the Bar, respondent worked in his fathers law office for a short while, then
worked as an Operations Officer in the World Bank Group for about 2 years,
which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries,
negotiating loans, and coordinating legal, economic and project work of the
Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines, he worked with the Meralco Group,
served as Chief Executive Officer of an investment bank and has
subsequently worked either as Chief Executive Officer or Consultant of
various companies.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC.
2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse
of discretion in confirming Monsods appointment.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the
bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 197273. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more
than 10 years. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist,
a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least 10 years.
HELD:
1. YES. In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice
of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in courtIn general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with
the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services,
contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of
mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice.
2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the
Comelec Chairman by the president is mandated by the constitution. The
power of appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom it is so
vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the
SC to exercise its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics
of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any
kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill. In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client
relationship, it is whether in or out of court.
PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has standing to bring this suit because of
his indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
HELD: No. Petitioner has no standing.
An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains.
Petitioners suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing "any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience."10 Certainly, preparing a
petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and
employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23
of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
whether such is allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.
HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such
practice is not allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals.
The services it offered include various legal problems wherein a client may
avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the
domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts. The standards of the legal profession condemn the
lawyers advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar
to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal
Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and
other circumventions of law which their experts can facilitate. Such is highly
reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The
best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as
well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between
a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. The Supreme Court also enumerated the following as allowed
forms of advertisement:
Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyers Oath and Rule 10.01,
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified
document before a court. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are
designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this
country should remain faithful to the Lawyers Oath.
PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence,
and has since failed to render much needed financial support. In their defense,
they postulated that they were not lawyers as of yet when they committed the
supposed immorality, so as such, they were not guilty of a violation of
Canon1, Rule 1.01.
As a lawyer, a person whom the community looked up to, Atty. Garrido and
Valencia wereshouldered with the expectation that they would set a good
example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When they
violated the law and distorted it to cater to their own personal needs and
selfish motives, not only did their actions discredit the legal profession. Such
actions by themselves, without even including the fact of Garridos
abandonment of paternal responsibility, to the detriment of his children by the
petitioner; or the fact that Valencia married Garrido despite knowing of his
other marriages to two other women including the petitioner, are clear
indications of a lack of moral values not consistent with the proper conduct of
practicing lawyers within the country. As such, their disbarment is affirmed.
After a much further investigation into the matter, the time and effort given yi
elded results telling her that Atty. Valencia and her legal husband had been
married in Hong Kong. Moreover, on June 1993, her husband left their
PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
The case was thus referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. The investigating officer made a finding that respondent
committed a crime that import deceit and violation of his attorneys oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility. As such he was recommended by
the IBP to be suspended for 2 years from the practice of law and as a member
of the Bar. The IBP governor adopted and approved the recommendation
FACTS: Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco filed a complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Pablo Bernardo for deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar and violation of his duties and oath as a lawyer. The
disbarment case was filed because from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty.
Bernardo with the connivance of Andres Magat willfully and illegally
committed fraudulent act with intent to defraud against complainants Fidela
and Teresita Bengco by using false pretenses, deceitful words to the effect
that he would expedite the titling of land belonging to the Miranda Family of
Tagaytay City who are the acquaintance of complainants.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the IBP Resolution is in accord with the rules considering
that the complaint was filed for more than 2 years from the alleged misconduct
and thus has prescribed?
2) Whether or not Atty. Bernardo is liable?
HELD:
1.) Yes, the IBP Resolution is valid.
Th respondents defense of prescription is untenable. The Court has held that
administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse of
considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution
of the administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of
a lawyer. Otherwise, members of the bar would only be emboldened to
disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that
as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they
stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative
liability they ought to answer for.
2) Yes, respondent Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is found guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
Bansig alleged that respondents act of contracting marriage with Alba, while
his marriage is still subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct
unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his
membership in the Bar.
The SC held that there is no question that the respondent committed the acts
complained of. He himself admitted in his answer that his legal services were
hired by the complainants through Magat regarding the purported titling of
land supposedly purchased. He used his position as a lawyer in order to
deceive the complainants into believing that he can expedite the titling of the
subject properties. He never denied that he did not benefit from the money
given by the complainants in the amount of P495,000.00.
Accordingly, Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.
Furthermore, he was ordered to return the amount of P200,000.00 to Fidela
Bengco and Teresita Bengco.
PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their
pleadings and filing motions before the RTC, Atty. Mendoza undermined his
capability.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land
but also the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court. Wherefore, respondent is ordered
DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of
Attorneys.
Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her
clients and their relatives to approach the judge and the fiscal "to beg and
cry" so that their motions would be granted and their cases against them
would be dismissed. To the Investigating Commissioner, this is highly
unethical and improper as the act of Atty. Mendoza degrades the image of
and lessens the confidence of the public in the judiciary.12 The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Mendoza be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) months.13
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mendoza is liable for giving improper advice to
her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty.
Mendoza made irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02
and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate
of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Rule
"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay
maging praktikal sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang
makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay
10
PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
15.07 states that "a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the
laws and the principles of fairness."
Atty. Mendozas improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in
our legal system. Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence
from external forces or factors22 according to the merits of a case. Atty.
Mendozas careless remark is uncalled for.
It must be remembered that a lawyers duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice.1wphi1 To that end, his clients success is wholly
subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest
which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his
clients cause, is condemnable and unethical.23
In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for two
(2) months as excessive and not commensurate to Atty. Mendozas
infraction. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe
forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only
in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof.24 The Court notes that when Atty. Mendoza made the remark "Iyakiyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso
noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice. While her remark was
inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is not disparaging and
reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Caracol may appear in court as a counsel for
Efren and Ernesto.
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HELD: The court ruled that a lawyer is not required to present a written
authorization from the client. In fact, the absence of a formal notice of entry of
appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in his clients
name. However, court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other party may
require a lawyer to adduce authorization from the client.
Domiciano also assailed the use of a falsified document (Waiver of Rights) by
Isidro that enabled him to secure an execution in the judgment in one of the
cases. He then filed cases for falsification and use of falsified document
against Isidro. On the other hand, Isidro averred that he was authorized by
Efren and Ernesto to appear as additional counsel, and consulted Atty. Aquino
who advised him to go ahead with the filing. He was not aware that there was
a waiver of rights executed in Ernestos favour.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Caracol may appear in court as a counsel for
Efren and Ernesto.
HELD: The court ruled that a lawyer is not required to present a written
authorization from the client. In fact, the absence of a formal notice of entry of
appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in his clients
name. However, court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other party may
require a lawyer to adduce authorization from the client.
Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for
a person without being retained nor may he appear in court without being
employed unless by leave of court. If an attorney appears on a clients behalf
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Eight years later, complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr.,
as members of the Association, filed a Complaint for Disbarment against
respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) for violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for his negligence in handling the
appeal and willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IBP correctly found him administratively liable for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: The petition is DENIED. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is found
administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.04, Canon 12 and Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is suspended from
the practice of law for one (1) month with warning that a repetition of the same
or similar violation shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent sought reconsideration but his motion was denied. The IBP
Board of Governors noted the motion was a mere reiteration of matters
already discussed and there were no substantial grounds to disturb the
February 19, 2009 Resolution.
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Rule 6.03 which states that A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in said service.
Atty. Silvosa claims that his appearance was only for the purpose of
reinstatement of bail and denies any relationship between and the accused.
Atty. Silvosa dismisses at the same time the allegations of Prosec. Toribio
and such allegations were self-serving and purposely dug by Atty. Catalan
and his puppeteer to pursue persecution.
The IBP ruled that respondent was guilty only of the first charge by appearing
and filing a motion to post bail bond pending appeal and thus violating Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and gave the penalty of
reprimand. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and
recommendation however modifying the penalty to suspension from the
practice of law for 6 months.
A petition for declaratory relief was filed before the sala of Judge Liangco. On
the very same day the petition was filed, respondent judge issued a resolution,
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Respondents Contention:
He reasoned that when he acted on the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by
the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Luis, Pampanga, he was
merely rendering a legal opinion honestly and in good faith; and that his
actions were not attended by malice, bad faith or any other ulterior motive. He
further pleads for compassion from this Court and for permission to remain a
member of the bar, because the practice of law is his only means of livelihood
to support his family.
The complainant Gozun was not served with summons or given notice of the
petition for declaratory relief. Complainant Gozun learned about the resolution
on June 2, 1996,
On June 3, 1996, complainant Gozuns wife together with other public school
teachers went to the office of the respondent judge. When asked about the
resolution, respondent judge answered, Ing Apung Guinu yu y Mayor Bondoc
at kaya ko makisabi (Your God is Mayor Bondoc and you should talk to him).
The agents of the municipal government demolished complainant Gozuns
house, using respondent judges resolution and the mayors executive order
as basis.
On December 18, 1996, complainant Gozun filed this administrative
complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator. The Office of the Court
Administrators evaluation, report and recommendation suggests the
dismissal of respondent from the bench. Thus, the OCA filed a Complaint for
Disbarment against respondent.
Petitioners Contention:
HELD: Yes, the evidence on record overwhelmingly supports the finding that
respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and inexcusable ignorance of wellestablished rules of procedures.
Petitioner is guilty of gross misconduct for acting with manifest bias and
partiality towards a party, as well as for inexcusable ignorance of wellestablished rules of procedure that challenged his competence to remain a
member of the legal profession. Thus, it prayed that he be disbarred, and that
his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys
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In the case at bar, respondent acted upon the Petition for Declaratory Relief
filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, without the
mandatory notice to Gozun who would be affected by the action. The records
show that respondent, upon receipt of the Petition, had it docketed in his court,
designated Gozun as respondent in the case title, and quickly disposed of the
matter by issuing a Resolution all on the same day that the Petition was filed
without notice and hearing. Respondent admitted that, to his mind, he was
merely rendering a legal opinion at the local governments behest, which he
gladly and expeditiously obliged. Without denying this fact in his Comment,
he admitted that he had erred in acting upon the Petition, but emphasized that
his actions were not attended by malice or bad faith. The undue haste with
which respondent acted on the Petition negates good faith on his part.
FACTS: In May 2008, the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 161455 (Pactolin vs
Sandiganbayan), affirmed the conviction of Atty. Rodolfo Pactolin for violation
of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (Falsification by a Private
Individual). It was duly proved that Pactolin falsified a letter, and presented
said letter as evidence in a court of law, in order to make it appear that his
fellow councilor acting as OIC-Mayor illegally caused the disbursement of
public funds. In said decisions, the Supreme Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for appropriate administrative actions
against Pactolin.
HELD: Rodolfo Pactolin should be, and is henceforth disbarred. The crime
of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good
morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude includes
everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman,
or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
As a rule, the Supreme Court exercises the power to disbar with great
caution. Being the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed
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only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and a member of the bar. But it has always been held that it is
appropriate to disbar a lawyer if he is convicted by final judgment for a crime
involving moral turpitude. Further, Pactolins situation is aggravated by the
fact that although his conviction has been affirmed, he has not served his
sentence yet.
HELD: YES. The Office of the Bar Confidant noted that it was unfortunate
that the defendant overlooked the procedure of passing certifications from the
IBP that she did not practice law during her suspension. The OBC then
recommended that the SC adopt a policy on the matter of the lifting of the
order of suspension of lawyer from the practice of law. In response to this the
SC established the following guidelines:
1. After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the
practice of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the
penalty;
2. Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately
executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within
which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said
motion shall render the decision final and executory;
3. Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall
file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar
Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the
practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period
of his or her suspension;
4. Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local
Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where
respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where
he or she has appeared as counsel;
5. The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of
respondents compliance with the order of suspension;
6. Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer
under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe
punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
MANIEGO v. DE DIOS
617 SCRA 142 (2010)
FACTS:
ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINANT:
Complainant seeks the disbarment of Atty. Lourdes de Dios, for engaging in
the practice of law despite being suspended by the Court. The petitioner
alleged that she filed a criminal complaint against Mr. Hiroshi Miyoshi who
was represented by the respondent. Petitioner discovered from a RTC staff
that Atty. de Dios has an outstanding suspension order from the Supreme
Court since 2001.
DEFENSE OF THE DEFENDANT(LAWYER) :
She alleges that she had already served her six months suspension and that
she informed the Court of her resumption of practice. The problem arose when
a judge erroneously issued a directive ordering the defendant to desist from
practicing law and revoking her notarial commission for 2 year . There after
the respondent filed a Motion for Clarification with the Supreme Court with
gave the impression that she was not yet allowed to practice law. She avers
that at the time she represented Mr. Hiroshi Miyoshi she had already served
her suspension. She only failed to pass certifications that she indeed refrained
from practicing law during her period of suspension.
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convince. She knew very well that at the time she represented her husband,
she is still serving her two (2)-year suspension order. Yet, she failed to inform
the court about it. Neither did she seek any clearance or clarification from the
Court if she can represent her husband. While we understand her devotion
and desire to defend her husband whom she believed has suffered grave
injustice, Atty. Lozada should not forget that she is first and foremost, an
officer of the court who is bound to obey the lawful order of the Court.
HOWEVER, this Court recognizes the fact that it is part of the Filipino culture
that amid an adversity, families will always look out and extend a helping hand
to a family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that
Atty. Lozada's actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband and
that in essence, she was not representing a client but rather a spouse, we
deem it proper to mitigate the severeness of her penalty.
Defendant: Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced by circumstances and
her desire to defend the rights of her husband who is embroiled in a legal
dispute. She claimed that she believed in good faith that her appearance as
wife of Edilberto Lozada is not within the prohibition to practice law,
considering that she is defending her husband and not a client. She insisted
that her husband is a victim of grave injustice, and his reputation and honor
are at stake; thus, she has no choice but to give him legal assistance.
HELD:
Indeed, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law.
When this Court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, as in the
instant case, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring
the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension.
In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the records,
there is no doubt that Atty. Lozada's actuations, that is, in appearing and
signing as counsel for and in behalf of her husband, conducting or offering
stipulation/admission of facts, conducting direct and cross-examination, all
constitute practice of law. Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to
Petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's
oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.
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However, the father of the victim, Atty. Camaligan, opposed on the said oath
taking. Petitioners act constituted evident absence of that moral fitness
required for admission to the bar.
Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for
Mercantile Law during that time. The Court had adopted the findings of the
Investigating Committee, which identified petitioner as the person who had
downloaded the test questions from the computer of Balgos and faxed them
to other persons.
HELD: Yes. The lawyer's oath is not a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law. Every lawyer should at all times weigh his actions according to
the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers
conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be
faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the
reinstatement of petitioner in the Philippine Bar.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION SHOULD BE GRANTED.
HELD: YES
Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct
offenders. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring
officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed
has already served its purpose.
The Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber.
On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic
with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service. The Court is
persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of
Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking
judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and
uncalculating.
Petitioners subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some
hope that if he were to reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his
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achievements as a lawyer would redound to the general good and more than
mitigate the stain on his record. Compassion to the petitioner is warranted.
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but
should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or
chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges
associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity
and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the
same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of nonreformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to
ensure a period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has
productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a
chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning
or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of
the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as
potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency.
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any
other candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person
of good moral character.
Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his
indiscretion in the legal profession and in his personal life. He has asked
forgiveness from his children by complainant Teves and maintained a cordial
relationship with them. Records also show that after his disbarment,
respondent returned to his hometown and devoted his time tending an
orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her death. In 2009, he was
appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor and thereafter, assumed the
position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II. Moreover, he is a parttime instructor. Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities
by helping his neighbors and friends who are in dire need.
Eight years after or on June 4, 2012, respondent filed the instant Petition For
Extraordinary Mercy seeking judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll
of Attorneys.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION SHOULD BE GRANTED:
HELD: The Court finds the instant petition meritorious.
In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency, the Court laid down the following
guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
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From the attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that
respondent has sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 58 years of age,
he still has productive years ahead of him that could significantly contribute to
the upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of society. While the
Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant
officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have
reformed their ways, as in this case. Accordingly, respondent is hereby
ordered reinstated to the practice of law.
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2.
3.
4.
5.
he had handled involving Julius Wills III, who had figured in an automobile
accident in 1986. To settle the case amicably, Atty. de Vera received -- on
his clients behalf -- a $12,000 check, which he then deposited in his personal
account. Because of his irregular deposit of his client's funds, respondent was
suspended from the practice of law for three years, upon the recommendation
of the hearing referee. The case was not decided on the merits, because Atty.
de Vera resigned from the California Bar. Later, his resignation was accepted
by the Supreme Court of California.
On the second ground, complainant averred that respondents transfer of
membership from the Pasay, Paraaque, Las Pias and Muntinlupa (PPLM)
IBP Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter was a circumvention of the
rotation rule. Allegedly, Atty. de Vera made the transfer for the sole purpose
of becoming IBP national president. Complainant stressed that respondent
neither resided in Agusan del Sur nor held office there.
A companion case, Bar Matter No. 1227, referred to the letter-request of
respondent, asking the Supreme Court to schedule his oath-taking as IBP
national president. On the other hand, AM No. 05-5-15-SC referred to the
letter-report of IBP National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, furnishing the
Court with the May 13, 2005, IBP Resolution removing Atty. de Vera from the
latters positions as IBP board member and executive vice-president, for
committing acts inimical to the board and the IBP in general.
In this case, Judge Diaz expressed sincere repentance for his past
malfeasance. He humbly accepted the verdict of this Court in Alvarez. Three
years have elapsed since the promulgation of Alvarez. It is sufficient to ensure
that he has learned his lesson and that he has reformed. His 12 years of
service in the judiciary may be taken as proof of his dedication to the
institution. Thus, the Court may now open the door of further opportunities in
the judiciary for him.
The controversy in these two consolidated cases started when the IBP board
approved the withdrawal of a Petition docketed at the Supreme Court as
Integrated Bar of the Philippines et al v. Senate of the Philippines et al. - SCR165108. Subsequently, during the plenary session held at the 10th National
IBP Convention, respondent allegedly made some untruthful statements,
innuendos, and blatant lies in connection with the IBP board's Resolution to
withdraw the Petition
VELEZ v. DE VERA.
496 SCRA 345. 2006
FACTS: In AC No. 6697, Complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez sought the
suspension or disbarment of Respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera (1) for
misrepresentation through his concealment of the suspension order rendered
against him by the State Bar of California; and (2) for violation of the rotation
rule enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491.
On May 12, 2005, IBP Governor Romulo A. Rivera wrote to IBP National
President Cadiz, praying for the removal of the IBP board membership of Atty.
De Vera, who had allegedly committed acts inimical to the board and the IBP
in general. The following day On May 12, 2005, IBP Governor Romulo A.
The first ground concerned an administrative case filed against Atty. de Vera
before the State Bar of California. The action arose from an insurance case
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Rivera wrote to IBP National President Cadiz, praying for the removal of the
IBP board membership of Atty. De Vera, who had allegedly committed acts
inimical to the board and the IBP in general.
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER THE JUDGMENT IN AC NO. 6052 CONSTITUTED A BAR TO
THE FILING OF AC 6697
2. WHETHER, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW,
RESPONDENT ATTY. DE VERA COMMITTED MALPRACTICE
AMOUNTING TO MORAL TURPITUDE IN THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES
On June 13, 2005, the IBP board took note of the vacancy in the EVP position,
brought about by the removal of Atty. de Vera. In his stead, IBP Governor
Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected and declared as EVP.
On June 20, 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished that position. Thus,
on June 25, 2005, during its last regular meeting, the IBP board elected a new
EVP in the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar.
HELD:
As to the first issue, The Court unanimously held in a per curiam Decision that
AC No. 6052 did not constitute a bar to the filing of AC No. 6697. The two
administrative cases involved different subject matters and causes of action.
In AC No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de Vera to
run for the position of IBP governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present
Administrative Complaint, the subject matter was his privilege to practice law.
The two aforementioned cases did not seek the same relief. In the first case,
the complainants sought to prevent respondent from assuming his post as
IBP governor for Eastern Mindanao; the cause of action referred to his alleged
violation of IBP bylaws. In the second case, what was principally sought was
his suspension or disbarment; the primary cause of action was his alleged
violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On June 28, 2005, IBP National President Cadiz requested the Supreme
Court's approval of Atty. Salazar's election and assumption of office as
national president, in the event that Atty. de Vera would be disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law; or should his removal from his positions
as member of the 2003-2005 board of governors and as EVP of the IBP be
approved by the Court.
