THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT regained such domicile when her husband died.
regained such domicile when her husband died. It was further decided that when her husband died, the
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC [G.R. 119976/ SEPTEMBER 18, 1995/ JUSTICE KAPUNAN]
FACTS:
 Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for representative of the 1 st district of
Leyte.
 Private respondent, Cirilo Roy Montejo, incumbent Representative of the 1 st district of Leyte, filed a
petition for Petitioner’s disqualification, alleging that she did not meet the Constitutional requirement for
residency.
 Petitioner the 1yr residency required as her Certificate of Candidacy showed “____ years and seven
months”.
 Petitioner then filed with the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte an Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry “seven” months to “since childhood”. This was not accepted for
it was filed out of time.
 It was then filed to COMELEC, where the 2nd Division, by a vote of 2:1, came up with the resolution:
1. Finding the private respondent’s Petition for Disqualification meritorious
2. striking off petitioner’s Corrected/Amended Cert. of Candidacy of March 31, 1995
3. Canceling her original Cert. of Candidacy
 Even the MR to COMELEC was denied.
 Petitioner’s reasons for the change:
o It should be noted that she was born and raised in Leyte.
o She moved to Manila to pursue her studies as well as work. She met Ferdinand Marcos
who was then the representative of Batac, Ilocos Norte. When they got married, she followed her
husband throughout his political career.
o Her husband fixed their residence in Batac but during his presidency, they lived in
Malacanang Palace.
o After the death of her husband and her exile, she was not allowed to return to her
ancestral home as it was sequestered by the PCGG, forcing her to live in different residences. Eventually
she returned to Leyte and settled there.
ISSUES:
 Whether or not petitioner met the 1yr residency qualification for election purposes.
 Whether or not COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction before and after the elections.
HELD:
1. Qualification on 1 yr residency
 No. Depending on the justice, there are multiple reasons or opinions. First, the SC said that for the
purposes of election law, residence is synonymous to domicile.
 In the case Ong vs. Republic, the Court’s concept of domicile is to mean an individual’s “permanent
home”.
 She has never lost her domicile, which she had since birth even when she got married. When she
got married, the husband has set their domicile and she lost her domicile of Leyte by operation of law but
return to her original domicile was as if there was no interruption. Furthermore, on basis of another
opinion, upon the death of her husband, she had the freedom to choose her domicile.
 An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different
places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes.
 To effect a change in domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. an actual removal or an actual change of domicile
2. bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose
 The absence of any, residence of origin is deemed to continue.
2. Qualification on 1 yr residency
 The contention of the petitioner is that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not
the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House Representatives in accordance
with Art. VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution
 Doctrine: a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to
be merely directory, “so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory
that if the statute had intended such result, it would have clearly indicated it.”
 Mandatory vs. Directory provision
o Difference lies on grounds of expediency; less injury results to the general public by
disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law
o Statute is construed to be merely directory when “the statutory provisions which may
be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are
usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and
purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act.”
DOMINO VS. COMMISSSION ON ELECTIONS (310 SCRA 546)
FACTS: Challenged in this case for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction are the Resolution of May
6, 1998 of the Second Division of the COMELEC, declaring petitioner Juan Domino disqualified as candidate for
representative of Sarangani in May 11, 1998 elections and the Decision of May 29, 1998 of the COMELEC en
banc denying DOMINO’s motion for reconsideration.
On March 25, 1998, Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of Sarangani,
indicating that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one year and two months
immediately preceding the election. On March 30, private respondents Narcisio Raglifo Jr, Eddie Java,
JuanBayonito Jr, Rosario Samson and Dionisio Lim filed with the COMELEC petition to deny due course to or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. They alleged that Domino is not a resident much less a registered voter of
Sarangani. They had substantiated evidences which include: the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent wherein
he claims he have resided in the constituency where he seeks election for one year and 2 months and that he is
a registered voter of Sarangani; Voter’s Registration Record dated June 22, 1997 indication registration in
Balara, QC. Respondent’s Community Tax Certificate dated Jan 15, 1997. Certificate of Candidacy of respondent
for the position of Congressman in the 3 rd district if QC where he stated his residence in the constituency where
he seeks to be elected immediately preceding the election as 3 years, 5 months an d that he is a registered
voter in Balara QC; a copy of the application for transfer of registration records due to change of residence and
copy of the sworn application for cancellation of voter’s previous registration.
For his defense, Domino maintained that he had compled with the one year residence requirement and that he
has even residing in Sarangani since Jan1997 he showed a copy of the contract lease between Nora Dacaldacal
as Lessor and respondent as Lessee executed in January 15, 1997, copy if the application for Transfer of
Registration Records due to Change of Residence, CTC of the notice of approval of Application. 1. Rommel was born in QC on October 26 1973. Migrated to Australia in 1981 when he was 8 yrs old
On May 6, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution declaring Domino disqualified as and acquired Australian citizenship.
candidate for the position of representative of Sarangani for lack of the one year residence requirement a 2. On November 2008, at age 35, he decided to return to the PH and live with his brother, Romeo Jr in
likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy He negates all his protestations that he Brgy Veteran’s Village, Ipil, Province of Zamboanga Sibugay. 4 days upon his return, he took an oath
established residence in SAranganias early as Jan 1997. He lacks one year residence requirement. of allegiance to the RP, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of PH citizenship
On May 11, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution 3046 ordering that the cast votes for by the Bureau of Immigration.
Domino be counted but to suspend proclamation of winning since the resolution disqualifying him has not yet 3. On September 2009, he renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of the
become final and executor. same in compliance with RA 9225 (An Act Making the Citizenship of the Philippines who Acquire
On September 15,1998 Lucille Chionbian-Solon, the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes Foreign Citizenship Permanent, amending for the purpose CA 63, as amended and for other
was allowed by the Court to intervene. Intervenor asks the court to uphold Domino’s disqualification and to purposes). Since his return, Rommel acquired a residential property in the same village where he
proclaim her as the representative of Sarangani. and his brother lived as well as a fishpond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay.
4. He also applied for registration as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil. Respondent Dan Erasmo, then
ISSUE: brgy captain of Barangay Veteran’s Village opposed his registration as a voter but the Election
1) Whether or not the judgment of MTC of QC declaring the petitioner as resident of Sarangani, not QC is final Registration Board approved it and included Rommel’s name in the COMELEC voter’s list for their
2) Whether or not petitioner resided in Sarangani, one year preceding the elections precinct. Erasmo then filed before the MCTC of Upul a petition for the exclusion of Rommel’s name
3) Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition in the official list of voters but MCTC denied the petition, with the RTC affirming the same.
5. Rommel then filed his COC for Governor of Zambo Sibugay on Nov 28 2009 for the May 2010
DECISION: the petition is DISMISSED elections. Erasmo then filed a petition to deny due course/cancel Rommel’s COC on the ground of
material misrep since he failed to comply with:
RATIO: The COMELEC has the jurisdiction to determine whether false representation as to material facts was
made in the certificate of candidacy that will include the residence of the candidate. A decision in an exclusion
or inclusion of voters in the list of voters, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res
judicata. The MTC exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared Domino a resident of Sarangani.
The term residence as used in law means the same thing as domicile which imports not only intention to reside
but also personal presence in the place. Three rules must be born in mind,1) that a man must have a residence
or domicile somewhere; 2) when once established, it remains until new one is acquired; 3)a man can have but
one residence or domicile at a time. o Reqs of RA 9225 and
Domicile requires not just bodily presence but also a declared probable intent to make it one’s fixed abode. The o One-year residency requirement of the LGC
lease contract entered in Jan 1997 does not support a change of domicile. Domino’s lack of intention to
abandon his residence in QC is further that he was a qualified candidate strengthened by his act of registering
as voter in QC. Domino still falls short of one year residency requirement.
The COMELECunder Sec 78 Art 9 of the Omnibus Election Code has jurisdiction over a petition to deny due
course to or cancel certificate of candidacy and continues even after election, if for any reason no final
judgment or disqualification is rendered before the election and the candidate facing the disqualification
received the highest number of votes.
It is now settled that the candidate who received the second highest number of votes MAY NOT BE 6. 2nd Division of Comelec ruled that while he regained citizenship under RA 9225, he failed to prove
PROCLAIMED WINNER in case the WINNER IS DISQUALIFIED. Thus the votes cast for DOMINO are presumed to residency requirement for a gubernatorial candidate to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga
have been cast in the sincere belief. Sibugay. En Banc affirmed 2nd Division, ruling that Rommel had been a mere guest or transient
visitor in his brother’s house and for this reason he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile.
7. SC issued a status quo ante order, enjoining COMELEC from enforcing its orders. In the meantime,
Rommel won and was proclaimed winner.
JALOSJOS V. COMELEC [G.R. NO. 191970] 24 April 2012 | Abad, J. | Membership in the legislature; residence
qualification
FACTS:
ISSUE w/ HOLDING: WON Rommel presented enough proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile
in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay - YES.
● LGC requires a candidate seeking position of prov’l governor to be a resident of the province for at
least one year before the election. For election laws, residence is synonymous with domicile,
meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place, but must also have
personal presence in such place coupled with a conduct indicative of intention. Jurisprudence has
laid down the ff. guidelines as to the question of intention:
o Every person has a domicile or residence somewhere
o Where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one
o A person can have but one domicile at a time
● Applying the guidelines above to this case, the Ct concluded that Rommel has met the residency
requirement
1. Domicile of Origin v Domicile of Choice and Domicile by Operation of Law
● COMELEC pointed out that Rommel failed to prove that he changed his domicile. Since he has failed
to prove Zamboanga Sibugay is his domicile, it assumed that his domicile is at QC or Australia.
● Ct on the other hand, differentiated domicile of origin with domicile by choice and domicile by
operation of law. QC was Rommel’s place of birth, his domicile of origin. He effectively changed his
domicile from QC to Hostralia* when he migrated there at the age of eight. When he came to the
PH to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, evident that Rommel did so with intent to change
his domicile for good. How so?
o He went here
o Reacquired his citizenship in the PH
o Renounced his allegiance to Australia.
● By these acts, he forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his
domicile there. To say that Rommel has not established a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay
despite loss of his domicile of origin (QC) and domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia)
would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
2. Acquisition of property is not a requisite of residence
● COMELEC concluded that Rommel has not come to settle in Ipil since he merely has been staying at
his brother’s house.
● SC on the other hand has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in the
community to establish his residence or domicile. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it
be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or a relative. To insist that a candidate own a house
where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Rommel
has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile
● His next-door neighbors made affidavits attesting to his physical presence at his residence in Ipil. Ct
said that they are more credible (as opposed to his other *not next-door*) neighbors, since they
have a better chance of noting his presence or absence.
● Also, as stated in the above facts, he bought a residential lot in the same village along with a fish
pond in San Isidro, Naga Zamboanga Sibugay.
● Also showed correspondences with political leaders from where he lived
● Also, registered voter
3. COMELEC findings still subject to review
● While Ct ordinarily respects factual findings of admin bodies like the COMELEC, still may review
decisions for palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations.
4. Respect decision of the people
● Rommel won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay.
The Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts re his
qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Petition GRANTED. sets aside resolution of COMELEC 2nd Div and En Banc that
disqualified Rommel from seeking election
ONGSIAKO REYES V. COMELEC [G.R. NO. 207264] 22 OCT. 2013 | PEREZ, J. | MEMBERSHIP IN THE
LEGISLATURE; RESIDENCE QUALIFICATION
FACTS:
1. 31 October 2012 – respondent Tan filed an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Reyes on grounds that it contained material representation,
specifically:

● that she is single when she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of Batangas;
● that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas
which is the residence of her husband, and at the same time, when she is also a resident of 135 J.P.
Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of Congressional Spouses of the
House of Representatives;
● that her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her birthdate is either 8 July
1959 or 3 July 1960;
● that she is not a permanent resident of another country when she is a permanent resident or an
immigrant of the United States of America; and
● that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen.
2. Petitioner filed her Answer, countering respondent’s allegations:
● Her marriage to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas was void ab initio because it was only
solemnized through a religious rite, not complying with formal requirements prescribed by the
Family Code. Petitioner argues that since she’s not duty-bound through marriage to live with
Congressman Mandanas, his residence can’t be attributed to her.
● Her NSO Certificate of Live Birth shows that her birth date as 3 July 1964.
● Petitioner notes that the allegation that she is a permanent residence/citizen of the USA is
unsupported by evidence.
3. 8 February 2013 – respondent filed a “Manifestation with Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and
Amended List of Exhibits” consisting of, among others:
● a copy of an article published on the internet on 8 January 2013 entitled “Seeking and Finding the
Truth about Regina O. Reyes” with an Affidavit of Identification and Authenticity of Document
executed by its author Eliseo J. Obligacion, which provides a database record of the Bureau of
Immigration indicating that petitioner is an American citizen and a holder of a U.S. passport;
● a Certification of Travel Records of petitioner, issued by Simeon Sanchez, Acting Chief, Verification
and Certification Unit of the Bureau of Immigration which indicates that petitioner used a U.S.
Passport in her various travels abroad.
4. 27 March 2013 – COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling Reyes’ COC upon her failure to
comply with RA No. 9225’s (“Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003”) requirements (oath of
allegiance and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship) and with the one-year residency requirement
under Sec. 6, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution.
5. 8 April 2013 – Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that she’s a natural-born Filipino citizen
and that she hasn’t lost such status by obtaining and using an American passport; neither did she become a
naturalized American citizen upon her marriage to an American citizen. Petitioner averred that such a marriage
only resulted in a dual citizenship, thus there was no need for her to fulfill RA 9225’s requirements. (although
she had attached a an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public on 24
September 2012.)
6. an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public on 24 September 2012.
[Reyes vs. Commission on Elections, 699 SCRA 522(2013)]
7. 14 May 2013 – COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
8. 18 may 2013 – Petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 elections.
9. 5 June 2013 – COMELEC En Banc issued a Ceritifcate of Finality declaring the 14 May 2013 Resolution final
and executor, since 14 days had elapsed from the date of promulgation with no order issued by the Supreme
Court restraining its execution.
Petitioner took her oath of office before House Speaker Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr, set to assume office at 30
June 2013.
ISSUES w/ HOLDING:
1. WON COMELEC has no jurisdiction over petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already
taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone
congressional district of Marinduque.
- YES. COMELEC retains jurisdiction over the case bc of the following reasons:
o a. HRET doesn’t acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’ qualifications/ assailed
COMELEC Resolutions bc petitioner wasn’t able to file, well, a petition with said tribunal.
o b. HRET’s jurisdiction only begins after the candidate is considered a Member of the
House of Representatives. The SC cites Sec 17, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as
the ruling in the case of Marcos vs. COMELEC.
2. WON COMELEC committed GAoD amounting to LEJ when it took cognizance of Respondent Tan’s alleged
“newly-discovered evidence” without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in
evidence which became the basis for its Resolution of the case without giving the petitioner the opportunity
to question and present controverting evidence, in violation of Petitioner’s right to due process of law.
- NO. The COMELEC still retains jurisdiction over a candidate bc citing past jurisdiction (Vinzons-Chato
vs. COMELEC; Limkaichong vs. COMELEC), the HRET only assumes jurisdiction over winning
candidates that have had:
o (1) a valid proclamation,
o (2) a proper oath, and
o (3) assumption of office.
- Since petitioner’s term only starts at 30 June 2013, only then does the HRET assume jurisdiction
over her case. The oath she took before Speaker Belmonte doesn’t count since it’s not the oath of
office that confers membership to the House of Representatives.
- According to Section 6, Rule II of the Rules of the House of Representatives, before there is a valid
or official taking of the oath it must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and (2) in open session. Although petitioner made the oath before Speaker
Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it
remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied with.
- COMELEC issued its Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration regarding the
cancellation of her COC on May 14, 2013 – four days before she was proclaimed the winning
candidate. Also, Section 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that any decisions
regarding the disqualification of candidates/ cancellation of COCs/ suspension of elections shall
become final and executory after five days from their promulgation, unless restrained by the SC.
Petitioner should have filed a petition with the SC on or before 10 June 2013, but since she didn’t,
respondent COMELEC rightly issued a Certificate of Finality.
3. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
declared that Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet the residency requirement for the position
of Member of the House of Representatives.
 - NO, COMELEC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in finding her ineligible for Membership of
the House of Representatives in regards to her citizenship/residency.
- Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of
“newly-discovered evidence” (Eli Obligacion’s blog article; the Certification from the Bureau of
Immigration) without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She
likewise contends that there was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not
given the opportunity to question and present controverting evidence.
- Her contentions are incorrect because COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical
rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. (Se 2, Rule 1, COMELEC Rules of Procedure) the
proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in
nature, then the “newly discovered evidence” was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.
- There was also no denial of due process since she was given every opportunity to argue her case
before the COMELEC. Petitoner did not avail herself of the five-month period between Tan’s filing of
his petition and the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution. Also in administrative proceedings, as held
in Sahali vs. COMELEC, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the opportunity
or right to be heard.
- As to the issues regarding Petitioner’s citizenship, there is no showing that she complied with RA
9225’s requirements (oath and sworn renunciation), therefore COMELEC had the right to cancel
her COC. She claimed RA 9225 doesn’t apply to her since she’s only a dual citizen, but the Affidavit
of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship she submitted cannot be used to address the COMELEC’s
observations since she submitted it on September 2012, before Tan filed his petition.
- To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner
contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as
Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural-
born Filipino citizen. This holds no water since she didn’t comply with the requirements prescribed
by memoranda pertaining to Sec 3 of RA No. 9225.
- Petitioner also failed to establish her residency in Marinduque since she failed to establish re-
acquisition of her Filipino citizenship/ unable to establish her domicile of choice through positive
acts (her serving as Provincial Administrator from January to July 2013 doesn’t count).
4.WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, by
enforcing the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225, it imposed additional qualifications to the qualifications of
a Member of the House of Representatives as enumerated in Section 6 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
of the Philippines.
- NO. Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion by imposing additional requirements for
Membership to the House of Representatives since it merely applied the requirements enumerated
in Sec. 6, Art IV of the Constitution.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Petition DISMISSED. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED,
finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of
the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld.
RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as
unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals
Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
FACTS: The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar
as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1),
Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in
Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.
They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the
use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they
are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the
certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title,
nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof
which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of
Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer
considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in
public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand,
Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered  ipso
facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its
enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of
the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes
effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should not
have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the “Accountability of Public Officers:”
Sec. 1.    Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those members of the
House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as  ipso facto resigned therefrom,
upon the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
ISSUES: W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation of the
due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it
becomes effective.
HELD: To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of
an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere
details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.”
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to
include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said
repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its
content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective
officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006,
which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the “one
subject-one title” rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may
contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with
or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the
method and means of carrying out the general subject.
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or discrimination
that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with Congress when the
President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government
may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy
matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political
branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative
determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic
theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion
within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the
legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial
cognizance. Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v.
Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has
a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election
process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws – the fair, honest and orderly
election of truly deserving members of Congress – is achieved.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their
office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be
removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by
virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing
authority.
Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it “shall take effect
immediately upon its approval,” is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid.
In Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:
... the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-
period shall be shortened or extended….
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding
its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of
general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the
courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive
concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on
constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional
limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such transgression has been shown in this case.
CODILLA V. DE VENECIA (150605, 393 SCRA 639)
FACTS:
These are petitions for certiorari to review the decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET). Petitioners, Sixto Balinguit and Antonio Co, and the private respondent Jose Ong Jr. vied for the position
of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar in the May 1987 congressional election.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the said district. Petitioners filed election
protests. Petitioners contend his qualification as a member of the House of Representatives on the basis of
Article VI Sec. 6 of the present Constitution. The HRET declared that the respondent Jose Ong Jr. is a natural-
born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was however, denied. Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
On the issue of jurisdiction
The Constitution explicitly provides that the HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole
judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the respective members, as stated in
Article VI Sec. 17. The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear, and complete. The use of the
word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these tribunals. It has been argued that under Article
VI Sec. 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-
sided political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals.
On the issue of citizenship
The grandfather of private respondent, Ong Te arrived in the Philippines from China in 1895 and was able to
obtain a certificate of residence from then Spanish colonial administration. Ong Te brought the private
respondent’s father, Jose Ong Chuan, to Samar from China. The respondent’s father, Jose Ong Chuan filed with
Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization, and the same court declared him to be a
Filipino citizen. Respondent Ong was then 9 years old. The house of the respondent in Samar was burnt twice
and they rebuilt it twice in the same district twice. Ong, after completing his elementary education in Samar,
went to Manila to acquire his secondary and college education. He took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations and since employment opportunities were better in Manila, Ong found a job in the Central Bank
of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked the hardware business of his family in Manila. In
1971, his full brother, Emil Ong, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention where his
status as a natural-born citizen was challenged. Emil was declared a natural born Filipino.
Respondent Ong’s situation is argued to rest on Article IV Sec. 1(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that
“those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of the majority” are citizens of the Philippines. Section 2 of the same article also reads in its last sentence:
“Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens”. There is no dispute that the respondent’s mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her
marriage. Thus, the contention lies on whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
The aforementioned provision was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where, one born of a Filipino
father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. Under the 1973 Constitution,
they were both considered as natural-born citizens with legislative intent to correct an unfair position which
discriminates against Filipino women.
The petitioners also argue that the respondent’s father was not validly, a naturalized citizen because of his
premature taking of oath of citizenship.
On the issue of residency
The petitioners argue that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot,
therefore be a resident of the said place.
ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion in its decision on the grounds that (1)
respondent Ong is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and (2) respondent Ong is not a resident of the
second district of Northern Samar.
HELD: NO. Petition is dismissed. The questioned decision of the HRET is affirmed. Respondent Ong is declared a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
RATIO:
On the issue of jurisdiction
In the exercise of Article VIII Sec. 1 of the present Constitution, the Court is merely to check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or
has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to the lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will
not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET to decide. The degree of judicial intervention should not
be made to depend on how many legislative members of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test
remains the same – manifest grave abuse of discretion. In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of
power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of
judicial review by the Supreme Court.
On the issue of citizenship
In relation to Article IV Sections 1 and 2, to expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected
citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was
already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized. According
to jurisprudence that defines “election”, the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. The private
respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the
Philippines. There is no doubt in this case about respondent Ong’s being Filipino when he turned 21.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This cannot be done. An
attack on person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. To ask the Court to
declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to the respondent’s father as null and void would run against the
principle of due process, as he has already been laid to rest and that he has no opportunity to defend himself.
Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of
his father. The citizenship of his father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent “chose” to
be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father of the
respondent were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship.
The same issue on natural-born citizenship has already been decided in the case of the full blood brother of the
respondent Ong, which is another reason why the Court cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest
grave abuse of discretion.
On the issue of residency
The petitioners argument on this issue is misplaced. It is not required that a person should have a house in
order to establish his residence and domicile. The legislative intent is to adhere to the earlier definition of the
word “residence” which regarded it as having the same meaning as “domicile”. “Domicile” denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. The absence of a
person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of
that person. It is characterized by animus revertendi and that in the case at bar, the periodical journeys made by
the respondent to his home province, while studying and later on practicing his profession in Manila, reveal that
he always had the animus revertendi. In considering the residence of a person, It is enough that he should live in
the municipality or in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. The Constitution only requires that the
candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the
Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified.
TOLENTINO & MOJICA vs. COMELEC, RECTO & HONASAN G.R. No. 148334 January 21, 2004 
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001 (“Resolution No. 01-
005”) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 (“Resolution No. 01-006”) of respondent Commission
on Elections (“COMELEC”). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14
May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared “official and final” the ranking of the 13 Senators
proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.
Facts: Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines, the Senate
on February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election
to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each,
were due to be elected in that election. The resolution further provides that the “Senatorial candidate garnering
the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona,
Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004. 
On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected
Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full
term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th. 
Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for
prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They contend that COMELEC issued
Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in
the special election as required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to
indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as
allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters
Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as
purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that because of these
omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections
without distinction such that “there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single
election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term.” Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a temporary
restraining order during the pendency of their petition. Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme
Court required COMELEC to Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentino’s and Mojica's standing to
bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed
public funds; nor claim that they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and
01-006. 
Issue:  WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:
(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and
(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645. 
Decision:  WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. 
Ratio Decidendi:  (1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers
some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision
on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity. 
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special
election is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the
result of special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly
believed that there was no special election to fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void. 
(2) There is no basis in the petitioners’ claim that the manner by which the COMELEC conducted the special
Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to document separately the
candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirement exists in our
election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC “fix the date of election,” if
necessary, and state among others, the office/s to be voted for. 
Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May 14, 2001 merely
implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said
resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated
by former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate
agreed to amend the resolution by providing as it now appears, that “the senatorial cabdidate garnering the
13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.”
ATONG PAGLAUM vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 203766) Summarized by Cathy Pedrosa
A petition for Certiorari – Whether or not COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it (i) denied
the petitions for registration of party-list groups and (ii) cancelled the existing registration and accreditation of
some party list organizations because (i) the party list failed to represent any marginalized sector, and (ii) not all
nominees / representatives of the party list belong to the sector they represent. A total of 54 party-list groups
and organizations are involved in the case. The Court held there was no grave abuse of discretion as COMELEC
merely followed the criteria set in the existing jurisprudence: (i) Ang Bagong Bayani case and (ii) BANAT case.
However, the Court REVERSED the aforementioned jurisprudence and set out NEW parameters. The Court then
REMANDED all 54 petitions to COMELEC for determination of qualification based on the new criteria.
FACTS:
1. Pursuant to the provisions of RA 7941 (The Party-list System Act), approximately 280 party-list
groups registered w/ COMELEC to be able to participate in the May 13, 2013 elections.
2. COMELEC denied the registration of 12 party-list groups. Partido ng Bayan ng Bida was granted
registration but was denied participation in the election. COMELEC then issued Resolution No. 9604 excluding
the names of 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the May 2013 party-list elections.
3. Per Resolution No. 9513, par. 2, COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to
determine whether the existing party-list groups have continually complied with the requirements of (i) R.A. No.
7941, (ii) criteria set in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, and (iii) Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections (BANAT). The COMELEC found 39 party-
list groups noncompliant, hence disqualified them from participating in the election.
4. COMELEC’s reason for disqualifying the 54 party-lists as set in:
a. Ang Bagong Bayani case:
 First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x
(Meaning ALL (i) national, (ii) regional, and (iii) sectoral groups or organizations must represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sectors, else disqualified).
 Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors x x x
 Seventh, not only the candidate party or must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x. (Meaning all nominees of the party-list
groups must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent, else
disqualified).
b. BANAT jurisprudence:
 Officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list elections,
abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and
R.A.No. 7941 (see second above – officially revoked).
5. 13 petitions were granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction, 41 petitions
granted mandatory injunctions (pls. refer to the verdict for the relevance).
6. Guys just added info. for better understanding:
 Under Art. VI, section 5(1) the House of Representative (HOR) shall be composed of 250
seats (now 292 na ata..) allocated 80%-20% to:
i. “Congressmen”: 80% x 250 seats = 200 seats,
ii Party-lists:        20% x 250 seats =  50 seats
 If a district has 200,000 voters, will have 1 Congressman seat. Same logic applies for the
party-list group, with max 3 seats though, e.g. if the party-list group garnered 1,000,000 votes, it will
be given 3 seats only, not 5. (But in the current 16th HOR, others were given 2 seats only even the
votes were 600,000+, maybe to give an opportunity/seat to those who got 200,000 votes since
there’s a 20% limit/max 50 seats for party-lists.
ISSUE(S):
1. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying the 54 party-lists by (i) denying their application for registration & (ii)
cancelling their registration and accreditation.
2. WON the criteria in (i) Ang Bagong Bayani and (ii) BANAT should be applied by the
COMELEC in the coming May 2013 party-list elections.
HOLDING:
1. No grave abuse of discretion since COMELEC merely followed prior jurisprudence.
2. No. The Court sets new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and
sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani
and BANAT.
NEW PARAMETERS FOR QUALIFICATION:
PARAMETER # 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. (Meaning, the
party-list system is not only for sectoral parties (3) but also for non-sectoral parties (1 & 2).
RATIO of PARAMETER #1:
(i) Intent of the framers – (Commissioner Monsod v. Commissioner Villacorta) Commissioner Monsod, main
sponsor of the party-list system wanted that the whole 20% seats be for sectoral parties only. He said if UNIDO,
a national party will be allowed to join the party-list election, it’s like giving UNIDO 2 votes/seats in the HOR (1
for the Congressman position, one for the party-list). Hence, delimiting the sectoral parties’ participation in
legislation which is the whole point of the exercise.
Commissioner Villacorta said political parties (like UNIDO) can participate in the party-list system “as long as
they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution”. He was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups only in an
electoral contest would be like placing babes in the lion's den.
The vote was 19-22 in favor of Com. Villacorta’s idea of not limiting the seats to sectoral groups as evidenced in
the provisions in the Constitution and RA 7941, discussed below. But they compromised that in the 1988
election (only), the 5 major political parties will not join the party-list election. Another compromise is stated in
Section 5(2) Article 6, discussed below.
(ii) Section 5(1), Article VI, 1987 Constitution - The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities…x x x and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(iii) Section 5(2), Article VI - The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification
of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. (Meaning the other half is
for non-sectoral groups, and after 3 consecutive terms, the seat will be open for all – sectoral and non-sectoral)
(iv) Section 3 (a), RA 7941 - The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election
of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations
or coalitions thereof registered with the COMELEC. (Meaning, the common denominator between sectoral and
non-sectoral parties is that though they cannot expect to win in legislative district elections but they can garner,
in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes (200,000) that winning candidates can garner in
legislative district elections, granting them 1 seat in HOR.
PARAMETER # 2. National parties and regional parties do not need to (i) organize along sectoral lines and (ii)
nor represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
RATIO of PARAMETER #2:
(i) Section 3(a), RA 7941 A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
Section 3(b) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government.
Section 3(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector.
(ii)  Reasoning is so as not to deprive and exclude ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list
system. To exclude them from the partylist system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle,
leaving as their only option the armed struggle.
(iii) Section 5, RA 7941 - “the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. (Meaning,
those bold are not necessarily marginalized but “lack well-defined political constituencies” and can thus form
party-lists, regardless of their economic status as citizens).
(iii) Section 6(a), RA 7941 – provides grounds for refusal and/or cancellation of registration and NONE refers to
non-representation of the marginalized sector. (Grounds: religious sect, advocates violence, foreign party, failed
to participate or obtain at least 2% of votes in the last 2 elections.
PARAMETER # 3.
(i) Political parties, whether major or not, can participate in party-list elections provided they register under
the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections (Congressman position).
(ii) If the political party fields candidates in legislative district elections, they can still participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
RATIO of PARAMETER #3:
(i) Pls. refer to the intent of the framers as discussed in parameter #1.  Moreover, it was Commissioner Tadeo
who asked if minority political parties are prohibited. And the answer was they’re not prohibited, whether
major or not, they’re allowed.
(ii) Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the “first five (5) major political parties on from
participating in the May 1988 party-list elections ONLY. Thus, major political parties can participate in
subsequent party-list elections
(iii) Reasoning why the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-
list elections is to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized
and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.” And they can do so by
organizing an independent sectoral party that must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. Such sectoral
party and the political party then form a COALITION.
PARAMETER # 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be:
(i) “marginalized and underrepresented”
- include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers
(ii) lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.”
 include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
 It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns
of their sector.
RATIO of PARAMETER #4:
(i) Please refer to Parameter#2 (iii) Section 5, RA 7941
(ii) The phrase “marginalized and underrepresented” appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2 on
Declaration of Policy. The Ponencia harmonizes the broad policy declaration in Section 2 with its specific
implementing provisions in Section 5, that the term “marginalized and underrepresented” shall refer to those
economically marginalized only (lanor, peasant, etc.) while the others are ideologically marginalized (women,
youth).
PARAMETER # 5.
(i) A majority of the members of sectoral parties must belong to:
a. the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors they represent
b. the “lack of well-defined political constituencies” sectors they represent.
(ii) The nominees of sectoral parties, must either
a. belong to their respective sectors, or
b. must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors.
(iii) The nominees of national and regional parties must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
RATIO of PARAMETER #5:
(i) Belonging to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector does not mean one must “wallow in poverty,
destitution or infirmity; they are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical
Coordination Board.
(ii) Belonging to the ideology-based or cause-oriented national, regional, and sectoral parties that lack of well-
defined political constituencies is clearly different from the economically marginalized sectoral parties. It is
sufficient for these parties to consist of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same
governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
(iii) Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees -
No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless:
a. he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
b. a registered voter,
c. a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day
of the election, able to read and write,
d. a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election. (Necessarily a track record as well).
PARAMETER # 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
RATIO of PARAMETER #6:
At least one nominee / representative of the party-list should be qualified. If there are no qualified nominees,
then it follows that their party-list, represented by the unqualified nominees, is also not qualified to have a seat
in the HOR.
VERDICT: ALL 54 petitions GRANTED, and REMANDED to the COMELEC:
13 petitions – determine WON they are qualified to register per new standards but will not participate in the
May 2013 elections
41 petitions - determine WON they are qualified to register and participate in the May 2013 elections per new
standards
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST V. COMELEC G.R. No. 206952 | October 22, 2013 Dela Cruz - Group 7
PETITIONER: Abang Lingkod Party-List (Abang Lingkod)
DEFENDANT: Commission on Elections

COURT: Supreme Court, En Banc

PONENCIA: Reyes, J.
Laws:
Facts and Procedural History:

1. RA 7941 – guidelines for registering party-list groups set forth in Ang Bagong Bayani – OFW Labor
Party v. COMELEC Special civil action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

- Party-list undergoes a summary evidentiary hearing to determine whether it is qualified to run ● Abang Lingkod is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant farmers and
under party-list system fisherfolks, and was registered under the party-list system in 2009.
● It participated in the May 2010 elections but failed to obtain number of votes needed for a seat in
the House of Representatives.
● In 2012, Abang Lingkod manifested before COMELEC intent to participate in May 2013 elections.
● COMELEC issued resolution which set summary evidentiary hearing (SEH) for purposes of
determining their continuing compliance with the requirements under RA 7941.
● Again, COMELEC issues a resolution scheduling the SEH of previously registered party-list groups
into 3 dates—August 17, 31, and September 2, 2012—for the SEH of Abang Lingkod’s Manifestation
2. Sec. 5 of RA 7941 of Intent.
● Abang Lingkod, in compliance with COMELEC’s resolution, filed pertinent documents to prove
compliance with RA 7941.
● On November 7, 2012, COMELEC cancelled Abang Lingkod’s registration as a party-list.

- “Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days
before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to
participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a o Abang Lingkod failed to establish its track record in uplifting the marginalized and
coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform underrepresented.
or program of government list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant o Abang Lingkod failed to show that its nominees are themselves marginalized and
information as the COMELEC may require. Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, underrepresented.
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.”
● Abang Lingkod filed with SC a petition for certiorari, alleging that COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion. Said petition was able to obtain status quo ante orders from SC.
● On April 2, 2013, SC in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC laid down new parameters to be observed
by the COMELEC in screening parties, organizations, or associations seeking registration and/or
accreditation under party-list system:
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
● SC remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously registered party-list systems including that of
Abang Lingkod.
● COMELEC issued resolution affirming the cancellation of Abang Lingkod’s registration. They issued
resolution sans SEH, citing the proximity of May 2013 elections as reason thereof.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector. 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections
provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields o “It is not enough that the party-list organization claim representation of the
candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only
marginalized and underrepresented because representation is easy to claim and to
through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The
feign”
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
o “Abang Lingkod submitted pictures showing a seminar. And as if to insult the
through a coalition.
Commission, the photographs submitted appear to have been edited to show in the
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented banners that Abang Lingkod participated in the activities.”
or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
● On May 12, 2013, Abang Lingkod sought a reconsideration of COMELEC’s resolution but withdrew,
5. A majority of the members of the sectoral parties or organizations that represent the alleging that there might not be enough time for COMELEC to pass upon merits for reconsideration.
''marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and ● In support of the instant petition, Abang Lingkod claims that the COMELEC gravely abused its
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of discretion when it affirmed the cancellation of its registration sans a summary evidentiary hearing
sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must for that purpose, asserting that the COMELEC should have allowed it to present evidence to prove
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations its qualification as a party-list group pursuant to Atong Paglaum.
that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" or that represent those who ● COMELEC avers that the instant petition should be dismissed for utter lack of merit.
lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their respective ● The COMELEC further claims that it did not abuse its discretion when it cancelled ABANG LINGKOD’s
sectors, or must have a track record or advocacy for their respective sectors. The registration on the ground that it failed to establish a track record in representing the marginalized
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members and underrepresented.
of such parties or organizations.
Hence, the filing of the petition. 2. Yes. COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling Abang Lingkod’s registration.

Issues:

✓ COMELEC did so by requiring evidence of track record.

1. Whether Abang Lingkod was denied due process when the COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of its
registration under the patiy-list system sans any summary evidentiary hearing
2. Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling Abang Lingkod’s registration
under the party-list system

o Track record = record of past performance often taken as an indicator of

future performance.
Holding:
o Ang Bagong Bayani: case where track record requirement was imposed.
Petition is meritorious.

1. No. Due process was given to Abang Lingkod, and it cannot be invoked.
✓ Sec. 5 of RA 7941 states how to show representation:

✓ COMELEC had afforded Abang Lingkod with sufficient opportunity to present evidence
establishing its qualification.
✓ Abang Lingkod was able to file Manifestation of Intent and other documents prove its
continuing compliance with RA 7941, and COMELEC set 3 separate dates for SEH.
✓ There is no necessity for SEH to determine qualification of petitioners.
✓ SC merely gave COMELEC an option for another SEH.
o “xxx attaching constitution, bylaws, platform, or program of government, list
of offices, coalition agreement, and other relevant information as COMELEC
may require. xxx”
o Law does not require groups to submit proof of their track record as a
group.
✓ Track record is not the same as submission of constitution, by-laws, platform or program
of government list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require—which are pieces of documentary evidence intended to
establish that a group exists and is a going concern.
✓ In Atong Paglaum, doctrine is:
o National/regional group = there is no necessity to represent any
marginalized or underrepresented sector
o Sector group = there is a necessity to represent marginalized or
underrepresented sector
✓ There is no mention of requiring track record. Instead, it is sufficient that ideals
represented are geared towards the cause which they represent.
✓ Track record is required only for nominees not under sector represented.
✓ There is no logic in treating sectoral groups differently from national/regional groups. It
deters marginalized and underrepresented sector from organizing themselves. And
varying track records (according to dissent) would result in absurd and unjust situation.
o Leonen’s dissent: Parties are still required to present track record,
notwithstanding Atom Paglaum pronouncement. Track records would differ
based on nature of group (only sectoral must submit and prove their links
with marginalized and underrepresented sector; national and regional must
only show bona fide existence as an organization).
✓ Submission of constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government list of officers,
coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require are
not the same as a track record.
✓ No explicit reversal of guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani in Atong Paglaum.
✓ Different treatment has no basis in law and jurisprudence.
✓ Leonen’s dissent: Deceit committed by Abang Lingkod puts serious question on the
existence of the organization and the genuineness of its representation.
o The said issues were never raised in COMELEC proceedings, so it is unjust for
Court to scrutinize legitimacy of Abang Lingkod.
✓ Abang Lingkod has previously registered as a party-list group in May 2010 elections.
✓ Digitally edited photos are part of track record.
o Since track record is no longer a requirement, there is no effect on
qualification of Abang Lingkod.

✓ If there is no track record of nominees, then there is no effect on Abang Lingkod’s
registration.
o But the nominees who are not from the representative sector become an
issue.
o 5 nominees = 3 farmers, 1 NGO worker, and 1 employee
o The 3 farmers are qualified, but the other two are not.
o However, sixth guideline from Atong Paglaum enables sectoral parties or
organizations not to be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
Judgment:
o Petition is GRANTED.
o Resolution of the COMELEC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
o COMELEC is hereby ORDERED to PROCLAIM Abang Lingkod as one of the winning party-list groups
during the May 13, 2013 elections.
PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS (324 SCRA 689)
FACTS: The accused was a member of the lower House when he was convicted of rape. He was confined in the
National Penitentiary while his appeal was pending. He was re-elected. He argued that he should be allowed to
attend legislative sessions and committee hearings; because his confinement was depriving the electorate of his
district of their voice in Congress and that he has a duty to attend the sessions in Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be allowed to attend sessions in Congress?
HELD: No. Election to high government offices doesn’t free the accused from the common restraints of general
law. The constitution provides that a member of the House of Representative is privileged from arrest only if
the offense is punishable by not more than 6 years of imprisonment. The accused has not given any reason why
he should be exempted from the operation of this provision. Section 11, Article 6 of the Constitution states that
a the members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions especially if the reason if a
legitimate one. Confinement of a congressman charged with a crime punishable by more than 6 years of
imprisonment has constitutional foundations. Allowing the accused to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings will virtually make him a free man. When the voters of his district reelected him, they had
full awareness of the limitation of his freedom of action. The accused is only one of the members of the House
of Representatives. Congress continues to function despite the absence of one or a few of its members. The
issue in this case boils down to the question of equal protection. Election to the position isn’t reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement.
Instant motion is denied.
JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG (17 SCRA 87)
Petitioners Jimenez, et al. filed present appeal from an order of CFI-Rizal dismissing their claim for damages for
the publication of an allegedly libellous letter of defendant Cong. Cabangbang.
The main issue is W/N the said letter is a privileged communication for which Cabangbang is exempted from
being questioned outside Congress under Article VI, Sec. 15 of the Constitution.
The Court held that the letter is not absolutely privileged - it did not fall under the scope of “speech or debate”
which includes utterances made in the performance of official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, votes cast, while in session, as well as bills introduced and other acts done in the
performance of official duties because an open letter to the President when Congress was not in session and
published in several newspapers of general circulation by the defendant was not in the performance of his
official duty.
Important Persons:
 Petitioners:
(1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez of National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA)
(2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI
(3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP
 Respondent: Cong. Bartolome Cabangbang
FACTS:
1. On November 14,1958, Cong. Cabangbang wrote and published an open letter to the President of
the Philippines in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. The respondent, in
publishing the letter, felt that it was his solemn duty to expose vital information of the following alleged
operational plans of unnamed ambitious AFP officers (“planners”):
 Plan 1: insidious plan or massive political build-up
of then National Defense Secretary Jesus Vargas to become a Presidential candidate in the
1961 elections
 Plan 2: coup d’etat which was temporarily
suspended subject to future developments
 Plan 3: modified Plan 1, loyalty parade to assuage
the President and the public while Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the authority
of Congress, to rally AFP officers and members behind him
2. The letter further adds that the petitioners Jimenez, Lukban, and Albert and other officers are under
the control of the “planners” and that having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano,
probably belonged to the Vargas-Arellano clique.
3. Petitioners then filed a complaint with CFI-Rizal for recovery of damages for the publication of the
defendant’s allegedly libelous letter. The defendant then moved to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds that
the letter is not libelous, and if it were, the said letter is a privileged communication under Art. VI, Sec. 15 of the
Constitution considering that he was a member of the HOR and Chairman of Committee on National Defense.
The CFI-Rizal granted the motion to dismiss and the petitioners subsequently filed this appeal to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE(S):
1. W/N the publication is a privileged communication under Art. VI, Sec. 15 of the Constitution
2. W/N the publication is libelous
HOLDING:
1. NO, the publication is not a privileged communication
Speech and Debate Clause
The Court defines the phrase “speech or debate therein” in the invoked provision to mean utterances
made in the performance of official functions such as speeches delivered, statements made, votes cast
(while the same is in session), as well as bills introduced and other acts performed done in the
performance of his official duties (whether inside or outside premises housing its offices).
Considering that the letter was dated and published when Congress presumably was NOT IN SESSION and
that in causing the publication of the letter, the defendant was NOT IN PERFORMANCE of his official duty
as a member of Congress or as an officer of any Committee, the communication is not absolutely
privileged.
2. NO, the letter is not libelous
Although the letter states that the petitioners are under the control of the planners and that they
probably belonged to the Vargas-Arellano clique, the defendant likewise added that “it is of course
possible that petitioners are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no
knowledge”. It is explicitly stated that they may be absolutely unaware of the plans and clearly implied
that they were not the planners but merely unwitting tools of the planners. The Court does not consider
this statement derogatory to entitle petitioners to damages since they are officers of the AFP and are by
law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff (2 high-ranking officials
which the letter suggests are included in the “planners”).
VERDICT: The SC affirms CFI-Rizal’s decision to dismiss the petition.
Additional Notes:
In the 1987 Constitution, speech and debate clause may be found under Article VI, Section 11 which
states that:
“A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof.” (Emphasis ours.)
This privilege of speech is intended to leave the legislator unimpeded in the performance of his
duties and free from fear of harassment from outside. (Bernas, S.J.)
ANTONINO VS. VALENCIA (57 SCRA 70)
The speech and utterances must constitute legislative action- that is actions that are done in relation with the
duties of a Member of the Congress.
FACTS: Gaudencio Antonino then a Senator and Liberal Party head of Davao attributed the loss of LP candidate
to the support given by defendant Brigido Valencia then Secretary of Public Works and Communications to the
independent LP candidate which divided the LP votes. Antonino was quoted in metropolitan newspapers when
he said that had not Valencia “sabotaged” and “double-crossed” the LP, its official candidate would have won.
On 28 Feb 1964, Antonino while attending a Senate session filed a formal request with a Senate Committee to
investigate the actions of Valencia as Sec. of Public Works and Communications in connection with acquisitions
of public works supplies and equipments. Copy of the formal request was furnished to the Commission on
Appointments with the request that they be considered in passing upon Valencia’ appointment to the Cabinet.
Two-page press release was issued by the office of the Sec of Pub Works and Com and the contents were
published or reported on the front pages of 6 metropolitan newspapers. The press release depicted Antonino as
a consistent liar; that he prostituted his high public offices as monetary board member and senator for personal
ends and pecuniary gains; and imputed to him the commission of certain serious offenses in violation of the
Constitution and Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Antonino then filed the present civil action against
Valencia.
Valencia filed a counterclaim and claims that he did not issue or cause the publication of the press release and
that they were made in good faith and in self defense and that they were qualifiedly privileged in character.
Lower court ruled against Valencia holding that he caused and was liable for the issuance of the libelous press
release and its publication in the papers and rejected his defenses of qualified privilege and defensive libel.
Valencia appealed to SC. During the course of the appeal, Antonino died in a plane crash. Sen. Magnolia
Antonino as adminastrix substituted her husband as plaintiff-appelle.
ISSUE: Whether the press release is libelous? Whether or not the press release is protected as a qualified
privilege communication?
HELD: Press release is libelous. Statements released were defamatory and libelous in nature where malice in
law is presumed because they were against the honor, integrity and reputation o f plaintiff. Defendant Valencia
made his imputations against the plaintiff publicly and unofficially as to be qualifiedly privileged. The malice in
the act of the defendant was proven when the Court observed that had the defendant been prompted by a
sense of duty and not because of malice, the charges should have been filed with the Senate or any of its
Committees and not publicized widely by all metropolitan newspapers. Defendant-appellant’s claim of
defensive libel is likewise rejected because his argument that he had been libeled by the plaintiff and
accordingly the former justified to hit back with another libel is based upon a wrong premise. Plaintiff
Antonino’s act was not libelous because the letter he sent was a privileged communication because the
defendant was charged by the plaintiff in his capacity as a Secretary of Public Works and Communications and
the same were filed privately and officially to the Senate and Commission on Appointments.
Judgment affirmed.
POBRE V DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO [AC: 7399, Aug 25, 2009] Ponente: Velasco; Group 6- Gerodias
Facts
 Chief Justice position vacated soon and the Judicial Bar Council sent public invitations for
nominations, Miriam being a recipient.
 JBC backtracks and says that only incumbent justices (not Miriam) would be considered
 Miriam lashes out at the JBC for not giving advanced advisory, calling it an unjust act
 She is foaming in the mouth/homicidal/humiliated
 Spit on the face of CJ Art Panganiban and cohorts
 No longer interested to be CJ because SC are idiots
 Pobre prays for the disbarment/disciplinary actions against Miriam for direct contempt of court
 Miriam claims parliamentary immunity under Art 6, Sec  11 Consti
Issue: W/N Court will discharge disciplinary action – NO
 Art 6, Sec  11: No member shall be questioned nor held liable in any other place for a speech or
debate in the Congress
 Ratio for immunity
 Enable/encourage firmness and success of discharge of his public trust w/o resentment
 seeks to avoid polite and ineffective debating forum and not for legislators in their
private capacity but for the public good
 Court do not interfere with the manner of the performance of legislative duties
 Therefore Court is not correct remedy, rather the disciplinary authority of assembly (Ethic
committee)  and the voters (by not voting again)
 Privilege speech are not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of
Court
The Court’s Deep Concern
 Miriam crossed  limits of decency and professional conduct, it was an expression of anger and not
prelude to remedial legislation as she claims
 Respect of the Courts must be maintained as to not erode people’s faith in the judiciary
 She could have vented her anger in a better/more respectful way
 JBC only includes the Chief Justice as an ex-officio chairperson, so no need to attack the all members
of the Court
 Violation of Code of Professional Responsibility
 Canon 8, Rule 8.01: no abusive, offensive, improper language
 Canon 11: observe and maintain the respect due to courts
 Miriam as a successful lawyer should have known better
 Art 8, Sec 5(5) Consti: Powers of SC includes promulgating rules for the Integrated Bar
 Shield the Judiciary from assault
 Enforce rigid standards
 Lawyer in public office may not be disciplined as member of the Bar, while in the discharge of public
office, except if misconduct violates oath as a lawyer
 Misconduct = in private individual and private/public practice
 Have previously disciplined Sen Sotto, Atty. Sorreda and Atty. Cruz for repeatedly insulted and
threatened the court
 Court is not hesitant to discipline Miriam the facts/circumstance however deter the Court despite
her lack of remorse due to constitutional consideration
 But reiterates that parliamentary immunity is not to protect them for their own benefit
 Despite Rules of the Senate re Parliamentary Acts and Language, Senate admin bent backwards,
no action against her
 Court takes note of Miriam’s implied admission of making the statements and Pobre’s complaint is
for public welfare despite Miriam’s protestation
HELD: Letter-complaint DISMISSED
PUYAT V. DE GUZMAN (113 SCRA 31)
This case is about a constitutional violation of Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of Interim
Batasang Pambansa (this case happened in ’79 and decided in ‘82; hence, ’73 Consti was still in effect).
Fernandez involved himself by appearing as counselor in the SEC case regarding a conflict in the election for
Directors of IPI. Such involvement is specifically prohibited by Sec. 11, Art. VIII ’73 Constitution. In an attempt
to continue his involvement in the case without violating the Constitution, he moved to intervene (instead of
appearing as counsel) in the same case and the Commissioner of SEC granted his motion. The case at hand is a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review the order of the SEC Commissioner
granting Fernandez’s motion to intervene in the SEC case.
LESSON: A member of the National Assembly (Batasang Pambansa) is not allowed to be involved in cases
provided for in Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the ’73 Constitution (the equivalent of this provision in the ’87 Consti is Sec.
14, Art. VI). Fernandez somehow found a loophole but this case exemplified how strictly the provision must be
followed to avoid undue influence of Assemblymen in certain bodies such as administrative ones.
Important People: Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez, Hon. Sixto T.J. De Guzman, Jr. (Assoc. Commissioner
of the Securities & Exchange Commission or SEC), Eustaquio T. C. Acero
IPI (Internat’l Pipe Industries Corp.) – private corporation
FACTS:
a. May 14, 1979 – Election for the 11 Directors of IPI; two groups emerged as winners: 1) Puyat
Group (6 individuals; Eugenio J. Puyat, et al., who are the petitioners in the present case) and 2) Acero Group (5
individuals, Eustaquio T.C. Acero et. al., respondents)
 The Puyat group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.
b. May. 25, 1979 – Acero Group instituted a quo warranto proceedings at the SEC
 The quo warranto questions the election claiming that the stockholders’ votes were not
properly counted.
c. May 25-31, 1979 – Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties w/ respondent SEC
Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez orally entered his appearance as
counsel for respondent Acero.
 Puyat Group objected Fernandez’ action on Constitutional Grounds: Sec. 11, Art. VIII (No
assembly could “appear as counsel before x x x any administrative body” and SEC IS an
administrative body.
 Because Constitutional prohibition is clear, Fernandez didn’t continue his appearance for
respondent Acero
d. May 31, 1979 – When the SEC was called, it turned out:
i. May 15, 1979 Fernandez bought from Augusto Morales 10 shares of stock of IPI for P200 upon
request of Acero to qualify him to run for election as Director.
ii. Deed of sale notarized only on May 30, 1979 (sought to be registered on the same day)
iii. May 31, 1979 (notice that this is the day after notarization) Fernandez filed an Urgent Motion for
Intervention in the SEC Case as owner of 10 IPI shares alleging interest in the matter in litigation
e. July 17, 1979 SEC granted leave to intervene; BASIS: Fernandez’ ownership of 10 shares >> this
Order is the subject of the present petition
e. July 3, 1979 – Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the CFI Pasig against N.V. Verenigde
Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior - De Maas and respondent Eustaquio Acero and others, to annul the sale of
Excelsior’s shares in the IPI to the respondent Asero. In that case, Fernandez appeared as counsel for
defendant Excelsior.
 Note that the court already ruled before that Fernandez, as an Assemblyman, could not
appear as counsel in a case originally filed with a CFI because then the Court would be one
“without appellate jurisdiction”. (Sec. 11, Art. VIII “…before any court without appellate
jurisdiction”)
Sept. 4, 1979 – the Court en banc issued TRO enjoining respondent SEC Assoc. Commissioner from allowing the
participation as an intervenor of Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC Case.
SolGen’s Comment (for respondent Commissioner) supports the stand in allowing intervention. Court en banc
(Nov. 6, 1979) resolved to consider Comment as an Answer to the Petition.
ISSUE(s):
1. W/N Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC Case without violating
Sec. 11 Art. VIII of the Constitution
2. W/N, in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit
indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision.
HOLDING:
 By virtue of the Motion of Intervention, Fernandez (ordinarily) cannot be said to be appearing as
counsel on behalf of another, but simply joining the cause of the private respondents. This cause
can be theoretically justified by saying he is only protecting his ownership of 10 shares of IPI and not
the protection of any of the parties.
 HOWEVER, certain circumstances says otherwise:
a. He acquired a mere P200 worth of stock in IPI (that’s just 10 shares out of a whopping 262, 843
outstanding shares)
b. Said shares were acquired “after the fact” or on May 30, 1979:
  After election of Directors on May 14
 After quo warranto suit had been filed before  SEC on May 25, and;
 one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC (May 31)
c. Before he moved to intervene, he has signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent
Acero (which was objected to by petitioners)
c. Realizing validity of objection, he decided instead to “intervene” on the grounds of legal interest in
the matter under litigation
c. Of note: he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior (co-defendant of Acero) in the case before
CFI Pasig
 With the foregoing circumstances, SC says that Fernandez indirectly appeared as counsel before an
administrative body (i.e. SEC) and therefore circumvented the Constitutional prohibition.
 The “intervention” was merely an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings
in some other capacity. It would be naïve to believe that his involvement was to enable him
eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC
Case. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.
 To uphold the “intervention” would make the constitutional prohibition ineffective. Any
Assemblyman then could acquire the minimal participation in the “interest” of the client and then
“intervene” in the proceedings.
Laws Cited: SEC. 11, ART. VIII 1973 Constitution
VERDICT: Order by respondent Commissioner granting Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to
intervene in SEC Case is hereby reversed and set aside. TRO is hereby made permanent.
LIBAN V GORDON [G.R. NO. 175352, JAN. 18, 2011] LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
PETITIONER: DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BORNARDO, SALVADOR M. VIARI
RESPONDENT: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS
I. RELEVANT DOCTRINES:
1. SEC. 13, ART. VI of the 1987 Constitution: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
2. SEC. 7, ART. XIV of the 1935 Constitution: The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for
the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are
owned and controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality therof.
II. FACTS:
 Petitioner Liban filed a petition with the Supreme Court alleging that respondent Gordon, who was
elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors, forfeited his
position in senate pursuant to SEC. 13, ART. VI.
 Court ruled that the office of the PNRC chairman is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned/controlled corporation for the purposes of prohibition under the relevant
article.
 The court further held that the PNRC charter, R.A. 95, as amended by P.D Nos. 1264 & 1643, are
declared void, as they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers. This
conflicts with SEC. 7, ART. XIV. The court thus ruled that PNRC must incorporate under the
corporate code and register with Securities and Exchange Commission if it wishes to be a private
corporation.
 Res. Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration of the decision which was
likewise filed by the PNRC on the following grounds:
1. Intervenor PNRC was never a party to the instant controversy.
2. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was never an issue in this case.
3. Current charter of PNRC is P.D. NO. 1264, not R.A. No. 95, P.D. was not a creation of
congress.
4. PNRC’s structure is sui generis (of its own kind), functions as an auxiliary to the govt.,
thus is not a private corporation but is independent of govt. control.
III. ISSUES & HOLDING:
1. W/N it was correct for the court to have passed on and decided on the issue of the constitutionality
of the PNRC charter. NO.
 Issue of constitutionality not the lis mota of the case
 Issue of constitutionality of R.A. no. 95 not raised by either parties, and was not
among the issues outlined in the body of the decision, thus it was not the very lis
mota of the case.
 lis mota- when questions of constitutional significance are raised, court can
exercise its power of judicial review.
 Alavrez v. PICOP Resources Inc ruled that “the court will not touch the issue of
unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota.”
 Court should not have ruled R.A. no. 95 unconstitutional, rather should have
exercised judicial restraint.
 The PNRC, the entity most adversely effected in this case and not even originally a
party in this case, is being forced to suddenly reorganize after more than 60 years
of its existence in this country is unreasonable.
 The PNRC is sui generis in nature, it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private
corporation.
 R.A. 95 has remained valid from the time of it’s enactment on March 22,  1947
under the 1935 constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 and 1987
constitutions. The PNRC charter and its amendatory laws have never been
questioned or challenged in on constitutional grounds, not even in the case at bar.
 By requiring PNRC to register as a private corporation, it conflicts with the
country’s adherence to the Geneva Conventions under P.D 1264 signed by Pres.
Marcos.
 Under the constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
International Law as part of the law of the Land.
 PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, cannot be classified as an instrumentality of the state, so as not to
lose its character of neutrality.
 Not strictly a private corporation either, as its regulated by international
humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the state.
 Sui generis character of PNRC requires the court to treat controversies involving
them on a case-to-case basis.
IV. JUDGMENT: R.A. 95 remains constitutional in its entirety, court to modify its previous decision.
CHAVEZ V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL [Mendoza, J.] Summarized by Sophia Sy
 Chavez assails constitutionality of the current practice of having 2 representatives from each House
of Congress sit in the JBC. Court grants his petition and declares the practice, resulting to having 8 members in
the JBC, as against Sec. 8, Art VIII of the Constitution. Respondents file this MR stating that such provision was
plain oversight and would result to absurdity due to the bicameral nature of Congress. Court refutes such
arguments and affirms initial decision. (But see Leonen Dissent.)
IMPORTANT PEOPLE
Francisco Chavez (petitioner, former Sol Gen)
Sen. Francis Escudero, Rep. Niel Tupas (respondents, filed this MR)
FACTS
1. Petitioner, in a pleading, asked Court to determine whether Sec. 8 (1) of Art VIII allows more
than one member of Congress to sit in JBC and if the practice of having 2 reps from each
house is sanctioned by the Constitution.
2. Court granted said petition. Declared the current numerical composition of JBC
unconstitutional and directed JBC to reconstitute itself to allow only 1 member of Congress to
sit.
3. Respondents file this MR. They pray to dismiss petition due to ff. grounds:
1) that allowing only one representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity
considering its bicameral nature;
2) that the failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment when there was a shift from
unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight;
3) that two representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention of the Framers to
insulate the JBC from political partisanship; and
4) that the rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member composition would provide a
solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.
Pertinent provision:
Art. VIII. Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of
the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
ISSUE with HOLDING
1. WON Sec. 8 Art. VIII merely allows one representative from Congress to sit in the JBC, thereby
making the practice of having 1 representative from each House unconstitutional? YES.
 In the interpretation of constitutional provisions, Court relies on postulate that the
Framers mean what they say.
 Court cannot accede to argument of plain oversight. In opting to use the singular letter
"a" to describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers
intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC.
 Several provisions (i.e. Sec. 4, 8, 18 of Art VII) have been adjusted to be in tune of shift
to bicameralism. Thus, to say that framers failed to adjust provisions by sheer
inadvertence is not persuasive.
 In sitting in the JBC, Congress is not in the exercise of its primary function to legislate,
but merely in exercise of a contributory non-legislative function to support the
executive power to appoint.
 In the exercise of other congressional functions such as power of appropriation,
declaration of an existence of a state of war, canvassing of electoral returns for the
President and Vice-President and impeachment, the dichotomy of each House must be
acknowledged considering the interplay between the two.
 In contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in their
participation in the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House
of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Framers simply
gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain
constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of government. (Membership of
JBC: 4 regular members plus 3 reps from each major branch of Government = 7 total
members)
 Cong. Datumanong: “to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with
one vote each, is to negate the principle of equality among the three branches of
government…”
 Assoc. Justice Quisumbing: “Two votes…gives Congress more influence in the
appointment of judges… would increase the number of JBC members to eight, which
could lead to voting deadlock...and a clear violation of 7 enumerated members in the
Constitution”
 Sec. Devanadera: “…two (2) representatives from Congress would increase the number
of JBC members to eight (8), a number beyond what the Constitution has contemplated.
 Retired Justice Ynares-Santiago: the composition of the JBC reflects the Commission’s
desire "to have in the Council a representation for the major elements of the
community." xxx The ex-officio members of the Council consist of representatives from
the three main branches of government while the regular members are composed of
various stakeholders in the judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section
8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as representing one co-equal branch of
government. xxx No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress
in the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under Article VI and
constituent powers under Article XVII of the Constitution. While the latter justifies and,
in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two Houses of Congress as they relate inter
se, no such dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts with the other two co-
equal branches of government. It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the
three governmental branches to assign the same weight to considerations that any of
its representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees to the judiciary. The
representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives…should not have any
more quantitative influence as the other branches in the exercise of prerogatives evenly
bestowed upon the three.
 It cannot be argued that the President in effect has more influence over JBC because all
of the regular members are his appointees. The appointment of said members are still
subject to confirmation by CoA.
 Casus omissus: “case omitted is held to be intentionally omitted”. Court cannot supply
what it thinks legislature would have supplied (in this case: additional member to JBC)
since this is tantamount to judicial legislation.
 Despite unconstitutionality, due to doctrine of operative fact, all prior official actions of
JBC are valid.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Motion for Reconsideration DENIED. July 17, 2012 Decision (enjoining JBC to reconstitute itself so
that only 1 member of Congress would sit as representative) immediately executory.
DOCTRINE
co-equality of 3 branches: Congress only entitled to 1 representative and 1 vote in JBC
constitutional interpretation: verba legis, casus omissus (see ratio above)
SOCIAL JUSTICE SYSTEM VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD AND PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
Ponente: VELASCO JR., J.
These 3 petitions challenges the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private
offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities.
.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the
rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May
10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re-election in the May 10,
2004 elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65.  In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a
qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and
(2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a
candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate.  He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by
requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a
mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as
drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to
expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
G.R. No.  157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner SJS,  a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the DDB
and the PDEA from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give
unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing.   For another, the
provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an
employee deemed undesirable.  And for a third, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches is
also breached by said provisions.
G.R. No. 158633  (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous  Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for
infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right
against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
ISSUES:
Procedural: WON the petitioners have locus standi – YES
SC: There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections,
possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the subject matter of the petition, among
other preliminary considerations.  Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus
standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount public interest involved in the
enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
Principal issues:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs
violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection
clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?
RULING and RATIO:
(1) (a) Candidates for Public Office
Supreme Court: Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if
a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no
effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with
the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no
choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution.  Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed. 
 Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are limited in the sense that it is
subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the
power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.
 In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a
candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also
without such power.
*The unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision
defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.
(2) Supreme Court: The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.
(b) Students
The SC deduced the following from the US cases (Vernonia  and Board of Education ) cited: (1) schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer
rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3)
schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may
adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to
impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
The provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional. This constitutional viability emanates primarily from the waiver of the student of their right to
privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntary submitting their persons to the parental
authority of school authorities.
(c) Private and Public Employees
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
"reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. And whether a search
at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion
on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest. In the criminal
context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally determined by a judge.