Protesting the election of both Atty. Santiago and Atty. Salazar, Atty. De Vera
vehemently insists that there is no proof that he misappropriated his client's
funds as the elder Willis gave him authority to use the same and that the latter
even testified under oath that he "expected de Vera might use the money for
a few days." He also questions his removal from the IBP Board on the ground
that he was denied "very basic rights of due process recognized by the
Honorable Court even in administrative cases" like the right to answer
formally or in writing and within reasonable time, the right to present
witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing. He protest the fact that he
was not able to cross-examine the complainant, IBP Governor Rivera, and
the latter voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor
and judge at the same time.
In resolving the second issue, the Court cited Maquera, according to which a
judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction may
transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines, only if the
basis of the foreign courts action included any of the grounds for disbarment
or suspension in our jurisdiction.
The Court opined that by insisting that he was authorized by his clients father
and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera was impliedly admitting his
use of the Willis funds for his own personal use. Undoubtedly, his
unauthorized use of his clients funds was highly unethical.
The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the
plenary session, and personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera's
actuations, an evidentiary or formal hearing was no longer necessary.
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It was clear that by depositing the $12,000 check in his own bank account and
using it for his own benefit, respondent was guilty of malpractice, gross
misconduct, and unethical behavior. He violated his oath to conduct himself
with all good fidelity to his client. Nevertheless, the Court decreed that, where
any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not
be decreed. Considering the amount involved in this case, the Court
considered the penalty of suspension for two years appropriate.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines
shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since
Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof
terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege
to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino
citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
On the other hand, The Court found that the transfer by Atty. de Vera of his
membership to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter was within his rights. He could
not be deemed to be guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. Neither the Code
of Professional Responsibility nor the Lawyers Oath punished lawyers for
aspiring to be the IBP national president or prohibited them from doing
perfectly legal acts in accomplishing that goal.
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues
in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing
legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the
applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and
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(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him
of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an
officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member
of the Philippine bar.
It can not be overstressed that the practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions.1It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both the
power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare.
FACTS: Petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses filed with (petitioner) with the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice
law in the Philippines. The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 21, 1966; that he lost his
privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United States of
America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he reacquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225
or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his
oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General
in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if
granted, to resume the practice of law.
HELD: YES. The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice
of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioners membership in
the bar;ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No.
9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to
have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance
to the Republic.1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another
country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225,
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RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
Atty. Guico described the administrative complaint as replete with lies and
inconsistencies, and insisted that the charge was only meant for harassment.
He denied demanding and receiving money from Chu, a denial that Nardo
corroborated. He further denied handing to Chu a draft decision printed on
used paper emanating from his office, surmising that the used paper must
have been among those freely lying around in his office that had been pilfered
(stolen) by Chus witnesses in the criminal complaint he had handled for Chu.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
According to Chu, during a Christmas party held on December 5, 2006 at Atty.
Guicos residence in Commonwealth, Quezon City, Atty. Guico asked him to
prepare a substantial amount of money to be given to the NLRC
Commissioner handling the appeal to insure a favorable decision. On June
10, 2007, Chu called Atty. Guico to inform him that he had raised P300,000.00
for the purpose. Atty. Guico told him to proceed to his office at Times Street,
Quezon City, and to give the money to his assistant, Reynaldo (Nardo)
Manahan. Chu complied and delivered the money to Nardo. Subsequently,
Atty. Guico instructed Chu to meet him on July 5, 2007. Atty. Guico handed
Chu a copy of an alleged draft decision of the NLRC in favor of CVC. The
draft decision was printed on the dorsal portion of used paper apparently
emanating from the office of Atty. Guico. On that occasion, the latter told Chu
to raise another P300,000.00 to encourage the NLRC Commissioner to issue
the decision. But Chu could only produce P280,000.00, which he brought to
Atty. Guicos office on July 10, 2007. However, it was Nardo who received the
amount without issuing any receipt.
Chu followed up on the status of the CVC case with Atty. Guico in December
2007. However, Atty. Guico referred him to Nardo who in turn said that he
would only know the status after Christmas. Chu again called Nardo and was
invited by Nardo to meet for lunch. Chu asked Nardo if the NLRC
Commissioner had accepted the money, but Nardo replied in the negative and
simply told Chu to wait. Nardo assured that the money was still with Atty.
Guico who would return it should the NLRC Commissioner not accept it.
On January 19, 2009, the NLRC promulgated a decision adverse to CVC. Chu
confronted Atty. Guico, who in turn referred Chu to Nardo for the filing of a
motion for reconsideration. After the denial of the motion for reconsideration,
Atty. Guico caused the preparation and filing of an appeal in the Court of
Appeals. Finally, Chu terminated Atty. Guico as legal counsel on May 25,
2009.
HELD:
1) YES
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The testimony of Chu, and the circumstances narrated by Chu and his
witnesses, especially the act of Atty. Guico of presenting to Chu the supposed
draft decision that had been printed on used paper emanating from Atty.
Guicos office, sufficed to confirm that he had committed the imputed gross
misconduct by demanding and receiving P580,000.00 from Chu to obtain a
favorable decision. Atty. Guico offered only his general denial of the
allegations in his defense, but such denial did not overcome the affirmative
testimony of Chu. The SC cannot help but conclude that the production of the
draft decision by Atty. Guico was intended to motivate Chu to raise money to
ensure the chances of obtaining the favorable result in the labor case. As
such, Chu discharged his burden of proof as the complainant to establish his
complaint against Atty. Guico. In this administrative case, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.
Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel Chu
to raise the large sums of money in order to obtain a favorable decision in the
labor case. He thus violated the law against bribery and corruption. He
compounded his violation by actually using said illegality as his means of
obtaining a huge sum from the client that he soon appropriated for his own
personal interest. His acts constituted gross dishonesty and deceit, and were
a flagrant breach of his ethical commitments under the Lawyers Oath not to
delay any man for money or malice; and under Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility that forbade him from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His deviant conduct eroded the faith
of the people in him as an individual lawyer as well as in the Legal Profession
as a whole. In doing so, he ceased to be a servant of the law.
Grave misconduct is improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of
judgment.
Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct and disgraced the Legal Profession.
There is no question that any gross misconduct by an attorney in his
professional or private capacity renders him unfit to manage the affairs of
others, and is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or
disbarment, because good moral character is an essential qualification for the
admission of an attorney and for the continuance of such privilege.
2) NO
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The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend him from the
practice of law for three (3) years would be too soft a penalty. Instead, he
should be disbarred, for he exhibited his unworthiness of retaining his
membership in the legal profession. As the Court has reminded in Samonte
v. Abellana:
HELD: YES.
The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Guico be
ordered to return the amount of P580,000.00 to Chu is well-taken. That
amount was exacted by Atty. Guico from Chu in the guise of serving the
latters interest as the client. Although the purpose for the amount was
unlawful, it would be unjust not to require Atty. Guico to fully account for and
to return the money to Chu. It did not matter that this proceeding is
administrative in character, for, as the Court has pointed out in Bayonla v.
Reyes:
Although the Court renders this decision in an
administrative proceeding primarily to exact the ethical
responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Courts
silence about the respondent lawyers legal obligation to
restitute the complainant will be both unfair and inequitable.
No victim of gross ethical misconduct concerning the clients
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together with three of its stockholders who are the complainants in this
administrative case, namely Yolanda A. Andres, Minette A. Mercado and Elito
P. Andres, filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Amended Alias Writ of
Execution, contending that they are not bound by the judgment as they were
not parties to the labor case. In an Order, dated March 13, 2006, however,
respondent denied the Urgent Motion to Quash.
7, 2006 Resolution directing him to file his Comment. He also failed to attend
the mandatory conference before the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline
despite notice. Neither did he file his Position Paper. As a former Labor
Arbiter, respondent should know that orders of the court are not mere
requests but directives which should have been complied with promptly and
completely. He disregarded the oath he took when he was accepted to the
legal profession to obey the laws and the legal orders of the duly constituted
legal authorities. x x x His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called
upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost
in complying with court directives as an officer of the court.
HELD:
As a rule, for one to be held administratively accountable for gross ignorance
of the law, there must be a showing that the error was gross and patent as to
support a conclusion that the actor was so moved with malice, bad faith,
corruption, fraud, and dishonesty.
The court ruled that based from the Decision rendered by respondent, the
respondent did not act whimsically or arbitrarily; his ruling could not in any
manner be characterized as imbued with malice, fraud or bad faith. His
conclusion was reached after an examination of the documents presented
and evaluation and assessment of the arguments raised by the parties. He
did not capriciously rule on the issues presented; on the contrary, he exerted
efforts to weigh the positions of the contending parties. In any event, we hold
that respondent should not be held accountable for committing an honest
mistake or an error in the appreciation of the facts of the case before him.
Atty. Mendoza failed to comply with his obligation on due date. Upon demand
to pay, he requested Ms. Sosa not to deposit the postdated check. She
acceded and deferred the deposit of the check based on Atty. Mendozas
promise that he would later pay. The check was subsequently
returned/dishonored after Ms. Sosa finally deposited it sometime in October
2006; it was Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
Ms. Sosa, thru her lawyer Atty. Ernesto V. Cabrera, sent a letter to Atty.
Mendoza demanding payment of the loan plus interest and collection charges.
Atty. Mendoza ignored the demand letter despite receipt, as proven by the
Registry Receipt and Registry Return Receipt. Likewise, he did not, in any
Based from the foregoing, the court have no basis to hold respondent
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law. However, the court note
that respondent had consistently and obstinately disregarded the Courts and
IBPs orders. It is on record that respondent totally ignored the Courts June
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manner, contact Ms. Sosa to explain why he failed to pay. In view of the
repeated failure of Atty. Mendoza to pay, Ms. Sosa filed the complaint for
disbarment or suspension, charging Atty. Mendoza for violation of Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This Rule states that [a] lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
Atty. Mendoza admitted the existence of the loan and that it is a valid
obligation. However, he alleged that he only received One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) from one Elenita Cruz (Elenita), a friend of
the complainant. Atty. Mendoza did not attach an affidavit from Elenita nor
any evidence proving that he only received P100,000.00.
The facts of the case show that Atty. Mendoza engaged in improper or wrong
conduct as the failure to pay the loan was willful in character and implied a
wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment.
It is undisputed that Atty. Mendoza obtained a loan in the amount of
P500,000.00. He signed the promissory note and acknowledgement receipt
showing he received P500,000.00.19 Although he initially denied getting this
amount and claimed that he only received P100,000.00, he did not present
any evidence to prove his claim. He later also admitted the validity of his loan
without qualification as to the amount. Also undisputed is the fact that Ms.
Sosa tried to collect the amount due upon maturity but Atty. Mendoza failed
to pay. In fact, Ms. Sosa deferred depositing the postdated check upon Atty.
Mendozas request, and based on his promises that he would pay. Despite
all these, he still failed to comply with his obligation. Worse, the check when
finally deposited was dishonored, a fact that Atty. Mendoza did not dispute.
ISSUES:
1) WHETHER OR NOT ATTY. MENDOZA SHOULD BE HELD
LIABLE?
2) WHETHER THE COMPLAINANT CAN COLLECT THE AMOUNT
OF THE OBLIGATION OF THE LOAN IN A DISBARMENT
CASE?
HELD:
1) YES.
Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or in his private capacity
is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment
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claimed he had P600,000.00 and that he was ready to pay his obligation.
What is clear is that his obligation remains outstanding after all these years.
Other than his claim that he was disposing of real properties in order to settle
his obligation, Atty. Mendoza also failed to explain why he failed to pay despite
his admission of a just and valid loan. Whatever his reasons or excuses may
be, dire financial condition does not justify non-payment of debt.
The facts and evidence in this case clearly establish Atty. Mendozas failure
to live up to his duties as a lawyer as dictated by the lawyer's oath, the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby
degrading not only his personal integrity but his profession as well. To
reiterate, his failure to honor his just debt constitutes dishonest and deceitful
conduct. This dishonest conduct was compounded by Atty. Mendozas act of
interjecting flimsy excuses that only strengthened the conclusion that he
refused to pay a valid and just debt
2) No.
The SC differ with the IBPs recommendation ordering Atty. Mendoza to pay
the amount of the loan plus legal interest because the instant case is solely
an administrative complaint for disbarment and is not a civil action for
collection of a sum of money.
The quantum of evidence in these two types of cases alone prevents the court
from agreeing with the IBPs order to pay; the administrative complaint only
requires substantial evidence to justify a finding of liability, while a civil action
requires greater evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence.
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. In the recent case of Heenan v. Atty. Espejo (A.C. No. 10050,
December 3, 2013, 711 SCRA 290), The SC En Banc did not agree with the
Sesbreo alleged that, Garcia filed a similar complaint against him before the
IBP and Garcias complaint was motivated by resentment and desire for
revenge because he acted as pro bono counsel for Maria Margarita and Angie
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Ruth. Sesbreo alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase with
the inherent accessory penalties provided by law was deleted. Sesbreo
argued that even if the accessory penalty was not deleted, the disqualification
applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreo further alleged that
homicide does not involve moral turpitude.
was never wiped out. He served the commuted or reduced penalty, for which
reason he was released from prison. More importantly, the Final Release and
Discharge18 stated that [i]t is understood that such x x x accessory
penalties of the law as have not been expressly remitted herein shall
subsist. Hence, the Parcasio case has no application here. Even if Sesbreo
has been granted pardon, there is nothing in the records that shows that it
was a full and unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of law is not a
right but a privilege. It is granted only to those possessing good moral
character. A violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession
justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty against a lawyer, including
the penalty of disbarment.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that
disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a
crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men
or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
xxx Moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of
which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases
are reached.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of
Virginia in the United States and both lived as husband and wife until October
2001. Their union produced one offspring.
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by
the court in the Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between
Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage
to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine law.
There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the
President can grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.15 In this case, the executive
clemency merely commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years
and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment the penalty imposed on
Sesbreo. Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty.Commutation only
partially extinguished criminal liability. The penalty for Sesbreos crime
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter in
the mail informing her of Atty. Catindigs scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo,
and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter written and signed by
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Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty.
Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his
impediment is removed. On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr.
Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale condominium in Salcedo Village,
Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.
On May 15, 1995, the parties met again at the Mandarin Restaurant in Baguio
City and, in the presence of a Notary Public, Atty. Liberato Tadeo, respondent
and Ma. Elena executed and signed an affidavit attesting to their illicit
relationship and seeking their respective spouses' forgiveness.
With regards to Atty. Baydo, there is a dearth of evidence to prove the claimed
amorous relationship between her and Atty. Catindig. As it is, the evidence
that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim were mere allegations, an
anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed having an
affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty.
Catindig. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of
violating the Lawyers Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and is DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Complainant instituted the present suit for disbarment on May 23, 1995
charging respondent of gross immorality and grave misconduct. In his
Answer, respondent admitted the material allegations of the complaint but
interposed the defense of pardon.
Finding merit in the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
through Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, submitted its Report and
Recommendation dated September 21, 2007 for the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for one (1) year, which was adopted and
approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution dated October 19,
2007. Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration there from was denied in the
Resolution dated June 26, 2011.
TIONG v. FLORENDO.
662 SCRA 1. 2011
FACTS: Complainant Elpidio P. Tiong, an American Citizen, and his wife,
Ma. Elena T. Tiong, are real estate lessors in Baguio City. They are likewise
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Respondent's act of having an affair with his client's wife manifested his
disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of
fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of
his profession. Likewise, he violated the trust and confidence reposed on him
by complainant which in itself is prohibited under Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Undeniably, therefore, his illicit relationship with
Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful and grossly immoral conduct warranting
disciplinary action from the Court. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
provides that an attorney may be disbarred or suspended from his office by
the Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
office, grossly immoral conduct, among others.
HELD: NO.
The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide,
thus:
"CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
However, considering the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that a
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months, instead of
one (1) year as recommended by the IBP-CBD, is adequate sanction for the
grossly immoral conduct of respondent.
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
It has been consistently held by the Court that possession of good moral
character is not only a condition for admission to the Bar but is a continuing
requirement to maintain one's good standing in the legal profession. It is the
bounden duty of law practitioners to observe the highest degree of morality in
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PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
As a lawyer, a person whom the community looked up to, Atty. Garrido and
Valencia wereshouldered with the expectation that they would set a good
example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When they
violated the law and distorted it to cater to their own personal needs and
selfish motives, not only did their actions discredit the legal profession. Such
actions by themselves, without even including the fact of Garridos
abandonment of paternal responsibility, to the detriment of his children by the
petitioner; or the fact that Valencia married Garrido despite knowing of his
other marriages to two other women including the petitioner, are clear
indications of a lack of moral values not consistent with the proper conduct of
practicing lawyers within the country. As such, their disbarment is affirmed.
After a much further investigation into the matter, the time and effort given yi
elded results telling her that Atty. Valencia and her legal husband had been
married in Hong Kong. Moreover, on June 1993, her husband left their
conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence,
and has since failed to render much needed financial support. In their defense,
they postulated that they were not lawyers as of yet when they committed the
supposed immorality, so as such, they were not guilty of a violation of
Canon1, Rule 1.01.
BUENO v. RANESES.
687 SCRA 711. 2012
Before the Court is the Complaint for Disbarment1 against Atty. Ramon
Raeses filed on March 3, 1993 by Amparo Bueno with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline.
FACTS: Bueno related that she hired Atty. Raeses to represent her in Civil
Case. In consideration for his services, Bueno paid Atty. Raeses a retainer
fee of P3,000.00. She also agreed to pay him P300.00 for every hearing he
attended. No receipt was issued for the retainer fee paid.
Atty. Raeses prepared and filed an answer in her behalf. He also attended
hearings. On several occasions, Atty. Raeses would either be absent or late.
Bueno alleged that on November 14, 1988, Atty. Raeses asked for
P10,000.00. This amount would allegedly be divided between him and Judge
Nidea, the judge hearing Civil Case No. 777, so that they would not lose the
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PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
case. Atty. Raeses told Bueno not to tell anyone about the matter. She
immediately sold a pig and a refrigerator to raise the demanded amount, and
gave it to Atty. Raeses. In addition, Atty. Raeses asked for another
P5,000.00 sometime in December 1988, because the amount she had
previously given was inadequate. Bueno then sold her sala set and colored
television to raise the demanded amount, which she again delivered to Atty.
Raeses. Bueno later discovered that the trial court had required Atty.
Raeses to comment on the adverse partys offer of evidence and to submit
their memorandum on the case, but Atty. Raeses failed to comply with the
courts directive. Atty. Raeses concealed this development from her. In fact,
she was shocked when a court sheriff arrived sometime in May 1991 to
execute the decision against them. She went to Atty. Raeses office to ask
him about what happened to the case. Atty. Raeses told her that he had not
received any decision. Bueno later discovered from court records that Atty.
Raeses actually received a copy of the decision on December 3, 1990. When
she confronted Atty. Raeses about her discovery and showed him a courtissued certification, Atty. Raeses simply denied any knowledge of the
decision
HELD: Yes.
Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the rule that
instructs lawyers to refrain from any impropriety tending to influence, or from
any act giving the appearance of influencing, the court.
In this case, Atty. Raeses committed an even graver offense. As shown, he
committed a fraudulent exaction, and at the same time maligned both the
judge and the Judiciary. These are exacerbated by his cavalier attitude
towards the IBP during the investigation of his case; he practically disregarded
its processes and even lied to one of the Investigating Commissioners
regarding the notices given him about the case.
The Court supports the Investigating Commissioner in his conclusion. As
Commissioner Limpingco succinctly observed:
By its very nature, the act [of] soliciting money for bribery purposes would
necessarily take place in secrecy with only respondent Atty. Raeses and
complainant Bueno privy to it. Complainant Amparo Bueno has executed
sworn statements and had readily affirmed her allegations in this regard in
hearings held before the IBP Investigating Commissioners. Respondent Atty.
Raeses, for his part, has not even seen it fit to file any answer to the
complaint against him, much less appear in any hearings scheduled in this
investigation.