1st factor: the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the
meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the
backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing
requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's
work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit,
and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy
expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such
privacy has been upheld.
2nd factor: the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the
scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law
authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"? The intrusion into the employees' privacy, under
RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is
relatively minimal. To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial
enough to override the individual's privacy interest under the premises.  nullified (and to exclude votes from Cotabato from the counting of votes for her position) as Shariff
Taking into account the foregoing factors, the SC hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the
limited context of the case, reasonable and,  ergo, constitutional.
(d) Persons Accused of Crimes
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory
drug testing for persons accused of crimes. We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons
charged before the public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1)
day imprisonment.  The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and
"suspicionless."  In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug
testing can never be random or suspicionless.  The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical
to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint.  They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion.  When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will.  The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the
procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.  To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
9165.  Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
SEMA v COMELEC G.R. No.177597 & 178628 / July 16 2008 / Carpio, J. (hallo, this is 72 pages, I’ll try to make it
short)
SUMMARY.  Under the amended organic act of the ARMM (RA 9054), the ARMM regional assembly had the
power to create provinces, which it invoked in enacting MMA 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
COMELEC declared, through Resolution 7902, that Cotabato city was still part of the legislative district of Shariff
Kabunsuan. Sema and Marquez argued that Cotabato city was not a part of said legislative district. SC ruled that
the power to create provinces rests only in the legislature and could not be delegated, as such the creation of
Shariff Kabunsuan was unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE. The creation of a legislative district by Congress does not emanate alone from Congress power to
reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress power to create provinces which cannot be created
without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of the
Constitution because the Constitution provides that each province shall have at least one representative in the
House of Representatives.
FACTS.
Under the Local Government Code (LGC), only an Act f Congress can create provinces, cities, or municipalities.
 Based on the ordinance appended to the Constitution, the first legislative district of Maguindanao
consisted of Cotabato city and eight other municipalities. Maguindanao is part of the ARMM (created by
RA 6734, amended by RA 9054); Cotabato, however, is not, having voted against its inclusion.
 ARMM’s legislature (the ARMM regional assembly) exercised its power to create provinces (granted
by Sec. 19, Art VI of RA 9054) and enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201 (MMA Act 201) creating
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, consisting of the eight other municipalities of Maguindanao’s first
district. Maguindanaoan votes ratified the province. Cotabato then asked COMELEC to clarify its status,
since its legislative district has been converted into a province by MMA 201. Initially, COMELEC considered
Cotabato as part of Shariff Kabunsuan  to maintain status quo in the first legislative district (Res. No. 07-
0407) pending the enactment of any law.
 COMELEC then issued Res. No. 7902 amending its previous resolution, renaming the legislative
district: Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (Formerly 1st district of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City).
 Sema, a candidate for the 2007 elections for Rep. of said district, asked that said resolution be
Kabunsuan is entitled to its own representative in Congress under Sec.5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution, and
Sec3 of the Ordinance; and that Res.No. 7902 usurped Congress’ power to create/reapportion legislative
districts. Citing Felwas v Salas, she argued that when a province is created by statute, the corresponding
representative district comes into existence solely by operation of the Constitution, without a
reapportionment. She added that Sec 19, Art VI of RA 9054 is a valid delegation of the power to create
provinces, as Art X of the Constitution grants autonomous regions legislative power over matters
regarding the promotion of their general welfare. While RA 9054, if taken literally, will contravene the
constitution, the former may be construed as prohibiting the assembly to prescribe any standards that do
not comply with the minimum criteria set by RA 7160 (LGC).
 Dilangalen argued that Sema was estopped as she had indicated in her COC that she was seeking
election in Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City. He added that COMELEC did not reapportion any
districts, but merely renamed it; Cotabato also could not comprise a single legislative district as only the
Congress has the power to designate such, and the city’s population does not meet the minimum
requirement (Sec5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution). A province, according to him, may only be created by
Congress under the LGC. RA 9054 also withheld any power from the regional assembly to enact measures
relating to the national elections. He also argued that to recognize every district that the assembly creates
will lead to a disproportionate representation of the ARMM in Congress.
 COMELEC initially agreed with Sema, then abandoned its position and argued that Sec19, Art VI of
RA 9054 is unconstitutional for violating the Constitution.
ISSUES & RATIO.
Summary of the first two issues:
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the
Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create
provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative
districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a
legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district.
Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district
representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within
its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act
201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
1. WON Sec 19, Art VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional. – YES.
Through Sec19, Art VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the Regional Assembly the power to create provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays within the ARMM. This delegation was made under its plenary powers as
the power to create LGUs is not an express legislative power granted by the Constitution.
The creation of any of the four local government units must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of it
must follow the criteria in the LGC. Second, it must not conflict with the Constitution. Third, there must be a
plebiscite in the political units affected. There is no express prohibition or grant of authority in the Constitution
for Congress to delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs; however, under its plenary
powers, Congress can delegate the creation of municipalities and barangays to the said bodies provided that it
doesn’t conflict with Sec10, Art X of the Constitution. Congress has already delegated to provincial boards etc.
the power to create barangays; however, under the LGC, only an act of Congress can create provinces, cities or
municipalities. Sec 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution, as well as Sec3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution, requires that a city whose population is at least 250K, or any province, shall be entitled to at least
one representative. A province and a city (with 250K+ pop.), then, cannot be created without a legislative
district because it will violate these provisions. Felwa  v Salas teaches that when a province is created, a
legislative district is created by operation of the Constitution because the Constitution provides that each
province shall have at least one representative in the House of Representatives.Thus, the power to create a
province, or a city with 250K+ pop., inherently involves the power to create legislative districts (dahil entitled na
sila magkaroon ng representative).
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative
districts. These powers are exercised through Congress’ laws, and not through laws enacted by local legislative
bodies. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts
for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body,
cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did
not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts (Sec20, Art X, Consti), likewise, the
amended ARMM Organic law (RA 9054) prohibits the Assembly from exercising legislative powers on matters
related to national elections. A legislative district representative to the Congress is a national office, whose
occupant is a national official and maintained by national funds. It is evident that there is an inherent limitation
on the legislative powers of LGUs that it is limited to local offices, and never to national offices. To allow such a
provision (such as that in RA 9054) would allow an Assembly to operate outside its jurisdiction, and violate Art X
of the Consti.
2. WON MMA Act 201 is void. – YES.
A province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the Constitution (Sec 5(3) of Art VI, and
Sec 3 of appended Ordinance) mandates that each province shall have at least one representative. Thus, the
creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is unconstitutional.
Sec5 of MMA 201 provided that the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City shall remain, unless
provided by national law. However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district. only an
act of Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative district by operation of the Constitution. Thus, only
Congress has the power to create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative district.
Allowing local legislative bodies, without regard to the LGC standards, to create provinces, would allow said bodies
to increase membership of a national body beyond the maximum limit set by the constitution, causing
proportional representation to be negated  as representatives from ARMM can immediately become members
through their assembly’s continuous creations of provinces or cities. It must be emphasized that organic acts of
autonomous regions cannot prevail over the constitution.
3. WON COMELEC Resolution 7902 is valid. – YES.
Wala lang, as it complies with the constitution in preserving the geographic and legislative district of the 1 st
District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City.
SEN. BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III AND MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO V. COMELEC [GR No. 189793] | April 7, 2010
| Perez, J. (Gel)
Facts: 2 senators who voted against the approval of then House Bill 4264, filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 to nullify RA 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the 1st and
2nd Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From
Such Reapportionment."
Prior to RA 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur had a population of 1,693,821, distributed among 4 legislative
districts.
1st District - 417,304; 2nd District - 474,899; 3rd District - 372,548; 4th District - 429,070
Following the enactment of RA 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order
to create an additional legislative district for the province.
1st District - 176,383; 2nd District - 276,777; 3rd District - 439,043; 4th District - 372,548; 5th District - 429,070
Petitioners: a population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new district. The
reconfiguration of the first and second districts is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end
up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Respondents: (procedural) Rule 65 is the wrong mode to assail constitutionality of RA 9716; pets have no locus
standi;
(substantive) The 250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a
CITY and has NO APPLICATION IN PROVINCES.
Issue: WoN RA 9716 is unconstitutional
Held: No, it is not unconstitutional. There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000
minimum population that must compose a legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and
the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a
representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of
250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be
entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
Mariano v. COMELEC: limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to
its initial legislative district. While Art. VI, Sec. 5(3) requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to
be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to
an additional district.
Mariano is also applicable to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created
within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should
such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an
initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC: The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality
as a standard in gauging equality of representation.
SANTIAGO VS. GUINGONA [G.R. No. 134577]
Constitutional Commission records: Aside from population, other things were taken into consideration: districts
must be compact, adjacent, and contiguous (Palawan districts); districts must be "united" (Tuba is isolated from
The case at hand revolves around the selection of the Senate minority leader as well as the judiciary’s authority
Benguet and is only accessible through Baguio); districts based on areas of production (Cavite's fishing district,
to decide on questions involving the internal procedures of the Houses of Congress given the lack of guidelines
vegetable and fruits district, and rice district)
from the constitution and laws. It was held that the Courts have an obligation to resolve cases where the
validity of a grant of power subject to constitutional limits is assailed, even if the issue is political in nature.
Factors mentioned during deliberations on HB 4264:
(a)  the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities; (b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of
Important People:
the regrouped municipalities; (c)  the natural division separating the municipalities; and (d) the balancing of the
1. Petitioners: Sen. Miriam Santiago and Senator Tatad
areas of the 3 districts resulting from the redistricting of Districts One and Two
2. Respondents: Senator Guingona and Senator Marcelo Fernan
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second legislative
3. You, dear reader ;)
districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be
considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the
FACTS: (In order of chronological events)
composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and
the spirit of the letter.
I. 27 JUL 1998 — the Senate convened to elect its officers
Wherefore, the petition is hereby dismissed. RA 9718 is a valid law.
A. Sen. Fernan was voted by a vote of 20-2 beating Sen. Tatad
B. Tatad then manifested that he was assuming the position of minority leader since he
AVELINO VS. CUENCO (83. PHIL. 17)
belonged to the 2 who voted against Fernan and thus comprised the minority
FACTS:
C. a discussion was held on who should constitute the Senate “minority”:
1. Sen. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-
 Petition of quo warranto. Petitioner, Jose Avelino, asks the court to declare him the rightful senate president UMDP Party (numbering 7, and also a minority) chose Sen. Guingona as minority leader. No
and oust the respondent, Mariano Jesus Cuenco. consensus was reached so Senators Santiago and Tatad delivered privilege speeches the next
 Feb 18, 1949; the request of senator Lorenzo Tanada to speak on the floor on Feb 21, 1949 was granted to day but ultimately, the Senate failed to resolve the issue.
formulate charges against the then senate president Avelino. On the day that Tanada was supposed to speak II. 30 JUL 1998 — Senate President formally recognized Sen. Guingona as minority leader following the
on the floor, Avelino delayed his appearance, did not immediately open the session, and read slowly the receipt of a letter signed by the 7 LAKAS senators stating that they had elected Guingona
resolution of senator Sanidad and Tanada. When the session finally started, Sanidad moved that the roll call II. 31 JUL 1998 — Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco Tatad instituted an original
be dispensed with but senator Tirona, Avelino’s follower, opposed the motion because of the plan of petition for quo warranto seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto Guingona as minority leader of the Senate and
Avelino’s group to delay the session to prevent Tanada from delivering his privilege speech. Suddenly, a the declaration of Tatad as rightful minority leader
disorderly conduct broke out in the senate gallery. Senator Pablo David, Avelino’s follower, moved for II. 4 AUG 1998 — Court required Solgen and R to file comments
adjournment of session perhaps consistent with their ploy to prevent Tanada’s privilege speech. Sanidad II. 25 AUG 1998 — comments were submitted by both
opposed the motion and moved that it be submitted to a vote. Suddenly, Avelino banged the gavel, II. 23 SEPT 1998 — P filed their consolidated reply
abandoned the chair, and walked out of the session hall followed by senator Francisco, Torres, Magalona, II. 29 SEPT 1998 — controversy was declared submitted for decision without need of memoranda
Clarin, David, and Tirona. Cuenco was designated to chair the session. Tanada was finally able to deliver his A. in regular cases, RTC and the SC have concurrent jurisdiction and a basic deference to
privilege speech. Sanidad’s resolution no. 68 was read and approved. Tanada yielded the chair to senate the hierarchy of courts impels the filing of such petitions to the lower tribunals but for special and
president pro-tempore Arranz. Then, Sanidad introduced resolution no. 67 entitled “Resolution declaring important reasons/exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as petitions assailing acts of
vacant the position of the president of the senate and designating the honourable Mariano Jesus Cuenco legislative officers like the Senate President and the Speaker of the House, exceptions are made.
acting president of the senate.” Resolution no. 67 was approved. ISSUES/RATIO
I. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
A. Petitioners aver that the court does have jurisdiction because the definitions of
“minority” and “majority” involve an interpretation of the constitution. Specifically, the assailed
ISSUES: Does the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter? If it has, were resolutions nos. 68 and 67
provision is Sec. 16(1), Art VI: “the Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives
validly approved?
its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective members”
B. The respondents and Solgen assert that because the constitution does not actually
DECISION: Petition dismissed. Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.
provide for the office of a minority leader in the senate, this is an internal matter to be handled
exclusively by the legislature by virtue of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers. Also, there is no law
RATIO: The court does not have any jurisdiction in view of the separation of powers and the constitutional grant
prohibiting a Senator who voted for the winning Senate president from becoming minority leader.
to the senate of the power to elect its own president. The selection of the presiding officer affects only the
C. The Court cites relevant jurisprudence:
senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change, or reinstate them. The
1. Avelino: Vested with the power of Judicial Review, the Court has
petition to put back the petitioner to preside is only acceptable if the majority of the senators want to, such
jurisdiction over constitutional questions regarding the presence of a quorum whether it is
remedy lies in the senate session hall and not in the supreme court.
justiceable or political in nature to make sure that none of the branches transcends the
Assuming that the court has jurisdiction, the session left by Avelino and presided by Arranz was a continuation
constitution
of the session. Thus, the departure of the minority senators does not prevent the remaining majority senators
2. Tanada vs Cuenco:
from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.
 a. Political question are questions which, under the constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislative or Executive branch of the government.
These are concerned with questions dependent upon the wisdom of a particular
measure
b. The validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is
subject to mandatory constitutional limitations and therefore within the Court’s
jurisdiction
3. Javellana vs Executive Sectretary:
a. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional, or subject to limitations,
the issue of whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or
the restrictions respected is justiciable/non-political as it assails the legality of the
contested act and not its wisdom.
4. Other cases illustrating that the act of apportioning seats to which each chamber is entitled to is
political in nature but involves the legality of the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as
prescribed by Sec. 18, Art VI
5. Well-settled doctrine: jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations
of the complaint/petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff/petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted
D. Where the questions raised involve the validity of the act of apportioning/granting
power bound by constitutional limits, qualifications, and conditions in the legislature, regardless
of whether it is political in nature or not,  the court has jurisdiction to inquire whether the Senate
committed a violation of the Constitution
1. the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or petition and in this case, Senator Santiago avers that Sec. 16(1), Art VI has not
been observed
II. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
A. Petitioners claim that “majority” is comprised of (i) those who voted for the winning
Senate President and (ii) accepted committee chairmanships. Since Guingona and the LAKAS
members all voted for Sen. Fernan, they comprise the majority.
B. Court:
1. Majority is the number greater than half or more than half of any total. The
constitution simply means that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than half
of all senators but it does not delineate who comprise the majority or minority
a. It does NOT say that those who do not vote for the Senate President
comprise the minority or that the defeated candidate will automatically become the
minority leader
b. In the past, members of the minority have voted for the Senate President
and been assigned to committee chairmanships
2. The minority is historically that party with the lesser numbers but given that our government is a
multiparty system, this is difficult to determine. The constitution does not prescribe which of the many minority
groups or combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader, neither does it say how the selection
of other officers should proceed. The power to determine the rules of its proceedings, therefore, is given to
each of the houses and the method for this should then be prescribed by the Senate itself
a. “each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary”
3. The Senate formulated its own rules for the conduct of elective officers but did not prescribe the
method for voting majority and minority leaders. Because of this. the court cannot intervene as it is an internal
affair
a. Justice Florentino Feliciano: where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist,
then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashioned promulgate as well as to
implement them, before the courts may intervene
b. legislative rules are not permanent like statutory rules and as they are merely matters of procedure,
their observance are of no concern to the courts
4. No provision of the constitution, laws, rules, or the practice of the Senate was violated. The
Congress is vested with the power and prerogative to resolve this matter themselves because judicial
intervention would violate the doctrine  of separation of powers. The court may, however, look into whether
or not there has been a GAoD (Sec. 1, Art. VIII). This effectively enables them to settle even those matters
deemed as political questions.
III. Was the respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader?
A. Usurpation is the unauthorised arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one who is not
entitled by law to do so.
B. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper remedy and may be brought by:
1. solgen
2. public prosecutor
3. person claiming to be entitled to the public position usurped
C. The person suing must show that they have a clear right to the contested office. In this
case, petitioners failed to present any sufficient proof of this. And since there isn't any clearcut
guideline for this issue, they cannot claim that illegality or irregularity tainted Guingona’s
assumption of the office of Senate minority leader. Also, there appears to be no GAoD in any of his
acts as minority leader.
IV. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognising Respondent Guingona as
the minority leader?
A. “grave abuse of discretion” is the capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment. It is the abuse of
discretion and must be patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law or the exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility
1. based on this standard, there is no grave abuse of discretion especially
considering that Guingona is a part of a minority party and both sides were given the
sufficient opportunity to articulate their standpoints in the two weeks preceding the
appointment
HELD: No constitutional or legal infirmity or grave abuse of discretion attended the recognition of and the
assumption into office by Respondent Guingona as Senate minority leader. Petition is DISMISSED
ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA (277 SCRA 268)
FACTS: Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by
imposing so-called “sin taxes” (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes,
originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on
September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain
amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to
reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral conference
committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996.  At 11:48 a.m., after a recess,
Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship
speech, after which he was interpellated.  Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate.  He was interrupted
when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum.  Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and
asked for a head count.  After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a
quorum. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo
announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he
never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996
of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).  Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO.  What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).  There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO.  No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up.  I want to know what is the question that
the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER  (Mr. Daza).  There was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of the report,
and the Chair called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO.  Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
 THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).  The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).  The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO.  Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o’clock, Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).  The session is adjourned until four o’clock, Wednesday, next week.
On that same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by
the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996.  The enrolled bill was signed into law
by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and/or challenging
the validity of RA 8240.
ISSUES:
1. Whether RA 8240 was passed in violation of rules of the House which will therefore be a violation of the
Constitution.
2. Whether the Supreme Court has the power to look into the internal proceeding of the House.
HELD: It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No.
8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law. Petitioners claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter
declared Rep. Albano’s motion approved. But what happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the
sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of
the conference committee report.  The Chair called out for objections to the motion.  Then the Chair declared:
“There being none, approved.”  At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking,
“What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?”  The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep.
Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee
report had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel. Verily, the fact
that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House making the passage of the bill to a law in
accordance with the law. The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken
every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of the
bill. Therefore, no violation of the Constitution was shown.
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking
redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has no more
power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House as long as no violation of
the Constitutional violation is shown.
OSMENA V. PENDATUN (109 PHIL. 863)
Facts and Procedural History:
1. On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to the Supreme Court a verified
petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against
Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members
of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59.
2. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary
immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from
proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to
substantiate his charges against the President with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he
must show cause why the House should not punish him.
3. The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, where it was stated that Sergio Osmeña,
Jr., made a privilege speech entitled a Message to Garcia. There, he claimed to have been hearing of
ugly reports that the government has been selling “free things” at premium prices. He also claimed
that even pardons are for sale regardless of the gravity of the case.
4. The resolution stated that these charges, if made maliciously or recklessly and without basis in
truth, would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity of the presidential office and would
expose it to contempt and disrepute.
5. The resolution formed a special committee of fifteen Members to investigate the truth of the
charges against the President of the Philippines made by Osmeña, Jr. It was authorized to summon
him to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to require the attendance of
witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers before it, and if he fails to do so he would be
required to show cause why he should not be punished by the House. The special committee shall
submit to the House a report of its findings before the adjournment of the present special session of
the Congress of the Philippines.
6. In support of his request, Osmeña alleged that  the Resolution violated his constitutional
absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words
constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words,
the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other
business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be
held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
7. The Supreme Court decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to answer,
without issuing any preliminary injunction.
8. The special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving Congressman Osmeña a
chance to defend himself, found him guilty of serious disorderly behavior and acting on such report,
the House approved on the same day House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as
recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.
9. The respondents filed their answer where they challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain
the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension and then
invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session, the Committee had thereby
ceased to exist.
10. After the new resolution, Osmena added that the House has no power under the Constitution, to
suspend one of its members.
Issues
(1) W/N the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity
(2) W/N his speech constituted no disorderly behavior for which he could be punished; and
(3) W/N the House has power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members
Holding
1. NO.
a.) Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution Copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of
the United States.
 ● understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions
for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself.
● Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any other place" than
Congress.
b.) Rule XVII, sec. 7, recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken
in debate."
c.) For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be
censured, committed to prison , even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. (in accordance with
US jurisprudence)
d.) The appendix to this decision amply attest to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the
practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its
members, including imprisonment,  suspension or expulsion.
2. Court has no jurisdiction on this issue. The House has exclusive power.
a.) The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only
▪ because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also
▪ because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the
House knows best.
b.) If this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly
behavior, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction,
c.) The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such
situation a prudent refusal to interfere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
3. Yes
a.) Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino
precedent
▪ Although this Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no
jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner
▪ The Jones Law (under which the Senate was then functioning) gave the Senate no
power to remove an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino.
▪ however, that at that time the Legislature had only those power which were
granted to it by the Jones Law;
▪ whereas now the Congress has the full legislative powers and preprogatives  of a
sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Constitution.
▪ Whereas now, as we find, the Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of
suspension which the Constitution did not impair.
b.) In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended a Senator for 12 months
in 1949.
Judgement
ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed
CEFERINO PAREDES, JR. VS SANDIGANBAYAN
252 SCRA 641 – POLITICAL LAW – THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT – SUSPENSION OF A MEMBER OF CONGRESS –
RA 3019
IN JANUARY 1990, TEOFILO GELACIO, THE THEN VICE MAYOR OF SAN FRANCISCO, AGUSAN DEL SUR FILED A
CASE AGAINST CEFERINO PAREDES, JR. (WHO WAS THEN THE GOVERNOR OF THE SAME PROVINCE), ATTY.
GENEROSO SANSAET (COUNSEL OF PAREDES), AND MANSUETO HONRADA (A CLERK OF COURT). THE THREE
ALLEGEDLY CONSPIRED TO FALSIFY A COPY OF A NOTICE OF ARRAIGNMENT AND OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF
STENOGRAPHIC NOTES. GELACIO CLAIMED THAT, IN FACT, NO ARRAIGNMENT NOTICE HAD EVER BEEN ISSUED
AGAINST HIM IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING AGAINST HIM. GELACIO WAS ABLE TO PRODUCE A CERTIFICATION
FROM THE JUDGE HANDLING THE CASE HIMSELF THAT THE CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST HIM NEVER REACHED THE
ARRAIGNMENT STAGE BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION WAS DISMISSED. ATTY. SANSAET ON HIS PART
MAINTAINED THAT THERE WAS INDEED A NOTICE OF ARRAIGNMENT BUT HE LATER RETRACTED HIS
TESTIMONIES. PAREDES CLAIMED THAT SANSAET ONLY CHANGED HIS SIDE BECAUSE OF POLITICAL
REALIGNMENT. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN RECOMMENDED THAT PAREDES ET AL BE
CHARGED WITH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS. PAREDES APPEALED BUT WAS EVENTUALLY DENIED BY
THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PAREDES, NOW A MEMBER OF CONGRESS, MAY BE SUSPENDED BY ORDER OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN.
HELD: YES. THE SUPREME COURT AFFIRMED THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION OF CONGRESSMAN PAREDES BY THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, DESPITE HIS PROTESTATIONS ON THE ENCROACHMENT BY THE COURT ON THE
PREROGATIVES OF CONGRESS. THE SC RULED:
“X X X. PETITIONER’S INVOCATION OF SECTION 16 (3), ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION – WHICH DEALS WITH
THE POWER OF EACH HOUSE OF CONGRESS INTER ALIA TO ‘PUNISH ITS MEMBERS FOR DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR,’
AND ‘SUSPEND OR EXPEL A MEMBER’ BY A VOTE OF TWO-THIRDS OF ALL ITS MEMBERS SUBJECT TO THE
QUALIFICATION THAT THE PENALTY OF SUSPENSION, WHEN IMPOSED, SHOULD NOT EXCEED SIXTY DAYS – IS
UNAVAILING, AS IT APPEARS TO BE QUITE DISTINCT FROM THE SUSPENSION SPOKEN OF IN SECTION 13 OF RA
3019, WHICH IS NOT A PENALTY BUT A PRELIMINARY, PREVENTIVE MEASURE, PRESCINDING FROM THE FACT
THAT THE LATTER IS NOT BEING IMPOSED ON PETITIONER FOR MISBEHAVIOR AS A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES.”
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN (2001)
FACTS: In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her
act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which
prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to
be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis
Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago. Santiago
petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995,
a motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then.
The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating the
Constitution.
HELD: Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each “… house may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its
Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.”
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. – any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving
fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in
whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if
he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its
own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a
punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as the case may be,
upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is
not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be suspended as a
senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in
the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been
held that the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may
be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding
before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of
the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his
continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records
another evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial
of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the
proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that
the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office
under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds
set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.
UNITED STATES VS. PONS (34 PHIL. 725)
FACTS: Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte were convicted of the crime of illegal importation of
opium. It was alleged in the information that the accused, conspiring together, plotting among themselves did,
knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and fraudulently, bring from a foreign country and import and
introduce in the City of Manila 520 tin cans containing 125 kgs of opium. Each were found guilty of the charged.
The accused appealed, but Beliso withdrew his appeal and the judgment has been final to him. On appeal,
counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for
1941 was on February 28; that the Act 2381, under which Pons must be punished was not passed or approved
on the 28th but on March 1 of that year; that the same is null and void.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the accused may be convicted under Act 2381.
2. Whether the adjournment of the legislature be proved by legislative journals or by extraneous evidences.
DECISION: The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.

RATIO: Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of Commission shall perform the duties which would properly
be required of the Recorder of the Commission under the existing law. Under Rules 15 and 16 of Legislative
Procedure of Philippine Commission “the proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and accurately stated
in the journal.” Furthermore, on page 793 of the Commission Journal, it is stated that:
“The Journal for Saturday, February 28, 1914 was approved. Adjournment sine die of the Commission as a
Chamber of the Philippines. The hour of midnight having arrived, on motion of Commissioner Palma, the
Philippine Legislature adjourned sine die.”
The Courts of the Philippines are bound, judicially, to take notice of what the law is, and to enable them to
determine whether the legal requisites as to the validity of a statute have been complied with, it is their right,
as well as their duty, to take notice of the legislative journals. When the legislative journal show with certainty
the time of adjournment of the Legislature and are clear and unambiguous respecting the same, they are
conclusive; and extraneous evidence cannot be admitted to show a different date of adjournment.
In the instant case, the journal says that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This
settles the question and the court did not err in declining to go behind the journals.
CASCO PHILIPPINES CHEMICAL CO., INC. VS. GIMENEZ (7 SCRA 347)
FACTS: There was enacted a Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Act. The Central
Bank of the Philippines issued Circular No. 95 fixing the a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange
transactions. Petitioner, Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc, engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues
bought imported urea and formaldehyde which are main raw materials in the production of its products and
has paid the margin fee. Thereafter, petitioner sought to refund the said margin fee pursuant to to Resolution
No. 1529 of the Monetary Board which declared that urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said sale. The
Central Bank issued the corresponding vouchers for the refund but failed to give the money on the ground that
the exemption granted by the Monetary Board is not within the purview of the said RA.
The pertinent provisions of the Republic Act provide:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provisions of section one hereof shall not
be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
X X X
XVII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users.
Petitioner contends that the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and formaldehyde. It shall be
noted that the National Institute of Science and Technology has expressed that urea formaldehyde is not a
chemical solution. It is a finished product distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde
ISSUE: Whether or not Urea and Formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin
fee.
HELD: Denied the petition.
RATIO: The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by the
Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of a bill before it was
certified by the officers of the Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree. The importation of urea and formaldehyde is not exempt from
payment of margin fees being distinct and different from urea formaldehyde as provided in the law.
ASTORGA v. VILLEGAS [GR No. L – 23475]
Original Action in the SC for mandamus, injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction, assailing Mayor Villegas and co to adhere to the provisions of RA 4065, the “An Act
Defining the Powers … of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila.”
Doctrine: Journal Entry Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory
The Court ruled that the Journal Entry Rule, which demonstrated the intent of the legislative body, prevails over
the legal technicality and process of enacting a bill
Important People: Herminio Astorga (Vice-Mayor of Manila) and Antonio Villegas (Mayor of Manila)
FACTS:
 On March 30, 1964 House Bill 9266 was filed in the House of Representatives
 Passed on the third hearing without any amendments
 Afterwards, it was sent to the Senate
 The Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities led by
Senator Gerardo Roxas recommended a minor amendment
 Instead of the City Engineer, it should be the President Pro tempore that
succeeds the Vice-Mayor if the latter cannot act as Mayor.
 When it was discussed on the floor of the Senate on the 2nd reading, substantial amendments on
Section 1 were introduced by Senator Tolentino
 These were approved by the Senate, while the one recommended by the Committee
wasn’t
 On May 21, 1964, the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that the
Bill has been passed “with amendments”
 Attached to this was the one recommended by Roxas and not the Tolentino
amendments which were approved by Senate
 The House of Representatives therefore signified its approval
 The printed copies were then certified by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the State and the Senate President
 This was then approved by the President on June 18, 1964
 Became RA 4065
 This led to a public denunciation from City Mayor Villegas which drew the immediate reaction of
Senator Tolentino
 He issued a press statement that argued that the copy signed by the President was the
wrong version of the bill passed by the Senate
 As a consequence, the Senate President addressed a letter explaining that the copy of House Bill
signed by the Congress officers was not the bill duly approved and thus he considers his signature to
be invalid
 A further letter clarified the invalidation, saying that the bill on which his signature
appeared was never approved by the Senate and therefore the fact that he and the
Secretary signed it does not make it into a valid enactment
 The Bill was duly returned to the Senate on July 3
 On July 31, 1964, the President also withdrew his signature, saying that it would be against public
policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by the two Houses of Congress
 Upon the foregoing facts, the Mayor of Manila, Villegas, issued circulars to disregard the provisions
of RA 4065
 Reacting to this was the Vice-Mayor, Astorga, who filed a petition for mandamus to compel the
Mayor, the Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police and
others to comply with 4065.
 Respondents argue that since it was not the bill actually passed by Senate, what should
be decisive should be the entries in the journal (journal entry method)
  The Court later issued a restraining order for Astorga and the subsequent Vice-Mayors, enjoining
them from exercising any of the powers in RA 4065 until further orders.
ISSUE(S)/HOLDING:
1. WON RA 4065 was passed
 It has to be argued that there are doubts that the previous case, Mabanag et al vs. Lopez Vito, laid
rest to the question of whether an enrolled bill or journal entry method should be espoused
 In that case, the majority applied the “enrolled bill” doctrine
 “When there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of
said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and of the due
enactment thereof”
 The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on “the respect due to coequal and independent
departments,” which requires the judicial department “to accept, as having passed Congress, all
bills authenticated in the manner stated.” (Field vs. Clark)
 Thus it has also been stated that if the attestation is absent, then the courts may resort
to the journals for proof of its enactment.
 The 1935 Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof
 Section 10(4) “Each house shall keep a Journal of its proceedings…”
 Section 21(2) “No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed
and copies… furnished to its members… and the question upon its passage shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal.”
 The petitioner’s argument that the attestation is conclusive proof of the bill’s enactment is
neutralized by the Senate President’s declaration that his signature is invalid
 This plus the subsequent clarification meant that the bill he signed was never approved
 It should be argued that the procedure of signing bills is merely a mode of authentication.
 The function of attestation is not of approval
 It is the approval of the Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is
essential
 The journal of the proceedings of each House is no ordinary record
 This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of the House Bill was the same
one passed by both Houses
ANGARA v. ELECTORAL COMMISSION
FACTS: In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were
candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district.
On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed
Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest
had thus far been filed.
On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of
Angara.
On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous
confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation,
Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can
take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.
ISSUE/s:
1. W/N the SC has jurisdiction over such matter. YES
2. W/N EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest. NO
RULING: SC DENIED the petition.
RATIO:
1. SC has jurisdiction
The National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and the concurrence of a
majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine
what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate
funds for their support, the National Assembly exercises to a certain extent control over the judicial
department.
The judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in
the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance
and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power
in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its
authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other.
Upon principle, reason and authority, we (SC) are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the
present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly.
2. Electoral Council did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
The Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935,
fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the election of any member of the
National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it
by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the powers and functions conferred
upon the same by the fundamental law.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to
limit the time within which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction
that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of
the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision
relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive powers to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
ABBAS VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (166 SCRA 651)
FACTS: Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution states that the Electoral Tribunal “shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court...and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the HOR, as the case may be.” On October 9, 1987, Petitioners filed before the respondent
Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who
were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections. The respondent tribunals was at
the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) senators.
On November 17, the petitioner filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of
the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of the above case on the ground that all of
them are interested parties, and respondents. This mass disqualification, in effect, would leave only the three
Justices to serve as Members of the Electoral Tribunal. The Motion was denied and hence, this petition for
certiorari.
ARGUMENTS: Petitioners argue that considerations of public policy and norms of fair play and due process
require the mass disqualification. Further, necessity dictates that an amendment of the Tribunal’s Rules of
procedure permitting the contest to be decided by only three Members is a practicable and unconstitutionally
unobjectable solution.
ISSUE: Whether a Senate Electoral Tribunal composed of only three (3) Justices of the SC is a valid Electoral
Tribunal under the Constitution
HELD: NO. The suggested device is unfeasible and repugnant to the Constitution.
REASONS: Looking into the wording and intent of Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution, it is clear that in
creating a Tribunal composed by Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, both “judicial” and
“legislative” components commonly share the duty and authority of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of Senators. The fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed
membership of the SET is 2 to 1 – an unmistakable indication that the “legislative component” cannot be totally
excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit
and intent of the Constitution.
The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the tribunal no alternative but to
abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of senators.
The framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that
would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Yet the
Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations. Litigants in such situations must
simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the
Tribunal.
Refrain from participation must be distinguished from complete absence. Indeed, an individual Member of the
Tribunal may recuse himself from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his
biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. But a Tribunal cannot legally function as
such absent its entire membership of Senators or Justices.
LAZATIN VS. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (168 SCRA 391)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for Representative of the first district of
Pampanga in the May 11, 1987 elections. During the canvassing of the votes, respondent objected to the
inclusion of certain election returns and brought the case to the COMELEC. On May 19, The COMELEC ordered
the suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate, yet on May 27, petitioner was proclaimed the
winner.
Respondent filed two petitions: a) to nullify the proclamation and b) prevent petitioner from taking office.
However, the COMELEC did not act on the petitions. On June 30, petitioner assumed office.
On September 15, the COMELEC nullified the proclamation. The Supreme Court set aside the revocation on
January 25, 1988.
On January 28, Respondent received a copy of the Court’s decision and consequently filed an election protest
with the HRET on February 8.
ARGUMENTS: In moving to dismiss private respondent’s protest on the ground that it was filed late, petitioner
cited Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code:
A sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa...shall be filed... within
ten (10) days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
Using the above rule, Petitioner argued that respondent had only until February 6 to file a protest.
Since the protest was filed on February 8, the HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
However, the HRET argued that petitioner was able to file the protest on time, citing Sec. 9 of the HRET rules:
Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be filed... within fifteen (15) days from
the effectivity of these rules on November 22, 1987 where the proclamation has been made prior to the
effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the same may be filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of
proclamation.
Using the above rule, the HRET argued that respondent has up February 11 to file a protest. Since it was filed on
February 8, the HRET ruled it was within the prescribed period and thus, had jurisdiction over the matter.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the protest
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court may conduct a Judicial Review of decisions/final resolutions of the HRET
HELD:
1. YES. The HRET has jurisdiction over the protest, as it was filed within the period prescribed by Sec. 9 of the
HRET Rules.
2. NO, except for cases requiring the exercise of the Court’s “extraordinary jurisdiction.”
REASONS: Inapplicability of Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code to the case at bar: Under the 1973
Constitution, Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to petitions filed before the COMELEC
contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial or city official.
Under the 1987 Constitution, it has ceased to be effective. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been
abolished and legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the HOR and
the Senate in their respective Electoral Tribunals.
Exclusive character of the Electoral Tribunal’s Power: The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to
promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing
election protests before it, is beyond dispute. The use of the word “sole” emphasizes the exclusive character of
the jurisdiction conferred. It is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution.
It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred is conferred or duly enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred.
Following this principle, the HRET, in order to fully exercise its constitutional function may implement its own
rules concerning the filing of electoral protests.
A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except under the 1973 Constitution, the power to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative branch
has been exclusively granted to the legislative body itself. In the 1935 Constitution, this power was lodged to an
independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature and specially created for that singular
purpose. Under the 1973 Constitution, this delineation between the power of the Executive and the Legislature
was blurred when jurisdiction over electoral contests was vested in the COMELEC, an agency with general
jurisdiction over the conduct of election for all elective national and local officials. The 1987 constitution vested
this jurisdiction back to the respective Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives.
Scope of the Supreme Court over decisions made by the HRET: So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the
power to be the sole judge of all contests related to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members, any
final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall as a rule, not be reviewed by the Court. Its
corrective power extends only to decisions and resolutions constituting a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the Electoral Tribunals.
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO versus HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ELMER E.
PANOTES [GR. 199149] January 22, 2013
FACTS:
- consolidated cases involving the use of the picture images of ballots as the equivalent of the original
paper ballots for purposes of determining the true will of the electorate in the District of Camarines
Norte in the May 2010 elections
- Chato renewed her bid in the May 2010 elections as representative of the Second Legislative District
of Camarines Norte
- Chato lost to Panotes who was proclaimed the winner
- Chato filed an electoral protest before the HRET assailing the results in all the 160 clustered
precincts
o Chato designated forty (40) pilot clustered precincts in which revision of ballots shall be
conducted
 showed a substantial discrepancy between the votes of the parties per
physical count vis-a-vis their votes per election returns
- Panotes moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the case, and praying that a preliminary
hearing be set in order to determine first the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes used in the
elections as certain irregularities in the condition of the ballot boxes subject of the revision were
apparent
- Resolution of HRET directed the copying of the picture image files of ballots relative to the protest
until completion
o decryption and copying proceeded as scheduled.
- canvassing before the Provincial Board of Canvassers was halted in order to wait for the
transmission of the results from the Municipal Board of Canvassers, which could not be done until
each and every clustered precinct was duly accounted for.
- HRET
o issued the assailed Resolution denying Chato's Urgent Motion to Prohibit the Use by
Protestee of the Decrypted and Copied Ballot Images in the Instant Case on the ground
that she failed to show proof that the CF cards used in the twenty (20) precincts with
substantial variances were not preserved or were violated
o declared that, although the actual ballots used in the May 10, 2010 elections are the
best evidence of the will of the voters, the picture images of the ballots are regarded as
the equivalent of the original citing Rules on Electronic Evidence
ISSUE: Whether or not HRET the picture images of the ballots may be considered as the “official ballots” or the
equivalent of the original paper ballots which the voters filled out.
DECISION: Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit
RATIONALE
- Term “official ballot” where AES is utilized is defined as the “paper ballot, whether printed or
generated by the technology applied, that faithfully captures or represents the votes cast by a voter
recorded or to be recorded in electronic form
- two types of AES identified
o (1) paper-based election system;
 type of AES that “use paper ballots, records and counts votes, tabulates,
consolidates/canvasses and transmits electronically the results of the vote
count.
o (2) direct recording electronic election system.
 uses electronic ballots, records, votes by means of a ballot display provided
with mechanical or electrooptical component that can be activated by the
voter, processes data by means of computer programs, record voting data
and ballot images, and transmits voting results electronically
- the system captured the images of the ballots in encrypted format which, when decrypted for
verification, were found to be digitized representations of the ballots cast
o picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise “official
ballots” that faithfully captures in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined
 the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled
out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in
an electoral protest.
- The HRET having jurisdiction and has decided over the case, to substitute the SC’s judgment to the
findings of the HRET will constitute an intrusion into its domain and a curtailment of its power to act
of its own accord on its evaluation of the evidentiary weight of testimonies presented before it.
SILVERIO TAGOLINO V HRET (G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013)
FACTS: Richard Gomez filed his Certificate of Candidacy seeking the Congressional office of the House of
Representatives for the 4th District of Leyte.
 In his CoC, he indicated that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng Ormoc City.
 Bueneventura Juntilla, one of the opposing candidates, questioned the residence indicated in the CoC
before the COMELEC.
 Juntilla argued that, Richard is a resident of Colgate St, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila
and not of Can-adieng Ormoc City
COMELEC 1st division ruling:
 It granted Juntilla's petition without any qualification. And in its dispositive portion it stated, "Richard
Gomez is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the Office of Congresssman, Fourt District of Leyte, for
lack of residency requirement"
Lucy Torres-Gomez then filed her CoC together with a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from the
Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s official substitute candidate of her husband Richard wherein the
COMELEC En Banc approved such substitution.
COMELEC En Banc's ruling:
 It held that the disqualification does not automatically cancel one's CoC and the political party is still
allowed to substitute the candidate whose candidacy was declared disqualified.
Juntilla filed a motion for reconsideration from the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc. Pending the resolution of
the motion, the elections were held and the name of Richard Gomez remained in the ballots which garnered
majority of the votes. Due to the approved substitution by the COMELEC, votes for Richard were credited in
favor of Lucy and she was proclaimed the Representative of the 4th District of Leyte
Juntilla opposed and filed a Petition for quo warranto before the HRET arguing that, Lucy did not validly
substitute Richard because his CoC was void ab initio.
HRET ruling:
 It dismissed Juntilla's petition and declared the substitution as valid
  It also said that the COMELEC 1st Division's resolution spoke of disqualification and not the
cancellation of the CoC
Juntilla filed for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Supreme Court
ISSUE: Was there a valid substitution? And as a consequence of such substitution, was Lucy Torres-Gomez
validly elected as a representative of the 4th District of Leyte? NO
HELD: A valid CoC as a condition sine que non for the substitution of candidate
 Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that, if an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and
certified by the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who
died, withdrew or was disqualified
 Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an “official candidate” before candidate substitution
proceeds.
 As defined under Section 79(a) of the OEC, the term “candidate” refers to any person aspiring for or
seeking an elective public office who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an
accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties.
 Clearly, the law requires that one must have validly filed a CoC in order to be considered a candidate.
Effect of Sec 68 and Sec 78 on candidate substitution under Sec 77
 Sec 681 speaks of a disqualification of the candidate based on the election offenses enumerated
therein while Sec 78 speaks of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC based on a person’s
misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the elective office aspired for. It
is not enough there was lack of qualification but there was also a false representation in the CoC.
 And under Sec 68, a person disqualified can be validly substituted pursuant to Sec 77 because he
remains a candidate but is ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction by the
commission of the election offenses enumerated in Sec 68.
 But a person whose CoC has been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Sec 78 cannot be
substituted because he is not considered a candidate. Hence, being a cancelled CoC it is considered
void ab initio and thus cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and valid votes.
 In this case, there was confusion as to the word "disqualified" in the resolution of the COMELEC 1st
division, which was also adopted by the COMELEC En Banc and HRET.
 But it must be noted that Richard's "disqualification" was due to his failure to comply with the
residency requirement and misrepresenting his residence which is a ground for denial due course to
and/or cancellation of CoC under Sec 78.
 Hence, there was no valid substitution and Lucy Torres Gomez was not a bona fide candidate for the
position when she ran for office, which means she could not have been elected.
1 The authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete.  It is therefore clear that this Court has no
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared
by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or
other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing
electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85,
86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or
an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code,
unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
Barbers v. COMELEC
Facts:
Robert Z. Barbers and Rodolfo Biazon were candidates for re-election to the Senate of the
Philippines in the 10 May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections. COMELEC sitting en banc as the NBC
for the election of Senators promulgated a resolution proclaiming the first 11 duly elected Senators in the
elections. The COMELEC declared that it would proclaim the remaining 12 th winning candidate for Senator after
canvassing the remaining unsubmitted COCs.
On 2 June 2004, the COMELEC promulgated another resolution proclaiming Biazon as “the 12 th
ranking duly elected 12th Senator. According to COMELEC, Biazon obtained 10,685 more votes than Barbers. 
The COMELEC stated that this difference will not materially be affected by the votes in certain precincts where
there was failure of elections.
Barbers filed a petition to annul the proclamation of Biazon as Senator claiming that the latter’s
proclamation was void, illegal and premature being based on an incomplete canvass. Barbers asserted that the
remaining uncanvassed COCs and votes and the results of the special elections, which were still to be
conducted, would undoubtedly affect the results of the elections.
On the other hand, Biazon asserts that the COMELEC 1 st Division has no jurisdiction to review,
reverse or modify the actuations of COMELEC en banc sitting as National Board of Canvassers for Senators and
that because he already took his oath, it should not entertain Barbers’ petition. It also argued that considering
his lead over Barbers, the remaining votes in the uncanvassed COCs would not substantially affect the results as
to the 12th senator. On the other hand, Barbers countered by saying that there could be no valid proclamation
based on an incomplete canvass. COMELEC denied Barbers’ petition.
It ruled that Barbers’ petition cannot be categorized as a pre-proclamation controversy since the issues cited
are not proper for such nor it can be categorized as an election protest since the ground cited also does not
make it as such. Besides, the COMELEC also found out that considering Biazon’s lead over that of Barbers, even
if those unincluded votes would be counted in favor of Barbers still it would not affect the results. MR denied by
COMELEC en banc. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the petition
Held: No. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal that has the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain this kind of petition in
light of Sec. 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Senate Electoral
Tribunal as well as the ruling in Pangilinan v. COMELEC. In Javier v. COMELEC, it was held that the phrase
“election, returns and qualifications” should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the
validity of the contestee’s title.  But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that “election” referred to the
conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and
counting of the votes; “returns” to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including
questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns;
and “qualifications” to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed
winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. The word “sole” in
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
underscores the exclusivity of the SET’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to members of the Senate.  
jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. Since Barbers contests Biazon’s proclamation as the 12 th winning
senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers’ complaint.
Issue: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when, after having used Provincial Certificates of
Canvass in the canvass of election results for Senators up to 2 June 2004, the COMELEC used the Municipal
Certificates of Canvass in the final tabulation of the uncanvassed results and that of the special elections yet to
be held in certain parts of the country
Held: No. It is a rule that an incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent
proclamation.  A canvass is not reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless the board of canvassers
considers all returns and omits none.  However, this is true only where the election returns missing or not
counted will affect the results of the election. (Sec. 233, Omnibus Election Code; Sec. 9 COMELEC Resolution No.
6749)
In the present case, the report which the COMELEC Supervisory Committee submitted shows that
Barbers obtained 6,736 votes in areas where results were not included in the national canvass.  As for Biazon,
he garnered 2,263 votes. Also, the Supervisory Committee’s report shows that the total number of registered
voters in areas where special elections were still to be conducted was only 2,931, covering only 19 precincts
in three municipalities. Since the election returns not included in the national canvass as well as the results of
the special elections to be held would not materially affect the results of the elections, it is immaterial whether
the COMELEC used PCOCs or MCOCs in the subsequent canvass.
PIMENTEL V. HRET (2002)   | G.R. NO. 141489 | NOVEMBER 29, 2002    | CARPIO, J.
Petitioners: Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr.
Respondents: House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
FACTS:
 Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for a party-list system in the House of
Representatives, as follows:
 (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.
 (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth and such
other sectors as may be provided by law except the religious sector.
 3 March 1995: Party-List System Act took effect to promote proportional representative in the
election of representatives.
 11 May 1998: National elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through
popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become members of the
House.
 Proclaimed winners: 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations.
 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC): 2 representatives to the House;
the other 12 party-list groups had one representative each.
 House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two
constitutional bodies.
 Procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who are
to occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the
Commission on Appointments (CA).
 It does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House
nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA.
 As of the date of filing of the petitions, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were
composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties.
 18 January 2000: Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters to Senate President Ople and
Associate Justice Melo, requesting them to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET,
respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
 Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
 Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in
case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members,[18] (Emphasis supplied)
 20 January 2000: HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel’s
letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives.
 HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter
to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno.
 2 February 2000: petitioners filed with this Court their petitions, contending that, under the
Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1
seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA.
 They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel.
 Petitioners also invoke the following provision of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941:
 Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.  - The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House
of Representatives including those under the party-list.
ISSUES + RATIO:
1. WON the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the
HRET. – NO
 Petitioners’ reliance on Guingona Jr. v Gonzales is misplaced.
 The procedural questions that petitioners want the Court to brush aside are
not mere technicalities but substantive matters that are specifically provided
for in the constitutional provisions cited by petitioners.
 The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative,
within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list
representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and
the CA.
  Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and
on the House the authority to elect aming their members those who would
fill the 12 sears for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the
Commission Appointments.
 Section 17, Article Vi of the Constitution says that each chamber of the
Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined
limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each
chamber’s respective electoral tribunal.
 These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of
the HRET:
 Rule 3. Composition. - The Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the House of
Representatives who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Senior
Justice in the Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
 Rule 4. Organization. - (a) Upon the designation of the Justices of the
Supreme Court and the election of the Members of the House of
Representatives who are to compose the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal pursuant to Sections 17 and 19 of Article VI of the Constitution, the
Tribunal shall meet for its organization and adoption of such resolutions as it
may deem proper. 
 Likewise, Section 1 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments provides:
 Section 1. Composition of the Commission On Appointments. Within thirty
(30) days after both Houses of Congress shall have organized themselves
with the election of the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted. It
shall be composed of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the
House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented herein.
 However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with
the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear
violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
 Otherwise the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of
government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.
 Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party
list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the
CA.
 The petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list
groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the
CA.
 Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House
barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET
or the CA.
 Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the
House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election
process.
 As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of
Representatives, the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this
time.
 The five party-list representatives who are petitioners in the instant case have not
alleged that they are entitled to, and have been unlawfully deprived of, seats in the
HRET or the CA.
 Neither have they claimed that they have been nominated by the party-list
groups in the House to the HRET or the CA.
 As such, they do not possess the personal and substantial interest required
to confer them with locus standi. 
 The party raising the constitutional issue must have such personal stake  in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
2. WON the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list
representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion. – NO
 There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in
response to the letters of Senator Pimentel.
 Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules,
the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.
3. WON the court can rule on the present membership of the House in the Commission on
Appointments (which is argued to have violated the Constitutional requirement of proportional
representation because there are no party list representatives in the CA). –NO, the issue is rendered
academic.
 The issues raised in the petitions have been rendered academic by subsequent events.
On May 14, 2001, a new set of district and party-list representatives were elected to the
House.
 The Court cannot now resolve the issue of proportional representation in the HRET and
the CA based on the present composition of the House of Representatives as presented
by petitioners and the Solicitor General.
 With the May 14, 2001 elections, it is certain that the composition of the House has
changed.
 In the absence of a proper petition assailing the present composition of the HRET and
the CA, the instant petitions must fail.
 Otherwise, for the Court to rule on the instant petitions at this time would be
tantamount to rendering an advisory opinion, which is outside our jurisdiction.
BONDOC v. PINEDA (1991) [G.R. No 97710]
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc to review the decision of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) on withdrawal of nomination of Congressman
Camasura, which in effect, declared the proclamation of petitioner as congressman void due to a change from a
5-4 vote in favor of proclaiming Dr. Bondoc as congressman to a 4-4 vote.
Important People: Emigdio A. Bondoc, Marciano M. Pineda, Congressman Camasura
Facts:
 1. In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino  Senate and HoR shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole Judge of all
(LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of their respective members…
of the Representative for the 4th District of the province of Pampanga.  Difference between 1935 and 1987 Constitution: proportional (1987) instead of equal
2. Marciano M. Pineda garnered 31,700 votes while Emigdio A. Bondo gathered 28,400 votes (3,300
(1935) representation
difference in votes)
3. May 19, 1987: Pineda was proclaimed the winner  Use of world sole underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of HRET as judge
4. Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 26) in HRET composed of 3 Justices of Supreme Court (SC)  The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an
and 6 HR members chosen on basis of proportional representation independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
5. July 1989: Bondoc’s protest was submitted for decision partisan consideration and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the
6. October 1990: Decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by 23 votes legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members
7. LDP members insisted on a reappreciation and recount of ballots thereby delaying finalization of
decision by at least 4 months 2. No. Camasura’s expulsion was unlawful.
8. Bondoc now leads by 107 votes; 5-4 vote to proclaim Bondoc as winner Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET
9. March 5 1991: HRET issued Notice of promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991 in HRET Case No
25
 The resolution of the HoR removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for
disloyalty to the LDP because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party’s candidate, Bondoc,
10. Congressman Camasura and Congressman Bautista were expelled from LDP for allegedly helping
is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the HRET to be the sole judge of the
organizing the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco for allegedly having invited LDP members in
election contest between Pineda and Bondoc
Davao del Sur to join said political party - a complete betrayal to LDP
11. March 4, 1991: Chairman of Tribunal, Justice Ameurfina Herrera received a letter from the OSG of
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET
HRET that the HoR decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman
Camasura to the HRET  Judges must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence
12. Promulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in the electoral protest Bondoc v Pineda scheduled for  HoR committed grave abuse of discretion in expelling Cong. Camasura for having cast a conscience
March 14, 1991 is sought to be aborted since Camasura voted in favor of proclamation (vote before vote in favor of Bondoc based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the
was 5-4) and can be overturned on a motion for reconsideration ballots and three votes by the tribunal
13. Congressman Camasura’s vote was a conscience vote
14. At the open session of the HRET, it issued Resolution No. 91-0018 cancelling the promulgation for Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure
the decision in HRET Case No. 25 (Bondoc v Pineda) because decision lacks the concurrence of 5
members as required by Section 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal
 Members of HRET as sole judge of congressional election contests are entitled to security of tenure
just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution
15. All members of the tribunal resigned being of the opinion that it undermines the independence of
the Tribunal  Membership may be terminated only in expiration of member’s congressional term of office, his
16. Court resolved to: death, permanent disability, resignation from political party, formal affiliation with another political
a. decline the request of Justices Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano to be relieved from their membership of party or removal for other valid cause
HRET
b. to express their concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in the proceedings of the HRET, Verdict: Petition Granted. Rescinding election of Cong. Camasura as member of HRET void.
which performs functions purely judicial in character despite the inclusion of legislators in its memberships
c. to note the view that the term of all members of the Electoral Tribunals is co-extensive with the Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 (1988)
corresponding legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but only for valid legal cause
2. March 21, 1991: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of Legislative Power
Bondoc praying to: EXCEPTION: Subordinate Legislation
a. Annul the decision to withdraw the nomination of Rep. Camasura Tests for Valid Delegation of Legislative Power
b. Issue a writ of prohibition restraining whomsoever may be designated in place of Camasura from
assuming his position in the HRET FACTS: Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The widow filed a
c. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering Rep Camasura to reassume his position complaint for damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, based on Memorandum Circular No. 2
d. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable
issued by the latter which stipulated death benefits and burial expenses for the family of an overseas worker.
Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity of the memorandum circular. Nevertheless, the POEA assumed
Issues:
jurisdiction and decided the case.
1. Is the HoR empowered by the Constitution to interfere with the disposition of an election contest in
the HRET through the ruse of reorganizing the representation in the tribunal of the majority party?
2. Was Congressman Camasura’s expulsion from the HRET lawful and valid? ISSUE: W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers