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PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and
fraudulent.1wphi1 It is false because no bribery apparently took place as
Atty. Raeses in fact lost the case. It is fraudulent because the professed
purpose of the exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond these, he maligned
the judge and the Judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won,
not on the merits, but through deceitful means a decidedly black mark
against the Judiciary. Last but not the least, Atty. Raeses grossly
disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude towards its disciplinary
proceedings.
From these perspectives, Atty. Raeses wronged his client, the judge
allegedly on the "take," the Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which he
is a member. The Court cannot and should not allow offenses such as these
to pass unredressed. Let this be a signal to one and all to all lawyers, their
clients and the general public that the Court will not hesitate to act decisively
and with no quarters given to defend the interest of the public, of our judicial
system and the institutions composing it, and to ensure that these are not
compromised by unscrupulous or misguided members of the Bar.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Ramon A. Raeses is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. The Office of the
Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to delete his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Costs against the respondent.
NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and HILDA S. PRESBITERO
vs. ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR.
A.C. No. 9872 January 28, 2014
IBP DECISION:
The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for committing the following acts:
(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they
were from his own account;
(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged
to her;
COMPLAINANTS ALLEGATIONS:
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(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-squaremeter lot he mortgaged to her;
(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;
(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although
he knew that it was exorbitant; and
(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were
dishonored as the accounts were already closed.
The IBP-CBD also found that respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01
of the CPR when he failed to properly account for the various funds he
received from complainants and violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR which
prohibits borrowing money from a client unless the clients interest is fully
protected or the client is given independent advice.
Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money
he received from his client, Presbitero. Indeed, his failure to return the excess
money in his possession gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the
trust reposed in him by, the client.
Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero
and to Navarro belonged to his son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is
similar to his name. It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. We have ruled that conduct, as used in the
Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyers professional duties. A
lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional
or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting
in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it
renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed P1,000,000 from his client
Presbitero. At the time he secured the loan, respondent was already the
retained counsel of Presbitero. In his dealings with his client Presbitero,
respondent took advantage of his knowledge of the law as well as the trust
and confidence reposed in him by his client.
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Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the
printing and circulation of the said calling card.
IBP FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION:
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD,
in its report and recommendation, found that respondent had encroached on
the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 and other canons
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened
the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or
brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the
CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that
any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
LISANGAN v. TOLENTINO.
A.C. No. 6672, September 04, 2009
FACTS: A complaint for disbarment filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of
professional services.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie
Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent
promised them financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims.
To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them
text messages.
ISSUES:
1) WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IS GUILTY IN VIOLATION
OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY?
2) WHETHER THE PENALTY OF THE IBP IS COMMENSURATE
TO THE CONDUCT OF THE RESPONDENT?
HELD:
1) YES
Front
Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino is guilty of violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and
16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including
the manner by which a lawyers services are to be made known.
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With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the
rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter
to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for
his services. Respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list
nor receiving benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied
Labianos connection to his office. Respondent committed an unethical,
predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He cannot escape liability
under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which
provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any mans cause.
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of
legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty.
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless
the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or
by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
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The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception
is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses
(such as filing fees, stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes,
cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling
for the client.
(d)
(e)
Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The
phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to
change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money
was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking
advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass
commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the
legal profession.
The SC SUSPENDED respondent from the practice of law for a period of one
year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
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Pitogo obtained a copy of the three (3) documents from the Land
Transportation Office. He went to Suellos office to have them certified. Pitogo
claims that when he called Suello the next day to tell him about the importance
of these documents to his civil case, Suello disowned the documents. Suello
instead ordered his secretary to give Pitogo a copy of his notarial register.
Pitogo reiterated to Suello that the documents were important in his civil case
pending before the Regional Trial Court. He requested Suello to certify the
authenticity and veracity of the three (3) documents he obtained from the Land
Transportation Office. He wanted to determine if the documents were duly
notarized by Suello or were merely fabricated. Pitogo did not receive a reply
from Suello.
Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may
perform notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which granted
the commission. Clearly, Atty. Siapno could not perform notarial functions in
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PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
Pitogo filed his Affidavit-Complaint against Suello before the IBP. Pitogo
alleges that there were discrepancies between the three (3) documents
notarized by Suello and Suellos entries in his notarial register.
RESPONDENT:
Suello denies having notarized the three (3) documents obtained from the
Land Transportation Office.He denies the allegation that he disowned the
documents. He admits that he certified the documents as true copies. Suello
explains that it was his secretary who certified Pitogos documents. Pitogo
called Suello the next day to ask for a certification. Suello told Pitogo that his
secretary was not given such authority.
Hence, when respondent negligently failed to enter the details of the three (3)
documents on his notarial register, he cast doubt on the authenticity of
complainants documents. He also cast doubt on the credibility of the notarial
register and the notarial process. He violated not only the Notarial Rules but
also the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to
promote respect for law and legal processes.
IBP:
Recommended Suellos suspension from the active practice of law for six (6)
months, as well as the revocation of his commission as a notary public. He
also recommended Suellos disqualification as notary public for (4) years.
Later, in his Position Paper, he passed the blame to his secretary. This
violates the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits lawyers from
engaging in dishonest and unlawful conduct. Respondents secretary cannot
be blamed for the erroneous entries in the notarial register. The notarial
commission is a license held personally by the notary public. It cannot be
further delegated. It is the notary public alone who is personally responsible
for the correctness of the entries in his or her notarial register. Respondents
apparent remorse may assuage the injury done privately, but it does not
change the nature of the violation.
Failure to properly record entries in the notarial register is also a ground for
revocation of notarial commission.
Notarial acts give private documents a badge of authenticity that the public
relies on when they encounter written documents and engage in written
transactions. Hence, all notaries public are duty-bound to protect the integrity
of notarial acts by ensuring that they perform their duties with utmost care.
Petitioners Contention:
Complainants alleged that Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal)
sought Omaas legal advice on whether they could legally live separately and
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PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
The IBP-CBD found that Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The IBP-CBD stated that Omaa had failed to
exercise due diligence in the performance of her function as a notary public
and to comply with the requirements of the law. The IBP-CBD noted the
inconsistencies in the defense of Omaa who first claimed that it was her parttime staff who notarized the contract but then later claimed that it was her
former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD found that respondent truly signed
the questioned document, yet she still disclaimed its authorship, thereby
revealing much more her propensity to lie and make deceit. Hence, The IBPCBD recommended that Omaa be suspended for one year from the practice
of law and for two years as a notary public.
ISSUE: Whether or not Omaa violated the Canon of Professional
Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal and Espinosas Kasunduan Ng
Paghihiwalay?
HELD: Yes, in preparing and notarizing a void document, Omaa violated Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that
[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Omaa alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not personally know
Espinosa. She denied that she prepared the contract. She admitted that
Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract
but she told him that it was illegal. Omaa alleged that Espinosa returned the
next day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her parttime office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature
and notarized the contract. Omaa presented Marantals Sinumpaang Salaysay
(affidavit) to support her allegations and to show that the complaint was
instigated by Glindo. Omaa further presented a letter of apology from her staff,
Arlene Dela Pea, acknowledging that she notarized the document without
Omaas knowledge, consent, and authority.
Omaa knew fully well that the Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay has no legal effect
and is against public policy.
Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval
is void. The Supreme Court has also ruled that a notary public should not
facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the
separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal
partnership, which is exactly what Omaa did in this case.
The Supreme Court held that it cannot accept Omaas allegation that it was
her part-time office staff who notarized the contract. The High Court agreed
with the IBP-CBD that Omaa herself notarized the contract. Even if it were
true that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only showed
Omaas negligence in doing her notarial duties. A notary public is personally
responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve
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Respodents defense:
The Trinidads claimed that they paid for the land by installments, completing
the payment on June 24, 1986 with the result that the Arguelleses executed
the deed of sale in their favor. For its part, Metrobank filed a cross-claim
against the Trinidads for litigation expenses, alleging that the Trinidads were
answerable for such expenses under the mortgage contracts.
Atty. Julieta A. Omaa was suspended from the practice of law for ONE YEAR
and her commission as a notary public is REVOKED and she is SUSPENDED
as a notary public for TWO YEARS.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY v. ARGUELLES
679 SCRA 348, 2012
HELD:
RTCs Decision:
The RTC ruled in favor of the Arguelleses and cancelled both the title in the
name of the Trinidads and the mortgages in Metrobanks favor. The primordial
issue, said the RTC, was whether or not the Trinidads paid the balance of the
agreed purchase price by installments. It found that they did not since they
could not present proof of the payments they supposedly made.
CAs decision:
The Arguelleses filed a complaint against the Trinidads with the RTC of Imus,
Cavite for the cancellation of their title in the latters names. Subsequently, the
complaint was amended to implead Metrobank and sought the cancellation of
the real estate mortgages over the property in its favor.
The CA affirmed that of the RTC but reduced the award of moral damages
to P50,000.00 each in favor of Servando and Claudio Arguelles. As for
Metrobank, the CA held that it was not a mortgagee in good faith as it appears
that Metrobank compelled the Trinidads to acquire title over the property
before the initial loan could be approved.
The SC ruled in favor of the Trinidads. Both the RTC and the CA held that the
presumption of regularity of a public document did not attach to the subject
deed of sale, given that the notary public, Atty. Saulog, Jr. failed to establish
the authenticity of the signatures on it. He could not remember if the
Arguelleses, present in court as he testified, were the same persons who
appeared and acknowledged the document before him. But it is too much to
expect a notary public who had but a brief time with the Arguelleses during
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the notarial ceremony to remember their faces 12 years later. What matters
is Atty. Saulog, Jr.s testimony respecting the ritual of notarization that he
invariably followed. He gave unbending assurance that he ascertained the
identities of the parties to documents who appeared before him, including the
Arguelleses, by requiring them to show documentary proofs of the same and
to sign the documents in his presence. Besides, the theory of the Arguelleses
is that it was Atty. Saulog, Jr. who facilitated the preparation of the falsified
deed of sale for the benefit of the Trinidads. But, if this were so, it would have
made more sense for Atty. Saulog, Jr. to testify in defense of the genuineness
of the transaction by claiming that he recalled the faces of those who
appeared before him 12 years ago and that they were no other than the
Arguelleses.
meant to harass or intimidate [him]. Also, the documents were tampered and
adulterated, or that [s]omebody might have forged [his] signature.
IBP:
Recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law and
disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent can be administratively liable.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez is guilty of
engaging in notarial practice without a notarial commission, and be
Suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years and be Disqualified from
being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years.
Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with
public interest and that a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client,
but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and
takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the
administration of justice as an officer of the court. Accordingly, [l]awyers
are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also
of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
Similarly, the duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and
impressed with public interest. [N]otarization is not a routinary, meaningless
act, for notarization converts a private document to a public instrument,
making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of
its authenticity and due execution.
In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed partylitigants, courts, other lawyers and the general public to the perils of ordinary
documents posing as public instruments. As noted by the Investigating
Commissioner, respondent committed acts of deceit and falsehood in open
violation of the explicit pronouncements of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Evidently, respondent's conduct falls miserably short of the
RESPONDENT:
denied the allegations saying, I have never been notarizing any document or
pleadings and added that he has never committed any malpractice, nor
deceit nor have violated [the] lawyers (sic) oath. He dismissed such
allegations as being preposterous, full of lies, politically motivated and x x x
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high standards of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing required from
lawyers. It is proper that he be sanctioned.
the disqualification rule, it behooved upon Atty. Revilla, Jr. to act with
prudence and refuse notarizing the document.
JANDOQUILE v. REVILLA
A.C. No. 9514, April 10, 2013
As to requiring the affiants to present valid identification, the Court ruled that
he cannot be liable. . If the notary public knows the affiants personally, he
need not require them to show their valid identification cards. This rule is
supported by the definition of a "jurat" under Section 6, Rule II of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. A "jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on
a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and presents
an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity; (c)
signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes
an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or
document. In this case, Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Atty. Revilla, Jr.s wife;
Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa is his wifes sister-in-law; and Elmer Alvarado is the
live-in houseboy of the Brosas family. Atty. Revilla, Jr. knows the three affiants
personally. Thus, he was justified in no longer requiring them to show valid
identification cards.
Let it be impressed that Atty. Revilla, Jr. was clearly disqualified to notarize
the complaint-affidavit of his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity.
While he has a valid defense as to the second charge, it does not exempt him
from liability for violating the disqualification rule.
However, Atty. Revilla, Jr.s violation of the disqualification rule under Section
3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice is not a sufficient ground
to disbar him. Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not commit any deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct or gross immoral conduct, or any other serious ground for
disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
HELD: No
Indeed, section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly
disqualifies respondent from notarizing the complaint-affidavit, from
performing the notarial act, since two of the affiants or principals are his
relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. Given the clear provision of
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for a period of three (3) months. Atty. Revilla, Jr. is further DIRECTED to
INFORM the Court, through an affidavit, once the period of his disqualification
has lapsed.
transaction of the parties." Notarial fees paid by the parties were also covered
by a receipt issued by the Treasurer of the Municipality of Real, Quezon.
After due proceedings, Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III
(Commissioner Abelita) issued the Report and Recommendation8 dated
November 20, 2012 for the cancellation of Atty. Rinens notarial commission
and his suspension from notarial practice for a period of one year.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rinen should be removed from being a notary
public.
HELD: YES.
Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in
an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct."13 "The notarization of a document
carries considerable legal effect. Notarization of a private document converts
such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notarization is not an empty routine; to
the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree.
Wilberto claimed that his mother Aurora died on May 7, 1987, leaving behind
as heirs her spouse, Celedonio Talisic, and their three children, namely:
Arlene Talisic Villarazo, Wilberto and Alvin Corpuz Talisic. It was only after his
fathers death on November 2, 2000 that Wilberto and his siblings knew of the
transfer of the subject parcel via the subject deed. While Wilberto believed
that his fathers signature on the deed was authentic, his and his siblings
supposed signatures were merely forged. Wilberto also pointed out that even
his name was erroneously indicated in the deed as "Wilfredo".
In the present case, Atty. Rinen did not deny his failure to personally verify
the identity of all parties who purportedly signed the subject document and
whom, as he claimed, appeared before him on April 7, 1994. Such failure was
further shown by the fact that the pertinent details of the community tax
certificates of Wilberto and his sister, as proof of their identity, remained
unspecified in the subject deeds acknowledgment portion. Clearly, there was
a failure on the part of Atty. Rinen to exercise the due diligence that was
required of him as a notary public ex-officio. The lapses he committed in
relation to such function then justified the recommendations presented by the
IBP.
Respondent denied the charge against him and explained that it was only
on April 7, 1994 that he came to know of the transaction between the Spouses
Durante and the Talisics, when they approached him in his office as the then
Presiding Judge of the MunicipalTrial Court, Real, Quezon, to have the
subject deed prepared and notarized. His clerk of court prepared the deed
and upon its completion, ushered the parties to his office for the administration
of oath.6 The deed contained his certification that at the time of the
documents execution, "no notary public was available to expedite the
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sanction. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this
Resolution to enable it to determine when the revocation of his notarial
commission and his disqualification from being commissioned as notary
public shall take effect.
In his defense, Atty. Salve vehemently denied that he falsified the Deed of
Absolute Sale. He averred that the said document was regular on its face
except the month of sale, i.e., August 12, 2007 instead of September 12,
2007, which is a mere clerical error due to sheer inadvertence on the part of
his secretary. Atty. Salve claimed that the date stamp accidentally slid to
August instead of September as it was also being used by three (3) other
office clerks and two (2) lawyers for other office documents. Atty. Salve
further narrated that both Salita and Rodriguez went to him and brought the
PN and other loan documents executed by Salita himself. He also clarified
that the PN was notarized in their presence on December 12, 2002 and both
got a copy right after. Atty. Salve then inferred that it was Salita who erased
the PNs machine printed numbers using his own handwriting and thereafter
photocopied it to make it appear that the document was not among the notarial
documents he submitted to the Office of the Clerk of Court of Tagum Cityfor
the year 2002. Finally, Atty. Salve averred that the certified electronic copies
of the PN in the Office of the Clerk of Court of Tagum City and the ones in his
law office are identical and the same, while Salitas alleged falsified photocopy
is totally different.
Petitioners Contention:
It dismissed Salitas complaint for lack of merit. He found that Salita was not
able to obtain the required quantum of proof to hold Atty. Salve
administratively liable, especially considering that Salitas criminal complaint
was dismissed for lack of probable cause.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP Investigating
Commissioners Report and Recommendation dismissing the case for lack of
merit. However, upon reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Resolution dated March 8, 2014 setting aside its December 29, 2012
Resolution and recommended the suspension of Atty. Salves notarial
Salita noticed that one copy of the Deed of Sale was purportedly notarized on
August 12, 2007, while another was notarized a month later, or on September
12, 2007. Thus, Salita went on to conclude that because of the foregoing
events, it appeared as if he had sold the subject property to Rodriguez and
executed the same before Atty. Salve.
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commission for a period of three (3) months. It, however, failed to state the
reasons for imposing the suspension.
HELD: Yes, Atty. Salves act of certifying under oath an irregular Deed of
Absolute Sale without requiring the personal appearance of the persons
executing the same constitutes gross negligence in the performance of duty
as a notary public.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated
therein. These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated because what are
stated therein are facts they have personal knowledge of and are personally
sworn to. Otherwise, their representatives names should appear in the said
documents as the ones who executed the same.
FACTS: Complainants Jimmy Anudon and Juanita Anudon are brother- and
sister-in-law. Complainants and Jimmys brothers and sister co-own a 4,446square-meter parcel of land located in Sison, Pangasinan Respondent Atty.
Arturo B. Cefra is a distant relative of Jimmy and Juanita. He was admitted
to the bar in 1996. He practices law and provides services as notary public in
the Municipality of Sison, Pangasinan. Atty. Cefra notarized a Deed of
Absolute Sale over a land owned by the petitioners. The names of petitioners
appeared as vendors, while the name of Celino Paran, Jr. appeared as the
vendee. Jimmy and Juanita claimed that the Deed of Absolute Sale was
falsified. They alleged that they did not sign the Deed of Absolute
Sale. Moreover, they did not sign it before Atty. Cefra. The National Bureau
of Investigations Questioned Documents Division certified that Jimmy and
Juanitas signatures were forged. This is contrary to Atty. Cefras
acknowledgment over the document. Moreover, it was physically impossible
for Jimmys brothers and sister to have signed the document because they
were somewhere else at that time. Due to the forgery of the Deed of Absolute
Sale, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, with Jimmy and Juanita as
witnesses, filed a case of falsification of public document against Atty. Cefra
and Paran.
To recount, records reveal that Rodriguez used, among others, the Deed of
Absolute Sale notarized by Atty. Salve to file an ejectment complaint against
Salita. However, it must be remembered that Salita was merely made to sign
such document as collateral for his loan and that he had already fully paid the
same, as evidenced by the notarized Release of Real Estate Mortgage
executed by Rodriguez herself. Considering the circumstances, it is simply
unfathomable for Salita to appear before Atty. Salve to have the said
document notarized, as it will be detrimental to his own interests. Hence, the
Court finds that Atty. Salve notarized the pre-formed Deed of Absolute Sale
without Salitas presence before him.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal
or immoral arrangements. By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, he
converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document into a public
document. In doing so, Atty. Salve,as borne from the records of this case,
effectively proclaimed to the world that: (a) all the parties therein personally
appeared before him; (b) they are all personally known to him; (c) they were
the same persons who executed the instruments; (d) he inquired into the
Defendant Defense:
In his defense, Atty. Cefra stated that Jimmy and Juanita were aware of the
sale of the property and that Juanita and Jimmys wife Helen Anudon went to
his residence to consult him on how they could sell the land. Atty. Cefra
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claimed that he assisted in the preparation of the documents for the sale,
which included the deed of sale and the acknowledgment receipts for
payment. Parans relatives, , brought the Deed of Absolute Sale to the
residences of Jimmy, Juanita, and Johnnys son, Loejan Anudon to have the
document signed. Parans relatives informed Atty. Cefra that they witnessed
Jimmy, Juanita, and Loejan sign the document. Loejan affixed the signatures
for his father, Johnny, and his uncle and aunt, Alfonso and Benita. Atty. Cefra
admitted knowing that Loejan affixed the signatures of Johnny, Alfonso, and
Benita with the full knowledge and permission of the three. He allowed this
on the basis of his belief that this was justified since Loejan needed the
proceeds of the sale for the amputation of his mothers leg.