Held:
1. No. HoR is not empowered
 Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution HELD: SC held that there was valid delegation of powers.
In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given - They either did not take or did not successfully take the NMAT which is required by the Board of
no authority to promulgate the regulation, and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an Medical Education and administered by the Center for Education Measurement (CEM)
exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. - They filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory judgment and prohibition with prayer for TRO and
preliminary injunction to enjoin CEM, the Board of Medical Education, and the Secretary of
GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception Education, Culture, and Sports from enforcing Sec.5a&f of RA2382 and MECS order no. 82 series of
1985 requiring passing such tests as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be - Objectives of RA2382:
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The o standardization and regulation of medical education
ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or o govern the examination for registration of physicians
surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. o supervision, control, and regulation of the practice of Medicine in the Philippines
- RA2382 created the Board of Medical Education which is mandated under Sec.5 to:
Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power o (a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of
medicine;
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, o (f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a
the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of
have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in Medical Education;
the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. o (h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and regulations for the
proper implementation of the foregoing functions.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not - Sec.7 provides the minimum requirement for admission to med schools:
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative. o No conviction of any offense involving moral turpitude
o record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts;
Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
o certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical
Education;
Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power
o certificate of good moral character issued by 2 former professors in the college of liberal
arts;
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to
o birth certificate.
cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities
- Under MECS order no. 82, the NMAT was created as an additional requirement for the issuance of
and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to reasonably
certificates of eligibility for admission; cannot be admitted as a freshman without such certificate
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of the problems attendant
- They contend that the NMAT is unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement in violation of
upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct
due process
and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates,
who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields.
ISSUES: WON the MECS order and RA2382 are unconstitutional?
Power of Subordinate Legislation
HELD/ RATIO: NO.
- NMAT is reasonably related to the state interest of protecting the public health and safety
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
- Reason of the regulation is the improvement of professional and technical quality of graduates of
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the
medical schools
national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to
- Better students=better graduates=better doctors
issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate
- Such admission tests are prevalent worldwide
legislation.”
The legislative and administrative provisions impugned by them constitute a valid exercise of the police
power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute by “filling in” the
authority of the sovereign to secure and promote an the important interests and needs — in a word, the public
details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No.
order — of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical
2 is one such administrative regulation.
safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of
governmental effort and regulation.
Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730 (1987)
The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of
FACTS
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also
- Petitioners sought admission to schools/colleges of medicine for SY87-88
well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine
first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of
governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements — i.e., the
completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school — for admission to the medical profession, has
also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.
The regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the
rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates
of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That
upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of
limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually
for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our
professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and
economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for
achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into our medical schools" and of
"improving the quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission
tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test
[MCAT] and quite probably in other countries with far more developed educational resources than our own,
and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are
entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and
regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly
effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease
or trauma.
Tatad v. Secretary of Energy, 282 SCRA 337 (1997)
Facts: The petitions assail the constitutionality of various provisions of RA 8180 entitiled the “Downstream Oil
Industry Deregulation Act of 1996.” Under the deregulated environment, any person or entity may import or
purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and
operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own
requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitions raise a justiciable controversy
(2) Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the law
(3) Whether or not Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180 violates the one title one subject requirement of the Constitution
(4) Whether or not Sec. 15 of RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power
(5) Whether or not RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in
restraint of trade and unfair competition
Held: As to the first issue, judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to
determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law.
Where a statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act
as unconstitutional and void.
The effort of respondents to question the legal standing of petitioners also failed. The Court has brightlined its
liberal stance on a petitioner’s locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people. In the case, petitioners pose issues which are significant to the people and which
deserve the Court’s forthright resolution.
It is also contended that Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180 on tariff differential violates the provision of the Constitution
requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. The Court did not concur
with this contention. The title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law.
A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general
subject. The Court held that Sec. 5 providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of RA 8180 which is
the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Petitioners also assail Sec. 15 of RA 8180 which fixes the time frame for the full deregulation of the downstream
oil industry for being violative of the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power. There are two
accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power: the completeness
test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do
is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law
to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Section 15
can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Congress expressly provided in RA 8180
that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full
deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any
purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion
given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays
down the standard to guide the judgment of the President. He is to time it as far as practicable when the prices
of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso
in relation to the US dollar is stable.
Petitioners also argued that some provisions of RA 8180 violate Sec. 19, Art. XII of the Constitution. Section 19,
Art. XII of the Constitution espouses competition. The desirability of competition is the reason for the
prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason for
regulation of unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle of Sec. 19, Art. XII of the
Constitution which cannot be violated by RA 8180. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league
players in the oil market. As the dominant players, they boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The
tariff differential of 4% on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products therefore works to their immense
benefit. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market
power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those
who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their
product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The provision on inventory widens the balance
of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily
comply with the inventory requirement of RA 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective
competitors again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost.
The most important question is whether the offending provisions can be individually struck down without
invalidating the entire RA 8180. The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the
Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced. The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and
connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. RA 8180 contains a
separability clause. The separability clause notwithstanding, the Court held that the offending provisions of RA
8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck down. The provisions on tariff differential,
inventory and predatory pricing are among the principal props of RA 8180. Congress could not have regulated
the downstream oil industry without these provisions. Unfortunately, contrary to their intent, these provisions
on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition, encourage monopolistic power
and interfere with the free interaction of market forces.
People v. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 (1989)
Facts: Private respondents were charged with violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.
They also charged constitutionality of Sec.32 (…be punished by a fine of not less than P100 nor more than
P1000, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.) of said R.A on grounds that it a.) imposes a cruel and
unusual punishment, b.) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Judge Dacuycuy ruled that the
said section is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue of delegation of legislative power.
Issue: W/N Sec. 6 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power and is valid.
Held: NOT VALID! The duration of penalty for the period of imprisonment was left for the courts to determine
as if the judicial department was a legislative dep’t. The exercise of judicial power not an attempt to use
legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the admin. of justice and the app. of
existing laws to the facts of particular cases. Said section violates the rules on separation of powers and non-
delegability of legislative powers
Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253 (1995)
NATURE Certiorari and Prohibiton
PETITIONERS Congressman James L. Chiongbian etc.; Immanuel Jaldon
RESPONDENTS   Hon. Oscar M. Orbos, etc.
SUMMARY.  Petitioners contend the validity of RA No. 6734 which authorizes the President to merge regions
remaining after forming the ARMM, and the subsequent EO 429 by which she did this. Only 4 provinces voted in
favor to be part of the ARMM and others were covered by the EO, including some provinces/cities which did not
vote in the plebiscite. SC dismissed the challenges saying that the power to merge is conferred upon it by
Congress in RA 5435 and a legislative standard was properly identified for the President to exercise this
conferred power.
DOCTRINE.   The regrouping is just definition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the
purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of LGUs by the President and insuring the efficient delivery
of essential services. Administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative
purposes, not for political representation.
FACTS.
 Pursuant to Art. X, §18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed RA No. 6734, the Organic Act for
the ARMM, calling for a plebiscite.  RA No. 6734 has a provision which authorizes the President to
"merge" by administrative determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the
Autonomous Region. She issued an EO pursuant to such authority, "Providing for the Reorganization of
Administrative Regions in Mindanao."
 In the plebiscite only 4 provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous region: Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi and these provinces became the ARMM.
 EO No. 429:
Province/City From Region To Region
Misamis Occidental X IX
Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City X IX
South Cotobato XI XII
General Santos City XI XII
Lanao del Norte XII IX
Iligan City and Marawi City XII IX
 Petitioners and their arguments
 GR No. 96754: members of Congress representing legislative districts in South Cotobato,
Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Lanao del Norte and Zamboanga City.
 They protested saying that the President is not authorized to pick certain
provinces and cities within the existing regions — some of which did not even take
part in the plebiscite and restructure them to new administrative regions. The
transfer of the provinces are alterations of the existing structures of governmental
units—reorganization. While the authority necessarily includes the authority to
merge, the authority to merge does not include the authority to reorganize.
 G.R. No. 96673: Jaldon, is a resident of Zamboanga City, who is suing in the capacity of
taxpayer and citizen.
 Petitioners in both cases contend that Art. XIX, §13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional
because (1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to
"merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no
standard for the exercise of the power delegated and (2) the power granted is not expressed
in the title of the law.
 SolGen arguments:
 Reorganization of regions is merely the exercise of a power "traditionally lodged in the
President" (Abbas v. Comelec), and a mere incident of his power of general supervision over
local governments and control of executive departments, bureaus and offices under Art. X,
§16 and Art. VII, §17, of the Constitution.
 No undue delegation of legislative power but only a grant of the power to "fill up" or
provide the details of legislation because Congress did not have the facility to provide for
them.
 The power "to merge the existing regions" is embraced in the title of RA No. 6734: "An
Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," because it
is germane to it.
 Power is not limited to merger of those regions but extends to all regions in Mindanao
as necessitated by the establishment of the autonomous region.
 P.D. No. 1416: The President of the Philippines shall have the continuing authority to
reorganize the National Government...
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. W the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative in character, or W it is executive in
character? Legislative BUT there is no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on
the President the power to merge administrative regions.
Nature of administrative regions and the basis and purpose for their creation.
R.A. No. 5435 authorized the President, with the help of a Commission on Reorganization, to reorganize the
different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the government, including
banking or financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled by it, so as to promote "simplicity,
economy and efficiency in the government." Thus the creation and subsequent reorganization of
administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law.
In conferring on the President the power "to merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions"
following the establishment of the ARMM, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation
dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions.
Abbas: "while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a
power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general
supervision over local governments [see Art. X, §4 of the Constitution]." The regions themselves are not
territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes."
The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries which has been
described in Pelaez v. Auditor General or as "administrative in nature."
2. WON Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the
exercise of the power granted and whether in any event the grant of power to him is included in the subject
expressed in the title of the law? YES.
A legislative standard may be expressed, gathered or implied. It need not be found in the law challenged
because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation.
With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same
policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive
Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue
programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the
service in the transaction of the public business."
3. WON the power given is fairly expressed in the title of the statute? YES.
The constitutional requirement that "every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof" has always been given a practical rather than a technical construction.
The title is not required to be an index of the content of the bill. It is a sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all provisions of the statute are
germane to that subject. Certainly the reorganization of the remaining administrative regions is germane to
the general subject of R.A. No. 6734, which is the establishment of the ARMM.
4. WON the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions the provinces and cities in
which either did not take part in the plebiscite on the creation of the Autonomous Region or did not vote in
favor of it? YES.
While Art. XIX, §13 provides that "The provinces and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous
Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions," this provision is subject to the qualification that "the
President may by administrative determination merge the existing regions." This means that while non-
assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the
Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions
as the exigency of administration may require.
The regrouping is just definition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of
facilitating the administrative supervision of LGUs by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of
essential services.
Administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political
representation.
The reorganization of administrative regions in E.O. No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit: (1) contiguity
and geographical features; (2) transportation and communication facilities; (3) cultural and language groupings;
(4) land area and population; (5) existing regional centers adopted by several agencies; (6) socio-economic
development programs in the regions and (7) number of provinces and cities.
5. WON the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the regional center of
Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City? YES.
Abbas: administrative regions are mere "groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, . . .
[They] are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays."
There is no basis for contending that only Congress can change or determine regional centers. To the contrary,
the examples of P.D. Nos. 1, 742, 773 and 1555 suggest that the power to reorganize administrative regions
carries with it the power to determine the regional center.
DECISION. Dismissed.
Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16 2008 [In relation to Art. VI, Sec. 5]
(See above)
B. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS (SECTION 18)
Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989)
A political realignment in the HOR was caused by reorganization of the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP). Due to this, HOR revised its COA representation, giving the LP seat of Rep. Daza to LDP. He filed
for petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, which the Court dismissed and upheld
respondent’s election.
IMPORTANT PEOPLE
Rep. Raul A. Daza (petitioner), Rep. Luis C. Singson (respondent)
Hon. Raoul V. Victorino (respondent and Sec of Commission of Appointments)
FACTS
1. After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the HOR apportioned its 12 seats in COA
among several political parties (Lakas ng Bansa, PDP Laban, the Liberal Party, etc).
2. Petitioner was chosen as representative of the Liberal Party (LP).
3. Sep 16, 1988 – Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) reorganized. 24 LP members
transferred to LDP. (17 LP members, 159 LDP in all)
4. HOR withdrew COA seat of petitioner and gave this to the newly-formed LDP.
5. Dec 5, 1988 – HOR elected new set of representatives with original members except
petitioner. Singson added as additional LDP member.
6. Jan 13, 1989 – Petitioner challenged his removal from COA and the assumption of his seat by
respondent. Court issued TRO.
ISSUE with HOLDING
1. W/N petitioner can be removed from COA (if HOR reorganization and COA representation
changes are valid)
Both parties are invoking Cunanan v. Tan (see Notes)
 Petitioner: LDP is not a permanent political party because not yet registered in accordance
with Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(5), in relation to other Constitution provisions. Also, LDP not yet stable
and should survive in a general congressional election.
Respondent: Reorganization at any time is allowed to reflect any changes in the political
alignments, but changes should be permanent.
Court: COMELEC granted the petition of the LDP for registration as a political party (Aug 28,
1989), weakening petitioner’s argument. Petitioner’s contention
that the party should pass the test of time not acceptable because under this theory, a
registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in the HOR/Senate would still not be
entitled to representation in COA as long as it was organized only recently – LDP’s 157
members would have no COA and HRET representation.
Petitioner’s contention that the party must survive general congressional election: LDP
has passed that test. It has the biggest following in HOR.
HOR has authority to change its representation in the COA to reflect at any time the
changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership.  Such changes
must be permanent and do not include temporary alliances/factional divisions not without
permanent shifts of allegiance.
2. W/N question raised by petitioner is political in nature
Respondent: Issue is beyond the jurisdiction of Court
Court: Court has competence to act on the matter. What is involved is the legality and not the
wisdom of the act of HOR removing the petitioner from COA. Even if it was, Court can still
resolve it under expanded jurisdiction.
3. W/N respondent has been improperly impleaded
Court: NO. Singson technically correct in saying that he did not cause Daza’s removal, but this
case is treated like a petition for quo warranto for the petitioner is questioning the
respondent’s right to sit as COA member.
Furthermore, where serious constitutional questions are involved, “the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.”
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Petition DISMISSED. TRO lifted. Respondent was validly elected in COA.
DOCTRINE
Sec. 18, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution:
“There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex
officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House
on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in the
case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.”
RELEVANCE TO THE LESSON
The Commission on Appointments is a body of the Congress of the Phils. provided by the
Constitution (see Doctrine). It confirms certain appointments of the President. The members are: Senate
President, ex-officio Chairman, 12 Senators and 12 HOR members.
Reorganization of the COA is valid when it is based on the proportional representation of the
political parties in the HOR (Sec 18, Art VI Consti). Additionally, please see Court holding in #1 issue (bold text).
OTHER NOTES
1. Cunanan v. Tan – about 1961 HOR elections. Allied Majority was formed by some Nacionalista Party
members with Liberal Party because they were not contented with the House leadership. This
caused reorganization of the chamber and also affected House representation in COA (3
Nacionalista members in COA replaced by their Allied Majority colleagues). Petitioner’s ad interim
appointment as Deputy Admin. of Reforestration rejected by COA and replaced by respondent.
Cunanan came to SC, contending that rejection of his appointment was null and void because
Commission was invalidly constituted.
Court agreed. Allied Majority temporary combination – Nacionalista defectors in Allied
Majority had not disaffiliated from their party. COA reorganization was invalid because it was not
based on the proportional representation of the political parties in HOR.
Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr., 187 SCRA 377 (1990)
PETITIONERS: Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng, Kababaihan para sa Inang Bayan
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. (Speaker of the House of Representatives), et. al.
TOPIC: Commission on Appointments
LAW: Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio
Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a
tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress
from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
 In 1987, a congressional election was held.
 Petitioner Nikki Coseteng was the only candidate under the banner of KAIBA. Respondent Mitra was
the Speaker of the House, while respondent Congressman Sumulong was the Majority Floor Leader
(MFL).
 In August 1987, upon nomination of respondent MFL Sumulong, the House of Representatives
elected 11 out of the 12 Congressmen to represent the House of Representatives in the Commission on
Appointments (which included Cong. Verano Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Imperial,
Lobregat, Beltran and Locsin). In September 1987, upon nomination of the Minority Floor Leader, the
House of Reps. elected Cong. Roque Ablan, Jr. (of KBL) as the 12 th member of the Commission on
Appointments representing the Coalesced Minority in the House.
 One year later, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was organized as a political party. 158 of
the 202 Members of the House affiliated with the LDP.
 The LDP now being the majority, the House Committees—including the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments—had to be reorganized.
 In October 1988, Petitioner wrote Respondent Speaker requesting that she be appointed as a
member of the COA and House Tribunal as representative of KAIBA. Her request was endorsed by 9
congressmen.
 In December 1988, the House of Reps. revised the majority membership in the COA to conform with
the new political alignments. Rep. Daza, who was in the original list, was replaced by Cong. Singson.
Cong. Ablan was retained as the 12th member representing the House Minority.
 In February 1981, petitioner and her party KAIBA filed with the Supreme Court this Petition for
Extraordinary Legal Writs (which the SC said  may be considered as a petition for quo warranto and
injunction), praying that the SC declare null and void the election of the following respondents as
members of the Commission on Appointments: Ablan, Verano Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon,
Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, and Locsin, and to enjoin them from acting as such on the theory that their
election to the Commission violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation.
ISSUE: W/N the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of 2. The formula to determine the number of seats a party will have in the Commission of
proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Appointments is as follows:
Constitution. a. No.  of Senators of Party x 12No. of Senators Elected (24)
2. Following the formula the proportional representation of each party is as follows:
JUDGMENT: a. LDP – 7.5 members
YES. PETITION DISMISSED. The revision of the House Representation in the Commission on Appointments is b. NPC – 2.5 members
based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Sec. 18, Article VI of the 1987 c. LAKAS-NUCD – 1.5 members
Constitution. The election of the 12 members to the Commission is valid. d. LP-PDP-LABAN- 0.5 member
2. In an organization meeting on August 27, 1992, Senator Romulo as Majority Floor leader, for
RATIO: LDP, nominated eight (8) senators (Senators Angara, Herrera, Alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, Ople,
 There are 160 members of the LDP in the House which meant that LDP represented 80 percent of Sotto, Romulo).
the House membership. 80% of 12 members would be 9.6 which could be rounded to 10 members of the 3. Senator Guingona and Senator Osmena objected to the nomination.
Commission. The remaining two seats were given to LP (resp. Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the 4. In light of this, Senator Arturo Tolentino proposed a compromise, the composition being: 8
Coalesced Majority and KBL (Ablan) as the principal opposition party. LDP, 2 NPC, 1 LAKAS-NUCD, 1 LP-PDP-LABAN.4
5. Hence, Senator Guingona filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to recognize the
 KAIBA (which is presumably a member of the Coalesced Majority) are bound by choices made by
membership of Senator Romulo as the 8 th senator of LDP, and Senator Tanada for LP-PDP-
the MAJORITY.
LABAN, on the ground that the compromise proposed by Tolentino was violative of the rule of
 Even if KAIBA is considered an opposition party, KAIBA had only one member (Coseteng) which proportional representation.
represents only .4 % or less than 1% of the House membership and is NOT entitled to a seat in the 6. Based on the mathematical computation for proportional representation each party was
Commission. entitled to a half-seat; however the proposed composition of the Commission of
 For a political party to be able to claim proportional membership in the Commission - it should Appointments increased the membership of LDP and LP-PDP-LABAN while it decreased the
represent at least 8.4 % of the House membership - or at least 17 congressmen or congresswomen. membership of LAKAS-NUCD and NPC.
ISSUE with HOLDING
 On Petitioner’s contention that she had 9 indorsements: the indorsements of 9 congressmen and
1. Whether the election of Senators Alberto Romulo and Wigberto E. Tañada as members of
congresswomen in favor of petitioner are of no moment because they are not members of her party. In
the Commission on Appointments is in accordance with the provision of Section 18 of Article
fact, they signed identical indorsements in favor of her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap
VI of the 1987 Constitution.
 On Petitioner's contention that the Commission members from the House should have been a. NO. The Court rules that the election and nomination of respondents are not in accordance with
nominated and elected by their respective political parties: SC said the Petition of Petitioner itself Section 18 of Article VI, since it breaches the rule of proportional representation because it deprives the
showed that they were nominated by their respective floor leaders. They were elected by the House (not minority political party of half a representation.
by their party) as provided in Sec. 18 art. VI of the Constitution. b. Section 18 works as a check on the majorityparty and helps to maintain the balance of power. No
 On the issue of whether or not the Petition raises a political question and therefore should be Party  can claim more than what it is entitled to under this rule.
dismissed: NO. It does not raise a political question: SC said, it has been held in Daza vs. Singson that "the c. Section 18 assures membership to the Commission on Appointments for any party provided it has at
legality, and not the manner of filling the Commission as prescribed by the Constitution—even if political least two senators elected (Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr.).
in nature—is justiciable because under the expanded jurisdiction of the court conferred by Sec. 1, Article d. The Court lays down the guidelines:
VIII of the Constitution, judicial review includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of i. In the Senate, a political party or coalition must have at least two duly elected senators for every
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or seat in the Commission on Appointments.
instrumentality of the government. ii. Where there are more than two political parties represented in the Senate, a political
party/coalition with a single senator in the Senate cannot constitutionally claim a seat in the Commission. (Thus
Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789 (1992) the cases cited to support Tanada’s claim of membership cannot serve as precedents).
b. The Court further says that it is not mandatory that 12 senators be elected to the Commission on
The case is a petition for prohibition to prohibit respondents Senators Romulo and Tanada from assuming Appointments, what the constitution requires is a majority of the entire membership. The Court says (after
membership in the Commission on Appointments in light of the fractional memberships their respective parties citing Sec. 10 Ch.3 of the Rules of Commission on Appointments), the constitution does not require the election
have. and presence of 12 senators and 12 members of the House of Representatives so that the Commission may
function; it can function as long as there is quorum.
IMPORTANT PEOPLE 2. If said membership of the respondent senators in the Commission is violative of the
Senator Guingona, petitioner Constitutional provision, did the respondent Senate act in grave abuse of discretion in
Senate President Gonzales, respondent electing the respondent Senators?
Senator Romulo, respondent a. The Court rules that assuming that the Constitution intended that 12 senators be elected as a
Senator Tanada, respondent requirement, the case still can’t be rectified by the senate acting in disregard of the rule of proportional
FACTS representation. The election and nomination is clearly a violation of Sec. 18 Article VI, and was done in grave
1. The results of the May 11, 1992 elections produced the following composition of the Senate: abuse of discretion.
a. LDP – 15 Senators 2. If there was grave abuse of discretion by respondent Senate, acting through the LDP
b. NPC – 5 Senators majority, should a writ of prohibition enjoining, prohibiting and restraining the respondent
c. LAKAS-NUCD – 3 Senators Senators from sitting as members of and participating in the proceedings of the Commission
d. LP-PDP-LABAN – 1 Senator on Appointments be issued?
a. YES. A writ of prohibition is to be issued ordering the respondents to desist from assuming
membership in, and discharging functions of the Commission on Appointments; and for Senate President
Gonzales to desist in recognizing the membership of said respondents from the Commission.
C. LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS (SECTION 21)
Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, 45 (1950)
Petitioner: Jean L. Arnault
Respondent: Euistaquio Balagtas as Director of Prisons
Pontente: Labrador, J.
Topic: Legislative Investigation
Facts:
1. This is a continuation of the previous case, Arnault v. Nazareno
2. In December 1951, while still in confinement in Bilibid, petitioner executed an affidavit.
3. He gives in detail the history of his life, the events surrounding acquisition of the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates by Gen. Burt, the supposed circumstances under which he met Jess D. Santos.
4. Senate Special Committee subjected petitioner to questioning regarding the identity of Jess D.
Santos.
5. After questioning, the Committee adopted Resolution No. 114 on November 8, 1952. The
resolution orders the Director of Prisons to hold Petitioner in his custody until Petitioner has
purged himself of contempt to the satisfaction of the Senate.
6. Petitioner files for the writ of habeas corpus. He claims that, among other things, the questioned
purchase was not illegal and it was beneficial to the government, that petitioner-appellee purged
himself of the contempt charges when he disclosed the fact that the one to whom he gave the
P440,000 was Jess D. Santos, and that the legislative purpose or intention, for which the Senate
ordered the confinement may be considered as having been accomplished, and there is no reason
for petitioner continued confinement.
Issue and Holding:
1. W/N the Court may review the Senate Special Committee’s finding about the credibility of the
petitioner’s statement? No.
- The judicial department of the government has no right or power or authority to do because that would
be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle of separation of powers established by the
Constitution. The only instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoked are when there
has been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the
legislative discretion.
2. W/N the Senate has the power and authority to pass its resolution ordering the continued
confinement of the petitioner? Yes.
-  It is contended by petitioner that if he committed an offense of contempt or perjury against the
legislative body, the legislature may not punish him, for the punishment for his refusal should be sought
through the ordinary processes of the law, i. e., by the institution of a criminal action in a court of justice.
- American legislative bodies, after which our own is patterned, have the power to punish for contempt if
the contempt has had the effect of obstructing the exercise by the legislature of, or deterring or
preventing it from exercising, its legitimate functions. The US Supreme Court held the existence of that
power in the case of Jurney vs. MacCraken.
- The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is
founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise
of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power. When the framers of the Constitution
adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its
respective authority, it must have intended each department's authority to be full and complete,
independently of the other's authority and power. And how could the authority and power become
complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the
legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is
impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its authority or
dignity.
3. W/N the petitioner has purged himself of contempt? No.
- In order that the petitioner may be considered as having purged himself of the contempt, it is necessary
that he should have testified truthfully, disclosing the real identity of the person subject of the inquiry. It
is true that he gave a name, Jess D. Santos, as that of the person to whom delivery of the sum of
P440,000 was made. The Senate Committee refused to believe, and justly, that is the real name of the
person whose identity is being the subject of the inquiry. The Senate, therefore, held that the act of the
petitioner continued the original contempt, or reiterated it. The act may be further interpreted as an
affront to its dignity. It may well be taken as insult to the intelligence of the honorable members of the
body that conducted the investigation. The act of defiance and contempt could not have been clearer
and more evident. The Senate resolution declaring the petitioner in contempt may not be claimed as an
exertion of an arbitrary power.
Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Comm., 203 SCRA 767 (1991)
Nature of Case: petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
injuective relief
Petitioner(s): JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE MILLS JR., LEONARDO
GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS,
ELVIE CASTILLO, and CYNTHIA SABIDO LIMJAP
Respondent(s): THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by and
through the CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, respondents, JOSE S. SANDEJAS
petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injuctive relief, to
enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce
evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group
in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations.
FACTS:
 July 30 1987, The Republic of the Philippines, represented by PCGG (Presidential Commission on
Good Government) assisted by OSG, filed with the Sandiganbayan a civil case entitled “Republic of
the Philippines v Benjamin ‘Kokoy’ Romualdez, et al.” for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages.
 The complaint alleged that defendants Benjamin ‘Kokoy’ Romualdez and Julliette Gomez
Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos, taking undue advantage of their relationship, influence and connection with
the Marcos spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at
the expense of the plaintiff and the Filipino people:
 in taking control of some of the biggest corporations in the Philippines like Meralco, PCI
Bank
 Manipulated the formation of Erectors Holdings, Inc to appear viable and to borrow
more capitals
 After the Revolution, in conspiracy with Bengzon Law office Lawyers, tried to conceal
and place, beyond the inquiry and jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) herein Defendant's individual and collective funds, properties, and
assets subject of and/or suited int he instant Complaint
 Maneuvered, with technical knowhow, the purported sale of defendant Romualdez’s
interests in several companies, 3 days after PCGG creation to make it seem that
Romualdez has already divested himself of the ownership of the same when it was still
run by Bengzon’s Lawyers
 Misused the Meralco Pension Fund
  Cleverly hid behind the veil of corporate entity, through the use of the names and
managerial expertise of the FMMC senior managers and lawyers
 
 Petitioners filed their answers. Meanwhile, conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the
“Romualdez corporations” were carried in various metropolitan newspapers.
 Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech "on a matter of personal
privilege" before the Senate on the alleged “take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flagship of the
First Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to
look into the possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to Republic Act No.
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
 On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of
on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). The Committee started its
investigation. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed to appear and to testify on the matter
of the sale of 36 corporations by Benjamin Romualdez
 May 29 1989→At the hearing, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may
“unduly prejudice” the defendants in the civil case before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose F.S.
Bengzon, Jr. also refused to testify invoking his constitutional right to due process and that the
publicity of the investiagation will affect his and his co-defendants rights in the Sandiganbayan Case.
 The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee suspended its inquiry and directed the petitioners to file their
memorandum on the constitutional issues raised. It issued a resolution rejecting the petitioner's
plea to be excused from testifying. The Committee voted to pursue and continue its investigation of
the matter.
 Petitioners filed the petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
injunctive relief.
 Petitioner:
 the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and required their
attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its
jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional
rights, and to their grave and irreparable damages, prejudice and injury, and that there
is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
i.
law
 the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary
restraning order and/or injunctive relief.
ISSUES + RULING:
1. WON the Supreme court has Jurisdiction→ Yes
ii.
 Respondents: Supreme court cannot properly inquire into the
motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations, much less can it
enjoin the Congress or any its regular and special committees from making inquiries
in aid of legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers
iii.
 Court: Angara v Comelec
 The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government.
 The judicial departments is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof
 when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries; it
does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
established for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them
the political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to
judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional
boundaries has been given to this Court
 it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose
of determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee to conduct inquiries into private affairs in purported aid of legislation
1. WON the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not
done in aid of legislation
a. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
b. Both houses of Congress has the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation but the
limit is that the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected."
b. It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the
right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.
b. Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides the power
to conduct formal inquiries or investigations
b. Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno: the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body
making it, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to
legislate or to expel a member
b. Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees
any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in its judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of
legislation
b. In order to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, the speech or resolution under which
such an inquiry was proposed must be considered
b. In Enrile’s Privilege speech:
he made a statement which was published in various newspapers on accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby"
Lopa of "having taken over the FMMC Group of Companies."  Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to to him categorically
denying that he had "taken over " the FMMC Group of Companies; former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself
stated on TV that there has been no takeover by him (Lopa); and that these repeated allegations of a "takeover"
of his (Lopa's) part of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious.
Lopa’s reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on ], to avail of the privilege
hour, so that he could respond to the said Lopa letter, and also to vindicate his reputation as a Member of the
Senate of the Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his (Enrile's) charges that he (Lopa) had taken
over the FMMC Group of Companies are "baseless" and "malicious."
In his answer to Lopa, he presented Official Memorandum to PCGG written and signed by former
Governor, now Congressman Jose Ramirez, in his capacity as head of the PCGG Task Force for Region VIII where
he stated that when he and the members of his task force sought to serve a sequestration order on the
management of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte, management officials assured him that relatives of the President of
the Philippines were personally discussing and representing SOLOIL so that the order of sequestration would be
lifted and that the new owner was Mr. Ricardo A. Lopa
b. Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called
upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise
known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."
b. the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon committee was to find out
whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in
connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the
Lopaa Group.
 b. therefore, no intended legislation was involved
j. The questioned inquiry was conducted not in pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212.
a. Inquiry under the resolution: to look into the charges against PCGG filed by the three stockholders
of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Sec. 26, Art XVIII of the Constitution.
b. Sen. Enrile’s speech was conducted not in pursuant of this because:
i. Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG
ii. Neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the petitioners are connected with the government but are private
citizens
 the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really
"in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of
Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives
of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of
the courts rather than of the legislature
b. this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if
they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding
c. If we presently rule that petitioners may not be compelled by the respondent Committee to appear,
testify and produce evidence before it, it is only because we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of
legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative
and the judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution
Ruling: Petition Granted. Senate Blue Ribbon committee enjoied from compelling petitioners to testify and
produce evidence at the inquiry
Sabio, v. Gordon, et al. - G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006
FACTS:

1. WON Senate Blue ribbon Committee has Jurisdiction over the inquiry→ NO
 February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No.
a. when respondent Committee decide to conduct its investigation of the petitioners, the complaint in 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),"directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses
Civil No. 0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint shows that one of its incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC)
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors."

b. the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent Commitee is one over which jurisdiction had
 May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote
Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public
been acquired by the Sandiganbayan.
meeting
c. In short, the issue had been pre-empted by that court.  May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same
time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1:
d. To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the
 "No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence
Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between a legislative commitee
in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its
and a judicial tribunal,
official cognizance."
e. but if the Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the  Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum requiring Chairman Sabio and PCGG
possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario to appear in the
discounted. public hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify
 Again, Chairman Sabio et. al. refused to appear.
f. In fine, for the rspondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy
already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial  This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an Order requiring Chairman Sabio et. al. to show cause why
jurisdiction that had much earlier set in. they should not be cited in contempt of the Senate.
 Sabio et. al. argued that Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the power
g. Baremblatt vs. United States, : of legislative inquiry, and a recognition by the State of the need to provide protection
to the PCGG in order to ensure the unhampered performance of its duties
i. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it [Congress] cannot inquire into matters that are
exclusively the concern of the Judiciary.  Villar and the majority of the Committees' members issued an Order directing Major General Jose
Balajadia (Ret.) to place Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners under arrest for contempt
2. WoN the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to self-incrimination→ Yes (pa-double check na lang  Chairman Sabio filed a petition for habeas corpus
kung tama yung disposition medyo iffy ung pagka-understand ko)
 Meanwhile, Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its officers and directors filed a petition for
a. One of the limitations of a congressional committee’s right to inquire includes the bill of rights certiorari and prohibition against the Senate Committee, arguing, among others that the subpoena
violated petitioners' rights to privacy and against self-incrimination.
b. One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against self-
 Respondents argue that Section 4(b) has been repealed by the Constitution and that the Senate
incrimination. This right construed as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of by the accused in a Committees are vested with contempt power
criminal case; but it may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of them

c. Romero v CA: ISSUES:

i. “… an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any all  W/N Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution
questions…”
 W/N the subpoena violated petitioners' rights to privacy and against self-incrimination.
RULING: Issue 1:
 Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21.
 Senate v. Ermita: "the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive branch."
 Arnault: "the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate."
 The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the
administration of existing laws
 It even extends "to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are
within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish."
 PCGG belongs to this class.
 A mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of
any constitutional basis.
 The 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of "any
of its committee."
 it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees.
Issue 2:
 One important limitation on the Congress' power of inquiry is that "the rights of persons appearing
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."
 The power of inquiry must be "subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on
government action."
 Barenblatt v. United States: "the Congress, in common with all the other branches of
the Government, must exercise its powers subject to the limitations placed by the
Constitution on governmental action, more particularly in the context of this case, the
relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights."
 The right to privacy.
 The Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at least two
guarantees that explicitly create zones of privacy.
 It highlights a person's "right to be let alone" or the "right to determine what, how
much, to whom and when information about himself shall be disclosed."
 Section 2 guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose."
 Section 3 renders inviolable the "privacy of communication and
correspondence" and further cautions that "any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding."
 In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine
whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether
that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.
 Applying this determination to these cases, the answers are in the negative.
 Petitioners were invited in the Senate's public hearing to focus on
petitioners' acts committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and
directors of the said corporations
 Consequently, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy over matters
involving their offices in a corporation where the government has interest.
 The right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state
interest.
 The right against self-incrimination
 This right maybe invoked by the said directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings
Corporation only when the incriminating question is being asked, since they have no
way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them."
 That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying respondent
Senate Committees their power of inquiry.
JUDGMENT: Petitions DISMISSED. Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is declared REPEALED by the 1987 Constitution.
Respondent Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative to Senate Resolution 455 is upheld.
Romulo L. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, Senate
Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, G.R. No.
180643 (2008)
FACTS
 The Senate conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation regarding anomalies surrounding the NBN
project. Neri, former NEDA  Director General, was summoned to appear and testify in a Senate
hearing.
Note: DOTC entered into a contract with Chinese company, ZTE, for the supply of equipment and services for the
National Broadband Network (NBN) Project. Several high officials were allegedly using their influence to push
the approval of the NBN project by NEDA.
 Neri disclosed that former COMELEC Commissioner Benjamin Abalos offered him a bribe in
exchange for his approval in the NBN. However, invoking executive privilege, he refused to answer
the following questions: (1) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (2)
whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (3) whether or not she directed him to approve
the project.
 Neri was subpoenaed to respond to the unanswered inquiries.
 Executive Secretary Ermita wrote to the Senate saying that the responses to the questions are
covered by executive privilege. He said that the disclosure of such information might impair
diplomatic and economic relations with China.
 Neri’s arguments: (1) non-appearance was upon the order of the President, and (2) conversation
with President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic latters
relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible
loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines.
 Respondent Senate Committees argue that Neri’s testimony is material and pertinent in the
investigation conducted in aid of legislation.
ISSUES
 WON the communication is covered by executive privilege.
HELD: Yes
RATIO
 The communication is covered by presidential communication privilege (PCP). It used the
elements of PCP cited by the US Supreme Court in US vs Nixon.
Elements of PCP (US vs Nixon) Case at bar
The protected communication must relate to a The power to enter into an executive agreement with
quintessential and non-delegable presidential power. other countries without the concurrence of Congress is a
quintessential and non-delegable power of the President.
The communication must be authored or solicited and Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be
 received by a close advisor of the President or the
President himself. The advisor must be in operational
proximity with the President.
Information sought likely contains important evidence
and by the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority
considered a close advisor being a member of the
President’s cabinet.
There is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority
8. The 2nd petition was filed by the retired CA judges Ranada and Agcaoili as concerned citizens praying to bar
the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry because it violates: (a). RA 4200 – Anti-wiretapping
Law and
(b). Sec. 3, Art 3, 1987 Constitution – privacy of communication.
9. Intervening respondents: Senators Pimentel, Aquino, Biazon, Lacson, etc.
10. Intervening petitioner: Major Sagge one of the resource persons summoned to testify in the legislative
hearings w/o being apprised of his rights through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, hence violating daw his right to due process.

 The three questions directed at Neri veer more towards the exercise of legislative oversight function ISSUE with HOLDING:
than a legislative inquiry. Oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process
(i.e. compelling witnesses to appear and testify at Senate hearings) only to the extent that it is 1. Justiciability:
performed in pursuit of legislation (Senate v Ermita). A. Petition #1 – Dismissed being moot and academic.
 There was no violation of the right to information. The right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid - The recording were already played &heard by the members so there’s nothing to prohibit. lol
of legislation CANNOT be equated with the people’s right to public information. WHY? They obtain - The committee reports were already publicized and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent
information as public officials and members of Congress, NOT as private individuals. committees
 Executive privilege was properly invoked. Standards for properly invoking executive privilege (1) a
B. Petition #2 – Granted. Justiciable.
formal claim of privilege lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter,
- Locus Standi – Retired Justice Ranada & Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of laws. Intervenor Major
and (2) specifies a precise and certain reason for preserving the confidentiality. Executive Secretary
Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process. They satisfy the requisite of personal stake in the outcome
Ermita’s letter serves as a formal claim of privilege and reason specified  (disclosure might impair
of the controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.
diplomatic and economic relations with China)
- Issues are also of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the bench and
Note: What qualifies as a precise and certain reason? A particular ground must be specified (whether the
bar and for guidance of all.
information involves military or diplomatic secrets, etc.) It is not intended to be comprehensive.
2. Whether the Senate may be allowed to continue with the legislative inquiry. NO. Senate is not allowed
Garcillano v. House Committee on Public Information, G.R. No. 170338, 23 Decemnber 2008.
without its duly published rules of procedure.
2 Consolidated Petitions by (i) Garcillano and (ii) the Retired Justices w/ Intervenors Maj. Sagge and
a. Violates Sec. 21, Art. 6, 1987 Constitution:
some senators, praying that the HOR and the Senate be prohibited from continuing with their legislative inquiry
Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
for the Hello Garci scandal. (An interesting case sana but…) The SC dismissed the 1 st pet’n being moot &
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
academic; granted the 2nd pet’n. - The Court barred the Senate from continuing with the legislative inquiry
appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.
because it didn’t publish its rules on legislative inquiry. (boo boring…) In Justice Puno’s dissent, he said that
Senate should be allowed to continue with the inquiry without violating RA 4200 (Anti-wiretapping law) to
b. Violates Art 2. Of the Civil Code – publication in the Official Gazette / 2 newspapers of general circulation.
achieve the very purpose of the law, to enhance / come up with better legislation to further prevent / penalize
wiretapping cases.
c. Respondents admitted that the 14th Congress didn’t publish the rules when they first opened.
IMPORTANT PEOPLE: Grrr. Because of Major Sagge. He intervened kasi and invoked that his right to due
d. Cited prior prior jurisprudence Neri v. Senate Committee wherein it was declared that their rules are
process was violated because of the non-publication of the Rules (that’s why the decision was so boring).
procedurally infirm. (guys bale, as in inulit lang talaga ung sa Neri)
FACTS
(i) Rules of Senate (Main) VERSUS (ii) Rules (on Legislative inquiries)
1. Senator Escudero delivered a privilege speech about the Hello Garci tapes which set in motion the
i. Rules of Senate (Main)
congressional investigation of the respondent House Committees.
- Sec 123 Rule 44: Unfinished business of the prior Congress will be taken by the new Congress as if
2. The Hello Garci tapes allegedly contain the President’s instructions to Commissioner Garcillano to manipulate
present for the first time.
the 2004 Presidential elections in her favor.
- Sec 136 Rule 51: At the start of each session, the Pres may endorse the rules to the appropriate
3. After prolonged debate by the Committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of recordings, the
committee for amendment and revision.
tapes were played in the chambers of the House.
- Sec 136 Rule 52: These rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in
4. The House Committee decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely but still decided to prepare the
force until they are amended or repealed.
committee reports. (hindi inexplain why sinuspend and nilimot for 2 yrs! Well…)
ii. Rules (on Legislative inquiries)
5. Alarmed by these developments, Commissioner Garcillano filed a case in Court (1 st petition) to restrain the
- These rules shall take effect 7 days after publication in 2 newspapers of general circulation.
House Committees from playing the tapes and including the same in the committee reports.
- It does not explicitly provide for continued effectivity until repealed or amended.
6. After 2 years of quiescence, Sen. Panfilo Lacson again brought the issue before the public through his
privilege speech with a promise to disclose the unvarnished truth.
(i) versus (ii) analysis:
7. Sen. Lacson’s speech was then referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense & Security chaired by
>> Therefore, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on Legislative inquiries) would continue into the next
Sen. Biazon.
Congress. The new Senate may adopt different rules for legislative inquiries and should publish the same. If it
were the intention of the Senate to make these rules (on Legislative inquiries) be effective even in the next
Congress, then it could have easily adopted the same language of the main rules of Senate.
e. Respondents aver that the rules are published in booklet form & available for anyone for free.
Held: Untenable. These cannot justify the requirement of the Constitution and the ruling in Tanada v. Tuvera –
publication in the Official Gazette and per E.O. 200 newspaper of general circulation.
f. Respondents invoked RA 8792.
Held: Untenable. RA8792 allows an electronic data message as admissible for evidentiary purposes, but NOT to
make the Internet a medium for publishing laws.
g. Senate caused the publication of the rules on Legislative inquiries on Oct 31, 2008 in Manila Bulletin and
Malaya.
Held: We take judicial notice but this does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by this
petition.
Abas Kida v. Senate, G.R. No. 196271, 18 October 2011.
Consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of RA10153, which synchronized the date of elections of
the ARMM with the national and local elections. Aside from this, the statute also authorized the President to
appoint officers-in-charge for the different offices before the new date of elections comes. After a detailed
discussion involving testing the statute against multiple constitutional doctrines and provisions, the court
upheld the constitutionality of RA10153.
FACTS
Overview
1. The 1987 Constitution mandated through Section 15, Article 10 to create autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras. According to Section 18, Article 10, congress was to enact an
organic act for these autonomous regions to concretely carry into effect the granted authority.
2. August 1, 1989 - Congress enacted RA6734, providing for an organic act for ARMM and scheduled
the first regular elections for regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later
than 90 days after its ratification.
3. November 6, 1990 - as required by Section 18 (2), Article 10 of RA6734, a plebiscite was held fully
establishing the ARMM.
4. RA9045 was passed, which refined the structure of the ARMM as first defined in the organic act and
reset the date of regular elections for the ARMM regional officers to the second Monday of September
2001.   and 3 of RA9054 for amendments.
5. June 22, 2001 -  RA9140 was passed which reset the regular elections originally scheduled in RA9045
to November 26, 2001. It also set the plebiscite to ratify RA9045 to not later than August 15, 2001.
6. August 14, 2001 - RA9045 was ratified in a plebiscite.
7. RA933 was passed which reset the ARMM regional directions of the 2nd Monday of August 2005
and to the same date every 3 years thereafter. This law was not ratified in a plebiscite.
8. June 30, 2011 - RA10153, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013 to coincide with the national
and local elections, was passed.
9. Petitioners, assailing the constitutionality of the laws, argue:
 RA9140, RA9333, RA10153 all amend RA9054. Thus, these laws have to comply with the
supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements set in Sections 1 and 3 of RA9054. As they did not,
these laws never became effective.
 RA10153 is unconstitutional for its failure to follow the three-reading requirement set in
Sec26(2), Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
 RA10153 violates the right to suffrage of the ARMM people and the “elective and
representative” character of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM.
 President has no power to appoint OICs.
 Presidents appointment gives him power over the ARMM, in violation of Section 16, Art
10 of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE with HOLDING (NOTE: i revised the way the issues are laid out here from page 286 in a way that i think
will flow better for recit)
I. WON the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
Yes, the constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
Sections 1, 2, and 5, Article 18 (Transitory provisions) clearly show the intent of the frames to adjust
the term of incumbent officials to end at the same date. The purpose of this is to synchronize the
holding of all future elections - whether national or local - to once every three years. This is
supported by the deliberations of the framers of the constitution.
Osmena vs COMELEC upholds this, stating that the terms of officials were, in the constitution,
synchronized to end on the same day which will also synchronize the date of all future elections.
Although called “regional” elections, the ARMM elections should be understood as local elections
under the rule that, when reading the constitution, words should be given their common and
ordinary meaning. Thus, the ARMM regional elections fall into the constitutional mandate of
synchronization above.
II. WON the passage of RA10153 violates Section 26(2) Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution (three
readings on separate days rule).
No, it did not violate this rule. In the case at bar, the President wrote to the Speaker of the house
and certified the necessity of immediate implementation. Thus, the requirement of three separate
ratings on separate days can be dispensed with.
As for the issue that there was no necessity for the immediate elections, the court rules that this
matter elicits a different standard of review (not judicial review).
In any case, the purpose of this rule is to (1) inform the legislators of the law, and (2) to give them
notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment progress. Records show that both
advocates and opponents had sufficient opportunity to present their views so there is no violation.
III. WON the passage of RA10153 requires a supermajority and plebiscite as required by Sections 1
A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to Section 7,
Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?
No, RA9333 and RA10153 are not amendments. RA9054 only fixed the date of the first
elections and did not fix the regular elections. There was then a need to fix the next
elections. So, they are not amendments because they did not revise anything in the
latter law.
B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No.
9054 violate Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary
doctrine on irrepealable laws?
Yes. Section 16(2), Article 6 states that a majority of the House shall constitute quorum
to do business. Sectarian 1, Article 17 of RA9054 rears a vote of no less than two-thirds
of the Members of the House and of the Senate in order to amend RA9054. Thus, it is
unconstitutional as it demands more than what the Constitution demands.

While it is not a total ban against repeals, it presents a limitation in excess of what the
Constitution requires.
C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous regions
under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?
Yes. Requirements in RA9054 enlarged the plebiscite requirement as
embodied in Section 3 Article 17 of that act. Section 18, Article 10 of the Constitution
states that plebiscites are only required for the creation of autonomous regions and for
determining which provinces, cities, and geographic areas will be included. The rule is
also that amendments to the organic act require plebiscites. But since the date of the
ARMM elections is not one of the matters the Constitution mandates that Congress
provide, it does not require a plebiscite to be effective.
IV. WON Congress committed GOAD of discretion when the authorized the President to appoint OICs
in the interim before new date of the ARMM elections.
The court identified three choices the Congress could have made for ARMM’s governance before
the new date of elections.
A. Allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity,
pursuant to Section 7 (1), Article 7 of RA9054.
Unconstitutional because this would be in violation of Section 8, Article 10 of
the constitution stating “the term of office of elective local officials, except
baranggay officias, shall be three years”. Congress is without power to
extend the term of the incumbent officials.
Arguing that a holdover constitutes a new term and an appointment by
Congress will also fail as this would be an encroachment on the Presidents
power to appoint.
B. For COMELEC hold special elections in the ARMM, with terms set
to expire on the new date of elections.
Unconstitutional as COMELEC has no authority to conduct special elections.
The power to fix the date of election is with Congress, and Congress has
exercised its legislative wisdom by already setting the new date of elections
to be synchronized with national and local elections. This is a policy decision
by Congress that it will not call for a special election. As such, the executive
and judiciary cannot act against Congress and order COMELEC to hold
special elections.
Congress did grant COMELEC, through Sections 5 and 6 of BP881, the power
to postpone elections to another date. But, these provisions allow COMELEC
that task under the circumstances of violence, terrorism, loss of election
material, force majeure.
Furthermore, in the same way the Congress cannot lengthen the terms of
officials, it cannot shorten them either. This will be the case with the elected
officials if a special election is held.
C. Authorize President to appoint OICs
The power to appoint is in the executive and is enshrined in Section 16,
Article 7 of the Constitution stating that he shall appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The authorizing
law is RA10153.
As for the argument that this violates the mandate that the officials be
“elective and representative of the constituent political units”, the court
holds that this view stems from the misinterpretation hat RA10153 is a law
that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions.
As discussed, the assailed RA does not amend the organic act of the ARMM.
It only provides for interim appointments until the new date of elections, as
dictated by necessity and the patent unconstitutionality of the other options
discussed above.
As for the argument that this will set a precedent that allows the President
to cancel elections and lets him appoint OICs in the place of local officials,
the court holds that (1) the power to cancel elections is left to the Congress
and not the President and (2) even Congress is very limited in canceling
elections and the purpose in this case was very specific: to synchronize all
elections.
V. WON RA10153 violates the autonomy granted to the ARMM.
No. The autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and
concerns.  Synchronization is as well entrenched as Regional Autonomy and they should thus be
read together. Autonomy never equated to independence. Thus, the ARMM should still work within
the larger framework of the State, and is still subject to the national policies set by national
government.
VI. WON the grant of power to appoint the OICs violates
A. Section 15, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution
B. Section 16, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution
C. Section 18, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution (check out III-C)
THIS WAS A BIT WEIRD KASI HINDI NAMAN DINISCUSS YUNG 15 and 16. OR AT LEAST NOT IN THIS
FORMAT. I’LL JUST PLACE HERE WHAT WAS SAID ABOUT SECTIONS 15-21 OF ARTICLE 10.
Sections 15-21 should serve as a standard that Congress must observe in dealing with legislation touching on
the affairs of the autonomous regions. The Constitution intends for the self-rule and self-governance of the
autonomous regions. But, equal clear are the principles of national sovereignty and territorial integrity in Art 10.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153
for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order
we issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.
DOCTRINE
Autonomous regions still work within the framework of the state. Regional autonomy should be read as co
nsistently, not contradictory, with other constitutional mandates.
The postponement and resetting of elections is a legislative task.
WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT TO THE LESSON.
 This falls under Procedure of passage of bills and certification by the President of Urgency. Pls refer back to
the second issue.
Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita (Executive Secretary) (2005) J Austria-Martinez
FACTS:
1. Legislative history: R.A. No. 9337 (An Act Amending several sections in the NIRC on VAT) is a
consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705, and Senate Bill No.
1950.
2. The Law took effect on July 1, 2005 but the Court issued a TRO in view of the complaints aired on TV
and radios that all prices increased by 10%.
3. 5 petitioners arguments: that it is unconstitutional. (details will be discussed in the issue & ratio
part)
1. G.R. No. 168056 - ABAKADA GURO Party List
 President’s stand by authority constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive
authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution
 Stand by authority - That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve
percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied: (i) Value-added
tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or (ii) National government deficit as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 %).
2. G.R. No. 168207 - Sen. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al
 President’s stand by authority constitutes undue delegation and violation of the no-
amendment rule upon last reading of a bill laid down in Article VI, Section 26(2) of the
Constitution.
3. G.R. No. 168461 - Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al.,
 provisions are unconstitutional for being arbitrary, oppressive, excessive, and
confiscatory in violation to their right of non-deprivation of life, liberty or property
without due process of law
4. G.R. No. 168463 - members of the House of Representatives led by Rep. Francis Joseph
G. Escudero
 Bicameral Conference Committee acted without jurisdiction in deleting the no pass on
provisions
 violates Article VI, Section 24(1) of the Constitution, which provides that all
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives
5. G.R. No. 168730
 Governor Enrique T. Garcia allowing these establishments to pass on the tax to the
consumers is inequitable, in violation of Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution.
ISSUES and RULING: RA 9337 NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL, TRO Lifted.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE
 
Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
 a. ArticleSection 24, and b. Article VI, Section 26(2)
A. WON THE BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE exceeded its authority –
NO.
 Petitioners Escudero, et al., and Pimentel, et al., allege that the Bicameral Conference Committee
exceeded its authority by:
 1) Inserting the stand-by authority in favor of the President.
 2) Deleting entirely the no pass-on provisions found in both the House and Senate bills;
among others…
  Petitioners now beseech the Court to define the powers of the Bicameral Conference Committee.
RULING:
 The power of internal regulation and discipline are intrinsic in any legislative body.
 Article VI, Section 16 (3) of the Constitution provides that each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings. Pursuant to this inherent constitutional power to promulgate and implement its own
rules of procedure, the respective rules of each house of Congress provided for the creation of a
Bicameral Conference Committee.
 In Farias vs. The Executive Secretary
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and
the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities
alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral
Conference Committee.
 This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of
Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and
with their observance the courts have no concern.
 Nevertheless, just to put minds at ease that no blatant irregularities tainted the proceedings of the
bicameral conference committees, the Court deems it necessary to dwell on the issue. The Court
observes that there was a necessity for a conference committee because a comparison of the
provisions of House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 on one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other,
reveals that there were indeed disagreements.
 Citing Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance
 It is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new
provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee
can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why
it cannot propose several provisions, so long as such amendment is germane to the
subject of the bills before the committee.
 The amendments made, (stand by authority, no pass-on provision) are germane to subjects of the
provisions on VAT.  Thus no GAOD by the Bicameral Conference Committee.
B. WON there is violation of the “NO AMENDMENT RULE” Sec 26(2), Art. 6 – No
violation.
 Petitioners argument that the practice where a bicameral conference committee is
allowed to add or delete provisions after these had passed three readings is in effect a
circumvention of the no amendment rule (Sec. 26 (2), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution),
 Held: Citing Tolentino v Sec of Finance
 Art. VI. 26 (2) must be construed as referring only to bills introduced for
the first time in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee
report. Otherwise, there would be no end to negotiation since each house
may seek modification of the compromise bill.
 C. WON there is violation of the exclusive origination of revenue bills from the
House of Reps (Sec. 24), Art 6. – No violation
 Petitioners claim that the amendments to these provisions of the NIRC did not at all
originate from the House.
 Citing Tolentino again:
 To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates
power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose
amendments. It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of
the two houses.
 Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate
can propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by
the Constitution to originate in the House.
 Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing
revenue, tariff or tax bills, etc. must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts,
the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local
needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at
large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national
perspective. Both views bear on the enactment of such laws.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
 
1. Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the NIRC,
violate the following provisions of the Constitution:
 
a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and
b. Article VI, Section 28(2)
 
2. Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the NIRC; and
Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC, violate the following provisions of
the Constitution: a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and b. Article III, Section 1
RULING:
A. WON there is undue delegation of Legislative Power – No.
 Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., Pimentel, Jr., et al., and Escudero, et al. contend in
common that Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337giving the President the stand-by authority to raise
the VAT rate from 10% to 12% when a certain condition is met, constitutes undue delegation of the
legislative power to tax.
 Purely legislative power, which can never be delegated, has been described as the authority to
make a complete law complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be
applicable and to determine the expediency of its enactment.
 Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation of legislative powers is subject to the following
recognized limitations or exceptions:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution; (2)
Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution; (3)
Delegation to the people at large; (4) to local governments; and (5) to administrative bodies.
- A delegation is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out, or implemented by the delegate and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A
sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies
the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected.
 The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the
law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006,
contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the
12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive.
 No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of
discretion (or that it is mandatory) is the fact that the word shall is used in the common
proviso.   Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12%
rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress.
 In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of
either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the
President or even her subordinate. His function is to gather and collate statistical data
and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by
Congress is present. Thus, he is an agent of Congress and not of the President.
 There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law.
B. WON the 12% increase in VAT Impose an Unfair and Unnecessary Addl Tax Burden – No.
The Court in this case will not dawdle on the purpose of Congress or the executive policy, given that it is not for
the judiciary to "pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
C. WON the due process was violated. – No.
 Petitioners argue that provisions are unconstitutional for being arbitrary, oppressive, excessive, and
confiscatory in violation to their right of non-deprivation of life, liberty or property without due
process of law
 Held: The input tax is not a property or a property right within the constitutional purview of the due
process clause. A VAT-registered persons entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory
privilege.
D. WON the uniformity and equitability of Taxation laws were violated. – No.
 Uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be
taxed at the same rate. Different articles may be taxed at different amounts provided that the rate
is uniform on the same class everywhere with all people at all times.
 In this case, the tax law is uniform as it provides a standard rate of 0% or 10% (or 12%) on all goods
and services. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the NIRC, provide for a rate of 10% (or 12%) on sale of goods and properties,
importation of goods, and sale of services and use or lease of properties. These same sections also
provide for a 0% rate on certain sales and transaction.
E. WON the progressivity of Taxation was violated – No.
 Lastly, petitioners contend that the limitation on the creditable input tax is anything but regressive.
It is the smaller business with higher input tax-output tax ratio that will suffer the consequences.
 Progressive taxation is built on the principle of the taxpayers ability to pay. The VAT is an antithesis
of progressive taxation. By its very nature, it is regressive. The principle of progressive taxation has
no relation with the VAT system inasmuch as the VAT paid by the consumer or business for every
goods bought or services enjoyed is the same regardless of income.
 Nevertheless, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes, like the VAT.
What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation.
 Arroyo v De Venecia [GR No. 127255, August 14, 1997] Osmena v. Pendatun: The rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject
to revocation, modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the body
Petitioner: Joker Arroyo adopting them
Respondent: Jose de Venecia US v. Ballin, Joseph and Co: Constitution empowers each House to
determine its rules of proceedings. Power to make rules is a continuous
CASE:
power.
Petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the validity of R.A. 8240 which amends certain provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing “sin taxes” on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. City Loan Savings v. Moore: Legislative act will not be declared invalid for
noncompliance with the rules.
FACTS: State v. Savings Bank: Authority of the House may be abused, but when the
1. Law originated in the House of Representatives as HB No. 7189. The bill was approved on the third House clearly acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would be an
reading on Sept. 12, 1996. unwarranted invasion of the independence of the legislative department.
2. The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House. After recess, Javier, McDonald v. State: no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether two
Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after houses have or have not complied strictly with their own rules
which he was interpellated. Arroyo was fourth to interpellate, and announced that he was going to Schweizer v. Territory: Courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void
raise a question on the quorum although he never did. on account of non-compliance with its rules of procedure made by itself.
3. Albano then moved to approve conference committee report, to which Arroyo asked for
clarification. However, Deputy Speaker then approved the motion.
 According to Justice Fernando, rules are hardly permanent in character and are subject
4. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker and Senate President. The enrolled bill was also to revocation and modification. Mere failure to conform does not have the effect of
signed into law by President Fidel Ramos. nullifying.
5. Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of Arroyo’s interpellation. However,  In the case at bar, there were no rights transgressed. House rules do not affect other
Court says there is no need to discuss this point as petitioners have announced that to expedite rights except those in the Senate.
resolution of petition, they agree that the word “approved” appears in the transcripts.  Hence, Courts cannot look into internal proceedings
6. Petitioner’s principal argument is that RA No. 8240 is null and void because:
a. It was passed in violation of the rules of the HOR. II. Judicial Power
b. These rules embody the constitutional mandate in Sec. 16(3) of Art. 6 of the  Even if judicial review has expounded in scope, there is still a need for an actual case or
Constitution stating that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings and controversy.
that consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself.
c. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly
 It is an established rule that courts cannot declare act of legislature void on account
merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself. It is not the case that
passed is false and spurious.  
the branch has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction to call for
2. More specifically, petitioners charge that
exercise of judicial review.
a. In violation of Rule 8(35) and Rule 17(103) of the rules of the House – Chair, in submitting the
conference committee report to the House, did not call for yeas and nays, preventing Arroyo from questioning
III. Railroading of Passage
presence of quorum
b. In violation of Rule 19(112) – Chair deliberately ignored Arroyo’s question  Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was “railroaded” as Arroyo
c. In violation of Rule 16(97) – Chair refused to recognized Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Albano’s motion
Albano’s motion and declared report approved approved.
d. In violation of Rule 20(121-122), Rule 21(123), Rule 27(109) – Chair suspended session without  However, approval of conference committee report had already been declared before
ruling on Arroyo’s motion subsequent objection from Arroyo.
2. Respondents answer that:  There is no rule cited that in cases involving a conference committee report, a nominal
a. Court is not proper venue to enforce House rules. voting must be held.
b. Journal no. 39 covering sessions shows that on Motion of Albano, there being no objection, HB was
 In the approval of the original bill, yeas and nays have already been taken. It would have
approved.
been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
ISSUE:  When session resumed, Arroyo made no more objection.
W/N Congress committed grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA 8240. – NO.  Arroyo was prevented from continuously questioning presence for a quorum, for it had
already been established.
RATIO:  Out of 111 members, only 5 are questions its manner of execution.
I. Violation of Internal Rules of the House
 It is clear that there was no violation of the constitutional requirements for enactment IV. Enrolled Bill Doctrine
of the law, but of internal rules.  Signing of Speaker and Senate President and certification of secretaries of both Houses
 As seen in cases both here and abroad, Court has no power to inquire into non- is conclusive of its enactment.
compliance with its own rules.  It is well-established as a rule of evidence.
  Courts have refused to look into allegations that enrolled bill was otherwise than as
certified by presiding officer.
 Enrolled bill carries on its face a solemn assurance by legislative and executive
departments charged with duty of enacting and executing laws.
 Art. 6, Sec. 16(4) of Constitution: Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings
i. Journal is regarded as conclusive.
ii. Bill which became RA 8240 is in the journal. Therefore, enactment is proven.
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court to set aside a
legislative act as void based on its own rules of procedure. That would make the Court guilty itself of grave
abuse of its discretion to do so.
WHEREFORE, petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed.
PUNO, J. – Concurring and Dissenting
 In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the
political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. Constitution
empowers courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion.
Therefore, the Court should give due course to this, as the case at bar calls for the Court to define
parameters of power and review violations of the rules of the House. In resolving the case, lessons
of our own history should provide us the light, and not the experience of foreigners.
 However, there was no grave abuse of discretion since house rules are at their own discretion.
 It is high time to re-examine the preference for enrolled bill doctrine. In Mabanag, the Court relied
on old rules of procedure in embracing the doctrine. However, this has long been repealed by the
news rules. More importantly, the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill results in suspension of truth.
Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 517 (1975)
FACTS: Petitioner was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces of the Philippines until his
reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2332.
June 18, 1955, the date when Republic Act No. 1382 took effect, petitioner had a total of 9 years, 4
months and 12 days of accumulated active commissioned service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
On July 11, 1956, the date when Republic Act 1600 took effect, petitioner had an accumulated
active commissioned service of 10 years, 5 months and 5 days in the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
Petitioner's reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960 was pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act 2334, and such reversion was neither for cause, at his own request, nor after court-martial
proceedings;
From 15 November 1960 up to the present, petitioner has been on inactive status and as such, he
has neither received any emoluments from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor was he ever employed in
the Government in any capacity;
On September 17, 1969 the petitioner brought an action for " Mandamus and Recovery of a Sum of
Money" in the court a quo to compel the respondents Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines  to reinstate him in the active commissioned service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to readjust his rank, and to pay all the emoluments and allowances due to him from the time of his
reversion to inactive status.
However, the respondents contend that the paragraph 11 has no relevance or pertinence
whatsoever to the budget in question or to any appropriation item contained law since RA 1600 is about
appropriation of money for the operation of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, while the said
paragraph 11 refers to the fundamental government policy matters of the calling to active duty and the
reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP. and is therefore proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par.
2 4 of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill unless it
relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein; and any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to such appropriation.
Issue:  WON paragraph 11 RA 1600 is unconstitutional. Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?
Held: 
YES.  The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance
to any appropriation item.
RA 1600 is , is restricted to "appropriating funds for the operation of the government while Section 11 refers to
a fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve
officers in the AFP. 
… That reserve officers with at least ten years of active accumulated commissioned service who are still on
active duty at the time of the approval of this Act shall not be reverted to inactive status except for cause after
proper court-martial proceedings or upon their request;…
Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of the
constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was a completely unrelated
provision attached to the GAA. 
It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the title of
the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed
in the title, such provisions are void, inoperative and without effect. 
SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.
Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 (1987)
Summary: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1177. The court ruled that the decree is
unconstitutional on ground that the prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was
explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution.
Doctrine: Appropriation Laws
The Petition: Constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec.44 of P.D. No. 1177, otherwise known as the
“BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977”.
FACTS:
 Petitioners filed the petition as concerned citizens, as members of the National Assembly/Batasang
Pambansa, parties with general interest, and as taxpayers.
 Par. 1 of Sec 44 of P.D. No. 1177:
“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations
Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.”
 Grounds for the petition:
“A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGES UPON THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY
AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEYS.
B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 IS REPUGNANT TO THE CONSTITUTION AS IT
FAILS TO SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF FUNDS
ARE TO BE MADE.
C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 ALLOWS THE PRESIDENT TO OVERRIDE THE
SAFEGUARDS, FORM AND PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING
APPROPRIATIONS.
D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWERS TO THE EXECUTIVE.
E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF BY THE BUDGET MINISTER AND THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES
ARE WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION.
 The Solicitor Genreral’s comments
 Questioned the legal standing of the petitioners, there being no justiciable controversy.
 The provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to Section 16[5], Article VIII of
the 1973 Constitution; and that at any rate, prohibition will not lie from one branch of
the government to a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the
latter's sphere of responsibility.
 Petitioner’s reply
 Due to a change in Administration, there is a need to temporarily suspend the resolution
"until developments arise to enable the parties to concretize their respective stands."
 Solicitor General’s rejoinder – Motion to dismiss
 Based on the abrogation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the
Freedom Constitution of March 25, 1986, which has allegedly rendered the instant
petition moot and academic.
ISSUE/S + RULING:
 W/N there is a justiciable controversy– YES!
 Held: Respondents’ motion to dismiss denied. The court takes cognizance of the case as
it is of national interest.
 The newly ratified 1987 Constitution carries verbatim section 16[5], Article
VIII of the 1973 Constitution under Section 24[5], Article VI.
 The taxpayers have sufficient interest in the prevention of illegal
expenditures (cf. Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, et al.)
 W/N par 1, sec 44, of PD 1177 is unconstitutional – YES!
 Held: The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit
and categorical under the 1973 Constitution.
 Transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may
be made only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the
government branch or constitutional body:
 BUT: The above provision unduly over extends the privilege granted under
said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer
funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau
or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be
transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be
taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the
item to which said transfer is to be made.
 Paragraph 1 of Section 44 puts the constitutional safeguards to naught.
 (As petitioners contend) Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the enactment
of unfunded appropriations, results in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses
accountability for budgetary performance and entrenches the pork barrel system as
the ruling party may well expand public money not on the basis of development
priorities but on political and personal expediency.
 W/N the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed act of the Executive – YES!
 Held: Where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional
powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the
government had assumed to do as void.
Final Ruling:
Petition granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is DECLARED NULL AND VOID for
being UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Araullo vs.. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287 February 3, 2015; read also the original decision on July 1, 2014
This case is a consolidation of nine (9) cases, assailing the constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP) of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and in relation to this, National Budget
Circular (NBC) No. 541 and related issuances of the DBM in the implementation of DAP. This issue exploded
when the topic of the Congressional pork barrel was still fresh in the public mind. Belgica vs. Executive Secretary
was just filed with the Supreme Court [which is subsequently declared unconstitutional (November 19, 2013)].
IMPORTANT PEOPLE
 Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada – delivered the privilege speech on September 25, 2013 which
prompted the DBM to issue a public statement and bring to the public consciousness the DAP
 Araullo, Maria Carolina – Chairperson of Bagong Alyansang Makabayan; G.R. No. 209287
 Secretary Florencio Abad – Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
FACTS
1. September 3, 2013 – Belgica, et. al. and Villegas filed an Urgent Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently
embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the
Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential
Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave
abuse of discretion
2. September 25, 2013 – Sen. Jinggoy Estrada delivered his privilege speech stating that some senators
received Php 50 Million each as incentive for impeaching Chief Justice Corona.
3. Secretary Abad responded through a public statement explaining that the funds released were budgeting and enhanced the role of the Budget Commission → 1973 Constitution PD 1177 and 1405
based on the Senators’ letters of request for funding and explained further that these funds were part of the (the latter created the Ministry of Budget) → EO 711 (Office of Budget and Management - OBM) →
DAP designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion (they also made claims in EO 292 (DBM)
their website regarding DAP and where it comes from).
THE BUDGET CYCLE
4. DBM cited the following as legal bases for DAP’s use for savings:
a. Section 25(5) Article VI, 1987 Constitution Public or government expenditures are generally classified into two:
b. Section 39 (Authority to use Savings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38
(Suspension of Expenditure Appropriations, Chapter 5, Book VI of EO 292 1. Capital Expenditures or outlays
(Administrative Code of 1987)  Expenses whose usefulness last for more than one year
c. General Appropriations Acts of 2011, 2012 and 2013 provisions on the  Add to the assets of government including investments in the capital of government-
following:
owned or controlled corporations and subsidiaries
i. Use of savings
ii. Meaning of savings  Usually infrastructure
iii. Priority in the use of savings 2. Current operating expenditures
b. For the use of the unprogrammed funds, DBM cited provisions in the GAA  Purchases of goods and services for current consumption
2011-2013 as legal bases
 Benefit from this does not extend beyond fiscal year
5. Nine (9) petitions assailing the constitutionality are filed within days.  Has two (2) components:
5. The Court consolidated these cases to form the case at hand. i. Personal services (PS) – basically salaries of government
5. Oral arguments were held on November 19, 2013 and the Court directed DBM Sec. employees
Abad to submit the following: ii. Maintenance and other operating expenses (MOOE)
a. List of savings brought under DAP sourced from:
i. Completed programs Public expenditures can also be grouped according to function:
ii. Discontinued or abandoned programs 1. Economic development expenditures
iii. Unpaid appropriations for compensation 2. Social services or social development expenditures
b. Certified copy of the President’s directive dated June 27, 2012 referred to in 3. General development or general public services
NBC 541 4. National defense
c. All circulars and orders issued in relation to DAP 5. Public debt
5. In compliance, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) (government’s counsel)
submitted seven (7) evidence packets (please see Other Notes for the complete list of packets) Or according to nature of funds:

OVERVIEW OF THE PHILIPPINE BUDGET SYSTEM 1. General fund

2. Special fund
ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION
Public revenues are generally derived from the following sources:
 Financing public goals and activities was an idea that existed from the creation of the State
1. Tax revenues
 To protect the people, the territory and sovereignty, the government must perform vital 2. Capital revenues
functions that require public expenditures  Examples: Sales of fixed assets or scrap thereof, Sale of public lands etc.
2. Grants
 The Philippine Budget System is greatly influenced by western public financial institutions (Spain
and US colonized us before)
 Like grants from Asian Development Bank, World Bank etc.
3. Extraordinary income
 The Philippine Budget System is guided by two principal objectives:  Example: repayment of loans by GOCCs
1. To carry on all government activities under a comprehensive fiscal plan developed in 4. Public borrowing
accordance to the Constitution and prevailing statutes and sound public management  Proceeds of repayable obligations with interest from domestic and foreign creditors.
2. To provide for periodic review and disclosure of the budgetary status of Government
so that the enlightened citizenry and persons entrusted with the law can determine the
The Budget Cycle is enumerated below. There’s also an infographic here for a prettier description of things. Take
adequacy of the budget actions taken and the financial position of the Government
note that the size of the page containing the infographic is A3. If you’re going to print this digest, I suggest you
take it out so you can print the whole thing easily. Or convert this Word File into PDF and then print.
 Jones Law (1916) [Budget Office within Department of Finance] →  1935 Constitution (budget
policy, procedure established, strengthened by EO 25 – Budget Commission) + CA No. 246 (1 st BUDGET PREPARATION PHASE
budget law – line item budget framework) → RA No. 992 Congress introduces performance- BUDGET CALL
  The Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) sets budget parameters beforehand  DBM and the DBCC present the NEP and BESF to the President and Cabinet for further refinements
(including macroeconomic and fiscal targets and agency budget ceilings) before the Budget Call or reprioritization
 National Budget Call for National Government Agencies (NGAs)  After approval, the DBM prepares and finalizes the budget for submission to Congress (now called
 Corporate Budget Call for Government Owned and/or Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) and the President’s Budget) and submits the same which have the following:
Government Financial Institutions (GFIs)  President’s Budget Message (PBM)
 The DBM established an early budget prep in this administration. Say the Government was  BESF
preparing for the 2016 budget. Before Aquino Administration: Budget call will be around April 2015.  NEP
During Aquino Administration: Budget call will be in December 2014.  Details of Selected Programs and Projects
 In response, agencies will submit their AGENCY BUDGET PROPOSALS to the DBM.  Staffing Summary

STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT BUDGET LEGISLATION PHASE

 A new process in budget preparations which seeks to increase citizen participation in the budget
process, departments and agencies are tasked to partner with civil society organizations (CSOs) and
other citizen-stakeholders as they prepare their agency budget proposals
 This was piloted in the preparation of the 2012 National Budget, is now being expanded towards
institutionalization
 This wasn't cited in the ponencia, so this is just added information :))
TECHNICAL BUDGET HEARINGS
 conducted after departments and agencies submit their Agency Budget Proposals (ABPs) to the
DBM
 agencies defend their proposed budgets before a technical panel of DBM, based on performance
indicators on output targets and absorptive capacity
 DBM bureaus then review the agency proposals and prepare recommendations
 DBM  has a total of 7 Bureaus (A to G) which handle the different budgets of agencies/ offices
submitted to them
 Bureau A to E: National Government Agencies including Judiciary and Legislative Offices
as well as the Constitutional Commissions
 Bureau F: GOCCs and GFIs
 Bureau G: PDAF, Special Shares, Calamity Fund, IRA
EXECUTIVE REVIEW
 DBM Bureaus review the ABPs and come up with recommendations for the Executive Review Board
(ERB) comprised of the DBM Secretary and DBM senior officials
 Discussions here cover the prioritization of programs and corresponding support
CONSOLIDATION, VALIDATION AND CONFIRMATION
 DBM consolidates the recommended agency budgets into the National Expenditure Program (NEP),
the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) and the Staffing Summary
 The NEP:
 is submitted in the form of a proposed GAA (it is in book format, the same goes for the
BESF and the Staffing Summary, as well as the final GAA)
 provides details of spending for each department by agency and then by program,
activity or project (PAP)
 also contains Details of Selected Programs and Projects for a more detailed
disaggregation of key PAPs in the NEP (the GAA doesn’t have this)
PRESENTATION TO PRESIDENT AND CABINET
HOUSE DELIBERATIONS
 First reading
 President’s Budget is assigned to the House Appropriations Committee
 Committee and its Sub-committees schedule and conduct budget hearings of
departments and agencies
 Crafts the General Appropriations Bill (GAB)
 GAB is sponsored, presented and defended by the HoR’s Appropriation Committee in
plenary session
 GAB is approved on Third Reading and is submitted to the Senate
SENATE DELIBERATIONS
 Senate Finance Committee and Sub-Committee are in charge
 To expedite proceedings, the Senate may conduct its committee hearings simultaneously with the
HoR’s deliberations but the proposed amendments to the GAB are submitted to the Senate Plenary
only after the HoR has formally transmitted their approved GAB to the Senate
 GAB is approved on Third Reading and shall be submitted for Bicameral Deliberations
BICAMERAL DELIBERATIONS
 Constituted of a panel each for the Senate and the House of Representatives
 Harmonizes conflicting provisions of their respective GAB versions
 Harmonized GAB is produced
RATIFICATION AND ENROLLMENT
 Submitted to both Houses which will vote to ratify the final GAB for submission to the President
 Once submitted, it is considered enrolled
PRESIDENT’S VETO MESSAGE
 President and the DBM review the GAB and prepare a Veto Message where identified budget items
are submitted to direct veto or conditional implementation
 Under the Constitution, the GAB is the only legislative measure where the President can impose a
line-veto (in all other cases, a law is either approved or vetoed in full) (check out Philconsa vs.
Enriquez for veto doctrine)
ENACTMENT
 If Congress fails to pass the GAB at the end of any fiscal year, the GAA for the previous year is
automatically re-enacted (this actually happened under GMA’s time)
 In the Aquino administration, the GAA is usually signed in December of the year before
implementation
BUDGET EXECUTION PHASE
RELEASE OF GUIDELINES AND PROGRAM
  The budget execution phase begins with DBM’s issuance of guidelines on the release and utilization
of funds.
BUDGET EXECUTION DOCUMENTS (BEDs) SUBMISSION
 Agencies are required to submit their BEDs at the start of budget execution. These documents
outline agency plans and performance targets. These BEDs include the (1) physical and financial
plan, (2) monthly cash program, (3) estimate of monthly income, and (4) list of obligations that are
not yet due and demandable.
ALLOTMENT AND CASH RELEASE PROGRAMMING
 To ensure that releases fit the approved Fiscal Program, the DBM prepares an Allotment Release
Program (ARP) to set a limit for allotments issued to an agency and on the aggregate. The ARP of
each agency corresponds to the total amount of the agency-specific budget under the GAA, as well
as Automatic Appropriations. A Cash Release Program (CRP) is also formulated alongside that to set
a guide for disbursement levels for the year and for every month and quarter.
ALLOTMENT RELEASE
 Allotments, which authorize an agency to enter into an obligation, are either released by DBM to all
agencies comprehensively through the Agency Budget Matrix (ABM) and individually via Special
Allotment Release Orders (SAROs).
 ABM. This document disaggregates all programmed appropriations for each agency into two main
expenditure categories: “not needing clearance” and “needing clearance.” The ABM is the
comprehensive allotment release document for appropriations which do not need clearance, or
those which have already been itemized and fleshed out in the GAA.
 SARO. Items identified as “needing clearance” are those which require the approval of the DBM or
the President, as the case may be (for instance, lump sum funds and confidential and intelligence
funds). For such items, an agency needs to submit a Special Budget Request to the DBM with
supporting documents. Once approved, a SARO is issued.
INCURRING OBLIGATIONS
 In implementing programs, activities and projects, agencies incur liabilities on behalf of the
government. Obligations are liabilities legally incurred, which the government will pay for. There are
various ways that an agency “obligates:” for example, when it hires staff (an obligation to pay
salaries), receives billings for the use of utilities, or enters into a contract with an entity for the
supply of goods or services.
CASH ALLOCATION
 To authorize an agency to pay the obligations it incurs, DBM issues a disbursement authority. Most
of the time, it takes the form of a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA). This is a cash authority issued
periodically by the DBM to the operating units of agencies to cover their cash requirements. The
NCA specifies the maximum amount of cash that can be withdrawn from a government servicing
bank for the period indicated. The release of NCAs by DBM is based on an agency’s submission of its
Monthly Cash Program and other required documents.
 The DBM may issue Non-Cash Availment Authority (NCAA) (for non-cash disbursements) and Cash
Disbursement Ceiling (CDC) for departments with overseas operations to allow the use of income
collected by their foreign posts for their operating requirements
DISBURSEMENT
 This is the final step of the budget execution phase, where government monies are actually spent.
The Modified Disbursement Scheme is mostly used, where disbursements of national government
agencies chargeable against the Treasury are made through government servicing banks, such as
the Land Bank of the Philippines.
 The budget process, of course, does not end when government agencies spend public funds: each
and every peso must be accounted for to ensure that is used properly, contributing to the
achievement of socio-economic goals.
BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY PHASE
This phase happens alongside Budget Execution Phase
PERFORMANCE AND TARGET OUTCOMES
 Agencies are held accountable not only for how these use public funds ethically, but also on how
these attain performance targets and outcomes using available resources.
 Performance measures are set alongside the preparation of the National Budget
 Prior to the execution of the enacted National Budget, these performance targets are firmed up
during the preparation of BEDs.
BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY REPORTS (BARS)
 Submitted by agencies on a monthly and quarterly basis, BARs are required reports that show how
agencies used their funds and identify their corresponding physical accomplishments. These include
quarterly physical and financial reports of operations; quarterly income reports, a monthly
statement of allotments, obligations and balances; and monthly report of disbursements.
REVIEW OF AGENCY PERFORMANCE
 The DBM regularly reviews the financial and physical performance of agencies. Actual utilization of
funds and physical accomplishments, as indicated in the agencies’ BARs, are evaluated against their
targets as identified via OPIF and in the agencies’ BEDs.
 Agency Performance Reviews (APRs) are conducted quarterly or every semester, as the case may
be. An annual Budget Performance Assessment Review (BPAR) is conducted to determine each
agency’s accomplishments and performance by the year-end.
 The DBM regularly reports results to the President.
AUDIT
 Auditing is not within the DBM’s jurisdiction, and is instead lodged under the Commission on Audit
(COA).
 Auditing is critical in ensuring agency accountability in the use of public funds.
 The DBM uses COA’s audit reports in confirming agency performance, determining budgetary levels
for agencies and addressing issues in fund usage
Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883, 891 (1920)
FACTS:
1. The petitioner alleges and respondent admits that on or about July 1, 1919, the latter contracted with the
petitioner to supply to it for a term of thirty years all sugar cane produced upon her plantation. Said contract
was recorded in the Registry of Property.
2. In the interim the execution of said contract, Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature, known as the "Public
Land Act," became effective.
3. The respondent, while admitting said contract and her obligation thereunder to execute a deed pursuant
thereto, bases her refusal so to do upon the fact that more than 61 per cent of the capital stock of the
petitioner is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not RA 2874 applies to agricultural lands held in private ownership.
(2) Whether or not complies with the constitutional requirement "That no bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
HELD: (1)
1. No. It is held that Act No. 2874 was intended to apply to and regulate the sale, lease and other disposition of
public lands only.
2. The title of the Act, always indicative of legislative intent, reads: "an Act to amend and compile the laws
relating to lands of the public domain, and for other purposes”.
3. Said act, by express provisions of Sections 4, 5, 67 and 105, does not apply to lands privately owned by the
government.
4. The Act nowhere contains any direct or express provision applying its terms to privately owned lands. The
court holds, therefore, that the purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. 2874 was and is to limit its
application to lands of the public domain, and that lands held in private ownership are not included therein and
are not affected in any manner whatsoever.
(2) No. The objects of the constitutional requirement under Section 3 of the Jones Law are:
1. first, to prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation;
2. second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles
gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted;
3. to fairly apprise the people of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may
have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire.' (Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, p. 143.)
4. This constitutional requirement is mandatory and not directory. In the said Act, the words "and for other
purposes" contained in its title, must be treated as non-existent, held to be without force or effect whatsoever
and have been altogether discarded in construing the Act.
5. That the use of the words "other purposes," can no longer be of any avail as they express nothing and
amount to nothing as a compliance with this constitutional requirement.
6. The phrase expresses no specific purpose and imports indefinitely something different from that which
precedes it in the title.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 (1994) [Check digest folder]
De Guzman v. Comelec, G.R. No. 129118, 19 July 2000.
SUMMARY.  Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for vice-mayor. Respondent filed for
disqualification of petitioner on account of his US citizenship. SC held that petitioner is disqualified because RA
9225 provides for the twin requirements of oath of allegiance and renunciation of foreign citizenship for those
running for elective positions. Petitioner only complied with the first requirement, but not the second one. The
legislative intent for this requirement is to ensure that candidates only have 1 citizenship, i.e. PH citizenship.
DOCTRINE.
1. Section 5(2) compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but
who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship:
1. to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and
2. for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines , to additionally execute a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections.
2. The oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the one
contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn renunciation
sought under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225.
FACTS.
 De Guzman and Angelina DG. Dela Cruz were candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
 1st case: Dela Cruz filed a petition for disqualification against De Guzman alleging that he is not a
Filipino citizen but a US immigrant and resident.
 De Guzman admitted that he was a naturalized American but that he applied for dual
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and took his oath of allegiance to the RP upon approval, the
year before. He argued that, having re-acquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to
exercise full civil and political rights, and to run as vice-mayor.
 Dela Cruz won as vice-mayor.
 2nd case: De Guzman filed an election protest on grounds of irregularities and massive cheating.
 Meanwhile, (1st case) COMELEC ruled petitioner was disqualified:
 Respondent has validly reacquired Filipino citizenship. However, based on subparagraph
(2), Section 5, De Guzman should have renounced his American citizenship before he can run
for any public elective position. The Oath of Allegiance taken by respondent was for the
purpose of re-acquiring Philippine citizenship. It did not, at the same time, mean that
respondent has renounced his American citizenship. Thus, at the time respondent filed his
certificate of candidacy he was, and still is, a dual citizen, possessing both Philippine and
American citizenship. For this reason alone, respondent is disqualified to run for the
abovementioned elective position.
 Petitioner filed MR but was dismissed for having been rendered moot in view of Dela Cruz’s victory.
 In the 2nd case, TC declared De Guzman as the winner for the Vice-Mayoralty position with a
plurality of 776 votes over Dela Cruz.
Petitioner’s arguments
 COMELEC En Banc prematurely dismissed the MR because at that time, there was a
pending election protest which was later decided in his favor.
 De Guzman invokes the rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections and Mercado v.
Manzano, that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy,
containing an oath of allegiance, constituted a renunciation of his foreign citizenship
Respondent’s arguments
 Passage of R.A. No. 9225 effectively abandoned the Court’s rulings in Frivaldo and
Mercado.
 The current law requires a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship.
 De Guzman, having failed to renounce his American citizenship, remains a dual citizen
and is therefore disqualified from running for an elective public position under Section 40[11]
of the LGC.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing petitioner’s MR for being moot?
YES. COMELEC committed GAD in dismissing petitioner’s MR solely on the ground that the same was
rendered moot because he lost to private respondent.
An issue becomes moot when it ceases to present a justifiable controversy so that a determination thereof
would be without practical use and value.
In this case, the pendency of petitioner’s election protest assailing the results of the election did not render
moot the MR which he filed assailing his disqualification.
 The issue of petitioner’s citizenship did not become moot; the resolution of the issue remained
relevant because it could significantly affect the outcome of the election protest.
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office.
It bears stressing that the RTC later ruled in favor of petitioner in the election protest and declared him the
winner. In view thereof, a definitive ruling on the issue of petitioner’s citizenship was clearly necessary.
2. WON De Guzman is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May
14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American citizenship in accordance with R.A. No. 9225?
YES. Petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his failure to renounce his American
citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for:
1. natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country (where De Guzman falls under); and
2. natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a
foreign country.
The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking
the oath of allegiance. De Guzman re-acquired his Philippine citizenship after taking the oath of allegiance on
September 6, 2006.
However, R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement (see footnote no. 2) on those who wish to seek
elective public office.
The filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225.
 Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable to the instant case because R.A. No. 9225 provides for
more requirements.
 Japzon v. COMELEC: Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 requires the twin requirements of swearing to an
Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.
 Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC: a candidate’s oath of allegiance to the RP and his CoC do not
substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship.
Section 5(2) compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who
reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship:
3. to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and
3. for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines , to additionally execute a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
On the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, the law requires the
Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other than that
which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines).
 The intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine
citizenship to take their oath of allegiance to the RP, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign
citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in
Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.
The oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the one
contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn renunciation
sought under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225.
 The said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in
Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for
those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 and who seek elective
public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.
DECISION. DISMISSED; Petitioner DISQUALIFIED.
Commission of Internal Revenue v. CTA, 185 SCRA 329 (1990)
Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990)
This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the Presidential veto of Section 55 of the 1989 General
Appropriations Bill (GAB) and Sec 16 of the 1990 GAB which prohibit the president from restoring
appropriations already disapproved by Congress through augmentation. Petitioners contend that these
provisions are not covered by President’s item-veto power and to veto these provisions would be to veto the
entire bill. The Court ruled upheld the Presidential veto of specific provisions for being inappropriate to the bill.
(See Doctrine below)
IMPORTANT PEOPLE (effectively, Legislative vs. Executive)
 Neptali Gonzales, Ernesto Maceda, Alberto Romulo, et. al (petitioners)
- Members and ex-officio members of the Committee on Finance of the Senate
Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., Hon. Vicente Jayme, Hon. Carlos Dominguez

(respondents) - Cabinet members who implemented GAB 1989 & 1990 inc. Nat’l Treasurer & COA
Chairman
FACTS
1. On December 16, 1988, Congress passed the GAB of 1989 (House Bill No. 19186),
eliminating or decreasing certain items in the proposed budget by the President. Congress
presented this bill to the President for consideration and approval.
2. On December 29, the President signed the Bill into law (Republic Act No. 6688).
However, the President vetoed 7 Special Provisions and Section 55 of the General Provisions.
3. On February 2, the Senate issued Resolution No. 381 expressing that the Presidential
veto on Section 55 is unconstitutional and issuing a directive to Senate Committee on Finance to file
a suit in the name of the Senate to contest the constitutionality of the Presidential veto.
4. Thus, on April 11, the current petition for prohibition/mandamus was filed, assailing the
constitutionality and legality of the Presidential veto and seeking to enjoin the implementation of
RA 6688.
5. On January 19, 1990, the petitioners filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental
petition raising the same issue but questioning President’s veto of Section 16 of GAB of 1990 (HB
No. 26934), substantially similar to Section 55 but made to appear as a condition or restriction to
the use of savings.
ISSUE with HOLDING
I. Procedural Issues (no issues raised, Court simply discusses judicial determination)
1. There is an actual case or justiciable controversy.
 There is a need to rule on the parameters of the
exercise of item-veto power in order to prevent the recurrence of a similar problem when
a general appropriations bill is passed. (capable of repetition yet evading review)

In this case, the Court simply discharges a solemn
duty to determine essentially the scope of intersecting powers in which the Executive and
Senate are in dispute based on the judicial power conferred by Art. 8, Sec. 1 of the
Constitution.
2. The petitioners have locus standing.

As ruled in Sanidad v. Comelec, the Court enjoys
open discretion in entertaining taxpayer suits. In Tolentino v. Comelec, the Court held that
a Senate member has the requisite personality for cases where issue on constitutionality
is raised.  
II. Substantive Issue
1. W/N veto by the President of Section 55 of the 1989 GAB and subsequently Section 16 of the
1990 GAB is unconstitutional and without effect - NO
a. Extent of President’s Item-Veto Power
  Petitioners contend that the vetoed
sections are provisions and not items, and thus, outside the scope of the Presidents item-
veto power. Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
“The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in
an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect items to
which he does not object.”
 Concededly, the terms item and
provision have different meanings in budgetary legislation and practice. An item in a bill
refers to particulars, details, the distinct and severable parts of the bill. It is a specific
appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into
an appropriation bill.
 However, the Court ruled that despite
the fact that no reference was made in the above section of the current Constitution as to
the veto of a provision, the extent of the President’s veto power in the 1935 Constitution
(which expressly allows veto power on ‘a provision of an appropriation bill’) has not
changed.

It is a basic principle that a distinct and
severable part of the bill may be the subject of a separate veto. In this case, a provision in
an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to which
it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill. Thus, a provision may be subject to a
separate veto.   Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution,
b. Inappropriateness of so-called “Provisions” and “Conditions/Restrictions”
 The Court believes that Section 55 and
Section 16 are not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term. Art. 6, Sec. 25 (2) of the
1987 Constitution requires that a provision should relate specifically to some particular
appropriation. However, the challenged provisions (1) do not relate to any specific
appropriation but applies to all items disapproved by Congress, (2) pertains to items which
cannot be found in the face of the Bill and (3) are more of an expression of Congressional
policy rather than budgetary appropriation. Thus, these sections are actually inappropriate
provisions and shall be treated as ‘items’ for purposes of veto power over general
appropriation bills. (Henry v. Edwards)
 2.       Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving
Petitioners also contend that these
sections are conditions and as such, are beyond the veto power citing Bolinao Electronics
Corporation v. Valencia where it was held that veto of a condition which did not include
the related item is invalid. However, the Court rules that to be considered as a restriction
in an appropriations bill, it must exhibit a connection with money items in the budgetary
sense. (Test of Appropriateness) Thus, these sections must also be considered
inappropriate “conditions”. While “artfully drafted” to appear as conditions, they are
actually general measures more appropriate for substantive and separate legislation. Since
these are not valid conditions, Bolinao ruling becomes inapplicable.
c. Power of Augmentation and Validity of Veto

Sections 55 and 16 impairs
constitutional and statutory authority of the President and other key officials to augment
any item/appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency. (Art. 6,
Sec. 25 (5) of Constitution) Exercising this authority on disapproved items does not equate
giving Executive the power to rewrite the budget since there is a defined limit that the
transfers must come only from its own savings.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of the assailed Presidential veto is UPHELD and the Petition is
hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
DOCTRINE
Presidential Power to Veto “Inappropriate Provisions”
Provisions are considered inappropriate for an appropriations bill when the provision:
1. has no relation to any specific appropriation
2. relates to items not found on the face of the bill
3. is more of an expression of a desired policy rather than budgetary
appropriation
RELEVANCE TO THE LESSON
GR: The President must veto bills in its entirety.
ETR: Inappropriate provisions may be vetoed separately.
Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 508 (1994)
Facts:
                House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved
by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain
items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized
members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the “pork barrels” allotted to them and to realign their
respective operating budgets.
Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have
become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his
Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain
conditions, as follows:
1.        Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that “this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the
1994 GAA.” And that “appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are
automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated
under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987.
funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s),
3.        Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
4.       Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No.
6675).
5.       The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of the
Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund,” which requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release
of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the “Specific
Prohibition” which states that the said Modernization Fund “shall not be used for payment of six (6) additional
S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers”
6.       New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds.
7.        Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress.
Issue:
                whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the
Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e)
Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU’S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) are
constitutional; whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the
automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional
Held:
                The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process. There
is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those
questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
 The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No.
1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in
Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President
vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some
government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is
because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such
practices as exceptions to the “one-fund policy” (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A
for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Management’s
Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is
unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of
a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said
item shall be expended — 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly
comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an
“appropriate” provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of
medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said
item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “use of Fund” for the AFP modernization program
that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of
the “congressional or legislative veto.” However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the
issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at
hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions, Special Provisions Nos.
2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of
the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of
the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10),
more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for
the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and
29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the
challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer
or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is
the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be
embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief
and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU’s to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the
Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the
President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it
cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the
President has the power to take “necessary and proper steps” to carry into execution the law. These steps are
the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.
Belgica, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al GR No. 208566, November 11, 2013
Consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. The Court held the PDAF
unconstitutional.
IMPORTANT PEOPLE
●     Greco Belgica, Jose Villegas, Jr. , Jose Gonzalez, Reuben Abante and Quintin Paredes San Diego - G.R.
208566; Social Justice Society President Alcantara - G.R. 208493; Pedrito Nepomuceno as former Mayor and
Provincial-Board Member of Marinduque - G.R. 209251 (Petitioners)
●     Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr.; Secretary of Budget and Management Abad; National Treasurer De
Leon; SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. Drilon in his capacity as Senate President and
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr. in his capacity as Speaker Of The House,
President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III (Respondents)
FACTS
Pork Barrel System’s Conceptual Underpinnings
Pork Barrel as a general concept.
●     American-English origins: “The ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves
who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from
the generosity of their well-fed master”.
●     Later on, it was the same concept in American legislation to ‘bring home the bacon’ where representatives
file political bills for the sake of his district.
●     It refers to the lump-sum, discretionary funds of members of the legislative and would later on evolve in
reference to certain features of the Executive.
History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines
Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972)
●     Act 3044 or the Public Works Act of 1922: Appropriations were subjected to post-enactment legislative
approval (through a committee elected by the Senate and the HoR.
●     1950s. Post-enactment legislation broadened from the areas of fund release to the area of project
identification. Discretion of choosing projects transferred from the Secretary of Communications and C to the
Legislative. Local government councils, civil groups, and individuals appealed to Congressmen or Senators for
projects.
●     1960s. The practice ceased. There was stalemate between the HoR and the Senate.
Martial Law (1972-1986) “one-man controlled legislative”
●     1982. The practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individuals began. Batasang Pambansa created a new
item in the GAA or the General Appropriations Act which is called the Support for Local Development Projects
(SLDP) under the title National Aid to Local Government Units. Each assemblyman received 500,000 pesos and
was able to ‘communicate their project preferences’ to the Ministry of Budget and Management.   
●     CPD under SLDP began to cover not only public works or ‘hard projects’ but also ‘soft projects’ or those
similarly categorized with educational, health and livelihood projects.
Post Martial-Law Era: Aquino Administration (1986-1992)
●     1989. Lump sum appropriations.
●     1990 GAA Countrywide Development Fund initially had 2.3 B pesos to cover ‘small local infrastructure and
other priority projects’
●     1991 and 1992 GAAs. No indication of amount received for each legislator.
●     1992 Mems of the HoR received 12.5M each in CDF. Senate mems got 18M each. They ‘could identify any
kind of project’
Ramos Administration (1992-1998)
●     1993, 1st time to include allocation for the VP.
HoR – 12.5M each, Senate - 18M each, VP - 20M
●     1994-1996. Same appropriation with the 1993 Article.
●     1997. ‘in consultation with the implementing agency concerned.’ Congressmen and VP were directed to
submit to the DBM a list of 50% of the projects to be funded from their respective CDF allocations which shall
be duly endorsed by (a) Senate Pres and chair of Committee of Finance (b) Speaker and Chair of the Committee
on Appropriations.
●     1998. Publication of project list no longer required. List itself sufficed for the release of funds. Congressional
insertions used to perpetuate the administration’s political agenda.

Estrada Administration (1998-2001)
●     1999 CDF removed, replaced by 3 separate forms of Congressional Insertions
(1)  Lingap Para sa Mahirap Program Fund (2) Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Fund (3) Food Security
Program Funds.
Undergoes ‘prior consultation’ with the members HoR.
●     2000 PDAF appeared in the GAA. Realignment of funds to any expense category was expressly allowed. Sole
condition -  “no amount shall be used to fund personal services and benefits”
●     2001. same with 2000 GAA.
Arroyo (2001-2010)
●     2002 PDAF Article: orders the release of funds directly to the implementing agency or LGU concerned
●     2003 same with expansion on purpose
●     2004: same as 2003
●     2005: PDAF to be used to fund priority programs and projects under 10 point agenda and introduced the
program menu concept which is a list of general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular
PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by identifying authority
●     2006-2010: same as 2005
●     PDAF silent on specific amounts except for DepEd School Building Program and DPWH which requires prior
consultation with concerned member of congress
●     It was during this era that allowed formal participation of NGOs in implementation of government projects
●     In Supplemental Budget for 2006, at least 250/500M Pesos allotted for construction and completion of
school buildings shall be made available to NGOs
●     2007: Government Procurement Policy Board amends implementing rules and regulations of RA 9184
(Government Procurement Reform Act) to include procedure whereby the Procuring Entity may enter into a
memorandum of agreement with an NGO provided that an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount
to be specifically contracted out to NGOs
Present Administration (2010-present)
●     2011: includes statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators (40M hard project +
30M soft project), Senators (100M hard project + 100M soft project) VP (100M hard project + 100M soft
project)
●     provision on realignment of funds was included
●     2012 and 2013: identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority
list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency but it would still be the individual legislator who
would choose and identify the project
●     Provision on legislator allocations and fund realignment were included
●     Allocation for VP (200M) was deleted
●     2013: allows LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to
implement projects
●     Any realignment of PDAF funds, modification and revision of project identification as well as requests for
release of funds were all required to be favorably endorsed by House Committee on Appropriations and the
Senate Committee on Finance
History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines
●     President Marcos expanded to include certain funds of President such as Malampaya Funds (Section 8 PD
910) and the President Social Fund (Sec 12, TItle IV of PD 1869)
Controversies in the Philippines
●     1996: Former Marikina Rep Romeo Candazo blew the lid on the huge sums of government money that
regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks (19-52%)
●     2004: concerned citizens sought nullification of PDAF for being unconstitutional but lack of pertinent
evidentiary support of illegal misuse of PDAF dismissed petition
●     July 2013: NBI investigated allegations that government has been defrauded of some 10B Pesos for the past
10 years by a syndicate (Janet Lim Napoles Corporation) using funds from pork barrel in ghost projects with at
least 20 dummy NGOs
●     Aug 16 2013: Commission on Audit (COA) released results of 3 year audit investigation (2007-2009)
●     As for Presidential Pork Barrel, whistle-blowers alleged that at least 900M Pesos from royalties in operation
of Malampaya gas project has gone into a dummy NGO
Procedural Antecedents
Sept 10 2013: Court issued resolution to:
a. consolidate all 3 cases that were filed on Aug 28, Sept 3 and Sept 5 against PDAF
b. requiring public respondents to comment on consolidated petitions
c. issuing TRO enjoining authority from releasing pork barrel funds
Sept 23 2013: OSG filed consolidated comment seeking the partial lifting with respect to educational and
medical assistance purposes and petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE with HOLDING
     I.        Procedural Issues
A. Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy.
 Yes, there exists an actual and justiciable controversy
 Requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the
parties on constitutionality on the Pork Barrel System
 Questions are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their
utilization are currently existing and operational hence there exists an immediate or threatened
injury to petitioners
 Case not moot as there is still an actual controversy - executive branch has no constitutional
authority to nullify its legal existence
B.  WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy subject to judicial review
 Yes. They are subject to judicial review.
 The intrinsic constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom
of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon
 Section 1, Article VIII: “The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. [It] includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
C.  WON petitioners have legal standing to sue
 Yes, they have standing.
  Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and assert
that they dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.
 Petitioners as taxpayers are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds
 Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed
or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law
 In addition, the issues they have raised may be classified as matters of transcendental importance of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest
D.  WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the Court) on Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez
(Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of the Court on Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget
and Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the “pork barrel system” under
the principles of res judicata and stare decisis
 No. They are not barred to bring the case to court based on the 2 principles.
 Res judicata (matter adjudged) and stare decisis (follow past precedents) are general procedural law
principles which both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to
subsequent cases
 Focal point of res judicata is the judgment and that a judgment on the merits in previous case would
bind a subsequent case if there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action
o Required identity not attendant since Philconsa challenged the 1994 CDF Article, Lamp
challenged the 2004 PDAF Article while the current case is challenging the entire Pork
Barrel System
 Focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created and that absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike
o Philconsa case: limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the
propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to members of congress
o Present cases call for a more holistic examination of the interrelation between the CDF
and PDAF articles with each other and the intra-relation of post-enactment measures
contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article
 Complexity of issues and broader legal analyses are reasons against application of the stare decisis
principle.
o Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the
post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the
same was merely recommendatory.
II. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”
WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on…
 Separation of powers
o Yes. It violated SOP
o The defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of
legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation
o Post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release
and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and hence
allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere
of budget execution. Legislators have been authorized to participate in “the various
operational aspects of budgeting” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans
for individual activities and the “regulation and release of funds” in violation of the
separation of powers principle.
o Abakada: “from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.
 Non-delegability of legislative power
o Yes, it violated non-delegability
o Legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
o appropriation which is lodged in Congress
o Power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation
 Sec 29(1) Article VI of 1987 Constitution: No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
o Bengzon case: Power of appropriation involves a) setting apart by law a certain sum
from public revenue for b) a specified purpose
o PDAF Article: individual legislators are given personal lump-sum fund from which they
are able to dictate a) how much from such fund would go to b) a specified project or
beneficiary that they themselves also determine — which constitution does not allow
 Checks and balances
o Yes, it violates checks and balances
o Actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration
o This kind of lump sum/post enactment legislative identification budgeting system
fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget” which subverts the prescribed
procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President’s power of item
veto.
 Accountability
o Yes, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate
Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the
2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are
deemed as unconstitutional.
o Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that “public office is a public
trust,” is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should
exercise their official functions only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution
which embodies the parameters of the people’s trust.
o The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation
of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested “observers” when
scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law.
o Sec. 14 Art VI of 1987 Constitution: No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before
the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall
he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or
its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any
 office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to
act on account of his office.
 Political dynasties
o No. Court finds it speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the pork
barrel system would be able to propagate political dynasties.
 Local autonomy
o Yes. It violates local autonomy
o Gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without
taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator
represents
o Allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality,
wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration
o A district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of
funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province
III. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”
WON the following phrases are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative
power.
(A) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910
relating to the Malampaya Funds,
●     YES, it is unconstitutional. The phrase constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does
not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect
to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use said
funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.
●     Applying the principle of ejusdem generis (meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to
include – or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned) is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government” states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as
a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase “for such other purposes” may be
limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development programs of
the government; and, third, the Executive department has used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related
purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to
“energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government.”
●     As they are severable, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds “to
finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government,” remains
legally effective and subsisting.
(B) [first,]“to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and [second,] to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential
Social Fund,
●     The second indicated purpose adequately limits the authority of the President to spend the Presidential
Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities. However, the first indicated purpose
gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a
“priority“. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development projects” and
hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project
as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility.
Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” must be stricken down as
unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient
standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended
by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.
IV. Ancillary Prayers
A. Petitioners’ prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports. DENIED.
·         Petitioners prayed that the Exec Sec and/or the DBM be ordered to release to the COA and to the public
(a) “the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003-
2013” and (b) Executive’s lump sum discretionary funds (including the proceeds from Malampaya funds and
remittances from PAGCOR)
·         Petitioners invoked Sec 28, Art II and Sec 7 Art III of the 1987 Constitution.
·         Court held that Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to be invoked.
·         The information sought by the petitioners is public anyway.  
B. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations. DENIED.
·         This should be left to the prerogative of the political branches of the government.
C. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO: Consequential Effects of Decision.
·         Court held that a SARO is not a directive to pay. Thus, only those funds issued a Notice of Cash Allocation
(NCA) should be allowed to be used. PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an obligated SARO, should remain
enjoined.
V. Consequential Effects of the Decision.
·         The declaration of unconstitutionality of all subject articles/provisions must only be treated as prospective
in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED.
·         TRO issued last September 10, 2013 was made PERMANENT.
·         Use of funds not issued by NCAs, but only by SAROs are enjoined.
·         Remaining PDAF to be reverted to the unappropriated surplus of general fund.
·         Malampaya Fund and PSF remain therein to be utilized for their respective special purposes, not
otherwise declared unconstitutional.
·         Petition for the complete list/schedules or detailed reports related to the availment and utilization of the
funds subject of these cases. DENIED.
·         Petition for the inclusion of subject funds in the budgetary deliberation DENIED.
·         Court DIRECTS all to prosecute those who may be criminally liable of the offense related to the improper
use of funds.
Pork Barrel System is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
·         Violation of SoP, the non-delegability of legislative power. It denies presidential veto power, impairs public
accountability and subverts genuine local autonomy.
·         Entire 2013 PDAF Article, all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, all
informal practices of similar import/effect, the phrases in PD 910 and PD 1869.
  