ISSUE: Is Atty. Cefra guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 1 of Code
of Professional Responsibility?
HELD:
The IBPs finding:
Respondent violated the Notarial Law and Canon 1. That his notarial
commission be revoked, his notarial practice suspended for 2 years and that
he be suspended from practice of law for 1 year.
Notarization is the act that ensures the public that the provisions in the
document express the true agreement between the parties. Transgressing
the rules on notarial practice sacrifices the integrity of notarized documents. It
is the notary public who assures that the parties appearing in the document
are the same parties who executed it. This cannot be achieved if the parties
are not physically present before the notary public acknowledging the
document.
Aside from Atty. Cefras violation of his duty as a notary public, Atty. Cefra is
also guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. This canon requires a lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. He
contumaciously delayed compliance with this courts order to file a
Comment. As early as September 19, 2001, this court already required Atty.
Cefra to comment on the Complaint lodged against him. Atty. Cefra did not
comply with this order until he was arrested by the National Bureau of
Investigation. Atty. Cefra only filed his Comment on January 15, 2008, more
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than seven years after this courts order. Atty. Cefras actions show utter
disrespect for legal processes.
not actually his but the residence certificate number of Florentina. Atty.
Examen also falsely acknowledged that the two witnesses personally
appeared before him when they did not. Lastly, it is alleged that despite
knowing the infirmities of these documents, Atty. Examen introduced these
documents into evidence violating his oath as a lawyer and the CPR.
The Court SUSPENDED him from the PRACTICE OF LAW for TWO
YEARS, REVOKED his incumbent NOTARIAL COMMISSION ,
and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED him from being COMMISSIONED as a
NOTARY PUBLIC. Respondent was also sternly warned that more severe
penalties will be imposed for any further breach of the Canons in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Defendant:
In his defense, Atty. Examen pointed out that there was no longer any
prohibition under the Revised Administrative Code for a notary public to
notarize a document where one of the parties is related to him by
consanguinity and affinity. With regard to the use of Florentinas residence
certificate as Ramons, Atty. Examen said that he was in good faith and that
it was office practice that the secretary type details without him personally
examining the output. In any event, he reasoned that the use of anothers
residence certificate is not a ground for disbarment and is barred by
prescription
IBP:
On MR, the IBP imposed a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
a period of one year and disqualification from re-appointment as Notary Public
for a period of two years.
ISSUE: W/N atty. Examen violated the notarial code.
HELD: Yes.
On January 12, 2002, the heirs of Alilano filed a suit for recovery of possession
before the Regional Trial Court of Sultan Kudarat against Edna Examen and
Atty. Roberto Examen. It was during this proceeding that Atty. Examen
introduced into evidence the March 31, 1984 and September 12, 1984
Absolute Deeds of Sale.
Complainant stated that Atty. Examen allegedly violated the notarial law when
he notarized the absolute deeds of sale since a notary public is prohibited
from notarizing a document when one of the parties is a relative by
consanguinity within the fourth civil degree or affinity within the second civil
degree. It is also alleged that Atty. Examen notarized the documents knowing
that the cedula or residence certificate number used by Ramon Examen was
In this case, the heirs of Alilano stated that Atty. Examen was prohibited to
notarize the absolute deeds of sale since he was related by consanguinity
within the fourth civil degree with the vendee, Ramon. The prohibition might
have still applied had the applicable rule been the Spanish Notarial Law.
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However, following the Courts ruling in Kapunan, the law in force at the time
of signing was the Revised Administrative Code, thus, the prohibition was
removed. Atty. Examen was not incompetent to notarize the document even
if one of the parties to the deed was a relative, his brother.
WHEREFORE,
respondent
Atty.
Roberto
E.
Examen
is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS. In
addition, his present notarial commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED, and he
is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for a period of two
(2) years from finality of this Decision. He is further WARNED that any similar
act or infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely
A notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed
with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. Good faith cannot be a
mitigating circumstance in situations since the duty to function as a notary
public is personal. The Court note that the error could have been prevented
had Atty. Examen diligently performed his functions: personally checked the
correctness of the documents. To say that it was his secretarys fault reflects
disregard and unfitness to discharge the functions of a notary public for it is
he who personally acknowledges the document. He was behooved under
Section 251, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code to check if the
proper cedulas were presented and inspect if the documents to be
acknowledged by him reflected the correct details. This Court cannot stress
enough that notarization is not a routinary act. It is imbued with substantive
public interest owing to the public character of his duties.
Atty. Examen posits that the failure of a notary to make the proper notation
of cedulas can only be a ground for disqualification and not the proper subject
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RESPONDENT:
ISSUE: W/N Baker and McKenzie can practice law in the Philippines
HELD: No.
The Court held that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot
practice law in the Philippines. Respondents' use of the firm name Baker &
McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they
could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business
enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" This is
unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practice law in the
country.
IBP:
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practicing law under the
firm name Baker & McKenzie.
However, respondent should still be held liable for violation of Civil Service
Rules and Regulations since he failed to show that he was permitted by his
Office to appear as counsel for his clients.
Complainant also alleged that respondent was engaged in the private practice
of law. He lives in a house and lot owned by complainants family without
paying any rental and refuses to leave the place despite the latters demands.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated the civil service law and be
administratively liable.
HELD: For accepting employment as a member of the PLEB of Quezon City
while concurrently employed as Legal Officer V of the Manila Urban
Settlement Office, in violation of the Constitution and the statutes, which in
turn contravene his Attorneys Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility;
and by engaging in the illegal practice of law, Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
Respondent cannot justify his practice of law by claiming that his office (the
Manila Urban Resettlement) is not really strict when it comes to appearing in
some private cases as they (employees) were sometimes called to render
service even on holidays without additional compensation. At most, he should
have asked written permission from his chief as required by Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules that (n)o officer or employee shall
engage directly in any private business, vocation or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of the Department.
Respondent also failed to establish that his primary functions as Legal Officer
of the Manila Urban Settlements Office allow his appointment as PLEB
member, an exception to dual appointment prohibited by the Constitution and
the statutes. Indeed, respondent, in accepting such appointment, has
transgressed the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Local
Government Code of 1991. Being contra leges, respondent also violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Attorneys Oath.
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Anent its offer of private documents, the prosecution likewise failed to comply
with Section 27, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads, "[a]n authorized
public record of a private document may be proved by the original record, or
by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an
appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody." Considering that the
private documents were submitted and filed with the BOC, the same became
part of public records. Again, the records show that the prosecution failed to
present the certified true copies of the documents.
The CTA noted that, in its Opposition to the Demurrer, the prosecution even
admitted that none of their witnesses ever positively identified the accused in
open court and that the alleged misdeclared goods were not competently and
properly identified in court by any of the prosecution witnesses.
The prosecution filed its motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the
CTA, stressing, among others, that to grant it would place the accused in
double jeopardy.
On July 24, 2013, the Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue
Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG), as counsel for the BOC, received a
copy of the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment
in the case.
Despite opposition, the CTA dismissed the case against Garcia and Vestidas
Jr, for failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
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Hence, this petition for certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the CTA when in ruled that: 1) the pieces of documentary evidence
submitted by the prosecution were inadmissible in evidence; 2) the object
evidence consisting of the alleged misdeclared goods were not presented as
evidence; and 3) the witnesses failed to positively identify the accused as
responsible for the misdeclaration of goods.
The Court deems it proper to remind the lawyers in the Bureau of Customs
that the canons embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility equally
apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.
Thus, RATS lawyers should exert every effort and consider it their duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
IN RE: PETITION OF ATTY. MEDADO TO SIGN ROLL OF ATTORNEYS,
B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013
ISSUE: Whether or not there was failure on the part of the prosecution to
present the certified true copies of the documentary evidence as provided
under Section 7, Rule 130 and Section 127, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court?
FACTS: Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the
degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1979and passed the same years bar
examinations.cOn 7 May 1980, he took the Attorneys Oath at the Philippine
International Convention Center (PICC) together with the successful bar
examinees. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May
1980, but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had
misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys given by the Bar Office
when he went home to his province for a vacation.
HELD: Yes, the Supreme Court agrees with the disposition of the CTA.
The display of patent violations of even the elementary rules leads the Court
to suspect that the case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. was doomed by
design from the start. The failure to present the certified true copies of
documentary evidence; the failure to competently and properly identify the
misdeclared goods; the failure to identify the accused in court; and,worse, the
failure to file the petition for certiorari on time challenging a judgment of
acquittal, are tell-tale signs of a reluctant and subdued attitude in pursuing the
case. This stance taken by the lawyers in government service rouses the
Courts vigilance against inefficiency in the administration of justice. Verily,
the lawyers representing the offices under the executive branch should be
reminded that they still remain as officers of the court from whom a high sense
of competence and fervor is expected. The Court will not close its eyes to this
sense of apathy in RATS lawyers, lest the governments goal of revenue
enhancement continues to suffer the blows of smuggling and similar activities.
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado
found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that
he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of
the PICC was probably just an attendance record.
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that
he was mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively
involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated under the mistaken belief
that since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys
was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer; and the matter of
signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was
subsequently forgotten.
Even the error committed by the RATS in filing a motion for reconsideration
with the CTA displays gross ignorance as to the effects of an acquittal in a
criminal case and the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. Had the
RATS been eager and keen in prosecuting the respondents, it would have, in
the first place, presented its evidence with the CTA in strict compliance with
the Rules.
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About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant
Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.
HELD:
The OBC Decision:
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference
on the matter on 21 September 2012 and submitted a Report and
Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013. The OBC recommended
that the instant petition be denied for petitioners gross negligence, gross
misconduct and utter lack of merit. It explained that, based on his answers
during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification
for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the
legal consequences of his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake
of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is
presumed to know the law and its consequences. Ignorantia facti excusat;
ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Applying these principles to the case at
bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when
he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oathtaking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized
that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer
claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado
should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of
signing therein that would have made him so. When, in spite of this
knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary
steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
After a judicious review of the records, the SC granted Medados prayer in the
instant petition, subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty
equivalent to suspension from the practice of law. At the outset, the Court
noted that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin
to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that the
Court has reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of members of
the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted. For one,
petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally
filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was
not a third party who called this Courts attention to petitioners omission;
rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after
the passage of more than 30 years.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by ones assuming
to be an attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority,
may constitute indirect contempt of court,which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both. Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal
contempt and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of
hearings. In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed
indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of
law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no
formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him. Knowingly
engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification
from the practice of law, which is more than what we can say of other
individuals who were successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar.
For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the
strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima
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the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office were under reinvestigation since she' did
not have the opportunity to answer the criminal complaint.
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
"investigation, report and recommendation or decision within ninety (90) days
from receipt of [the] records[.]"The Investigating Commissioner of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines found
Atty. De Vera administratively liable for serious misconduct and
recommended the penalty of suspension for one (1) year from the practice of
law.
Upon maturity of the checks, Teresita presented the checks for payment.
However, the checks "bounced" for being drawn against insufficient funds.
Teresita attempted to encash the checks for a second time. However, the
checks were dishonored because the account was closed.
Teresita demanded payment from Atty. De Vera. However, she failed to settle
her obligations, prompting Teresita to file complaints against Atty. De Vera for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. The Quezon City Prosecutor's Office issued
the Resolution dated March 4, 2008 finding probable cause for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code. On the same day, an Information for estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code was filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. Subsequently, a warrant of arrest was issued by the
trial court.
HELD: After considering the parties' arguments and the records of this case,
we resolve to adopt and approve the recommendations of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Board of Governors.
Misconduct involves "wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment";47 it is serious or gross when it is flagrant.
A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her
actions whether acting in a public or private capacity.50 The Code of
Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 1 -A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW
AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Respondent:
Atty. De Vera presented her version of the facts. She claims that the present
administrative case is baseless. She points out that the proceedings before
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....
CANON 7 -A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITYAND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
....
The Court, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), resolves this matter of the election of the Executive VicePresident (EVP) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the 20112013 term.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
This administrative matter was triggered by the Petition for Intervention filed
by petitioner-intervenor IBP-Southern Luzon Region (IBP-Southern Luzon),
seeking a declaration that the post of EVP-IBP for the 2011-2013 term be held
open to all regions and that it is qualified to field a candidate for the said
position.
FACTS:
In 1973, the Philippine Bar was integrated1 to elevate the standards of the
legal profession, to improve the administration of justice and to enable it to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.2 Governing the IBP was
the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG), consisting of the governors from each
of the nine (9) geographic regions of the archipelago,3 namely: Northern
Luzon, Central Luzon, Southern Luzon, Greater Manila, Bicolandia, Eastern
Visayas, Western Visayas, Eastern Mindanao, and Western Mindanao.4 The
governors of the IBP-BOG are, in turn, elected by the House of Delegates
which consists of members duly apportioned among the chapters of each
region.5
Membership in the bar requires a high degree of fidelity to the laws whether
in a private or professional capacity. "Any transgression of this duty on his
part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode
the public's faith in the Legal Profession as a whole."56 A lawyer "may be
removed or otherwise disciplined 'not only for malpractice and dishonesty in
his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy
of the privileges which his license and the law confer to him.'"
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Trina De Vera is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in
Atty. De Vera's personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and a
copy be served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.
At the helm of the IBP is the IBP National President (IBP-President),6 who is
automatically succeeded by the EVP. When the Philippine Bar was first
integrated, both the IBP-President and the EVP were elected by the IBP-BOG
from among themselves or from other members of the Integrated Bar,7 with
the right of automatic succession by the EVP to the presidency for the next
succeeding full term. The presidency rotated among all the nine regions in
such order as the IBP-BOG had prescribed.8 Both the IBP-President and the
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PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
EVP held a term of one (1) year, with the presidency rotating from year to year
among the regions.9
On November 1, 1974, the IBP By-Laws took effect, providing that the IBPPresident and the EVP be chosen by the Board of Governors from among
nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis.10 It
was also provided that the IBP-President and the EVP hold office for a term
of two (2) years from July 1 following their election until June 30 of their second
year in office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and
qualified.11
The Executive Vice President shall automatically become President for the
next succeeding term. The Presidency shall rotate among the nine Regions.
On January 27, 1999, in Velez v. de Vera,18 reasoning that the rotation
system applied only to the EVP, the Court considered the election of then EVP
Leonard De Vera (De Vera), representing the Eastern Mindanao region,
asone completing the first rotational cycle and affirmed the election of
Jose Vicente B. Salazar (Salazar) of the Bicolandia region as EVP. The Court
explained that the rotational cycle would have been completed with the
succession of EVP De Vera, representing Eastern Mindanao as IBPPresident. For having misappropriated his clients funds and committing acts
inimical to the IBP-BOG and the IBP in general, De Vera was removed as
governor of Eastern Mindanao and as EVP, and his removal was affirmed by
the Court.
. In Bar Matter No. 287, dated July 9, 1985, the Court approved the
recommendation allowing the IBP-President, the EVP and the officers of the
House of Delegates to be directly elected by the House of Delegates.12
Unfortunately, history recalls that this mode of electing the IBP national
officers was marred with unethical politicking, electioneering and other
distasteful practices. Thus, on October 6, 1989, the Court in Bar Matter No.
491, dated October 6, 1989, ordered: 1] the annulment of the just concluded
national elections; 2] the abolition of the system of election of national officers
by direct action of the House of Delegates; 3] the restoration of the former
system of having the IBP-President and the EVP elected by the IBP-BOG
from among themselves, with right of succession by the EVP to the presidency
and subject to the rule that "the position of Executive Vice President of the
IBP shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions;"13 4] the holding of
special elections for the election of the first set of IBP-President and
EVP;14 and 5] the appointment of a caretaker board to administer the affairs
of the IBP pending the holding of special elections.15
Thus, Salazar became IBP-President for the 2005-2007 term with Feliciano
Bautista (Bautista) of Central Luzon as EVP. The term of Salazar was the start
of the second rotational cycle. Bautista eventually succeeded to the IBP
presidency with Atty. Rogelio Vinluan (Vinluan) as his EVP.
In 2009, however, the national and regional IBP elections were again tainted
with numerous controversies, which were resolved by the Court in the
following manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves that:
In the same Bar Matter No. 491, the Court ordered the amendment of Section
47, Article VII of the IBP By-laws, to read:
SEC. 47. National Officers. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have
a President and Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of
Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable,
on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex officio Vice President for their
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The Court issued a resolution24 addressing the issues with respect to the
election of governor for IBP-Western Visayas. In clarifying that the rotational
rule was one by exclusion, the Court explained that in the election of governor
of a region, all chapters of the region should be given the opportunity to have
their nominees elected as governor, to the exclusion of those chapters that
had already served in the rotational cycle. Once a rotational cycle would be
completed, all chapters of a region, except the chapter which won in the
immediately preceding elections, could once again have the equal opportunity
to vie for the position of governor of their region. The chapter that won in the
immediately preceding election, under the rotational cycle just completed,
could only vie for the position of governor after the election of the first governor
in the new cycle.
ISSUES:
Sec. 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have
a President, an Executive Vice President, and nine (9) regional Governors.
The Executive Vice President shall be elected on a strict rotation basis by the
Board of Governors from among themselves, by the vote of at least five (5)
Governors. The Governors shall be ex officio Vice President for their
respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the
Board of Governors.
The violation of the rotation rule in any election shall be penalized by
annulment of the election and disqualification of the offender from
election or appointment to any office in the IBP.
HELD:
In the special elections that were held thereafter, Roan I. Libarios (Libarios),
representing IBP-Eastern Mindanao Region, was elected EVP and he later on
succeeded as president.
There is no dispute that the Constitution has empowered the Supreme Court
to promulgate rules concerning "the integrated bar."41 Pursuant thereto, the
Court wields a continuing power of supervision over the IBP and its affairs like
the elections of its officers. The current controversy has been precipitated by
the petition in intervention of IBP-Southern Luzon, praying that the election of
the EVP for the 2011-2013 term be opened to all and that it be considered as
qualified to field a candidate for the said position.
the IBP-BOG, acting on the letter of then Gov. Erwin M. Fortunato (Fortunato)
of IBP-Western Visayas requested that the Court provide guidance on how it
would proceed with the application of the rotational rule in the regional
elections for governor of IBP-Western Visayas.23
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In the exercise of its continuing supervisory power, the Court is allowing the
matter to be raised as an issue because it has not yet been squarely settled,
as will be pointed out later on.Moreover, it is not only an exercise of its
constitutional and statutory mandated duty, but also of its symbolic function of
providing guiding principles, precepts and doctrines42 for the purpose of
steering the members of the bench and the bar to the proper path.
In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually
rotated among the nine Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the
Presidency is merely a result of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP
to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the position
of IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule pertains to the Presidency.
The rotation with respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the
automatic succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the
election of Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already
produced an EVP and, thus, the rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate
that the supervening event of Atty. de Vera's removal as IBP Governor and
EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency. The fact
remains, however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite the nonassumption by Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.
At any rate, granting that technical rules are strictly applied in administrative
matters, the Court can exercise its power and prerogative to suspend its own
rules and to exempt a case from their operation if and when justice requires
it. "The power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so
pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had
already declared final."46
The notion that the ruling in Velez50 should not be considered at all by the
Court because it is barred by the Omnibus Motion Rule deserves scant
consideration. It may have been earlier overlooked, but the Court is not barred
from motu propio taking judicial notice of such judicial pronouncement,
pursuant to its continuing supervisory powers over the IBP.
From the above, it is clear that the amendment was effected to underscore
the shift of the rotation from the position of president to that of EVP. The
purpose of the system being to ensure that all the regions will have an equal
opportunity to serve as EVP and then automatically succeed as president.
While there may have been no categorical pronouncement in Velez that the
second rotational cycle started with the election of Salazar as EVP, it cannot
be denied that it was so. With the Velez declaration that the election of De
Vera as EVP completed the first cycle, there can be no other consequence
except that the term of EVP Salazar commenced a new rotational cycle. As
there were only four (4) regions which had served as EVP, there are still five
(5) other regions which have not yet so served. These regions are:
As previously mentioned, in Velez,48 the Court stated that the rotation system
applies to the election of the EVP only and considered the service of then EVP
De Vera, representing the Eastern Mindanao region, as having completed the
first rotational cycle. For said reason, the Court affirmed the election of
Salazar of Bicolandia as EVP. The Court explained that the rotation cycle with
respect to the presidency would have been completed with the succession of
EVP De Vera as IBP-President. The specific words used in Velez49 were:
1. Northern Luzon
2. Greater Manila Area
3. Eastern Visayas
4. Western Visayas
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5. Western Mindanao
Therefore, either the governor of the Western Visayas Region, or the governor
of the Eastern Mindanao Region should be elected as Executive VicePresident for the 2009-2011 term. The one who is not chosen for this term,
shall have his turn in the next (2011-2013) term. Afterwards, another rotation
shall commence with Greater Manila in the lead, followed by Southern Luzon,
Eastern Visayas, Western Mindanao, Northern Luzon, Bicolandia, Central
Luzon, and either Western Visayas or Eastern Mindanao at the end of the
round.54
Needless to state, Western Visayas is not the only region that can vie for EVP
for the 2011-2013 term. This answers the query of Fortunato.
With respect to IBP-Southern Luzon, following the ruling in Velez,51 it is clear
that it already had its turn to serve as EVP in the Second Rotational Cycle.
The Special Committee failed to take into account the Velez ruling
Apparently, the report of the Special Committee failed to take into account the
ruling in Velez55 that the service of then EVP Leonard De Vera, representing
the Eastern Mindanao region, completed the first rotational cycle.
the Court then was confronted with limited issues. Among those were: 1] the
validity of the election of Nasser A. Marohomsalic as governor of the IBPWestern Mindanao Region; 2] the validity of the election of Manuel M.
Maramba as governor for the Greater Manila Region for the term 2009-2011;
3] the validity of the election of Erwin M. Fortunato as governor for Western
Visayas Region for the term 2009-2011; and 4] the validity of the elections for
EVP for the 2009-2011 term presided by then IBP-President Bautista. The
four issues were intertwined since the validity of the elections presided by IBPPresident Bautista was questioned on the alleged lack of quorum, as it was
attended by Marohomsalic, whose own election was then also being
questioned.
With those limited issues resolved, the Court directed that special elections
should be held for the election of EVP for the remaining 2009-2011 term "to
heal the divisions in the IBP and promote unity by enabling all the nine (9)
governors-elect to elect the EVP in a unified meeting called for that
purpose."53 In ordering the special elections to be conducted, the Court took
into account the report of the Special Committee as follows:
Only the governors of the Western Visayas and Eastern Mindanao regions
have not yet had their turn as Executive Vice President cum next IBP
President, while Central Luzon and Bicolandia have had two (2) terms
already.
At any rate, the statement of the Court in its December 14, 2010
Resolution57 that "only the governors of the Western Visayas and Eastern
Mindanao regions have not yet had their turn as Executive Vice President,"
did not pertain to the lis mota of the case. Thus, it did not settle anything so
as to be deemed a precedent-setting ruling. Those statements, therefore,
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could not be considered as overturning, vacating and setting aside the ruling
in Velez58 that the service of then EVP De Vera completed the first
rotational cycle.
Moreover, in A.M. No. 491, the Court stressed that: "One who has served as
President of the IBP may not run for election as EVP-IBP in a
succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine
(9) regionsshall have completed; whereupon the rotation shall begin anew."
Rotation by Exclusion
As Velez60 declared that the election of EVP De Vera completed the first
rotational cycle, it could only mean that all regions had their respective turns
in the first rotational cycle. Thus, in this second rotational cycle, issues as to
the nature of his election and service as IBP-President during the First
Rotational Cycle are inconsequential.
If Eugene Tan served only up to April, 1991, it was not because he served
merely in the interim. He served up to that time only because he resigned.
As reflected in Bar Matter No. 565, dated October 15, 1991, Tan resigned as
IBP-President when he was charged by several staff members of the IBP in a
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Thus, as applied in the IBP-Western Visayas Region, initially, all the chapters
shall have the equal opportunity to vie for the position of Governor for the next
cycle except Romblon, so as no chapter shall serve consecutively. Every
winner shall then be excluded after its term. Romblon then joins the
succeeding elections after the first winner in the cycle.64
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That the Court, in its December 14, 2010 Resolution,66 ordered the election of
the EVP-IBP for the next term based on the inaccurate report of the Special
Committee, is a fact. That cannot be erased. As a consequence thereof,
Libarios of IBP-Eastern Mindanao is now the IBP President. He, however, is
part of the second rotational cycle because 1] in Velez67 it was categorically
ruled that the service of then EVP De Vera, representing the Eastern
Mindanao region, completed the first rotational cycle; and 2] he could not
be part of the first rotational cycle because EVP de Vera of the same region
had already been elected as such.
the IBP "to start on a clean and correct slate, free from the politicking and the
under handed tactics that have characterized the IBP elections for so long."
Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws should be further amended
It is to be noted that in the December 14, 2010 Resolution,68 the Court did not
categorically overturn the ruling in Velez.69 It merely directed the election of
the next EVP, without any reference to any rotational cycle.
Whatever the decision of the Court may be, to prevent future wranglings and
guide the IBP in their future course of action, Section 47 and Section 49 of the
IBP By-laws should again be amended. Stress should be placed on the
automatic succession of the EVP to the position of the president. Surprisingly,
the automatic succession does not appear in present Section 47, as ordered
amended by the Court in the December 14, 2010 Resolution. It should be
restored. Accordingly, Section 47 and Section 49, Article VII, are
recommended to read as follows:
To declare that the first rotational cycle as not yet completed will cause more
confusion than solution. In fact, it has spawned this current controversy. To
consider the service of current president, Libarios, as part of the first rotational
cycle would completely ignore the ruling in Velez.70
The Board of Governors shall elect the President and Executive Vice
President from among themselves each by a vote of at least five (5)
Governors. Upon expiration of the term of the President, the Executive VicePresident shall automatically succeed as President.
How then do we treat the turns of those who had already served in the second
rotational cycle? Shall we treat them as anomalies? As aberrant
developments,
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term of the new rotational cycle ends, subject once more to the rule on
exclusion.
The order of rotation by exclusion shall be without prejudice to the regions
entering into a consensus to adopt any pre-ordained sequence in the new
rotation cycle provided each region will have its turn in the rotation.
To further avoid conflicting and confusing rulings in the various IBP cases like
what happened to this one, the December 14,2010 Resolution and Velez,72 it
is recommended that the Court create a committee for IBP affairs to primarily
attend to the problems and needs of a very important professional body and
to make recommendation for its improvement and strengthening.
SEC. 49. Terms of office. - The President and the Executive Vice-President
shall hold office for a term of two years from July 1 following their election until
June 30 of their second year in office and until their successors shall have
been duly chosen and qualified.
In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties
shall be performed by the Executive Vice President, and in the event of the
death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Executive Vice President
shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion of the term. His
tenure as such shall not be considered a new turn in the rotation.
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ISSUE:
HELD:
1. Yes.
The respondent did not file any answer or position paper, nor did he appear
during the scheduled mandatory conference. Respondent in fact abandoned
his last known address, his law office in Olongapo City, after he committed
the embezzlement. Respondent should not be allowed to benefit from his
disappearing act. He can neither defeat this Court's jurisdiction over him as a
member of the bar nor evade administrative liability by the mere ruse of
concealing his whereabouts. Thus, service of the complaint and other orders
and processes on respondent's office was sufficient notice to him.
RESPONDENT:
Respondent failed to file his answer and position paper despite service of
notice at his last known address. Neither did he appear in the scheduled
mandatory conference. In this connection, the CBD found that respondent
abandoned his law practice in Olongapo City after his transaction with
complainant and that he did not see it fit to contest the charges against him.
Indeed, since he himself rendered the service of notice on him impossible, the
notice requirement cannot apply to him and he is thus considered to have
waived it. The law does not require that the impossible be done. The law
obliges no one to perform an impossibility. In this connection, lawyers must
update their records with the IBP by informing the IBP National Office or their
respective chapters of any change in office or residential address and other
contact details. In case such change is not duly updated, service of notice on
the office or residential address appearing in the records of the IBP National
Office shall constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for purposes of
administrative proceedings against him.
IBP:
Ruled that respondent used his position as a lawyer to mislead complainant
on the matter of land ownership by a foreigner. He even went through the
motion of preparing falsified and fictitious contracts, deeds and agreements.
And for all these shameless acts, he collected P400,000 from complainant.
Worse, he pocketed the P3.8 million and absconded with it.
The CBD found respondent to be "nothing more than an embezzler" who
misused his professional status as an attorney as a tool for deceiving
complainant and absconding with complainant's money. Respondent was
2. Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas
be DISBARRED.
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All lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws and to
do no falsehood. That oath is neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words.
It is a sacred trust that should be upheld and kept inviolable at all times.
Lawyers are servants of the law and the law is their master. They should not
simply obey the laws, they should also inspire respect for and obedience
thereto by serving as exemplars worthy of emulation.
Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental
constitutional policy, showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross
ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he knew
were void and illegal.
Respondent's misconduct did not end there. By advising complainant that a
foreigner could legally and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and by
assuring complainant that the property was alienable, respondent deliberately
foisted a falsehood on his client. He did not give due regard to the trust and
confidence reposed in him by complainant. Instead, he deceived complainant
and misled him into parting with P400,000 for services that were both illegal
and unprofessional. Moreover, by pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8
million given by complainant for the purchase of the property, respondent
committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in nature.
A lawyer who resorts to nefarious schemes to circumvent the law and uses
his legal knowledge to further his selfish ends to the great prejudice of others,
poses a clear and present danger to the rule of law and to the legal system.
He does not only tarnish the image of the bar and degrade the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, he also betrays everything that the legal
profession stands for.
Atty. Pactolin appealed to the SC but affirmed his conviction. The Court
treated the matter as an administrative complaint against him as well under
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, it referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate action.
It is respondent and his kind that give lawyering a bad name and make laymen
support Dick the Butcher's call, "Kill all lawyers!" A disgrace to their
professional brethren, they must be purged from the bar.
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VILLATUYA v. TABALINGCOS
676 SCRA 37 (2012)
Pactolins Contention:
The Supreme Court upheld the finding of the Sandiganbayan that the copy of
Abastillas letter which Atty. Pactolin attached to his complaint was spurious.
Given the clear absence of a satisfactory explanation regarding his
possession and use of the falsified Abastillas letter, this Court held that the
Sandiganbayan did not err in concluding that it was Atty. Pactolin who falsified
the letter. The Court relied on the settled rule that in the absence of
satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged
document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification.
The crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty,
and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude
includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Defendants Defense:
In his defense, respondent denied charges against him and asserted that the
complainant was not an employee of his law firm but rather an employee of
Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., one of the financial consultancy firms.
Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in
performing his job and that there was no verbal agreement between them
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regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by
his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant
had been paid. Respondent also denied committing any unlawful solicitation.
To support his contention, respondent attached a Joint Venture Agreement
and an affidavit executed by the Vice-President for operations of Jesi and
Jane Management, Inc. On the charge of gross immorality, respondent
assailed the Affidavit of a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had been retracted
by the affiant himself. Respondent did not specifically address the allegations
regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women
ISSUES:
1. WON respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
nonpayment of fees to complainant;
2. WON respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation; and
3. WON respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married
thrice.
HELD:
The Commissioners Recommendation:
Commission promulgated its Report and Recommendation addressing the
specific charges against respondent. The first charge, for dishonesty for the
nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. On
the second charge, the Commission found respondent to have violated the
rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal services and
unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the
violation. As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be
guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission recommended
that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
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What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered
into marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting.
Respondents Contention:
Respondent admitted having notarized and acknowledged a deed of donation
executed by the donor, Atty. Linco, in favor of his son, Alexander David T.
Linco, as represented by Lina P. Toledo. He was invited by Atty. Linco,
through an emissary in the person of Claire Juele-Algodon (Algodon), to see
him at his residence and was then informed that Atty. Linco was sick and
wanted to discuss something with him. Atty. Linco showed him a deed of
donation and the TCT of the property subject of the donation. Respondent
claimed that Atty. Linco asked him a favor of notarizing the deed of donation
in his presence along with the witnesses. However, respondent explained that
since he had no idea that he would be notarizing a document, he did not bring
his notarial book and seal with him. Thus, he instead told Algodon and Toledo
to bring to his office the signed deed of donation anytime at their convenience
so that he could formally notarize and acknowledge the same. On July 30,
2003, respondent claimed that Toledo and Algodon went to his law office and
informed him that Atty. Linco had passed away on July 29, 2003. Respondent
was then asked to notarize the deed of donation. Respondent admitted to
have consented as he found it to be his commitment to a fellow lawyer. Thus,
he notarized the subject deed of donation, which was actually signed in his
presence on July 8, 2003.
Petitioners Contention:
She claims that respondent's reprehensible act in connivance with Toledo was
violative of her and her children's rights but also in violation of the notarial law.
The notarial acknowledgment stated that Atty. Linco and Lina P. Toledo
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of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
one year.
TUMBOKON v. PEFIANCO
678 SCRA 60 (2012)
It is established that Atty. Linco was already dead when respondent notarized
the deed of donation on July 30, 2003. Respondent likewise admitted that he
knew that Atty. Linco died a day before he notarized the deed of donation.
Respondent notarized the document after the lapse of more than 20 days from
July 8, 2003, when he was allegedly asked to notarize the deed of donation.
The sufficient lapse of time from the time he last saw Atty. Linco should have
put him on guard and deterred him from proceeding with the notarization of
the deed of donation.
However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial procedure in
order to accommodate the alleged need of a colleague. The fact that
respondent previously appeared before him in person does not justify his act
of notarizing the deed of donation, considering the affiant's absence on the
very day the document was notarized. In the notarial acknowledgment of the
deed of donation, respondent attested that Atty. Linco personally came and
appeared before him on July 30, 2003. Yet obviously, Atty. Linco could not
have appeared before him on July 30, 2003, because the latter died on July
29, 2003. Clearly, respondent made a false statement and violated Rule 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer.
Respondent:
Explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25% contingent fee basis,
and advanced all the expenses. He disputed the August 11, 1995 letter for
being a forgery and claimed that Sps. Yap assumed to pay complainant's
commission which he clarified in his July 16, 1997 letter. He, thus, prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint and for the corresponding sanction against
complainant's counsel, Atty. Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a baseless
complaint.
For breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility, the
notarial commission of respondent ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, is REVOKED.
And he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period
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based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia
accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the
case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo
denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet
Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty.
Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for
Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an
affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an
affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for
comparison. Using Atty. Bancolos affidavit and other documentary evidence,
Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying
the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo. The Office of the
Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public document
for insufficiency of evidence. The administrative case for dishonesty was also
dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19 September
2005.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyer violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01,
Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code).
HELD: YES.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications
for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a
high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing,
and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the
courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied
in the Code. Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting
of the above standards whether in their professional or in their private
capacity.
Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a
complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolos law partner.
The complainants alleged that they were subjected to a harassment
Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature
of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty.
Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants
attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty.
Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report
concluded that the questioned signatures in the letter-complaints and the
submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and
the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were
respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were
also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute
innocent people. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the
secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty.
Bancolo.
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Defendants Defense:
suspended for 1 year. The charge against Atty. Jarder shall be dismissed for
lack of merit.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the SC agreed with the
findings and recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds
to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable. Atty. Bancolo
admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly,
this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA VS. ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE
A.C. No. 7269, November 23, 2011
FACTS: Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel
for Irene Bides, while Busmente was the counsel for the defendant Imelda B.
Ulaso (Ulaso) in an ejectment case. Another case for falsification was filed
against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana
alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela
Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmentes
collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings.
Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders and notices specified
Dela Rosa as Busmentes collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged
that upon verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.
RESPONDENT:
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal
assistant for a few years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment
with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting
herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmentes
former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not represent Ulaso and that
his signature in the Answer presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was
forged.
BOGs Decision:
The Board of Governors of the IBP approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Atty. Bancolo shall be
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IBP:
pointed out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from
his office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005.
Pleadings and court notices were still sent to Busmentes office until 2005.
The IBP-CBD noted that Dela Rosas practice should have ended in 2003
when Macasieb left.
Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient
evidence to prove that Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. We agree with the recommendation of
the IBP, modifying the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente
should be suspended from the practice of law for six months.
HELD:
We agree with the IBP.
We SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS.
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public
policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found
duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on
the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails
to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose
is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this
purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him
not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to
make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or
corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of
the Bar, misrepresented herself as Busmentes collaborating counsel in Civil
Case No. 9284. The only question is whether Busmente indirectly or directly
assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment in his office ended in 2000
and that Dela Rosa was able to continue with her illegal practice of law
through connivance with Macasieb, another member of Busmentes staff. As
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before the rendition of said judgment. They were surprised to learn, however,
that the respondents filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
This prompted them to seek legal advice to another lawyer who referred the
complainants to Atty. Paras, who had just resumed his practice of law after
his suspension. Atty. Paras proceeded to file a disbarment case against the
respondents with the IBP.
Atty. Paras clearly defied the authority of this Court when he represented the
complainants and filed an answer on their behalf during the period of his
suspension from the practice of law. They alleged that he appeared in several
cases and filed numerous pleadings despite his suspension.
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline:
It is for the foregoing reason that the Court cannot simply yield to
complainants change of heart by refuting their own statements against the
respondents and praying that the complaint for disbarment they filed be
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dismissed. It bears emphasizing that any misconduct on the part of the lawyer
not only hurts the clients cause but is even more disparaging on the integrity
of the legal profession itself. Thus, for tarnishing the reputation of the
profession, a lawyer may still be disciplined notwithstanding the complainants
pardon or withdrawal from the case for as long as there is evidence to support
any finding of culpability. A case for suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainants, if the facts
proven so warrant. It follows that the withdrawal of the complainant from the
case, or even the filing of an affidavit of desistance, does not conclude the
administrative case against an erring lawyer.
Caspe alleged the controversy started when Atty. Mejica disregarded conflict
of interest rules. Caspe said that when he filed a complaint for attempted
murder against Antonio Rodriguez, Jr., Atty. Mejica served as Caspes
counsel. When Rodriguez, Jr. filed his counter-affidavit, it was Atty. Mejica
who counseled and represented him.
Caspe brought separate suits for damages and disbarment: one for conflict of
interest and the present complaint. Atty. Mejica tried to negotiate a settlement
but Caspe refused. Atty. Mejica allegedly then threatened Caspe that he will
help file cases after cases against the complainant until he kneels before
[him]. He will put down complainant so much so that he will be removed from
the service. From then on, Caspe alleged, Atty. Mejica maliciously
encouraged the filing of suits against him.
Therefore, in the instant case, the Court cannot just set aside the finding of
culpability against the respondents merely because the complainants have
decided to forgive them or settle matters amicably after the case was
completely evaluated and reviewed by the IBP. The complainants
forgiveness or even withdrawal from the case does not ipso facto obliterate
the misconduct committed by Francisco. To begin with, it is already too late
in the day for the complainants to withdraw the disbarment case considering
that they had already presented and supported their claims with convincing
and credible evidence.
In the present complaint, Caspe narrated that on December 21, 2007, Romulo
Gaduena, a barangay tanod, harassed Jan Mark Busa and Marcelino Jataas
with a gun. Caspe, who was on duty, together with PO1 Onofre Lopea
responded. They recovered a caliber 0.357 revolver which was turned over
to the Can-avid Police station. The incident was recorded in the police blotter.
Gaduena evaded arrest with the help of barangay captain Prudencio Agda
and other barangay tanods who allegedly clobbered Caspe and took his gun.
In the interest of peace and harmony, the Chief of Police called and requested
that Caspe desist from filing charges against the barangay captain and
tanods, specifically Gaduena. Caspe acceded.