DOCTRINE
·         Appropriation is to “allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose,” and hence if written
into the law, the legislative intent to appropriate exists.
·         The Constitution “does not provide or proscribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which
an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that is be ‘made by law’.”
·         Appropriation law may be “detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be” for as long as the intent to
appropriate may be gleaned from the same.
RELEVANCE TO THE LESSON
The case discusses a part of the legislative process, specifically the Requirements as to Appropriation Laws.
The VALIDITY OF APPROPRIATION is ascertained by the requirements: (a) determinate or determinable amount
of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose.
Two fundamental tests to ascertain that adequacy of legislative guidelines:
1. Completeness test – the law must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by
the delegate.    careers – menial jobs in overseas employment, etc.
2. Sufficient standard test – the standard must specify the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under
which it is to be implemented.
OTHER NOTES
P. S. When handwriting the digest, just start with the issues. Treat the historical background as supplementary
information (better pa rin kung alam natin though). LOL
Commissioner of BIR v. CA, 298 SCRA 83 (1998)
CIR v. santos 1998
Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991)
Petitioners: Teofisto A. Guingona, Jr. and Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.
Respondents: Hon. Guillermo Carague, in his capacity as Secretary, Budget & Management, Hon. Rozalina S.
Cajucom, in her capacity as National Treasurer, and Commission on Audit
Facts
 1990 budget = P233.5 Billion
 P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service)
 P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831 (General Appropriations Act)
 Appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports = P27,017,813,000
 Said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177, and P.D.
No. 1967
 The petition seeks the declaration of unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sec 31 of P.D. No. 1177, and
P.D. No 1967 + restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said
decrees
 Respondents contend that the petition involves a pure political question
 Gonzales v. Macaraig (unconstitutionality of presidential veto of Sec 16 RA 6831)
 Court: "With the Senate maintaining that the President's veto is unconstitutional, and
that charge being controverted, there is an actual case or justiciable controversy
between the Upper House of Congress and the executive department that may be taken
cognizance of by this Court."
Issues
1. Is the appropriation of P86 Billion in the P233 Billion 1990 budget violative of Section 5, Article XIV
of the Constitution? No.
2. Are P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967 still operative under the Constitution? Yes.
3. Are they violative of Section 29(1) Article VI of the Constitution? No.
First Issue
 Sec. 5, Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution
 Reason behind provision
 Mr. Ople: all the great & sincere piety professed by every President & Congress of the
Philippines since WW2 for the economic welfare of public school teachers always ended
up in failure; this failure caused mass defection of the best & brightest teachers to other
 Central problem was budgetary priority – pay rate of teachers hopelessly pegged to rate
of government workers in general
 Recognition by the Constitution of the highest priority for public school teachers will
make teaching competitive again – “restored to its lost glory”
 Petitioners: As against this constitutional intention, P86B is appropriated for debt service while only
P27B is appropriated for the Department of Education in 1990 budget
 Court: It does not follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power
to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state
policies or objectives
 Since 1985, budget for education has tripled and compensation of teachers doubled
 The amount P29,740,611,000.00 set aside for the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports under the General Appropriations Act is the highest budgetary allocation among
all department budgets
 Clear compliance with constitutional mandate according highest priority to education
 Congress has power to provide appropriation that can reasonably service our enormous debt, the
greater portion of which was inherited from the previous administration
 Not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country; very
survival of economy is at sake
Second Issue
 RA 4860
 'SEC. 6. The Congress shall appropriate the necessary amount out of any funds in the
National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to cover the payment of the principal
and interest on such loans, credits or indebtedness as and when they shall become due.'
 After declaration of Martial Law, President Marcos issued PD 81 amending Sec 6
 In order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes
and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits, or indebtedness x x x, the
proceeds of which are deemed appropriated for the projects, all the revenue realized
from the projects financed by such loans x x x shall be turned over in full, after
deducting actual and necessary expenses x x x, to the National Treasury by the
government office, agency or instrumentality, or gov’t-owned or controlled corporation
concerned, which is hereby appropriated for the purpose as and when they shall
become due.
 If there still remains a deficiency, such amount necessary to cover the payment of the
principal and interest on such loans, credit or indebtedness as and when they shall
become due is hereby appropriated out of any funds in the national treasury not
otherwise appropriated
 Pres. Marcos also issued PD 1177:
  SEC. 31. Automatic appropriations. — All expenditures for (a) personnel retirement
premiums, government service insurance, and other similar fixed expenditures, (b)
principal and interest on public debt, (c) national government guarantees of
obligations which are drawn upon, are automatically appropriated; Provided, that no
obligations shall be incurred or payments made from funds thus automatically
appropriated except as issued in the form of regular budgetary allotments.
 And PD 1967:
 Section 3. In the event that any borrower institution is unable to settle the advances
made out of the appropriation provided therein, the Treasurer of the Philippines shall
make the proper recommendation to the Minister of Finance on whether such
advances shall be treated as equity or subsidy of the National Government to the
institution concerned, which shall be considered in the budgetary program of the
Government.
 “Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing Fiscal Year 1990” Pres. Corazon C. Aquino
 The proposed P233.5B budget will require P132.1B of new programmed appropriations
out of a total P155.3B in new legislative authorization from Congress.
 The rest of the budget (P101.4B) will be sourced from existing appropriations: P98.4
billion from Automatic Appropriations and P3.0 billion from Continuing
Appropriations||
 P86.8 billion out of the P98.4 Billion are programmed for debt service
 In other words, the President had, on her own, determined and set aside
the said amount of P98.4B with the rest of the appropriations of P155.3B
to be determined and fixed by Congress, which is now RA 6831.
 Petitioners: said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then President Marcos
became functus oficio when he was ousted in February 1986
 Assuming arguendo that PD 81, 177, and 1967 did not expire with the ouster of Marcos,
said decrees are inoperative after the adoption of the 1987 Constitution under Art XVIII
 Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
 Said decrees are inconsistent with Sec 24 Art VI
 Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of
the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall  originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments
 Said decrees violate Sec 29(1) of Art VI of the Constitution
 Without definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation, it is
undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in
advance the amount appropriated for the debt service
 Court: not persuaded
 Sec 3 Art XVIII – transitory provision
 Adopted by framers to preserve social order so that legislation by then-
President Marcos may be recognized
 Clear intent: amounts needed to cover payment of principal & interest on all
foreign loans should be made available when they shall become due, w/o
the necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating funds
therefor
 Solicitor General says:
 It enables the Government to take advantage of a favorable turn of market conditions
 Absent an automatic appropriation clause, the Philippine Government has to await and
depend upon Congressional action
 The claim that payment of loans and indebtedness is conditioned upon the continuance
of the person of President Marcos and his legislative power goes against the intent and
purpose of the law
 Construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied prospectively
Third Issue
 Court: questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms and conditions and sufficient
standards are indicated therein.
 Legislative intention: the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the
Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on
the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without
the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises.
 The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt payment
and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the country
 Government budgetary process – 4 major phases
 Budget preparation, Legislative authorization, Budget execution, Budget accountability
 No provision in our Constitution that provides/prescribes any particular form of words or religious
recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be
“made by law”
The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No.
1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by
Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to implement the same.
PASCUAL VS SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS (1960)
Concepcion, J. Topic: Taxation is for a public purpose (CASTRO)
FACTS:
 P Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action for declaratory relief with injunction
on the ground that RA 920, “An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works”, contained in Sec 1C(a) an item
of P85k for the construction and repair of Pasig feeder road terminals however, at the time of the passage
of the Act, the feeder roads were nothing but projected subdivision roads not yet constructed. He also
claimed that the projected feeder roads do not connect any government property and that the subdivisions
were private properties of R Zulueta, who was part of the Senate during the passage of the Act.
 He alleged that R Zulueta offered to donate said projected feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig.
The council approved. However, no deed of donation was executed. R Zulueta wrote another letter calling
attention to the approval of RA 920 and the sum of P85k appropriated therein for the construction of the
projected feeder roads. Letter was endorsed to the District Engineer who, up to now has not made any
endorsement. P was contending that they were private property making the appropriation of P85k was
illegal and void ab initio.
 He also alleged that to give a semblance of legality, R executed, while he was a member of the
State, and alleged deed of donation of the 4 parcels of land. However, P believes that such donation
violated the law which prohibits members of Congress from being directly or indirectly financially
interested in any contract with the government, and hence, is unconstitutional.
 R’s defense was that the P had no legal capacity to sue and that the petition did not state a cause of
action. R contends that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal and not its provincial governor should represent the
Province of Rizal. It also said that there is no law which makes illegal the appropriation of public funds for
 the improvements of private property. Also, the constitutional provision invoked by P is inapplicable since
it is a pure act of liberality and not a contract.
LC: held that since public interest is involved, the Provincial Governor of Rizal and the provincial fiscal who
represents him have the personalities to question the constitutionality of the said item in RA 920. It also ruled
that legislature is without power to appropriate public revenues for anything but a public purpose. In this case,
the improvement of the feeder roads, if such were private, would not be a public purpose. Also, being subject
to the condition that the gov’t of RP will use the land for street purposes only is forbidden by the Constitution
hence, illegal. LC ruled however, that the donation may not be contested by P since his interest are not directly
affected. LC ruled that appropriation should be upheld and the case dismissed.
ISSUES: WON public funds may be appropriated for private purpose NO
WON P may contest the donation YES
HELD:
1) It is a GR that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public
purpose. It is essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity as
justifying a tax, and no the magnitude of the interest to be affected not the degree to which the general
advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion.
Incidental  to the public or to the state, which results form the promotion of private interest and the prosperity
of private enterprises does not justify their aid by the use of public money.
Taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only. Money raised by taxation can be expended only for
public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals.
Under the express and implied provisions of the Constitution, public funds may be used only for public purpose.
The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax and the constitution no
appropriation of state funds can be made other than for a public purpose. The test of the constitutionality of a
statue requiring the use of public funds is whether the statue is designed to promote the public interest, as
opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might
incidentally serve the public.
2) There are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of
public funds, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an office of the State for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the
request of a taxpayer. In American ruling, the GR is that not only persons individually affected but also
taxpayers, have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may
therefore question the constitutionality of statues requiring expenditure of public moneys. (not applicable if
Federal gov’t – in PH, not identical to that relationship bet taxpayers of US and its Federal Gov’t)
SC ruled that petitioner is not merely a taxpayer. The Province of Rizal, which he represents officially as its
Provincial Governor is our most populated political subdivision, and, the taxpayers therein bear a substantial
portion of the burden of taxation, in the PH. LC should not have dismissed that case and that a writ of
preliminary injunction should have been maintained. REVERSE DECISION OF LC.
Osmeña v. Orbos, 220 SCRA 703 (1993)
FACTS:
1. The petitioner seeks the corrective, 1prohibitive and coercive remedies provided by Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court
2. October 10, 1984, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the
General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was:
 designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum
products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world market
prices of crude oil
 reclassified into a "trust liability account," in virtue of E.O. 1024 (issued on May 1985) and
ordered released from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy cha
3. President Corazon C. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive Order No. 137 on
February 27, 1987, expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost
underrecovery incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum productsla
4. the petition alleges that the status of the OPSF as of March 31, 1991 showed a "Terminal Fund
Balance deficit" of some P12.877 billion
5. December 10, 1990: the Energy Regulatory Board issued an order approving the increase in pump
prices of petroleum products, and at the rate of recoupment, the OPSF deficit should have been
fully covered in a span of six (6) months, but this notwithstanding, the respondents - Oscar Orbos, in
his capacity as Executive Secretary; Jesus Estanislao, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance;
Wenceslao de la Paz, in his capacity as Head of the Office of Energy Affairs; Chairman Rex V.
Tantiongco and the Energy Regulatory Board - "are poised to accept, process and pay claims not
authorized under P.D. 1956.
6. The petition further avers that the creation of the trust fund violates
29(3), Article VI of the Constitution, reading as follows:
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and
paid out for such purposes only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been
fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the
Government.
7. The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956, as amended, must be
treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,'
8. Petitioner further points out that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the
taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the
special purpose/objective for which it was created."
9. Petitioner also contends that the "delegation of legislative authority" to the ERB violates 28 (2).
Article VI of the Constitution, viz.:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix,
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government;
and, inasmuch as the delegation relates to the exercise of the power of taxation, "the
limits, limitations and restrictions must be quantitative, that is, the law must not only
specify how to tax, who (shall) be taxed (and) what the tax is for, but also impose a
specific limit on how much to tax."
10. The challenge posed by the petitioner is premised primarily on the view that the powers granted to
the ERB under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power of the State.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the creation of the trust fund violates
29(3), Article VI of the Constitution,
2. Whether or not section 8, paragraph 1 (c) of P.D. No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137,
is constitutional, for "being an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power . . to the Energy
Regulatory Board"
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED insofar as it prays for the nullification of the reimbursement of
financing charges, paid pursuant to E.O. 137, and DISMISSED in all other respects.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. NO. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in
the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain from
the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is
placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject
to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the
constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without precedent.ch
2. NO. With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the
provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum
products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the
 general policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump
rates, Section 8(c) of P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to
augment the resources of the Fund. For a valid delegation of power, it is essential that the law
delegating the power must be (1) complete in itself, that is it must set forth the policy to be
executed by the delegate and (2) it must fix a standard - limits of which
are sufficiently determinate or determinable - to which the delegate must conform. The standard,
as the Court has already stated, may even be implied. In that light, there can be no ground upon
which to sustain the petition, inasmuch as the challenged law sets forth a determinable standard
which guides the exercise of the power granted to the ERB. By the same token, the proper exercise
of the delegated power may be tested with ease. It seems obvious that what the law intended was
to permit the additional imposts for as long as there exists a need to protect the general public and
the petroleum industry from the adverse consequences of pump rate fluctuations.
Remman Enterprises, Inc. vs. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service and Professional
Regulation Commission G.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014
Petitioners: Remman Enterprises, Inc. and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders' Association
Respondents: Philippine Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service (PRBRES) and Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC)
FACTS
1. Assailed here is the July 12, 2011 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila which denied the
petition to declare as unconstitutional Sections 28(a), 29 and 32 of Republic Act No. 9646.
2. About RA 9646 (Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines):
a. Full title: "An Act Regulating the Practice of Real Estate Service in the Philippines, Creating for the
Purpose a Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other
Purposes"
b. signed into law by President Arroyo on July 29, 2009
c. aims to professionalize the real estate service sector through a regulatory scheme of licensing,
registration and supervision of real estate practitioners
d. transfers the authority to supervise real estate service practitioners to the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC), through the newly created Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service (PRBRES)
3. December 7, 2010 -- Petitioners filed the civil case, alleging the following:
 It violates the one subject-one title rule (Article VI, Section 26 of the 1987 Constitution).
 It is in direct conflict with PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers'
Protective Decree) as amended by EO 648 which gives the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade,
and the power to issue licences to sell.
 It violates the due process clause because it impinges on real estate developers' basic
right to use and dispose property as found in Article 428 of the Civil Code.
 Section 28(a) of RA 9646 violates the equal protection clause because there is no
substantial basis for NOT exempting real estate developers from the requirements
imposed by it.
 The additional cost of commissions under RA 9646 would affect the pricing and
affordability of real estate packages.
4. July 12, 2011 -- The trial court denied the petition on the ff. grounds:
 The assailed provisions are relevant to the title.
 There is no conflict between PD 957/ EO 648 and RA 9646 because it doesn't render
valueless the licenses issued by HLURB to real estate developers.
 It does not violate the due process clause. Property owners can still develop and sell
their properties provided that they hire a licensed real estate broker to oversee the sale.
This is a valid exercise of police power.
 Section 28(a) does not violate the equal protection clause. The basis for the exclusion of
developers from the exemption is the high number of reports regarding fraud
committed by real estate service practitioners.
4. They appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES
Whether there is a justiciable controversy:  YES
1. Justiciable controversy, as defined in the case:
 There must be an assertion of a legal right on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the
other.
 It must be admitting of specific relief through a conclusive decree.
 The act being challeged must directly and adversely affect the person challenging it.
2. SC: Petitioners, who are real estate developers, are directly affected by the RA in the following
ways:
 It imposes registration and licensing requirements on them and there can be criminal
sanctions if they don't comply.
 They allege that the prohibitions made by the RA violate their rights as property owners.
Whether RA 9646 is unconstitutional for violating the one title-one subject rule: NO
1. Petitioners: The law's title does not reflect the limitations it imposes on real estate developers.
 Under this law, real estate developers are prohibited from performing real estate
service transactions without first complying with its registration and licensing
requirements.
 Petitioners contend that real estate developers aren't included in the definition of "real
esate service practictioners" so the title is insufficient.
2. SC: The one title-one subject rule is liberally construed by the Court. It is satisfied if all parts of the
statute are related to and are germane to the subject expressed in the title.
 An act can contain any number of provisions as long as they are not foreign
to/inconsistent with the title.
 The title just needs to be comprehensive enough as to include the general object which
the statute seeks to effect.
3. SC: In this case, the Court finds that the inclusion of real estate developers is germane to the
objective of the law.
 Its objective is to develop “a corps of technically competent, responsible and
respected professional real estate service practitioners whose standards of
practice and service shall be globally competitive and will promote the growth of
the real estate industry.” (Sec 2, Declaration of Policy of RA 9646)
 Real estate developers perform acts falling under real estate service practices.
Logically, they should be covered in order to achieve the goal of professionalizing
the whole sector.
Whether RA 9646 is in conflict with PD 957, as amended by EO 648, with respect to HLURB's exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate real estate developers: NO
1. Petitioners: RA 9646 impliedly repeals PD 957.
  PD 957 confers to the National Housing Authority (now the HLURB) the exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business.
 By divesting it of its exclusive jurisdiction and undermining the licenses issued by
HLURB, RA 9646 impliedly repeals PD 957.
2. SC: Repeals by implication are not favored, and can only be inferred if there is a showing of clear
repugnance between the laws.
 Inconsistency is never presumed. The language of the statutes must be
irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant; otherwise, the inference of implied
repeal cannot be drawn.
3. SC: No conflict because under PD 957, HLURB is given authority to supervise only those who sell
subdivision lots and condominium units. HLURB's authority to implement PD 957 does not foreclose regulation
of the entire profession of real estate service.
 PD 957 vested the NHA (now HLURB) with jurisdiction to regulate (including
register, approve, monitor and issue licenses) real estate trade and business, but
their jurisdiction covers only those who are engaged in the sale of subdivision
lots and condominium units.
 [Note: EO 648 amended PD957 and transferred these regulatory powers from the
NHA to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC). EO 90 remaned
HSRC as HLURB and designated it as the regulatory body for housing and land
development.]
 On the other hand, RA 9646 regulates ALL real estate service practitioners,
including those already regulated by HLURB.
 There is no apparent conflict between the two laws.
 It is also presumed that Congress wasn't ignorant of laws already existing at the
time of RA 9646's enactment. We can't say that they intended to enact a
conflicting law.
Whether the assailed provisions are unconstitutional for violating substantive due process, insofar as they
affect the rights of real estate developers: NO
1. Petitioners: They are unduly oppressive and infringe on the constitutional right against deprivation
of property without due process.
 The requirement to engage the services only of licensed real estate professionals
is a burden to developers and only add to their expenses.
2. SC: The law does not deprive them of their property, and it is a valid exercise of police power.
 RA 9646 does not restrict their use and enjoyment of their properties.
 The "burden" they feel is an unavoible consequence of a reasonable regulation of
the real estate profession.
 The profession is susceptible to corruption and manipulation, so its practitioners
should be made more competent and their ethical standards should be raised.
 The object of the regulation is the promotion of overall national progress by
developing the real estate sector.
 "Property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare."
Whether Section 28(a), which treats real estate developers differently from other natural or juridical persons
who directly perform acts of real estate service with reference to their own property, is unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection clause: NO
1. SEC. 28. Exemptions from the Acts Constituting the Practice of Real Estate Service. – The provisions
of this Act and its rules and regulations shall not apply to the following:
(a) Any person, natural or juridical, who shall directly perform by himself/herself the acts mentioned in Section
3 hereof with reference to his/her or its own property, except real estate developers;
2. Petitioners: There is no justification for treating real estate developers differently.
 No substantial distinction between them and ordinary property owners. In fact,
real estate developers are more capable of entering into real estate transactions.
3. SC: Sustains the trial court's ruling that there is no violation of the equal protection clause.
 Citing Ichong v. Hernandez: The equal protection clause "merely requires that all persons [...]
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced."
 There is no violation is the classification is based on real and substantial differences, and is
germane to the law's purpose.
 Since the 1970s, the number of errant real estate developers and sellers has been increasing.
 RA 9646 merely recognizes the need to impose new license requirements to all real estate
practitioners, especially to those working for real estate developers since they sell property
in the ordinary course of business (unlike individuals who just have isolated transactions).
DISPOSITION
The petition is DENIED. Decision of RTC of Manila is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
Pertinent provisions of RA 9646:
 SEC. 28. Exemptions from the Acts Constituting the Practice of Real Estate Service. – The
provisions of this Act and its rules and regulations shall not apply to the following:
(a) Any person, natural or juridical, who shall directly perform by himself/herself the acts mentioned in Section
3 hereof with reference to his/her or its own property, except real estate developers;
 SEC. 29. Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate Service . – No
person shall practice or offer to practice real estate service in the Philippines or offer
himself/herself as real estate service practitioner, or use the title, word, letter, figure or
any sign tending to convey the impression that one is a real estate service practitioner,
or advertise or indicate in any manner whatsoever that one is qualified to practice the
profession, or be appointed as real property appraiser or assessor in any national
government entity or local government unit, unless he/she has satisfactorily passed the
licensure examination given by the Board, except as otherwise provided in this Act, a
holder of a valid certificate of registration, and professional identification card or a
valid special/temporary permit duly issued to him/her by the Board and the
Commission, and in the case of real estate brokers and private appraisers, they have
paid the required bond as hereto provided.
 SEC. 32. Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service . – (a) No partnership or
corporation shall engage in the business of real estate service unless it is duly registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the persons authorized to act
for the partnership or corporation are all duly registered and licensed partnership or
corporation are all duly registered and licensed real estate brokers, appraisers or
consultants, as the case may be. The partnership or corporation shall regularly submit a
list of its real estate service practitioners to the Commission and to the SEC as part of its
 annual reportorial requirements. There shall at least be one (1) licensed real estate
broker for every twenty (20) accredited salespersons.
Divisions or departments of partnerships and corporations engaged in marketing or selling any real estate
development project in the regular course of business must be headed by full-time registered and licensed real
estate brokers.
Branch offices of real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants must be manned by a duly licensed real estate
broker, appraiser or consultant as the case may be.
In case of resignation or termination from employment of a real estate service practitioner, the same shall be
reported by the employer to the Board within a period not to exceed fifteen (15) days from the date of
effectivity of the resignation or termination.
Subject to the provisions of the Labor Code, a corporation or partnership may hire the services of registered and
licensed real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants on commission basis to perform real estate services and
the latter shall be deemed independent contractors and not employees of such corporations.
Garcia v. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 279 (1994)
SUMMARY: The Prepatory Recall Assembly (PRA) of Bataan passed a resolution calling for the recall of Gov.
Garcia. Garcia question the first resolution with the SC  for not notifying all PRA members. The SC granted Gov.
Garcia’s petition. In response, PRA sent a new notice of session and passed a second resolution for the recall of
Gov. Garcia. Gov. Garcia filed a petition in the SC questioning the constitutionality of the alternate mode of
recall by the PRA. The SC upheld the constitutionality of PRA and dismissed the petition.
DOCTRINE: Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office. The
people’s prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in the absence of
constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations. Such power has been held to be
indispensable for the proper administration of public affairs. Not undeservedly, it is frequently described as a
fundamental right of the people in a representative democracy. There is nothing in the Const that will suggest
that the people have the sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding. The
initiation of the process of recall through the PRA and its resolution is not the recall itself – it merely starts the
process.
NOTE: The PRA has been discontinued since 2004 because of its removal in amendments to the LGC.
FACTS:
 Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the May 1992 elections.
 In June 1993, some mayors, vice mayors and Sangguniang Bayan members of the 12 municipalities
of the province met and constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the
recall election of Garcia.
 A resolution was passed for the recall of Garcia on the ground of loss of confidence.
o 146 names appeared in the resolution but only 80 carried the signatures of the PRA
members.
o Only 74 signatures were found genuine. PRA had a membership of 144 and its majority
was 73.
 Garcia filed with COMELEC a petition to deny due course to the resolution alleging that the PRA
failed to comply with the substantive and procedural requirements laid down in Sec 70, LGC.
o COMELEC dismissed the petition and scheduled the recall elections for the position of
governor.
o Garcia filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to
annul the COMELEC resolution dismissing Garcia’s petition.
o SC granted the petition for certiorari on the narrow ground that the sending of selective
notices (known political allies of Garcia were not given notice) to members of the PRA
violated the due process protection of the Constitution and fatally flawed the
enactment of the resolution.
 In accord with the SC resolution, Dinalupihan Mayor de los Reyes again sent Notice of Session to the
members of the PRA to convene.
o PRA convened and 87 of its members passed a resolution calling for the recall of Garcia.
 Garcia filed with SC a Supplemental Petition and Reiteration of Extremely Urgent Motion pressing
for a resolution of their contention that Sec 70, LGC is unconstitutional.
o Sec. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. (a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory
recall assembly or by the registered voters of the local government unit to which the
local elective official subject to such recall belongs  (b) There shall be a preparatory
recall assembly in every province, city, district, and municipality which shall be
composed of the following: (1) Provincial level. — All mayors, vice-mayors and
sanggunian members of the municipalities and component cities;
ISSUE: WON the alternative mode of allowing a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the process of recall is
unconstitutional - NO
HELD:
 Every law enjoys the presumption of validity. To strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must
be clear and unequivocal showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute permits.
Legislative History
 Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office.
o The people’s prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign
power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all
governmental operations.
o Such power has been held to be indispensable for the proper administration of public
affairs.
o Not undeservedly, it is frequently described as a fundamental right of the people in a
representative democracy.
 Recall as a mode of removal of elective local officials made its maiden appearance in Sec 2, Art XI
(Local Governments) of the 1973 Const.
o The Batang Pambansa then enacted The LGC of 1983 (BP 337).
o Sec 54, Chap 3 provided only one mode of initiating the recall elections of local elective
officials, i.e., by petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in the
LGU concerned.
o This power of recall was not exercised by the people.
 Art XIII, 1987 Const expressly recognized the Role and Rights of People’s Organizations. Sec 3, Art X
also reiterated the mandate for Congress to enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum.
 The LGC of 1991 (RA 7160) provided for a second mode of initiating the recall process through a
preparatory recall assembly which in the provincial level is composed of all mayors, vice-mayors and
sanggunian members of the municipalities and component cities.
 o There were two principal reasons why this alternative mode was adopted:
(a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people, and
(b) to cut down on its expenses.
 Congress took note that the mechanism of initiating recall by direct action was utilized
only once in Angeles, Pampanga, but even this lone attempt failed. They brushed aside
the argument that this second mode may cause instability in the LGU due to its
imagined ease.
The electorate does not have the sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceedings.
 There is nothing in the Const that will suggest that the people have the sole and exclusive right to
decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding.
o It did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections.
o Neither did it prohibit the adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall elections.
 By the mandate in Sec 3, Art X, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective
mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. Congress has made its choice and it is not the
prerogative of the Court to supplant this judgment.
The initiation of the process of recall through the PRA and its resolution is not the recall itself.
 The initiation by the PRA is also initiation by the people, albeit done indirectly through their
The PRA resolution did not subvert the will of the electorate of the province who elected Garcia with 12,500
representatives.
votes.
o It is not constitutionally impermissible for the people to act through their elected
representatives.
 The law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a PRA will not be
corrupted by extraneous influences.
o The diverse and distinct composition of the membership of a PRA guarantees that all
sectors of the electorate province shall be heard.
o The law also requires a qualified majority of all the PRA members to convene in session
and in a public place.
o It also requires that the recall resolution must be adopted during its session called for
the purpose.
o Compliance with these requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid
resolution of recall which can be given due course.
 It cannot be asserted with certitude that the members of the Bataan PRA voted strictly along
narrow political lines.
o Neither COMELEC nor SC made a judicial inquiry as to the reasons that led the members
to cast a vote of lack of confidence against Garcia.
 Evardone v. COMELEC: Loss of confidence as a ground for recall is a political question.
 Pimentel (in his book): There is no need for PRA to bring up any charge of abuse or corruption
against the local elective officials who are the subject of any recall petition.
 The proposal will still be passed upon by the sovereign electorate of Bataan.

 A PRA resolution of recall merely starts the process.  As this judgment has yet to be expressed, it is premature to conclude that the sovereign will of the
electorate has been subverted.
o A PRA resolution of recall that is not submitted to the COMELEC for validation will not
recall its subject official.  For more that judgments of courts of law, the judgment of the tribunal of the people is final for
o A PRA resolution of recall that is rejected by the people in the election called for the sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
purpose bears no effect whatsoever.
 The initiatory resolution merely sets the stage for the official concerned to appear before the
tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office.
 Before the people render their sovereign judgment, the official remains in office but his right to
continue in office is subject to question (Sec 72, LGC).

The law does not give an asymmetrical treatment to locally elected officials belonging to the political minority
(no violation of the equal protection clause).
 The politically neutral composition of the PRA, as provided in Sec 70(b), LGC, must be considered.
o Its membership is not apportioned to political parties.
o PRA at the provincial level includes ALL the elected officials in the province concerned.
o Considering their number, the greater probability is that no one political party can
control its majority.
 The only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the people.
o Loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere difference in political party affiliation.
 All powers are susceptible of abuse.
o The mere possibility of abuse cannot infirm per se the grant of power to an individual or
entity.
o To deny power simply because it can be abused by the grantee is to render government
powerless and no people need an impotent government.
o All our laws assume that our officials will act in good faith and will regularly perform the
duties of their office.