The complainants belated claim that the respondents were faultless and that
the allegations stated in the disbarment complaint were just fabricated by their
former counsel cannot stand against the clear and preponderant evidence
they earlier presented. What clearly appears is that the facts material to the
violation committed by Francisco are well-established notwithstanding Atty.
Paras supposed fabrication of some insignificant particulars.
However, Gaduena, with Atty. Mejica as counsel, filed a complaint for serious
slander by deed against Caspe, which was supported by a joint affidavit of
two barangay tanods. It was alleged that Caspe kicked, collared and slapped
Gaduenas face. This prompted Caspe to disregard the agreement with the
Chief of Police and he filed cases against the tanods. Suspecting that Atty.
Mejica encouraged Gaduena to file the case against him, Caspe filed the
cases for damages and disbarment against Atty. Mejica before the IBP.
Petitioners Contention:
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He asked that the hearing be postponed and rescheduled and that copies of
the complaint be furnished to him. The hearing was thus rescheduled to
January 13, 2009 and a copy of the complaint was sent to him via a private
courier, LBC. It appeared however that he did not claim the mail.
CBD thus recommended that Atty. Mejica be suspended from the practice of
law for one year.
On December 9, 2008, Atty. Mejica once more manifested that he did not
receive any notice from LBC of any mail to be claimed. He also expressed
misgivings on the shift from registered mail to the use of a private courier to
send copies of the complaint. He requested that a copy of the complaint be
sent to him via registered mail.
The IBP BOG adopted the Report and Recommendation of the IBP CBD.
HELD: Yes, Atty. Mejica further violated Canon 1145 of the CPR which calls
for a lawyer to observe and give due respect to courts and judicial officers.
The Supreme Court adopts the findings of the IBP but modify the penalty
imposed.
Atty. Mejica failed to appear in the January 13, 2009 hearing. Again, Atty.
Mejica failed to appear for the February 3, 2009 hearing. The IBP CBD
ordered the case submitted for decision.
The IBP CBD concluded that there could be no other reason for Atty. Mejica
to file the cases against PO1 Caspe other than to get back at him. The High
Court agrees that the confluence of circumstances points to Atty. Mejicas
corrupt motive in helping Gaduena in filing cases against Caspe, in violation
of Rules 1.03, 1.04 and 10.01 of the CPR.
Respondents Contention:
Atty. Mejica maintains that he was not afforded due process. He stated that
he received a Notice of Preliminary Conference for October 21, 2008 but did
not appear since he did not receive a copy of the complaint and was not
ordered to answer. For the scheduled February 3, 2009 Conference, Atty.
Mejica reasoned that it was impossible for him to attend the meeting since he
received the Notice in the afternoon of February 3, 2009.33 Furthermore, he
was not given the opportunity to answer. Atty. Mejica also maintained that he
never threatened Caspe because he was not present during the preliminary
conference where he allegedly uttered the threatening words.
With respect to Atty. Mejicas claim that he was not afforded due process, i.e.,
he was not able to receive a copy of a complaint which in turn was the reason
for him not to have attended the mandatory conference, This contention is
untenable.
Section 5, Rule V of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar
Discipline Integrated Bar of the Philippines provides that:
The IBP CBD found respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.03, 1.04 and 10.01
of the CPR. It stated that Atty. Mejica was corruptly motivated in encouraging
the filing of suits against Caspe making good his threat to file case upon case
against the latter until he kneels before him. Notice was taken that this was
Atty. Mejicas second infraction for a similar offense. In Baldado v. Mejica, he
was suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months. The IBP
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Atty. Mejica during the course of these proceedings has missed all four
scheduled hearings supposedly since he was not furnished any copy of the
complaint. Records suggest however that a copy of the complaint was sent
to him on August 25, 2008, a mail which he did not claim. He submitted two
manifestations in response to notices he received. He was thus placed on
notice that there was an action against him.
It is the Courts opinion that Atty. Mejicas attitude toward the proceedings
before the IBP indicates a lack of respect for the IBPs rules and procedures.
respondent Atty. Aquilino A. Mejica is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 1.03,
1.04 and 10.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS.
ANTERO J. POBRE v. SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009
FACTS: In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with
enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Courts attention to the following
excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on the
Senate floor:
HELD: This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront
in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free
speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative
and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body
to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce
anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being
served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the
manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee
rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of
the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the
privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the
courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the
name of parliamentary immunity. For the above reasons, the plea of Senator
Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary
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action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally
or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however,
that this could not be the last word on the matter.
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts
should be allowed to erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case, the
lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Natasha V. HeysuwanFlorido, the complainant, averred that she was the legitimatespouse of the
respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido, the respondent, but because of
theestranged relation, they lived separately. They have two children whom
the complainant has thecustody. Complainant filed a case for the
annulment of her marriage; meanwhile there, wasanother related case
pending in the Court of Appeals.Sometime in the middle of December 2001,
respondent went to complainants residence
in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two
minor children besurrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of
an alleged Resolution issued by theCourt of Appeals which supposedly
granted his motion for temporary child custody.
Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not
received any motionfor temporary child custody filed by
respondent.Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged
resolution of the Court ofAppeals, but respondent failed to give it to her.
Complainant then examined the resolutionclosely and noted that it bore two
dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensingsomething
amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to respondent. The
complainantverified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a
certification.
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of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do
so.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for
his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
HELD: Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast
on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is
asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of
verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due
recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the
defense of a clients cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth.
FACTS: The ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del
Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was
promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya
Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision, raising
solely the following grounds:
Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They
constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is
prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:
I.
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Corona). Thereafter, various authors wrote the Court regarding the alleged
plagiarism of their works.
II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the
broader, if fundamental, responsibility of states to protect the human
rights of its citizens especially where the rights asserted are subject
of erga omnes obligations and pertain to jus cogens norms.
Counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and
Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they posited for the first time their
charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya
decision. They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out
the fact not only of extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true
intents of the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the
assailed Judgment for denying the Petition."
Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court in reply to the charge
of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
The Court formed the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards (the Ethics
Committee) pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the Court
referred the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics
Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members
of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the
interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and
abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for
one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.
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Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement
exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free
speech.
One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the
threat to judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice that
immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks on judicial decisions and institutions
pose.
In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of
fidelity and due respect to the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully
well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits of the
Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statements issuance, were still both
sub judice or pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have been
widely publicized. On this point, respondents allege that at the time the
Statement was first drafted on July 27, 2010, they did not know of the
constitution of the Ethics Committee and they had issued the Statement under
the belief that this Court intended to take no action on the ethics charge
against Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant lapse of time from the
drafting and printing of the Statement on July 27, 2010 and its publication and
submission to this Court in early August when the Ethics Committee had
already been convened. If it is true that the respondents outrage was fueled
by their perception of indifference on the part of the Court then, when it
became known that the Court did intend to take action, there was nothing to
prevent respondents from recalibrating the Statement to take this supervening
event into account in the interest of fairness.
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certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court
demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another
under established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges,
court employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court
and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for
admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the
courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors,
regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to
which they belong.
(5) Finally, respondents requests for a hearing and for access to the records
of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of merit.
LANTORIA v. BUNYI
A.M. Case No. 1769, June 8, 1992
FACTS: This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L. Lantoria, seeking
disciplinary action against respondent Irineo L. Bunyi, member of the
Philippine Bar, on the ground that respondent Bunyi allegedly committed acts
of "graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and corruption of the judge and bribery",
in connection with respondent's handling of Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88
then pending before the Municipal Court of Experanza, Agusan del Sur,
presided over by Municipal Judge Vicente Galicia in which respondent Bunyi
was the counsel of one of the parties, namely, Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas.
Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M. Mascarinas of Manila was
the owner of d farm located in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that herein
complainant Lantoria was the manager and supervisor of said farm, receiving
as such a monthly allowance. 2 It appears that the complaint in Civil Case
Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to eject the squatters from the aforementioned
farm. 3 These cases were assigned to the Municipal Court of Esperanza,
Agusan del Bur, the acting municipal judge of which was the Honorable
Vicente Galicia (who was at the same time the regular judge of the municipal
court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur
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Respondent admitted the existence of the letter but explained the contents
thereof as follows:
a) the said letter of June 1, 1974, is self-explanatory and speaks for itself, that
if ever the same was written by the Respondent, it was due to the insistence
of the Complainant thru his several letters received, that the decisions in
question be drafted or prepared for Judge Galicia,
b) Thirdly, in the same letter, the decisions as prepared were in the form of
drafts, as in fact, the letter mentioned subject to suggestion or correction to
change or modify for the better by Judge Galicia (Second paragraph, Ibid);
c) Fourthly, in the some letter, Responding (sic) even apologized for the delay
in sending the same to the Complainant and expressed his gratitude for his
assistance in attending to the cases involved
The Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report
and recommendation. On 21 July 1980, the Solicitor General submitted his
report to the Court, Hence, in his report, the Solicitor General found that
respondent is guilty of highly unethical and unprofessional conduct for failure
to perform his duty, as an officer of the court, to help promote the
independence of the judiciary and to refrain from engaging in acts which would
influence judicial determination of a litigation in which he is counsel. The
Solicitor General recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year. He filed with the Court the
corresponding complaint against respondent.
CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain
from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court.
Rule 13.01 A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality
to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges.
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Fiscal Salva conferred with the Solicitor General as to what steps he should
take. A conference was held with the Secretary of Justice who decided to
have the results of the investigation by the Philippine Constabulary and
Malacaang investigators made available to counsel for the appellants.
CRUZ v. SALVA
G.R. No. 12871, July 25, 1959, 105 Phil. 115
Thereafter, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for new trial with this
Tribunal supporting the same with the so-called affidavits and confessions of
some of those persons investigated. By resolution of this Tribunal, action on
said motion for new trial was deferred until the case was studied and
determined on the merits. In the meantime, the Chief, Philippine
Constabulary, head sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva copies of the same
affidavits and confessions and written statements, of which the motion for new
trial was based, and respondent Salva proceeded to conduct a
reinvestigation.
FACTS:
Petitioner:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed
by Timoteo V. Cruz against Francisco G. H. Salva, in his capacity as City
Fiscal of Pasay City, to restrain him from continuing with the preliminary
investigation he was conducting in September, 1957 in connection with the
killing of Manuel Monroy which took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay City
Respondent:
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the instance of Realista, had scheduled the hearing at an early date, that is in
August, 1957. Respondent claims that before he would go to trial in the
prosecution of Realista he had to chart his course and plan of action, whether
to present the same evidence, oral and documentary, presented in the original
case and trial, or, in view of the new evidence consisting of the affidavits and
confessions sent to him by the Philippine Constabulary, he should first assess
and determine the value of said evidence by conducting an investigation and
that should he be convinced that the persons criminally responsible for the
killing of Manuel Monroy were other than those already tried and convicted,
like Oscar Castelo and his co-accused and co-appellants, including Salvador
Realista, then he might act accordingly and even recommend the dismissal of
the case against Realista.
The duty and role of prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure
the conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.
HELD:
(1)
As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary
investigation which he and his committee began ordinarily, when a criminal
case in which a fiscal intervened though nominally, for according to
respondent, two government attorneys had been designed by the Secretary
of Justice to handle the prosecution in the trial of the case in the court below,
is tried and decided and it is appealed to a higher court such as this Tribunal,
the functions and actuations of said fiscal have terminated; usually, the appeal
is handled for the government by the Office of the Solicitor General.
Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion for said fiscal to conduct
a reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved in
the appeal.
(2)
However, with respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite
petitioner to appear and testify before him at the scheduled preliminary
investigation, under the law, petitioner had a right to be present at that
investigation since as was already stated, he was more or less deeply
involved and implicated in the killing of Monroy according to the affiants whose
confessions, affidavits and testimonies respondent Salva was considering or
was to consider at said preliminary investigation. But he need not be present
at said investigation because his presence there implies, and was more of a
right rather than a duty or legal obligation. Consequently, even if, as claimed
by respondent Salva, petitioner expressed the desire to be given an
opportunity to be present at the said investigation, if he latter changed his
mind and renounced his right, and even strenuously objected to being made
to appear at said investigation, he could not be compelled to do so.
(3)
The newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what
took place during the investigation, and this involved headlines and extensive
recitals, narrations of and comments on the testimonies given by the
witnesses as well as vivid descriptions of the incidents that took place during
the investigation. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the killing
of Manuel Monroy which had already been tried and finally determined by the
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PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
IN RE: ALMACEN
G.R. No. 12871, February 18, 1970
lower court and which was under appeal and advisement by this Tribunal, was
being retried and redetermined in the press, and all with the apparent place
and complaisance of respondent,
FACTS: Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil
case. They lost in said civil case but Almacen filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said motion but he failed
to indicate the time and place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion
was denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as
it agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion for reconsideration.
Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court
which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution. This earned the ire
of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional. He then
filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyers certificate
of title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his profession
when members of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for
justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that
due to the minute resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without
knowing the reasons why and that he became one of the sacrificial victims
before the altar of hypocrisy. He also stated that justice as administered by
the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf
and dumb.
The members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such
publicity and sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of
respondent Salva. In this, he committed what was regard a grievous error and
poor judgment for which we fail to find any excuse or satisfactory explanation.
His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence,
discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when
a criminal case is being investigated by the authorities, even when it being
tried in court; but when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even
encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending consideration by this
Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent, and this
Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put an end
to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary
measure, even a penalty to the one liable.
In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in
holding the preliminary investigation involved in this case, insofar as Salvador
Realista is concerned, for which reason the writ of preliminary injunction
issued stopping said preliminary investigation, is dissolved; that in view of
petitioner's objection to appear and testify at the said investigation,
respondent may not compel him to attend said investigation, for which reason,
the subpoena issued by respondent against petitioner is hereby set aside.
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacens petition as the
Court wanted to wait for Almacen to ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen
did not surrender his lawyers certificate though as he now argues that he
chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may be permitted to give reasons
and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him . . . in an
open and public hearing. He said he preferred this considering that the
Supreme Court is the complainant, prosecutor and Judge. Almacen was
however unapologetic.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in
part and denied in part. Considering the conclusion arrived at by us,
respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby publicly reprehended and
censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism that he
had given to and allowed in connection with his investigation, which we
consider and find to be contempt of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that
a repetition of the same would meet with a more severe disciplinary action
and penalty.
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HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are
needed because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full
opinion for every petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable
to effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme
Court is to decide only those cases which present questions whose
resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and
parties involved. It should be remembered that a petition to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the courts denial. For one
thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals
opinion.
On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded
said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the
court and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and
through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. His right as a
citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner,
and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been
encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism
that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts.
According to them, each lawyer contributes a fixed amount every month for
the maintenance of the entire office; and expenses for cases, such as
transportation, copying, printing, mailing, and the like are shouldered by each
lawyer separately, allowing each lawyer to fix and receive his own
professional fees exclusively.
As such, the lawyers do not discuss their clientele with the other lawyers and
associates, unless they agree that a case be handled collaboratively.
They averred that complainant's labor cases were solely and exclusively
handled by Atty. Dionela and not by the entire law firm. Moreover,
respondents asserted that the qualified theft case filed by FEVE Farms was
handled by Atty. Penalosa, a new associate who had no knowledge of
complainant's labor cases, as he started working for the firm after the
termination thereof.
FACTS: Complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm of
the respondents, for labor cases. Atty. Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was
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PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
The IBP found that complainant was indeed represented in the labor cases
by the respondents acting together as a law firm and not solely by Atty.
Dionela. Consequently, there was a conflict of interest in this case, as
respondents, having been retained by FEVE Farms, created a connection that
would injure complainant in the qualified theft case. Moreover, the termination
of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client.
As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents' pronounced liability is not
altered by the fact that the labor cases against complainant had long been
terminated. Verily, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no
justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with
that of the former client. The client's confidence once reposed should not be
divested by mere expiration of professional employment.
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PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
Complainant, however, did not sign the said agreement because respondent
verbally asked for One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as
acceptance fee and a 15% contingency fee upon collection of the
overpayment made by Multitel to Benefon, a telecommunications company
based in Finland. Complainant found the proposed fees to be prohibitive and
not within his means. Hence, the retainer agreement remained unsigned.
After a few weeks, complainant was surprised to receive a demand letter from
respondent asking for the return and immediate settlement of the funds
invested by respondents clients in Multitel. When complainant confronted
respondent about the demand letter, the latter explained that she had to send
it so that her clients defrauded investors of Multitel would know that she was
doing something for them and assured complainant that there was nothing to
worry about.
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PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
his help, she would not have earned such amount. Overwhelmed and
relieved, complainant accepted respondents offer but respondent, later on,
changed her mind and told complainant that she would instead invest the
P2,000,000.00 on his behalf in a business venture. Complainant declined and
explained to respondent that he and his family needed the money instead to
cover their daily expenses as he was no longer employed. Respondent
allegedly agreed, but she failed to fulfill her promise.
Petitioners Contention:
ISSUES:
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PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
HELD:
1.) Yes, a lawyer client relationship exists between petitioner and
respondent.
Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively
communicating with complainant, who, at that time, was beleaguered with
demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a
lawyer-client relationship. Respondent cannot shield herself from the
inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance
she rendered to complainant was only in the form of friendly accommodations,
precisely because at the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she
was already privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had been referred
to her by the SEC
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PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
A lawyers act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very
unethical. It comes within those acts considered as abuse of clients
confidence. The canon presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the
lawyers ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on her obligation.
Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing
money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected:
CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
clients
that
may
come
into
his
possession.
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the
clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter he is handling for the client.
FACTS:
Petitioner:
Complainant alleged that on March 1, 2000, she engaged the services of
respondent for the purpose of titling and/or reconstituting the titles to the real
estate properties of the late Bernabe Olayta, situated in the Municipalities of
Camalig and Guinobatan, both in the province of Albay. In connection
therewith, she claimed to have given the aggregate amount of P112,499.55
to respondent. However, respondent failed to update complainant regarding
the status of the matters referred to him. Thus, complainant terminated her
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer
and his client is one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any
natural tendency goes, this trust and confidence is prone to abuse. The rule
against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent
the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client.46 The rule
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyers ability to use all the
legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.
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various amounts to respondent, of which the latter admitted the receipt of only
P55,000.00. Despite the foregoing, respondent failed to comply with his
undertaking and offered the excuse that the reconstitution of the titles and the
preparation of the Deed were delayed due to the Deeds several revisions;
and that Bernabe Olaytas surviving heirs were living in different places,
making it difficult to secure their presence, much less obtain their signatures
to the said Deed.
Respondent:
Respondent asserts that he only received P55,000.00 and that the rest of the
money was received by a certain Rowena Delos Reyes-Kelly who was not an
employee of his law firm. Furthermore, he averred that he had already offered
to return the amount of P30,000.00 to complainant, claiming that he already
earned the fees for legal services in the amount of P20,000.00 for having
studied the matter entrusted to him and drafted the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition (Deed) that underwent several revisions.
IBP:
The IBP Board of Governors recommended penalty to suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months. On motion for reconsideration
of respondent, his period of suspension was further decreased to one (1)
month.
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the
lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money
was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if not used accordingly,
the money must be returned immediately to the client.16 As such, a lawyers
failure to return the money to his client despite numerous demands is a
violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity, as
in this case.
Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men
of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of
professional employment18 and, hence, must be disciplined accordingly.
HELD: Yes.
It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is
duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such clients
cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyers neglect of a legal
matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for
which he must be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon
18of the CPR.
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Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for violation of
lawyers oath.
(1) scheduled preliminary investigation where she promised to pay her loan
obligation.
In January 2009, Victoria met Atty. Espejo through her godmother, Corazon
Eusebio (Corazon). Atty. Espejo obtained a loan from Victoria. Since Atty.
Espejo was introduced to her as her godmothers lawyer, Victoria found no
reason to distrust the former. Hence, during the same meeting, Victoria
agreed to accomodate Atty. Espejo and there and then handed to the latter
the amount of PhP 250,000. To secure the payment of the loan, Atty. Espejo
simultaneously issued and turned over to Victoria a check for two hundred
seventy-five thousand pesos (PhP 275,000) covering the loan amount and
agreed interest. On due date, Atty. Espejo requested Victoria to delay the
deposit of the check for the reason that she was still waiting for the release of
the proceeds of a bank loan to fund the check. However, after a couple of
months of waiting, Victoria received no word from Atty. Espejo as to whether
or not the check was already funded enough. In July 2009, Victoria received
an Espejo-issued check in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (PhP 50,000)
representing the interest which accrued due to the late payment of the
principal obligation. Victoria deposited the said check but, to her dismay, the
check bounced due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejo failed to pay despite
Victorias repeated demands. Worried that she would not be able to recover
the amount thus lent, Victoria decided to deposit to her account the first check
in the amount of PhP 275,000, but without notifying Atty. Espejo of the fact.
However, the said check was also dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.
Victoria thereafter became more aggressive in her efforts to recover her
money. She, for instance, personally handed to Atty. Espejo a demand letter
dated August 3, 2009.
When Atty. Espejo still refused to pay, Victoria filed a criminal complaint
against Atty. Espejo for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa under
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, before the Quezon City
Prosecutors Office.
Atty. Espejo disregarded the notices and subpoenas which she personally
received and continued to ignore Victorias demands. She attended only one
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PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
HELD: Yes, Atty. Espejos issuance of worthless checks and her blatant
refusal to heed the directives of the Quezon City Prosecutors Office and the
IBP contravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7, Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks
in her private capacity and not as an attorney of Victoria is of no moment. The
Court held in several cases, a lawyer may be disciplined not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for gross misconduct
outside of his professional capacity. While the Court may not ordinarily
discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in his non- professional or
private capacity, the Court may be justified in suspending or removing him as
an attorney where his misconduct outside of the lawyers professional
dealings is so gross in character as to show him morally unfit and unworthy of
the privilege which his licenses and the law confer.
Atty. Espejo did not deny obtaining a loan from Victoria or traverse allegations
that she issued unfunded checks to pay her obligation. It has already been
settled that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be
sanctioned.
FACTS: Petra Durban and Paz Durban were sisters who had jointly owned a
parcel of land. They died without leaving a will. Their land was thereafter
expropriated in connection with the construction of the Bancasi Airport. An
expropriation compensation amounting to P2,453,429.00 was to be paid to
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PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN
their heirs. Bayonla and her uncle, Alfredo Tabada (Alfredo), were the
compulsory heirs of Paz, being, respectively, Pazs granddaughter and son.
Bayonla charged Atty. Reyes with gross dishonesty, deceit, conversion, and
breach of trust. Bayonla alleged that she and Alfredo had engaged the legal
services of Atty. Reyes to collect their share in the expropriation
compensation, agreeing to her attorneys fees of 10% of whatever amount
would be collected; Atty. Reyes had collected P1 million from the ATO; that
Bayonlas share, after deducting Atty. Reyes attorneys fees, would be
P75,000.00, but Atty. Reyes had delivered to her only P23,000.00, and had
failed to deliver the balance of P52,000.00 despite repeated demands; Atty.
Reyes had collected the amount of P121,119.11 from the ATO; that Bayonlas
share, after deducting Atty. Reyes attorneys fees, would be P109,007.20,
but Atty. Reyes had handed her only P56,500.00, and had failed to deliver the
balance of P52,507.20; and that Atty. Reyes should be disbarred for depriving
her of her just share.
Until such time that respondent had complied with the aforementioned, she is
suspended from the practice of her legal profession.
ISSUE: Whether or not the findings and recommendations of the IBP Board
of Governors were proper.
HELD:
Respondent was guilty of violating the canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer
shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of her client that may come into
her possession. Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 imposes on the lawyer the duty to
account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 demands that the lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand, subject to the lawyers lien
over the funds, or the lawyers option to apply so much of the funds as may
be necessary to satisfy the lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to the client.
RESPONDENT:
Atty. Reyes admitted that Bayonla and Alfredo had engaged her legal services
for the purpose of collecting their share in the expropriation compensation;
that as consideration for her services, Bayonla and Alfredo had agreed upon
a 40% contingent fee for her; that she had given to Bayonla more than what
had been due to her; that Alfredo had received from the ATO the check for
the second release corresponding to the share of both Bayonla and Alfredo;
that Alfredo had gotten more than Bayonla out of the second release; that on
June 5, 1995 she had received out of the second release by the ATO only her
40% contingent fee; that Bayonla and Alfredo had agreed to bear the
expenses for the collection of their share; that she had incurred travel and
other expenses in collecting such share; and that she should be absolved
from liability arising from the complaint.
There is no question that the money or property received by a lawyer for her
client properly belongs to the latter. Conformably with these canons of
professional responsibility, we have held that a lawyer is obliged to render an
accounting of all the property and money she has collected for her client. This
obligation includes the prompt reporting and accounting of the money
collected by the lawyer by reason of a favorable judgment to his client.
IBP:
By not delivering Bayonlas share despite her demand, Atty. Reyes violated
the aforestated canons. The money collected by Atty. Reyes as the lawyer of
Bayonla was unquestionably money held in trust to be immediately turned
over to the client. The unjustified withholding of money belonging to the client
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II
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a
fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.
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Respondent:
Admitted having received money from complainant but failed to render an
accounting or, at least, apprised the complainant of the actual expenses
incurred. Worse, respondent even inculcated in the mind of the complainant
that she had to adhere to the nefarious culture of giving grease money
or lagay to the British Embassy personnel, as if it was an ordinary occurrence
in the normal course of conducting official business transactions as a means
to expedite the visa applications.
FACTS:
Petitioner:
Complainant claimed that she engaged the services of Atty. Amboy on May
27, 2007 in connection with a partition case. In accordance with the Retainer
Agreement between the parties, Soliman agreed to pay Atty. Amboy
P50,000.00 as acceptance fee. Upon the latters engagement, Soliman paid
her P25,000.00. Later on, Atty. Amboy advised Soliman to no longer institute
a partition case since the other co-owners of the property were amenable to
the partition thereof. Instead, Atty. Amboy just facilitated the issuance of the
titles to the said property from the co-owners to the individual owners; the
P25,000.00 already paid to her was then treated as payment for her
professional services.
Later, Soliman gave Atty. Amboy P16,700.00 as payment for the transfer
tax. In the second quarter of 2009, Atty. Amboy told Soliman that there was
a delay in the issuance of the titles to the property because of the failure of
the other co-owners to submit certain documents. Atty. Amboy then told
Soliman that someone from the Register of Deeds (RD) can help expedite the
issuance of the titles for a fee of P80,000.00. On June 17, 2009, Atty. Amboy
told Soliman that her contact in the RD agreed to reduce the amount to
P50,000.00. Further, Soliman deposited the amount of P8,900.00 to Atty.
Amboys bank account as payment for the real property tax for the year
2009. Thereafter, Soliman deposited the amount of P50,000.00 to Atty.
Amboys bank account as payment for the latters contact in the RD.
Later, Atty. Amboy informed Soliman that the certificates of title to the property
were then only awaiting the signature of the authorized officer. However, Atty.
Amboy failed to deliver the respective certificates of title of Soliman and her
co-owners to the subject property.
However, Atty. Amboys secretary informed Soliman that their contact in the
RD was asking for an additional P10,000.00 to facilitate the release of the said
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certificates of title. Soliman then refused to further pay. Soliman then asked
the updates on the release of the said title but respondent did not answer.
Thereafter, Soliman and Atty. Amboys secretary went to the office of a certain
Atty. Marasigan, Deputy RD of Manila. Soliman asked Atty. Marasigan if he
received the P50,000.00 as payment for the release of the said titles. Atty.
Marasigan denied having received any amount to facilitate the release of the
titles and claimed that the reason why the same could not be processed was
that Atty. Amboy failed to file certain documents. Upon demand to release the
documents and the money given, respondent refused.
Respondent:
Atty. Amboy admitted that she had a retainer agreement with Soliman, but
denied having received any amount from the latter pursuant to the said
agreement. She claimed that the retainer agreement was not implemented
since the partition case was not instituted. She claimed that she merely
undertook to research, gather and collate all documents required in the
partition and in the transfer of the titles from the co-owners to the individual
owners. She denied having failed to submit the relevant documents to the RD
which caused the delay in the processing of the said titles. She likewise
denied having asked Soliman for P50,000.00 to facilitate the release of the
said titles.
The circumstances of this case clearly show that Atty. Amboy, after receiving
P25,000.00 as payment for her professional services, failed to submit material
documents relative to the issuance of separate certificates of title to the
individual owners of the property. It was her negligence which caused the
delay
in
the
issuance
of
the
certificates
of
title.
The Court further finds improper the refusal of Atty. Amboy to return the
amount of P50,000.00 which she paid in order to facilitate the release of the
certificates of title. To reiterate, upon inquiry, Atty. Marasigan, the Deputy RD
of Manila, denied having received any amount from Atty. Amboy. In not
returning the money to Soliman after a demand therefor was made following
her failure to procure the issuance of the certificates of title, Atty. Amboy
violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule
16.03 thereof, which requires that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property
of his client upon demand. It is settled that the unjustified withholding of
money belonging to a client warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.
IBP:
IBP
Board
of
Governors
recommends
Atty. Amboys suspension from the practice of law was increased from
six (6) months to two (2) years and that she was ordered to return the entire
amount she received from Soliman.
A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of
his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for
his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a
gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs
public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
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Defendants Defense:
He alleged that upon careful examination of the heirs' unlawful detainer
complaint, he noticed a discrepancy between the descriptions of the subject
property as indicated in the said pleading as opposed to that which
complainant supplied to him. On the belief that the parties may be contesting
two (2) sets of properties which are distinct and separate from one another,
respondent, at the preliminary conference conducted on October 28, 2003,
moved for the suspension of further proceedings and proposed that a
commissioner be appointed to conduct a re-survey in order to determine the
true identity of the property in dispute. The MTC allowed the counsels for both
parties to decide on the manner of the proposed re-survey, leading to the
assignment of a Department of Agrarian Reform Survey Engineer (DAR
Engineer) for this purpose. The survey conducted by the DAR Engineer
revealed that complainant's tillage extended to about 5,000 square meters of
the subject property which was determined to belong to the heirs, the rest
being covered by the title of Pelagia. Dissatisfied, complainant manifested her
intention to secure the services of a private surveyor of her own choice, and
promised to furnish respondent a copy of the survey results, which she,
however, failed to do. Later, complainant accused respondent of manipulating
the DAR Survey Results which caused their lawyer-client relationship to turn
sour and eventually be severed. She has since retrieved the entire case
folders and retained the services of another lawyer.
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RULING:
It took some period of negotiations between them and Atty. Era before the
latter delivered to them copies of a deed of absolute sale involving the
property. However, Atty. Era told them that whether or not the title of the
property had been encumbered or free from lien or defect would no longer be
his responsibility. He further told them that as far as he was concerned he had
already accomplished his professional responsibility towards them upon the
amicable settlement of the cases between them and ICS Corporation.
The Court resolves to adopt the IBP's findings and recommendation. The
relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust
and confidence. In this light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be
ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of
diligence in handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at
all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention,
skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether
he accepts it for a fee or for free. Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
Canon 18 of the Code embody these quintessential directives.
When Samson and his co-complainants verified the title of the property they
were dismayed to learn that they could not liquidate the property because it
was no longer registered under the name of ICS Corporation. Due to the
silence of Atty. Era for sometime thereafter, Samson and his group wrote to
him to remind him about his guarantee and the promise to settle the issues
with Sison and her cohorts. But they did not hear from Atty. Era at all.
Case law further illumines that a lawyers duty of competence and diligence
includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel's care or
giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client
before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences,
preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases
with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the
client or the court to prod him or her to do so.28 Conversely, a lawyer's
negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action.
During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not anymore appear for Samson
and his group. This forced them to engage another lawyer. They were
shocked to find out later on, however, that Atty. Era had already been entering
his appearance as the counsel for Sison in her other criminal cases involving
the same pyramiding scam that she and her ICS Corporation had perpetrated.
Samson executed an affidavit alleging the foregoing antecedents, and praying
for Atty. Eras disbarment on the ground of his violation of the trust, confidence
and respect reposed in him as their counsel.
RESPONDENT:
FACTS: Ferdinand A. Samson and his relatives were among the investors
who fell prey to the pyramiding scam perpetrated by ICS Corporation, a
corporation whose corporate officers were led by Emilia C. Sison. Samson
engaged Atty. Era to represent him and his relatives in the criminal
prosecution of Sison and her group.
Atty. Era alleged that the conclusion of the compromise settlement between
Samson and his group, on one hand, and Sison and her ICS Corporation, on
the other, had terminated the lawyer-client relationship between him and
Samson and his group; and that he had been appointed as counsel de officio
for Sison only for purposes of her arraignment.
Atty. Era called a meeting with Samson and his relatives to discuss the
possibility of an amicable settlement with Sison and her cohorts. They
acceded and executed the affidavit of desistance he prepared, and in turn
they received a deed of assignment covering land executed by Sison in behalf
of ICS Corporation.
IBP:
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Found Atty. Era guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests, for
failing to serve his clients with competence and diligence, and for failing to
champion his clients cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.
In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving
the same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the
former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The rule
is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. It behooves lawyers not only
to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration
of justice. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree.
The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the
termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the clients ceasing to employ
the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between
them. It even survives the death of the client.
1. The law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent them with
undivided loyalty;
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Petitioners Contention:
Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18,
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondents Contention:
By way of defense, Atty. Margallo argued that she had agreed to take on the
case for free, save for travel expense of P1,000.00 per hearing. She also
claimed that she had candidly informed Ramirez and his mother that they only
had a 50% chance of winning the case. She denied ever having entered into
an agreement regarding the contingent fee worth 30% of the value of the land
subject of the controversy.
Atty. Margallo asserted that she would not have taken on the Appeal except
that the mother of Ramirez had begged her to do so. She claimed that when
she instructed Ramirez to see her for document signing on January 8, 2009,
he ignored her. When he finally showed up on March 2009, he merely told
her that he had been busy. Her failure to immediately inform Ramirez of the
unfavorable Decision of the Court of Appeals was due to losing her clients
number because her 8-year-old daughter played with her phone and
accidentally erased all her contacts.
On August 26, 2009, Atty. Margallo informed Ramirez that his Appeal had
been denied. She told him that the Court of Appeals denial was due to
Ramirezs failure to establish his filiation with his alleged father, which was
the basis of his claim. She also informed him that they could no longer appeal
to this court since the Decision of the Court of Appeals had been promulgated
and the reglementary period for filing an Appeal had already lapsed.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and
approved the recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline. The
Board of Governors resolved to recommend a penalty of reprimand to Atty.
Margallo with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely.
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The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines affirmed with
modification its earlier Resolution. It found that respondent Atty. Margallo had
violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Consequently, the Board of Governors
recommended that Atty. Margallo be suspended from the practice of law for
two (2) years.
Respondent:
Denied spending complainants money, explaining that he had already
prepared the initiatory pleading and was poised to file the same, when he
discovered through the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City that the filing fee was quite costly. This prompted him to immediately relay
such information to complainant who undertook to raise the amount needed.
While waiting, however, the instant administrative case was filed against him.8
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It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is
duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such clients
cause with diligence, care, and devotion, whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed upon him.16 Therefore, a lawyers neglect of a legal
matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for
which he must be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon
18of the CPR, which reads:
FACTS: Complainant Julian Penilla entered into an agreement with Sps Rey
and Evelyn Garin for the repair of his Volkswagen automobile. Despite full
payment, the spouses defaulted in their obligation. Thus, complainant decided
to file a case for breach of contract against the spouses where he engaged
the services of respondent as counsel.
Respondent sent a demand letter to the spouses and asked for the refund of
complainants payment. When the spouses failed to return the payment,
respondent advised complainant that he would file a criminal case for estafa
against said spouses. Respondent charged P30,000 as attorneys fees and
P10,000 as filing fees. Complainant turned over the relevant documents to
respondent and paid the fees in tranches. Respondent then filed the complaint
for estafa before Asst. City Prosecutor Jose C. Fortuno of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Respondent attended the hearing with
complainant but the spouses did not appear. After the hearing, complainant
paid another P1,000 to respondent as appearance fee. Henceforth,
complainant and respondent have conflicting narrations of the subsequent
events and transactions that transpired.
Complainant alleges that when the case was submitted for resolution,
respondent told him that they have to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to Asst.
City Prosecutor Fortuno to expedite a favorable resolution of the case.
Complainant claims that despite initial reservations, he later acceded to
respondents suggestion, bought a bottle of Carlos Primero I for P950 and
delivered it to respondents office.
Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno later issued a resolution dismissing the estafa
case against the spouses. Respondent allegedly told complainant that a
motion for reconsideration was needed to have [the resolution] reversed.
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Complainant claims not hearing from respondent again despite his several
letters conveying his disappointment and requesting for the return of the
money and the documents in respondents possession. Later, complainant
learned that a civil case for Specific Performance and Damages was filed but
was dismissed. He also found out that the filing fee was only P2,440 and not
P10,000 as earlier stated by respondent.
A review of the proceedings and the evidence in the case at bar shows that
respondent violated Canon 18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Complainant correctly alleged that respondent
violated his oath under Canon 18 to serve his client with competence and
diligence when respondent filed a criminal case for estafa when the facts of
the case would have warranted the filing of a civil case for breach of contract.
To be sure, after the complaint for estafa was dismissed, respondent
committed another similar blunder by filing a civil case for specific
performance and damages before the RTC. The errors committed by
respondent with respect to the nature of the remedy adopted in the criminal
complaint and the forum selected in the civil complaint were so basic and
could have been easily averted had he been more diligent and circumspect in
his role as counsel for complainant. What aggravates respondents offense
is the fact that his previous mistake in filing the estafa case did not motivate
him to be more conscientious, diligent and vigilant in handling the case of
complainant. The civil case he subsequently filed for complainant was
dismissed due to what later turned out to be a basic jurisdictional error.
On the other hand, Respondent denied charging complainant filing fees for
the estafa case. He also countered that the payment of P30,000 made by the
complainant was his acceptance fee for both the estafa case and civil case.
Respondent likewise denied the following other allegations of complainant:
that he assured the success of the case before the prosecutor; that he asked
complainant to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to the prosecutor; that he
promised to fix the case; and that he charged P10,000, as he only charged
P5,000, as filing fee for the civil case.
Respondent explained that it was not a matter of indifference on his part when
he failed to inform petitioner of the status of the case. In fact, he was willing
to return the money and the documents of complainant. What allegedly
prevented him from communicating with complainant was the fact that
complainant would go to his office during days and times that he would be
attending his daily court hearings.
Furthermore, After the criminal and civil cases were dismissed, respondent
was plainly negligent and did not apprise complainant of the status and
progress of both cases he filed for the latter. He paid no attention and showed
no importance to complainants cause despite repeated followups. Clearly,
respondent is not only guilty of incompetence in handling the cases. His lack
IBP recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for
six months for negligence within the meaning of Canon 18 and transgression
of Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
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Under Rule 18.04, a lawyer has the duty to apprise his client of the status and
developments of the case and all other information relevant thereto. He must
be consistently mindful of his obligation to respond promptly should there be
queries or requests for information from the client. In the case at bar,
respondent explained that he failed to update complainant of the status of the
cases he filed because their time did not always coincide. The excuse
proffered by respondent is too lame and flimsy to be given credit. Respondent
himself admitted that he had notice that complainant had visited his office
many times. Yet, despite the efforts exerted and the vigilance exhibited by
complainant, respondent neglected and failed to fulfill his obligation under
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 to keep his client informed of the status of his case
and to respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
Defendants Defense:
Respondent also violated Canon 17 of the Code which states that [a] lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere
duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest degree of fidelity,
zeal and fervor in the protection of the clients interest. The most thorough
groundwork and study must be undertaken in order to safeguard the interest
of the client. Respondent has defied and failed to perform such duty and his
omission is tantamount to a desecration of the Lawyers Oath.
Atty. Agleron admitted that complainant engaged his professional service and
received the amount of P10,050.00. He, however, explained that their
agreement was that complainant would pay the filing fees and other incidental
expenses and as soon as the complaint was prepared and ready for filing,
complainant would pay 30% of the agreed attorneys fees of P100,000.00. On
June 7, 1996, after the signing of the complaint, he advised complainant to
pay in full the amount of the filing fee and sheriffs fees and the 30% of the
attorneys fee, but complainant failed to do so. Atty. Agleron averred that since
the complaint could not be filed in court, the amount of P10,050.00 was
deposited in a bank while awaiting the payment of the balance of the filing fee
and attorneys fee.
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services of Atty. Adquilen, a former Labor Arbiter, who re-filed his labor case.
Similarly, the case was dismissed due to the parties' failure to submit their
respective position papers. Complainant and Atty. Adquilen re-filed the case
for a third time. During its pendency, the representative of Capitol purportedly
offered the amount of P74,000.00 as settlement of complainant's claim,
conditioned on the submission of the latters position paper. Atty. Adquilen,
however, failed to submit one, resulting in the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of interest and failure to prosecute.
RULING: The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors except as to the penalty imposed. Atty. Agleron violated Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that:
Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his
client with competence, and to attend to his clients cause with diligence, care
and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed on him. In a number of cases, the Court held that a lawyer should
never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence
renders him liable for disciplinary action such as suspension ranging from
three months to two years. In this case, the Court finds the suspension of Atty.
Agleron from the practice of law for a period of three months sufficient.
RESPONDENT:
Atty. Adquilen failed to comply with the directive and the subsequent showcause resolutions. On the other hand, Atty. Quesada, in his Comment,
admitted having accepted and filed the initial labor case for complainant. He,
however, explained that he was unable to file the required position paper due
to complainant's failure to furnish him with the employment records and other
relevant documents. He also claimed that when he was informed of the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, he advised complainant to re-file the
case with the assistance of another lawyer as he had to attend to his duties
as Chairman of union. He later denied the existence of any lawyer-client
relationship between him and complainant, and claimed that the labor case
was handled by another lawyer.
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in its November 19, 2011 Resolution which represents the settlement initially
offered by Capitol in the dismissed labor case. The return of the said amount
partakes the nature of a purely civil liability which should not be dealt with
during an administrative-disciplinary proceeding such as this case. In TriaSamonte v. Obias, the Court recently illumined that disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are only confined to the issue of whether or not the
respondent-lawyer is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar
and that the only concern is his administrative liability. Thus, matters which
have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's professional engagement, such as the
liabilities of the parties which are purely civil in nature, should be threshed out
in a proper proceeding of such nature, and not during administrativedisciplinary proceedings, as in this case.
Respondent Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01
of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is accordingly SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year. On the other hand, the administrative
complaint against respondent Atty. Amado T. Adquilen is hereby DISMISSED
in view of his supervening death.
STEPHAN BRUNET vs. ATTY. RONALD GUAREN
A.C. No. 10164 March 10, 2014
The Court must, however, clarify that the foregoing resolution should not
include a directive to return the amount of P74,000.00 as ordered by the IBP
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Guaren took all the pertinent documents relative to the titling of their lotcertified true copy of the tax declaration, original copy of the deed of
exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan, and original copy of
the waiver. On March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren asked for additional payment of
Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) which they dutifully gave. From 1997 to
2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the case and each time he
would say that the titling was in progress. They became bothered by the slow
progress of the case so they demanded the return of the money they paid.
Respondent agreed to return the same provided that the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) be deducted to answer for his professional fees.
a case against complainants without a written consent from the latter. The
CBD recommended that he be suspended for six (6) months.
The IBP Board of Governors, adopted and approved with modification the
Report and Recommendation of the CBD, suspending Atty. Guaren from the
practice of law for three (3) months only.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Guaren should be held administratively liable?
HELD: Yes, in the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the
amount of P7,000.00 as partial payment of his acceptance fee. He, however,
failed to perform his obligation to file the case for the titling of complainants'
lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his
client with competence and diligence when he neglected a legal matter
entrusted to him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
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Said case was terminated on June 20, 1958, probating the said will. The
oppositors in this case who are the same persons mentioned above appealed
this case to the Higher Court of the Philippines and was decided by the Hon.
Supreme Court of the Philippines on October 12, 1967 in G.R. No. L-23638
and L-23662, affirming the decision of the Lower Court
That after the decision of the above-mentioned case was promulgated, the
same parties filed on June 5, 1968 Civil Case No. 3677-M with the CFI of
Bulacan for annulment of will; this case was filed through their counsel, Atty.
Gregorio Centeno. Said case was dismissed by the Court on February 11,
1970.
That on August 13,1971, again, the clients of Atty. Montalvo filed Civil Case
No. 4078 with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for annulment of the said
will; this case was again dismissed by the Court on December 21, 1971;
That on April 22, 1972, again the same parties, through their counsel Atty.
Montalvo, filed another case with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
allegedly for Partition of the same property mentioned in the probate of will
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4151. This case was again dismissed
by the Court in its Order dated October 11, 1972;
Another case was filed by the same parties, through Atty. Montalvo, for
specific performance, with the CFI of Bulacan and was docketed as Civil Case
No. 4188-M. This case was again dismissed by the Court in its Order dated
October 24,1973. On August 12, 1974, the said case was remanded to the
Court of Appeals, Manila, by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
Yet, another case filed by the same persons mentioned above through Atty.
Montalvo with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and was docketed as
Civil Case No. 4458.
In view of the numerous cases filed against me by the same parties, through
their counsel, Atty. Montalvo, complainant filed this case.
FACTS: A Probate of Will was filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
regarding the same property subject of the annulment of sale and was
docketed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan as Sp. Proc. No. 831-M.
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Respondnet Montalvo, claims that the case for the interest of justice
certainly never for harassment and that the complainant by filing this instant
complaint for disbarment wants to cow and intimidate the undersigned in order
to withdraw as counsel of his clients because she has been thwarted in her
erroneous belief that she owns exclusively all the properties comprising the
estate of the late Benedicta de Los Reyes and could not accept and take into
account the reality that by virtue of the final decision of the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. 5618 and 5620 she is not the sole owner of the present estate of the
deceased but only a co-owner with the clients of the undersigned. Montalvo
stated that it was Dimagiba who refused to be bound by the Supreme Court
Decision in G.R. Nos. 5618 and 5620
court dockets get clogged and the administration of justice is delayed, our
judicial system may not be entirely blame less, yet the greater fault lies in the
lawyers who had take their privilege so lightly, and in such mindless fashion.
On the basis of the foregoing, we find him guilty of malpractice as charged.
He has violated his oath not to delay any ma for money or malice, besmirched
the name of an honorable profession, and has proven himself unworthy of the
trust repose in him by law as an officer of the Court. We have not
countenanced other less significant infractions among the ranks of our
lawyers. He deserves the severest punishment of DISBARMENT.
WHEREFORE on the basis of the foregoing, and consisted with the urgent
need to maintain the high traditions an standards of the legal profession and
to preserve undiminished public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved
to DISBAR the respondent Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr. from the practice law. His
name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
ONG v. UNTO
A.C. No. 2417, February 6, 2003
HELD: Yes.
Any lawyer who assumes the responsibility for a client' cause has the duty to
know the entire history of a case, specially if any litigation has commenced.
In the case at bar, even Atty. Montalvo does not deny the fact that the probate
of the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes has been an over-extended a
contentious litigation between the heirs.
FACTS: This is a disbarment case filed by Alex Ong against Atty. Elpidio D.
Unto, for malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. It is evident
from the records that he tried to coerce the complainant to comply with his
letter-demand by threatening to file various charges against the latter. When
the complainant did not heed his warning, he made good his threat and filed
a string of criminal and administrative cases against the complainant. They,
however, did not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client.
The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone
who could provide him any information against the complainant just so he
would have leverage in his actions against the latter.
Defendants Defense:
A lawyer should never take advantage of the seemingly end less channels left
dangling by our legal system in order wangle the attention of the court. Atty.
Montalvo may have thought that lie could get away with his indiscriminate
filing o suits that were clearly intended to harass Ismaela Dimagiba When
There was none. The records show that the respondent was directed to
submit his comment on the complaint lodged against him. He did not file
any. Subsequently, the case was endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. In turn, the OSG
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forwarded the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Negros Oriental, authorizing said office to conduct the investigation.
It appears that the respondent did not appear before the investigating officer,
then Provincial Fiscal Jacinto Bautista, to answer the charges against
him. Instead, he moved for postponement.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Untos acts constitute malpractice.
COMPLAINANTS:
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It suspended respondent from the practice of law for a period of one year for
entering into a champertous agreement.
Responsibility, which states that lawyers shall not lend money to a client,
except when in the interest of justice, they have to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter they are handling for the client.
A reading of the contract for legal services shows that respondent agreed to
pay for at least half of the expense for the docket fees. He also paid for the
whole amount needed for the recording of complainants adverse claim.
HELD: We find that respondent did not violate any of the canons cited by
complainants. Respondent cannot be faulted for advising complainants to file
an action against Fevidal to recover their properties, instead of agreeing to a
settlement of P10,000,000 a measly amount compared to that in the original
agreement, under which Fevidal undertook to pay complainants the amount
of P35,000,000. Lawyers have a sworn duty and responsibility to protect the
interest of any prospective client and pursue the ends of justice. Any lawyer
worth his salt would advise complainants against the abuses of Fevidal under
the circumstances, and we cannot countenance an administrative complaint
against a lawyer only because he performed a duty imposed on him by his
oath.
While lawyers may advance the necessary expenses in a legal matter they
are handling in order to safeguard their clients rights, it is imperative that the
advances be subject to reimbursement. The purpose is to avoid a situation in
which a lawyer acquires a personal stake in the clients cause. Regrettably,
nowhere in the contract for legal services is it stated that the expenses of
litigation advanced by respondent shall be subject to reimbursement by
complainants.
In addition, respondent gave various amounts as cash advances (bali),
gasoline and transportation allowance to them for the duration of their
attorney-client relationship. In fact, he admits that the cash advances were in
the nature of personal loans that he extended to complainants.
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to intervene in
a case to protect his rights concerning the payment of his compensation.
According to the discretion of the court, the attorney shall have a lien upon all
judgments for the payment of money rendered in a case in which his services
have been retained by the client. We recently upheld the right of counsel to
intervene in proceedings for the recording of their charging lien.
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fix the attorneys fees on a quantum meruit basis, with due consideration of
the expenses that Atty. Lacaya incurred while handling the civil cases.
Ruling of the RTC:
Spouses Cadavedo filed an action before the RTC of Zamboanga City against
the spouses Ames for sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of
homestead after the latter failed to pay the balance of the purchase price. The
spouses Cadavedo initially engaged the services of Atty. Rosendo Bandal
who, for health reasons, later withdrew from the case; he was substituted by
Atty. Lacaya. Spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee
basis. The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee
of P2,000.00
While Atty. Lacaya was handling the cases of petitioners, Atty. Lacaya asked
for one-half of the subject lot as attorneys fees. He caused the subdivision of
the subject lot into two equal portions, based on area, and selected the more
valuable and productive half for himself; and assigned the other half to the
spouses Cadavedo.
Vicente Cadavedo and his sons-in-law entered the portion assigned to the
respondents and ejected them by filing a counter-suit for forcible entry.
Vicente and Atty. Lacaya entered into an amicable settlement, re-adjusting
the area and portion obtained by each. Atty. Lacaya acquired 10.5383
hectares pursuant to the agreement. The MTC approved the compromise
agreement.
The spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action against the
respondents, assailing the MTC-approved compromise agreement. The
spouses Cadavedo prayed, among others, that the respondents be ejected
from their one-half portion of the subject lot; that they be ordered to render an
accounting of the produce of this one-half portion from 1981;and that the RTC
Petitioners Contention:
The petitioners argue that stipulations on a lawyers compensation for
professional services, especially those contained in the pleadings filed in
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courts, control the amount of the attorneys fees to which the lawyer shall be
entitled and should prevail over oral agreements. In this case, the spouses
Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed that the latters contingent attorneys fee
was P2,000.00 in cash, not one-half of the subject lot. This agreement was
clearly stipulated in the amended complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1721. Thus,
Atty. Lacaya is bound by the expressly stipulated fee and cannot insist on
unilaterally changing its terms without violating their contract.
Respondents Contention:
Respondents counter that the attorneys fee stipulated in the amended
complaint was not the agreed fee of Atty. Lacaya for his legal services. They
argue that the questioned stipulation for attorneys fees was in the nature of a
penalty that, if granted, would inure to the spouses Cadavedo and not to Atty.
Lacaya.
The respondents point out that: (1) both Vicente and Atty. Lacaya caused the
survey and subdivision of the subject lot immediately after the spouses
Cadavedo reacquired its possession with the RTCs approval of their motion
for execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 1721; (2) Vicente expressly ratified
and confirmed the agreement on the contingent attorneys fee consisting of
one-half of the subject lot; (3) the MTC in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case)
approved the compromise agreement; (4) Vicente is the legally designated
administrator of the conjugal partnership, hence the compromise agreement
ratifying the transfer bound the partnership and could not have been
invalidated by the absence of Benitas acquiescence; and (5) the compromise
agreement merely inscribed and ratified the earlier oral agreement between
the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya which is not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order and public policy.
Issue: Whether or not the attorneys fee consisting of one-half of the subject
lot is valid and reasonable, and binds the petitioners?
HELD: No, the attorneys fees consisting of the one half of the subject lot is
not valid for the following reasons:
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latter one-half of the subject lot, the agreement is nevertheless void. This
agreement is champertous and is contrary to public policy.
The rule of the profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with
his client for part of
the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting
the case at the lawyers expense is designed to prevent the lawyer from
acquiring an interest between him and his client. To permit
these
arrangements is to enable the lawyer to "acquire additional stake in the
outcome of the action which might lead him to consider his own
recovery rather than that of his client or to accept a settlement which might
take care of his interest in the verdict
to the sacrifice of that of his
client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to his clients cause."
In the present case, the transfer or assignment of the disputed onehalf portion to Atty. Lacaya took place while the subject lot was still
under litigation and the lawyer-client relationship still existed
between him and the spouses Cadavedo. Thus, the general
prohibition provided under Article 1491 of the Civil Code, rather than
the exception provided in jurisprudence, applies. The CA seriously
erred in upholding the compromise agreement on the basis of the
unproved oral contingent fee agreement.
5) Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorneys fees on a quantum
meruit basis
Also, with respect to the two subsequent cases, it did not and could
not otherwise justify an attorneys fee of one-half of the subject lot.
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FACTS: On August 1, 1988, Kraft Foods (Phils.), Inc. (KFPI) hired Czarina
Malvar (Malvar) as its Corporate Planning Manager. From then on, she
gradually rose from the ranks, becoming in 1996 the Vice President for
Finance in the Southeast Asia Region of Kraft Foods International
(KFI),KFPIs mother company. On November 29, 1999, respondent
Bienvenido S. Bautista, as Chairman of the Board of KFPI and concurrently
the Vice President and Area Director for Southeast Asia of KFI, sent Malvar a
memo directing her to explain why no administrative sanctions should be
imposed on her for possible breach of trust and confidence and for willful
violation of company rules and regulations. Following the submission of her
written explanation, an investigating body was formed. In due time, she was
placed under preventive suspension with pay. Ultimately, on March 16, 2000,
she was served a notice of termination.
Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 20 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, factors such as the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the time spent
and the extent of the services rendered, the customary charges for
similar services, the amount involved in the controversy and the
benefits resulting to the client from the service, to name a few, are
considered in determining the reasonableness of the fees to which a
lawyer is entitled.
In the present case, the following considerations guide this Court in
considering and setting Atty. Lacayas fees based on quantum
meruit: (1) the questions involved in these civil cases were not novel
and did not require of Atty. Lacaya considerable effort in terms of
time, skill or the performance of extensive research; (2) Atty. Lacaya
rendered legal services for the Spouses Cadavedo in three civil
cases beginning in 1969 until 1988 when the petitioners filed the
instant case; (3) the first of these civil cases (Cadavedo v. Ames)
lasted for twelve years and reaching up to this Court; the second
(Ames v. Cadavedo) lasted for seven years; and the third (Cadavedo
and Lacaya v. DBP) lasted for six years, reaching up to the CA; and
(4) the property subject of these civil cases is of a considerable size
of 230,765 square meters or 23.0765 hectares.
Obviously aggrieved, Malvar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal
dismissal against KFPI and Bautista in the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). In a decision dated April 30, 2001,1 the Labor Arbiter
found and declared her suspension and dismissal illegal, and ordered her
reinstatement, and the payment of her full backwages, inclusive of allowances
and other benefits, plus attorneys fees.
On October 22, 2001, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter but
additionally ruled that Malvar was entitled to "any and all stock options and
bonuses she was entitled to or would have been entitled to had she not been
illegally dismissed from her employment," as well as to moral and exemplary
damages.
While her appeal was pending in the Supreme Court, she and respondents
entered into a compromise agreement, whereby she was paid P40,000,000
in addition to the P14,252,192.12 earlier paid to her. She later filed a motion
to dismiss/withdraw case but before it could be acted upon, a motion for
intervention to protect attorneys rights was filed by the law firm of Dasal,
Llasos and Associates, through its Of counsel, retired Supreme Court
The Supreme Court ruled that respondents are entitled only to two
(2) hectares (or approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot),
with the fruits previously received from the disputed one-half portion,
as attorneys fees. They shall return to the petitioners the remainder
of the disputed one-half portion.
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Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo. The motion sought, among others, that
both Malvar and KFPI be held and ordered to pay jointly and severally the
intervenors contingent fees.
In opposing the motion, Malvar claimed that the intervenor lacked the legal
capacity to intervene because it had ceased to exist after Atty. Marwil N.
Llasos resigned from the intervenor and Atty. Richard B. Dasal became barred
from private practice upon his appointment to a position in a government
subsidiary. They both personally handled her case. Besides, their dismissal
was based on a justifiable cause.
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ISSUE:
Is respondent guilty of violation of Canon 21?
Is there a conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad?
HELD:
1). No
2. No.
Rule 15.03 provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.
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In his defense, he averred that he was engaged to represent the Lim family
by William and Leonardo Lim, the children of Spouses Hio and Dolores Chu.
That by virtue of a deed of absolute sale executed in their favor by their
parents, William and Leonardo had assumed that the TCTs were already
transferred to their names. He prepared the initial pleading based on his
honest belief that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were then still living. Had
he known that they were already deceased; he would have most welcomed
the information and would have moved to substitute Leonardo and William
Lim as defendants for that reason.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. for
lack of merit.
HELD: No. The Court found that the respondent, as attorney, did not commit
any falsehood or falsification in his pleadings. The records indicated that the
respondent did not misrepresent that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were
still living. On the contrary, the respondent directly stated in the answer to the
complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim, and in
the clarification and submission, supra, that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores
Chu were already deceased.
DE LEON v. CASTELO
A.C. No. 8620, January 12, 2011
FACTS: On January 2, 2006, the Government brought suit for the purpose of
correcting the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering two parcels of land
located in Malabon City then registered in the names of defendants Spouses
Lim Hio and Dolores Chu due to their encroaching on a public callejon and on
a portion of the Malabon-Navotas River shoreline. De Leon, having joined the
civil case as a voluntary intervenor two years later, now accuses the
respondent, the counsel of record of the defendants, with the serious
administrative offenses of dishonesty and falsification warranting his
disbarment or suspension as an attorney. The respondents error was
allegedly committed by his filing for defendants Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores
Chu of various pleadings that is, answer with counterclaim and cross-claim in
relation to the main complaint; and answer to the complaint in intervention
with counterclaim and cross-claim despite said spouses being already
deceased at the time of filing.
Even if any of the respondents pleadings might have created any impression
that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living, the Court still
cannot hold the respondent guilty of any dishonesty or falsification. For one,
the respondent was acting in the interest of the actual owners of the properties
when he filed the answer with counterclaim and cross-claim on April 17, 2006.
As such, his pleadings were privileged and would not occasion any action
against him as an attorney. Secondly, having made clear at the start that the
Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer the actual owners of the
affected properties due to the transfer of ownership even prior to the institution
of the action, and that the actual owners needed to be substituted in lieu of
said spouses, whether the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living
or already deceased as of the filing of the pleadings became immaterial. And,
lastly, De Leon could not disclaim knowledge that the Spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu were no longer living. His joining in the action as
a voluntary intervenor charged him with notice of all the other persons
Defendants Defense:
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